– Need it with 24 hours – 03-24   6 AM 

  

 Pleas Read the the file very very carefully 

 6 pg. without References 

Abstract 

– Introduction.

– Research Objectives.

– Literature Review.3 pg. 

– Methodology.

– Expected Outcomes.

– Outcome Utilization.

– References.

Economic impact COVID-19

Research Topic: How companies in Saudi Arabia develop a health culture in their business to achieve reputation and competitive advantage

Culture of Health (Definition): A culture which encourages everyone, including businesses, to maximize good health and well-being for themselves, for others with whom they live and work, for their communities, and for the environment

Research should be based on an analysis of gaps in current knowledge of epidemiology

Proposal should fulfil the following: 6 pg. without References. Single phase

– Abstract

– Introduction.

– Research Objectives.

– Literature Review.3 pg.

– Methodology.

– Expected Outcomes.

– Outcome Utilization.

– References.

The Ministry of Health in Saudi Arabia (MOH) is working to establish healthcare research strategy

aims to ensure an innovative research environment where evidence informs policy

development and decision making by supporting and sustaining local research

capacity. The strategy has three components:

• Increase research productivity and strategic value by aligning research funding

with health system strategic priorities to optimize impact and return on

investment.

• Foster knowledge translation and exchange by facilitating linkages between

researchers and decision-makers for the uptake and use of evidence.

• Build capacity by attracting, developing and retaining world-class health research

professionals.

Economic impact

COVID
–
19

Research
Topic:

How

compan
ies

in
Saudi

Arabia

develop a health
culture in
their
business to achieve reputation and competitive
advantage

Cultur
e of Health

(Definition
)
:

A culture which encourages everyone, including businesses, to maximize
good health and well
–
being for themselves, for others with whom they live and work, for their
communities, and for the environment

Research should be based on an analysis of gaps in current knowledge of epidemiology

Proposal should fulfil the following:

6
pg.

without
References.

Single phase

–

Abstract

–

Introduction.

–

Research Objectives.

–

Literature Review.
3
pg.

–

Method
ology.

–

Expected Outcomes.

–

Outcome Utilization.

–

References.

The Ministry of Health
in
Saudi

Arabia

(MOH) is working to establish healthcare research strategy

aims to ensure an innovative research environment where evidence informs policy

development and decision making by supporting and sustaining local research

capacity. The strategy has three components:

• Increase research productivity and strategic value by aligning research funding

with health system strategic priorities to optimize i
mpact and return on

investment.

• Foster knowledge translation and exchange by facilitating linkages between

researchers and decision
–
makers for the uptake and use of evidence.

Economic impact COVID-19

Research Topic: How companies in Saudi Arabia develop a health
culture in their business to achieve reputation and competitive
advantage
Culture of Health (Definition): A culture which encourages everyone, including businesses, to maximize
good health and well-being for themselves, for others with whom they live and work, for their
communities, and for the environment

Research should be based on an analysis of gaps in current knowledge of epidemiology

Proposal should fulfil the following: 6 pg. without References. Single phase
– Abstract
– Introduction.
– Research Objectives.
– Literature Review.3 pg.
– Methodology.
– Expected Outcomes.
– Outcome Utilization.
– References.

The Ministry of Health in Saudi Arabia (MOH) is working to establish healthcare research strategy
aims to ensure an innovative research environment where evidence informs policy
development and decision making by supporting and sustaining local research
capacity. The strategy has three components:
• Increase research productivity and strategic value by aligning research funding
with health system strategic priorities to optimize impact and return on
investment.
• Foster knowledge translation and exchange by facilitating linkages between
researchers and decision-makers for the uptake and use of evidence.

N2-718-03

4

R E V :

J A N U A R Y 3 1 , 2 0 1 8

Professor Richard H.K. Vietor and Research Associate Haviland Sheldahl-Thomason prepared this case. Funding for the development of this case
was provided by Harvard Business School. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as
endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.

Copyright © 2018 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685,
write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied,
or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.

R I C H A R D H . K . V I E T O R

H A V I L A N D S H E L D A H L – T H O M A S O N

Saudi Arabia:

Vision 20

30

In terms of embracing Vision 2030, there’s no turning back.1

— Mohammed K.A. Al-Faisal (MBA ’96

)

At an investor summit in late October 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman pledged to
“moderate” Saudi Arabia. “We will not spend the next 30 years of our lives dealing with extremis

t

ideologies. We will destroy them today, and immediately,” said the Prince. “Saudi was not like this
before 1979. Saudi Arabia and the entire region went through a revival after 1979…All we are doing
is going back to what we were: a moderate Islam that is open to all religions and to the world and to
all traditions and people.”

2

The summit was celebrating more than a year’s progress of Vision 2030 – the development strategy
that the young Prince had introduced in June of 2016. In an environment of sharply declining oil prices,
the 32-year-old Prince – not yet designated Crown Prince – had introduced a plan to move Saudi Arabi

a

away from its long-dependence on oil exports, to become an investment powerhouse, to develop the
non-oil economy and, in the process, create six million jobs for Saudi’s.3

Then, in November of 2017, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) had more than 300 business executives,
including 11 princes, detained at the Ritz Carlton in Riyadh on charges of corruption. Clearly, MBS
wanted to emphasize his seriousness about the Vision 2030 changes, and perhaps garner more public
support. These leaders were to be held until they settled payments to the government – some in the
billions of dollars – to recover their corrupt gains and help fund ambitious government programs. A
decision to allow women to drive again had preceded this audacious, yet popular move, and it was
shortly followed by other announcements to open movie theaters and to reduce subsidies on gasoline
and electricity in 2018. The new budget, released December 19th, modified the Nationa

l

Transformation Plan and reaffirmed, albeit delayed, return to a balanced budget.

The question on everyone’s mind – Saudis and foreign investors alike – was what Mohammed bin
Salman would do next – not just domestically, but also to stabilize and secure Saudi Arabia’s foreign
policy in the chaotic and dangerous Middle East.

718-034

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

2

Background

Saudi Arabia was the largest country on the Arabian Peninsula, occupying 80% of the total area. It
was bordered by Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait to the north, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to
the east and Oman and Yemen to the south (see Exhibit 1). Saudi Arabia had an expansive coastline
along the Red Sea to the West and the Persian Gulf to the East. Of the country’s 800,000 square-mile
landmass, 95% was desert and only 1.6% of was arable.

Saudi Arabia’s population exceeded 32 million in 2017, 7 million of whom lived in the capital city,
Riyadh. Over 83% percent of the population was urbanized, including 12 million foreigners who
worked or resided in the country.4 Remittances of nearly $46 billion were sent from the Kingdom to
other countries in 2015 – one of the highest levels in the world.5 Because of its high fertility rate, 70%
of the Saudi population was under the age of 30. The official language was Arabic, although English
was spoken widely in business.

History of Saudi Arabia

Prior to the rise of Islam, the Arabian Peninsula was a strategic trade corridor, located between the
Nile River Valley and Mesopotamia. However, the birth of the prophet Muhammad would transform
the future Kingdom of Saudi Arabia into a religious epicenter.6 In 610, Muhammad was visited by the
Angel Gabriel, who shared a message from God which Muhammad dictated in Arabic, eventually
becoming the Qur’an.7 Muhammed began spreading the teachings of Islam in Mecca, and in 622 he
moved to Medina, where he would live for the remainder of his life. By the time of his death, most
Arabian communities had declared loyalty to Muhammad and to Islam. Mecca and Medina developed
into the two holiest cities of Islam, which gave rise to the Kingdom’s description as the “Land of the
Two Holy Mosques.”

The Islamic Empire continued to spread after Muhammad’s death, and within 100 years it stretched
from India and China to Spain. Yet the Arabian Peninsula was ruled by various empires, including the
Byzantines, Sassanids and Ottomans. In the eighteenth century, the Islamic Empire fractured into
smaller kingdoms as the Arabian Peninsula grew increasingly isolationist, populated by semi-feudal
tribes. Then, in the early 1700s, Muhammed bin Abdul Wahhab, a Muslim scholar, and Muhammad
bin Saud, a tribal leader from the village of Diriyah, established the first Saudi state, free from Ottoman
rule.8 With the goal of restoring the pure teachings of Islam by promoting monotheism and a strict
interpretation of the Qur’an, the two men started a revivalist movement, deemed Wahhabism. This
movement formed the basis of the monarchy and the practice of Islam and shari’a law in contemporary
Saudi Arabia.

The first Saudi state gained control of Mecca and Medina and would cover almost all of the modern-
day territory. However, in the early 1800s the Ottoman’s, displeased with the state’s increasing powers,
besieged Diriyah and destroyed the new government. A tumultuous period followed, as the Al Saud
dynasty regained control of parts of the area in 1824 and established the second Saudi state. This too
would collapse before the end of the century, due to internal conflicts. The Al Saud family fled to
Kuwait after the second state failed, but in 1902 Abdul-Aziz bin Saud returned to the area and seized
Riyadh, the beginning of a series of conquests that would lead to the modern third Saudi state, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in 1932. The Qur’an was declared the constitution.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahrain

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Arab_Emirates

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oman

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Saud

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

3

The Practice of Islam

The Muslim faith established five obligations, which included: (1) reciting “There is no God but God
and Muhammad is the Messenger of God,” (2) praying five times a day, (3) giving 2.5% of one’s total
net worth to the poor (Zakat), (4) fasting during the month of Ramadan (the ninth month in the Muslim
lunar calendar), and (5) taking a pilgrimage to Mecca during one’s lifetime (Hajj). Islam was the basis
of the Kingdom’s laws, and was the only recognized religion in Saudi Arabia.

The majority of Saudi’s were Sunni Muslims and followed the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence –
one of the most conservative practices of Islam. There were a smaller number of Shia Muslims,
approximately 10% of the population, though the Wahhabi ideology denounced their faith. The
religion had been divided following Muhammad’s death, after which the majority of believers (which
would become “Sunni”) supported Muhammad’s central advisor Abu Bakr as the successor. But a
minority supported Muhammad’s son-in-law, Ali. The minority, or Shia, began to form following the
murder of Ali after he was named the fourth caliph. Religious differences and intolerances developed,
as the Sunni believed that divine revelation ended with Muhammad while the Shia believed that their
leaders were divinely guided. Discrimination against Shia Muslims had been widely reported – the
Human Rights Watch detailed unfair judicial and educational treatment against the Shias. For example,
in Saudi Arabia, some Shias were not allowed to be judges and Shias were not allowed to teach their
religion.9 Over a millennium, however, Shia came to dominate Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain, with
significant minorities in Yemen, Kuwait, Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Modern History

The political centralization and unification that occurred after the creation of the modern Saudi state
led to the power of a relative few. The royal family and the ministries of finance, the interior, and
foreign affairs were the powers that initially ran the country. The economic development of the
Kingdom, under the leadership of Abdul-Aziz bin Saud (known as Ibn Saud) was initially dependent
on tourism revenues from Muslim pilgrimages, but it skyrocketed after the discovery of oil in 1938 by
American geologists.10

After establishing relations with the US in 1933, Ibn Saud had allowed US companies to engage in
oil exploration and develop oil resources following the discovery of the second largest oil reserve in
the world. The oil companies and the Saudi government set up a joint venture that would become the
Arabian-American Oil Company (later renamed Saudi Arabian Oil Company, known as Aramco),
today the largest energy company in the world.11 The discovery of oil marked the beginning of Saud

i

Arabia’s international integration, as the country began exporting oil in 1939. In 1945, the Kingdom
and the US agreed to a “security-for-oil” deal, whereby the Kingdom would securely supply western
markets with oil and the US in turn would provide military assistance and training.

During the next decade, the success of the oil industry necessitated the creation of a new economic
administration.12 The government created the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) to act as the
central bank and manage oil revenues in 1952. The oil sector molded the Kingdom’s economy, as
supporting enterprises were established to benefit the newfound resource wealth. Oil revenues
allowed Ibn Saud to provide free healthcare for all Saudis and to invest heavily in education. The
Kingdom had built 226 schools by 1951 and established its first university in 1957.13 Despite the
growing wealth, the Kingdom was forced to seek financial assistance from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in 1958, as the government’s spending had surpassed revenues. In 1960, Saudi Arabia,
along with the oil-rich nations Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela, formed the Organization of the

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Saud

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030
4

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which aimed to coordinate petroleum policies among the
members to ensure stable prices.14 By 2017 ten other countries had joined OPEC.

