Discussion

 Hello is there anyone that can help me with my Discussion questions.  I have multiple discussion questions for different chapters. I will have the instruction in the upload.  

eg LOR

READ THESE GU

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DELINES!

Completion: Students ore responsible for completing oll fourteen of these primory
source exercises ond for onswering oll questions in o given exercise. Posts will be
graded for guolity ond length. No lote posts will beoccepled.

Format: Complel e sen! ences ond occurote grommor ore reguired.If you do use
direct guototions, you must provide proper in-text cifotions – see our oddendum
for detoils.

Originolity: Do not repeot the some informotion onother student has olreody
posted – odd something new to secure os mony points os possible! Breaking ground
eorly moy be odvontageous. Eleventh hour posts thot simply restote moferiol
olreody discussed will not secure the highest scores. Cutting and posting from on
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Student Replies: Replying to, or oddressing,onother student’s post is encouroged
ond is o gneot woy to moke certoinyou’re not simply repeoting informotion ond
losing points for redundoncy. Respectful debate is welcomed.

Word Count: Posts must meet the 2oo-word minimum to eorn o possing scone
(“C”). Quolity posts thot exceed this minimum length will secure points thot
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well. This is not on occosion for lersereplies. Contextuolize the guestions inyour
chopter neodings.

The Atomic Bomb and lts Irnplications

ln July 1945, scientists associated with the Manhattan Project became involved in debates about how the atomic
bomb should be deployed. Members of the Scientit’ic Panel of the secretary of war’s lnterim Advisory Committee

agreed that a bomb could be used for military purposes but disagreed about whether it could be used without
prior warning and demonstration. Other groups of scientists secretly began circulating petitions, such as the one
reprinted here, in which they set out their views. The petitions never reached the president, but they raised issues

that emerged in the postwar period.
ln the section of his memoirs reprinted here, President Harry S. Truman sets out the views of other scientists

on the secretary of war’s Advisory Committee, and explains the logic of his decision to use the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945) and the events as they unt’olded.

A Petition to the President of the United States

uly 17,1945

A Perrrroru ro rur Pnesr-
DENT oF rne Ururrro Srerrs

We, the undersigned scientists, have

been working in the field of atomic
power. Until recently we have had to
fear that the United States might be
attacked by atomic bombs during this
war and that her only defense might lie
in a counterattack by the same means.
Today, with the defeat of Germany, this
danger is averted and we feel impelled

to say what follows:

The war has to be brought speedily
to a successful conclusion and attacks by

atomic bombs may very well be an effec-
–

tive method of warfare. We feel, how-
ever, that such attacks on Japan could
not be justified, at least not unless the
terms which will be imposed after the
war on Japan were made public in detail

and Japan were given an opportunity to
surrender. . . .

[]f Japan still refused to surrender
our nation might then, in certain cir-
cumstances, find itself forced to resort
to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step,

however, ought not to be made at any
time without seriously considering the
moral responsibilities which are involved.

The development of atomic power
will provide the nations with new means
of destruction. The atomic bombs at
our disposal represent only the first step

in this direction, and there is almost no

limit to the destructive power which will
become available in the course of their
future development. Thus a nation which

sets the precedent of using these newly
liberated forces of nature for purposes of
destruction may have to bear the respon-

sibility of opening the door to an era of
devastation on an unimaginable scale.

lf after this war a situation is allowed
to develop in the world which permits
rival powers to be in uncontrolled posses-
sion of these new means of destruction,
the cities of the United States as well as
the cities of other nations will be in con-
tinuous danger of sudden annihilation. . . .

