After reading the article “‘Big Questions About Intergovernmental Relations and Management: Who Will Address Them?” by Kincaid and Stenberg, choose two of the questions from the article that intrigued you the most. Then in 750-1,000 words, do the following:

• Explain whether the questions still need answering or if they have been addressed by government since the article was published.
• If they have been answered, explain why and how. If they have not been answered, explain what government can do to start finding answers to them.
• Describe the importance of the questions as they relate specifically to state and local governments.

Intergovernmental
Management
Symposium

196 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011

John Kincaid
Lafayette College

Carl W. Stenberg
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Fiscal, administrative, and political tensions among the
partners in the federal system have not eased, and perhaps
have grown, since the demise of the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996.
Yet no governmental organizational capacity exists to
address big intergovernmental questions in an ongoing
manner through nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data
collection, deliberation, and policy

formulation.

Since the death of the U.S. Advisory Commis-sion on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in 1996, important intergovernmental issues have
remained on the country’s agenda. Shortly after the
2008 presidential election, for example, the Federal
Systems Panel (2008) of the National Academy of
Public Administration delivered an “Intergovernmen-
tal Agenda” to the incoming administration asserting
a need to “restructure intergovernmental management
across the federal system” on the basis of “collabora-
tion rather than command and control.” Th e agenda
cited such policy challenges as health care access
(e.g., Medicaid) and cost reductions, housing, natural
disasters, terrorism, energy consumption, unemploy-
ment, and infrastructure. Th e agenda disappeared in
the bowels of the White House.

Yet continuing intergovernmental process issues
deserve attention. Th ese include, among others, fi scal
pressures on all governments; declining federal aid
for such place-based functions as infrastructure and
economic development; escalating social welfare costs
for state and local governments; increasing condi-
tions of federal aid; the proliferation of grants to
more than 900; federal programs designed poorly for
effi ciency, eff ectiveness, and equity; coercive inter-
governmental regulations and federal preemptions;
unfunded and underfunded federal and state man-
dates; tensions in state–local jurisdictional and fi scal
relations; impediments to multistate and substate
regional collaboration; the nationalization of state
criminal law; federal restrictions on state and local
taxes; and federal court orders (Kincaid 2008; Posner
and Conlan 2008).

Th e following 15 questions—which are not exhaustive
and do not include constitutional questions such as
those posed by the Patient Protection and Aff ordable
Care Act of 2010 and by calls to repeal the Seven-
teenth Amendment—are derived from the contribu-
tions to this symposium as well as recent literature. In
framing these questions, it is diffi cult to distinguish
consistently between intergovernmental relations
(IGR) and intergovernmental management (IGM).
In the main, we take “intergovernmental relations” to
be a term that encompasses all types of interactions
between elected and nonelected offi cials of federal,
state, and local governments. Th e especially important
dimension of IGR is policy making—both lawmaking
and regulation promulgation—in which elected of-
fi cials and agency heads are important actors. We take
“intergovernmental management” to be a less compre-
hensive term, encompassing the implementation and
management of intergovernmental policies. Politics
cannot, of course, be divorced from management, but
the especially important dimension of IGM is admin-
istration, in which nonelected offi cials from agency
heads to street-level bureaucrats are prime actors.

We do not seek to answer the following questions,
but rather to pose them, sometimes provocatively, for
discussion.

1. Can intergovernmental relations generate more
eff ective and effi cient policies and implementation
without restoring the primacy of the “governmen-
tal” in intergovernmental? Th e U.S. ACIR was
founded on the democratic premise that elected
government offi cials legitimately represent the people.
Th e ACIR also was founded on the constitutional
premise that American democracy is federal. Th e
people’s democratic representatives, therefore, are
principally the elected executive and legislative of-
fi cials of the nation’s general-purpose federal, state,
and local governments, with federal and state offi cials
each presiding over a sovereign order of government.
Consequently, intergovernmental initiatives should be
formulated and overseen by elected federal, state, and

“Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations
and Management: Who Will Address Th em?

“Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 197

late 1990s, local governments were relegated, perhaps, to a back seat
in Washington, D.C.