Ibn Saud died in 1953, and his son, the crown prince Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, became the new
King. However, following an increase in the nation’s debt and accusations of profligacy, fellow
members of the royal family deposed Saud in 1964, claiming that the country needed a more capable
leader to strengthen the Kingdom’s frail economy. Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became the new king,
and was instrumental in the economic and cultural modernization of the country.

The IMF had suggested that the Kingdom create a planning agency, and the 1960s therefore marked
the beginning of economic planning in the Kingdom. King Faisal created the Central Planning
Organization in 1965 to aid in diversifying the economy, although its influence was limited by financial
constraints. The country released the first of several five-year development plans in 1970, which
prioritized investment in infrastructure, education and defense.15 When the Arab-Israel War broke out
in 1973, and the United States re-armed Israel, Saudi Arabia led other Arab states to impose an oil
embargo on certain Western countries. Together with pressures already begun in Libya, the embargo
shortly led to crude oil price increases, from $2.40 to $11.65 per barrel. Oil prices jumped again in 1978,
during the Iranian Revolution – this time to $36 per barrel. Thus, through the 1970s and early 80s,
Saudi Arabia experienced its highest ever levels of growth.

Faisal outlawed slavery and oversaw some modernization of the Saudi culture. Female education
was introduced in 1964, and women were allowed to travel freely if they had a letter of permission.
The television was introduced in 1965, and the initial broadcast was a recitation of the Qur’an.
However, Faisal allowed for extremist Muslims from Egypt and Syria to seek refuge in Saudi Arabia.16
Faisal was assassinated by his nephew in 1975, and was succeeded by his half-brother Prince Khalid.
Further unrest developed in 1979, when religious conservatives seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca to
protest the recent liberalization measures, claiming that they were against the teachings of Islam. This
prompted the rise of an ultraconservative periphery, and an increase in conservatism in Saudi society.
To appease the conservatives, Khalid empowered the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the
Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), which monitored behavior previously supervised by families. The
CPVPV employed the religious police, the mutaween, who enforced dress codes, supported the
segregation of unmarried men and women, forced the shutdown of stores during prayer time and
prevented women from independent travel during the 1980s and 90s.

Government

Saudi Arabia was a hereditary monarchy, and Islam was the foundation of the country’s laws. The
succession of the throne was determined by the king, who chose the crown prince with help from the
Allegiance Council (see Exhibit 4). The 1992 Basic Law, passed under the rule of King Fahd, was
indicative of a constitution, and mandated that the succession of the throne pass through direct male
descendants of Ibn Saud. The Council of Ministers had been effective since 1953, and was composed
of 22 ministries in areas such as education, defense, and the economy. The members were selected by
royal decree and were tasked with advising the king and approving legislation. Fahd created the
Consultative Council (also called the Shura Council) in 1992, which was based on the Islamic concept
of a majilis, whereby educated citizens could personally approach their leader with concerns.17 The
Council had 150 members, all appointed by the king, and were able to propose laws to the king. While
initially all 150 members were male, in 2013 King Abdullah, Fahd’s successor, appointed 30 women to
the Council.

King Fahd also divided the nation into 13 provinces in 1992, each with their own governor, a deputy
governor, and a provincial council. The provincial council was responsible for drafting a development

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

5

budget and monitoring ongoing projects. Provincial elections were allowed for half of the seats in 2005,
with men allowed to vote for male candidates, and expanded in 2015, when women were allowed to
both run as candidates and vote. In the 2015 municipal elections, with 284 seats up for grabs, twenty
women were elected. There had been 1,000 female candidates and 7,000 male candidates, and
approximately 81% of the 130,000 female registered voters cast ballots.18

Legal System

Saudi Arabia’s judicial system was based on Shari’a law for both criminal and civil cases. Shari’a law
was not codified, and judicial decisions were based on the Qur’an, the Sunnah (the practices and
sayings of Muhammad), Ijma (the consensus of Muslim scholars on religious issues) and Qias (analogy
based on written reports of Muhammad). The court system was dominated by Shari’a courts, which
heard the majority of the cases and were divided into three categories – Courts of the First Instance,
Courts of Cassation and the Supreme Judicial Council. The Board of Grievances handled cases
pertaining to the government. In 2007, King Abdullah created a Supreme Court and specialized courts
for commercial and labor issues. But the Kingdom and its legal system had been criticized for a variety
of human rights infringements, including the lack of protection for religious freedom and for not
always informing a suspect the crime of which they were accused.19

Senior religious scholars formed the ulema, the country’s religious leadership. Saudi judges and
lawyers were a part of the ulema, and the most senior members were appointed to the Council of Ulema.
The Council members directly advised the king and issued fatwas, opinions on Islamic law. Once a
fatwa had been issued, the mutaween were expected to carry out its conditions. The government
officially recognized the religious authority of the ulema, and the ulema in turn provided the support of
the religious community for government decisions.20 For example, in 1979 the ulema issued a fatwa that
supported the use of force against those who had seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca. This situation
led to the ulema having more powers throughout the Kingdom, although beginning in 2005 their
influence was dampened as the country gradually opened to some Western norms.21 In 2010, King
Abdullah mandated that only clerics of the Council of Ulema had the authority to issue fatwas, a move
some saw as the assertion of government control over the religious authority.22 The strategic
relationship between government and the ulema was meant to increase stability in the nation, although
many were unsure how much influence the ulema had on governmental affairs.

Islamic law also influenced the finance industry in Saudi Arabia, and Islamic finance was common
in the area. Shari’a law forbade the collection of interest on loans, as well as investments in goods such
as pork and alcohol, and emphasized risk-sharing as part of raising capital. By 2016 Islamic finance
accounted for two-thirds of total bank financing.23 Of the 12 commercially licensed banks in the
Kingdom, 4 were fully compliant with Islamic law and the others provided a mix of Islamic and
conventional banking services. Islamic banking was growing relatively quickly in the Kingdom, and
was monitored and regulated by the SAMA.

Two of the most important institutional problems facing the country were education and the
judiciary. “These institutions have to be substantially fixed were Vision 2030 to succeed.”24 Domestic
education was still plagued by weak teachers and the wrong subjects. And while the foreign
educational push of Saudis to the USA was a good idea, it had been poorly managed. The judiciary
took forever, too often operating with outdated principles and rules. Simple property cases, for
example, could take up to 10 years.

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

6

Current Government

Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud was crowned king of Saudi Arabia following the death of his
predecessor and half-brother, King Abdullah, in February 2015. Salman appointed Muqrin bin
Abdulaziz Al Saud, the youngest surviving son of Ibn Saud, as crown prince and promptly began
reforming the country. The king, with the help of his young son Mohammad Bin Salman, abolished
eleven committees that former kings had created and replaced them with two agencies, the Council of
Political and Security Affairs and the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, in an effort to
increase efficiency.25 However, in part to appease those who were worried about the succession of
power in the country as the sons of Ibn Saud aged, 79 year-old King Salman appointed his nephew,
Muhammad bin Nayef, as crown prince a few months later, replacing Muqrin. Nayef’s appointment
represented the eventual transition of leadership of the Kingdom from the sons of Ibn Saud to his
grandsons. Nayef was largely known for his work in dismantling Al Qaeda in the Kingdom and
strengthening relations with the United States and other western nations. While Nayef was highly
respected internationally, Mohammad Bin Salman was given increasing control over national policy.
Named deputy crown prince later in 2015, Mohammad Bin Salman served as defense minister and
head of the Council for Economic Affairs and Development.

In 2017, King Salman took an extraordinary step of relieving Nayef of his duties and appointing his
31-year-old son Mohammad as the crown prince, leaving the position of deputy crown prince empty.
And less than a year later, Crown Prince Mohammed, as head of a new anti-corruption agency, arrested
dozens of Saudi princes and businessmen, including the billionaire investor Prince Alwaleed bin Talal
and his putative rival for the throne, Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah – head of the Saudi National Guard.26
Those arrested during the crackdown were accused of corruption, but some thought the arrests were a
move to amass power.

Bin Salman’s power was thus further consolidated, and while his youthfulness and reform-minded
approach to the country was largely embraced by the younger Saudi population, more conservative
Saudi’s viewed his temperament as impulsive and were wary of the progressive reforms he
suggested.27 In addition to his economic power, MBS now oversaw the three main security services in
the Kingdom – the military, internal security services and the National Guard, control of which had
historically been divided between different branches of Ibn Saud’s descendants.28 A former US
ambassador remarked that it was a “coup de grâce of the old system,” and that “all power has now
been concentrated in the hands of Mohammed bin Salman.”29 The Economist described the crown prince
as the most powerful man in Saudi Arabia since its founder.30

Culture in the Kingdom

Social behavior in Saudi Arabia was heavily monitored and dependent upon the values of Shari’a
law. Social norms included the wearing of traditional clothes for men and women. Men typically wore
a thobe, a floor-length tunic, accompanied by a shemagh and aqal, a red and white warp held atop the
head with a black ring. However, younger Saudi males were increasingly drawn to Western clothes.
Women were required to wear an abaya, a black robe that covered the body, as well as a headscarf. The
use of the abaya in the Kingdom was based on tradition and was meant to obscure women, for their
visibility might incite fitna, or chaos, in a man’s heart.31 Some wore a niqab, a black veil that covered
the entire face besides the eyes.

Since 1979, in the wake of the terrorist attack, Saudi Arabia had curtailed women’s rights; the World
Economic Forum ranked it 141 (out of 144 countries) in terms of gender parity, particularly concerning
economic opportunity and political empowerment. Female unemployment stood at 32% (see Exhibit

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdullah_of_Saudi_Arabia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_bin_Nayef

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

7

13), and women worked in a segregated space. One woman remarked that “you need to be in a
desegregated workspace for women to rise in a company so they can be integrated in the total
workforce.”32 And Saudi women were prevented from obtaining a driving license until 2018, which,
personal freedoms aside, had increased the transportation costs associated with work and sapped
disposable incomes. Saudi Arabia had very limited public transportation, and with half of the
population historically prohibited from driving, ride-hailing applications such as Uber were welcomed
into the country. Some noted the contradiction of not allowing women to mix with non-familial men
but allowing them to be driven around by complete strangers.33 While steps had been taken towards
increasing the role of women in society, such as the ability for them to get an education, go to the gym,
participate in the Olympics, attend sporting events, appear on television and vote, they were still
unable to travel independently and composed only 13% of the Saudi workforce in 2015. Human Rights
Watch stated that the system of male guardianship effectively rendered women legal minors.34
Concerning further changes to the establishment, one woman stated that, although she was initially
hopeful, “I’m a Saudi woman, so we are born with very little hope to begin with.”35 For many years,
commented another, “the government has been a paternal figure. The government held back
innovation by default.”36 One woman observed that after 1979, the clergy had wanted more power.37
Her husband added on “but now, there’s a new sheriff in town.”38 The Crown Prince “was using shock
treatment. They don’t have the luxury of time for change now.”3

9

Saudi youth also faced restrictions in their public lives, as they were not allowed to date openly and
their entertainment options had been historically limited. Relationships were mostly arranged, and
cinemas were banned in the kingdom. Saudi Arabia heavily regulated traditional media sources.
Reporters Without Borders ranked Saudi Arabia 168th out of 180 countries on its 2017 Freedom of Press
Index. Internet content was also heavily regulated, as the government cracked down on offensive or
anti-Islamic content, as well as content that criticized the Saudi royal family. However, social media
sites such as Facebook and Twitter were allowed and provided Saudis a space to more freely discuss
their opinions. “More things are considered the norm,” observed one student. “It is expanding year
by year, but religion limits you from certain aspects.”40 The internet was deemed by some as the least
repressive space for expression in the Kingdom, and the government had even responded to some
opinions expressed online.41

The acceptance of smartphones led to the proliferation of social media: by 2016, 10 million of the
Kingdom’s 11 million active social media accounts were accessed via smartphone.42 Saudi youth
comprised the majority of social media users. Saudi society provided ideal conditions for a social media
boom, as social media provided a medium through which the youth could more freely express
themselves, meet friends and those of the opposite sex and entertain themselves.43 Saudi Arabia grew
to have the highest penetration of Twitter and per-capita consumption of YouTube in the world (see
Exhibit 16 for social comparators).44 While the Kingdom had banned calls via Skype and WhatsApp,
citing that they did not adhere with telecom regulations, that ban was lifted in 2017.

