• Preliminary Hazard Analysis
• What-IfAnalysis
• Checklist Analysis
• ~at-If Checklist Analysis
• Hazard and Operability Analysis . .,
• Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
THE HAZARD ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
, Fault Tree Analysis
, Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT).
I ‘
It was also said in Z590.3 that:
333
As a practical matter, having knowledge of three risk assessment concepts will
be sufficient to address most, but not all, risk situations. They are Preliminary
Hazard Analysis and Ris~ As,sessment, the What~lf/Checklist Analysis
methods, and Failur~ Mode and Effects Analysis. (p. 23)
Having knowledg~ ~d capability with re~pect to ·.the above-mentioned three
standards will be sufficient t~ deal with a huge majority of the ne~ds of Zl 0. Addition.µ
comments on risk assessment techniques appear later ·iµ this ch;ipter in the section
“Recommended Reading.”
[ ‘
THE HAZARD ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
Section 7 in ANSI/ASSE Z590.3 is devoted to the hazard analysis and risk
assessment process. It is the core of the prevention through design standard. The
following process outline is a recent work, having been approved by the American
National Standards Institute on September 1, 2011. In the standard, the narrative for
each subject is extensive and is recommended reading. Under management direction,
the hazard analysis and risk ‘assessment process follows.
1. Select a risk assessment matrix
2. Establish the analysis parameters
3. Identify the hazards
4. Consider failure modes
5. Assess the severity of consequences
6. Determine occurrence probability
7. Define initial risk
8. Select and implement hazard avoidance, elimination, reduction and control
methods
9. Assess the residual risk
10. Risk acceptance decision making
l 1. Document the results
12. Follow-up on actions taken
Reaching group consensus in the risk assessment process is a highly desirable
g~al. Sometimes, for what an individual considers obvious, achieving consensus is
still desirable, so that buy-in is obtained for the actions taken.
334 A PRIMER ON SY5TEM SAF~: SECTIONS 4.0, 4-2, 5, 1. 1, 5.1.2, AND APPENDIX F
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRICES
It would be highly unusual for a text or standard on system safety not to includ .
assessment matrices and provide examples. There are many, many van·at· e nsk . · ·· Ions f
matrices, and the definitions of the terms used m them vary greatly. The matn °
d
• . . x used
should be the one that management l!lll users m an organization decide is b . – . bl . b . est for
them. It is strongly recommended that a smta . e matnx e c~osen because of .
al
. . k d . . aki ‘ Its v ue m ns ec1s1on m ng. . ..
A ri_sk assessment matrix_ provid~s ‘ fl inetl)od of catego~zi~~ c~mbinations of
probability of occurrence and seventy of h~, th_us est~bhshing nsk levels. 210
requires that priorities be established i~ thC? apph~ation of its requirements. A matrix
helps in communicating with d~cisiC?n mak~rs on risk reduction actions to be taken.
Also, risk assessment matrices assist in comparing al’!d prioritizing· risks and in
effectively allocating mitigation resources. .
All personnel involved in the risk assessment processes must understand the
definitions used for occurrence probability and severity and for risk levels in the
risk assessment matrix chosen. Examples of risk assessment matrices are shown in
several chapters in thHr book’. ·
THE HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS
. I I • ,
It was said in the “The System Safety IC,ea” .-t~at if risk reduction was necessary after
a risk assessment, the steps to follow were those in the hierarchy of controls. That
subject is covered in Chapter 14 in ~s book. Decision piakers shou_ld understand
that with respect to the six levels of control shown in ZlO’s hierarchy of controls, the
ameliorating actions described in the first, second, and third contro~ levels are more
effective because they:
• Are preventive actions that eliminate or reduce risk by design, elimination,
substitution, and engineering measures ·
• Rely the least on human behavior-the performance of personnel
• Are less defeatable by unit managers, supervisors, or workers
Actions described in the fourth, fifth, and sixth levels are contingent actions and
rely greatly on the performance of personnel for their effectiveness. Inherently, tbeY
are less reliable. ·n
In applying the hierarchy of controls, the expectation is that consideration wdi
b
. h · · ·11 be ma e e given to eac step m descendmg order, and that reasonable attempts WI h
to avoid, eliminate, reduce, or control hazards and their associated risks ~u!e
steps higher in the hierarchy before lower steps are considered. A lower step indi g
hierarchy of controls is not to be chosen until practical applications of the pr~ce n a
1 1 1 1 · · · k ·tuauonS, ev~ or. eve s are considered. It 1.s understood that for many ns st ts is
combination of the risk management methods shown in the hierarchy of contro
necessary to achieve acceptable ris,k levels.
WHY SYSTEM SAFETY CONCEPTS HAVE NOT BEEN WIDELY ADOPTED 335
plying the hierarchy of controls, the outcome should be an acceptable risk
10
1
~p achieving that goal, the following should be taken into consideration.
Jeve • n .
, Avoiding, elimina~ng, or reducing the probability of a hazard-related incident
or exposure occurring.
, Reducing the severity of harm or damage that may result if an incident or
exposure occurs .
• The feasibility and effectiveness of the risk reduction measures to be taken, and
their costs, in relation to the amount of risk reduction to be achieved.
, All of the requirements of ZlO.
WHY SYSTEM SAFETY CONCEPTS HAVE
NOT BEEN WIDELY ADOPTED
At least one other author expected a more widespread adoption of system safety con-
cepts beyond the use by the military, aerospace personnel, and nuclear facility
designers. He also bad to recognize that it wasn’t happening. In The Loss Rate
Concept In Safety Engineering, R. L. Browning wrote this:
As every loss event results from the interacti<;m,s of elements in a system, it
follows that all safety is "systems safety." The safety community instinctively
welcomed the systems concept when it appeared during the stagnating
performance of the mid-1960s, as evidenced by the .~nsuing freshet of sym-
posia and literature. J:or . a time, it was ,thought that this seemingly novel
approach could reestablish the continuing improvem~nt that the public had
become accustomed to; however, this anticipation has not been fulfilled.
Now, some three decades later, although systems techniques continue to find
application and development in exotic programs (mi!;isil~s. aerospace, nuclear
power) and in the academic community, they are seldom met in the domain of
traditional industrial and general safety. (p. 12)
Although there were countless seminars· and a proliferation of papers on system
safety, the generalist in the practice of safety seldom adopted system safety concepts.
response to his owQ question-Why this rejection?-Browning expressed the
view that system safety literature and seminars on system safety may have turned
off generalist safety professionals because of the “exotica” they usually presented.
I believe that to be so.
En ~evert_heless, Browning went on to build The Loss Rate Concept In Safety
gmeenng on system safety concepts. He also gave this encouragement:
We have found through practical experience that industrial and general safety
c~ be engineered at a level considerably below that required by the exotics,
using the mathematical capabilities possessed by average technically minded
persons, together with readily available input data. (p. 13)
336 A PRIMER ON SYSTEM SAFETY: SECTIONS 4.0, 4.2, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, AND APPENDIX F
There is a reality in Browning_’ s ob’servatioris: S~stem safety _literature at the .
he wrote ·his book- was loaded with governmental Jargon, and_ 1t easily repeUecttitne
uninitiated. It made more of the highly complex hazard analysis and risk asse the
techniques requiring extensive knowledge of mathematics and probability s~ment
than it did of concepts and purposes. · – , eory
Some system safety literature did, and still does, give the appearance of ex t’
1 • o tea That is changing. Texts on system safety that are tru Y pnmers and slanted toward h ·
h
. t e
neop yte have been wntten. · · ,
PROMOTING THE USE OF SYSTEM SAFETY CONCEPTS
With the hope of generating further interest by generali_s~ safety professionals in
system safety concepts, it is suggested that they concentrate oh those basics through
which gains can be made in an occupational, environmental, or product design setting
and avoid being repulsed by the more exotic hazard and risk assessment metho-
dologies. Ted Ferry said it well in the Preface he wrote for Richard Stephans’ book
System Safety for the 21st Century:
Professional credentials or experience in “system safety” are not required to
appreciate the potential value ‘of the systems approa:cli and system safety tech-
niques to general safety’ and health practice. (p. xiii) ·
To paraphrase Browning:All hazards-related incidents result from interactions of
. r ‘
elements in a system. Therefore, all safety is system safety. Therein lies an important
idea In Safety Management, John V. Grimaldi’and ·RolHn H. Simonds wrote:
A reference to system analysis may merely imply an orderly examination of an
established system or subsystem. (p. 287)
Applying system safety as “an orderly examination of an established system or
subsystem” to identify, analyze, avoid, eliminate, reduce, or control hazards can be
successful in the less complex situations without using elaborate analytical methods.
