Question 1:

⁞ Instructions:

After reading all of Chapter 1, please select ONE of the following primary source readings:

• “What is the Socrative Method?” by Christopher Phillips (starting on page 14)
  -or-
• “The Euthphro” by Plato (starting on page 16)

Write a short, objective summary of 250 which summarizes the main ideas being put forward by the author in this selection.

Write a short summary that identifies the thesis and outlines the main argument. Reading summaries are not about your opinion or perspective – they are expository essays that explain the content of the reading. All reading summaries must include substantive content based on the students reading of the material. 

Reading Material:  Doing Ethics 

ORIGINAL WORK. NO PLAGIARISM 

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From The Euthyphro

PLATO

* * *

Euthyphro. Piety . . . is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is
not dear to

them.

Socrates. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which
I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I
make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.
Euthyphro. Of course.
Socrates. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person
which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the
gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that
said?
Euthyphro. It was.
Socrates. And well said?
Euthyphro. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.
Socrates. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and
hatreds and differences?
Euthyphro. Yes, that was also said.
Socrates. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for
example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of
this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at
once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?
Euthyphro. True.
Socrates. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the
differences by measuring?
Euthyphro. Very true.
Socrates. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a
weighing machine?
Euthyphro. To be sure.
Socrates. But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which
therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the
answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these
enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil,
honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ,
and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you
and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?
Euthyphro. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is
such as you describe.
Socrates. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a
like nature?
Euthyphro. Certainly they are.
Socrates. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just
and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels
among them, if there had been no such differences—would there now?
Euthyphro. You are quite right.
Socrates. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and good, and hate
the opposite of them?
Euthyphro. Very true.
Socrates. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as
unjust,—about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among
them

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them.

Euthyphro. Very true.
Socrates. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and
are both hateful and dear to them?
Euthyphro. True.
Socrates. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also
impious?
Euthyphro. So I should suppose.
Socrates. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the
question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is
both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is
also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you
may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or
Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Hera, and there
may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
Euthyphro. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the
propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about
that.
Socrates. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing
that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?
Euthyphro. I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always
arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is
nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence.
Socrates. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not
to be punished?
Euthyphro. No; they do not.
Socrates. Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for
they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny
their guilt, do they not?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but
they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when?
Euthyphro. True.
Socrates. And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just
and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among
them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of
injustice is not to be punished?
Euthyphro. That is true, Socrates, in the main.
Socrates. But they join issue about the particulars—gods and men alike; and, if
they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and
which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true?
Euthyphro. Quite true.
Socrates. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better
instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods
a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead
man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from
the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on
behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of
murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his
act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
Euthyphro. It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very clear indeed
to you.
Socrates. I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as
the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to
the gods.
Euthyphro. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.

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Socrates. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker.
There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to
myself: “Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded
the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety
and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and
impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to
the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.” And therefore,
Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the
gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far
as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy;
and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our
definition of piety and impiety?
Euthyphro. Why not, Socrates?
Socrates. Why not! Certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no
reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of
instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.
Euthyphro. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the
opposite which they all hate, impious.
Socrates. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept
the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?
Euthyphro. We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test
of enquiry.
Socrates. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I
should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods
because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
Euthyphro. I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
Socrates. I will endeavour to explain: we speak of carrying and we speak of being
carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such
cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies?
Euthyphro. I think that I understand.
Socrates. And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying
because it is carried, or for some other reason?
Euthyphro. No; that is the reason.
Socrates. And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
Euthyphro. True.
Socrates. And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible
because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried
because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think,
Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state
of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because
it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it
suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it
suffers. Do you not agree?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved
follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro; is not piety, according to your
definition, loved by all the gods?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?

