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Biological Roots of Moral
Development Assignment

OVERVIEW

You will summarize the assigned readings and devise a lesson plan in the context of higher
education. Teaching skills are essential in academia. Reading for comprehension is one thing,
and reading for the purpose of teaching is another. You will be given opportunities to read for the
purpose of teaching in the context of higher education while thinking about and devising plans
for how to deliver of the content of the readings.

INSTRUCTIONS

Details:

Read

Chapter 19-22

1. While completing the assigned readings for the Module: Week, think about which topic
to cover in your lecture for college students. State your topic and come up 3-4 objectives.
The first heading in the paper should be “Topic and Objectives.” When listing objectives,
start with “After this lecture, students will be able to…”

2. The second heading should be “Summary of the Lecture Content.” Citing the assigned
readings (with pages as necessary), summarize the content to be delivered in class. Your
summary should be at least 2 pages, double-spaced. Do not go over 3 pages. The goal is
not to discuss all of the details to be discussed in class but to summarize the lecture
content noting the most important concepts in a coherent manner (showing their
connections to the overall topic and objectives).

3. Provide a 2-page, double-spaced, lesson plan for an hour-long lecture on the chosen
topic. You can be creative here, but provide an outline of the lecture followed by concrete
in-class activity/discussion ideas.

Further instructions:

1. This assignment is for your future teaching opportunities, so think concretely about your
teaching context as a doctoral-level instructor and make it as useful for you as possible.

2. Use current APA format with appropriate citations and headings as well as a reference
page, but do not include the title and abstract.

Please see the Summary and Lesson Plan page under the Summary and Lesson Plan
Resources for a link to Bloom’s Taxonomy information to consider as your write your
objectives.

Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.

Ch .19 The Neurobiological Bases of Empathic Concern for Others

There has been a remarkable increase in theory and research on the neurobiological foundations
of empathy, sympathy, compassion, prosocial behavior, and altruism in recent years.
In this chapter, we examine how empathic concern for others is connected to genetic,
neurophysiological, hormonal, and autonomic physiological functioning. Neurobiological
researchers take various positions on the extent to which empathy and related constructs
are reflective of morality, precursors to morality, or fundamental building blocks of morality.
Our position conforms to the latter view: Empathy is a primary motivational force
for caring behaviors toward others in need (de Waal, 2008). As a basic, essential element
of compassion, empathy forms the basis for the capacity to think and act with positive,
care-oriented morality. We begin with a brief consideration of definitional and theoretical
issues before turning to the exciting new insights arising from empirical research.

Empathy is defined here as the recognition and sharing of another’s emotional state. Recognition
entails cognitive empathy, or the capacity to comprehend another’s emotional
state and understand another’s perspective. Shared emotional states reflect affective empathy,
or vicarious affective arousal that might be similar to the other’s emotion. This is
distinct from emotional contagion, a close matching of the other’s emotion, or personal
distress, a self-focused aversive reaction to another’s distress or pain, in that affective empathy
is a resonant emotion that is felt on behalf of the other person (Zahn-Waxler &
Robinson, 1995). Closely related to empathy are sympathy and compassion, which reflect
an orientation toward another’s distress or pain, feelings of sadness or concern on behalf
of that person, and a desire to promote that person’s well-being. Prosocial behavior constitutes
actions taken to benefit another’s well-being, including actions to alleviate their
distress. Thus, the broad behavioral category of prosocial behavior can encompass altruism,

which promotes another’s needs at some cost to oneself. These related affective, cognitive,
and behavioral reactions all reflect, to some degree, expressions of empathic concern for
the well-being of others (Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, Usher, & Bridges, 2000).

