Please no plagiarism because it would be check and make sure that you know something on the subject of international relations also look over the instructions carefully before you write it 

Levels of Analysis and the Crisis in Syria

Purpose: The primary goal of this assignment is to explore another very important concept in international relations, the levels of analysis precept. Your specific task is to read a Congressional report analyzing the Syrian crisis and then discuss and assess the various levels of analysis illustrated in the report.

Prepare: Review Chapters 2, 3 and 4 in the course text. In addition, read the assigned report, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response (Links to an external site.).

Reflect: International relations occur at a variety of levels. Individual diplomats and world leaders communicate with each other daily. Domestically, state governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations and private international businesses develop international plans and strategies. Foreign policy is crafted by governments at the domestic level but is designed to be implemented at the systemic level. Finally, at the systemic level, international organizations, like the UN or NATO, interact not only with functionally similar organizations but also with multi-national corporations and state governments. Importantly, our ability to understand where these interactions are taking place and how and why this level of analysis affects the interactions is necessary for a broad and nuanced appreciation of global relations.

Write: In your assignment, complete the following:
Discuss statements within the report that illustrate the different levels of analysis.
Explain why each statement you selected from the report corresponds to the level of analysis you identified.
Assess which level of analysis provides the most comprehensive justification for the emergence of conflict in Syria.
The Week 2 Assignment:
Must be at least two pages (not including title and reference pages) and formatted according to APA style as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center (Links to an external site.).
Must include a separate title page with the following:
Title of paper
Student’s name
Course name and number
Instructor’s name
Date submitted
Must use at least three appropriate sources:
These could include the article, the course text, and any of the required or recommended resources for this week.
You can also include additional resources found on the Ashford University Library website. The Scholarly, Peer Reviewed, and Other Credible Sources downloadtable offers additional guidance on appropriate source types.
Must document all sources in APA style as outlined in the Citing Within Your Paper (Links to an external site.).
Must include an introductory paragraph with a succinct thesis statement.

Must include a conclusion that summarizes the main points and restates the thesis.

Must include a separate references page that is formatted according to APA style as outlined

Armed Conflict in Syria:

Overview and U.S. Response

Updated

July 27, 2020

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

RL33487

Congressional Research Service

SUMMARY

Armed Conflict in Syria:
Overview and U.S. Response
As of 2020, Syria faces growing economic instability and pockets of renewed political

unrest, amid ongoing interventions by outside states and new public health challenges

posed by the spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19). The government of Syrian

President Bashar al Asad—backed by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah—has recaptured most

areas formerly held by opposition forces but faces persistent challenges from fighters

linked to the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL/ISIS), as well as new protests

stemming from deteriorating economic conditions. U.S.-backed local forces have

recovered most territory formerly held by the Islamic State, but the group continues to

maintain a low-level insurgency.

U.S. policy toward Syria since 2014 has prioritized counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State, which

sought to direct external attacks from areas under the group’s control in northeast Syria. Since 2015, U.S. forces

deployed to Syria have trained, equipped, and advised local partners under special authorization from Congress

and have worked primarily “by, with, and through” those local partners to retake nearly all areas formerly held by

the Islamic State. As of July 2020, about 600 U.S. troops remain in Syria, where they continue to support local

partner force operations against Islamic State remnants.

In addition to counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State, the United States also has responded to

Syria’s ongoing civil conflict by providing nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition and civil society groups,

encouraging diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the civil war, and serving as the largest single

donor of humanitarian aid to Syria and regional countries affected by refugee outflows.

The Trump Administration has described U.S. policy towards Syria as seeking (1) the enduring defeat of the

Islamic State; (2) a political settlement to the Syrian civil war; and (3) the withdrawal of Iranian-commanded

forces.

 Enduring defeat of ISIS. U.S.-backed partner forces re-captured the Islamic State’s final
territorial strongholds in Syria in March

2019.

However, U.S. military officials in 2020 assessed

that the group maintains a low-level insurgency in both Syria and Iraq and likely retains an intact

command and control structure. The Defense Department has not disaggregated the costs of

military operations in Syria from the overall cost of the counter-IS campaign in Syria and Iraq

(known as Operation Inherent Resolve, OIR), which had reached $40.5 billion by September 30,

2019.

 Political settlement to the conflict. The United States continues to advocate for a negotiated
settlement between the government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad and Syrian opposition

forces in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 (which calls for the drafting of

a new constitution and U.N.-supervised elections). However, the Asad government has retaken

most opposition-held areas by force, thus reducing pressure on Damascus to negotiate. U.S.

intelligence officials in 2019 assessed that Asad has little incentive to make significant

concessions to the opposition.

 Withdrawal of Iranian commanded forces. Administration officials state that the removal of
Iran from Syria is a political rather than military goal, and have emphasized that the United States

will seek to counter Iranian activities in Syria primarily through the use of economic tools such as

sanctions. The United States has on occasion conducted strikes on Iranian-backed militias in

Syria when such forces appeared to endanger U.S. or Coalition personnel.

RL33487

July 27, 2020

Carla E. Humud,
Coordinator
Analyst in Middle Eastern
Affairs

Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Congressional Research Service

External Players. A range of foreign states have intervened in Syria in support of the Asad government or Syrian

opposition forces, as well in pursuit of their own security goals. Pro-Asad forces operating in Syria

include

Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia. The United States and a range of regional and European states have at

times backed select portions of the Syrian opposition, while also expressing concern about reported ties between

some armed opposition groups and extremist elements. Israel has acknowledged conducting over 200 military

strikes in Syria, mostly targeting Hezbollah and/or Iranian targets. In addition, Turkey maintains military forces in

northern Syria as part of a broader campaign targeting Kurdish fighters.

Humanitarian Situation. As of mid-2020, roughly half of Syria’s pre-war population remains internally

displaced (6.2 million) or registered as refugees in neighboring states (5.6 million). The United States has directed

more than $11.3 billion toward Syria-related humanitarian assistance since FY2012, and Congress has

appropriated billions more for security and stabilization initiatives in Syria and neighboring countries. In July

2020, the Security Council reauthorized cross border humanitarian aid into Syria for a period of one year. The

vote restricted aid to a single crossing point at Bab al Hawa following vetoes by Russia and China.

Public Health. Syria has struggled to provide adequate testing for the novel COVID-19 virus, and the extent of

the virus’s spread in the country is thought to exceed official health ministry counts. As of mid-July, Syria

reported less than 500 confirmed cases of COVID-19, as compared to over 86,000 cases in neighboring Iraq, and

over 267,000 cases in Iran. Syria contains numerous populations that are particularly vulnerable to infection,

including thousands of internally displaced persons and detainees living in overcrowded conditions and lacking

adequate access to sanitation facilities. Syria’s health care system also has been significantly degraded since the

start of the conflict in 2011 as a result of attacks by pro-regime forces on health care workers and infrastructure.

Additional Domestic Challenges. Syria faces an economic crisis, with the value of the Syrian pound dropping to

record lows, and the cost of basic staples increasing by over 100% since 2019. In 2020, the Asad government also

has confronted a resurgence of armed opposition in previously recaptured areas south of the capital, as well as

growing criticism from both domestic and external allies.

The 116th Congress has sought clarification from the Administration concerning its overall Syria policy, plans for

the withdrawal of U.S. military forces, the U.S role in ensuring a lasting defeat for the Islamic State, U.S.

investments and approaches to postconflict stabilization, the future of Syrian refugees and U.S. partners inside

Syria, and the challenges of dealing with the Iran- and Russia-aligned Asad government.

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Congressional Research Service

Contents

Background ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1

Issues for Congress ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6

Syria Provisions in FY2020 Defense and Foreign Operations Legislation …………………………. 9
FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) ……………………………………….. 9
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) ………………………………….. 10
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93) ………………………………………………. 11

Select Syria-Related Legislation in the 116th Congress ………………………………………………….. 11
Special Immigrant Status for U.S. Partner Forces ……………………………………………………. 11

Military Developments …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12

Turkish Incursion into Northern Syria …………………………………………………………………… 12
Islamic State: Ongoing Threats …………………………………………………………………………….. 14
Idlib Crisis …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 16

Political Developments …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 20

Non-State Governance Structures ………………………………………………………………………………. 20
Political Negotiations ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 21

The Geneva Process ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 21
The Astana Process …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 23

Humanitarian Situation …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 24

Cross-Border Aid Endangered ……………………………………………………………………………… 24
Vulnerable Areas ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 25

Public Health Developments …………………………………………………………………………………………… 28

U.S. Policy ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 29

Trump Administration Statements on Syria Policy ………………………………………………….. 30
U.S. Sanctions on Syria ………………………………………………………………………………………. 31

U.S. Assistance to Vetted Syrian Groups …………………………………………………………………………… 32

U.S. Military Operations; Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Efforts …………………………………. 32
U.S. Military Presence in Syria …………………………………………………………………………….. 32
U.S. Repositions Forces in 2019 …………………………………………………………………………… 33
Syria Train and Equip Program …………………………………………………………………………….. 35
FY2021 Defense Funding Request ……………………………………………………………………….. 36

U.S. Nonlethal and Stabilization Assistance ………………………………………………………………… 37

Outlook & Challenges ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 41

Consolidating Gains against the Islamic State ………………………………………………………… 41
Preserving Relationships with Partner Forces ………………………………………………………… 42
Countering Iran ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 43
Addressing Humanitarian Challenges in Extremist-Held Areas ………………………………… 44
Assisting Displaced Syrians …………………………………………………………………………………. 44
Preventing Involuntary Refugee Returns ……………………………………………………………….. 45
Managing Reconstruction Aid ……………………………………………………………………………… 46
Supporting a Political Settlement to the Conflict …………………………………………………….. 46
Monitoring Destabilizing Economic and Political Trends ………………………………………… 47

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Congressional Research Service

Figures

Figure 1. Syria: Map and Country Data ……………………………………………………………………………… 2

Figure 2. Syria Conflict 2011-2019 ……………………………………………………………………………………. 3

Figure 3. Syria Areas of Influence 2020 ……………………………………………………………………………… 4

Figure 4. Syria Areas of Influence 2017 ……………………………………………………………………………… 5

Figure 5. Syria-Turkey Border ………………………………………………………………………………………… 13

Figure 6. Idlib and its Environs ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 19

Tables

Table 1. Evolution of U.S. Military Presence in Syria ………………………………………………………… 34

Table 2. Syria Train and Equip Program: Appropriations Actions and Requests …………………….. 36

Table 3. Nonlethal and Stabilization Funding for Syria ………………………………………………………. 39

Appendixes

Appendix. Syria Study Group Findings and Recommendations …………………………………………… 48

Contacts

Author Information ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 49

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

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Background

In March 2011, antigovernment protests broke out in Syria, which has been ruled by the Asad

family for more than four decades. The protests spread, violence escalated (primarily but not

exclusively by Syrian government forces), and numerous political and armed opposition groups

emerged. In August 2011, President Barack Obama called on Syrian President Bashar al Asad to

step down. Over time, the rising death toll from the conflict, and the use of chemical weapons by

the Asad government, intensified pressure for the United States and others to assist the

opposition. In 2013, Congress debated lethal and nonlethal assistance to vetted Syrian opposition

groups, and authorized the latter. Congress also debated, but did not authorize, the use of force in

response to an August 2013 chemical weapons attack.

In 2014, the Obama Administration requested authority and funding from Congress to provide

lethal support to vetted Syrians for select purposes. The original request sought authority to

support vetted Syrians in “defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime,” but

the subsequent advance of the Islamic State organization from Syria across Iraq refocused

executive and legislative deliberations onto counterterrorism. Congress authorized a Department

of Defense-led train and equip program to combat terrorist groups active in Syria, defend the

United States and its partners from Syria-based terrorist threats, and “promote the conditions for a

negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”

In September 2014, the United States began air strikes in Syria, with the stated goal of preventing

the Islamic State from using Syria as a base for its operations in neighboring Iraq. In October

2014, the Defense Department established Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent

Resolve (CJTF-OIR) to “formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by

ISIS in Iraq and Syria.” CJTF-OIR came to encompass more than 70 countries, and bolstered the

efforts of local Syrian partner forces against the Islamic State. The United States also gradually

increased the number of U.S. personnel in Syria from 50 in late 2015 to roughly 2,000 by 2017.

President Trump in early 2018 called for an expedited withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria,1 but

senior Administration officials later stated that U.S. personnel would remain in Syria to ensure the

enduring defeat of the Islamic State. Then-National Security Advisor John Bolton also stated that

U.S. forces would remain in Syria until the withdrawal of Iranian-led forces.2 In December 2018,

President Trump ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Syria, contributing to the

subsequent decision by Defense Secretary James Mattis to resign, and drawing criticism from

several Members of Congress. In early 2019, the White House announced that several hundred

U.S. troops would remain in Syria.

As the Islamic State and armed opposition groups relinquished territorial control inside Syria, the

Syrian government and its foreign partners made significant military and territorial gains. The

U.S. intelligence community’s 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment stated that the conflict had

“decisively shifted in the Syrian regime’s favor, enabling Russia and Iran to further entrench

themselves inside the country.”3 Coalition and U.S. gains against the Islamic State came largely

through the assistance of Syrian Kurdish partner forces, but neighboring Turkey’s concerns about

those Kurdish forces emerged as a persistent challenge for U.S. policymakers. In 2019, Turkey

launched a cross border military operation attempting to expel Syrian Kurdish U.S. partner forces

1 Remarks by President Trump on the Infrastructure Initiative, March 30, 2018; Remarks by President Trump and

Heads of the Baltic States in Joint Press Conference, April 3, 2018.

2 “Bolton: U.S. forces will stay in Syria until Iran and its proxies depart,” Washington Post, September 24, 2018.

3 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018.

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from areas adjacent to the Turkish border. In conjunction with the operation, President Trump

ordered the withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Syria and the repositioning of others in areas of

eastern Syria once held by the Islamic State.

Territorial gains by the Syrian government have pushed remaining armed opposition forces

(including Al Qaeda affiliates) into a progressively shrinking geographic space that is also

occupied by roughly 3 million Syrian civilians. (Figure 3 and Figure 4 show how territory held

by Syrian opposition forces was significantly reduced between 2017 and 2020.) The remaining

opposition-held areas of Idlib province in northwestern Syria have faced intensified and ongoing

Syrian government attacks since 2019. Unrest in southern areas recaptured by the government in

2020 suggests that security conditions nationwide may remain fluid.

The U.N. has sponsored peace talks in Geneva since 2012, but it appears unlikely that the parties

will reach a political settlement that would result in a transition away from Asad. With many

armed opposition groups weakened, defeated, or geographically isolated, military pressure on the

Syrian government to make concessions to the opposition has been reduced. U.S. officials have

stated that the United States will not fund reconstruction in Asad-held areas unless a political

solution is reached in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254.4 In June 2020, the

Trump Administration began implementing congressionally enacted sanctions on the Asad

government and its financial backers as part of a campaign to deny it revenue to compel Syrian

leaders to end the war (see “U.S. Sanctions on Syria”). Some observers have warned of possible

unintended effects of new sanctions given fragile economic conditions prevailing in the country.5

Figure 1. Syria: Map and Country Data

Sources: CRS using data from U.S. State Department; Esri; CIA, The World Factbook; and the United Nations.

4 State Department, “Joint Statement on the Ninth Anniversary of the Syrian Uprising,” March 15, 2020.

5 “Will more Syria sanctions hurt the very civilians they aim to protect?” War on the Rocks, June 10, 2020.

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

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Figure 2. Syria Conflict 2011-2019

Source: CRS.

Note: For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11080, Syria Conflict Overview: 2011-2018, by Carla E. Humud.

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Congressional Research Service 4

Figure 3. Syria Areas of Influence 2020

As of May 25, 2020

Sources: CRS using area of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor, last revised May 25, 2020. All areas of

influence approximate and subject to change. Other

sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports.

Note: U.S. military officials have acknowledged publicly that U.S. forces are operating in select areas of eastern

Syria to train, advise, assist, and equip partner forces.