Even though about 63 percent of federal aid is dedicated to social
welfare benefi ts for individuals, which is predominantly a state

responsibility, the health of “places” remains
vital to the social welfare of all citizens. As a
Canadian initiative put it, “We are rediscov-
ering that economic competitiveness, social
well-being, and ecosystem resilience depend,
in large part, on collective behaviour in specifi c
‘places’” (Shugart and Townsend 2010, 4).
Furthermore, some other federal countries
have strengthened the intergovernmental roles
of local governments, and several have even
recognized local, usually municipal, govern-
ments as the third order of government in their
constitution (Steytler 2009).

3. How will eff orts to induce national
economic growth and remedy the inter-
governmental system’s unsustainable fi scal
condition aff ect state and local revenues

and services? Studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Of-
fi ce (GAO), Congressional Budget Offi ce, Peterson Foundation,
National Academy of Public Administration, and others point to
the unsustainability of current federal, state, and local spending.
Th e GAO (2010b) has projected a $9.9 trillion fi scal gap between
state and local expenditures and revenues for 2009 to 2058 that
could require state and local spending reductions or tax increases of
about 12.3 percent every year for the next 50 years. Under current
policies, the GAO also expects that demographic changes (mainly a
growing senior citizen population), rising health care costs, and defi –
cit spending will require the federal government’s major entitlement
programs, plus net interest payments, to consume “93 cents of every
dollar of federal revenue” by 2030 (2010a, 6). Th ese projections, if
accurate, have grave implications for intergovernmental programs
and state and local fi nances. In turn, the possibility of reviving a
program such as General Revenue Sharing (e.g., Shiller 2010) is
virtually out of the question.

No agreement has been reached on solutions, although Medicare,
Medicaid, Social Security, defense, and defi cit spending have been
identifi ed as prime targets for federal budget reform. Given the
high-profi le politics associated with these budget items and the
“sacred cow” status of the major programs, lower-profi le programs
could bear the brunt of initial cutbacks. For example, discretionary
spending for both place (e.g., infrastructure) and person (e.g., social
services) functions carried out by states and localities could be re-
duced. Also, the federal government could enact new taxes, such as a
national sales tax or value-added tax (VAT). A federal consumption
tax likely would place downward political pressure on state and local
sales tax rates. Conceivably, the states could be pressured or man-
dated to abolish their sales taxes and join a national VAT regime,
which would make them dependent on revenues distributed by the
federal government from its VAT. Th e tax-exempt status of state and
local bonds could be reduced further, too. Th ere is a need to identify
and measure the possible impact of such federal initiatives on state
and local fi nances.

local offi cials. In this respect, assembling these offi cials (and from
both political parties) in a peak intergovernmental advisory organi-
zation made eminent sense. Th e ACIR refl ected the sine qua non of
the idea of cooperative federalism.

However, the rise of “governance” as a theoreti-
cal perspective and empirical reality brought
into play a competing organizational dynamic
rooted in the private sector. Th is dynamic
refl ected disenchantment with government
as well as enchantment with the thought
of a more porous, pluralistic polity made
wiser, more eff ective, and more democratic
by networks of “governing” organizations in
which government is one among many actors
and in which government offi cials enjoy no
presumption of primacy, even though they are
the only democratically elected representatives
of the people within governance networks.
Furthermore, because the federal government
is the preeminent source of fi scal and regula-
tory resources for such networks, it is not clear
that the governance paradigm even values state
and local offi cials and, thereby, intergovernmental relations. Given
that state and local governments are entrenched constitutionally,
intergovernmental relations remain a necessary—and perhaps, for
the paradigm’s proponents, a lamentably frictional—component of
governance, but not a component necessarily valued as a principle of
democratic self-government and multigovernmental negotiation to
enhance policy outcomes.