Numerous theories have attempted to reconcile the apparent incompatibility of feeling
and acting toward the well-being of others with the drive for individual survival and reproductive
success emphasized by traditional evolutionary perspectives. According to kin
selection processes, a network of genetically related individuals within a population will
cooperate and engage in altruistic acts with one another and thereby increase the average
genetic fitness of the network as a whole, even if such behavior reduces the individual
fitness of certain members of the group (Wilson, 1978). With evolutionary pressure having
selected for a propensity for cooperative or altruistic behaviors toward kin, one can
expect that such behaviors would occasionally be directed toward unrelated others (West,
El Mouden, & Gardner, 2011).
Some sociobiologists have suggested that altruism evolved through reciprocity (Trivers,
1971). Under certain conditions, natural selection favors altruistic behaviors because these
actions eventually benefit the altruistic individual at a later time, through quid pro quo
returns of the favor, or by increasing the benevolent actor’s stature and status within the
community (McAndrew, 2007). Others have argued that altruism among nongenetically
related members of social species that live in group contexts (including humans) increases
the odds of reproduction by the group and, thus, species survival (e.g., Rachlin, 2002;
Sober & Wilson, 1998). A genetic propensity toward concern for others facilitates group
cooperation, cohesion, and success against threats and challenges. Even if some altruistic
individuals are personally disadvantaged by their own actions, as the group thrives and
grows, the genetic basis for compassion and helping also is perpetuated.

Research on the Biological Bases of Empathy

These theoretical perspectives put the roots of human empathy in our biology. In the
balance of this chapter, we review of the evidence for this proposal from studies of human
neurobiology. Three central themes emerged repeatedly in our review: definition
and measurement, levels of analysis, and development. Framed as questions, first, how do
researchers’ definitions of empathy and related constructs contribute to their identification
of neurobiological correlates, and how are the contexts or procedures for measuring
empathic concern associated with the neurobiological features identified? Second, what
can we glean about cohesive or synergistic functioning of multiple levels of neurobiological
activity during empathic responses? And third, is there any evidence for age-related
changes in the neurobiology of empathy?

Ch. 20 The Moral Baby

Most developmental research into morality so far has focused on children and adolescents,
as can be seen in the contributions of this current volume. We think that the time is ripe to take a
serious look at the moral lives of babies.
One motivation for this comes from evolutionary theory. Biologists have long been
interested in how a species like ours—in which large groups of nonkin work together on
projects of mutual benefit—could come to exist. This was largely a mystery at the time
of Darwin, but there are by now several candidate theories for how our complex social
structures can arise. These include the accounts developed in the 1970s and 1980s based
on kin selection and reciprocal altruism (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971, 1985), as well
as theories based on group selection—a proposal once derided by biologists, but now
returning as a serious contender (see Nowak & Highfield, 2011, for an accessible review).
Such theories explain our complex social structures as grounded in certain propensities
that we can view as moral, including altruism to nonkin, guilt at betraying another, and
righteous anger toward cheaters. While the details are a matter of considerable debate, the
notion of unlearned moral universals is consistent with what we now know about biological
evolution. And one way to explore the nature of such universals is to look at babies.
The second motivation comes from developmental psychology. Over the last 30 or so
years, findings based on looking-time methods set off a revolution in how we think about
the minds of babies. The original studies used such methods to focus on early knowledge
of physical objects—a baby’s “naïve physics.” A vast body of research now suggests that—
contrary to what was taught for decades to legions of psychology undergraduates—babies
think of objects largely as adults do, as connected masses that move as units, that are
solid and subject to gravity, and that move in continuous paths through space and time
(e.g., Baillargeon, 1987; Spelke, 1990; Wynn, 1992). Other studies have found rich social
understanding. For instance, babies before their first birthday appreciate that individuals
have goals (Gergely et al., 1995; Woodward, 1998) and soon afterward they appreciate the other
individuals can have false beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). These sorts of
findings make it plausible that some rudimentary moral capacities will also be present in
young babies.

One can distinguish moral understanding from moral sentiments. It is one thing to judge
that certain acts are right or wrong—to appreciate, for instance, that if X hits Y for no
reason, then X has done something wrong. It is another to have moral emotions, to feel
sympathy for the pain of Y and anger toward X. While most of the research that we discuss
below focuses on understanding, there is little doubt that such sentiments are critical
to morality. As David Hume (1739/2000) pointed out, without moral passions, our moral
reasoning would be useless—we might know right from wrong, but we would never be
motivated to act upon this knowledge.
There are several moral emotions, including guilt, shame, gratitude, and anger, but most

developmental research has focused on caring about other people—sometimes described
as compassion. Is this an inherent part of our natures?
Many scholars believe that it is, that it makes society and culture possible. In his book The
Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1759, Hume’s contemporary Adam Smith begins with:

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary
to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this
kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when
we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.
(Smith, 2002, p. 11)

Ch. 21 A Neurodevelopmental Perspective on Morality

In the past decade, a dramatic shift in the study of morality has occurred, moving away
from incompatible notions of moral development and toward a more integrated theory.
An explosion of interdisciplinary research in psychology, anthropology, biology, economics,
and neuroscience has resulted in an attempt to more clearly define and investigate the
concept of morality across domains. Work amongst these fields of study now suggests that
human social sensibility emerges from a sophisticated integration of cognitive, emotional,
and motivational mechanisms, which are shaped through cultural exposure, and can therefore
be seen as a product of our biological, evolutionary, and cultural history, representing
an important adaptive element for social cohesion and cooperation.
New research involving neuroscientific methods lends support to the notion of morality
as an integrated process, heavily dependent on emotional sensibilities. Despite the
enthusiasm and grandiose claims in the media about the discovery of a moral compass
associated with a single region of the brain, the reality is much more complex. Functional
neuroimaging studies with healthy participants have shown that, while moral reasoning is
underpinned by specific neural circuitry, these circuits are not unique to morality. Rather,
they involve communication between regions and systems underlying various affective
states, cognitions, and motivational processes. This phenomenon is not exclusive to the
study of morality. Indeed, there is no evidence for a direct one-to-one mapping of any
psychological construct to a simple underlying neural substrate. It is critical, therefore that
moral cognition be decomposed into the multiple processes and representations involved
in its neuro-computational implementation, including (but not limited to) the specific
capacities for the perception of causation, valuation, agency, cognitive control, emotional
inhibition, and theory of mind (Young & Dungan, 2012). Complimentary to the neuroscience
approach is the contribution of developmental psychology as a means of integrating theory and
research on the subcomponents of more complex social behaviors. A focus on
neurodevelopmental systems is particularly useful,

as it allows one to investigate human social tendencies when only some components of, or
precursors to, more mature moral behaviors are observable. Developmental studies can
provide unique opportunities to investigate how the components of the developing system
interact in ways not possible to view in adults, where all the components are fully
mature (De Haan & Gunnar, 2009).
The current chapter integrates developmental research with burgeoning work on the
neurological underpinnings of morality. We begin with a comprehensive review of the
neurological underpinnings of moral cognition in adults, as evidenced through psychopathology,
and neuroimaging studies with typically developing populations and individuals
with socioemotional dysfunctions. Next, the neurodevelopment of morality is examined
with reference to early signs of sensitivity, fairness, and concern for others, all of which are
thought to be precursors to a more mature morality. Neuroimaging studies focusing on
the developmental changes to the perception of others’ distress is then presented, supporting
the role of affective arousal in moral reasoning. Finally, we discuss new neurodevelopmental
data, utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), eye tracking, and
moral evaluation, indicating that the affective, cognitive, and regulatory aspects of empathy
involve interacting neural circuits with distinct developmental trajectories. Together these
data are consistent with the view that morality is instantiated by functionally integrating
several distributed areas/networks involved in affect, mentalizing, decision making, and
reward.

In the past decade, research in affective and cognitive neuroscience has turned to functional
neuroimaging techniques as a way to identify a network of brain regions involved
in moral cognition.

One seminal functional MRI study investigated the neural correlates of moral emotion
in participants who were asked to passively view pictures of emotionally charged
scenes (e.g., physical assaults, poor children abandoned in the streets, war scenes) with
and without moral content (e.g., body lesions, dangerous animals, body products). Results
showed that both basic and moral emotions elicited from the scenes with moral content
are associated with activation in the amygdala, thalamus, and upper midbrain (Moll et
al., 2002a). The orbital (OFC), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and the posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS) were also recruited when viewing scenes evocative of moral
emotions, indicating that these regions play a central role in moral appraisals. Similarly,
when participants were engaged in a simple visual sentence verification task, a network
comprising the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the temporal pole, and pSTS
was specifically activated by moral judgments (Moll et al., 2002b). In contrast, judgment of
emotionally evocative, but nonmoral statements activated the amygdala, lingual, and
vmPFC. Another fMRI study examined brain regions that were activated during simple
ethical decision making about unambiguous written scenarios not containing direct
bodily harm or violence (Heekeren et al., 2003). Simple moral decisions (i.e., judging
whether the sentence described was morally appropriate or inappropriate), compared to
semantic decisions, resulted in activation of pSTS, temporal poles, lateral prefrontal cortex,