The added material strength which
this lead [in the field of atomic power]
gives to the United States brings with
it the obligation of restraint and if we

were to violate this obligation our
position would be weakened in

of the world and in our own
would then be more difficult for
live up to our responsibility of brir
the unloosened forces of
under control.

ln view of the foregoing,
undersigned, respecifully
first, that you exercise your
Commander-in-Chief, to rule
United States shall not resort
use of atomic bombs in this
the terms which will be im
Japan have been made public

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and ‘Japan knowing these ter
refused to surrender; second,
such an event the question of
or not to use atomic bombs be
by you in the light of the
presented in this petition as
the other moral responsibilities
are involved.

Source: Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F
and R. Hal Williams, eds.,The Manhattan
A Documentary lntroduction to the Atomic
(New York:2000), p. 173.

930 CHAPTER 26 The SecondWorldWar

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Competing Viewpoints

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P r e si dent Tr um an\ M emo ir s

ll}ll;’fi#Y:’::r.#
beyond imagination. On the other hand,
the scientific advisers of the committee
reported, “We can propose no technical
demonstration likely to bring an end to
the war; we see no acceptable alterna-
tive to drrect military use.” lt was their
conclusion that no technical demonstra-
tion they might propose, such as over a
deserted island, would be likely to bring
the war to an end. lt had to be used
against an enemy target.

The final decision of where and
when to use the atomic bomb was up to

e. Let there be no mistake about it. I
the bomb as a military weapon

never had any doubt that it should
used. The top military advisers to the

its use, and
I he unhesitat-

told me that he favored the use of
atomic bomb if it might aid to end
war.

ln deciding to use this bomb I wanted
make sure that it would be used as a

on of war in the manner prescribed

the laws of war. That meant that
d it dropped on a military target

ad told Stimson that the bomb should
dropped as nearly as possibly upon a
production center of prime military

rortance.

Stimson’s staff had prepared a
of cities in Japan that might serve

as targets. Kyoto, though favored by
General Arnold as a center of military
activity, was eliminated when Secretary
Stimson pointed out that it was a cultural
and religious shrine of the Japanese.

Four cities were finally recom-
mended as targets: Hiroshima, Kokura,
Niigata, and Nagasaki. They were listed
in that order as targets for the first
attack. The order of selection was in
accordance with the military importance
of these cities, but allowance would be
given for weather conditions at the time
of the bombing. Before the selected
targets were approved as proper for
military purposes/ I personally went over
them in detail with Stimson, lvlarshall,
and Arnold, and we discussed the mat-
ter of timing and the final choice of the
firsttarget….

On August 6, the fourth day of the
journey home from Potsdam, came
the historic news that shook the world.
I was.eating lunch with members of
the Augusta’s crew when Captain Frank
Graham, White House Ar1″p Room
watch officer, handed me the following
message:

To rur PResroEur FRoM THE SecnrreRy
or WRn

Big bomb dropped on Hiroshima
August 5 al 7:15 e.u. Washington
time. First reports indicate complete
success which was even more conspic-

uous than earlier test.

I was greatly moved. I telephoned
Byrnes aboard ship to give him the news
and then said to the group of sailors
around me, “This is the greatest thing in
history. lt’s time for us to get home.”

Source: Harry S. f r uman, Memoirs, v ol. 1, Year of
Decrslons (Garden City, NY: 1955),pp.a19-21.

Questions for Analysis
7. Scientists circulated petitions to

express their fears about how the
atomic bomb would be used. Examine
the outcomes the scientists proposed,

Which came closest to subsequent
events? Which was the most prudent?
The mosl honest?

2. ls it appropriate for scientists to pro-
pose how new weapons should be
used? Are they overreaching in trying
to give advice in foreign affairs and
military strategy, or are they obligated

to voice moral qualms?

Conclusion 931

READ THE5E GUIDELINES!

Complet

i

on: Students ore responsible for completing oll fourteen of these primory
source exercises ond for onswering oll questions in o given exercise. Posts will be
graded for guolity ond length. No lote posts will be accepted.

Formot: Complet e sentences ond occurote grommor ore required. ff you do use
direct guototions, you must provide proper in-texf citotions – see our oddendum
for detoils.