Energy

The Kingdom had long relied on oil for its economic development. Saudi Arabia reported 266
billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves – the largest in the world (see Exhibit 6). Natural gas, at 8.4
trillion cubic meters, was the world’s fifth largest gas reserve.45 In 2017 Saudi Arabia was the world’s
largest exporter of oil and its second largest producer, following Russia. Saudi Arabia produced over
10 million barrels of crude oil a day in 2016, and oil constituted 85% of the nation’s export revenues.46
The Kingdom had played a critical role as OPEC’s swing producer, possessing a spare production
capacity of over 2 million barrels per day.47

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

8

The state-owned Saudi Aramco dominated oil production in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom had
granted exploration rights to the American firm Socal (later Standard Oil) in 1933, and the country’s
first commercially productive oil well, Dammam No. 7, was discovered in 1938. Saudi oil was
developed by a cartel of four companies – Esso (now Exxon), Chevron, Texaco and Mobil. Together
they produced enough Saudi oil to meet, but not exceed, global demand. By 1980, however, the
Kingdom had nationalized their assets, under the control of the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, or
Aramco. 48 Although government owned, Aramco operated as a private firm (albeit with direction
from the Saudi Energy Ministry). The Saudi state benefitted from Aramco’s profits through three
channels: taxes (which had been 85% after costs, capital expenditures, etc. were deducted, though this
was lowered to 50% in 2016), royalties at 20% and dividends.49

Despite its abundance of the natural resource, Saudi Arabia’s energy markets faced many challenges
in the twenty-first century. Domestic consumption in the Kingdom grew at a record 7-9% in the years
from 2010 to 2015, spurred by population growth, economic prosperity and low, subsidized energy
prices. In 2016 domestic consumption amounted to 3.9 million barrels of oil a day – about 40% of the
Kingdom’s crude oil production.50 Generous government subsidies had stimulated the rapid increase
in energy consumption: energy subsidies amounted to $61 billion in 2015, just under 10% of GDP. The
government subsidized diesel prices, gasoline and electricity. Gasoline prices stood at $0.16 per liter in
2015, and Saudi citizens paid 60% less than international prices for electricity that same year.51 Saudi
Arabia relied on subsidized oil for around half of its electricity generation, a reliance that cut directly
into the country’s oil export earnings and caused the Kingdom to forgo significant revenue.52 What’s
more, potable water, produced by energy-intensive desalination, had long been free. These artificially
low prices led some to worry that firms would have less incentive to invest in productivity-enhancing
research.

Saudi officials had long known that the country would need to diversify from its dependence on oil
revenues and government spending, but attempts at diversification (such as a strategy to create six
new economic cities in the 2000s) tended to fall short of expectations.53 Price fluctuations, both rising
and falling, induced elements of the Dutch Disease. The instability caused by the outbreak of the Arab
Spring and the Shale Revolution in America forced the government to carefully consider the social
impact of price changes, as many Saudi’s viewed these subsidies as an entitlement.54

However, the international rise of new fuel sources, such as shale gas and tight oil, precipitated a
sharp drop in oil prices in late-2014 (see Exhibit 7). As supply surged, oil prices fell from an average
of $115 per barrel to under $50 by the end of the year. The government increased most energy and
water prices between 10 and 134% in 2016 to counteract its swelling budget deficit (which had reached
16% of GDP), and planned to raise them to parity with the international standard as part of Vision
2030.55 The growth of domestic energy consumption had fallen from 4.6% in 2015 to just 0.2% in 2016.56

In an attempt to push up international prices late in 2016, OPEC members and Russia agreed to cut
production (see Exhibit 8). As part of a total reduction of 1.2 million barrels per day (mmbpd), Saudi
Arabia’s cut was around 600,000 barrels per day. Still, this was of limited benefit as US shale producers
kept supplying the market with some 5 mmbpd. One observer remarked that competition in the oil
industry was “sheikhs versus shale.”57

Energy diversification

These changes to Saudi Arabia’s energy economy further intensified the need for the Kingdom to
diversify. By 2015, the country had begun formulating plans to increase solar and wind power sources
and to develop nuclear energy. Abdullah had created the King Abdullah City for Atomic and

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034
9

Renewable Energy (KACARE) back in 2010 to conduct feasibility studies as to how other energy
sources could be added to the Kingdom’s mix. The government allegedly planned to develop 30 solar
and wind projects as part of a $50 billion program to boost and diversify power generation, hoping to
produce 10% of its power from renewable sources by 2023.58 It also announced plans to build 16 nuclear
reactors by 2040, at a cost surpassing $80 billion.59 Aramco itself was diversifying by increasing
investments into downstream refining industries and facilitating the adoption of alternative energy
sources.60

Aramco increased exploration efforts for natural gas. Aramco managed the production of gas in the
country, but domestic demand was so high that the country consumed all that was produced. Gas
consumption was about 38% of total domestic energy consumption in Saudi Arabia, and in 20

17

Aramco had an active exploration program for unconventional resources such as shale and tight gas to
aid in meeting increased future energy demand.61 The Kingdom’s unconventional potential was
estimated to be 10 times the volume of its conventional oil and gas reserves, and it planned to double
its gas production capacity in the next decade.62 The increased use of natural gas and renewable sources
would also enable the Kingdom to increase oil exports and lower carbon dioxide emissions, a goal of
the Paris Climate Agreement to which Saudi Arabia was a signatory.63

International Affairs

Saudi Arabia had long depended on its oil wealth and its relationship with the US for its security
and stability, but the outbreak of the Arab Spring posed a threat to the Kingdom’s rule and regional
order. In 2010 Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor in Tunisia, set himself on fire in protest of his
treatment by the police, an act that incited riots throughout the country. Unrest spread to neighboring
countries as calls for democracy broke out across the region. The governments of Tunisia, Egypt,
Yemen and Libya were overthrown, and the Kingdom found itself surrounded by civil wars and failed
states.64 Saudi Arabia experienced some unrest at this time, including the self-immolation of a Saudi
man in 2011 and protests of limited scale in Riyadh and the Eastern Province. To prevent further
disruption, the Saudi government announced increases in social welfare allocations by $35 billion in
February 2011, and by a further $96 billion the following month.65 The increased expenditure was
largely able to quell the discontent in the country.

The Kingdom also worried that the regional uprisings could pave the way for increased Iranian
influence in the region. Saudi Arabia had been wary of Iran since the overthrow of the Shah during
the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the schism between Sunnis and Shias furthered the discomfort.
Saudi Arabia worried that the predominantly Shia Iran would encourage a rebellion of the Kingdom’s
Shia population, largely located in the Eastern Province. In an effort to circumvent increased Iranian
power, and to contain growing Shia dissent in Bahrain, former King Abdullah proposed a Gulf Union
between the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (the GCC, composed of the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait), though many believed that this was an
attempt for the Kingdom to impose hegemony over the region.66 Only Bahrain and Saudi Arabia
backed the proposal at the time.

Tensions between the two nations escalated further with the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in
2011 and then Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen in 2015. Saudi Arabia supported rebel
militant groups in Syria, including ones with Islamist ideologies, and provided them with military and
financial aid.67 Iran, both militarily and financially, supported Syria’s government under Assad, who
was one of Iran’s closest allies. Some noted that their interventions may have prolonged and deepened
the Syrian conflict.68 Similarly, the rise of the Houthi rebels who Iran allegedly supported in Yemen

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

10

prompted then-deputy crown prince Muhammed bin Salman to initiate airstrikes on the country in
defense of the government. The war continued into 2017, and led to significant civilian casualties, a
third of which were children, as well as famine throughout the nation and an outbreak of cholera.69
Amnesty International accused both sides of committing war crimes.

The pattern of supporting opposing forces in regional conflicts was viewed by some as a sort of
proxy war between the Kingdom and Iran as they competed over control of the area.70 Tensions were
further increased in 2017 when the prime minister of Lebanon and dual Saudi-Lebanese citizen, Saad
Hariri, announced his resignation in a televised broadcast from Saudi Arabia. He stated that increased
Iranian influence with Hezbollah in Lebanon had prompted his decision, though his actions raised
questions over whether Saudi Arabia had applied undue pressure.71 There was some concern that the
proxy war could erupt into actual warfare; the Houthis had launched dozens of missiles from Yemen,
some intercepted by the Saudis on the outskirts of Riyadh airport.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and the US had also been strained. Many blamed the US for
historically exacerbating regional tensions. The stationing of 600,000 US troops in Saudi Arabia when
Iraq invaded Kuwait during the 1990 Gulf War drew criticism from Saudi fundamentalists who
believed the country was too open to Western interests.72 Anti-US sentiment spread throughout the
nation, and was manifest in the 1996 car bombing of US barracks and the September 11 attacks in New
York and Washington. Fifteen of the 19 terrorists involved in that attack were Saudi citizens, as was
Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda.73 While the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq in 2003
further destabilized the region, President Obama expressed concern that Saudi Arabia exacerbated
regional conflict.74 President Trump was notably friendlier to Saudi Arabia, tweeting that he had “great
confidence in King Salman and the Crown Prince . . . they know exactly what they are doing.”75

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a source of conflict between the US and Saudi Arabia, as the US
had been a staunch supporter of Israel while the Kingdom supported the Palestinian cause. In 2013,
Saudi Arabia rejected a seat on the UN Security Council after years of petitioning for it – protesting the
perceived weak stance of the US with regard to Syria, Iran, Egypt and Israel. While both the US and
Saudi Arabia had the goal of maintaining stability in the Middle East, the Kingdom accused the US of
not doing enough to topple Assad’s regime in Syria. And while the USA, China, Russia, France,
Germany and Iran had agreed to a ten-year moratorium on Iranian nuclear development in 2015,
President Donald Trump declared it was the worst treaty ever signed and threatened to decertify it.

2017 also ushered in the Kingdom’s more aggressive foreign policies. Mohammed bin Salman, along
with leaders from Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, ended relations with Qatar in the
summer of 2017. They imposed an embargo on the gas-rich nation while accusing it of financing
terrorism and destabilizing the region and demanding that it shut down the broadcaster Al Jazeera,
decrease cooperation with Iran and stop supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. The Economist noted that
the embargo on Qatar might succeed only in harming the Gulf Cooperation Council and pushing Qatar
towards Iran.76

While the wars in Yemen and Syria continued, the icy relations between the Kingdom and Israel
were beginning to thaw. Both nations aspired to limit the power of Iran in the region, and although
they had no diplomatic relations their shared interests had opened a dialogue. In 2017 the prime
minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that “when Israel and the main Arab countries see eye-
to-eye, you should pay attention, because something important is happening,” and declared that
relations with the Middle East were the “best ever.”77

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

11

Extremism in the Kingdom

Saudi Arabia considered itself a leader in the Middle East and as a custodian for preserving Islamic
rights throughout the world. However, an increasing youthful population coupled with heightened
unemployment led to internal instability in the nation. Two-thirds of the Saudi population were under
30 in 2016, and 27% were under the age of 14. As youth unemployment hovered around 30% (see
Exhibit 13), some of these unsettled youth were drawn to extremist movements such as the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Approximately 1,000 young Saudis had become jihadis in Syria’s civil
war, and around 2,500 Saudi Arabians fought for ISIS, making the nation the second largest source for
ISIS recruits.78 While some clerics were accused of encouraging their youth to become jihads in Syria,
the Saudi government announced it would imprison Saudis who fought abroad or endorsed terrorist
groups in 2014.79 They also undertook measures to curb terrorist financing, with significant US
assistance.80

The Kingdom was not only a supplier of extremist fighters; it was also a victim of terrorist attacks.
Following the Iraq War in 2003, Saudi Arabia began its counterterrorism campaign, which aimed to
combat the ideological justifications for violence by utilizing education and debate.81 But attacks had
continued – in 2015 ISIS militants attacked four mosques throughout the Kingdom, killing 38 people.
And in 2016 four suicide bombers, also suspected of being affiliated with ISIS, attacked three locations
in the Kingdom, killing 4.

Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy

Monetary Policy in the Kingdom had been determined by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority
(SAMA) since 1952. SAMA was tasked with issuing the nation’s currency (the riyal), managing the
Kingdom’s foreign exchange reserves, enacting policies to stabilize prices and the exchange rate, and
supervising commercial banks, insurance firms, and other financial entities.82 Saudi Arabia, along with
the other members of the GCC, had pegged its currency to the USD since 1986. The exchange rate had
been consistently set at 3.75 riyals per USD since the peg’s creation (see Exhibit 3). The existence of the
peg led to Saudi Arabia’s monetary policy being set in tandem to that of the US. When the US raised
interest rates in 2015 Saudi Arabia followed suit, as it did for the following hikes in 2016 and 2017.

Saudi Arabia had typically exhibited strong fiscal surpluses, cushioned with revenues from oil
during periods of high oil prices (see Exhibit 10). However, this dependency on oil revenues led to
increasingly large fiscal deficits in the years following 2014, after oil prices fell below $50 a barrel. Oil
revenues had usually made up 90% of the nation’s budget; but the fall in prices led to deficits of 15.8%
of GDP in 2015 and 17.2% of GDP in 2016. These deficits were financed primarily by drawing down
the Kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund, as well as new borrowing.83 And while the deficit was expected
to shrink to 8.9% of GDP in 2017, to fully cover expenditures the government would require oil prices
of at least $70 a barrel.84

The Kingdom approved the 2018 budget in December, 2017. The government announced the largest
ever budgeted expenditure of 978 billion riyals, a 72 billion riyal stimulus package for the private sector,
and a separate, 133 billion riyal-increase in capital spending by the nation’s investment funds (see
Exhibit 11). Non-oil revenues were expected to rise, bolstered by increased expat fees, taxes, and
increased electricity prices.

Because of oil’s effects on fiscal policy, on the exchange rate and on employment, Saudi Arabia
exemplified the “rentier state.” This concept, first articulated in the 1960s, highlighted multiple
difficulties for economic development, caused by an abundance of natural resources. Rentier status

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

12

had seemed to affect the culture of the nation, as there was a strong preference for “easy gain rather
than productive labor.”85 Saudi leaders were aware of this dependency and its effects, and while prior
attempts to diversify had limited impact, many believed that the new set of reforms in Vision 2030
would be influential, as the Kingdom could no longer rely on stable oil revenues.

SAMA had customarily deposited a large portion of the Kingdom’s revenues in a Foreign Holding
Account, invested in assets abroad (see Exhibit 12). But with the sharp drop in oil revenues in 2015,
government deficits had to be funded with significant withdrawals from the fund (see Exhibit 10). The
Kingdom had also created the Public Investment Fund (PIF) in 1971, which invested in domestic firms
and monitored state companies. The PIF would be essential to carrying out much of the diversification
entailed under Vision 2030.

Liberalization

Under King Fahd, with Abdullah as crown prince, Saudi Arabia had taken initial steps towards
liberalization, such as some privatization, diversification and foreign investment into the Kingdom.
Even trade was liberalized in 2005, when Saudi Arabia joined the World Trade Organization.86 The
attendant reforms required the Kingdom to allow foreign banks and insurance companies to establish
branches in the Kingdom, strengthen international property rights, reduce tariffs and allow foreign
telecom companies to own up to 70% of joint ventures. Saudi Arabia showed that it could successfully
privatize priority sectors when it floated 30% of the state-owned Saudi Telecom Company (STC) to the
public and created a regulatory commission to oversee the industry. STC would eventually expand
into nine markets.

The private sector in Saudi Arabia had long been underdeveloped, but the need for private capital
as well as the consequences of joining the WTO led to increased opportunities for private firms. The
Supreme Economic Council, which was created in 1999 to oversee the Kingdom’s economic, industrial,
agricultural and employment policies, was tasked with leading the national privatization program.
The government sold parts of or increased private participation in the Saudi Arabian Basic Industry
Corporation, the Saudi Arabian Mining Corporation, the Saudi Electricity Company, the Saudi Post
Corporation, and the General Port Authority.87 But the private sector was still dependent on
government spending. The economist John Sfakianakis remarked that “if you do any model where
you take out public spending, then private spending will grind to a halt.”88 The private sector
remained relatively small with predominantly foreign employees, as Saudi citizens tended to prefer
government work.89

Abdullah’s Strategy

Abdullah, who became king upon Fahd’s death in 2005, would rule Saudi Arabia for ten years. He
gently and gradually led the nation in its attempts to liberalize trade and diversify in the early 21st
century (see Exhibit 9 for trade details). He tried to decrease the country’s dependence on oil revenues,
to increase job opportunities for Saudi citizens, to reinforce privatization and began reforming
institutions. To help build the non-oil economy, the government identified clusters for further
development- automotive, minerals and metals, plastics, solar energy and home appliances – and gave
SAGIA, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, scope to promote investment and
modernization. During SAGIA’s early years, it formed the National Competitiveness Center with the
goal of monitoring and assessing the domestic business climate. The World Bank’s Doing Business
rankings scored the country as 26th in the world by 2013 (although this had slipped back to 92nd by 2017
– see Exhibit 15). The World Economic Forum viewed the Kingdom as 29th, of 138 countries, in

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

13

competitiveness. Restrictive labor regulations, an inadequately educated workforce and access to
financing were listed as the top impediments to doing business.90

SAGIA also promoted the creation of six new economic cities. These cities were to be developed by
the private sector to enhance knowledge-based industries, though the global financial crisis curtailed
investment and led to cancellations. Those that remained in development, or whose development
resumed following the crisis, were the King Abdullah Economic City near Jeddah and Jazan Economic
City. They were governed by a spin-off of SAGIA, the Economic Cities Authority.91 King Abdullah
Economic City had generated $7.9 billion of investment by 2017, enough to fund its spending for ten
years as it developed a deep-sea port, a logistics hub, a sports and recreation center and more than
6,500 residential properties.92 Companies such as Pfizer and Mars had established themselves in the
city, attracted by lower taxes and cheap energy.

Foreign workers’ visas proved problematic for businesses, as they took a significant amount of time
to obtain and were a common source of fraud. Revisions to the nation’s visa scheme were introduced
in 2016 to limit immigration and to increase foreign-worker mobility within the Kingdom by delinking
them from their sponsor. The changes also made it harder for firms to employ low-wage foreign labor
and increased visa fees. The Nitaqat program, which had been implemented in 2011, allowed the Labor
Ministry to rank firms by their proportion of employed Saudi citizens. The highest ranking companies
received preferential treatment for hiring foreign workers while low-ranking ones faced penalties to
promote the “Saudisation” of the economy.93 Nitaqat restrictions were tightened in 2016 to promote the
hiring of more Saudi citizens. Twelve million foreigners worked in the Kingdom in 2016, and
dominated the lower-wage, private sector (see Exhibit 14).94

Foreign direct investment in the Kingdom had slowed by 2016, hindered by the Nitaqat program,
by political and social tensions and by reduced access to credit.95 FDI inflows were $7.5 billion in 20

16

– the lowest inflow since 2004, before the Kingdom joined the WTO, and lower than the inflows to the
United Arab Emirates and Egypt.96 However, the Kingdom’s FDI outflows reached a record $8 billion,
largely as a result of diversification measures.97 The top investors in the Kingdom were the US, France
and Japan, and the majority of foreign investments were in the petrochemical industry.98

In 2016, Saudi Arabia had a $77.6 billion trade surplus in goods (see Exhibit 2). The vast majority
of exports was still crude oil, refined products, plastics and organic chemicals. The main countries the
Kingdom exported to were China, the US, India and South Korea. Most of its imports came from China,
the US, Germany and Japan.

Saudi Arabia had established its stock market, Tadawul, in 2003. The Capital Markets Authority
regulated the exchange, and by 2017 it listed 176 companies with a market capitalization of $449
billion.99 Three IPOs occurred in 2016 and were valued at $2.4 billion. The stock exchange had grown
substantially since it began operations, and opened to foreigners in 2015. In 2017 Sarah Al Suhaimi
became the first woman chairperson of the exchange. Suhaimi had previously been the first woman
head of a Saudi investment bank. The CEO of Tadawul, Khalid Al Hussan, was working towards
reclassifying the exchange as an emerging market, hoping to generate further investor inflows. Despite
these changes, many doubted the exchange’s ability to become a regional financial center akin to Dubai
and Abu Dhabi.

Vision 2030

In April, 2016, then-deputy crown prince Salman announced Vision 2030, a plan that detailed a
sweeping transformation of the Saudi economy. The goals of the Vision would be laid out in the

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

14

National Transformation Program (NTP), which presented implementation details as well as deadlines
for 346 projects through 2020. In the context of meager growth, 1.4% in 2016 and projected to fall to
0.5% in 2017, high unemployment and a massive reliance on public expenditure (80% of all household
income came from the government), Vision 2030 aimed to diversify growth, reduce dependence on oil,
and increase the role of the private sector and employment opportunities over the next 15 years (see
Appendix A).100 The country was preparing for an economic situation in which oil prices remained
low – one expert noted that “the entire business has been recalibrated,” and that $100 oil is an
“aberration that won’t recur absent an international crisis.”101

The incredibly ambitious blueprint documented a variety of social and economic reforms, though
no political ones. While the Saudi government employed more than five million Saudis, the civil
service alone was more than 1.2 million. “Do I need them all, today?” asked Sulaiman Al Hamdan, the
Civil Service Minister. The answer was “no.” Al Hamdan was overseeing an organizational
restructuring and the establishment of a five-tier performance evaluation. Yet some of the
“government bureaucrats don’t like to hear this…and will fight to the last minute…”102 “There has
been increasing talk between government and business…previously this was not possible.”103 The
Vision set forth the social goals of increasing women’s workforce participation from 22% to 30%,
increasing the number of pilgrimages made to the Kingdom, increasing non-pilgrimage tourism and
providing more entertainment options. MBS declared that the country would become a pillar of
moderation, tolerance, excellence, discipline, equity and transparency.104 Yet some of the suggested
social changes, although accompanied by repeated affirmations of Islamic values, discomfited the
religious establishment, which viewed them as indicative of western and liberal influences.

Economic reforms composed the majority of the document, and the primary economic objective
was to enhance the growth of the non-oil private sector, which grew only 0.1% in 2016. The Vision
aimed to add 450,000 jobs in the private sector by 2020, increase FDI to 5.7% of GDP, increase the share
of the non-oil sector from 16% to 50% of total revenues, increase the private sector’s contribution to
GDP from 40 to 65% (with the SME contribution raised from 20 to 35%), along with other measures.
The Kingdom planned to increase taxes to raise revenues, and in 2017 imposed a selective commodity
tax of 100% on tobacco and energy drinks along with a 50% tax on soda. A 5% value-added tax was
meant to be implemented in 2018, as well as a monthly fee to foreign workers in the Kingdom. The
government continued to reduce subsidies, but provided direct payments to households in need, as
part of its efforts to balance its budget by 2023, another goal of the Vision. Privatization plans were
announced for 16 sectors, including the post office, healthcare, airports, airlines, education, electricity,
water, chemicals, amidst others. These efforts were part of the government’s plan to reposition itself
from a service provider to a service regulator.

Perhaps the most shocking reform was the crown prince’s intent to privatize up to 5% of the state-
owned crown jewel Aramco. Heralded as the largest potential IPO in history, valued at a maximum
of $100 billion, the proceeds from the IPO would be invested into the PIF, and the remaining ownership
of Aramco would be under government control. This could make the PIF the largest sovereign wealth
fund in the world. The PIF had been expanded already, as it had invested $3.5 billion in Uber and
partnered with Japan’s Softbank to start a $100 billion technology fund – the world’s largest private
equity fund.105

The Kingdom also announced the creation of two new tourism projects: a Red Sea Beach tourism
project and the construction of a $500 billion futuristic mega city, Neom. The Red Sea tourism project
would cover an area larger than Belgium, including 50 islands, and would be developed by the PIF to
attract “luxury tourists.” One government document stated that it would be a semi-autonomous
region, leading to speculation that the nation’s strict dress code and alcohol ban might not be enforced.