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Congressional Research Service 5

Figure 4. Syria Areas of Influence 2017

As of January 3, 2017

Sources: CRS using area of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor. All areas of influence approximate.

Other

sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports.
Note: U.S. military officials have acknowledged publicly that U.S. forces are operating in select areas of eastern

Syria to train, advise, assist, and equip partner forces.

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Issues for Congress
Prior to the 2019 Turkish military incursion and U.S. withdrawal decisions, the 116th Congress

had been considering the Administration’s FY2020 requests for defense and foreign aid

appropriations, which presumed continued counterterrorism, train and equip, and humanitarian

operations in Syria. Members debated legislative proposals that would have extended and

amended related authorities and made additional funding available to continue U.S. efforts,

including stabilization programs. Following President Trump’s withdrawal and redeployment

decisions, Congress enacted revisions to the underlying authority for U.S. military train and equip

efforts in Syria and appropriated additional funds to continue related operations.

Congress may further consider what, if any, revised defense and foreign assistance needs may be

appropriate in connection with revised U.S. plans and any forthcoming changes to U.S. military

deployments in Syria or in neighboring Iraq. Similarly, Members may consider how, if at all,

Congress should increase, decrease, or reallocate defense, humanitarian, and stabilization

resources for FY2021 and what, if any, new or revised oversight mechanisms ought to be

employed.

Specific issues for congressional consideration could include the following.

U.S. military operations and authorities

U.S. forces have operated inside Syria since 2015 pursuant to the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations

for Use of Military Force (AUMF),6 despite ongoing debate about the applicability of these

authorizations to current operations in Syria.7 In December 2018, President Trump declared the

Islamic State “defeated,” raising questions about the authorities underlying a continued U.S.

military presence in Syria. Defense and State Department officials continue to highlight the

ongoing threat posed by the Islamic State, including to the U.S. homeland.8 Islamic State attacks

continue in areas of eastern Syria, and oversight reporting suggests that Administration officials

believe the group could resurge if military pressure on its remnants lessens.9 Nevertheless, some

observers have argued that some U.S. military outposts in Syria (such as the U.S. garrison at At

Tanf) appear primarily designed to stem the flow of Iranian-backed militias into Syria.10 In June

2020, President Trump reported to Congress that

United States Armed Forces are conducting a systematic campaign of airstrikes and other

necessary operations against ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria and against al-Qa’ida in Syria. A

6 At a December 11, 2019, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Esper stated that,

“[ … ] we think we have sufficient authorities right now under the ’01 and ’02 AUMFs to conduct what we—to do what

we need to do in Syria.” Similarly, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley stated, “[ … ] the ’01 AUMF

allows us to conduct offensive strike operations against terrorists, Al Qaeda, etc. ISIS, we should all remember, is a

direct derivative of Al Qaeda, and it is Al Qaeda in Iraq rebranded as ISIS.”

7 During a December 11, 2019, hearing on U.S. Syria policy by the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Smith

stated, “ … I don’t think it’s a good idea for us to be relying on the 2001 and 2002 AUMF in 2019. We could talk about

what’s in the 2001 AUMF and how it applies to now. I think that thing has been stretched beyond all recognition. But

the 2002 AUMF, it’s just ridiculous that we’re still saying that this is an authority. I was here, and I voted for that. The

2002 AUMF was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and stop the threat that he posed.”

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark

Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.

9 See reports (issued quarterly) by the Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve.

10 “U.S. Considering Plan to Stay in Remote Syrian Base to Counter Iran,” Foreign Policy, January 25, 2019.

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small presence of United States Armed Forces remains in strategically significant locations

in Syria to conduct operations and secure critical petroleum infrastructure, in partnership

with indigenous ground forces, against continuing terrorist threats emanating from Syria.11

Future of U.S.-SDF Partnership

Following the October 2019 Turkish incursion into northern Syria, the U.S.-backed Syrian

Democratic Forces (SDF) sought protection from the Asad government. U.S. Special

Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat

ISIS Ambassador James Jeffrey stated that the SDF and the Asad government reached “an

agreement in some areas to coordinate.”12 In December 2019, senior U.S. military officials

acknowledged “dialogue” between the SDF and the Syrian military, but in 2020 have testified

that U.S. forces continue to conduct combined operations with the SDF.13 U.S. officials have not

publicly elaborated on the scale of coordination and/or dialogue between the Syrian military and

the SDF, or on how this may impact U.S. interactions with, or funding for, the group.

Who are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)?

Since 2014, U.S. armed forces have partnered with a Kurdish militia known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG)
to counter the Islamic State in Syria. In 2015, the YPG joined with other Syrian groups to form the Syrian

Democratic Forces (SDF), comprising the SDF’s leading component. Turkey considers the YPG to be the Syrian

branch of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a U.S.-designated terror group that has waged a decades-long

insurgency in Turkey. Ankara has strongly objected to U.S. cooperation with the SDF. U.S. officials have

acknowledged YPG-PKK ties, but generally consider the two groups distinct.14

The Syrian Arab Coalition. Roughly 50% of the SDF is composed of ethnic Arab forces, according to U.S.

officials;15 this component sometimes is referred to as the Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC). In 2018, the U.S. military

assessed that the SAC probably is unable to conduct counter-IS operations on its own without the support of the

SDF’s primary component, the YPG.16 In 2018, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) described the SAC as “a

patchwork of Arab tribal militias, military councils, and former opposition groups recruited by the YPG initially as

a ‘symbolic’ move to help attract western support and training.”17 In 2020, DIA assessed that the YPG maintains

control over leadership and decision-making positions within the SDF and SDC-led institutions, demonstrating an

“unwillingness to share power with Arabs, even in the Arab-majority regions of the northeast where Arab fighters

probably represent a majority of the SDF’s front line forces.”18

11 President Donald Trump, Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the

Senate, June 9, 2020.

12 Ambassador James Jeffrey, State Department Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the

Global Coalition

to Defeat ISIS, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22, 2019.

13 Defense Under Secretary for Policy John Rood before the Senate Armed Services Committee, December 5, 2019;

CENTCOM Commander Gen. McKenzie before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 2020.

14 See, for example, “US admissions of PYD-PKK links growing,” Anadolu Agency, February 15, 2018.

15 Ambassador Jeffrey before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22,

2019.

16 2018 assessment referenced in “Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the

United States Congress,” October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019, p. 43.

17 Ibid.

18

Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020.

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Security of U.S. Forces in Syria

Syrian government forces, with the support of Russia, expanded their operations and presence in

some areas of eastern Syria evacuated by U.S., Coalition, and SDF forces in 2019. The expanded

presence of Syrian government forces in these areas may increase the potential for interactions

between remaining U.S. personnel and Syrian or Russian forces, with uncertain implications for

force protection and potential conflict. The Syrian government continues to refer to U.S. forces as

occupiers and has warned that “resistance” forces might target U.S. personnel.19 In July 2020,

CENTCOM Commander Gen. McKenzie stated, “Over time, [Syrian President] Bashar al-Assad

is probably going to turn to the east and increase pressure on us, and we’ll deal with that as it

happens.”20

Syrian officials have specifically called for the United States to end what they describe as the

“illegal” presence of U.S. forces at Syrian oilfields.21 The Defense Department has stated that

U.S. forces in Syria maintain “the inherent right to self-defense against any threat, includ[ing]

while securing the oil fields.”22 President Trump stated in October 2019 that, “we may have to

fight for the oil. It’s okay. Maybe somebody else wants the oil, in which case they have a hell of a

fight.”23 Vice President Pence stated the following month that U.S. troops in troops in Syria will

“secure the oil fields so that they don’t fall into the hands of either ISIS or Iran or the Syrian

regime.”24

In February 2020, pro-regime forces manning a checkpoint in Qamishli opened fire on Coalition

forces conducting a patrol; no Coalition injuries were reported.25 In early 2020, media reports

highlighted increasingly frequent “standoffs” between U.S. and Russian personnel along

highways in northeast Syria.26 U.S. officials have described these incidents as occurring along a

road that is shared by U.S., Russian, and Syrian forces operating in adjacent areas of the

northeast, particularly around Qamishli.27 In March, CJTF-OIR reported that Russian ground and

air incursions into areas of U.S. operations in Syria continued to occur on a regular basis.28

U.S. forces also may face threats from Islamic State remnants. In 2020, armed drones have

targeted U.S. military personnel operating near Syrian oil fields; military officials stated that a

March 2020 drone attack was “probably” conducted by the Islamic State using modified

commercially available drones.29

19 Syrian President Asad interview with Russia 24 and Rossiya Sevodnya, Syria Report, November 15,

2019.

20 CENTCOM news transcript, “MEI engagement with General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.” June 11, 2020.

21 Louay Falouh, Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations,

SC/14061, December 19, 2019.

22 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 1,

2019-December 31, 2019, p. 43.

23 Remarks by President Trump on the Death of ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,

October 27, 2019.

24 Remarks by Vice President Pence in a Press Gaggle | Erbil Air Base, November 23, 2019.

25 OIR Spokesman Col. Myles B. Caggins III, statement posted to Twitter (@OIRSpox), February 12, 2020, 6:58 AM.

26 “U.S. Troops in Standoffs With Russian Military Contractors in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2020.

27 Department of State transcript, “Ambassador Jeffrey on the Situation in Syria,” February 5, 2020.

28 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020, p. 9.

29 CENTCOM Commander Gen. McKenzie, AFRICOM Commander Gen. Townsend, and Acting ASD for

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Congressional Research Service 9

Syria Provisions in FY2020 Defense and Foreign Operations

Legislation

FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92)

The FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) extended the Syria Train and Equip program’s authority until

the end of 2020, and modified the program’s purposes. Changes under Section 1222 of the act

include

 specifying the program’s beneficiaries to include “appropriately vetted Syrian
groups and individuals,” striking previous language referencing Syrian

opposition forces;30

 amending the program objectives to include securing territory formerly
controlled by the Islamic State and supporting the temporary detention and

repatriation of IS detainees;

 eliminating some of the details previously reported to congressional committees
(such as the concept of operations, timelines, and types of training, equipment,

stipends, sustainment, construction, and supplies to be required), while

preserving broader reporting requirements on the goals and objectives of

authorized assistance, and on the number and role of U.S. military personnel

involved;

 removing the previously existing requirement for the Defense Department to use
prior approval reprogramming procedures to obligate funds for the Syria T&E

program and substituting a more frequent prior notification system (requiring

reports no later than 15 days before the expenditure of each 10% increment of

FY2019 and FY2020 funds);

 adding new reporting requirements on (1) the relationship between program
recipients and civilian governance authorities; (2) U.S. stabilization activities in

IS-liberated areas; and (3) IS detainees held by vetted Syrian groups; and

 restricting the provision of U.S. weapons to small arms.

Section 1224 of the act requires the president to identify or designate a senior-level coordinator

responsible for the long-term disposition of IS members currently in SDF custody. The

congressionally mandated Syria Study Group highlighted the lack of such a coordinator in its

September 2019 final report.

The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019

The FY2020 NDAA also incorporates the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (Title

LXXIV). Section 7411 of the act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to make a determination

within 180 days of enactment on whether the Central Bank of Syria is a financial institution of

primary money laundering concern. If so, the Secretary would be required to impose one or more

International Security Affairs Kathryn Wheelbarger before the House Armed Services Committee, March

10, 2020.

30 This change may reflect a gradual U.S. shift from supporting Syrian opposition forces (now largely defeated by the

Syrian government) to a greater reliance on Syrian Kurdish groups (which oppose the Islamic State but not necessarily

the Asad government).

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of the special measures described in Section 5318A(b) of title 31, United States Code, with

respect to the Central Bank of Syria.

Section 7412 directs the President to impose sanctions on any foreign person who the President

determines is knowingly providing significant financial, material, or technological support to the

government of Syria or to a foreign person operating in a military capacity inside Syria on behalf

of the governments of Syria, Russia, or Iran. It also makes eligible for sanctions foreign persons

who knowingly sell or provide (1) goods, services, technology, or information that significantly

facilitates the maintenance or expansion of the government of Syria’s domestic production of

natural gas, petroleum, or petroleum products; (2) aircraft or spare aircraft parts that are used for

military purposes in Syria in areas controlled by the Syrian government or associated forces;( 3)

significant construction or engineering services to the government of Syria.

Section 7413 requires the President to determine the areas of Syria controlled by the governments

of Syria, Iran, and Russia, and to submit a strategy to deter foreign persons from entering into

contracts related to reconstruction in those areas. The bill includes several suspension and waiver

authorities for the President, including for nongovernmental organizations providing

humanitarian assistance. Its provisions would expire five years after the date of enactment.

The Trump Administration announced the first designations under the Caesar Syria Civilian

Protection Act in June 2020 (see “U.S. Sanctions on Syria” below).

Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94)

The FY2020 State and Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (Division G of the Further

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-94) contains several Syria-related provisions:

 Section 7033(c) makes ESF funds available notwithstanding any other provision
of law for assistance for ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and Syria.

 Section 7035(a) makes NADR funds available for the Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund (CTPF) for programs in areas liberated from the Islamic State.

 Section 7041(i) makes not less than $40 million in ESF, INCLE, and PKO funds
appropriated by this act available, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for

nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria—of which, not less than $7 million

shall be made available for emergency medical and rescue response, and

chemical weapons use investigations. These funds may not be used for activities

that support Iran or Iranian proxies, or that further the strategic objectives of

Russia. They also may not be used in areas of Syria controlled by the Asad

government or associated forces.

 Section 7065(a) states that not less than $200 million of funds appropriated under
ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO, and FMF shall be made available for the Relief and

Recovery Fund for assistance for areas liberated or at risk from, or under the

control of, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, other terrorist organizations, or

violent extremist organizations, including for stabilization assistance for

vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities affected by conflict.

 This section also states that, of the funds made available for the Relief and
Recovery Fund, not less than $10 million shall be made available for programs to

promote accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,

including in Iraq and Syria.

 Title V of the bill, known as the Global Fragility Act of 2019, establishes a new
fund titled the Prevention and Stabilization Fund, and authorizes $200 million to

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be appropriated to the fund for each of the fiscal years 2020 through 2024. These

funds are authorized be used to support stabilization of conflict affected areas,

and to provide assistance to areas liberated from the Islamic State or other

terrorist organizations—as well as to support vulnerable ethnic and religious

minority communities affected by conflict. This new fund will replace the Relief

and Recovery Fund designation applied in recent appropriations acts.

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93)

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020 (Division A of the Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-93 ) makes $1.195 billion in the Counter ISIS Train and Equip

Fund (CTEF) available to counter the Islamic State globally, including to provide training,

equipment, logistics support, infrastructure repair, and sustainment to countries or irregular forces

engaged in counter-IS activities. No specific amount is designated for Syria in the act, but the

accompanying explanatory statement allocates $200 million for Syria programs, $100 million less

than the Administration’s request. Section 9019 states that no funds made available by the act

may be used for the “introduction of United States armed or military forces into hostilities in

Syria, into situations in Syria where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by

the circumstances, or into Syrian territory, airspace, or waters while equipped for combat.”

Select Syria-Related Legislation in the 116th Congress

Special Immigrant Status for U.S. Partner Forces31

The October 2019 Turkish military incursion into northern Syria targeted Syrian Kurdish forces

that had worked closely with the United States to secure the territorial defeat of ISIS. The same

month, three bills were introduced that would each establish a special immigrant visa (SIV)

program for certain Syrians32 who had worked with U.S. military forces or the U.S. government.

These programs would provide a new avenue under the U.S. immigration system for eligible

individuals to be considered for admission to the United States. Upon admission, these

individuals would become U.S. lawful permanent residents. Although the particular criteria in the

three proposed SIV programs differ, all three would require applicants to obtain a favorable

recommendation regarding their work with the U.S. government and be determined to be

admissible to United States, which requires clearance of background checks and security

screening, among other screening. All three programs would be subject to annual numerical

limits, which would apply to the principal applicants but not to their accompanying spouses or

children.