2. Should local governments have a more prominent seat at the
intergovernmental table? Although local governments are not
constitutional partners of the federal system, as a practical matter,
they are vital to IGR and IGM. Local governments gained a seat at
the intergovernmental table during the New Deal, largely because of
their Democratic political clout, especially that of big-city mayors.
Hence, federal aid often fl owed directly to local governments, and
local offi cials cooperated and competed with their state superiors in
the federal arena. Local offi cials sometimes distrusted state gover-
nors and legislators, and they argued that federal funds for local,
especially urban, needs and the poor would not reach their targets
if they were passed through state agencies. Th is concern triggered
a debate, which was addressed by the ACIR, about whether federal
aid bypassing state capitals was benefi cial or detrimental to federal-
ism and public policy, and under what conditions federal aid should
go through the states.

However, three developments largely unseated local governments
from being infl uential intergovernmental lobbyists. First, President
Ronald Reagan and subsequent Republican presidents defi ned IGR
as primarily a federal–state relationship. Democratic presidents have
been more attentive to local governments, but only insofar as it has
been politically advantageous to do so. Second, after 1987, federal
aid shifted sharply from places to persons, signifi cantly reducing
federal funding for local place functions such as economic devel-
opment, urban renewal, housing, education, transportation, and
government operations. Th ird, the ACIR was eliminated in 1996.
Local governments occupied 27 percent of the ACIR’s seats. By the

[T]he rise of “governance” as
a theoretical perspective and

empirical reality brought into
play a competing organizational
dynamic rooted in the private

sector. . . . in which government
is one among many actors and
in which government offi cials

enjoy no presumption of
primacy, even though they are
the only democratically elected

representatives of the people
within governance networks.

198 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011

In 2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
recommended eliminating income tax deductions for state and
local taxes. Most state and local offi cials oppose the elimination.
Th is issue has a partisan dimension, though: in 2005, for instance,
the average state and local tax payment in Democratic states was
$7,487, compared to $4,834 in Republican states (Maggs 2005).
Because most state income taxes are coupled to the federal tax code,
state offi cials fear that changes in federal tax laws, especially tax
cuts and retroactive changes, will reduce state tax revenues. Federal
offi cials feel no obligation to coordinate tax policies with state and
local offi cials.

At the same time, many state and local governments have been less
than fi scally responsible. Th e GAO found, for instance, that tax
increases boosting state and local own-source revenues increased faster
than the growth of personal income in 43 states during 1977–2007.
State and local general expenditures increased faster than personal
income growth in 47 states during 1977–2007 (GAO 2010b). Al-
though most states are formally complying with their balanced budget
rules, some are making questionable choices or unwarranted fi scal
assumptions in order to do so. Many states also have exhausted their
“rainy day” funds. It has become evident, as well, that most state and
local governments have underfunded pension programs and health
care benefi ts for their employees, placing a potentially huge fi scal
burden on taxpayers in future years. Th ere is a need to monitor the
complex interactions of federal and state tax laws and revenues, as well
as trends in funding commitments and capacities to meet obligations.

6. Should functional responsibilities be “sorted out” with turn-
backs or partial de-intergovernmentalization in order to achieve
greater effi ciency and eff ectiveness? Attempts to “divide the job”
of service delivery among intergovernmental actors originated in
the early days of cooperative federalism, but eff orts to do so have
not been undertaken since President Reagan’s unsuccessful “swap”

initiative in 1981–82. Some observers contend
that “sorting out” is futile because of the com-
plexity of intergovernmental management, the
resilience of functional picket-fence silos, the
widely varying appetites for taxes and services
among states and localities, and the lack of
political rewards. Others contend that sorting
out is unrealistic because of the complex inter-
governmental interdependence of most policy
functions. Still others add that “bigger is not
necessarily better.”

To these skeptics, consolidation or integration
of services and better coordination among
state, regional, and local agencies are more
practical and promising ways to bolster the
performance of governmental functions. Yet
these modest steps might not be suffi cient. If
revenue constraints and spending cutbacks
prove to be long-term IGM conditions that
cause public offi cials to fundamentally rethink

their service delivery strategies, then bold “idea federalism” studies
could help challenge the status quo and highlight innovations from
across the world for consideration by federal, state, and local policy
makers.