Repeating for emphasis: Applying the fund~entals of system safety can meet a
‘ ‘ · t rest
huge percentage of the provisions of ZlO. For safety generalists who take an in~
in system safety concepts, the following reading list is offered, from which selecuons
can be made. ‘
RECOMMENDED READING
Clift · E · ‘ b k · h · · This paper-on ncson s oo 1s w at the title says it is a System Safety Pnmer. b’ect
back, published in 2011, is only a 140-page read, ‘yet it covers the system safety su
1
very well as a primer. It is easy to read and is recommended.
RECOMMENDED READING 337
,n Safety for the 21st Century is an update by Richard Stephans of System
5Yst;ooo by Joe Stephenson. Stephans followed the advice given to “keep it as
Safe~ ,, The book begins with a history of system safe ty. Then the author
pruner. . a •nto system safety program planning and management and system safety
moalves_st techniques. About half of the book is devoted to those techniques.
an ys1
Stephans says:
‘fhis book is specifically written for:
• safety professionals, including people in industrial and occupational
safety, system safety, environm~ntal safety, industrial hygiene, health;
occupational medicine, fire protecti~n, reliability, maintainability, and quality
assurance
• Engineers, especially design engineers and architects
• Managers and planners
• Students and faculty in safety, engineering, and management (p. xv)
‘ A safety generalist w1;mld find this book to be a valuable source and not too
difficult to read.
Basic Guide to System Safety was written by Jeffrey W. Vincoli. These two sen-
tences are taken from the Preface: “It should be noted from the beginning that it is not
the intention of the Basic Guide to System Safety to provide any level of expertise
beyond that of novice. Those practitioners who desire complete knowledge of the
subject will not be satisfied with the information contained on these pages.”
Vincoli also says·: “The primary foc’ils pf this text shall be the advantages of
utilizing system safety concepts and techn,iques as they apply to tht: general
safety arena. In fact the industrial workplace can be viewed as a natural extension
of the past growth experience (?f the system safety discipline .” (p. 5) Vin~oli ful-
filled his purpose. He has written a basic book on system s.afety that willr serve”the
novice well ‘ . ,.
MIL-STD-882E, Standard Practice for System Safety, issued by the Department of
D~fense, serves well as a primer. It is available on the Internet and can ~e downloaded
without charge at http://www.system-safety.org/. Click on 882E in the right-hand
column.
1
The Federal Aviation Adntinistration’s System Safety Handbook is also ~m the
ntemet as a free download. This is really a training manual. There, are 17 chapters
~;d lO appendices~all individually dow~loadable as a separate PDF file. Enter
ederal Aviation Administration System Safety.Handbook” into a search.Engine, or
go ~h http://www.faa.gov/library/manuaWaviation/dsk_management/ss_handbook/.
go d Loss Rate Concept in Safety Engineering, by R. L. Browning, is a small but
ap 0
1
°0k that I have referred· to several times . Browning believes that one can int Y sy~tem safety concepts in an industrial setting without necessarily delving
thro exhotic mathematics. He builds on “The Energy Cause Concept”, and works
oug q 1. . ua 1tat1ve and quantitative analytical systems.
r
338 A PRIMER ON SYSTEM SAFETY: SECTIONS 4.0, 4.2, 5.1.1, 5. 1.
2 , AND APPENDIX F
System Safety Engineering and Management, 2nd ed., by Harold E. Roland
Brian Moriarty is a good but more involved book. It provides an extensive revie and
· th d f 1· . w of the concepts of system safety and therr me o s o app ication. An overview f . . f al al.al Oa
system safety program is given. The descnptions o sever an yt1c techniques
valuable. For the application of some of them, quite a bit of knowledge about ma:~
ematics is necessary.
PROGRESS REVIEW
For an assessment of how system safe~y principle~ relate _to the requireme~ts for an
occupational risk management system, readers are _asked to relate the prpvisions in
210 with what authors in system safety are writing.
Clifton Ericson in System Safety P~mer:
A known and acceptable level of safety can be achieved when the system safety
process is continuously and unconditionally applied. (p . 2)
Relative safeness is calculated by the metric of risk. Risk is the estimated value
of a potential event, based on the event’s gain or loss and the event’s likelihood
of occurrence. Thus, how safe something is becomes a function of the amount
of risk involved. (p. 3) ·
1
Since 100% freedom from hazards and risk is not possible, safety is more
effectively defined as freedom from unacceptable risk. (p. 4)
System safety is a form of preemptive forensic engineering, whereby potential mis-
haps are identified, evaluated and controlled before they occur. Potential mishaps
and their causal factors are · anticipated during the design stage, and then design
safety features are incorporated into the design to control the occurrence of the
potential mishaps-safety is intentionally designed-in and mishaps are designed-
out. This proactive approach to safety involves hazard analysis, risk assessment,
risk mitig_ation through design and testing to verify design results. (p. 7)
Jeffrey ViJ,1coli in Basic Guide to Syi tem Safety:
The process of system safety revolves around a desire to ensure that jobs or
tasks are performed in the safest manner possible,’ fr~ from unacceptable ~sk
or ~arm or daD;J-age. This forward-looking process occurs within a working
en~1~~nment w~ere p~ople, operati~g procedures, equipment/hardware, and
fac11It1es all. are mtegr~l factors that ~ay or may not affect the safe and success-
ful completion of the Job of task. (p. i2) ·
The Hazard Risk Matrix incorporates the elements of the Hazard Se:verity ta?le
and the Hazard Probability . table to. provide an effective tool for approx.iJnaung
accepta~le and unacceptable levels or degrees of risk. Obviously, from a sySteIIlS
standpomt, use of such a matrix facilitates the risk .assessment process. (p. 12)
b
REFERENCES 339
Richard Stephans in System Safety in the 21st Century:
The first and most effective way to control identified hazards is to eliminate
them through design or redesign changes. (p. 14)
Design and build safety into a system rather than modifying the system later in the
acquisition process when any changes are increasingly more expensive. (p. 22)
CONCLUSION
The principal intent in this chapter is to establish that fundamental system safety
concepts can be applied by generalists in the practice of safety to meet the provisions
in Zl0, outline ”The System Safety Idea,” and encourage generalists who have not
adopted system safety concepts to begin the inquiry and education to do so.
I sincerely believe that generalists in the practice of safety can learn from system
safety successes and be more effective in their work through adopting system safety
concepts. Their application in the occupational, environmental, and product safety
settings would result in significant reductions in incidents having adverse effects.
In summation: The entirety of purpose of those responsible for safety, regardless
of their titles, is to manage their endeavors with respect to hazards so that the risks
deriving from those hazards are acceptable.