Syrian Allies Protection Act (S. 2625). Introduced by Senator Warner, the bill would authorize

the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide special immigrant status to a Syrian national who

had worked directly with U.S. military forces as a translator or in another role deemed “vital to

the success of the United States military mission in Syria,” as determined by the Secretary of

Defense, for a period of at least six months between September 2014 and October 2019.

31 Andorra Bruno, Specialist in Immigration Policy, contributed to this section. For related information, see CRS

Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs.

32 Two of the bills also reference stateless persons habitually residing in Syria, as Syrian government policy for the past

several decades has denied Syrian citizenship to the majority of Kurdish residents.

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Applicants would need to obtain a written recommendation from a general or flag officer. The

SIV program would be capped at 250 principal applicants per fiscal year.

Syrian Partner Protection Act (H.R. 4873). Introduced by Representative Crow, the bill would

authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide special immigrant status to a Syrian

national or stateless person habitually residing in Syria who worked for or with the U.S.

government in Syria “as an interpreter, translator, intelligence analyst, or in another sensitive and

trusted capacity” for an aggregate period of not less than one year after January 2014. The

individual’s “service to United States efforts against the Islamic State” would need to be

documented in a positive recommendation or evaluation. The SIV program, which would be

temporary, would be capped at 4,000 principal applicants per year for five fiscal years.

Promoting American National Security and Preventing the Resurgence of ISIS Act of 2019

(S. 2641). Section 203 of S. 2641, as reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would

authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide special immigrant status to a Syrian or

stateless Kurd habitually residing in Syria who is or was employed by or on behalf of the U.S.

government “in a role that was vital to the success of the United States’ Counter ISIS mission in

Syria,” as determined by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. The

individual must have been so employed for a period of at least one year after January 2014 and

must obtain a favorable written recommendation from a senior supervisor. In addition, the

applicant must have experienced or must be “experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a

consequence of the alien’s employment by the United States Government.” The SIV program

would be capped at 400 principal applicants per fiscal year.

The Syrian SIV programs proposed by these bills are generally modeled on the existing

temporary SIV programs for Iraqis and Afghans who have worked for or on behalf of the U.S.

government, although there are some key differences. For example, under both the Iraqi and

Afghan SIV programs, the recommendation or evaluation (attesting to valuable service) that an

applicant is required to submit must be accompanied by approval from the appropriate Chief of

Mission. The Syrian SIV bills would not require applicants to obtain Chief of Mission approval,

although S. 2641 would require an applicant’s recommendation to be approved by a senior

foreign service officer designated by the Secretary of State. S. 2641 is also the only one of the

three bills to require an applicant to show that he or she has experienced or is experiencing a

serious threat as a result of employment by the U.S. government; this is a requirement under both

the Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs. In addition, all three Syrian SIV bills include provisions that

do not have counterparts under the Iraqi and Afghan programs that would provide for the

protection or relocation of applicants who are in imminent danger or whose lives or safety are at

risk.

Military Developments

Turkish Incursion into Northern Syria

Operation Peace Spring (2019)

On October 9, 2019, Turkey’s military (and allied Syrian opposition groups) entered northeastern

Syria in a military operation targeting Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) forces. Dubbed

Operation Peace Spring (OPS) by Turkey, the operation followed a call between President Trump

and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After the phone call, President Trump ordered a

pullback of U.S. forces from the area of the anticipated Turkish incursion. (28 Special Forces

Green Berets located along Turkey’s initial “axis of advance” were withdrawn prior to the

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Turkish operation.)33 This drew accusations among many, including some Members of Congress,

that the Administration had offered a tacit “green light,” to the Turkish operation, a charge

strongly denied by Administration officials who described the U.S. decision to withdraw forces as

a matter of personnel safety.34 President Trump said in a statement, “The United States does not

endorse this attack and has made it clear to Turkey that this operation is a bad idea.”35

Figure 5. Syria-Turkey Border

As of May 25, 2020

Source: CRS, using areas of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor.

Note: This map does not depict precisely or comprehensively all U.S. bases or operating locations in Syria.

A subsequent U.S.-brokered ceasefire in mid-October allowed for the withdrawal of SDF forces

from the Turkish zone of incursion, roughly corresponding to the area between the towns of Tell

Abiad and Ras al Ayn (see Figure 5). It also created a Turkish “safe zone” stretching between the

two towns, extending to a depth of 32km inside Syria. Separately, Turkey and Russia negotiated

33 Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.

34 At a December 11, 2019, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Esper stated, “[ …

] when you look at the situation at the time we faced maybe one or two scenarios. One would have been to allow our

troops to stand there in the face of a [ … ] Turkish onslaught which both Chairman Milley and I agreed wasn’t worth

risking our soldiers’ lives. Option two would have been an un-credible option, which would be fighting a long-standing

NATO ally.”

35 “Turkey’s Syria invasion was a ‘bad idea,’ Trump says,” Defense One, October 10, 2019.

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security zones east and west of the OPS area, from which SDF forces were also expected to

withdraw (to a depth of 30km from the border). These latter areas are being patrolled by a mix of

Turkish, Russian, and Syrian forces.

Following the Turkish operation, U.S. forces withdrew from outposts in northern Syria (including

Manbij and Ayn Issa); Syrian and Russian forces moved in “to fill the void created by departing

U.S. forces.”36 The State Department also moved its Syria Transition Assistance Team personnel

inside Syria (START-Forward) out of the country. In the same period, the SDF redoubled its

dialogue with the Asad government and reached an agreement to coordinate in some areas.

2020 Developments

In March, Defense Department officials reported that conditions in the Turkish area of incursion

(also known as the OPS area) have “stabilized for the time being.”37 However, Turkey reportedly

has moved hundreds of people from Turkish-controlled areas of western Syria (known informally

as the Euphrates Shield Area) to the newly established OPS area in central Syria, in what some

media reports have described as “population transfers.”38 The moves have raised questions

regarding whether the previous inhabitants of the OPS area will be permitted to return, and

whether the demographics of the area will be permanently altered. In June 2020, U.S.

CENTCOM officials stated that U.S. training efforts were on a “COVID pause” and U.S.

personnel were awaiting a political decision concerning the future of U.S. forces in the country.39

Islamic State: Ongoing Threats

In March 2019, the Islamic State lost its final territorial stronghold in Syria, as a result of

Coalition operations in partnership with the SDF. In October 2019, a U.S. airstrike killed IS

leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.40 Nevertheless, U.S. military officials warn that the group has not

been eliminated, and that it continues to pose a significant threat to local and regional stability. In

January 2020, U.S. officials estimated that the Islamic State retained about 14,000-18,000 IS

fighters active between Syria and Iraq—similar to estimates provided in mid-2019.41

A year after the Islamic State lost its final territorial stronghold in Syria, U.S. military officials

stated that the group continued to maintain a low-level insurgency, conducting primarily small

arms and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against SDF and Syrian military targets.42

CJTF-OIR reported that “al Baghdadi’s death did not result in any degradation of ISIS

capabilities in Syria, and ISIS likely retains an intact command and control structure, and a

36 Ibid.

37 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020, p49.

38 “Turkey’s occupation of northern Syria includes population transfers,” Al Monitor, May 7, 2020.

39 Brig. Gen. Duke Pirak, Comments to Middle East Institute, June 23, 2020.

40 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1,

2019-October 25, 2019.

41 News conference with Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, January

23, 2020; Briefing by Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Ambassador James F. Jeffrey and

Counterterrorism Coordinator Ambassador Nathan A. Sales, August 1, 2019.

42 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020, p. 10.

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presence in rural regions of Coalition operating areas in Syria.”43 In July 2020, CENTCOM

Commander Gen. McKenzie stated,

The long term future for ISIS, particularly in Syria, is going to be related to our ability to

establish local security organizations that can prevent ISIS from growing. There’s always

going to be a low level ISIS problem. I believe that’s going to be endemic. I don’t think it’s

going to go away. But what we want to do in areas where we can control with our SDF

partners, is we want to ensure that local security organizations are put in place that can

ensure that the responses will be local and they will not require external assistance.44

Turkey’s October 2019 incursion into Kurdish-held areas of northern Syria temporarily disrupted

joint operations with the SDF against the Islamic State.45 While joint operations had resumed by

late 2019, military officials in March 2020 noted that ongoing tension between Turkey and the

SDF “continued to divert SDF attention and resources away from the fight against ISIS.”46

Islamic State Detainees

The capture of the final Islamic State stronghold in Syria in March 2019 led to the surrender of

thousands of IS fighters, as well as their spouses and children. Since then, the SDF has retained

custody of roughly 10,000 IS militants (including approximately 2,000 foreign fighters) at several

makeshift prisons in northern Syria. Wives and children of IS fighters (some of whom also may

be radicalized) are held at separate IDP camps. The largest of these is Al Hol, which houses about

66,000 individuals, 96% of whom are women or children.47 Media reports suggest that the Islamic

State continues to operate and recruit within the camp.48 Military assessments also have described

displacement camps as a “relatively permissive operating environment” for IS supporters.49

The SDF has stated that it is unable to assume long-term responsibility for IS detainees and their

families, and the United States has urged countries to repatriate their citizens. To date, many

countries have been reluctant to do so, citing concerns about their inability to prosecute or

successfully monitor individuals who may have been radicalized. Some countries also have

stripped IS fighters and/or family members of their citizenship.

The security of facilities housing IS fighters and family members continues to be a significant

concern. The Islamic State has urged its followers inside Syria to launch operations to free IS

detainees, and U.S. military assessments have noted that the SDF is unable to provide more than

43 Ibid, 50.

44 CENTCOM news transcript, “General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. interview with VoA during a recent tour of the

region,” July 16, 2020.

45 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1,

2019-October 25, 2019.

46 Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019;

Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020, p6.

47 UN OCHA Syrian Arab Republic, North East Syria: Al Hol camp, January 13, 2020. Among the population, 46% are

Iraqis (30,724), 39% are Syrians (25,780), and 15% are third country nationals (TCNs) (9,597).

48 “Guns, Filth and ISIS: Syrian Camp Is ‘Disaster in the Making,’” New York Times, September 3, 2019.

49 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020, p. 6.

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“minimal security” at Al Hol.50 Military officials have warned of the risk of a “mass breakout”

from IS detention facilities, and described IS prisoners as “one of the most significant risks to the

success of the [defeat-ISIS] mission.”51 In March 2020, IS prisoners temporarily seized control of

part of a prison in Hasakah; SDF forces reported that they contained the uprising and that no IS

prisoners escaped.52

Securing IS Detainees: The U.S. Role

The Defense Department has stated that U.S. military forces do not operate within IS detention facilities or within

IDP camps for displaced IS family members.53 The Department also has reported that security at IS detention

facilities is provided by the U.S.-trained Provincial/Regional Internal Security Forces (PRISF).54 The Administration’s

FY2021 defense budget request seeks continued support to the PRISF as part of its request for $200 million in

CTEF funds for the Syria Train and Equip Program.

Various parts of the FY2021 defense budget request could be used, directly or indirectly, to support the security

of detention facilities and IDP camps. The request includes $15 million for basic life support services at detention

facility sites. It also includes funds for stipends for local forces, infrastructure repair, and sustainment.

In 2020, CJTF-OIR reported that it had established the Northeast Syria Coordination Group (NESCG) to replace

its former dedicated prison support mission in Syria. The NESCG, which is not permanently based inside Syria, will

coordinate with local and international partners on detainee issues.55

Idlib Crisis

Northern areas of Idlib province are the only remaining area of Syria still under the control of

armed opposition groups actively seeking the removal of Syrian President Asad. Armed groups

operating in Idlib represent the remnants of armed opposition groups that have challenged Asad’s

rule since 2011, as well as extremist groups that emerged during the course of the conflict—some

of which are affiliated with Al Qaeda and embrace an external operations agenda.

A Syrian government offensive and related fighting displaced nearly a third of the population of

Idlib between December 2019 and February 2020, in what U.S. officials described as “the largest

internal displacement of people that we’ve seen in such a short period of time in Syria in the

whole war.”56 At the same time, ongoing fighting in Idlib province in early 2020 between

opposition groups (backed by Turkey), and Syrian government forces (backed by Russia and Iran)

resulted in the deaths of dozens of Turkish soldiers. The attacks on Turkish soldiers, some of

which may have been conducted by Russia or with Russian involvement, raised the possibility

50 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1,

2019-June 30, 2019, p. 5.

51 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020, pp6-8.

52 “Kurdish-led forces put down revolt by ISIS detainees at prison in Syria,” Washington Post, March 30, 2020.

53 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020

54 Justification for FY 2021 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF),

February 2020.

55 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020

56 State Department, “Background Briefing With Senior Administration Official,” Special Briefing, February 14, 2020.

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that conflict in Syria between two major powers could escalate.57 Turkey, which publicly blamed

the Syrian government for the deaths, launched what it dubbed Operation Spring Shield against

Syrian military forces, downing three Syrian military aircraft.

Idlib Ceasefire. On March 5, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan reached an

accord to prevent further clashes between their forces. The agreement contains three main

provisions: a ceasefire along the “line of contact” in the Idlib de-escalation area, the

establishment of a security corridor (6km deep to the north and 6km deep to the south from the

M4 highway), and joint Russian-Turkish military patrols along the M4 from the settlement of

Trunba to Ain al Hawr (see Figure 6, below). 58 Turkish and Russian military personnel continue

to conduct joint awareness patrols pursuant to the agreement. U.S. officials in June 2020 stated

that the ceasefire was holding, despite some “minor shelling back and forth.”59 Turkey reportedly

has increased its military presence in Idlib since the agreement was signed, and expressed a

willingness to renew operations if necessary.60

Key Players

State Actors. Military forces from five countries currently operate or maintain forces in or around

Idlib, a province in northwest Syria that shares a border with Turkey and is slightly larger than the

state of Delaware. These include:

 Syria. Syrian military forces operating in Idlib have sought to 1) protect regime strongholds
in neighboring Lattakia from attack by Idlib-based rebels, and 2) reassert control over Syria’s

primary north-south (M5) and east-west (M4) highways, both of which transit through Idlib.61

 Russia. Russian aircraft have enabled Syrian ground operations in Idlib.62 In some
areas, Russian ground forces also have been used to occupy areas captured from anti-

Asad forces and to deter counteroffensives.

 Turkey. Turkey maintains twelve formal observation posts in or near Idlib
established as part of 2018 negotiations with Russia, as well as numerous informal

military posts.

 Iran. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces have supported Syrian
military operations in Idlib, according to U.S. officials.63

 United States. The United States does not maintain military forces in Idlib, but since
2014 has conducted airstrikes in the province targeting Al Qaeda linked groups.

57 “Deciphering Turkey’s darkest night in Syria,” Al Monitor, February 28, 2020.

58 Additional Protocol to the Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-Escalation Area, March 6,

2020 (as released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 432-06-03-2020.

59 Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS James Jeffrey on the Virtual Meeting of Ministers of the Global

Coalition to Defeat ISIS Small Group, June 5, 2020.

60 Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib, International Crisis Group, May 14, 2020.

61 Ibid.

62 State Department, “Senior State Department Official on the Situation in Syria,” Special Briefing, February 28, 2020.

63 “Escalation of Violence in Idlib,” Press Statement, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, February 4, 2020.

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Non-State Actors. A variety of non-state actors operate in Idlib, including armed groups

opposed to the Asad government as well as extremist groups who oppose the Asad

government but may also embrace an external operations agenda against U.S. or

European targets. These include:

 Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS). HTS is the successor group to the Nusra Front,
which was established in late 2011 as Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. In 2019, HTS

captured most of Idlib province from other rebel groups, and it runs a local

government in the area. U.S. officials estimate that 7,000-10,000 HTS members

operate in Idlib, while a U.N. committee estimates that the group has 12,000-

15,000 fighters.64

 Hurras al Din (HD). Also identified by the U.S. intelligence community as
linked to Al Qaeda, HD maintains an estimated 3,500-5,000 fighters in Idlib,

according to U.N. estimates—up to half of whom are foreign fighters.65 HD has

been described as the successor to the Khorasan Group, an Al Qaeda cell

composed of foreign operatives that sought to use Syria as a launching pad for

attacks against the West, before being largely eliminated by U.S. airstrikes.66 A

U.S. drone strike in Idlib in June 2020 killed HD leader Khaled al Aruri.