4. What design features should accompany federal economic
stimulus programs, health care and fi nancial regulation reform,
and other national policy initiatives in order to facilitate more
eff ective state and local implementation in times of austerity?
Federal responses to the 2007–9 national recession, banking and
securities failures, stock market collapse, housing crisis, and soaring
health care costs have focused more on money than on manage-
ment. While this is understandable, little attention has been given
to the implementation of national remedial actions by state and
local governments, many of which have reduced managerial capacity
in the wake of retirements, hiring freezes, and personnel cutbacks.
For example, from September 2009 to September 2010, state and
local government employment declined by 1.3 percent, while fed-
eral employment grew by 3.4 percent (Cauchon 2010). Traditional
channels for awarding funds have usually been followed, producing
delays and distortions, and performance measures have been modest
or nonexistent, as exemplifi ed by the sole metric of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA): the number of jobs cre-
ated by stimulus funds, an indicator developed by auditors, not
managers (Posner 2010, 26–27). Th e success of these national initia-
tives is largely in the hands of state and local public administrators
who are operating with minimal guidance and support, whose ranks
are stretched thin, and whose oversight abilities are diminished.
Having an organizational capacity to anticipate and prepare for the
IGM dimensions of national policy making could improve imple-
mentation and avoid micromanagement and “horror stories.”

Th e experience with ARRA also suggests that the federal govern-
ment has not developed a capacity to provide eff ective counter-
cyclical aid to states and localities. Generally, ARRA’s economic
outcomes are consistent with analyses of previous federal eff orts to
assist states and localities during recessions, which suggest that such
programs are less than optimal because they are not usually timed
well, triggered adequately, or targeted eff ectively (Mattoon 2009).

5. How can state and local governments be
viable intergovernmental partners without
greater fi scal capacity and fi scal responsi-
bility? One characteristic of contemporary
federalism is federal preemption of state taxes
through legislation and judicial action usually
undertaken pursuant to the commerce clause,
beginning especially with the enactment of
limits on tax-exempt private activity bonds in
1984. Federal judicial and statutory prohibi-
tions of state taxation of Internet services and
interstate mail-

order sales are among the most
prominent constraints.

In October 2007,
President George W. Bush signed a seven-year
extension of the moratorium on state and local
taxation of Internet access.

A number of states negotiated the Streamlined
Sales and Use Tax Agreement to collect taxes on
interstate mail-order sales. Th e agreement was
implemented voluntarily among consenting states in October 2005.
Although several large retailers comply voluntarily with the agreement,
Congress has not sanctioned the agreement or otherwise authorized
states to require sales tax collections by out-of-state vendors.

One characteristic of
contemporary federalism is
federal preemption of state

taxes via legislation and judicial
action usually undertaken
pursuant to the commerce
clause, beginning especially
with the enactment of limits

on tax-exempt private-activity
bonds in 1984. Federal judicial

and statutory prohibitions
of state taxation of Internet
services and interstate mail-

order sales are among the most
prominent constraints.

“Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 199

offi cials a cornucopia of choices, it also creates problems, such as
the limited capacity of most local governments to access grants or
manage multiple grants, time-consuming grant seeking, diffi culties
coordinating grant activities within states and localities, distortions
of recipient priorities, and negligible impacts of small grants on
long-term state and local capacities.

Th ere also is a growing need to coordinate grants across federal
agencies such as housing, environmental protection, and trans-
portation so as to promote sustainable communities, among other
things. To what extent are systems performance approaches to policy
programming frustrated by a stovepiped grant system, and how can
public offi cials be held adequately accountable for producing results
under such conditions?

If worsening federal budget conditions make discretionary pro-
grams targets for cutbacks, it would be valuable to have impartial
information about where to begin and what impacts will result.
Reviews under the Government Performance and Results Act
and Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) provide some data
about program eff ectiveness, and GAO evaluations off er additional
insights, but these are federal perspectives that sometimes fail to
consider state and local management conditions. For instance,
block grants have been ranked relatively low in PART reviews rela-
tive to accomplishing national goals, even though these instruments
are intended to maximize recipient fl exibility in achieving their
objectives and are popular with state and local offi cials and manag-
ers (Radin 2008).