Note: The substance of this chapter appears in the fourth edition of my book
On the Practice of Safety. It has been modified significantly to relate particularly to
the provisions in ZlO.
REFERENCES
ANSI/AIHA 210-2012. Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems. Des Plaines,
IL: American Society of Safety Engineers, 2012. Also at https://www.asse.org/cartpage.
php?link=210_2005&utm_source=ASSE+Members&utm_campaign=3677c44444-210_
Standard_Announcement_9 _17 _129 _l 3_2012&utm_medium=email.
• • I
ANSI/ ASSE 2590.3-2011. Prevention through Design: Guidelines for Addressing Occupational
Hazards and Risks in Design and Redesign Procttsse~. Des Plaines, IL: American _Society of
Safety Engineers, 2011.
ANSI/ASSE 2690.1-2011. ‘Vocabulary for Risk Management. Des Plaines, IL: American
Society of Safety Engineers, 2011.
ANSIIASSE 2690.2-2011. Risk Management Principles and Guidelines. Des Plaines, IL:
American Society of Safety Engineers, 2011.
ANSIJASSE 2690.3. Risk Assessment Techniques. Des Plaines, IL: American Society of
Safety Engineers, 2011.
ANSI B 11.0-2010. Safety of Machinery-General Safety Requirements and Risk Assessments.
Leesburg, VA: Bl 1 Standards, Inc., 2010.
ANSIIPMMI Bl55.1-2011. American National Standard for Safety Requirements for
Packaging Machinery and Packaging-Related Converting Machinery. Arlington, VA:
Packaging Machinery Manufacturers Institute, 2011.
340 A PRIMER ON SYSTEM SAFETY: SECTIONS 4.0, 4.2, 5.1.1 , 5.1.2, AND APPENDIX F
Browning, R. L. The Loss Rate Concept In Safety Engineering. New York: Marcel Dekker
1980. ‘
BS OHSAS 18001 :2007: Occupational health and safety management systems-Requirements.
London: BSI Group, 2007.
Clements, P.L. and Rodney J . Simmons. System Safety and Risk Management, NIOSH
Instructional Module, A Guide for Engineering Educators. Cincinnati, OH: National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1998.
CSA Z1002-12. Occupational health and safety-Hazard identification and elimination and
risk assessment and control. Toronto, Canada: Canadian Standards Association, 2012.
EN ISO 12100-2010. Safety of Machinery-General principles for Design. Risk assessment
and Risk reduction. G 6neva, Switzerland: International Organization for Standardization,
2010.
Environmental Management Systems: An Implementation Guide for Small and Medium-
Sized Organizations, 2nd ed. Access at http://www.fedcenter.gov/_kd/ltems/actions.
cfm?action=Show&item_id=598&destination=Showltem. Copyright is held by NSF
International Strategic ij.egistrations,. Ltd., Ann Arpor, MI.
Ericson, Clifton A. II. System Safety Primer. Self-published, 2011. Available through Internet
bookseUers. , ,
Federal Aviation Administration System Safety [Jandbook. Enter the title into a search engine,
or access at http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/risk_management/ss_handbook/.
GEIA-STD-0010-2008. Standard Best Practices for System Safety Program Development and
– Execution. Arlington, YA: Information Technology A_ssociation of America, 2008.
Grimaldi, John V. and Rollin H. .Simonds. Safety Management. Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1989.
Guidance On The Principles Of Safe Design For Work. Canberra, Australia: Australian Safety
and Compensation Council, an entity of the Australian government, 2006.
Machine Safety: Prevention of mechanical hazards. (2009). Quebec, Canada: The Institute for
research for safety and security at work and The Commission for safety and security at
work in Quebec, 2009. Also at www.irsst.qe.ca.en/home.htrnl.
MIL-STD-882E. Department of Defenses $tandard P~actice System Safety, 2012. It is ‘available
on the Internet and can be downloaded at http://www.system-safety.org/. Click on 882B in
the right-hand column.’
OSHA’s Rule for Process Safety Management of Highly ·Hazardous Chemicals, 29 CFR
1910.119. Washington, DC, OSHA, 1992.
Risk Assessment. The Europelin Union, 2008. http://osha.europa.eW:en/topics/riskassessment.
Roland, Harold E. and Brian ~foriarty. System Safety Engineering and Management, 2nd ed.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1990. ‘ i · •
“Scope and Funqtions of the Professional Safety Position” brochu;e. Des Plaines, IL. American
Society of Safety Engineers, 1998. ‘
Stephans, Richard A. System Safety in the 21st Century. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004, . d
System Safety Analysis Handbook (for which Warner Talso and Richard A. Stephans provide
stewardship). Unionville, VA: Internatipnal System Safety Society, 1999.
Vincoli, Jeffrey W. Basic Guide to System Safety. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1993.
ct-lAp’TER 16
PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN:
SECTIONS 5.1.1 TO 5.1.4 OF 2
10
–
This chapter, and ANSIIAIHA Z590.3-201 l, the Ameri~an National Standard titled
Prevention through Design: Guidelines for Addressing Occupational Hazards and
Risks in Design and Redesign Proce~ses, r~late to several provisions in ZlO: risk
assessment, Section 5.1.1; hierarchy of controls, Section 5.1.2; design requirements,
Section s: 1.3; and procurement, Section 5.1.4. lt 1 also pertains to the prevention of
serious injuries and fatalities. ‘ , ‘ We said earlier that applying. prevention through design principles early ‘in the
design and redesign processes reduces the p<>lential for incidents resulting in serious
harm or damage. In Chapter 3 “Inflovations in Serious Inj?ry and Fatality Prevention”,
1
presented “A Socio-Technicaf Model for Ari Operational Risk Management System”
which gives prominence and Significance to preverition through Oesign. The following
pnnctples are offered in support of the premise that prevention ·through design should
have such importance. ·,
I. Hazards and nsks are most effectively and economically avoided, eliminated,
or controlled in the clesign and redesign ·pro_cesses. .
2
· Hazard analysis i the most iinportant safety process in that, if it fails, all other
processes are likely to be ineffective (Johnson, p. 245).
3. Risk 885\’ssment should be the comerst~n~ of an operational risk management
system. –
Adva11ced S
a
. . . Second Ed ‘ _rfery Management: Focusing on ZlO and Serious In111ry Prevention ,
© 201
4
Jo •tt on .. Fred A. Manuele. · ho Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 309
11111
•
310 PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN: SECTIONS 5.1.1 TO 5.1.4 OF z10
•
Movhtg prevention
upstream ht the design
. process
Business 1–:;:7
concepts l_=_J L.:::_j
Prevention – / –
through __l__ Retrofit
design
Operation
maintenance
Moving safety from afterthought to a forethought in
‘ •proc’:5s, prod,~c~, and faci~ity design.
·’ –
Ease of safety
~lementation
FIGURE 16.1 Theoretical ideal prevention through the de~ign process.
, l ..
4. If, through the hazard identificaticm and analysis and risk assessment processes
‘ specifications are develop~ that are applied in th~ _procurement process so~
to avoid bringing hazards and their accompanying risks into a workpjace, the
potential for serious injuries is reduced ~ready. , . ‘
, ‘I ( . J.’ ,. i : ”
5. The entirety ofpprpose of th~ p~rsoni:iel re~pon~1ble for safety, re~ardless of
their titles, is to manage tpeir endeavors with respect to hazards so that the
ris~ deriving from those hazar~s .are ac~eptaQle. . . .