 Syrian National Army (SNA). U.S. officials have described the SNA as “Syrian
opposition forces fighting against the Assad regime who are supported and

supplied and commanded to some degree by Turkey.”67

 Hezbollah. Lebanese Hezbollah fighters have operated in Syria in support of the
Asad government since at least 2013 and as of 2020 were operating in Idlib

province, according to U.S. officials.68

 Other Iran-backed militias. Iran-backed fighters of various nationalities
reportedly have been killed in Idlib, including members of the Zainabiyoun

Brigade (Pakistani Shi’a militia) and the Fatemiyoun Brigade (Afghan Shi’a

militia).69

 Islamic State. A limited number of Islamic State fighters are believed to operate
in Idlib. A U.S. airstrike in Idlib in October 2019 killed Islamic State leader Abu

Bakr al Baghdadi.

64 Ambassador James Jeffrey at a press briefing on February 5, 2020; U.N. Security Council Report S/2020/53, January

20, 2020.

65 U.N. Security Council Report S/2020/53, January 20, 2020.

66 “U.S. Used Missile With Long Blades to Kill Qaeda Leader in Syria,” New York Times, June 24, 2020.

67 State Department Special Briefing, “Senior State Department Official Previewing the Upcoming D-ISIS Ministerial

and Syria Small Group Meetings,” November 12, 2019.

68 “Escalation of Violence in Idlib,” Press Statement, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, February 4, 2020.

69 “IRGC trained militias suffer losses in northwest Syria,” FDD’s Long War Journal, February 14, 2020.

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Figure 6. Idlib and its Environs

As of May 25, 2020

Source: CRS, using areas of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor.

Notes: Areas of influence approximate and subject to change.

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Political Developments

Non-State Governance Structures

Governance varies widely across Syria, both within and outside of government controlled areas.

While the Asad government has recaptured most areas formerly held by opposition forces, in

limited cases it has permitted local governance committees to operate in recaptured areas, due in

part to financial and manpower shortages.70 Meanwhile, a number of other groups have asserted

varying levels of control (ranging from de-facto to largely aspirational) outside of government-

held areas. These include:

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). The AANES was established

by PYD-linked Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria following the area’s liberation from the

Islamic State. The area administered by the AANES (roughly a third of the country), is the largest

area of Syria that remains outside of Asad government control. Primary components include the

U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as well as the SDF’s political wing, known as the

Syrian Democratic Council (SDC). AANES leaders have stated that the body is not aligned with

either the Asad government or with opposition forces.71

Syrian Salvation Government. The SSG was established in late 2017 and is closely affiliated

with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)—which the United States has designated as a Foreign Terrorist

Organization due to its links to Al Qaeda. The SSG administers most areas of Idlib province that

remain outside of Syrian government control. The SSG consists of a self-designated prime

minister and roughly a dozen ministries. It provides services—such as utilities— but also has

imposed restrictions on residents, particularly women.72 The U.N. has stated that HTS in Idlib has

“systematically imposed rules and codes of conduct on civilians living in areas under its control

that are fundamentally contrary to human rights.”73

National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, aka Etilaf, Syrian

Opposition Coalition, SOC). The SOC was established in 2012 in Doha, Qatar, as an umbrella

group encompassing an ideologically diverse range of political groups opposed to the Asad

government. In late 2012 the Obama Administration recognized the SOC as “the legitimate

representative of the Syrian people in opposition to the Asad regime,”74 without conferring upon

the group the legal authority of a state.75 Based in Turkey, the SOC does not control territory

inside Syria. The group frequently has served as an interlocutor with international actors, and

plays a leading role in U.N. brokered peace talks with the Syrian government. However, it exerts

little, if any, influence over armed groups operating inside Syria.

Syrian Interim Government (SIG). In 2013, the SOC established the SIG to serve as a political

institution capable of assuming power following what many at the time hoped would be the

imminent fall of the Asad regime. Its founders also sought—unsuccessfully—to establish the SIG

as a civilian authority over Syrian armed groups via the body’s self-appointed Defense Ministry.

70 “Bridging the Gap: Local Governance Committees in ‘Reconciled’ Areas of Syria,” Chatham House, April 2020.

71 Testimony of Ms Ilham Ahmed, Executive President, Syrian Democratic Council, before the House Oversight and

Reform National Security Subcommittee, October 23, 2019.

72 “The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib,” International Crisis Group, March 14, 2019.

73 Report of the U.N. Secretary General to the U.N. Security Council, April 23, 2020, S/2020/327.

74 “Obama Recognizes Syrian Opposition Group,” ABC News, December 11, 2012.

75 “U.S. Will Grant Recognition to Syrian Rebels, Obama Says,” New York Times, December 11, 2012.

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The SIG continued to operate even as the Asad government regained territory and the likelihood

of a political transition began to appear more remote. The SIG maintained offices in Idlib, until it

was forced out following the establishment of the HTS-affiliated SSG in 2017. Over time, the

SIG became increasingly affiliated with the Turkish government; currently it operates out of

Turkish-controlled areas of Aleppo province. One report described this arrangement as follows:

The SIG is formally the authority managing the areas taken over by armed groups funded

and armed by Turkey, namely the Euphrates Shield Area (ESA), which covers areas north

and northeast of Aleppo; the Olive Branch Area, around Afrin northwest of Aleppo; and

the Peace Spring area, which was taken recently. In practice, however, it is the Turks that

control these regions through their various proxies, including armed groups and civilian

entities.76

Political Negotiations

The Geneva Process

Since 2012, the Syrian government and opposition have participated in U.N.-brokered

negotiations under the framework of the Geneva Communiqué. Endorsed by both the United

States and Russia, the Geneva Communiqué calls for the establishment of a transitional governing

body with full executive powers. According to the document, such a government “could include

members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on

the basis of mutual consent.”77 The document does not discuss the future of Asad.

Subsequent negotiations have made little progress, as both sides have adopted differing

interpretations of the agreement. The opposition has said that any transitional government must

exclude Asad.78 The Syrian government maintains that Asad was reelected (by referendum) in

2014, and notes that the Geneva Communiqué does not explicitly require him to step down. The

Syrian government position is that a transitional government can be achieved by simply

expanding the existing government to include members of the opposition. Asad has stated that a

comprehensive solution to the current conflict must begin by “striking at terrorism” (which his

government defines broadly to include most opposition groups) and by ending external

interference in Syria.79

Who is the Syrian government negotiating with?

The Syrian opposition is diverse and fractured, and the specific groups involved in negotiations with the Asad

government have fluctuated over time. At present, the Syrian opposition is represented at U.N. sponsored talks

by the Syrian Negotiations Commission (SNC). The SNC was established in 2017, expanding the existing High

Negotiations Committee which had been formed in 2015 under Saudi auspices. The most significant change was

the inclusion within the SNC of political groups (notably the Moscow platform and the Cairo platform) which are

76 “Use of Turkish Lira to be Expanded in Northern Areas,” Syria Report, December 18, 2019.

77 Action Group for Syria, Final Communiqué, June 30, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/

FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria .

78 Lara Seligman, Colum Lynch, “As Assad Gains Ground, New Syria Talks Offer Little Hope of Peace,” Foreign

Policy, November 12, 2019.

79 Interview of Syrian President Asad by Syrian state TV, October 31, 2019. Transcript by state news agency SANA,

accessible on Syria Report.

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viewed by some oppositionists as having ties to the Asad government or its external backers.80 The SNC

continues to be headed by Naser Hariri of the SOC, who also led the HNC. As with its previous iteration, the

SNC does not include representatives from Kurdish-led SDF forces that control the northern third of Syria,

reportedly at Turkey’s request.81 However, the SDF has negotiated separately with the Asad government,

particularly following Turkey’s October 2019 incursion into northern Syria.

As part of the Geneva Process, U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, adopted in

2015, endorsed a “road map” for a political settlement in Syria, including the drafting of a new

constitution and the administration of U.N.-supervised elections. U.S. officials continue to stress

that a political solution to the conflict must be based on the principles of UNSCR 2254.

While the United States continues to call for a political settlement to the conflict, the U.S.

intelligence community since 2018 has assessed that Asad is “unlikely to negotiate himself from

power”82 or make meaningful concession to the opposition:

The regime’s momentum, combined with continued support from Russia and Iran, almost

certainly has given Syrian President Bashar al-Asad little incentive to make anything more

than token concessions to the opposition or to adhere to UN resolutions on constitutional

changes that Asad perceives would hurt his regime.83

In October 2019, Ambassador Jeffrey testified that the United States continues to support U.N.-

led political negotiations in Geneva pursuant to UNSCR 2254.84 State Department officials have

identified three points of leverage that the United States and its foreign partners could use to

encourage the Asad regime to accept a political settlement: the withholding of reconstruction

assistance, barring Syria’s re-entry into the Arab League, and refusing to restore diplomatic

relations with Damascus.85

United States officials have repeatedly expressed its view that Geneva should be the sole forum

for a political settlement to the Syria conflict, possibly reflecting concern regarding the Russia-led

Astana Process (see below). However, the United States supported efforts by the U.N. Special

Envoy for Syria to stand up a Syrian Constitutional Committee, an initiative originally stemming

from the Russian-led Sochi conference in January 2018 (see below).86 In December 2018,

Norwegian diplomat Geir Pederson succeeded Staffan de Mistura as U.N. Special Envoy for

Syria. In September 2019, Pederson announced the successful formation of the Syrian

Constitutional Committee. Pederson stated that the committee would be facilitated by the United

Nations in Geneva (see “Constitutional Committee,” below).87

80 “Syria opposition agree on united delegation for peace talks,” France 24, November 24, 2017. See also, “Where Do

We Go From Here? A First-Hand Account from Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 2018.

81 “Turkey targets US-backed Syrian Kurdish peace talks,” Al Monitor, May 12, 2020.

82 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018.

83 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019.

84 Ambassador James Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition

to Defeat ISIS, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22, 2019.

85 “Syria Peace Talks to Open After a Long, Strange Month,” New York Times, October 28, 2019.

86 Media Note, “The Secretary’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Ambassador James Jeffrey Travels to

Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia,” October 15, 2018.

87 “U.N. announces formation of Syrian constitutional committee,” Washington Post, September 23, 2019.

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The Astana Process

Since January 2017, peace talks hosted by Russia, Iran, and Turkey have convened in the Kazakh

capital of Astana. These talks were the forum through which three “de-escalation areas” were

established—two of which have since been retaken by Syrian military forces. The United States

is not a party to the Astana talks but has attended as an observer delegation.

Russia has played a leading role in the Astana process, which some have described as an alternate

track to the Geneva process. The United States has strongly opposed the prospect of Astana

superseding Geneva. Following the release of the Joint Statement by President Trump and

Russian President Putin on November 11, 2017 (in which the two presidents confirmed that a

political solution to the conflict must be forged through the Geneva process pursuant to UNSCR

2254), U.S. officials stated that

We have started to see signs that the Russians and the regime wanted to draw the political

process away from Geneva to a format that might be easier for the regime to manipulate.

Today makes clear and the [Joint Statement] makes clear that 2254 and Geneva remains

the exclusive platform for the political process.88

In January 2018, Russia hosted a “Syrian People’s Congress” in Sochi, in which participants

agreed to form a constitutional committee comprising delegates from the Syrian government and

the opposition “for drafting of a constitutional reform,” in accordance with UNSCR 2254.89 The

conference was boycotted by most Syrian opposition groups and included mainly delegates

friendly to the Asad government.90 The statement noted that final agreement regarding the

mandate, rules of procedure, and selection criteria for delegates would be reached under the

framework of the Geneva process.

Constitutional Committee. The committee, whose formation took nearly two years, consists of

150 delegates—50 each representing the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition, as well as

a “middle third” list comprising 50 Syrian-national delegates selected by the U.N. from among

the country’s legal experts, civil society members, political independents, and tribal leaders. The

committee includes a limited number of Kurds but does not include representatives from the

YPG, the SDF or the SDF’s political wing—the Syrian Democratic Council, SDC—which

administer large areas of northern Syria.91 The committee met for the first time in Geneva in

October 2019, where it formed a smaller 45-member Constitution-drafting group. The current

Syrian constitution was approved in a February 2012 referendum, replacing the constitution that

had been in place since 1973.

88 Background Briefing on the Joint Statement by the President of the United States and the President of the Russian

Federation on Syria, November 11,

2017.

89 Final statement of the Congress of the Syrian national dialogue, Sochi, January 30, 2018.

90 “Syrian Peace Talks in Russia; 1,500 Delegates, Mostly Pro-Assad,” New York Times, January 30, 2018.

91 “Syrian Kurds protest ‘unjust’ exclusion from constitutional committee,” Middle East Eye, October 2, 2019.

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Humanitarian Situation
As of mid-2020, an estimated 6.2 million Syrians are internally displaced, and an additional 5.6

million Syrians are registered with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as

refugees in nearby countries.92 The U.N. Secretary-General regularly reports to the Security

Council on humanitarian issues and challenges in and related to Syria pursuant to Security
Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393

(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020).93

Humanitarian conditions in Syria have deteriorated significantly in 2020. Eighty percent of

Syrians lived below the poverty line as of early 2020. In June 2020, U.N. officials reported that

the Syrian Pound had lost more value in the last six months than in the first nine years of the

crisis.94 The depreciating informal exchange rate has resulted in soaring food prices, reducing

access to basic food million people in 2019. staples for many families. In May 2020, the World

Food Programme announced that an estimated 9.3 million people in Syria—more than half the

current population, and the highest level ever recorded in Syria—are now food insecure, up from

an estimated 7.995

Cross-Border Aid Endangered

The Syrian government has long opposed the provision of humanitarian assistance across Syria’s

border and across internal lines of conflict outside of channels under Syrian government control.

Successive U.N. Security Council resolutions have nevertheless authorized the provision of such

assistance. UNSCR 2449 authorized cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance until

January 10, 2020. Russia and China abstained in the December 2018 vote that approved the

resolution, and the Russian representative argued at the time that “new realities … demand that

[the mandate] be rejiggered with the ultimate goal of being gradually but inevitably removed.”96

Crossing Points for Aid Reduced. On December 20, 2019, Russia and China vetoed a U.N.

Security Council resolution that would have renewed the authorization enabling U.N. agencies to

deliver aid into Syria from two points in Turkey and one in Iraq for another 12 months. U.N.

officials warned that without cross-border operations, “we would see an immediate end of aid

supporting millions of civilians.”97 On January 10, 2020, the Security Council approved

Resolution 2504, re-authorizing cross border aid into Syria via two of the four existing border

crossings—Bab al Salam and Bab al Hawa, both in Turkey—for a period of six months (rather

92 Reliefweb, Syrian Arab Republic. Latest figures available at https://m.reliefweb.int/country/226/syr?figures-display=

all.

93 Reports submitted by/transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council available at

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/reports-secretary-general.

94 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock Briefing to

the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria; New York, 29 June 2020

95 U.N. Document S/2020/427, Letter dated 21 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the

Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council, May 27, 2020.

96 United Nations Security Council, 8423rd meeting, December 13, 2018, S/PV.8423.

97 “Russia and China Block Cross-Border Aid Deliveries to Syria,” New York Times, December 20, 2019.

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than one year). The continued use of border crossings at Ramtha (Jordan) and Al Yarubiyah (Iraq)

was not authorized.98

Per UNSCR 2504, the authorization for all cross-border aid deliveries was set to expire on July

10, 2020. In May 2020, leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee urged Secretary of State Pompeo to intensify U.S. efforts at the Security

Council to renew the authorization for Syria cross-border aid and to push for the re-opening of the

Yarubiyah crossing.99 On July 7, Russia and China vetoed a Security Council draft resolution that

would have re-authorized the border crossings at Bab al Salam and Bab al Hawa for twelve

months. The United States subsequently vetoed a Russian draft resolution which would have re-

authorized only Bab al Hawa for a period of six months.

