Let’s look at a real-world scenario and how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays into it. In the scenario, the United States will be hit by a large-scale, coordinated cyber attack organized by China. These attacks debilitate the functioning of government agencies, parts of the critical infrastructure, and commercial ventures. The IT infrastructure of several agencies are paralyzed, the electric grid in most of the country is shut down, telephone traffic is seriously limited and satellite communications are down (limiting the Department of Defense’s [DOD’s] ability to communicate with commands overseas). International commerce and financial institutions are also severely hit. Please explain how DHS should handle this situation.
please explain how DHS should handle the situation described in the preceding paragraph
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references: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-strengthening-cybersecurity-federal-networks-critical-infrastructure/
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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reserved
Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyber Attacks
Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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National infrastructure
Refers to the complex, underlying delivery and support systems for all large-scale services considered absolutely essential to a nation
Conventional approach to cyber security not enough
New approach needed
Combining best elements of existing security techniques with challenges that face complex, large-scale national services
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Introduction
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.1 – National infrastructure cyber and physical attacks
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.2 – Differences between small- and large-scale cyber security
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Three types of malicious adversaries
External adversary
Internal adversary
Supplier adversary
National Cyber Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.3 – Adversaries and exploitation points in national infrastructure
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Three exploitation points
Remote access
System administration and normal usage
Supply chain
National Cyber Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Infrastructure threatened by most common security concerns:
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Theft
National Cyber Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Botnet Threat
What is a botnet attack?
The remote collection of compromised end-user machines (usually broadband-connected PCs) is used to attack a target.
Sources of attack are scattered and difficult to identify
Five entities that comprise botnet attack: botnet operator, botnet controller, collection of bots, botnot software drop, botnet target
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Five entities that comprise botnet attack:
Botnet operator
Botnet controller
Collection of bots
Botnot software drop
Botnet target
Distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack: bots create “cyber traffic jam”
Botnet Threat
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.4 – Sample DDOS attack from a botnet
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National Cyber Security
Methodology Components
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Ten basic design and operation principles:
Deception – Discretion
Separation – Collection
Diversity – Correlation
Commonality – Awareness
Depth – Response
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Deliberately introducing misleading functionality or misinformation for the purpose of tricking an adversary
Computer scientists call this functionality a honey pot
Deception enables forensic analysis of intruder activity
The acknowledged use of deception may be a deterrent to intruders (every vulnerability may actually be a trap)
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Deception
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Fig. 1.5 – Components of an interface with deception
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Separation involves enforced access policy restrictions on users and resources in a computing environment
Most companies use enterprise firewalls, which are complemented by the following:
Authentication and identity management
Logical access controls
LAN controls
Firewalls
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Separation
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Fig. 1.6 – Firewall enhancements for national infrastructure
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
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Diversity is the principle of using technology and systems that are intentionally different in substantive ways.
Diversity hard to implement
A single software vendor tends to dominate the PC operating system business landscape
Diversity conflicts with organizational goals of simplifying supplier and vendor relationships
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Diversity
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.7 – Introducing diversity to national infrastructure
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Consistency involves uniform attention to security best practices across national infrastructure components
Greatest challenge involves auditing
A national standard is needed
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Commonality
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Depth involves using multiple security layers to protect national infrastructure assets
Defense layers are maximized by using a combination of functional and procedural controls
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Depth
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Fig. 1.8 – National infrastructure security through defense in depth
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Discretion involves individuals and groups making good decisions to obscure sensitive information about national infrastructure
This is not the same as “security through obscurity”
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Discretion
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Collection involves automated gathering of system-related information about national infrastructure to enable security analysis
Data is processed by a security information management system.
Operational challenges
What type of information should be collected?
How much information should be collected?
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Collection
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Fig. 1.9 – Collecting national infrastructure-related security information
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Correlation involves a specific type of analysis that can be performed on factors related to national infrastructure protection
This type of comparison-oriented analysis is indispensable
Past initiatives included real-time correlation of data at fusion center
Difficult to implement
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Correlation
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Fig. 1.10 – National infrastructure high-level correlation approach
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
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Awareness involves an organization understanding the differences between observed and normal status in national infrastructure
Most agree on the need for awareness, but how can awareness be achieved?
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Awareness
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Fig. 1.11 – Real-time situation awareness process flow
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Response involves the assurance that processes are in place to react to any security-related indicator
Indicators should flow from the awareness layer
Current practice in smaller corporate environments of reducing “false positives” by waiting to confirm disaster is not acceptable for national infrastructure
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Response
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.12 – National infrastructure security response approach
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Commissions and groups
Information sharing
International cooperation
Technical and operational costs
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Implementing the Principles Nationally
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