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

15

The crown prince announced plans for Neom at an international business conference in Riyadh. He
described the proposed, 10,000 square mile city as one that would have no room for “anything
traditional,” and stated that it would have more robots than people and would be powered by solar
and wind energy.106

The changes would need to be speedily and efficiently implemented to bring about change by 2030,
a dire challenge in a country described by a Saudi minister as similar to “an obese man disfigured from
decades of gluttony and idleness.”107 Initial steps included cutting the salaries and benefits of state
employees, an act that cut the incomes of approximately 60% of Saudi employees by more than 20%.
This caused national uproar, and to appease the public King Salman issued a royal decree undoing the
pay cuts, and backdating the decree so it was as if the cuts never were.108 This act reinforced the need
for the Kingdom to consider social and political impacts when devising reforms, especially as the public
could view the decreased subsidies and potential future welfare cuts as a break of the “social contract”
in the Kingdom, where the citizens remain loyal to the monarchy so long as they remain prosperous.109
Some wealthy Saudis began sending money abroad and the Minister of Planning noted that “society is
split” regarding the reforms, but that the government will “win them through more transparency and
success.”110 In order to succeed, the minister noted that the Kingdom would need “political will, which
the prince provides; money, which we have; and human capacity, which we can hire.”111

While the country engaged in increased conflict with its neighbors, and while growth stagnated and
unemployment swelled, some wondered whether the country would survive with only economic and
social reforms, or whether political reform would follow if an increasingly distressed Saudi population
revolted.

Looking Ahead

As the New Year approached, business leaders and government officials in Saudi Arabia and
elsewhere contemplated the scope of change accomplished during the past 12 months and its likely
progress in the next few years. One thing on which everyone (except a few imams) agreed: change
was long overdue. But beyond that consensus, there remained disagreement and uncertainty.

Was Vision 2030 too aggressive, indeed unrealistic? “We have no other options except to move fast
to execute,” commented the Minister of Civil Service, “because we have slept for a long time.”112 That
is, had Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bitten off more than the country could chew? Would
insufficient implementation of the vision, and the National Transformation Plan, hurt public support
for the program and MBS? Or was it good to have ambitious targets which would inspire a country,
even if not fully attained? “It will be tough,” admitted Fahad Alturki, “but it is doable.”113 How would
foreigners, especially potential investors, view the turmoil of change? Would they invest, or wait and
see?

A second interesting question pertained to the price of oil and the government’s ability to
implement change. That is, if oil prices stayed below $60 per barrel, would the Saudi government have
sufficient revenues to implement the changes while caring for its people? Conversely, if oil prices
recovered to the 2014 level of $100 per barrel, would the government maintain the incentive to reform,
or slip back into the oil-leveraged comfort of past decades?

Foreign policy too remained a significant headache. If Saudi Arabia was to modernize this fast, it
needed a more stable environment in the Middle East. Crises in Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Iraq and Iran,
partly fueled by the Kingdom, did not engender an environment for social and economic reform.

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030
16

And finally, and fundamentally, was the issue of social change. How much would Saudi Arabia’s
social and cultural environment have to change if Vision 2030 were to be achieved? As Prince Bandar
bin Sultan, ambassador to the United States had remarked years earlier, “we like to modernize, but not
necessarily Westernize, and we are different…”114 Still today this remained the salient question; could
Saudi Arabia modernize, without westernizing?

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034
17

Exhibit 1 Map of Saudi Arabia

Source: Saudi Arabia Administrative map, the Central Intelligence Agency, accessed at

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/saudi-arabia-
administrative /image .

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/saudi-arabia-administrative /image

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/saudi-arabia-administrative /image

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718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

20

Exhibit 5 Saudi Arabia’s Royal Family Tree (Partial)

Source: Wall Street Journal Graphics, December 3, 2017, accessed at http://graphics.wsj.com/saudi-arabia-family-tree/.

http://graphics.wsj.com/saudi-arabia-family-tree/

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

21

Exhibit 6a Saudi Crude Oil Exports

Source: Saudi Chartbook, Jadwa Investments, November 2017, page 9.

Exhibit 6b Saudi Oil Production

Source: Saudi Chartbook, Jadwa Investments, November 2017, page 9.

Exhibit 6c Annual Energy Production, 2008-2016

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Crude Oil a 9,198 8,184 8,166 9,311 9,763 9,637 9,713 10,193 10,460

OPEC Spare Capacity a 1,398 3,790 3,983 3,053 2,123 2,158 2,073 1,463 1,148

Marketed Nat. Gas** 80,440 78,450 87,660 92,260 99,330 100,030 102,380 104,450 110,860

Refined Products a 1,971 1,911 1,914 1,857 1,927 1,842 2,104 2,481 2,826

Source: Created by casewriter using data from the Organization of the Petoleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Annual
Statistical Bulletin 2017. Spare capacity data is from the US Energy Information Administration, December 2017.

a 1,000 b/d.

b mn cubic units.

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

22

Exhibit 7 Crude Oil Price, West Texas Intermediate

Source: NASDAQ, January 12, 2018.

Exhibit 8a OPEC Crude Production (million barrels per day)

Source: Oil Market Report, International Energy Agency, November 14, 2017, page 16.

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

23

Exhibit 8b Non-OPEC Supply Reductions Commitment (thousand barrels per day)

Source: Oil Market Report, International Energy Agency, November 14, 2017, page 21.

Exhibit 9 Saudi Arabia’s Top Exports and Imports (billion USD)

Top Exports 2008 2010 2014 2016

Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products 281 215.2 284.7 163.5
Plastics and articles thereof 7.1 11.3 18.9 14.4
Organic chemicals 6 7.4 13.9 7.6
Ships, boats and other floating structures 1.3 0.6 2.3 2.4
Aluminum and articles thereof 0.6 0.5 2 1.9
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.6
Rubber and articles thereof 0 0 0.1 1.3
Vehicles other than railway, tramway 1.8 1.2 1.4 1.1
Electrical, electronic equipment 1.6 1 1 1.1
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins 0.5 0.5 0.8 1

Top Imports 2008 2010 2014 2016

Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery 20.3 15.9 26.3 17.8
Vehicles other than railway, tramway 16.2 15.6 23.2 17.7
Electrical, electronic equipment 10.6 10.1 18.9 14.3
Pharmaceutical products 2.7 3.3 5.3 5.2
Commodities not specified according to kind 0 0 0 4.9
Articles of iron or steel 5.7 4 8.1 4.2
Rubber and articles thereof 1.3 1.6 2.3 3.6
Optical, photo, technical, medical apparatus 2.1 2.4 4.1 3.5
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins 1.3 1.3 5.1 3.2
Iron and steel 10.6 4.6 5.6 3.2

Source: Created by casewriter using data from UN Comtrade, accessed December 2017.

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Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

25

Exhibit 11a Saudi Arabia’s Fiscal Balance Program

Source: “Saudi Arabia’s 2018 Fiscal Budget,” Jadwa Investment, December 18, 2017, page 13.

Exhibit 11b Budgeted allocations by sector

Source: “Saudi Arabia’s 2018 Fiscal Budget,” Jadwa Investment, December 18, 2017, page 4.

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

26

Exhibit 12 SAMA Total Foreign Reserve Assets

Source: Saudi Chartbook, Jadwa Investment, November, 2017, page 4.

Exhibit 13a Unemployment Rates in Saudi Arabia

Source: “Saudi Labor Market Update – Q2 2017,” Jadwa Investment, November 2017 page 1.

file:///Users/mohammedalzahrane/Downloads/../../../hsheldahlthomason/Downloads/20171108_Saudi-labor-market-update-Nov-2017

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

27

Exhibit 13b Unemployment by Gender and Education Level

Source: “Saudi Labor Market Update – Q2 2017,” Jadwa Investment, November 2017 page 4.

Exhibit 13c Youth Unemployment

Source: “Saudi Labor Market Update – Q2 2017,” Jadwa Investment, November 2017 page 2.

Exhibit 14 Saudi Arabia’s Labor Force Demographics

Source: House, Karen. “Saudi Arabia in Transition.” Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard

Kennedy School, July 2017, page 21.

file:///Users/mohammedalzahrane/Downloads/../../../hsheldahlthomason/Downloads/20171108_Saudi-labor-market-update-Nov-2017

file:///Users/mohammedalzahrane/Downloads/../../../hsheldahlthomason/Downloads/20171108_Saudi-labor-market-update-Nov-2017

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Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

29

Appendix A Goals of Vision 2030

Source: “Saudi Vision 2030,” Jadwa Investment, May 2016, Table 1, page 3.

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030
30

Endnotes

1 HRH Mohammed Al-Faisal, interview with the casewriters, December 3, 2017. This case would not have been possible
without the assistance of Mohammed Al-Faisal, President & CEO of Al Faisaliah Group Holding, in arranging interviews. We
are deeply grateful.

2 Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, quoted in CNBC, “Saudi Arabia promises a return to ‘moderate Islam,’ October 25,
2017; https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/25/saudi-arabia-promises-a-return-to-moderate-islam.html.

3 KSA Vision 2030: Strategic Objectives and Vision Realization Programs, June 2016.
www.vision2030.gov.sa/download/file/fid/1319.

4 “Saudis to tighten curbs on foreign workers in local jobs push: sources,” Reuters, March 20, 2017.

5 “Remittance Flows Worldwide in 2015,” Pew Research Center, August 31, 2016.

6 Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White, “Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability After the Arab Spring,” HBS case 714-053.

7 Ibid.

8 Deborah Kopka, Passport Series: Middle East (Lorenz Educational Press, 2011).

9 “Saudi Arabia: Treat Shia Equally,” Human Rights Watch, September 3, 2009.

10 “This day in geographic history, March 3 1938: Oil Discovered in Saudi Arabia,” National Geographic.

11 “A Chronology: The House of Saud,” Frontline, PBS.

12 Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White, “Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability After the Arab Spring,” HBS case 714-053.

13 Ibid.

14 “Brief History,” Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, accessed at
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm.

15 “Five-year plans,” Country Studies US, Saudi Arabia, accessed at http://countrystudies.us/saudi-arabia/37.htm.

16 “A Chronology: The House of Saud,” Frontline, PBS.

17 Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White, “Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability After the Arab Spring,” HBS case 714-053.

18 “Twenty female candidates win election in Saudi Arabia local balloting,” Los Angeles Times, December 13, 2015.

19 “Saudi Legal System,” Global Security, accessed at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/sa-legal-
system.htm.

20 Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White, “Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability After the Arab Spring,” HBS case 714-053.

21 René Rieger, Saudi Arabian Foreign Relations: Diplomacy and Mediation in Conflict Resolution, (Routledge, 2017).

22 Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Fatwa Restrictions and the State-Clerical Relationship,“ Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, October 27, 2010.

23 “Fitch: Islamic Banking Is Dominant in Saudi Arabia,” Reuters, February 2, 2016.

24 Prince Mohammed Al Faisal, interview with the casewriters, December 2, 2017.

25 “Mohammad Bin Nayef takes leading role in Saudi Arabia,” Gulf News, Saudi Arabia, February 17, 2015.

26 “Saudi Crown Prince’s Mass Purge Upends a Longstanding System,” The New York Times, November 5, 2017.

27 “Mohammed bin Salman: the meteoric rise of Saudi Arabia’s new crown prince,” The Financial Times, June 23, 2017.

28 “Saudi Crown Prince’s Mass Purge Upends a Longstanding System,” The New York Times, November 5, 2017.

29 Ibid.

30 “A Palace Coup in Saudi Arabia,” The Economist, November 11, 2017.

https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/25/saudi-arabia-promises-a-return-to-moderate-islam.html

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

31

31 Karen Elliot House, “Saudi Arabia in Transition: From Defense to Offense, But How to Score?” Harvard Kennedy School
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Senior Fellow Paper, July 2017.

32 Thoraya Obaid, boardmember of the Center for Structural Development, interview with the authors, December 5, 2017.

33 “Saudi women are a captive market for Uber and Careem,” The Economist, May 4, 2017.

34 “Boxed In: Women and Saudi Arabia’s Male Guardianship System,” Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2016.

35 “Saudi youth anxious to see progress on prince’s reform plan,” The Financial Times, July 27, 2017.