J • (. •
6. To achieve acceptable risk levels, ~lements of a q.ierarchy of controls should be
applied sequentially in the risk avoidanc~, elimi~ation, reduction, and control
endeavors.
The priictice of ~afety is hazards-based. Thus, Johnson wrote approp~ately
tliat hazard analysis is the most important safety process: Since all, risks ~nan
operational setting derive from hazards and s1nce the intent of an operauo~al
risk management system is to achie~e acceptable risk ·levels, it follows that nsk
assessment should be the cornerstone of an ·operational risk’ manageme?t syS!e_mk
The·core of prevention through design is hazard ·identification and an·alySrs allrl ns
assessment. ed
F. 16 · · is mov 1gure .1 depicts the theoretical ideal. Prevention through Design ‘th in
upstream in the design process. The intent is to have hazards and risks dealt wr the
th . · from e conceptual and design steps but that requires unattainable perfecoon . and
• · ‘ · non people mvolved. Hazards and risks will also be identified in the build, opera ‘
maintenance steps, for which redesign is necessary in a retrofitting process .
HISTORY 311
. ·teged to be the chair of the committee that wrote the Z590 3 t d ·. d
P
riv1 h . h . s an ar .
1 was . us that what I ave wntten ere shows a bias in favor of its • 1 , . be obv10 . • imp emen-
Jt ~111 In this chapter; we. . , . , -~· . . de a history of the safety through design/prevention through design movement.
• proVl t highlights of Z590.3, emphasizing the applicability of the provisions of
• :::::Odard to all h~~ds-b~e~ init~atives: environ~ental controls, product
_t safety of the pubhc, avmdmg property damage artd business interruption
siuetY, •
and so on. . ..
, Discuss the cu~ture ,chang~ ,?ecessary -~~- ~ost _ orga~izations as prevention
thfOUgh design concepts ar~ 1m?lemented w~thin an operation~ risk management
system. . .
, Encourage safety. professionals to bC?come involved in prevention through
design fqr job satisfaction an a to b~ percf ived as providing additional vaiue in
the organizations to which they give counsel. . ·
HISTORY
In the early 1990s, several safety professionals recognized through _their studies of
investigation reports for occupational injuries and illne.sses that design cau~al factors
were not addressed adequately. For example, a study made by this author at that time
indicated that although there were implications of workplace and work method
design inadequacies in over 35% percent of the· investigation reports analyzed, the
corrective actions proposed did not relate to the design implications. That study is
supported by a later analysis made in Australia. · · ·
In Guidance On The Principles Of Safe Design For Work, issued in 2006, com-
ments are made on the “contribution that the design of machinery and equipnienrhas
on the incidence of fatalities and injuries 1.n Australia.”
Of the· 210 identified workplace fatalities~ 77 (37%) definitely or probably ·had
design-related issues involved. Design c’ontributes to a(least -30% of work-
related serious nonfatal injuries·. (p. 6) • ·· i · · ·
To provide the necessary education for designers, safety professionals are encour-
:~ to develop their own supportive data on incidents in which-design shortcomings
2
;
1
identified. That initiative should be followed by a major effort to have Z590.3-
I 1 be accepted as a design guide. · ·
eq t was also noted in the early l 990s that designing for safety was addressed inad-
uately · a£ . . terns t . in s et_y-r~lated literature, and that the safety and health management s~s-
Pro edhat organizations had in p’ lace infrequently included safety through design
c ures .
tof~ecisio~ makers at the National Safety Co~ncil (NSC) gave authority to this author
nnaco · · ‘d fh · llllnittee to study the feasibility of the Council promotmg the 1 ea o avmg
:1
312 PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN: SECTIONS 5.1.1 TO 5.1.4 OF 210
safety and environmental needs incorporated in the design
outcome was that the NSC established The Institute For ,Safet;~ess, In 1
An advisory committee for the institute was formed , whose 0 ugh be
9
.
9s, th
· d I b d th . tnernb 81&n e industry, academia, organize a ~r, an o er interested persons. . e~s repres .
established by the advisory comnuttee: lnis 1s the _enteq ‘ ttJiss· · ion
To reduce the risk of injury, illness and environmentai •
decisio~s affecting safety, health, and the environment in : by :integrati
. – ‘ . stage ng
design process. · 8 of the
The message ~e adv~sory c~~-tte~ ‘w~t~~. t~ COI}Y~y ,· .when the .
through design was used 1s contamed m its defirution: · . _term ~afety
• , • ‘ • , • . I •
The integration of hazard analysts and nsk assessment methods .
· · · d taki th l ‘ · early in th design and engmeenng stages an ng . e a~tions _n~cessary_ so that . e
injury or damage are at an acceptable level. · , nsks of
In the literature developed by the Institute it was said that the follow· b
would be obtained by applying safety through design concepts: mg enefits
• Improved productivity
• Decreased operating costs·
• Significant risk reduction
• Avoi~ce of expensive ~etrofitting • L
‘ . ‘
Two groups were identified by the Institute, tQ be given _primary !lttention:
Academia-professor~ an<;l their students; and practicing engineers in industry and
safety professionals. . , ,1 ,
Much was accomplished by the lnstjtute. S~minars, workshops, and symposia
were held; proceedings were issued; presentations were made at safety conferences;
and book entitled Saf~ty Through Design .w~s. publishecl. Operations of the In_s~tute
were ~scontinued in ~005, ,in ac<.:ord w)th a previously establisped sunset provtswn.
In 2006, several of the participants in the flCtivities of the Institute For S~e~
Through Design, and others, received an e-mail from an executive at the Nauo~ · · auon
!°5ti~~ Occupatioqal _Safety and Health (NIOSH) encouragi~g our P~::shop
ID an 1rutiative for Preyent1on. through Design. In July 2007, NIOSH held a te 8
b
. . . . . . . u·ve to crea
to o tam the views . of a variety of stakeholders on a maJor mitia
sustainable national strategy for Prev~ntion through Design. . of the
Some of the participants expressed the yiew .that the long-term unp:~ could
NIOSH initiative could be “transfonn’ative ” meaning that a fi,mdamental stb Jtigher
· th · · ‘ • · ·ven to e occur m e practice of safc;ty, resulting in greater emphasis bemg gi ·
and more effective decision levels in the hierarchy of controls. “Devel0P
In 20Q8, NIOSH ,announced that on~ of its major initiatives was topreventi
00
and approve a broaq, generic . voluntary consensus standard
00
HIGHLIGHTS OF ANSI/ASSE 2590.3 313
.
0
that is aligned with international design activities and practice”
d .
tbfou8 d io lead that en eavor.
1 volunteere.~as obtained from the Standards Development Committee at the
su~portsociety of Safety Engineer~ .(ASSE) .. It w~ decided to develop a technical
J\lllerican t for the learning experience .. that wo~ld provide. So TR-Z790.001,
repOrt j·Report on Prevention Through Design, was issued in 2009. .
A fech;:~ember 1, 2011, theAmeric.~ National ,Standard~ Institµte (ANSI)approved
On dafd _ANSI/ASSE Z590.3-20ll,, Preve11tion Th,:ough Design: Guid.~fines for
the stan .
118
Occupatfonµl Hazards and Risks ir,, _the Design and Redesign Processes. :
Addressist. be understood that activities at NIOSH are limited to occupational safetv and It mu · · – ~J · ”
th ‘Ibus, the focus of Z590.3 is work-related. But, by intent, the terminology in t9() 3 was kept broad enough so thatthe guidelines could be applicable to all hazards-baSed fields: product safety, environrnental ;cqntrol,’ property damage that -could result
. business·interruption, and so on. in ·the standard, the definition of prevention through
:sign is work~related and identical;with .th~,.t in _the NIOSH literature. 1
Prevention-through design:: Addressing occupational safety. and .health .nee~ in
fue,{lesign ffll.9 redesign process to. preve_nt or _mini.quie th.e work-related hazards
and risks, associated with the construction, manufacture, use, maintenance,
retrofitting, and disposal of facilities, processes, materials, and· equipment.