and vmPFC. To investigate the neural underpinnings of everyday moral decision making,
Sommer and colleagues (2010) contrasted stories describing conflicts with either moral
or neutral content. In this study, a choice was required between hedonistic, but not illegal,
behavior or the fulfillment of a moral obligation toward another person (e.g., after a long
working day, you run to the bus stop to catch your transportation. At the bus stop, you
see an elderly person who has stumbled and needs help. Helping that person will result
in missing your bus. What would you decide?). Regions that significantly increased their
activity during the imagination of moral conflicts versus neutral conflicts included the
mPFC, right pSTS, and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG).

Ch. 22 Searching for the Evolutionary Roots of Human Morality

Foundations: The Role of Comparative Evidence

Humans, like all other organisms, have an evolutionary history, and many important events
in our history have been documented by paleontologists who study the fossil record, and
by molecular geneticists who sequence our genes. The challenge faced by researchers
studying the evolutionary origins of morality is that behavior and cognition do not leave
traces in the fossil record and cannot be extracted from DNA. However, we can gain some
understanding of the evolutionary roots of morality by comparing ourselves to other
closely related organisms. Evolutionary biologists generally reason that if two closely related
species share a particular trait, then it is likely that they inherited the trait from their
most recent common ancestor. Thus, if humans share a characteristic with chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes), such as the absence of a tail, then it is likely that the same trait characterized
our most recent common ancestor, which lived about 5–7 million years ago. On the
other hand, if humans possess a trait, such as bipedalism, which chimpanzees and other
great apes do not display, we can be reasonably confident that this trait evolved after the
human and chimpanzee lineages diverged.
Based on this logic, our goal is to consider whether humans share any of the features
of morality with other members of the primate order, particularly the great apes. We do
not expect to find codes of conduct prescribed by society, but it is possible that some
components of morality, such as a concern for the welfare of others, might be found in
other species (Flack & de Waal, 2000). The presence of these traits among other great
apes would imply that these capacities were also present in the most recent common
ancestor of humans and the great apes. The absence of these traits in other great apes
would suggest that these capacities arose after the lineages diverged. We focus on the
extant species most closely related to humans to help us understand when and how the
foundations of human morality evolved. The foundations, notably moral sentiments

(Smith, 1759), may also have arisen through convergent evolution in more distantly related
species, but we are concerned here with the phylogenetic roots of modern human
behavior.

Cooperation has long been recognized as a problem for the theory of evolution by natural
selection: Individuals who pay a cost to the benefit of others will go extinct, since they
will be at a disadvantage to individuals who reap the benefits without the costs (Darwin,
1871). In the evolutionary literature, as well as in economics at the proximate level, punishment
is an effective means of maintaining cooperation (or any behavior, for that matter:
Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). In the absence of punishment,
free riders and cheaters exploit cooperators, causing cooperation to decline dramatically
(for an example from economics, see Fehr & Gächter, 2002).
There are a number of accounts of animals harming others for immediate personal gain
(coercion), but little compelling evidence for punishment that produces delayed benefits,
at least in nonhuman primates ( Jensen, 2010; Jensen & Tomasello, 2010; Raihani, et al.,
2012). There is only one study in which researchers attempted to determine whether the
failure to reciprocate grooming or support led to elevated levels of aggression, and no
evidence was found to suggest that chimpanzees systematically targeted nonreciprocators
(Koyama, Caws, & Aureli, 2006). In an experimental study, chimpanzees punished individuals
who pulled a food tray away from them and thereby caused the thief to lose food
( Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007a). But in contrast to human studies in which punishment
(paying a cost so that targets experience a greater loss) increases levels of cooperative behavior
across trials (e.g., in the public goods game: Fehr & Gächter, 2002), in chimpanzees,