8. How can the fl exibility, discretion, and innovative aspects of
block grants be balanced against the performance and trans-
parency expectations of Congress and the presidency? As noted
earlier, research suggests a mismatch between PART expectations
and the design of block grants. Yet there has been no eff ort to
reconcile the confl ict between discretion and fl exibility for state
and local recipients with the accountability and transparency
needed by federal offi cials (Stenberg 2008). At the same time, the
original vision of many block grant promoters that block grants
would foster more systems-wide planning and programming has,
for the most part, not seen the light of day, although the surface
transportation program has moved somewhat toward systems-
wide thinking.

Similarly, since the demise of the ACIR, little attention has been
given to the eff ects of “recategorization” of existing block grants on
intergovernmental management. Th is trend has been in response to
congressional, federal agency, and interest group concerns about the
priorities and projects chosen by state and local recipients, and it
undercuts the intent of this instrument and the spirit of cooperative
federalism. Th e rise of earmarking also has reinforced narrow proj-
ect-by-project thinking and, at times, even distorted or contradicted
systemic plans prepared by state or local governments pursuant to
federal grant requirements. An example is the Water Resources Act
of 1986, which largely displaced project initiation rooted in river
basin planning in favor of locally initiated projects and congressio-
nal earmarks (NAPA 2007). Assuming that one strategy for cutting
federal discretionary spending might be to consolidate functionally
related categorical programs into block grants, analyses of the rede-
sign features and management issues would be useful.

Although the federal government has a poor track record of approv-
ing turnbacks, they are still worth considering. For example, some
observers have long regarded surface transportation (and motor
fuels taxes) as a prime candidate for a federal turnback to the states
(see, e.g., ACIR 1987a). Nothing intrinsic to federalism requires a
federal role. In Canada, for example, since 1867, “the provision of
highways has been mainly a provincial responsibility, with only a
small role played by the federal government” (Turgeon and Vaillan-
court 2002, 179).

Is education a candidate for partial de-intergovernmentalization?
(Kincaid 1992). Since 1965, the federal regulatory role in K–12
education has increased tremendously, while the federal fi scal role
has grown modestly; yet education outcomes remain unacceptably
low, and President Barack Obama acknowledged on NBC’s Today
Show in early October 2010 that “our per-pupil spending has gone
up during the last couple of decades even as results have gone down”
(quoted in McGurn 2010, 10). To what extent has the federal role
increased the bureaucratization, legalization, unionization, and
nationalization of education to the detriment of the state- and,
especially, local-specifi c factors associated with better outcomes,
such as teacher qualifi cations, rewards for good teaching, principal
and superintendent leadership, challenging curriculum, and parental
involvement? By contrast, K–12 and postsecondary education are
predominantly provincial responsibilities in Canada (Simeon and
Papillon 2006) and cantonal responsibilities in Switzerland (Fleiner
2006); in each case, the federal government plays small fi scal and
regulatory roles. What other policy fi elds might be candidates for
turnbacks or partial de-intergovermentalization?

Some governors have argued that “a crisis is a terrible thing to
waste.” Current economic conditions and fi scal projections might
signal an opportunity to reconsider the Reagan swap proposal with
respect to Medicaid. Federal assumption of fi scal responsibility for
the long-term care component of Medicaid would relieve the states
(and local governments in states that require a local contribution to
Medicaid) of a huge fi scal burden. Perhaps the swap could be even
larger: Medicaid and children’s health care entirely could become a
federal responsibility in exchange for turnbacks of education, trans-
portation, housing, community development, and other human
services. Such a swap would be about fi scally even overall (Harkness
2010), although its impacts would vary from state to state, the pros-
pect of which would generate confl ict between expected winners
and losers in any swap.