• . l I
Promoting the acquisition of knowledge of prevention through design concepts is
in concert·with the ASSE Position Paper ,on Designing •for Safety approved by its
board of directors in 1994,. the: opening paragraph of which follows.
• I • •
Design,ing For Safety (DFS) is a principle for d,~sign planning for new facilities,
eq_uipmen~ a.n’d qperatio.ns (pupµc, and private) to c~nserve hum~ and natµral
resources, and thereby protect people, property and the environrn~nt. DPS advo-
Cfltes .systelll:~!ic proces& to ens~e st~te-of-t.Qe:-¥1 engineering and µianagement
principles are used and incorporated into the design of facilities and overall
• I • ,
operations to assure safety and health of workers, as well as protection of the
environment and compliance ,w,ith ~urrent cpd.es and standards.
HIGHLIGHTS OF ANSI/ASSE Z590.3
!tis n · · ·. ·. . , · ‘ · · ‘· · · i: · . • •
In so!~ ~YJntention here to duplic~te the Z590_.,3 ,st,andfd; only hig~hght_s are given.
the instances, number or lett~r designatiO:ns may riot be e_xactly the same as in
and :ta.nd~d. It is expected that safety professionals who b~co’me involved in design
ed~sign pr~cesses will µeyelop a familiarity with Z590.3 in detail. ,
1. . Scope, Purpose, and Appllcatlon :~~::es~ope ofZ590.3: This standard provides guidance on including prevention
system. ~sign. concepts within an occupational safety and health management
ough the application of these concepts, decisions pertaining to occupational
314 PREVENT! · ON THROUGH DESIGN· SECTIONS 5.1.1 TO 5.1.4 OF 210
h zards and risks can be incorporated into the process of design and
a h” b redesj th ork Premises tools, equipment, mac mery, su stances, and Work &n of ew , . Proc
including their construction, manufacture, use: mamtenance, and ultimate dis esses,
reuse. This standard provides guidance fo~ a hfe-cycle assessment and desi~0sa1 or
that balances environmental and occupational sa[ety and health goals ov ill0de1
span of a facility, process, or product. l!C . er the 1:,
Although the Purpose statement indicates that the standard pertains Prine·
11,e a,oidance, elimination, reduction, or “‘.’•trol of occupational safety .. ~~Yto
hazards and risks in the design and redesign processes, this important ext ~th
ens1on
follows the purpose statement.
Note: Incidents that have the potential to result in occupational injuries and •u.
nesses can also result in damag~ to prol”:rty and .business i?te~ption, and darn~e
to the environment. Reference 1s made m several places m this standard to those
additional loss potentials which may require evaluation and resultant action . .
Largely, this slandard is applicable to all hazard-based operational risks, Panicul,dy
it relates directly to all of the four major stages of occupational risk management. ‘
a Pre-operatiQnal stage:.in the initial planning, design, specification, prototYPing,
and construction processes, where the opportunities are greatest and the costs
are lowest for hazard and risk .avoidance, elimination, reduction; or control.
b. Operational stage: where •hazards and risks are identified and evaluated and
mitigation actions are taken throµgh redesign initiatives or changes in work
methods before incidents or exposures occur.
c. Post-incident stage: where investigations are made of incidents and exposures
to determine the causal factors that will lead to appropriate interventions and acceptable risk levels.
d. Post-operational stage: where demolition, decommissioning, or reusing/retiuilding
operations are undertaken:
The application goals of utilizing prevention , through design concepts in an occupational setting are to:
a. Achieve acceptable risk levels.
b. Prevent or reduce occupationally related injuries, illnesses, and fatalities.
c. Reduce the cost of retrofitting necessary to mitigate hazards and risks
th
at were
not addressed sufficiently in the design or redesign processes.
Adde?dum A outlines the risk assessment process, and Addendum B gives tbe
progress10n of occupational hygiene issues flow.
2. Referenced and Related Standards
· · • • that per· Relative Amencan National Standards and other standards and guidebnes
tain to the purpose of the standard are listed.
HIGHLIGHTS OF ANSI/ASSE 2590.3
oet1n1t1ons . ;
315
3, ·t· 00 list grew to 27 in response · to suggestions mad b
defilll
1
d’ · · al al · . e Y commenters fbe of the standar s pnnc1p go s ts to achieve acce’ptaole risk 1 1 thr .
Since onde i·gn and redesign processes, the definitions relative to th teve sl ough-
out the es · . · . a goa only are
listed here.
A ceptable risk. That risk for which the probability of an incident or ,
a. c th •·t f h . .• d . . exposure
occurring an~ e seven yRPo or a~age t?at may result are as low as rea-
sonably practicable (ALA ) m the settmg bemg considered. ,
b. As lo~ ds reas~nably Pract!cable (~~). ‘That level of risk which can be
lowered further only by an increase m resource experlditu,re ‘that is dispropor-
tionate in relation to the resulting decrease ip ‘risk ‘ ‘ ,,. \’ . ‘ I
c. Hazard. ·The’ potential for harm. . . \’ ; . I
Note : Hazards include all aspects of technology and activity that produce
risk. Hazards include the characteristics of things (e.g., equipment, tech-
nology, processes, dusts, fibers, gases, matetjals? ~henµcals) ~d th.e .. actions
or inactions of people.
d. Hiera rchy ‘ of ‘controls. A systematic· approach to avoiding, . eliminating,
reducing, and coritr~lling risks, considering steps fo ”a ranked and sequenti.al
order, beginning with’ avoidance, elimination.’, and substitution. . .
e. Probability. An estimate of the likelih~od of ~n incident or exposure ~c~ng
that could result in harm or damage for a selected unit of time, events,
population, ite~~. or,. activiJ~ ~.eJng CQnsidered. , ;
1
f. Residual risk. The risk remaining aftei: risk r~duction measures have been
‘ • I • • • ” • • taken: ‘ ‘ · · · ,,, · · ” · ‘ · ‘ ·
‘. f • • ‘ J . i , : • > ‘ ‘, , • •, I > ‘ ; , • ‘ ‘ > :
g. Risk. An estimate of the probability of a ·hazard-relat~ inc1c!e~t ~r expos~e
occurring and the severity of harm or damage that could result.
h. Safety. Freedom from unacceptable risk. ,~-.
1
: . . . : .,
1. Severity. An estimate of the magnitude of harm or d~ag~ ~a~ ~?~ld_ re~~:m~bly
result from a hazard-related incident or exposure
4
• Roles and Reaponslbllltles
• I I ‘ To J ‘ • • ff t· P management shall provide the leadership to institute and m~~
1
tam e ec ~ive
s~sksterns for the design and redesign processes.’ Key p~ints: · anticiP;~te ha_zards and
ns · ·, 1 t bl nsk levels 1n . ‘ assess risks; apply the hierarchy of controls to achieve accep e ·
o]]oWing note> is significant iii the ro1eS• and responsibilities seelion. . . k
· ote: 1’he processes of identifying and analyzing hazards • nd assesf.:;8 ns
ltnpr~ve if management establishes a culture where ·emplo7e~ know ge an f
expene . 1 b t . s1gmficant aspects o th nee Is valued and respected and they col .a ora e,Ul · · al bl
e design d h do the work can make v ua e
contrib . an redesign activities. Employees w O • • k · ssments and in
p ~hons in identifying and evaluating hazardS, m ns asse ‘
roposing risk reduction measures.