Limited Reauthorization until 2021. On July 11, the Security Council passed a resolution

reauthorizing cross border aid for a period of one year, eliminating the Bab al Salam crossing and

leaving only a single approved crossing point at Bab al Hawa. U.N. officials previously had

emphasized the importance of the Bab al Salam crossing in addition to Bab al Hawa, stating,

“Both border crossings are required to sustain delivery. While the transshipment capacity of Bab

al-Salam is lower than that of Bab al Hawa, Bab al-Salam provides direct access to parts of

northern Aleppo that host some of the highest concentrations of displaced people in the country.

1.3 million people live in the area accessed from Bab al-Salam, and 62% of these people are

displaced.”100

Public Health Impact. Prior to the de-authorization of Al Yarubiyah for cross-border aid

deliveries, the WHO had used the crossing to transfer medical supplies and equipment to

northeast Syria. Since its closure, medical facilities in the area have faced shortages, prompting

the WHO to appeal to the Security Council to re-instate the crossing point.101 Both the Syrian and

Russian governments have long pushed to eliminate cross-border aid, arguing that aid should

instead be provided via cross-line deliveries from Damascus. However, U.N. officials have stated

that, “Cross-line deliveries to the north east from Damascus have not filled the gap in critical

medical supplies that were, until January this year, delivered through Al Yarubiyah border

crossing.”102

Vulnerable Areas

Numerous humanitarian challenges have arisen since the outbreak of the Syria conflict in 2011.

International organizations currently describe conditions in the below areas as particularly dire,

and have noted that the risk these areas face is magnified by the threat posed by COVID-19. In

98 “Security Council beats midnight deadline, renews Syria cross-border aid in contentious vote,” U.N. News, January

10, 2020.

99 Foreign Affairs Committee Press Release, “McCaul, Risch, Menendez, Engel, Call on Administration to Intensify

Efforts to Restore Cross-Border Humanitarian Operations at Syrian Border,” May 12, 2020.

100 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock Briefing to

the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria; New York, 29 June 2020

101 “Syria: Aid Restrictions Hinder Covid-19 Response,” Human Rights Watch, April 28, 2020. The WHO later

appeared to drop the specific provision regarding Al Yarubiya, leading observers to question whether the organization

faced external pressure. See, “WHO changes to U.N. Syria memo risk stoking Trump-fueled criticism,” Reuters, April

29, 2020.

102 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock Briefing to

the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, New York, 29 April 2020.

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each of these areas, displaced populations reside in overcrowded conditions with inadequate

access to sanitation. Officials have warned that the virus could spread rapidly among the

population in these areas, overwhelming the limited capacity of local health care systems.

Northwest Syria (Idlib, Aleppo, Hama). Military operations by pro-Syrian government forces in

and around Idlib displaced nearly a million people between December 2019 and February 2020.

In April, U.N. officials stated that, “The [March 2020] ceasefire may have brought a degree of

respite, but the humanitarian situation in the north-west is as dismal as it has ever been.”103 U.N.

officials estimate that displaced families make up two-thirds of the population of northwest Syria,

and that, of these, 70% are in need of humanitarian assistance.104

Northeast Syria (Raqqah, Hasakah, Deir ez Zor). Over four million people reside in the area,

including thousands of internally displaced persons and Islamic State prisoners in severely

overcrowded conditions.

Al Hol IDP Camp (Hasakeh). Built to house a maximum of 10,000 persons, the camp currently

houses nearly 70,000 displaced persons, many of whom fled the Islamic State’s final outpost in

eastern Syria. An estimated 94% of residents are women and children. According to the Kurdish

Red Crescent, at least 517 people, mostly children, died inside the Al Hol camp in 2019, due to

malnutrition, inadequate healthcare for newborns, and hypothermia.105

Rukban IDP Camp (Rural Damascus). In 2015, thousands of Syrians fleeing the advance of

regime forces became stranded at what is known as “the berm”—a stretch of no man’s land

between the Syrian and Jordanian border. As of May 2020, roughly 10,000 people remained at

Rukban, which falls within 50 km of the U.S. military garrison at At Tanf.106 The Syrian

government has not permitted any humanitarian convoys to access the area since September

2019. In May 2020, Amnesty International called on Jordan to allow relief aid for Rukban to

transit through Jordanian territory, as well as to allow those in need of urgent medical care to

receive treatment in Jordan.107 Jordanian officials, which declared the area around Rukban to be a

closed military zone following a 2016 suicide bombing, have maintained that any aid to Rukban

must be provided from Syrian territory.108

U.S. Humanitarian Funding

The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the Syria crisis, drawing from

existing funding from global humanitarian accounts and some reprogrammed funding.109 As of

July 2020, total U.S. humanitarian assistance for the Syria crisis since 2011 had reached over

$11.3 billion (including $696 million in humanitarian funds announced by U.S. officials at the

103 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock Briefing to

the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, New York, 29 April 2020.

104 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock Briefing to

the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria; New York, 29 June 2020.

105 “More than 500 dead in Syria’s Al-Hol in 2019: medics,” AFP, January 16, 2020.

106 “Jordan: Authorities must allow urgent medical care for displaced Syrians in Rukban during COVID-19,” Amnesty

International, May 7, 2020.

107 Ibid.

108 “FM reiterates Jordan’s support for political solution in Syria,” Jordan Times, April 20, 2020.

109 USAID Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance for the People of Syria, January 26, 2018.

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June 2020 Brussels donor conference).110 These funds have gone towards meeting humanitarian

needs inside Syria, as well as towards support for communities in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq,

and Egypt that host Syrian refugees.111

International Humanitarian Funding

Multilateral humanitarian assistance in response to the Syria crisis includes both the Regional

Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). The 3RP is

designed to address the impact of the conflict on Syria’s neighbors, and encompasses the

Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, the Jordan Response Plan, and country chapters in Turkey, Iraq,

and Egypt. It includes a refugee/humanitarian response coordinated by UNHCR and a

“resilience” response (stabilization-based development assistance) led by the U.N. Development

Program (UNDP).112

In parallel to the 3RP, the HRP for Syria is designed to address the crisis inside the country

through a focus on humanitarian assistance, civilian protection, and increasing resilience and

livelihood opportunities, in part by improving access to basic services. This includes the

reconstruction of damaged infrastructure (water, sewage, electricity) as well as the restoration of

medical and education facilities and infrastructure for the production of inputs for sectors such as

agriculture.113

The 2020 3RP appeal for Syria seeks $5.2 billion, and the 2020 HRP for Syria seeks $3.4 billion,

on par with previous years.114 Since 2013, the annual 3RP appeals for Syria have been funded at

roughly 60%.115

In March 2020, the U.N. launched the COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan to fund

COVID-19 response efforts in priority countries, including Syria. Coordinated by UNOCHA, the

appeal sought $2 billion for various U.N. entities. In May, the appeal was updated to $6.7 billion.

In June, the European Union hosted the fourth annual donors’ conference in Brussels for Syria

and regional states affected by the Syria crisis. Attendees pledged $5.5 billion in humanitarian aid

for 2020, as well as nearly $2.2 billion for 2021 and beyond.116 International financial institutions

and donors also announced $6.7 billion in concessional loans.

110 State Department Press Statement, “The United States Announces Additional Humanitarian Assistance for the

Syrian People,” June 30, 2020.

111 State Department Fact Sheet: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the Syria Crisis, March 14, 2019.

112 For additional details, see UNDP and UNHCR, 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2017—2018: In Response

to the Syria Crisis: Regional Strategic Overview, December 5, 2016.

113 For additional details, see UNOCHA, 2017 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Response Plan: January-December

2017.

114 Syria Refugee Response and Resilience Plan (3RP) 2020 (Regional response plan), Financial Tracking Service,

UNOCHA.

115 3RP Financial Summary – Q4 2019, April 27, 2020.

116 Council of the EU Press Release, “Brussels IV Conference on ‘Supporting the future of Syria and the region’: co-

chairs’ declaration,” June 30, 2020.

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Public Health Developments
As of mid-2020, Syria has experienced relatively few confirmed cases of COVID-19, despite the

presence of multiple risk factors. The Syrian government has reported the lowest confirmed case

counts in the region.117 However testing capacity is significantly limited compared to neighboring

states—in mid-July UNOCHA reported that the Syrian government had increased its daily testing

capacity to 345, up from 70 in early May.118

Syrian officials reported what they described as Syria’s first case of COVID-19 on March 22;

informal reports suggest that the virus may have been present in the country for some time.

Additional cases have subsequently been reported, the majority in government-controlled areas in

and around Damascus.119 Syrian Ministry of Health data does not include areas outside of central

government control.

 Northeast Syria. In Kurdish controlled areas of northeast Syria, the first confirmed case
of the virus was reported on April 17. As of early July, six cases had been confirmed in

the northeast.120 Because none of the confirmed cases had any travel history or known

contact with suspected cases, WHO has stated that, “it is assumed that there has been

some undetected transmission. Despite the limited number of cases in NES, the risk of

large-scale transmission continues to remain high.”121

 Northwest Syria. In opposition-held areas of northwest Syria (in and around Idlib), local
doctors in March reported deaths that appeared consistent with the virus, but were unable

to confirm due to lack of testing capability.122 As mid-July, four positive cases had been

recorded in the northwest.123

In May, the Syrian government began to lift some previously imposed restrictions; July reports

from Syria’s Ministry of Health showed an increase in the number of new cases.124 Some

observers assess that number of confirmed cases reported by the Syrian government understates

the spread of the virus.125

The capacity of the Syrian government to respond to an outbreak is limited. Syria’s medical

facilities have been significantly damaged or destroyed over the past decade of violent conflict. In

March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that it had documented over 500

attacks on medical facilities since 2016. A March 2020 study by the London School of Economics

estimates that there are only about 325 ICU beds with ventilators across the entire country, mostly

117 COVID-19 Daily Update, World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office. Most recent

confirmed case numbers available on Twitter @WHO ERMO.

118 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Preparedness and Response to COVID-19 Monitoring Report no.1, 14 July 2020.

119 Ibid.

120 UNOCHA and WHO, Syrian Arab Republic: COVID-19 Response Update No. 7, July 5, 2020.

121 Ibid.

122 “‘Wash Our Hands? Some People Can’t Wash Their Kids for a Week.’” New York Times, March 19, 2020.

123 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Preparedness and Response to COVID-19 Monitoring Report no.1, 14 July 2020.

124 “Coronavirus Update: Pandemic Spreads Across Syria,” Syria Report, July 15, 2020.

125 “Coronavirus cases suspiciously low in Syria, but new uptick is spurring the government to act,” Washington Post,

July 18, 2020.

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in government-held urban centers.126 Syrian health officials have blamed the ventilator shortage

on western sanctions (see “U.S. Sanctions on Syria”).127

U.S. Aid to Syria for COVID-19

In March 2020, the United States announced it would provide an additional $16.8 million in

humanitarian assistance for Syria in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.128 Separately, CJTF-

OIR officials announced in April that the Coalition had provided $1.2 million in supplies for

COVID-19 prevention efforts to coalition partners in northeast Syria. A coalition statement

reported that the equipment would help protect medical staff in northeast Syria, as well as guards

responsible for securing Islamic State prisoners. A coalition spokesperson stated, “Under Section

1209 of the United States’ 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, the Counter-ISIS Train and

Equip Fund (CTEF) provides financial support to the SDF to conduct their counter-ISIS

operations. In the context of COVID-19, the CTEF also authorizes the use of funds to procure

personal protective equipment for our partners in Syria and their ISIS detainees. Every purchase

must go through the appropriate request and review processes.”129

U.S. Policy
Since 2011, U.S. policy toward the unrest and conflict in Syria has attempted to pursue parallel

interests and manage interconnected challenges, with varying degrees of success. Among the

objectives identified by successive Administrations and by many Members in successive sessions

of Congress have been

 supporting Syrian-led efforts to demand representative, accountable, and
effective governance;

 seeking a negotiated settlement that includes a transition in Syria away from the
leadership of Bashar al Asad and his supporters;

 limiting or preventing the use of military force by state and nonstate actors
against civilian populations;

 mitigating transnational threats posed by Syria-based Islamist extremist groups;

 meeting the humanitarian needs of internally and externally displaced Syrians;

 preventing the presence and needs of Syrian refugees from destabilizing
neighboring countries;

 limiting the negative effects of other third party interventions on regional and
international balances of power; and

 responding to and preventing the use of chemical weapons.

As Syria’s conflict has changed over time from civil unrest to nationwide military conflict

involving multiple internal and external actors to the apparent resurgence of the Asad

government, to renewed instability driven by economic decline, the policies, approaches, and

126 Gharibah, Mazen and Mehchy, Zaki (2020) COVID-19 pandemic: Syria’s response and healthcare capacity. Policy

Memo. Conflict Research Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

127 “Economic Pressures Force Government to Relax Stay-At-Home Restrictions,” Syria Report, April 15, 2020.

128 State Department Factsheet, “The United States is Leading the Humanitarian and Health Assistance Response to

COVID-19,” March 30, 2020.

129 CJRF-OIR News Release, “Coalition provides COVID-19 equipment in NE Syria,” April 4, 2020.

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priorities of the United States and others also have changed. The United States and its Syrian and

regional partners have not succeeded in inducing or compelling Syrian President Bashar al Asad

to leave office or secured a fundamental reorientation of Syria’s political system as part of a

negotiated settlement process. The United States continues to advocate for an inclusive negotiated

solution, and has responded to Asad’s resumption of political and security control by expanding

economic sanctions on the regime. Forceful interventions in Syria by Russia, Iran, Turkey, the

United States, and Israel have created a fundamentally different set of calculations for

policymakers to consider relative to those that prevailed prior to the conflict.

Trump Administration Statements on Syria Policy

Since 2018, U.S. policy in Syria has sought three primary goals: the enduring defeat of the

Islamic State, a political settlement to the Syria conflict pursuant to UNSCR 2254, and the

withdrawal of Iranian-backed forces.130 The October 2019 Turkish military incursion into

northern Syria and subsequent withdrawal and/or repositioning of the bulk of U.S. forces in the

country raised questions about whether U.S. policy in Syria had (or would) shift. Ambassador

Jeffrey has since reaffirmed that previously articulated U.S. goals for Syria remain U.S. policy.131

When asked whether the enduring defeat of the Islamic State could be accomplished without

ground forces, Jeffrey stated, “We need ground forces. They do not necessarily have to be

American.”132

In December 2019, Defense Secretary Mark Esper stated that, “The United States strategy in the

Middle East seeks to ensure the region is not a safe haven for terrorists, is not dominated by any

power hostile to the United States and contributes to a stable global energy market.”133 Esper

added that the overarching U.S. goal with regard to Syria is to support a U.N.-sponsored political

settlement to the conflict that addresses those three objectives, clarifying that the hostile power in

the Syria context is Iran.

Administration officials have stated that the United States continues to work with the SDF,

despite the group’s decision following the Turkish incursion to coordinate in some areas with the

Asad government. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley stated, “[ … ] we’re still

working with [the SDF] in the eastern portion of northeast Syria, and then they are working with

the Russian and Syrian regime in—in other parts of Syria.”134 In response to questioning from

Members of Congress, U.S. military leaders in December 2019 confirmed that U.S. policy in

Syria remains to work “by with and through” local partners. When asked about what conditions

would need to be in place for U.S. forces to withdraw from Syria, Esper stated, “[ … ] when we

130 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1,

2019-October 25, 2019, p. 27.

131 Ambassador James Jeffrey before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22, 2019; Ambassador James

Jeffrey, Hudson Institute online livestream event, May 15, 2020 (“Transcript: Maximum Pressure on the Assad Regime

for its Chemical Weapons Use and Other Atrocities.”)

132 Ambassador James Jeffrey before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22, 2019.

133 Defense Secretary Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.

134 Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11,

2019.