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Euthyphro. No, that is the reason.
Socrates. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to
be loved of them because it is loved of them?
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that
which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things.
Euthyphro. How do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of
God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by
them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.
Euthyphro. True.
Socrates. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is
dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would
have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which dear to God is dear to him
because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved
by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite
different from one another. For one (θεοϕιλὲs) is of a kind to be loved because it is
loved, and the other (о′σιоν) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you
appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer
an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute of being loved by all the gods.
But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you
please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what
holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about
which we will not quarrel) and what is impiety?
Euthyphro. I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For
somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn
around and walk away from us.

* * *

Plato, The Euthyphro, translated by Benjamin Jowett.

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From What Is the Socratic Method?

CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS

The Socratic method is a way to seek truths by your own lights.
It is a system, a spirit, a method, a type of philosophical inquiry, an intellectual

technique, all rolled into one.
Socrates himself never spelled out a “method.” However, the Socratic method

is named after him because Socrates, more than any other before or since, models
for us philosophy practiced—philosophy as deed, as way of living, as something
that any of us can do. It is an open system of philosophical inquiry that allows one
to interrogate from many vantage points.

Gregory Vlastos, a Socrates scholar and professor of philosophy at Princeton,
described Socrates’ method of inquiry as “among the greatest achievements of
humanity.” Why? Because, he says, it makes philosophical inquiry “a common
human enterprise, open to every man.” Instead of requiring allegiance to a specific
philosophical viewpoint or analytic technique or specialized vocabulary, the
Socratic method “calls for common sense and common speech.” And this, he says,
“is as it should be, for how many should live is every man’s business.”

I think, however, that the Socratic method goes beyond Vlastos’ description. It
does not merely call for common sense but examines what common sense is. The
Socratic method asks: Does the common sense of our day offer us the greatest
potential for self-understanding and human excellence? Or is the prevailing
common sense in fact a roadblock to realizing this potential?

Vlastos goes on to say that Socratic inquiry is by no means simple, and “calls
not only for the highest degree of mental alertness of which anyone is capable” but
also for “moral qualities of a high order: sincerity, humility, courage.” Such
qualities “protect against the possibility” that Socratic dialogue, no matter how
rigorous, “would merely grind out . . . wild conclusions with irresponsible
premises.” I agree, though I would replace the quality of sincerity with honesty,
since one can hold a conviction sincerely without examining it, while honesty
would require that one subject one’s convictions to frequent scrutiny.

A Socratic dialogue reveals how different our outlooks can be on concepts we
use every day. It reveals how different our philosophies are, and often how tenable
—or untenable, as the case may be—a range of philosophies can be. Moreover,
even the most universally recognized and used concept, when subjected to Socratic
scrutiny, might reveal not only that there is not universal agreement, after all, on
the meaning of any given concept, but that every single person has a somewhat
different take on each and every concept under the sun.

What’s more, there seems to be no such thing as a concept so abstract, or
question so off base, that it can’t be fruitfully explored [using the Socratic method].
In the course of Socratizing, it often turns out to be the case that some of the most
so-called abstract concepts are intimately related to the most profoundly relevant
human experiences. In fact, it’s been my experience that virtually any question can
be plumbed Socratically. Sometimes you don’t know what question will have the
most lasting and significant impact until you take a risk and delve into it for a
while.

What distinguishes the Socratic method from mere nonsystematic inquiry is
the sustained attempt to explore the ramifications of certain opinions and then offer
compelling objections and alternatives. This scrupulous and exhaustive form of
inquiry in many ways resembles the scientific method. But unlike Socratic inquiry,
scientific inquiry would often lead us to believe that whatever is not measurable
cannot be investigated. This “belief” fails to address such paramount human
concerns as sorrow and joy and suffering and love.

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Instead of focusing on the outer cosmos, Socrates focused primarily on human
beings and their cosmos within, utilizing his method to open up new realms of self-
knowledge while at the same time exposing a great deal of error, superstition, and
dogmatic nonsense. The Spanish-born American philosopher and poet George
Santayana said that Socrates knew that “the foreground of human life is necessarily
moral and practical” and that “it is so even so for artists”—and even for scientists,
try as some might to divorce their work from these dimensions of human existence.