•
id
316 PREVENTION TH
ECTIONS 5.1.1 TO 5.1.4 OF Z10
ROUGH DESIGN: S
Ith suppliers
5 Relations W . were received that commenters wa • gesuons · . th ntect h apparent as sug . ·b . ging hazards mto e workplace ‘l’L elp i
It became avoid nn t th . … nat h I n . procedures . to . di cussions and arrangemen s at organizati e p ls creaung . The s th -6 th ons sh ‘ded in this section. , . i d guidance on e spec1 cs at should b . ou1d
prov1 ith suppliers are outime d ans recommended and the related addendu e expected
hfav~pwpliers is provided. PrOCe •~ments in ZlO. Addendum C provides prrn Pertains
0 S urement reqi.iµv ‘th li . , , 0Cllren,
directly to the proc · . . · aking arrangements w1 supp ers. ••1en1 . to assist m m . d th . guidelines. that are . . . this section recommen s at supp hers of, eq .
One of the provisions
1
dn m’ aterials provide documentation establishing thuiprnent,
I • processes, an · bl . k 1 • atari k techno ogies, , ~onducted and that an accepta e ns evel, as outlinea b s
assessment has ~?- ·achieved. . , y the . aruzauon has been ., . .
procunng org . I ample of ‘a basic risk assessment report that can be u·
Addendum D 1s an ex · , sed as
a guide for that purpo~e. ,· t. . ,
6. Design Safety Reviews
I ‘
In the design proces$, ri~k assessments _~ould be made as ?fien as needed, on a con-
tinuum. In addition, a formal design safety review proc~dur~ should be put in.place.
This section is supported by ~ddendum E, a safety desi~1,1 revi~w guide: Chapter 15
of this book is devoted entirely to design reviews. ·
7. The Hazard Analysis and Risk ‘Assessment Process ‘
This is the longest section in the stand~d. First, an outlin~ of the hazard analysis and
risk assessment process is given. Th~t is followed by the “how” for each element in the
outline. The tiutline follows .’ · · 1 · • • • • ‘ · ·
‘ .. _
• Select.a risk ~sessmeQt matrix.
• Establish the analysis -~ar~~ters.
• Identify the hazards.
,, r . \’1
• !
• Consider failure modes.
• Assess the severity of consequences.
• Deternu·ne .
occurrence probabilit ·.
• Define initiaf risk. y . .
• Select ·a d · , ·
n implement hazard . . d ontrol
methods. avoidance, elimination, reduction, an .. c
• A_ssess the residual risk.
• Risk acceptance d . .
• ec1s1on makin
Document the results. g.
• Follow-up on a t·
c ions taken .
HIGHLIGHTS OF ANSI/ASSE 2590.3 317
hazards the proper level of acceptable risk can be attained without
for JJJanY ther complex teams of people. Safety and health professionals and design
bringing tog_~ the proper experience and education can reach the proper conclusions of
engineers V:1 t 5 acceptable risk. For more complex risk situations, management should
wbatc00stJtue: in place to seek the counsel of experienced personnel who are partic-
have pro~!~: in risk assessment for the category of the situation being considered.
uJarlY ski_ group consensus is a highly desirable goal. Sometimes, for what an
ReacJung · hi · . ·11 d . bl h b . . . . . ual considers obvious, ac evmg consensus 1s stl esrra e, sot at uy-m 1s
1ndi~1~ for the actions taken. Addenda A and B serve as examples of suggested
obtaln h s to the risk assessment processes.
appro_acs;ongly urged that an appropriate risk assessment matrix be selected for the
Ins d · k t A . k . “d hazard analysis an ns ~se~smen proces~. . ns assessment matnx. prov1 es a
thod to categorize combmatlons of probab1hty of occurrence and seventy of harm,
:e 5 establishing risk levels. A matrix helps in communicating with decision makers on .:k reduction actions to be taken. Also, risk assessment matrices assist in comparing
~d prioritizing risks, and in effectively allocating mitigation resources. Addendum F
provides several examples of risk assessment matrices and descriptions of terms to
serve as a base for an organization to develop a matrix suitable for its operations.
e. Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment Techniques
Top management shall adopt and apply the hazard analysis and risk assessment tech-
niques suitable to the organization’s needs and provide the training necessary to
employees who will be involved in the process. Descriptions of eight selected tech-
niques are presented in Addendum G. Addendum H is a failure mode and effects
analysis form.
As a practical matter, having knowledge of three risk assessment concepts will
be sufficient to address most, but not all, risk situations: preliminary hazard analysis
and risk assessment, what-if/checklist analysis methods, and failure mod~ and effects
analysis. .
9· Hierarchy of Controls
m~~gement shall achieve acceptable risk levels by adopting, implementing, and
p atntaining a process to avoid, eliminate, reduce, and control hazards.and risks. The
rocess shall be based on the hierarchy of controls outlined in this standard, which is:
a. Risk avoidance
b. Elilllination
c. Substitution
d. Engin · eermg controls
e. War ·
ning systems
f. A.ct . .
mtn1strative controls
g. Personal .
protective equipment
318 “‘THROUGH DESl~N: SECTIONS 5.1.1 TO 5.1.4 OF 210 PREVENTIO, i
Thi . “prevention” standard. Research w~ done to develop a v:i..: .
. s 1s a th . f .. r ,, E -•ation .
hierarchy of controls to adapt to e_ meanhit~g of pretrveln tdo~. linunation Whi1_n the
firs ti. to be taken in many hierarc es o con o s, 1d not seem t
6
, ch is the t ac on . o t With
meaning of prevention. · the
• Elimination means removal; purging; talcing away; to get rid of somethj
eliminate, there has to. be something in place to rempve. . ng. 1o
• Avoidance means to prevent something from happening; keeping aw
. avemng. ,
Designers start with a blank sheet of paper or an empty screen in,a computer. ‘d
. . “d h d . ai ed design system. Designers have ,opportumttes to av?• azar s tn all design sta .
conceptual, preliminary, and final. In the early design phases, there are not Yet ges.
hazards to be eliminated, reduced,. or controlled, so .av.oidance is a better match r:!
hierarchy of controls for a prevention standard.
Addendum I includes extensive comments on .each of the elements in the hierarchy.
Addendum J is the Bibliography. ,
GOALS TO BE ACHIEVED
2590.3 says that insofar as is practicable, the goal shall be to assure that for the
design selected:
• An acceptable risk level is achieved, as defined in this standard.
< ' ' • I t ' '
• The probability of personnel making human errors because of design inade-
quacies is as. low as is reasonably practi,cable. .
• The ability. of perso~nel ,tq defeat the . work. sys.tern and the work methods
prescf!bed is as low as is r~asonably pr~ticable.
• The work processes prescribed take into consideration human factors
( ergonomics )-the capabilities and limitations of the work population.
• Hazards and risks with respect to access and the means for maintenance are at
as low as is reasonably practical. ” ‘
• The need for personal protective equipment is as low as is reasonably practi:~
1
‘ d ‘d · · · · t for uu an at IS1)rov1ded for its use where it is necessary (e.g., anchor pom s protection).
• Applicable laws, codes, regulations, and standards have been met.
• Any r · ed d • ‘dered. ecogmz co e of practice, internal or external, has been const
GETTING INVOLVED
It is recommended th t c . . hich theY a.red
. a saiety professionals use actual cases· m w · nan tnvolved to support th • . the des1g
. e premise that addressing hazards and risks m but also
redesign processes will result not only in achieving acceptable risk levels
PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING 319
uctivity and operational_ efficiency. That may be done easier in the rede-
higber prod I say to safety professionals: , JV rocess,
5ignP • . .