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could consider redeploying if you will would be when we feel confident that local security and

police forces are capable of handling any type of resurgence [ … ] of ISIS.”135

U.S. Sanctions on Syria

The United States has maintained economic sanctions on Syria since 1979, when the Syrian

government was found to be a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism. The Syria

Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-175; 22 U.S.C. 2151

note) required additional restrictions on U.S. exports, investments, transactions, and diplomatic

relations because of Syrian interference in Lebanon and its support for U.S.-designated Foreign

Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) including Hezbollah and Hamas. The United States has imposed

additional sanctions under nonproliferation legislation since the early 1990s and under national

emergency authorities since the beginning of the conflict in 2011.136 In 2013, the State

Department determined that the government of Syria had used chemical weapons in

contravention of international law, requiring another round of economic and diplomatic

restrictions. For national security reasons, however, restrictions would be applied on a case-by-

case basis.137

U.S. officials have described sanctions as both a tool for changing Syrian government behavior,

and a punitive measure designed to isolate Syria in response to ongoing human rights abuses by

the Asad government. In November 2018 and March 2019, the Department of the Treasury’s

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued advisories warning of the risk of U.S. sanctions

for parties involved in petroleum shipments to the government of Syria. OFAC stated that the

United States aimed to “disrupt support for the Assad regime by preventing the normalization of

economic and diplomatic relations […] The United States is committed to isolating the Assad

regime and its supporters from the global financial and trade system in response to the continued

atrocities committed by the regime against the Syrian people.”138

The State Department has noted that U.S. sanctions “will remain in place until the Syrian regime

and Russia permanently and verifiably adhere” to UNSCR 2254.139 In May 2020, President

Trump renewed for an additional year the national emergency authorities with respect to Syria,

including associated sanctions.1

40

In June, the Trump Administration released regulations providing for the implementation of

Executive Order 13894 of October 2019, based in part on requirements enacted in the Caesar

Syria Civilian Protection Act, which provides for sanctions against individuals determined by the

U.S. government

to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or

attempted to engage in, any of the following in or in relation to Syria:

135 Defense Secretary Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.

136 “U.S. Relations with Syria,” State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, July 23, 2018.

137 Department of State. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. “Determinations regarding Use of

Chemical Weapons in Syria Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of

1991,” Public Notice 8460, September 4, 2013, 78 Federal Register 55236.

138 Department of the Treasury, “OFAC Advisory to the Maritime Petroleum Shipping Community,” March 25, 2019.

139 “The State Department Imposes Sanctions on Individual Responsible for the Violence in Northern Syria,” State

Department Press Statement, March 17, 2020.

140 White House Statement, “Text of a Notice on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to the

Actions of the Government of Syria,” May 7, 2020.

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(1) actions or policies that further threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial

integrity of Syria; or

(2) the commission of serious human rights abuse….

The Administration then announced the designation of 39 individuals and entities pursuant to

Executive Order 13894. Those designated include Syrian President Bashar al Asad, his wife

Asma, and other members of the Asad family and supporters of the government. Secretary of

State Pompeo said

We will continue this campaign in the coming weeks and months to target individuals and

businesses that support the Assad regime and obstruct a peaceful, political resolution of the

conflict as called for by UNSCR 2254. We anticipate many more sanctions and we will not

stop until Assad and his regime stop their needless, brutal war against the Syrian people

and the Syrian government agrees to a political solution to the conflict as called for by

UNSCR 2254.141

U.S. Assistance to Vetted Syrian Groups

U.S. Military Operations; Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Efforts

U.S. Military Presence in Syria

U.S. forces have operated in Syria in support of the counter-IS campaign since 2015. The Special

Operations Joint Task Force, Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR), led by Major General

Eric T. Hill, has been “the primary advise, assist and accompany force in Syria, working closely

with the SDF.”142 SOJTF-OIR has reported to the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent

Resolve (CJTF-OIR), which leads the international coalition to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq

and Syria.143 In September 2019, Lieutenant General Robert “Pat” White assumed command of

CJTF-OIR. U.S. forces have operated in northern and eastern Syria in partnership with the SDF

and in southeast Syria in partnership with the Maghawir al Thawra militia near the At Tanf

garrison adjacent to the tri-border area shared by Syria, Jordan, and Iraq (Figure 3).

Military Authorities

U.S. strike operations against the Islamic State and Al Qaeda-affiliated targets in Syria are

conducted pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). U.S. forces

have operated in Syria for train and equip program purposes as well as to advise and assist U.S.

partner forces, whether or not those specific partner forces were trained and/or armed under the

train and equip program. Such “advise and assist” activities may have been conducted pursuant to

the authorities outlined by train and equip program provisions or pursuant to other defense

authorities defined in law or asserted by the executive branch. This includes military operations

against IS targets conducted pursuant to the 2001 AUMF. U.S. operations in Syria also are

supported in part by the 2014 request of the Iraqi government to the U.N. Security Council for

military support to address the threat of terrorism emanating from Syria. It remains to be seen

141 U.S. State Department, Press Statement on Syria Caesar Act Designations, June 17, 2020.

142 Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Jarrard via teleconference from Baghdad, Iraq, October 31, 2017.

143 See http://www.inherentresolve.mil for an organization chart.

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whether the Iraqi government may seek to amend or rescind that request in light of some Iraqis’

efforts to expel foreign military forces from Iraq and the ongoing U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue.

U.S. Repositions Forces in 2019

Following an October 6 call between President Trump and Turkish President Erdogan, the White

House announced that Turkey would “soon be moving forward with its long-planned operation

into Northern Syria,” and that U.S. forces would “no longer be in the immediate area.”144 A total

of 28 Special Forces Green Berets located along Turkey’s initial “axis of advance” subsequently

withdrew from the border area.145 On October 9, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring into

northern Syria. On October 14, Defense Secretary Esper announced that, at the President’s

direction, the United States would withdraw the approximately 1,000 remaining U.S. troops in

northeast Syria. Esper stated that, “Due to Turkey’s irresponsible actions, the risk to U.S. forces

in northeast Syria has reached an unacceptable level. We are also at risk of being engulfed in a

broader conflict.”146 In an October 19 briefing, Esper reinforced that “all forces” except those at

At Tanf garrison in southeast Syria would be withdrawn “within weeks.”147

On October 21, Secretary Esper stated that U.S. troops located next to oil fields in northeast Syria

“are not in the present phase of withdrawal. The present phase of withdrawal from northeast Syria

involves those troops up along the border.” Esper added that the focus for troops remaining in

Syria would be to “deny access, specifically revenue, to ISIS and any other groups that may want

to seek that revenue to enable their own malign activities.”148On October 21, President Trump

stated, “We’ve secured the oil [ … ] We want to keep the oil. And we’ll work out something with

the Kurds so they have some money, they have some cash flow.”149

Military officials stated on November 7, “I would be cautious with saying that ‘the mission [is] to

secure the oil fields.’ The mission is the defeat of ISIS. The securing of the oil fields is a

subordinate task to that mission, and—and the purpose of that task is to deny ISIS the—the

revenues from that oil infrastructure.”150 On November 13, President Trump stated, “We’re

keeping the oil. We have the oil. The oil is secure. We left troops behind, only for the oil.”151 On

December 11, Defense Secretary Esper clarified, “We are there to ensure the enduring defeat of

ISIS. So, a sub task of that, as we’ve directed to our commander on the ground, is to deny ISIS

access to that oil, because whoever controls that oil controls a resource that allows them to buy

weapons, equipment, fighters, to provide for their communities, etc.”152

144 White House Statement from the Press Secretary, October 6, 2019.

145 Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11,

2019.

146 Department of Defense, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper Regarding Turkey, Syria Border

Actions,” October 14, 2019.

147 DOD transcript, “Secretary of Defense Esper Media Engagement En Route to Afghanistan,” October 19, 2019.

148 DOD transcript, “Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Joint Press Conference With Senior Afghan Officials and

Resolute Support Mission Commander,” October 21, 2019.

149 Remarks by President Trump in Cabinet Meeting, October 21, 2019.

150 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Jonathan Rath

Hoffman and Navy Rear Admiral William D. Byrne Jr., Vice Director, Joint Staff, November 7, 2019.

151 Remarks by President Trump and President Erdoğan of Turkey Before Bilateral Meeting, November 13, 2019.

152 Defense Secretary Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.

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On December 5, Secretary Esper stated in an interview with Reuters that the U.S. military

withdrawal from Syria was complete.153 Esper stated that approximately 600 U.S. troops would

remain in Syria. A DOD Inspector General report on Operation Inherent Resolve covering the

period October-December 2019 stated that U.S. forces in northern Syria had been reduced from

approximately 1,000 to 500. An additional 100 U.S. troops would remain at the At Tanf garrison

in the tri-border area of southeast Syria. In March 2020, CENTCOM Commander Gen. McKenzie

stated that U.S. forces continue to operate alongside the SDF in what he termed the Eastern Syria

Security Area (ESSA). 154 CJTF-OIR has defined the ESSA as spanning from Deir ez Zor in the

south to the M4 highway in the north, and stretching east to the Iraqi border (see Figure 5).155 In

April, officials stated that U.S. training programs in Syria and Iraq under Operation Inherent

Resolve, temporarily suspended due to COVID-19, would resume “as conditions permit.”156

Table 1. Evolution of U.S. Military Presence in Syria

2015 Oct: White House announces that less than 50 U.S. Special Operations Forces

will deploy to Syria to support operations against the Islamic State.157

2016 Dec: Force Management Level (FML) for U.S. personnel in Syria increased to

allow the deployment of up to 500 individuals.

2017 Dec: DOD states that approximately 2,000 U.S. personnel are operating in

Syria.158

2018 Jan: Secretary of State Tillerson states that “the United States will maintain a

military presence in Syria focused on ensuring that ISIS cannot re-emerge.”159

Mar: President Trump states that U.S. troops will leave Syria “very soon.”160

Nov: Special Representative for Syria Engagement James Jeffrey states that, “U.S.

troops will stay on in Syria we say until the enduring defeat of ISIS.”161

Dec: President Trump announces U.S. forces will be returning from Syria

“now.”162

153 “Exclusive: U.S. military completes pullback from northeast Syria, Esper says,” Reuters, December 5, 2019.

154 CENTCOM Commander Gen. McKenzie before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 2020

155 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020.

156 Statement by the Political Directors of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Small Group, April 16, 2020.

157 Press Briefing by the Press Secretary Josh Earnest, October 30, 2015.

158 “Pentagon Announces Troop Levels in Iraq, Syria,” DoD News, December 6, 2017.

159 Rex Tillerson, “Remarks on the Way Forward for the United States Regarding Syria,” Hoover Institute at Stanford

University, January 17, 2018.

160 Remarks by President Trump on the Infrastructure Initiative, March 30, 2018.

161 Telephonic Press Briefing with James Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement, November 7, 2018.

162 Video posted to Twitter (@realDonald Trump), December 19, 2018, 3:10 PM.

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2015 Oct: White House announces that less than 50 U.S. Special Operations Forces
will deploy to Syria to support operations against the Islamic State.157

2019 Feb: White House states U.S. will leave some forces in Syria, seeks troop

contributions from allies to offset planned U.S. withdrawal.

6 Oct: President Trump directs withdrawal of U.S. troops from areas of northern

Syria in advance of Turkish military incursion; 28 U.S. Special Forces withdraw.163

14 Oct: President Trump directs the full withdrawal of the roughly 1,000

remaining U.S. troops in northern Syria.164

21 Oct: Secretary Esper states that U.S. troops located near Syrian oil fields will

remain to deny the Islamic State or “other groups” access to oil revenue.165

5 Dec. Secretary Esper states that the pullback of U.S. forces in Syria complete;

roughly 600 U.S. troops to remain inside the country.166

Syria Train and Equip Program

Overview

In 2014, Congress created a new authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to train and

equip select Syrians in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1209 of

P.L. 113-291, as amended). This authority, as amended by subsequent legislation, enables DOD

“to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, stipends, construction of training

and associated facilities, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian

opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals.” Such assistance

activities are authorized for select purposes, including supporting U.S. efforts to combat the

Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and promoting the conditions for a

negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war.

Congress has not appropriated funds specifically for the Syria train and equip program since the

program’s inception. Rather, through 2019, Congress required the Department of Defense to

reprogram funds from global counterterrorism assistance accounts to operations and maintenance

accounts to support program activities, with each reprogramming subject to the prior approval of

the four congressional defense committees. Amendments to the train and equip authority included

in the FY2020 NDAA changed this procedure and shifted the requirement to prior notification of

each 10% increment of available funds. (Table 2 provides information about program funding

and related requests.)

163 White House Statement from the Press Secretary, October 6, 2019; Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark

Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.

164 Department of Defense, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper Regarding Turkey, Syria Border

Actions,” October 14, 2019.

165 DOD transcript, “Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Joint Press Conference With Senior Afghan Officials and

Resolute Support Mission Commander,” October 21, 2019.

166 “Exclusive: U.S. military completes pullback from northeast Syria, Esper says,” Reuters, December 5, 2019.

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Table 2. Syria Train and Equip Program: Appropriations Actions and Requests

Thousands of Dollars

FY2015

Approved

Transfers

FY2016

Approved
Transfers

FY2017

Defense

Appropriation

FY2018

Request

FY2019

Defense
Appropriation

FY2020

Defense
Appropriation

FY2021

Request

225,000

(O&M

FY15)

116,453

(CTPF

FY15/16)

220,000

(CTEF)

500,000

(CTEF)

252,000

(CTEF)

200,000

(CTEF)
200,000
(CTEF)

220,500

(CTPF
FY15/16)

300,000

(CTPF

FY16/17)

279,500

(CTPF
FY15/16)

—

-157,408

(CTPF
FY15/16)
—

Net

Total

567,592 416,453 220,000 500,000 252,000 200,000 200,000

Combined

Net Total

2,356,045

Source: Executive branch appropriations requests and reprogramming notifications.

Notes: Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF). Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and
Equip Fund (CTEF). The authority for the Syria Train and Equip Program requires the Department of Defense to

submit prior approval notices to transfer funds into various service and department-wide Operations and

Maintenance accounts for program activities. Funds listed were approved for transfer by the required

congressional defense and appropriations committees during the fiscal years noted.

In February 2020, the DOD Inspector General released the results of an audit of accountability

processes for CTEF-funded equipment designated for transfer to vetted Syrians. The audit found

some deficiencies in the CTEF-Syria (CTEF-S) program’s tracking, reporting, storage, and

security for equipment prior to transfer to partner forces, including weapons and ammunition.

Special Operations Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR) took steps to

remediate the concerns identified, and the DOD-IG considers its recommendations closed.167

FY2021 Defense Funding Request

The Administration’s FY2021 defense funding request seeks $200 million in CTEF funds for the

Syria Train and Equip Program, to “develop and sustain a force of 10,000 personnel to secure,

defend, and stabilize territory previously controlled by ISIS.”168 This represents a shift from the

FY2020 request, which envisioned a vetted Syrian opposition (VSO) force of 61,000.169 The

167 DOD Inspector General, Results in Brief – Audit of the DoD’s Accountability of Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and

Syria Train and Equip Fund Equipment Designated for Syria, February 13, 2020.

168 Justification for FY 2021 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF),

February 2020.

169 Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF),

March 2019.

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FY21 request notes that the Defense Department adjusted its planning in light of the additional

drawdown of U.S. forces in Syria.

The request calls for continued support to the following groups operating in eastern Syria:

 Finish Forces, (commando and counterterrorism units) which conduct raids and
clearance operations against Islamic State cells in urban areas.

 Internal Security Forces, which provide civil protection and security via checkpoints
and city patrols.

 Provincial Internal Security Forces (PRISF), which provide wide area security
(including perimeter security operations for uninhabited areas to limit IS freedom of

movement). The PRISF also provide security at facilities for Islamic State detainees.

The request also calls for continued support to a group in southeastern Syria, Jaysh Maghawir

ath Thawra (MaT). MaT operates out of the At Tanf garrison in the Syria-Iraq-Jordan tri-border

area. In addition, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), “through its military councils and oil

protection force, remains a committed partner eligible for military assistance as it continues to

counter ISIS.”

Roughly a quarter of the request would provide logistical support, supplies, and services to VSOs,

including $15 million for basic life support services (subsistence, latrines, power generation) at

detention facility sites operated by local partner forces in Syria.

