Respond 250 

Do you think IGOs create a convergence of state interest?

Convergence of state interest goes along the same line as socialization with both influenced by interact with other entities (Greenhill 2010, Tanninchev 2015).  I think of two examples; US/Soviet cessation of the Cold War (Horelick 1989) and the UK/North Ireland Good Friday Agreement (Mageean and O’Brien 1998).  

Since the inception of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union faced off across the globe both economically (free market versus communism) and militarily (the Cuban Missle Crisis nearly escalated into nuclear war).  Robert McNamara, for Secretary of Defense under President Johnson agrued “that the more each reacted to the other’s escalation, the more they had chosen “an insane road to follow.” (Department of State n.d.).  Both countries distrusted one another deeply and sought influence around the globe.  SALT I and II (never ratified but agreed upon) sought to limit further escalation and stabilize relations (ibid). 

The Good Friday Agreements (Kelly n.d.) brought an end to the period known as The Troubles in Northern Ireland.  Factions on both sides, Westminister and Belfast, finally agreed to end hostilities with consessions made on both sides.  The landmark deal, chaired by Senator George Mitchell at the behest of President Clinton, was the first unification step subsequently follwoed by several other agreements (Landow and Sergie 2020).

This question recalled just one country and its effort towards socialization and that is post WWII Germany.  By any reasonable standard, Germany’s post war reconciliation (Rienzi 2015, Johns Hopkins 2015) and reintegration into the global community is the benchmark for other countries to emulate (Evans 2018).  Its turn around post-World War II enabled it to be a world leader today.  Greenhill (2010) determined, “IGOs can change state behavior through a process of socialization calls for a more optimistic assessment of the effects of participation in international institutions”.  In Germany’s case, he is on point though it was considerable internal effort that put the country toward its current status (Rienzi 2015, Johns Hopkins 2015, Evans 2018).  His basic point is laying with dogs will get you fleas. 

I believe, overall, this is true.  Greenhill states, “…socialization effects refer to behavioral changes that presumably come about through changes in the actors’ interest” (2010).  However, outliers show the limited effect of OIGs.  Russia, North Korea and China, are all members of numerous IGOs but all still have questionable human rights records (HRW n.d.) (HRW n.d.) (HRW n.d.).  They are certainly not the only countries with questionable records but, I observe, they are the ones most focused on by the international community.  Socialization can occurs but the countries must pursue change, sometimes with help (sanctions) (McMahon 2006), and sometimes with internal forces (Rienzi 2015).       

This question certainly leads to a rabbit hole of accountability issues; I will focus chiefly on US involvement with Iraq since 1990.  Grant and Keohane (2005, 39) highlight UN Security Council issue with reigning in Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction.  Initially, when I read the passage (Grant and Keohane 2005, 39) I took note of the article date and thought about all the information eventually making it into the public forum proving this narrative false (Breslow 2016, 9/11 Commission 2004, Bright 2007).  Colin Powell provided false information to the United Nations, learning later that it was false, and resigned (Breslow 2016).  The 9/11 Commission (2004) found several instances of intelligence failure.  Bright (2007), a British journalist, published a series of articles based on whistleblower documents, notably one based on an e-mail received by a staff member at British GCHQ (Government Communication Headquarters) outlining US plans to pressure the UN resolution sanctioning the invasion of Iraq.  

This list could go on concerning actions leading up to and since the invasion of Iraq and led to the matter of accountability.  Grant and Keohane (2005) also discuss accountability being an important measure for how NGOs behave.  US accountability has taken a massive hit over the past twenty years or so but that has not diminished our standing as a super-power as it would if the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation were accused of and proven to have violated international or national law.  

We have endured our loss our credibility and rebuffed international accountability attempts (Peltier and Faizi 2020).  Even recent cases such as the one currently in the International Criminal Court system concerning US Service members and officials action in Afghanistan, provide pause.  I was aware of the ICC but hadn’t read anything about it. I was unaware of sustained US effort towards to ICC (Pace n.d., Gallagher 2018, Marquand 2009).  Grant and Keohane (2005) rightly point out that states such as the US are “accountable to citizens and to an array of domestic interests and institutions”, but that is rarely successful.  No administration official suffered any consequence as a result of ouractions in Iraq.  I supposed one could argue Colin Powell suffered a hit to his impeccable reputation.  Concerning the ICC, would it further our world standing to allow for proscecution of individual service members and contractors for alleged doings in Afghanistan?  Again, as Grant and Keohane (2005) point out, probably not, but it might if the world thought we, as the global leader, were accountable for our successes and failures. 

IOs, such as the UN, have levied wide ranging sanctions as a measure of accountablility (UN 2017).  The EU and the US have also levied wide ranging sanctions (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2020, CRS 2019, Masters 2019).  Use of such sanctions afford the aforementioned greater influence over accountbility making it difficult to argue that they could be held accountable to anyone globally.  In 2018, the US and the EU controlled nearly half of the global GDP ($20.5T US, and $18.8T, EU, global $84.93T) (World Bank 2018).  The US provides the largest share of dues to the UN, nealry 20 percent of the budget (Hillard and Shendruk 2019).  Given these financial means, it seems unlikely that the United States could or would be held accountablity for any action it undertook.  However, recent G-20 events concerning climate change may have slightly altered the arch of accountability (Woodcock 2019, Vela 2019).
In conclusion, OI enforced accountablility depends on the influence wielded by the country.  It is highly unlikely the US would ever suffer any serious reprocussion for an action or series of actions, economically or legally.  Tomuschat (2006) presents an interesting overview from the Trials at Nuremberg to the ICC.  This is NOT to suggest or imply similar trials should be held of US officials concerning actions in Iraq.  However, I believe leaders lead and should be accountable for their actions.  Fundementally, I believe the ICC has that place in international accountability.