7. Should federal categorical grants-in-aid be consolidated in
order to reduce overlap, target resources, and improve results?
For most of its life, the ACIR called on Congress to consolidate
grant programs, especially those of relatively small fi scal size, on the
grounds that they are overlapping and duplicative. Th e rise of block
grants potentially off ered elected state and local offi cials both more
discretion and more authority over program design and implemen-
tation. However, congressional policy entrepreneurs, working with
interest groups and federal agencies, resisted these calls, leading
to de facto recategorization of many block grants, severe limits on
the amount of funds delivered through block grants, and a steady
increase in the number and costs of categorical grants, with only
two exceptions during the presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald
Reagan. Although the multiplication of grants off ers state and local

200 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011

bying, given the substantial impacts of these regulatory tools on the
fl exibility and resources of states and localities. However, the demise
of the ACIR, resulting in part from its 1995–96 work on federal
mandates, had a chilling eff ect on studies seeking to assess the ben-
efi ts and costs of regulatory federalism. One exception to this regu-
latory trend is the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which,
despite signifi cant loopholes in coverage such as homeland security,
welfare, and education, seems to have reduced unfunded mandate
enactments while also acting as a useful lobbying tool for the state
and local interest groups and a procedural tool for the Congressio-
nal Budget Offi ce to monitor mandate initiation and fi scal impacts.
Few studies of state mandates on local governments have been
undertaken recently (although the Pennsylvania Local Government
Commission was mandated by the state senate in 2010 to undertake
such a study), perhaps because of their politically volatile nature and
the decrease in state ACIRs, which sometimes were charged with
conducting such studies. Furthermore, the federal government is,
arguably, circumventing the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act by
enacting more conditions of aid that are unfunded or underfunded
de facto mandates. Given the currently anemic economy and the
dismal long-term fi nancial prospects for state and local govern-
ments, rigorous analysis of the benefi ts and costs of mandates would
seem to be imperative.

Similarly, preemption is a hot-button issue in Washington, D.C.,
and in some state capitals. In a global economy especially, debate
over whether the nation should have a single national standard or 50
standards on commerce, health and safety, banking and fi nance, the
environment, natural resources, and many other matters has been
contentious. Generally speaking, many conservatives and Republi-
cans who once championed states’ rights now favor federal preemp-
tion in a number of fi elds; many liberals and Democrats who once
championed federal preemption now oppose it in a number of fi elds
or support partial preemption in certain policy fi elds, such as envi-
ronmental and consumer protection. (Under partial preemption, the
federal government usually establishes a minimum national standard
to which all states and localities must adhere but allows state and
local governments to enact higher, more rigorous standards.)

Another regulatory device, waivers, has become more prevalent since
the ACIR’s demise. Th is executive tool is also politicized. Presidents
Reagan and George H. W. Bush, for example, issued some waivers,
but they were constrained by Democratic Congresses fearing that
these presidents would deploy waivers to gut social programs. Presi-
dent Bill Clinton faced a Democratic Congress and then Republican
Congresses more friendly to waivers, especially in social policy. Un-
der Clinton, several Republican governors (e.g., Tommy Th ompson
of Wisconsin) became national fi gures by using waivers to reform
welfare and lay the groundwork for the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Although waivers
can facilitate innovation, little attention has been given to their con-
stitutional and normative problematics insofar as “[t]hey jeopardize
the integrity of the rule of law and potentially enhance executive
power over legislative power . . . pose issues of democratic account-
ability insofar as they are negotiated and implemented by executive
offi cials outside of fl oodlit legislative processes . . . raise questions of
equity . . . insofar as they introduce variability in the implementa-
tion of law and, thus, equal-protection concerns, and insofar as they
politicize law enforcement” (Kincaid 2001, 22).

9. How has the “state” of state–local relations changed, and what
actions might be taken to improve these relationships? Competi-
tion for grants, funding cutbacks, unfunded mandates, and restric-
tions on local authority continue to strain state–local relations. Th e
ACIR devoted substantial research and recommendations to actions
that states could take to reduce tensions and strengthen relation-
ships with their local units, including granting more “home rule” or
discretionary authority; devolving more power over functions, per-
sonnel, and fi nances; providing more state grants and discretionary
fi nancial assistance to cities and counties; restraining state mandates;
providing compensatory aid for regulations with statewide impacts;
assuming greater fi scal and operational authority from local govern-
ments for social welfare, courts, mental health, elementary and sec-
ondary education, corrections, transportation, and other functions;
and creating a state ACIR equivalent to consider state–local issues,
conduct research on intergovernmental topics, and provide technical
assistance. Although each state monitors its own state–local rela-
tions in various ways, there is a need for a nationwide overview and
comparative perspective on state–local relations in order to discern
trends, spot emerging problems, and disseminate useful innovations.