U.S. Nonlethal and Stabilization Assistance

The Administration’s FY2020 foreign assistance budget request reflected the Trump

Administration’s intent to end U.S. nonlethal (non-humanitarian) assistance for the Syrian

opposition, and to shift funding responsibility for stabilization projects to coalition partners. From

2012 through 2018, the United States provided nonlethal assistance to some Syrian opposition

groups for specific, congressionally approved purposes. The United States also has funded

stabilization efforts in areas of northeastern Syria liberated from Islamic State control. Although

the Administration’s FY2020 and FY2021 requests sought no Syria-specific funding, Congress

appropriated funds for Syria programs and directed specific amounts for stabilization and other

priorities (see below).

Background

Since 2012, the United States has provided a range of nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition

and civil society groups. At the start of the Syria conflict, U.S. ability to provide aid to the Syrian

opposition was limited by restrictions stemming from an existing body of U.S. bilateral sanctions

against Syria, as well as Syria’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism. President Obama invoked

emergency and contingency authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act to enable initial

deliveries. To enable the expanded delivery of aid to Syrian opposition groups, the executive

branch requested and Congress granted specific authorities to provide nonlethal foreign assistance

in Syria for certain purposes notwithstanding other provisions of law. Over time, Congress

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expanded and amended these authorities to focus on areas of congressional priority and to put

into place oversight and reporting requirements.170

Nonlethal and Stabilization Aid to Syria: 2017-2020

Since FY2012, successive Administrations and Congresses have taken evolving approaches to

requests and appropriations of funds for assistance and stabilization programs in Syria. Funding

for both types of projects has been drawn from a mix of regular and OCO funds from multiple

accounts—largely ESF—with the Administration required to notify Congress of its intent to use

these funds for assistance and stabilization efforts in Syria.

FY2017 Funds. In January 2017, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it intended to

spend $230 million in FY2017 ESF-OCO funds (originally appropriated under the Further

Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, P.L. 114-254) to support

stabilization in areas liberated from the Islamic State in Syria. In August and September 2018, the

Trump Administration notified Congress of plans to reprogram those funds and instead rely on

contributions from foreign partners—reflecting a broader assessment by the Administration that

the United States was bearing more than its share of costs in regards to Syria stabilization. $214

million in FY2017 funds ultimately were obligated for Syria programs.

FY2018 Funds. The FY2018 appropriations act (P.L. 115-141) designated $500 million in

FY2018 funds from various foreign assistance accounts for a “Relief and Recovery Fund” (RRF)

for areas liberated or at risk from the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations. The

accompanying explanatory statement stated that funds were appropriated, among other purposes,

“for non-lethal assistance programs to address the needs of civilians affected by conflict in Syria

in a manner consistent with the prior fiscal year,” but neither the act nor the statement allocated a

specific amount for Syria. FY2018 RRF funds were available for Syria stabilization, but as of

June 2020, FY2018 monies had only been notified for Syria-related atrocity crime accountability

programs as directed by the act.

FY2019 Funds. The FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6) stated that, of the

funds appropriated under the ESF, INCLE, and PKO accounts, no less than $40 million should be

made available for nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria, of which not less than $7 million

should be made available for emergency medical and rescue response, and chemical weapons use

investigations. Notably, the act stated only that nonlethal assistance is to be provided for

170 The FY2014 foreign operations appropriations act (Section 7041(i) of Division K of P.L. 113-76), as expanded and

extended by the FY2015 act (Section 7041(h) of Division J of P.L. 113-235), made FY2015 and prior year ESF funding

available “notwithstanding any other provision of law” for select nonlethal purposes inside Syria. The FY2016

appropriations act (Section 7041(h) of Division K of P.L. 114-113) extended this authority further, granting

notwithstanding exceptions for FY2016 ESF funds as well as for FY2016 funds in the International Narcotics Control

and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) accounts. The Obama Administration used the

INCLE and PKO accounts to support justice sector activities in opposition-held areas of Syria and to provide nonlethal

assistance to select armed opposition groups. The appropriations acts for FY2017 (Section 7041(j) of Division J of P.L.

115-31) and FY2018 (Section 7041(k) of Division K of P.L. 115-141) further amended and specified the categories of

assistance authorized to be provided from these accounts. Prior to the enactment of specific notwithstanding authority

by Congress, the President was required to assert emergency and contingency authorities (i.e., Sections 451 and 614 of

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) to provide nonlethal assistance to the unarmed Syrian opposition and

to communities inside Syria.179 In 2012, the Administration began to use these emergency and contingency authorities

to provide food rations and medical supplies to the National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC)

and the Turkey-based Syrian Military Council (SMC).

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stabilization purposes. This was a significant departure from the FY2018 Consolidated

Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141), which authorized the use of appropriated funds for 14 listed

purposes, including establishing inclusive local governance, bolstering the viability of the Syrian

opposition, developing civil society and independent media, and countering extremism. In

October 2019, the White House announced $50 million for stabilization, religious and ethnic

minority communities, accountability, first responders, and the removal of explosive remnants of

war (ERW).171 To date, $54.5 million in FY2019 funds have been notified for Syria, including

$35.5 million in ESF-OCO funds and $19 million in ESF-OCO, INCLE, and NADR-CW funds

allocated to the RRF.

FY2020. The Administration’s FY2020 State and Foreign Operations request for Syria sought no

ESDF or NADR funding for Syria-specific programs, in contrast to the FY2019 request which

sought $130 million and $44.5 million for Syria programs in the two accounts, respectively.

Similar to the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the FY2020 Further Consolidated

Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-94) makes not less than $40 million available for nonlethal

stabilization in Syria, and specifies that no less than $7 million shall be used for emergency

medical and rescue response, and chemical weapons use investigations.

Table 3. Nonlethal and Stabilization Funding for Syria

$, millions

Fiscal Year FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021

Syria Request

745 ESF-OCO

1 INCLE-OCO

44 NADR-OCO

50 PKO-OCO

150 ESDF

41.5 NADR

130 ESDF

44.5 NADR
– –

Total Syria

Request
840 191.5 174.5 – –

Other Admin

request (not

Syria-specific)

1,000 RRF 50 RRF 40 RRF 145 RRF

5,900 IHA

135 RRF

Syria-specific

Appropriations
– –

40

ESF/INCLE/PKO

40
ESF/INCLE/PKO

TBD

Other

Appropriations
169 RRF 500 RRF 200 RRF 200 RRF TBD

Actual 214 2.5 54.5 (initial) – TBD

Source: U.S. State Department data, FY2017- FY2021 Budget Request Materials.

Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; ESDF = Economic Support and Development Fund; INCLE = International

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs; PKO

= Peacekeeping Operations; RRF = Relief and Recovery Fund; IHA = International Humanitarian Assistance.

FY2021 Request. The Administration’s FY2021 State and Foreign Operations request seeks no

funds for Syria-specific programs. The request would allocate $135 million to the Relief and

Recovery Fund, to support efforts in places including Syria. The request also seeks $5.9 billion

171 White House Statement from the Press Secretary, October 12, 2019.

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for the new International Humanitarian Assistance account (IHA) to address humanitarian needs

in crisis areas including Syria.

Syria START Programs

Following the closure of U.S. Embassy Damascus in February 2012, several regionally based

teams were established to monitor and implement U.S. assistance programs. A Syria Transition

Assistance and Response Team (START) operated from Turkey and coordinated U.S.

humanitarian and foreign assistance to northern Syria, including assistance to opposition-held

areas. In Jordan, the Southern Syria Assistance Platform (SSAP) monitored and coordinated

comparable U.S. humanitarian and foreign assistance to southern and eastern Syria, including

assistance to opposition-held areas. The State Department and USAID also deployed a small team

of U.S. civilian assistance officials (known as START Forward) inside areas of northern Syria

where DOD-trained and/or equipped local forces were in control.

These programs have undergone significant changes since 2018. Some START programs were

amended and/or ended in 2018 in line with the Administration’s plans to focus on stabilizing

former IS-held areas to the east. Cross-border SSAP programs reportedly were halted in mid-

2018, after Syrian military forces regained control of southwestern Syria.172 In late 2018, the

announced withdrawal of U.S. forces was preceded by the withdrawal of U.S. civilian personnel

from northern Syria. In 2019, the Administration announced that some U.S. forces would remain

in Syria, and START Forward personnel redeployed to the country in July.173 In October 2019,

following the Turkish military incursion into northern Syria, START Forward personnel were

again withdrawn from Syria, although most Department of State and USAID assistance activities

continued outside of the Turkish incursion zone.174

Stabilization Programming in Areas Liberated from the Islamic State

To date, stabilization programming for areas of northeast Syria liberated from IS control has

comprised four primary lines of effort: (1) demining, (2) promotion of local governance and civil

society, (3) rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, and (4) promotion of economic growth and

development.175 U.S. funding has included support for ethnic and religious minorities, civil

society and local governance, first responders, justice and accountability efforts, restoration of

essential services, community security, and ERW-removal.

In March 2020, USAID reported that it was funding approximately 240 projects in northeast

Syria, largely agricultural projects focusing on economic growth and food security. USAID also

reported that donor funds were “nearly expended,” and future donor commitments uncertain. As a

result, the agency reported that, “USAID programming has decelerated pending an infusion of

additional resources.”176

172 Written Statement of Robert W. Jenkins, Deputy Assistant Administrator, U.S. Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and

Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East & North Africa,

November 29, 2018.

173 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1,

2019-October 25, 2019, p. 42.

174 Ibid., p. 40.

175 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1,

2019 – June 30, 2019, p. 35.

176 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020, p. 9.

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In addition to funding shortfalls, some stabilization projects were relocated as a result of Turkey’s

October 2019 incursion into northern Syria, the subsequent establishment of the Turkish-

controlled OPS area, and the expansion of Russian and Syrian military units into areas formally

patrolled by U.S. forces. As of 2020, ongoing stabilization projects throughout the country face

the additional challenge of adjusting operations to account for the threat posed by COVID-19.

Outlook & Challenges
The victory of pro-Asad forces in the broader conflict appears likely, and, from a U.S.

perspective, that may further complicate several unresolved issues, including

 the stabilization and governance of areas recaptured from the Islamic State;

 the resolution of security threats posed by extremist groups in northwest Syria;

 the return and reintegration of internally and externally displaced Syrians;

 the reconstruction of conflict-damaged areas;

 the management of Syria-based threats to Syria’s neighbors; and

 the terms of a post-conflict political order in Syria.

In light of current trends and conditions related to these issues, Administration officials and

Members of Congress may reexamine appropriate terms and conditions for U.S. investment, force

deployment, and the nature of relationships with U.S. partners in and around Syria. Looking

forward, challenges for U.S. policy in Syria may include:

Consolidating Gains against the Islamic State

U.S. efforts to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State have focused on stabilization

programming in IS-liberated areas as well as ongoing support to local partner forces. The Trump

Administration in 2019 sought to shift financial responsibility for stabilization programs (which

have included activities such as restoring electricity to liberated areas) to coalition partners, while

also redeploying U.S. military personnel within and out of Syria. The State Department has

reported that stabilization activities via the START (Turkey-based), SSAP (Jordan-based), and

START-Forward platforms continue, albeit “almost exclusively with Coalition contributions.”177

To the extent that it relies on contributions by coalition partners, the future of stabilization

programming in Syria appears uncertain.

As noted above, the Trump Administration did not seek funds for Syria stabilization in its

FY2020 budget request, but Congress appropriated funds for this purpose. The Further

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 states that not less than $40 million shall be made

available for nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria. The act also makes additional funds

available for IS-liberated areas, including via the Relief and Recovery Fund and the Prevention

and Stabilization Fund. These funds could be used for stabilization activities in Syria, but are not

specifically designated as such.

The Administration has come under some scrutiny for failing to obligate funds appropriated by

Congress for Syria stabilization. The Syria Study Group report, issued in September 2019,

177 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1,

2019-October 25, 2019, p. 42.

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recommended that the Administration obligate

unspent funds in the Relief and Recovery Fund

designated for areas liberated from the Islamic State (Congress has not appropriated these funds

on a country-specific basis, but has used explanatory statement language to authorize their use in

specific countries).

U.S. support to local partner forces has been another key element in the U.S. effort to securing the

enduring defeat of the Islamic State and consolidating coalition gains. While the Administration

in 2019 reduced its troop presence in Syria from roughly 1,000 to 600 forces, senior U.S. military

leaders have emphasized their view that a continued U.S. military presence in Syria is vital to

preventing the re-emergence of the Islamic State. In December 2019, Joint Chief of Staff

Chairman Gen. Milley stated, “If we withdraw all our capabilities and support to the indigenous

governments and we don’t continue to operate by, with, and through them, then I believe that the

conditions will be set for [an Islamic State] resurgence.”178 Milley assessed that, in his view, the

SDF does not have “the independent capability” to prevent an Islamic State resurgence in the

absence of U.S. support. Moreover, ongoing political debate in Iraq concerning the future of U.S.

and other foreign forces in that country may affect related U.S. and coalition operations in Syria

during 2020.

Preserving Relationships with Partner Forces

Numerous Members of Congress have expressed concern about what they describe as the

abandonment of U.S. Kurdish allies in Syria. In October 2019, Senator Menendez stated

It was the Kurds who were largely our ground forces. It’s the Kurds that lost about 11 to

13,000 of their people. It’s the Kurds that were detaining over 10,000 ISIS fighters and

families for us [ … ] when you betray the person who you—the entity who you were fighting

on the battlefield with and you basically leave them when you’re finished using them and

say, you know, you’re on your own, it’s a hell of a way to send a global message that, in

fact, don’t fight for the United States because when they’re finished with you they’ll let

you die on the battlefield.

President Trump has defended his decision, stating, “We never agreed to protect the Kurds for the

rest of their lives [ … ] Where’s an agreement that said we have to stay in the Middle East for the

rest of humanity, for the rest of civilization, to protect the Kurds?”179 Defense Secretary Esper

also stated, “The handshake with the Kurds, with the SDF in particular, was a handshake that we

would ensure that we would defeat ISIS. It was not a handshake that said yes, we would also help

you establish an autonomous Kurdish state. It was also not a handshake that said yes, we would

fight Turkey for you.”180 At the same time, U.S. military officials have stated that “allies and

partners, both nation states but also indigenous partners like the SDF, are important to fulfill our

national security objectives.”181 Some have noted that the U.S. raid that killed Islamic State leader

178 Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11,

2019.

179 Remarks by President Trump in Cabinet Meeting, October 21, 2019.

180 Secretary of Defense Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.

181 Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11,

2019.

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Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was reportedly made possible by information provided by an informant

run by Kurdish intelligence officers.182

It is unclear whether or how changes in U.S. posture in Syria during 2019 will durably reshape

the U.S. relationship with Syrian Kurds. Military officials in late 2019 stated that joint U.S.-SDF

operations against the Islamic State had resumed, and Congress has appropriated funds for the

continued training and equipping of partner forces in Syria including the SDF. However, the

perceived uncertainty regarding U.S. policy in Syria and the future of the U.S. military presence

may prompt U.S. partner forces, including Kurds, to seek support elsewhere—including from

U.S. adversaries.

In early 2019, CJTF-OIR assessed that it was possible the SDF would splinter into separate

security force factions, depending in part on their negotiations with the Syrian government.

CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF “seeks to maintain semi-autonomous control of northeastern

Syria, either by controlling the territory with support from Coalition forces or by striking a deal

favorable to the constituent parts of the SDF with the Syrian regime and Russia.”183 It is possible

that as part of such an arrangement, the Syrian government and/or Russia could insist on

limitations being placed on U.S. operations, with uncertain but potentially negative effects on

U.S. operations against the Islamic State.