36 Princess Banderi Al Faisal, interview with the casewriters, December 5, 2017.

37 Dr. Maha Al Saud, vice president Alfaisal University, interview with the casewriters, December 4, 2017.

38 Prince Khaled bin Saad Al Saud, interview with the casewriters, December 4, 2017.
39 Thoraya Obaid, boardmember of the Center for Structural Development, interview with the casewriters, December 5, 2017.

40 A male student at Alfaisal University, interview with the casewriters, December 4, 2017.

41 Freedom on the Net 2016: Saudi Arabia Country Profile, Freedom House.

42 “Saudi Arabia Social Media Statistics 2016,” Global Media Insight, May 25, 2016.

43 “Young Saudis, Bound by Conservative Strictures, Find Freedom on Their Phones,” The New York Times, May 22, 2015.

44 “Saudi Arabia Social Media Statistics 2016,” Global Media Insight, May 25, 2016.

45 “The world’s top five countries with highest natural gas reserves,” Energy Business Review, July 21, 2017.

46 “Saudi Arabia Facts and Figures,” Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, accessed at
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/169.htm.

47 “Saudi oil output capacity 12.5 million b/d, but investment needed: Falih,” S & P Global Platts, June 2, 2016.

48 Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White, “Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability After the Arab Spring,” HBS case 714-053.

49 Ibid and “Saudi Arabia slashes Aramco’s tax rate to woo IPO investors,” The Financial Times, March 27, 2017.

50
BP Statistical Review of World Energy, BP, June 2017, page 15 and “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia,” Saudi Arabia Country

Profile, World Nuclear Association, October 2017.

51 “Saudi Arabia sets out strategy to reform subsidies and reduce domestic energy usage,” Oxford Business Group, accessed at
https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/subsidy-reform-government-sets-out-strategy-reduce-domestic-energy-usage.

52 “Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: 2017 Country Commercial Guide for US Companies,” US Commercial Service, page 7.

53 Jane Kinninmont, “Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract Austerity and Transformation,” Chatham House
Research Paper, July 2017.

54 Majid Moneef, Director of Aramco and former Secretary General of the Supreme Economic Council, interview with the
casewriters, December 4, 2017.

55
“Will Low Oil Prices End Saudi Arabia’s Gas Subsidies?” oilprice.com, September 18, 2017.

56 “Saudi Arabia: 2017 Article IV Consultation,” International Monetary Fund, October 2017.

57 “OPEC wants oil above $50, but US shale producers won’t play along,” CNBC, August 1, 2017.

58 “Saudis Seek Bids for First Utility-Scale Plant for Wind Power,” Bloomberg, July 16, 2017.

59 “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia,” Saudi Arabia Country Profile, World Nuclear Association, October 2017.

60 “Saudi Aramco IPO Part of Kingdom’s Diversification Plan,” Thomson Reuters Blogs, May 10, 2017.

61 “Saudi Aramco Gears Unconventional Gas Program,” E&P Magazine, September 4, 2017.

62 Ibid. and “Country Analysis Brief: Saudi Arabia,” US Energy Information Administration, October 20, 2017.

file:///Users/mohammedalzahrane/Downloads/../../../hsheldahlthomason/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.Outlook/0GB4NYGE/BP%20Statistical%20Review%20of%20World%20Energy,%20BP,%20June%202017,%20page%2015

https://sa.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/60/CCG-2017-Saudi-Arabia %20page%207

718-034 Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030

32

63 “Natural Gas and the Vision 2030,” Jadwa Investment, October 2016.

64 “Saudi Arabia: The challenged kingdom,” The Economist, May 23, 2015.

65 Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White, “Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability After the Arab Spring,” HBS case 714-053.

66 “GCC Members Consider Future of Union,” Al-Monitor, January 14, 2013.

67 “Syria crisis: Where key countries stand,” BBC News, October 30, 2015.

68 “Syria’s Paradox: Why the War Only Ever Seems to Get Worse,” The New York Times, August 26, 2016.

69 “Yemen crisis: Who is fighting whom?” BBC News, December 2, 2017.

70
“How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East,” The New York Times, November 19, 2016.

71 “The mysterious sudden resignation of Lebanon’s prime minister, explained,” Vox, November 13, 2017.

72 Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White, “Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability After the Arab Spring,” HBS case 714-053.

73 Ibid.

74 “US-Saudi Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, May 12, 2017.

75 “Saudi Arabia’s Special Power Over Donald Trump,” The New York Times, November 10, 2017.

76 “A Palace Coup in Riyadh,” The Economist, November 11, 2017.

77 “For Israel, concern over Iran leads to better ties with Arab states,” The Times of Israel, October 20, 2017.

78 “The Top 5 Countries Where ISIS Gets Its Foreign Recruits,” Time, April 14, 2017.

79 “Saudi Arabia cracks down on youths joining Syria jihadis,” The Financial Times, February 4, 2014.

80 Daniel L. Byman, “The US-Saudi Arabia counterterrorism relationship,” Brookings, May 24, 2016.

81 Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White, “Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability After the Arab Spring,” HBS case 714-053.

82 SAMA Functions, Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, accessed at http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
US/About/Pages/SAMAFunction.aspx.

83 “Saudi Arabia: 2017 Article IV Consultation,” International Monetary Fund, October 2017.

84
“Saudi Arabia needs $70 oil to break even,” Business Insider, November 1, 2017.

85 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Saudi Arabia 2008.

86 Ibid.

87 Mohamed A. Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges (Springer, 2010).

88 Richard H.K. Vietor and Hilary White, “Saudi Arabia: Finding Stability After the Arab Spring,” HBS case 714-053.

89 “Given a Choice, Saudis Prefer Government Jobs,” Gallup News, August 19, 2015.

90 “The Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017,” The World Economic Forum, 2016.

91 Nicos Komninos, The Age of Intelligent Cities: Smart Environments and Innovation-for-all Strategies (Routledge 2015).
92 “Saudi Arabia Builds Cities in the Sand to Move Beyond Oil,” Bloomberg, August 7, 2017.

93 “Saudis to tighten curbs on foreign workers in local jobs push: sources,” Reuters, March 20, 2017.

94 Ibid.

95 “Saudi Arabia: Foreign Investment,” Santander TradePortal, accessed at https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-
overseas/saudi-arabia/foreign-investment.

96 UNCTAD FDI statistical database, accessed November 2017.

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 718-034

33

97 “World Investment Report 2017: Arabs still lag,” Arab News, June 9, 2017.
98 “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Inward and Outward FDI,” Dhaman, 2016, accessed at http://dhaman.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Saudi .

99 Annual Statistical Report 2016, Tadawul, Saudi Stock Exchange.

100 Karen Elliot House, “Saudi Arabia in Transition: From Defense to Offense, But How to Score?” Harvard Kennedy School
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Senior Fellow Paper, July 2017.

101 Ibid.

102 Sulaiman Al Hamdan, Civil Service Minister, interview with the casewriters, December 6, 2017.

103 Fahad Alturki, chief economist of Jadwa Investment, interview with the casewriters, December 3, 2017.

104 “Vibrant Society with Strong Roots,” Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, accessed at http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/11.

105 “Softbank-Saudi tech fund becomes world’s biggest with $93 billion of capital,” Reuters, May 20, 2017.

106 “Saudi Arabia Just Announced Plans to Build a Mega City That Will Cost $500 Billion,” Bloomberg, October 24, 2017.

107 Karen Elliot House, “Saudi Arabia in Transition: From Defense to Offense, But How to Score?” Harvard Kennedy School
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Senior Fellow Paper, July 2017.

108 Jane Kinninmont, “Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract Austerity and Transformation,” Chatham House
Research Paper, July 2017.

109 Karen Elliot House, “Saudi Arabia in Transition: From Defense to Offense, But How to Score?” Harvard Kennedy School
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Senior Fellow Paper, July 2017.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 Sulaiman Al Hamdan, Minister of Civil Service, interview with the casewriters.

113 Fahad Alturki, chief economist of Jadwa Investment, interview with the casewriters, December 4, 2017.

114 Bander bin Sultan, quoted in PBS Frontline, “Interview with Prince Bander bin Sultan,” January 2001.

http://www.arabnews.com/node/1112711

Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030
Background
History of Saudi Arabia
The Practice of Islam
Modern History
Government
Legal System
Current Government
Culture in the Kingdom
Energy
Energy diversification
International Affairs
Extremism in the Kingdom
Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy
Liberalization
Abdullah’s Strategy
Vision 2030
Looking Ahead
Exhibit 1Map of Saudi Arabia
Exhibit 2Saudi Arabia Balance of Payments (billions USD)
Exhibit 3 Saudi Arabia National Income Accounts
a Figures for 2017 are estimates.
Exhibit 4Exchange Rate, Unemployment and Productivity in Saudi Arabia
Exhibit 5Saudi Arabia’s Royal Family Tree (Partial)
Exhibit 6aSaudi Crude Oil Exports
Exhibit 6bSaudi Oil Production
Exhibit 6cAnnual Energy Production, 2008-2016
Exhibit 7Crude Oil Price, West Texas Intermediate
Exhibit 8aOPEC Crude Production (million barrels per day)
Exhibit 8bNon-OPEC Supply Reductions Commitment (thousand barrels per day)
Exhibit 9 Saudi Arabia’s Top Exports and Imports (billion USD)
Exhibit 10Saudi Arabia’s Fiscal Budget (billions SR)
Exhibit 11aSaudi Arabia’s Fiscal Balance Program
Exhibit 11bBudgeted allocations by sector
Exhibit 12SAMA Total Foreign Reserve Assets
Exhibit 13aUnemployment Rates in Saudi Arabia
Exhibit 13bUnemployment by Gender and Education Level
Exhibit 13cYouth Unemployment
Exhibit 14Saudi Arabia’s Labor Force Demographics
Exhibit 15 Doing Business Indicators, Saudi Arabia
Exhibit 16 Social Indicator Comparison (most recent)
Appendix AGoals of Vision 2030
Endnotes

MY FIRST OBJECTIVE IS FOR
OUR COUNTRY TO BE A
PIONEERING AND SUCCESSFUL
GLOBAL MODEL OF
EXCELLENCE, ON ALL FRONTS,
AND I WILL WORK WITH YOU TO
ACHIEVE THAT.

KING SALMAN BIN ABDULAZIZ AL SAUD
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques

All success stories start with a vision, and successful
visions are based on strong pillars.
The first pillar of our vision is our status as the heart of
the Arab and Islamic worlds. We recognize that Allah
the Almighty has bestowed on our lands a gift more
precious than oil. Our Kingdom is the Land of the Two
Holy Mosques, the most sacred sites on earth, and the
direction of the Kaaba (Qibla) to which more than a
billion Muslims turn at prayer.
The second pillar of our vision is our determination to
become a global investment powerhouse. Our nation
holds strong investment capabilities, which we will
harness to stimulate our economy and diversify our
revenues.
The third pillar is transforming our unique strategic
location into a global hub connecting three continents,
Asia, Europe and Africa. Our geographic position
between key global waterways, makes the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia an epicenter of trade and the gateway to
the world.
Our country is rich in its natural resources. We are not
dependent solely on oil for our energy needs. Gold,
phosphate, uranium, and many other valuable minerals
are found beneath our lands. But our real wealth lies in
the ambition of our people and the potential of our
younger generation. They are our nation’s pride and the
architects of our future. We will never forget how, under

IT IS MY PLEASURE
TO PRESENT SAUDI
ARABIA’S VISION
FOR THE FUTURE.
IT IS AN AMBITIOUS
YET ACHIEVABLE
BLUEPRINT, WHICH
EXPRESSES OUR
LONG-TERM GOALS
AND EXPECTATIONS
AND REFLECTS OUR
COUNTRY’S
STRENGTHS AND
CAPABILITIES

FOREWORD

MOHAMMAD BIN SALMAN BIN
ABDULAZIZ AL-SAUD
Chairman of the Council of Economic
and Development Affairs