10. Should incentives or requirements be provided in federal and
state grant and regulatory programs to promote greater interlo-
cal collaboration? For decades, the structures of local governments
in metropolitan areas have been debated, and research has not
confi rmed the superiority of the public choice, consolidationist, or
middle-ground positions. Th e ACIR moved away from a more con-
solidationist (ACIR 1982) to a less consolidationist position (e.g.,
ACIR 1987b). What is known is that local structure is resistant
to change and that federal incentives and requirements have had
minimal impacts. Beginning in the 1950s, the federal government
provided fi nancial incentives to encourage regional organizations
to facilitate planning, provide technical assistance, and conduct
program reviews. Management circulars from the president’s Offi ce
of Management and Budget complemented these eff orts, and several
states regionalized planning and program administration. A few
states off ered fi nancial incentives for interlocal program cooperation.
Most of these eff orts no longer exist, other than those in transpor-
tation, where metropolitan planning organizations are a federal
requirement, and in economic development, where economic de-
velopment districts assist distressed communities in rural areas and
small metropolitan regions.

Needs to work across jurisdictional and sector boundaries have grown
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001), but new ways of doing so eff ectively
and effi ciently while preserving the people’s preferences for local self-
government have not kept pace. Experiments in collaborative gov-
ernance are under way across the country, and it would be useful to
know more about the successes and failures of these innovations. Th is
is a good example of the need for an ACIR-type capacity because
research on such experiments requires considerable and costly data
collection, which is usually beyond the reach of academics.

11. Under what circumstances are unfunded federal or state
mandates warranted or unwarranted, and when and how should
the federal government preempt state and local authority or
provide waivers for state and local exemptions and experiments?
Intergovernmental regulation, including mandates and preemptions,
has replaced grants-in-aid as the focal point for state and local lob-

“Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 201

needed of the impacts of these new forms of participation. In what
ways do they enhance and diminish governmental effi ciency and
eff ectiveness?

14. What trends have taken place during the past two decades in
intergovernmental relations and in tools for transacting inter-
governmental business? A valuable service rendered by the ACIR to
researchers, policy analysts, and students was to regularly track the
number and types of tools used to implement intergovernmental
programs. Th is included collecting and interpreting data on general
and special-purpose governments, categorical and block grants,
regulations and preemptions, and interlocal contracts and service
agreements. Th e annual Signifi cant Features of Fiscal Federalism
was one of the ACIR’s most popular publications. Th e ACIR also
mounted annual surveys (1972–94) of public opinion on federal-
ism and taxes. After the ACIR’s demise, the void in this literature
was fi lled partly by the GAO, Congressional Budget Offi ce, Census
Bureau, Rockefeller Institute, and Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism,
but there is no one-stop shop for this information. Many of the new
providers of information do so only intermittently and sometimes
inconsistently, some lack the credibility and policy audiences of the
ACIR, and some information has not been collected at all.

15. Who will answer the “big questions?” In the post-ACIR world,
other than a few federal agencies, no intergovernmental organiza-

tion has risen to provide continual nonpartisan
or bipartisan research, data collection, delib-
eration, and policy formulation. Th ink tanks
and scholars investigate some of these subjects,
but often with limited resources, narrow
foci, or a particular political or philosophical
point of view. Yet many people (e.g., Brunori
2001; Harkness 2010) who study or practice
intergovernmental relations express the need
for ongoing impartial or balanced attention to
intergovernmental management issues, as well
as to emerging trends and their implications.
As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY)
remarked during the debate on the ACIR’s
fi nal appropriation, “the ACIR does important,
if largely unheralded, work. And we stand on
the brink of terminating it. Th is is a mistake,
which we will regret . . . without the ACIR,
our knowledge of important matters will never
be anything more than meager. Th e action we
are about to take will harm our capacity to
govern eff ectively” (quoted in McDowell 1997,
127).