Countering Iran

U.S. military assessments continue to highlight the risks posed by foreign states operating in

Syria, particularly Iran. In late 2019, CENTCOM reported that Iran continued to maintain a

presence inside Syria in support of the Asad government and Iran’s own strategic objectives.184

CJTF-OIR reported to the DOD OIG that Iran’s goals in Syria include “retaining access to

Hezbollah in Lebanon, maintaining the ability to strike Israel from Syrian territory, maintaining a

military presence and military influence in Syria, and recouping investment through securing

economic and security contracts in Syria.”185

Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about Iranian drones conducting overflight

operations of U.S. bases in Syria and Iraq, which Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Milley has

described as “a very serious threat.”186 On at least two occasions in 2017, the U.S. Air Force shot

down armed Iranian UAVs that had advanced towards coalition forces in Syria with “hostile

intent.”187 Pro-Iranian militias operating in Syria, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), also may pose

a threat to U.S. forces. In December 2019, the United States launched retaliatory airstrikes on two

KH facilities in eastern Syria (and three KH facilities in Iraq) following a KH rocket attack in

182 “Kurdish informant provided key intel in operation that killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” NBC News,

October 28, 2019; “Trump’s Syria Troop Withdrawal Complicated Plans for al-Baghdadi Raid,” New York Times,

October 27, 2019.

183 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1,

2019-March 31, 2019.

184 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1,

2019-October 25, 2019, p. 32.

185 Ibid.

186 Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11,

2019.

187 “DoD Official: Sole Focus in Iraq, Syria Remains on ISIS,” CENTCOM, June 20, 2017.

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northern Iraq that killed a U.S. contractor. U.S. personnel in Syria may be vulnerable to additional

attacks by Iran-backed forces, particularly following the January 2020 U.S. airstrike that killed

Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qassem

Soleimani.

Addressing Humanitarian Challenges in Extremist-Held Areas

The international response to the humanitarian crisis in Idlib reflects a broader debate regarding

humanitarian assistance and counterterrorism, and how donors should balance the needs of

civilians against the risks that extremist groups could inadvertently benefit from, divert, or

influence the distribution of humanitarian assistance.188 Areas of Idlib province are the most

significant zone remaining outside of government control in western Syria, and the civilian

population has been described as caught between various extremist groups operating in the area

(some affiliated with Al Qaeda), and Syrian military forces which seek to bring the province

under central government control. Nevertheless, the presence of extremist groups in Idlib has

complicated the provision of humanitarian assistance to the province, out of concern that aid

could fall into the hands of Al Qaeda affiliated groups.189 Similarly, U.S. military assessments

have stated that, within camps for internally displaced persons, “DoD, DoS, and USAID have

struggled to address the often competing needs of providing security, isolating ISIS members and

supporters, preventing the spread of ISIS ideology, and providing for the health and welfare of

camp residents—who are mostly women and children.”190

Assisting Displaced Syrians

Conflict in Syria has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and has displaced

millions within the country and beyond its borders. As the intensity of conflict has declined in

some areas of the country, displaced Syrians have faced difficult choices about whether or how to

return to their home areas amid uncertainty about security, potential political persecution, crime,

economic conditions, lost or missing documentation, and prospects for recovery. In 2018, the

Asad government passed legislation enabling the state to designate land anywhere in the country

for redevelopment and displace its current residents—a measure which could alter the

demographics of formerly opposition-held areas and complicate the return of refugees and

displaced persons.191 Humanitarian advocates and practitioners continue to raise concerns about

the security and protection of returnees and displaced individuals in light of conditions in many

areas of the country and questions about the Syrian government’s approach to political

reconciliation.192

In addition, mechanisms and mandates that have provided for the delivery of humanitarian

assistance across the Syrian border without the consent of the Syrian government are facing

188 See for example, Jessica Trisko Darden, “Humanitarian assistance has a terrorism problem. Can it be resolved?”

War on the Rocks, January 3, 2019; Joel R. Charny, “Counter-terrorism and humanitarian action: the perils of zero

tolerance,” War on the Rocks, March 20, 2019.

189 “US tightens counter-terror clampdown on Syria aid,” The New Humanitarian, September 21, 2018.

190 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | January 1,

2020 – March 31, 2020, p. 7.

191 “Law No. 10 of 2018: Housing, Land, and Property,” Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, December 10, 2018.

192 See for example, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020: Syria (pp. 539-546).

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increasingly forceful opposition by Russia and China at the U.N. Security Council. These states

argue that the situation on the ground has changed, making it possible for aid to transit through

official checkpoints, and that cross border aid mechanisms should be evaluated and adjusted in

light of these developments.193 In January 2020, the Security Council renewed a more limited

mandate for cross-border delivery of humanitarian assistance for six months instead of twelve.

The United States remains the leading donor for international humanitarian efforts related to

Syria, and U.S. policymakers may face a series of decisions about whether or how to continue or

adapt U.S. support in light of changing conditions and administrative and logistical constraints.

Preventing Involuntary Refugee Returns

Despite the various impediments to the safe and voluntary return of refugees to Syria,

neighboring states that have hosted thousands of Syrian refugees since the beginning of the crisis

in 2011are increasingly calling for refugees to return home. In Lebanon, which hosts the largest

number of Syrian refugees per capita (Syrian refugees are estimated to comprise up to a quarter of

the population) political leaders have stated that the return of refugees should not be contingent

on a political solution to the Syrian conflict.194

In a September 2019 address to the U.N. General Assembly, Lebanese President Aoun argued that

the conditions for the “safe and dignified return” of refugees to Syria have been met, stating, “per

international reports, the security situation on most of the Syrian territories has become stable, the

military confrontations have become confined to the Idlib region, and the Syrian State has

officially declared, time and again, that it welcomes the return of its displaced citizens.”195 Aoun
stated that more than 250,000 displaced persons had returned to Syria, and accused some states of

trying to hinder refugee return by “sowing fear among the displaced.”196 In some cases, the return

of refugees to Syria has been facilitated by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).197 It is unclear

whether all refugees departed Lebanon voluntarily.198 UNHCR has continued to assess that

conditions are not right for the large-scale return of refugees to Syria.

Turkey, which hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees overall, has proposed using

international funds to resettle a portion of its refugee population in territory it currently occupies

in northern Syria.199 In November 2019, President Erdogan presented the U.N. Secretary General

with a plan for “new settlement areas for the return of Syrian refugees.”200 The plan, which was

reviewed by some media organizations, reportedly would require more than $26 billion in foreign

193 “Describing Vast Scale of Need, Humanitarian Official Urges Security Council to Renew Authorization for

Lifesaving Cross-Border Aid Delivery in Syria,” SC/14061, December 19, 2019.

194 “Aoun Calls for Gradual Return of Syrian Refugees,” Asharq Al Awsat, March 8, 2018.

195 Address by Lebanese President Michel Aoun at the 74th session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 2019.

196 Address by Lebanese President Michel Aoun at the 74th session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 2019.

197 “Aoun: Lebanon Could Organize Return of Syrian Refugees with Damascus,” Asharq Al Awsat, May 4, 2019; “The

return of Syrian refugee families from the camps of Ersal to the village of Essal el-Ward in Syria,” July 12, 2017,

http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb.

198 Amnesty International, “Lebanon: Authorities must immediately halt deportation of Syrian refugees,” August 27,

2019.

199 “Turkey Wants Refugees to Move to a ‘Safe Zone.’ It’s a Tough Sell.” New York Times, November 1, 2019;

“Erdogan renews call for ‘safe zone’ support as Syrians return,” Al Monitor, December 17, 2019.

200 “Readout of the Secretary-General’s meeting with H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey,”

http://www.un.org/sg/en, November 1, 2019.

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assistance.201 Some observers have questioned whether the plan would alter the demographics of

northern Syria by moving (primarily) Sunni Arab refugees into areas formerly administered by

Kurdish forces.202 U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres “stressed the basic principles relating

to the voluntary, safe and dignified of return of refugees,” but stated that UNHCR would form a

team to study the Turkish proposal.203 In late 2019, human rights organizations stated that it is

“likely” that hundreds of Syrian refugees had been detained and returned to Syria.204 In a

December 2019 hearing, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper also stated that Turkey was beginning

to return refugees to northern Syria.205

Managing Reconstruction Aid

In 2017, U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura estimated that Syria’s reconstruction

will cost at least $250 billion, and a group of U.N.-convened experts estimated in August 2018

that the cost of conflict damage (including lost economic opportunity during the conflict) could

exceed $388 billion.206 The Trump Administration has stated its intent not to contribute to the

reconstruction of Asad-controlled Syria absent fundamental political change and to use U.S.

diplomatic influence to discourage other international assistance to Asad-controlled Syria.

Congress also has acted to restrict the availability of U.S. funds for assistance projects in Asad-

controlled areas.207

In the absence of U.S. engagement, other actors such as Russia or China could conceivably

provide additional assistance for reconstruction purposes, but may be unlikely to mobilize

sufficient resources or adequately coordinate investments with other members of the international

community to meet Syria’s considerable needs. Predatory conditional assistance could also

further indebt the Syrian government to these or other international actors and might strengthen

strategic ties between Syria and third parties in ways inimical to U.S. interests. A lack of

reconstruction, particularly of critical infrastructure, could delay the country’s recovery and

exacerbate the legacy effects of the conflict on the Syrian population, with negative implications

for the country’s security and stability.

Supporting a Political Settlement to the Conflict

Since 2011, the United States has pursued a policy of seeking fundamental political change in

Syria, initially reflected in U.S. calls for President Asad to step aside. The Trump Administration

has stated that it seeks behavior change rather than regime change in Syria. However, the

Administration still calls for a political settlement to the Syria conflict based on UNSCR 2254,

which requires the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of U.N.-supervised elections.

201 “Turkey Pitches Plan to Settle 1 Million Refugees in Northern Syria,” Foreign Policy, December 18, 2019.

202 Ibid.

203 “Readout of the Secretary-General’s meeting with H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey,”

http://www.un.org/sg/en, November 1, 2019.

204 “Sent to a war zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian refugees,” Amnesty International, October 25, 2019.

205 Defense Secretary Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.

206 Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Syria, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, November 27, 2017; and,

U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, “Experts discuss post-conflict reconstruction policies after

political agreement in Syria,” August 7, 2018.

207 Section 7041(i)(2)(C) of Division G of P.L. 116-94 states that FY2020 funds made available for authorized purposes

in Syria “should not be used in areas of Syria controlled by a government led by Bashar al-Assad or associated forces.”

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Asad’s reelection in self-administered 2014 elections and his subsequent reconsolidation of

security control in much of western Syria may limit the likelihood of substantive political change

in line with U.S. preferences. U.N.-led negotiations over a settlement of the conflict remain open-

ended, but appear unlikely to result in the meaningful incorporation of opposition figures or

priorities into new governing arrangements in the short term. Alternative negotiations backed by

Asad’s Russian and Iranian supporters have their own logic and momentum, and place Syria’s

opposition groups in a political predicament. Congress and the Administration may reexamine

what remaining points of leverage the United States can exercise or whether new points of

leverage could be developed that might better ensure a minimally acceptable political outcome.

Members of Congress and Administration officials may differ among themselves over what such

an outcome might entail. Perceptions among Syrian opposition supporters of U.S. abandonment

or acquiescence to an Asad victory may also have long-term diplomatic and security

consequences for the United States and its partners.

Monitoring Destabilizing Economic and Political Trends

In 2020, international organizations have highlighted what they describe as “Syria’s severe

economic crisis.”208 In April, the World Food Program reported that the price of basic food staples

in Syria has increased by more than 100% over the past year; since mid-March some areas have

seen average price increases of 40%-50% for food staples.209 In early June 2020, some analysts

highlighted what they described as the collapse of the Syrian pound (SYP), which briefly traded

at over 3,000 to the dollar (as compared to 1,000 SYP to the dollar in January 2020, and 50 SYP

to the dollar pre-2011).210 President Asad also has faced rare public criticism, including from key

family members211 and foreign allies.212 Renewed protests in some parts of the country have

highlighted public discontent at state corruption and worsening economic conditions.213 At the

same time, renewed unrest in some areas previously recaptured from opposition forces have

prompted some analysts to describe Asad’s position as vulnerable despite the regime’s military

gains.214 It remains to be seen whether deteriorating economic conditions in Syria eventually

could erode broader support for Asad among regime loyalists, and potentially represent a new

destabilizing element within the country’s civil conflict.

208 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock Briefing to

the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, New York, 29 April 2020.

209 Ibid; “Food Prices Across Syria Double In A Year: WFP,” AFP, April 27, 2020.

210 “Currency Collapse Increases Social and Political Risks,” Syria Report, June 10, 2020; “Syrian pound hits new lows

over regional tensions – traders,” Reuters, January 13, 2020.

211 “Syria’s Assad seeks to control economy, goes after cousin,” Associated Press, June 4, 2020.

212 “Ex-Russia envoy to Syria slams Assad regime as unfit to rule,” Middle East Monitor, April 21, 2020; “Has

Moscow really turned against Assad?” Atlantic Council, May 12, 2020.

213 “Protest in southwest Syria against faltering economy, corruption,” Al Jazeera, June 7, 2020.

214 “Syria’s Assad is confronting the toughest challenges of the 9-year war,” Washington Post, May 25, 2020;

“Assassinations in southern Syria expose limits of Assad’s control,” Financial Times, April 28, 2020.

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Appendix. Syria Study Group Findings and

Recommendations
In September 2019, the congressionally mandated Syria Study Group (SSG) released its final

report and recommendations. The group’s principal findings were as follows (direct quotations):

 The liberation of ISIS-held territory does not eliminate the group’s threat to the United States.

 The ISIS detainee population is a long-term challenge that is not being adequately addressed.

 Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups remain active in Syria and threaten the United States.

 Despite Israeli air strikes and U.S. sanctions, Iran continues to entrench itself in Syria; Russia

and Iran show few serious signs of divergence.

 Assad has not won the conflict in Syria.

 Progress toward a political settlement to the Syria conflict has stalled, and Assad shows no

willingness to compromise with his opponents.

 The United States underestimated Russia’s ability to use Syria as an arena for regional

influence.

 U.S.-Turkey relations are strained in Syria by starkly diverging views of the SDF. A Turkish

incursion into northeastern Syria would represent a major setback to U.S. aims in Syria and a

new crisis for the U.S.-Turkish relationship.

 Although the SDF has been a highly effective partner in the fight against ISIS, it must

undergo a transition to ensure stability in northeastern Syria.

 The Assad regime’s systematic targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure constitutes

war crimes and demands accountability, as well as enhanced efforts to protect civilians.

 Syria’s humanitarian crisis, not least the challenges posed by internally displaced people and

refugees, will reverberate for decades. Most refugees are unlikely to return voluntarily given

current conditions in Syria.

 Despite these challenges, the United States maintains leverage to shape an outcome in Syria

that protects core U.S. national security interests.

The group’s principal recommendations were as follows:

 Halt the U.S. military withdrawal, consolidate gains in IS liberated areas, help local

communities establish alternate forms of governance

 Update the U.S. military mission to head off an IS insurgency

 Prepare contingency scenarios for an IS resurgence, a military engagement with Iranian

and/or Russian proxies forces, and a Turkish incursion into northeast Syria

 Return START Forward personnel to Syria, restart U.S. stabilization funding, obligate

unspent funds in the Relief and Recovery Fund

 Press the SDF to govern more inclusively and sever links with PKK leadership

 Develop an internationally coordinated strategy for addressing the challenge posed by IS

detainees in Syria; designate one senior U.S. official charged with implementing a coherent

strategy to address all IS detainees populations; increase CTEF funding and update

authorized activities for Syria

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 Assist the Iraqi Security Forces in preventing an IS resurgence in Iraq

 Continue to isolate the Asad regime through sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and denial of

reconstruction aid

 Test Russia’s willingness to support a political settlement but avoid making concessions to

Moscow

 Prevent further entrenchment by Iran and its proxies through continued support of Israeli

airstrikes, sanctions enforcement, and maintaining the U.S. military presence at the At Tanf

garrison in southeastern Syria

 Seek areas for cooperation with Turkey to address its legitimate security concerns while

pressing Turkey to avoid any incursion into northeast Syria

 Address humanitarian crisis in Idlib while countering the presence of terrorist groups

Bolster humanitarian efforts; support neighboring states hosting refugees. Oppose efforts to

forcibly return Syrian refugees; resume accepting Syrian refugees in the United States.

Author Information

Carla E. Humud, Coordinator

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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1. 2020-07-27T11:16:22-0400