Originolity: Do not repeot the some informotion onother student hos olreody
posted – odd something new to secute os mony points os possiblel Breoking ground
eorly moy be odvontogeous. Eleventh hour posts thot simply restote moteriol
olreody discussed will not secure the highest scores. Cutting ond posting from on
internet source does not guolify as completing an exercise.

Sfudent Replies: Replying to, or oddressing,onothen student’s post is encouroged
ond is o greot woy to moke certoin you’re not simply repeoting informotion ond

losing points for redundoncy. Respectful debote is welcomed.

Word Count: Posts must meet the ZOO-word minimum to esrno passing score
(“C”). Quolity posts thot exceed this minimum length will secure points that
propontionolity exceed the minimum possing grode.For instonce, guolity posts of
300 words or more eorn “B’s” while quolity posts of 400 words or more secure
“A’s.” But guolity is betten thon quontity! 5o o gneot post with 200 words will do
well. This is not on occosion for lersereplies. Contextualize lhe guestions inyour
chopter reodings.

The Cold War: Soviet and American Views

The first excerpt is t’rom a speech titled “The Sinews of Peace,” delivered by Winston Churchill at Westminster
College in Fulton, Missouri, in early 1946. Warning of the rising power of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, he
coinedthe phrase “iron curtain.”

The next excerpt is t’rom an address by Nihita Khrushchev, who became first secretary of the Communist party
in 1953. Three years later, his power secure, he began publicly to repudiate the crimes of loseph Stalin. Khrushchiv
presided over a short’lived thaw in Soviet-American relations. Yet, as can be seen in his address, Khrushchev shared
Churchill’s conception of the world as divided into two mutually antagonistic camps.

Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech

ffl shadow has fallen uoon the
tfl scenes so iately iighted by the
7fI Alred vrctory. Nobody knows
what Soviet Russia and its Communist
international organization intend to do
in the immediate future, or what are the
limits, if any, to their expansive and pros-
elytizing tendencies. I have a strong admi-
ration and regard for the valiant Russian
people and for my wartime comrade,
lrzlarshal [sic] Stalin. There is deep sympa-

thy and goodwill in Britain . . . towards
the people of all the Russias and a resolve
to persevere through many differences
and rebuffs in establishing lasting friend-
ships. We understand the Russian need
to be secure on her western frontiers by
the removal of all possibility of German
aggression. We welcome Russia to her

rightful place among the leading nations
of the world. We welcome her flag upon
the seas. Above all, we welcome con-
stant, frequent and growing contacts
between the Russian people and our
own people on both sides of the Atlantic.
It is my duty however . . . to place before
you certain facts about the present posi-
tion in Europe.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste
in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has
descended across the Continent. Behind
that line lie all the capitals of the ancient
states of Central and Eastern Europe.
Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Buda-
pest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all
these famous cities and the populations
around them lie in what I must call the
Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one

form or another, not only to Soviet
ence but to a very high and, in

friends and allies during the war, I
convinced that there is nothi

ng

admire so much as strength, and
nothing for which they have less
than for weakness, especially mil
weakness. For that reason the old
trine of a balance of power is
We cannot afford, if we can help
to work on narrow margins,
temptations to a triad of strength. lf
Western Democracies stand
in strict adherence to the princi
the Uniied Nations Charter, their
ences for furthering those

much broader anticommunist struggle. He announced that
he would dismantle Hungary’s political police and withdraw
from the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev might contemplate looser
ties between Eastern Europe and Moscow, but he would not
tolerate an end to the pact. On November 4, 1956, Soviet
troops occupied Budapest, arresting and executing leaders
o[ the Hungarian rebellion. The Hungarians took up arms,
and street frghting continued for several weeks. They had

hoped for Western aid, but Presidenr Dwight D. Eisenhower,
newiy elected to a second term, steered clear of giving them
support. Soviet forces installed a new government under the
staunchly communist Janos Kadar, and the repression con-
tinued, forcing tens of thousands o[ Hungarian refugees to
flee for the West. Khrushchev’s efforts at presenring a gen-
tler, more conciliatory Soviet Union to the West had been
shattered by revolt and repression.