6

tougher circumstances than today, our nation was
forged by collective determination when the late King
Abdulaziz Al-Saud – may Allah bless his soul – united
the Kingdom. Our people will amaze the world again.
We are confident about the Kingdom’s future. With all
the blessings Allah has bestowed on our nation, we
cannot help but be optimistic about the decades
ahead. We ponder what lies over the horizon rather
than worrying about what could be lost.
The future of the Kingdom, my dear brothers and
sisters, is one of huge promise and great potential, God
willing. Our precious country deserves the best.
Therefore, we will expand and further develop our
talents and capacity. We will do our utmost to ensure
that Muslims from around the world can visit the Holy
Sites.
We are determined to reinforce and diversify the
capabilities of our economy, turning our key strengths
into enabling tools for a fully diversified future. As such,
we will transform Aramco from an oil producing
company into a global industrial conglomerate. We will
transform the Public Investment Fund into the world’s
largest sovereign wealth fund. We will encourage our
major corporations to expand across borders and take
their rightful place in global markets. As we continue to
give our army the best possible machinery and
equipment, we plan to manufacture half of our military
needs within the Kingdom to create more job
opportunities for citizens and keep more resources in
our country.
We will expand the variety of digital services to reduce
delays and cut tedious bureaucracy. We will immediately
adopt wide-ranging transparency and accountability
reforms and, through the body set up to measure the
performance of government agencies, hold them
accountable for any shortcomings. We will be
transparent and open about our failures as well as our
successes, and will welcome ideas on how to improve.
All this comes from the directive of the Custodian of the
Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud,
may Allah protect him, who ordered us to plan for a
future that fulfills your ambitions and your aspirations.
In line with his instructions, we will work tirelessly from
today to build a better tomorrow for you, your children,
and your children’s children.
Our ambition is for the long term. It goes beyond

replenishing sources of income that have weakened or
preserving what we have already achieved. We are
determined to build a thriving country in which all
citizens can fulfill their dreams, hopes and ambitions.
Therefore, we will not rest until our nation is a leader in
providing opportunities for all through education and
training, and high quality services such as employment
initiatives, health, housing, and entertainment.
We commit ourselves to providing world-class
government services which effectively and efficiently
meet the needs of our citizens. Together we will
continue building a better country, fulfilling our dream
of prosperity and unlocking the talent, potential, and
dedication of our young men and women. We will not
allow our country ever to be at the mercy of a
commodity price volatility or external markets.
We have all the means to achieve our dreams and
ambitions. There are no excuses for us to stand still or
move backwards.
Our Vision is a strong, thriving, and stable Saudi Arabia
that provides opportunity for all. Our Vision is a tolerant
country with Islam as its constitution and moderation
as its method. We will welcome qualified individuals
from all over the world and will respect those who have
come to join our journey and our success.
We intend to provide better opportunities for
partnerships with the private sector through the three
pillars: our position as the heart of the Arab and Islamic
worlds, our leading investment capabilities, and our
strategic geographical position. We will improve the
business environment, so that our economy grows and
flourishes, driving healthier employment opportunities
for citizens and long-term prosperity for all. This
promise is built on cooperation and on mutual
responsibility.
This is our “Saudi Arabia’s Vision for

20

30

.” We will begin
immediately delivering the overarching plans and
programs we have set out. Together, with the help of
Allah, we can strengthen the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s
position as a great nation in which we should all feel an
immense pride.

7

OUR VISION

8

SAUDI ARABIA

THE HEART OF THE
ARAB AND ISLAMIC
WORLDS,
THE INVESTMENT
POWERHOUSE, AND
THE HUB
CONNECTING THREE
CONTINENTS

9

10

INTRODUCTION

A VIBRANT SOCIETY

A Vibrant Society.. with Strong Roots

A Vibrant Society.. with Fulfilling Lives

A Vibrant Society.. with Strong Foundations

A THRIVING ECONOMY

A Thriving Economy.. Rewarding Opportunities

A Thriving Economy.. Investing for the Long-term

A Thriving Economy.. Open for Business

A Thriving Economy.. Leveraging its Unique Position

AN AMBITIOUS NATION

An Ambitious Nation.. Effectively Governed

An Ambitious Nation.. Responsibly Enabled

HOW TO ACHIEVE OUR VISION?

12

14

16

22

28

34

36

42

50

58

62

64

72

78

INDEX

11

THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA IS
BLESSED WITH MANY RICH ASSETS.
OUR GEOGRAPHIC, CULTURAL,
SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES HAVE
ENABLED US TO TAKE A LEADING
POSITION IN THE WORLD

INTRODUCTION
12

To build the best future for our country, we have based
our Vision for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on three
pillars that represent our unique competitive
advantages. Our status will enable us to build on our
leading role as the heart of Arab and Islamic worlds. At
the same time, we will use our investment power to
create a more diverse and sustainable economy. Finally,
we will use our strategic location to build our role as an
integral driver of international trade and to connect
three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe.
Our Vision is built around three themes: a vibrant
society, a thriving economy and an ambitious nation.
This first theme is vital to achieving the Vision and a strong
foundation for economic prosperity. We believe in the
importance of a vibrant society. Members of this society
live in accordance with the Islamic principle of
moderation, are proud of their national identity and
their ancient cultural heritage, enjoy a good life in a
beautiful environment, are protected by caring families
and are supported by an empowering social and health
care system.
In the second theme, a thriving economy provides
opportunities for all by building an education system
aligned with market needs and creating economic
opportunities for the entrepreneur, the small enterprise
as well as the large corporation. Therefore, we will
develop our investment tools to unlock our promising
economic sectors, diversify our economy and create job
opportunities. We will also grow our economy and

improve the quality of our services, by privatizing some
government services, improving the business
environment, attracting the finest talent and the best
investments globally, and leveraging our unique
strategic location in connecting three continents.
Our nation is ambitious in what we want to achieve. We
will apply efficiency and responsibility at all levels. Our
third theme is built on an effective, transparent,
accountable, enabling and high-performing
government. We will also prepare the right environment
for our citizens, private sector and non-profit sector to
take their responsibilities and take the initiative in
facing challenges and seizing opportunities.
In each of these themes, we highlighted a selection of
commitments and goals, as a reflection of our ambition
and a representation of what we aim to achieve. This
Vision will be the point of reference for our future
decisions, so that all future projects are aligned to its
content.
To clarify our next steps, we have already prepared the
ground and launched some executive programs at the
Council of Economic and Development Affairs. We will
now launch a first portfolio of crucial programs with the
aim to achieve our goals and honor our commitments.

13

A VIBRANT
SOCIETY

1
14

15

LIVING
BY ISLAMIC
VALUES

Islam and its teachings are our way of life. They are the
basis of all our laws, decisions, actions and goals.
Following Islam’s guidance on the values of hard-work,
dedication, and excellence, Prophet Mohammed, Peace
Be Upon Him, said: “That Allah loves us to master our
work”.
Therefore, the principles of Islam will be the driving
force for us to realize our Vision. The values of
moderation, tolerance, excellence, discipline, equity,
and transparency will be the bedrock of our success.

WE HAVE ENORMOUS UNTAPPED
OPPORTUNITIES AND A RICH BLEND
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, BUT OUR
REAL WEALTH LIES IN OUR PEOPLE
AND OUR SOCIETY. WE TAKE PRIDE IN
WHAT MAKES OUR NATION
EXCEPTIONAL: OUR ISLAMIC FAITH
AND OUR NATIONAL UNITY. OUR
NATION IS THE CORE OF THE ARAB
AND ISLAMIC WORLDS AND

A VIBRANT SOCIETY..
WITH STRONG ROOTS

FOCUSING OUR EFFORTS
TO SERVE UMRAH
VISITORS

Saudi Arabia has assumed a prominent place in the world
and has become synonymous with hospitality and a warm
welcome to all Muslims. As such, it has carved a special
place in the hearts of pilgrims and the faithful everywhere.
We have been given the privilege to serve the Two Holy
Mosques, the pilgrims and all visitors to the blessed holy
sites. In the last decade, the number of Umrah visitors
entering the country from abroad has tripled, reaching 8
million people. This is a noble responsibility. It requires us to
spare no effort in seeking to offer pilgrims with all they
need so we fulfil our duty to provide good hospitality to our
brothers and sisters.
In this context, we have recently begun a third expansion to
the Two Holy Mosques, as well as modernizing and
increasing the capacities of our airports. We have launched
the Makkah Metro project to complement the railroad and
train projects that will serve visitors to the Holy Mosques

16

REPRESENTS THE HEART OF ISLAM.
WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT, GOD
WILLING, WE WILL BUILD A BRIGHTER
FUTURE, ONE BASED ON THE
BEDROCK OF ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES.
WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXCEL IN
PERFORMING OUR DUTIES TOWARDS
PILGRIMS TO THE FULLEST AND
PROMOTE OUR DEEP-ROOTED
NATIONAL IDENTITY

and holy sites. We have reinforced the network of our
transport system to facilitate access and help pilgrims
perform their visits with greater ease and convenience.
At the same time, we will enrich pilgrims’ spiritual journeys
and cultural experiences while in the Kingdom. We will
establish more museums, prepare new tourist and historical
sites and cultural venues, and improve the pilgrimage
experience within the Kingdom.

TAKING PRIDE
IN OUR NATIONAL
IDENTITY

We take immense pride in the historical and cultural legacy
of our Saudi, Arab, and Islamic heritage. Our land was, and
continues to be, known for its ancient civilizations and trade
routes at the crossroads of global trade. This heritage has
given our society the cultural richness and diversity it is
known for today. We recognize the importance of preserving
this sophisticated heritage in order to promote national
unity and consolidate true Islamic and Arab values.
We will endeavor to strengthen, preserve and highlight our national
identity so that it can guide the lives of future generations. We will
do so by keeping true to our national values and principles, as well
as by encouraging social development and upholding the Arabic
language. We will continue to work on the restoration of national,
Arab, Islamic and ancient cultural sites and strive to have them
registered internationally to make them accessible to everyone and,
in the process, create cultural events and build world-class
museums which will attract visitors from near and far. This will
create a living witness to our ancient heritage, showcasing our
prominent place in history and on the map of civilizations.

17

A VIBRANT SOCIETY..
WITH STRONG ROOTS

18

Rise in the number of pilgrims from
8 million to 30 million pilgrims

Increase number of registered
archaeological sites in UNESCO
from 4 to 8 the least

To more than double the number of Saudi
heritage sites registered with UNESCO

To increase our capacity to welcome Umrah
visitors from 8 million to 30 million every year

AMONG OUR
GOALS BY

2030

19

AMONG OUR
COMMITMENTS..

20

THE HONOR TO SERVE THE
INCREASING NUMBER OF
UMRAH VISITORS IN THE
BEST WAY POSSIBLE

We are honored to attend to pilgrims and Umrah
visitors’ needs, fulfilling a role bestowed on us by Allah.
Our expansion of the Two Holy Mosques has led to a
tripling in the number of foreign Umrah visitors over
the last decade, reaching eight million in 2015.
By increasing the capacity and by improving the quality
of the services offered to Umrah visitors, we will, by
2020, make it possible for over 15 million Muslims per
year to perform Umrah and be completely satisfied
with their pilgrimage experience.
We will achieve this by improving visa application
procedures which will smooth the visa process with the
aim of full automation. We will also further integrate
e-services into the pilgrims’ journey, which will enrich
the religious and cultural experience.
Both the public and private sectors will play a crucial
role in this project as we work to upgrade
accommodation, improve hospitality and launch new
services for pilgrims.

THE LARGEST ISLAMIC
MUSEUM

We have always taken – and will continue to take –
great pride in our heritage. Mohammad, the Last of
Prophets, Peace Be Upon Him, was from Makkah,
the birthplace of Islam. Medina is where the first
Islamic society was born.
We will build an Islamic museum in accordance with
the highest global standards, equipped with the
latest methods in collection, preservation,
presentation and documentation. It will be a major
landmark for our citizens and visitors, where they
will learn about the history of Islam, enjoy interactive
experiences and participate in cultural events.
Using modern technology, visitors to the museum
will take an immersive journey through the different
ages of Islamic civilization, as well as its science,
scholars and culture.
It will also be an international hub for erudition and
include a world-class library and research center.