O
nvince designers to. allow you to work with them on a proiect so th t
frY to c b’li d al J a ‘ demonstrate your capa i ty, an v ue.
you can . . . ,
w the value you bnng to the discussion. .
, ShO ‘d . . d . When teams are consi ermg a given es1gn or redesign situation, try to
‘ courage input from all present who have knowledge of the process.
~1r a holistic, macro view; include all ·hazard~based subjects if you can.
‘l!U’e . , ‘frY to involve operations personnel at al~ levels. Assume respectfully that those
ho do the work have knowle~ge and skill that can contribute to workplace and
:ork method redesign and encourage their input. . . ·
, Do yow; homework; includ~ alternative solutions al).d costs if that can be done.
, Understand . that you are proposing a culture change-that designers may
presume that you are intruding into their territory aµ,d will r~ist your involvement
to maintain their territorial prerogative.
, Do not play down the fact that implementing a new program can be challenging
and frustrating. Be patient. Utilize change management concepts. Be a good
listener. Be open to comment and criticism.
, Study the incident history in the entity to which counsel is being given and that
of its industry for support data showing that design shortcomings were among
the contributing factors for incidents t\lat have occurred.
A goal is to achieve buy-in by those who are involved, particularly at the senior
executive level. Training programs should be consid.ered for th~,value tq.ey provide.
Also, ask if it will be advantageous in a particular situation, for a prevention through
design system to be written. ,
PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING
~ple~enting the concepts of risk assessment and risk avoidance or reduction in
, e des1gn and redesign proce~ses is a long-term effort. On that point, Bruce Main
is eloq · . d
0
uent, as m the Introduction to his book -Risk Assessment: Challenges an
PPortunities, reproduced here with his permission. . ·
This is an · · · • · ·· hi u· ro ce exciting tlme in risk .assessment. Whether mac · nery ·up me, P –
Or
ss_throughput, cost savings -• new ideas for features, patentable innovations,
sun 1 •· · ‘th ac P Y documenting that a company makes really good products wi
ceptable · k d dri irnpro ns s, the opportunities abound to apply the process an ve
‘1’L ve~ents. The opportunities exist because risk assessment works.
1ue n k · that .8 assessment process is a .journey rather, than an event. Comparu~s
requ~e JUSl starting to complete risk assessmen~~ find their first efforts will
ire more ti’ · 1 &e A nnel . m~ anq •wjll. be less complete than later euorts. s perso
320 PREVENTION THAO
UGH DESIGN: SECTIONS 5.1.1 TO 5.1.4 OF z10
. trai”ning and become more familiar with the risk a · olved receive . d • k d . ssesstn mv h ards will be identtfie , more ns re uction methods d en1
process, ?1kore az ment process will improve and hasten in pace. epioYed and the ns assess . . . d . k
are learned and expenence 1s game , ns assessment be As lessons . d • . cotn
fi ed However some ttme an expenence is required for th es
more re nt ~ess to ~come fully integrated into a company. How m he risk assessmen p . b . . uc tun
depends on the company and its crrcumstances, u~ it typically takes rnonthse
ks Eventually the risk assessment process will become a Part of , not wee . . d . nonna1
business procedures. Until then, ip~ustry nee s time to fully and fortnally
implement these concepts (Introduction).
For safety professionals who are interested in well-written dissertati~
” f · k t h non “Implementing and D~plo~.ment o a ns ashses
11
s men system t at affects all design
decisions, Chapter 16 m Risk Assessment: C a enges and Opportunities is rec
mended. Bruce Main has given permission to duplicate the following key Points 0:;
of which should be considered in relation to procedures in place and the culture of an
organiz.ation.
1. Leadership is a key and critical factor in successfully implementing and
deploying the risk assessment process.
2. Integrating risk assessment in an organization is a process that generally
follows a sequence of phases. (Three frameworks are discussed.)
3. Engineering design needs to change to include the risk assessment process to
more effectively move safety into design. Only by changing the design process
will risk assessment efforts succeed.
4. Introducing the risk assessment process will explicitly change the design pro-
cess, allowing hazards ‘to be identified and risk reduction methods to be incor-
porated early in the design process. As with any new process or substantial
change, people may resist.
5· To be effective, the company culture must _be willing to embrace the ri_sk
assessment process, and cultural acceptance stems from management leadership,
6 In· d ·al · dusers · m UStri pr~uct or process applications,, fx?th equipment suppliers an ss.
should perform nsk assessments and be jnvolved in the risk assessment proee .
7 • In consumer p d d ·
0
&acturer 15 · . ro uct an component product applications, the man 1′
responsible for c d • . . Pr duct users
. on uctmg the nsk assessment if• applicable. 0 d
I
in
~;;ally have ~o risk assessment responsibilitie~ beyond using the pro uc
8 Pr ~nnanc~ wi
th the product information. . gress
. actical guidance is h d d ake pro
in the risk s are to help companies get started an rn toP risk
·as asses~ment process. Topics addressed include: when 10. s what
sessment, the time to 1 . racuces; to do 1• • comp ete an assessment leaders m best P 55men1, n cross •industry • tu . • . . • k asse
making h si ations, when to revise an existing ns
9. To integrc t~~eks to the method, results of risk assessment, a. nd otherli~k-el” need
a e ns assessm t · . will ‘
education and tr . . en_ into the design process, engineers
aming on nsk assessment in some form. (p. 230)
REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES AT NIOSH ON PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN 321
F ACTIVITIES AT NIOSH ON PREVENTION
Rev1euWG~ DESIGN . . . ~flO , n . , . ,
f k I is the coordinator of preventibn though design at NIOSH. ·Z590.3
painela flee .:; if personnel at NIOSH had not concluded that orie of its goals ,was to
would not eJUntion through Design (PtD) standard. Heckel was asked to provide a
have 8 rre;ethe relative activities at NIOSH ‘. which are ·extensive. This is what was
approved at NIOSH for inclusion in this chapter.
wntten .• . .
, ,
tion , through Design (PtD) was initiated · by the National Institute for
Prevenational Safety and Health in 2007 to’ eliminate hazards through the
occup f ‘f1 ·1· . 1 . d d d . gn and redesign o · act tties, processes, too s, equtpment, pro ucts, an
;:iorgahlzation of work.’ Strategic partners included the American Industrial
Hygiene Association (AIHA), the. _American ~ociety of Safety Eng~~:ers
(ASSE), CPWR.:.,_ The Center for Construction · Research and_ Trammg,
Kaiser Permanente, Liberty Mutual, the National Safety Council (NSC), the
Occupational Safety ‘and Health Administratiori (OSHA), ORC World-wide,
and the Regenstrief Center for Healthcare Engineering. · . -· ·
Toe first PtD workshop was held in July-2007. Attenclees included representa-
tives from industry, labor, government, and academia. Proceedings were published
in 2008 in a dedicated· issue of the Journal of Safety Research. A PtD’ Council
was· formed to guide the new • initiative. Council members were specialists in
occupational ·safety and health and arranged strategic goals around the themes of
Research, Education, Practice, and , Policy; The Plan for the National Initiative
(http://www.cdc:gov/niosh/docs/20H-12l/) was publishedin 2009.