Scholars call Socrates’ method the elenchus, which is Hellenistic Greek for inquiry
or cross-examination. But it is not just any type of inquiry or examination. It is a
type that reveals people to themselves, that makes them see what their opinions
really amount to. C. D. C. Reeve, professor of philosophy at Reed College, gives
the standard explanation of an elenchus in saying that its aim “is not simply to
reach adequate definitions” of such things as virtues; rather, it also has a “moral
reformatory purpose, for Socrates believes that regular elenctic philosophizing
makes people happier and more virtuous than anything else. . . . Indeed
philosophizing is so important for human welfare, on his view, that he is willing to
accept execution rather than give it up.”

Socrates’ method of examination can indeed be a vital part of existence, but I
would not go so far as to say that it should be. And I do not think that Socrates felt
that habitual use of this method “makes people happier.” The fulfillment that comes
from Socratizing comes only at a price—it could well make us unhappier, more
uncertain, more troubled, as well as more fulfilled. It can leave us with a sense that
we don’t know the answers after all, that we are much further from knowing the
answers than we’d ever realized before engaging in Socratic discourse. And this is
fulfilling—and exhilarating and humbling and perplexing.

* * *

There is no neat divide between one’s views of philosophy and of life. They are
overlapping and kindred views. It is virtually impossible in many instances to know
what we believe in daily life until we engage others in dialogue. Likewise, to
discover our philosophical views, we must engage with ourselves, with the lives we
already lead. Our views form, change, evolve, as we participate in this dialogue. It
is the only way truly to discover what philosophical colors we sail under. Everyone
at some point preaches to himself and others what he does not yet practice;
everyone acts in or on the world in ways that are in some way contradictory or
inconsistent with the views he or she confesses or professes to hold. For instance,
the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, the influential founder of
existentialism, put Socratic principles to use in writing his dissertation on the
concept of irony in Socrates, often using pseudonyms so he could argue his own
positions with himself. In addition, the sixteenth-century essayist Michel de
Montaigne, who was called “the French Socrates” and was known as the father of
skepticism in modern Europe, would write and add conflicting and even
contradictory passages in the same work. And like Socrates, he believed the search
for truth was worth dying for.

The Socratic method forces people “to confront their own dogmatism,”
according to Leonard Nelson, a German philosopher who wrote on such subjects as
ethics and theory of knowledge until he was forced by the rise of Nazism to quit.
By doing so, participants in Socratic dialogue are, in effect, “forcing themselves to
be free,” Nelson maintains. But they’re not just confronted with their own
dogmatism. In the course of a [Socratic dialogue], they may be confronted with an
array of hypotheses, convictions, conjectures and theories offered by the other
participants, and themselves—all of which subscribe to some sort of dogma. The
Socratic method requires that—honestly and openly, rationally and imaginatively—

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they confront the dogma by asking such questions as: What does this mean? What
speaks for and against it? Are there alternative ways of considering it that are even
more plausible and tenable?

At certain junctures of a Socratic dialogue, the “forcing” that this confrontation
entails—the insistence that each participant carefully articulate her singular
philosophical perspective—can be upsetting. But that is all to the good. If it never
touches any nerves, if it doesn’t upset, if it doesn’t mentally and spiritually
challenge and perplex, in a wonderful and exhilarating way, it is not Socratic
dialogue. This “forcing” opens us up to the varieties of experiences of others—
whether through direct dialogue, or through other means, like drama or books, or
through a work of art or a dance. It compels us to explore alternative perspectives,
asking what might be said for or against each.

* * *

Christopher Phillips, from Socrates Café. Copyright © 2001 by Christopher Phillips. Used by
permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Although not specifically concerned with ethics, this
short piece by Christopher Phillips makes a persuasive case for using the “Socratic method” to think
through difficult philosophical issues. To see the Socratic method applied to ethics, read the excerpt
from Plato’s Euthyphro that follows on p. 16.

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