Was Moynihan right? In the absence of an
ACIR-type capacity in Washington, D.C., and
in many states, will the “big questions” of IGR
and IGM remain largely unanswered or not
answerable at all?

As this symposium has underscored, the odds
do not favor proponents of a new ACIR-type
institution. Perhaps only a truly dramatic
event, one that could prove a signifi cant “game

Much like the State and Local Legal Center has identifi ed pend-
ing U.S. Supreme Court cases aff ecting federalism and state and
local interests and prepared briefs to argue its clients’ positions, an
intergovernmental organization could monitor trends, conduct
inventories of regulatory tools, and collect cost estimates to compare
with those provided by the Congressional Budget Offi ce so as to
help Congress make better-informed decisions.

12. How could social equity be better refl ected in aid formulas
and administrative arrangements? During the past 15 years or so,
equity has joined effi ciency and eff ectiveness as the third leg of the
intergovernmental management stool (Frederickson 2010)—from
the design of programs (e.g., eligibility) to delivery (e.g., assisting
elderly, disabled, poor, and non-English-speaking residents dur-
ing natural disasters). Yet it remains unclear how social equity can
be better embedded in the design and implementation of federal
and state aid formulas and management systems, especially in light
of Congress’s penchant for spreading money around. Geographic
targeting has been a weak feature of federal as well as state grants for
many years. Despite increases in the number and dollar amounts
of grants since the late 1980s, federal aid programs remain small
compared to those of most other federal countries; nearly all aid
programs contain no explicit fi scal or jurisdictional equalization or
tax capacity objectives; they remain basically input based rather than
performance based; and they are characterized by increasing propor-
tions dedicated to people-oriented rather than
place- or project-oriented programs. Some
intergovernmental welfare programs, especially
Medicaid, also pose signifi cant intergenera-
tional equity dilemmas, particularly as states
reduce funding for education, infrastructure,
and economic development in order to fi nance
senior citizen programs.

13. How do the new ways to engage citizens
in governance aff ect transparency, ac-
countability, and eff ectiveness? Th anks to
developments in communications technology,
old-style approaches to citizen outreach and
engagement such as public hearings, advisory
bodies for federally funded programs, com-
munity surveys, and citizen advisory boards
have been supplemented and, in some ways,
surpassed by electronic government and social
media. Citizens now have tools to make direct
contact with government agencies, monitor
in real time performance data and informa-
tion provided to grantors, as well as share their
views on government operations and person-
nel through blogs. To this extent, government
has become more transparent and accessible;
yet intergovernmental relations have grown
more complex and interconnected. Public
managers need help to fi nd ways to untangle
the intergovernmental management web and
to more clearly explain what their agencies
do, who is responsible, and how their capacity
to deliver services is aff ected by “new nor-
mal” conditions. At the same time, analysis is

Citizens now have tools to make
direct contact with government

agencies. . . . To this extent,
government has become more

transparent and accessible;
yet intergovernmental

relations have grown more
complex and interconnected.
Public managers need help

to fi nd ways to untangle the
intergovernmental management

web and more clearly explain
what their agencies do, who
is responsible, and how their
capacity to deliver services
is aff ected by “new normal”

conditions.

In the post-ACIR world, other
than a few federal agencies, no
intergovernmental organization
has risen to provide continual

nonpartisan or bipartisan
research, data collection,
deliberation, and policy

formulation.

202 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011

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changer” in the dynamics of intergovernmental relations, is required
to rejuvenate support and momentum for an ACIR-type entity.
Perhaps the current economic crisis, and responses to it, will have
transformative impacts on intergovernmental relations. Leadership
from the president and federalism proponents in Congress, support
from the Big 7, and advocacy by IGM practitioners and students
could greatly enhance the prospects for intergovernmental institu-
tional redevelopment.

Acknowledgments
We especially thank our colleagues Richard L. Cole and Bruce D.
McDowell for their helpful ideas.

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