In 2010/ the PtD t ole of the •designer/engineer was investigated by -bench-
marking PtD regulations of designers in the• construction industry in the United
Kingdom (UK) to further understand the potential impacts and opportunities for
implementation of the PtD concept in the US. · The Education and Information
Division of NIOSH coordinated a workshop, titled “Making Green Jobs Safe,”
~hich developed 48 compelling activities· for including worker ·safety and health
~to green jobs and sustainable design. A summary of the workshop was published
inZOll : http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2011-201/pdfs/2011-201 ‘ ‘ •
“Prevention through Design: A New Way of Doing Business,” was held in
~:~st !0l 1, included supportive business leaders, noted safety experts, and
or u~c researchers. At this stage, PtD concepts were included in 12 drafts
peep t~hed consensus standards. 1Two booklets, three textbooks, and 50
ate~·:ev~ewed papers had been published. Four case studies had been cre-
learne~ fr:monstrate t?e business value of PtD. ‘ Prese~ters_ shared lessons
Bil’lnih h ma Masters-level degree program at the University of Alabama-
offeredg am and a PtD course at Virginia · Tech. Half a dozen universities
courses co t . . . . highlight d n ammg PtD content. The·se and -other success stones were
I e at the conference · n 2011 h . . · . . .
approved fr t e Amencan Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) obtained
om the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) for ANSI/
a
322 PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN: SECTIONS 5.1.1 TO 5.1.4 OF z1o
ASSE 2590.3-th~ stand,ard titled “Preventiqn through Design· 0 .
for Addressing Occupational _Hazar~s and Ris_ks in Design ~d : 1deU?es
Processes.” This standard provides gwdance on mcluding Prevent’ ~design
Design concepts within an pccupational safety and health manage~on through
. d . . al . Th entsyste and can be applie IQ any occupation setting. e standard focus _Ill,
cally on the avoidance, elimination,,reduction, and control of occupatioes~J>ecifi.
and health hazards and risks ii! the design process. n ,Safety
In 2011, NIOSH met with the US Green Building Council (USGBC)
to collaborate on the inclusion of worker health and safety into Leade’ ?~
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) credits for certification. ~s 2[ 1
10
~OSH repre~~ntatives.met with_ the Con~~ction User’s Roundtable to ide;:
tify opportumties f~r collaboration: Additional emphasis was placed on the
development of business case. studies. Three papers summarizing the 20l 1
conference presentations in the areas of practice, p.olicy, and research we
p_ublished in the January 2013 issue of Professional Safety. Three mo;:
were published in the Marcb 2013 issue, including one focused on business
value, one pertftining to OSH management system~. and the third, education.
PtD has been the topic_ at more tban 55 , professional development courses,
webinars, and roundtable.presentations since 2008.
In August 2012, PtD -and .. the NIOSH -Nanotechnology .Research Center
(NTRC) collaboratecj with the State University New-York at Albany, College
of Nanos.cale Science & Engineering, to hold a Safe NanQ-Design workshop.
The purpose was to discuss the value pf. applying .PtD to safely synthesize
engineered nanoparticles and safely .commercialize nano-enabled products,
Applying PtD concepts in organizations handling engineered nanomaterials
assures that worker health and safety is considered at each step in the supply
chain, resulting in sustainable health and safety performance.
By the spring of 2013, two additional textbooks were published. A total of93
first generation publications were cited by 721 second generation public~tions,
Fifteen consensus standards containing PtD concepts have been publish_ed.
More than two dozen universities have expressed interest in the PtD Education
Modules for existing undergraduate classes. The first to be published was tbe
Architectural Design and Construction Instructor’s Manual (http://www.cdc.
gov/niosh/docs/2013-133). PtD
NIOSH is encouraging research in developing the business case for_ .
The focus is now on developing the process and related tools for de~ernu~:f
business value. Areas of interest include the methods to measure the impac
PtD concepts on actually reducing injury and illness. . roach
NIOSH i~ currently developing a systematic Health Hazard Banding :~cals
to assist safety and .health professionals in providing guidance for~ ~azard
without authoritative occupational exposure limits (OELs). The NIOS d can be
Banding process can be used with limited information and resources 8;ety spe·
performed quickly by in-house industrial hygienists and health and s pational
cialists. The outcome of the Health Hazard Banding process is an occu
exposure band (OEB).
REFEREN9ES 323
d Banding can be used to supplement and support OEL
geaitb I-lazal” facilitating a more rapid evaluation of health risks, providing
d veloPJllent bhy roicals without . OELs, identifying hazards to evaluated for e for c e ‘di th ‘th ,,idallce ubstitution, prov1 ng e user wi recommendations when S”‘ • n or s
1:Jlljnatt0 . ,.,lable andatoolforthedevelopmentqfNIOSHRecommended
e~ . a1data1sav… • .
(llJniJll Lunits, . .
~p05ure . ctivities focus on-providing educational materials for students r,,1ucation a . . •
r:,c, d designers. The impact of these tools must be assessed. Most
engine:• :ngineering students. ha:e Uttl~ practical experience wit:4 hazarli
grad~a · n risk assessment, and nsk avoidance or control methods. NIOSH
‘d nuficauo • . . h ed’ . .
1 e ki’ with ABET, the orgamzation t at acer its engmeenng and tech-. wor ng 1 • is urricula, to encourage facu ty to consider the safety and health of
nologytscand staff during the discovery phase of cutting-edge research.
stu:re are several areas where the incorporation of Prevention through Design
Pts into the curriculum dovetails with ABET objectives to improve student conce d c· · 3 I · PtD · th
1 omes, specifically un er ntenon c. ncorporating concepts mto e OU c . . . “- c l d curriculum shows a comm1tment to continuous improvement uom 1acu ty an
the learning community.
Practice activities focus on stakeholder ability to access, share, and apply
successful PtD practices. In addition to our continued dialog with USGBC and
CURf, NIOSH is collaborating with industry to identify Best Practices so
these can be front loaded into the Capital Design Process.
When a root cause analysis uncovers a design-related hazard, the design
solution should be documented for future reference during the conceptual
design phase of similar facilities or equipment.
Policy activities are focused on developing a PtD culture in industry.
Including PtD into consensus standards is the first step in the development of
a PtD culture.
CONCLUSION
:
1
:m~nt of safety professionals in the design processes is hugely more extensive
thro~ h n it 20_ ye8:s ago. There is opportunity here for professional satisfaction
COntrit P~•cipation m the design processes and for being perceived as a valued
utor m support of operational efficiency as well as risk management.
REl=ERENCEs
ANSIJASSE ZS
Guidelines fi 90-3-20l 1. American National Standard, Prevention through Design:
Processes DorpAd~ressing Occupational Hazards and Risks in Design and Redesign
Chr· · es lam IL 18tensen W es, : American Society of Safety Engineers, 2011.
Nar ‘ ayne C and F 10nat Sat ty C · red A. Manuele, Editors. Safety Through Design. Itasca, IL:
e ouncil, 1999.
324 PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN: SECTIONS 5.1.1 TO 5.1.4 OF 210
“Designing for Safety.” A position paper approved by the board of direct
Society of Safety Engineers, Des Plaines, 11, 1994. · ors, of the Arnen
Guidance On The Principles’ Of Safe Design For Work. Canberra, Austral{ . can
and Compensation Council,’an entity of the Australian government, 2~tu
straJian Sat
I , , · . , ety
Johnson, William. ·MORT Safety Assurance Systems. Itasca,· IL: National S
1980. (Also published by Marcel Dekker, New York.) afety Couneil
Main, •Bruce w.i Risk’ Assessment: Challenges and Opportunities. Ann Arb ‘
Safety Engineering, Inc., 2012. · · or, MI: Design
TR•Z790.001.’ A Technical1Report on Ptevention ·Through Design. Des Plain , ‘
Society of Safety Engineers, 2009. . es, D…. Arnencan
,/
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