946 | cHnerrn zz The Cold.War World: Global Politics, Economic Recovery, and Cultural Change

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‘T*’ffiI;:”.””:”,:,;ffi

will be immense and no one is likely to
molest them. lf however they become
divided or falter in their duty and .if

these all-important years are allowed to
slip away then indeed catastrophe may

overwhelm us all.

Source: Winston Churchill, Winston 5. Churchill: His
Com plete S peeches, 1 897 – 1 9 63, vol. 7, 1 9 43 – 19 49,

ed. Robert Rhodes James (New York: 1983),

pp.7290-91.

NihitaKhrushchev, Report to the Communist Party Congress (1961)

Cl i#’1r:.H:itiiir:i
ist, has been the chief content of the
period since the 20th party Congress.
It has become the pivot, the foundation

of world development at the present
historical stage. Two lines, two histori-
cal trends, have manifested themselves

more and more clearly in social develop-

ment. One is the line of social Progress,
peace and constructive activity. The
other is the line of reaction, oppression

and war.

ln the course of the peaceful com-
petition of the two systems capitalism
has suffered a profound moral defeat
in the eyes of all peoples. The common

people are daily convinced that capital-

ism is incapable of solving a single one of

the urgent problems confronting man-
kind. lt becomes more and more obvi-
ous that only on the paths to socialism

can a solution to these problems be
found. Faith in the capitalist system
and the capitalist path of development
is dwindling. lr4onopoly capital, losing
its influence, resorts more and more to

intimidating and suppressing the masses

of the people, to methods of open dicta-

torship in carrying out its domestic pol-

icy and to aggressive acts against other
countries. But the masses of the people
offer increasing resistance to reaction’s
acts.

It is no secret to anyone that the
methods of intimidation and threat are
not a sign of strength but evidence of
the weakening of capitalism, the (eep-

ening of its general crisis. As the saying
goes, if you can’t hang on by the mane,

you won’t hang on by the tail! Reaction
is still capable of dissolving parliaments
in .some countries in violation of their
coristitutions, of casting the best repre-

sentatives of the people into prison, of

sending cruisers and marines to subdue
the “unruly.” All this can put off for a
time the approach of the fatal hour for
the rule of capitalism. The imperialists
are sawing away at the branch on which

they sit. There is no force in the world

capable of stopping man’s advance along

the road of progress.

Source: Current Soviet Policies /V, ed, Charlotte

Saikowski and Leo Gruliow, from the translations
of Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Joint Committee

on Slavic Studies (New York: 1962), pp. 42-45.

Questions for Analysis

1. Whom didChurchill blameforbuilding

the lron Curtain between the Soviet
sphere and the Western sphere?

2. How was the Soviet Union actively
trying to create international commu-

nism? How was the United States try-

ing to spread its way of life globally?

Khrushchev’s policy of “peacefui coexistence” with
the West did not reduce his determination to stave off
any military threat to Eastern Europe. By the mid-1950s,
NATO’s policy of putting battlefield nuclear weapons
in West Germany seemed evidence of just such a threat.
What was more, East Germans continued to flee the coun-

try via West Berlin. Between 1949 and 1961,2.7 million
East Germans left-stark evidence of the unpopularity

of the regime. Attempting to stem the tide, Khrushchev
demanded that the West recognize the permanent division

of Germany with an undivided Berlin. When that demand
was refused, the East German government built a ten-foot
wall separating the two sectors of the city in 1961. The wall
brought a dangerous show of force on both sides, as the
Soviets and Americans mobilized reservists for war. The
newly elected American presidentJohn F. Kennedy marked

The Cold War and a Divided Continent 947

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