21

PROMOTING
CULTURE AND
ENTERTAINMENT

We consider culture and entertainment indispensable
to our quality of life. We are well aware that the cultural
and entertainment opportunities currently available do
not reflect the rising aspirations of our citizens and
residents, nor are they in harmony with our prosperous
economy. It is why we will support the efforts of
regions, governorates, non-profit and private sectors to
organize cultural events. We intend to enhance the role
of government funds, while also attracting local and
international investors, creating partnerships with
international entertainment corporations. Land suitable
for cultural and entertainment projects will be provided
and talented writers, authors and directors will be
carefully supported. We will seek to offer a variety of
cultural venues – such as libraries, arts and museums –
as well as entertainment possibilities to suit tastes and
preferences. These projects will also contribute to our
economy and will result in the creation of many job
opportunities.

THE HAPPINESS AND FULFILLMENT
OF CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS IS
IMPORTANT TO US. THIS CAN ONLY
BE ACHIEVED THROUGH PROMOTING
PHYSICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
SOCIAL WELL-BEING. AT THE HEART

LIVING HEALTHY,
BEING
HEALTHY

A healthy and balanced lifestyle is an essential mainstay
of a high quality of life. Yet opportunities for the regular
practice of sports have often been limited. This will
change. We intend to encourage widespread and
regular participation in sports and athletic activities,
working in partnership with the private sector to
establish additional dedicated facilities and programs.
This will enable citizens and residents to engage in a
wide variety of sports and leisure pursuits. We aspire to
excel in sport and be among the leaders in selected
sports regionally and globally.

A VIBRANT SOCIETY..
WITH FULFILLING LIVES

22

DEVELOPING
OUR
CITIES

Our cities already enjoy high levels of security and
development. Despite the current turmoil in the region
and the wide expanse of our territories, our country
and citizens are safe and secure. Our cities are among
the safest in the world with annual crime rates that are
less than 0.8 per 100,000 people, far below the
international rate of 7.6. We will maintain our safety and
security by supporting ongoing efforts to fight drugs
abuse, as well as by adopting further measures to
ensure traffic safety, reduce traffic accidents and
minimize their tragic consequences.
Our cities have grown significantly in recent decades; a
growth which has been accompanied by the steady
development of their infrastructure. To ensure we can
continue to enhance the quality of life for all and meet
the needs and requirements of our citizens, we will
continue to ensure high quality services such as water,
electricity, public transport and roads are properly
provided. Open and landscaped areas will also be
developed further, to meet the recreational needs of
individuals and families.

ACHIEVING
ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY

By preserving our environment and natural resources,
we fulfill our Islamic, human and moral duties.
Preservation is also our responsibility to future
generations and essential to the quality of our daily
lives. We will seek to safeguard our environment by
increasing the efficiency of waste management,
establishing comprehensive recycling projects, reducing
all types of pollution and fighting desertification. We
will also promote the optimal use of our water resources
by reducing consumption and utilizing treated and
renewable water. We will direct our efforts towards
protecting and rehabilitating our beautiful beaches,
natural reserves and islands, making them open to
everyone. We will seek the participation of the private
sector and government funds in these efforts.

OF OUR VISION IS A SOCIETY IN
WHICH ALL ENJOY A GOOD QUALITY
OF LIFE, A HEALTHY LIFESTYLE AND
AN ATTRACTIVE LIVING
ENVIRONMENT

23

A VIBRANT SOCIETY..
WITH FULFILLING LIVES

24

Naming three Saudi cities
Among the top 100 cities
In terms of quality of life*

Polarization of household spending on
culture And entertainment into the
kingdom to rise from % 2.9 to 6%

Increase percentage of sports
practitioners At least weekly from
13% to

40

%

Naming three Saudi cities
Among the top 100 cities
In terms of quality of life*

To increase the ratio of individuals exercising at least
once a week from 13% of population to 40%

To increase household spending on cultural and entertainment activities
inside the Kingdom from the current level of 2.9% to 6%

To have three Saudi cities be recognized in the top-ranked
100 cities in the world

AMONG OUR
GOALS BY
2030

25

AMONG OUR
COMMITMENTS..

26

By 2020, there will be more than

45

0 registered
and professionally organized amateur clubs
providing a variety of cultural activities and
enter tainment events.

“DAEM”
MEANINGFUL
ENTERTAINMENT FOR
CITIZENS

We will increase the number and variety of
cultural and enter tainment activities with the
aim of opening dedicated venues to showcase
our citizens’ myriad talents. We will also review
our regulations to simplify the establishment and
registration of amateur, social and cultural clubs.
We will launch and provide the necessar y
financial suppor t for “Daem”, a national program
to enhance the quality of cultural activities and
enter tainment. The program will create a national
network of clubs, encourage the exchange of
knowledge and international experiences and
promote better awareness of a wide range of
hobbies and leisure activities.

27

CARING FOR
OUR FAMILIES

Families are the key building block of a society,
protecting it from social breakdown across generations,
and acting as both its children’s sanctuary and the main
provider of their needs. One of the defining
characteristics of the Kingdom is its adherence to
Islamic principles and values, together with the unity
and extended family relations. Building on these key
characteristics, we will provide our families with all the
necessary support to take care of their children and
develop their talents and abilities. In particular, we
want to deepen the participation of parents in the
education process, to help them develop their children’s
characters and talents so that they can contribute fully
to society. Families will also be encouraged to adopt a
planning culture, to plan carefully for their future and
the futures of their children.
We recognize each family’s aspiration to own a home
and the important role ownership plays in strengthening
family security. Even though

47

percent of Saudi
families already own their homes, we aim to increase
this rate by five percentage points by 2020. This would
be a substantial achievement given the high increase in
the number of new entrants to the housing market. We
will meet this target by introducing a number of laws
and regulations; encouraging the private sector to
build houses; and providing funding, mortgage
solutions and ownership schemes that meet the needs
of our citizens.

OUR GOAL IS TO PROMOTE AND
REINVIGORATE SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN ORDER TO BUILD A
STRONG AND PRODUCTIVE SOCIETY.
WE WILL STRENGTHEN OUR FAMILIES,

DEVELOPING OUR
CHILDREN’S CHARACTER

We intend to embed positive moral beliefs in our
children’s characters from an early age by reshaping
our academic and educational system. Schools,
working with families, will reinforce the fabric of
society by providing students with the compassion,
knowledge, and behaviors necessary for resilient and
independent characters to emerge. The focus will be
on the fundamental values of initiative, persistence
and leadership, as well as social skills, cultural
knowledge and self-awareness. We will also promote
cultural, social, volunteering and athletic activities
through empowering our educational, cultural and
entertainment institutions.

A VIBRANT SOCIETY..
WITH STRONG FOUNDATIONS

28

EMPOWERING
OUR SOCIETY

We will continue modernizing our social welfare system
to make it more efficient, empowering and just.
Subsidies for fuel, food, water and electricity will be
better utilized by redirecting them towards those in
need. We will provide our most vulnerable citizens with
tailored care and support. Together with the private
sector and non-governmental organizations, we will
offer preparation and training to those unable to find
employment so they can smoothly join the workforce
whenever possible.

CARING FOR
OUR HEALTH

Our health care system has benefited from substantive
investment in recent decades. As a result, we now
have 2.2 hospital beds for every 1,000 people, world-
class medical specialists with average life expectancy
rising from

66

years to

74

years in the past three
decades. We are determined to optimize and better
utilize the capacity of our hospitals and health care
centers, and enhance the quality of our preventive
and therapeutic health care services.
The public sector will focus on promoting preventive
care, on reducing infectious diseases and in
encouraging citizens to make use of primary care as
a first step. It will deepen collaboration and
integration between health and social care, as well as
supporting families to provide home care when
necessary for their relatives. The public sector will
focus on its planning, regulatory and supervisory
roles in health care. We intend to provide our health
care through public corporations both to enhance its
quality and to prepare for the benefits of privatization
in the longer term. We will work towards developing
private medical insurance to improve access to
medical services and reduce waiting times for
appointments with specialists and consultants. Our
doctors will be given better training to improve
treatment for chronic diseases such as heart disease,
diabetes and cancer that threaten our nation’s health.

PROVIDE THE EDUCATION THAT
BUILDS OUR CHILDREN’S
FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERS AND
ESTABLISH EMPOWERING HEALTH
AND SOCIAL CARE SYSTEMS

29

A VIBRANT SOCIETY..
WITH STRONG FOUNDATIONS
30

Raise Social capital index from
position 26 to position

10

Increase the average of life
expectancy from 74 to

80

years

To increase the average life expectancy from 74 years to 80 years

To raise our position from 26 to 10 in the Social Capital index

AMONG OUR
GOALS BY
2030

31

AMONG OUR
COMMITMENTS..

32

“IRTIQAA”
A MORE PROMINENT ROLE
FOR FAMILIES IN THE
EDUCATION OF THEIR
CHILDREN

The engagement of parents in their children’s
education is one of the main principles of success.
Our goal by 2020 is for 80 percent of parents to be
engaged in school activities and the learning
process of their children.
We will launch the “Irtiqaa” program, which will measure
how effectively schools are engaging parents in their
children’s education. We will establish parent-led boards
in schools, to open discussion forums and further
engage with parents. Teachers will receive training to
raise their awareness of the importance of
communicating with parents and equip them with
effective methods to do so successfully. We will also
collaborate with private and non-profit sectors to offer
innovative educational programs and events that can
improve this academic partnership.

CORPORATIZATION:
EFFICIENT AND HIGH
QUALITY HEALTH CARE

Our goal is to enhance the standard and quality of
health care services. Our aim is a health care sector that
promotes competition and transparency among
providers. This will enhance the capability, efficiency
and productivity of care and treatment and increase
the options available to our citizens.
To achieve this goal, we will introduce corporatization
into the sector by transferring the responsibility for
health care provision to a network of public companies
that compete both against each other and against the
private sector. This will provide our citizens with the
highest quality of health care while, at the same time,
allowing the government to focus on its legislative,
regulatory and supervisory roles. Corporatization shall
also promote and prioritize specialization in health care
services and enable citizens to choose their preferred
service provider.

33

A THRIVING
ECONOMY

2
34

35

LEARNING
FOR
WORKING

We will continue investing in education and training so
that our young men and women are equipped for the
jobs of the future. We want Saudi children, wherever
they live, to enjoy higher quality, multi-faceted
education. We will invest particularly in developing
early childhood education, refining our national
curriculum and training our teachers and educational
leaders.
We will also redouble efforts to ensure that the
outcomes of our education system are in line with
market needs. We have launched the National Labor
Gateway (TAQAT), and we plan to establish sector
councils that will precisely determine the skills and
knowledge required by each socio-economic sector. We
will also expand vocational training in order to drive
forward economic development. Our scholarship
opportunities will be steered towards prestigious
international universities and be awarded in the fields
that serve our national priorities. We will also focus on
innovation in advanced technologies and
entrepreneurship.

THE SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES OF OUR
CHILDREN ARE ONE OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT AND CHERISHED ASSETS. TO
MAKE THE MOST OF THEIR POTENTIAL,
WE WILL BUILD A CULTURE THAT
REWARDS DETERMINATION, PROVIDES
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL AND HELPS
EVERYONE ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY

BOOSTING OUR SMALL
BUSINESSES AND
PRODUCTIVE FAMILIES

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are among
the most important agents of economic growth; they
create jobs, support innovation and boost exports.
SMEs in the Kingdom are not yet major contributors to
our GDP, especially when compared to advanced
economies. Therefore, we will strive to create suitable
job opportunities for our citizens by supporting SME
entrepreneurship, privatization and investments in new
industries. To help us achieve this goal, we have
established the SME Authority and we will continue
encouraging our young entrepreneurs with business-
friendly regulations, easier access to funding,
international partnerships and a greater share of
national procurement and government bids.
Our productive families now enjoy vast marketing
opportunities through social media and digital
platforms. We will facilitate access to these channels,
enable microfinance and motivate the non-profit sector
to build the capabilities of our productive families and
fund their initiatives.

A THRIVING ECONOMY..
REWARDING OPPORTUNITIES

36

PROVIDING
EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES

Our economy will provide opportunities for everyone – men and
women, young and old – so they may contribute to the best of
their abilities. We will place a renewed emphasis on lifelong
training and we will seek to make the most of the potential of our
workforce by encouraging a culture of high performance. These
efforts will be coordinated by the recently established Job
Creation and Anti-Unemployment Commission.
One of our most significant assets is our lively and vibrant youth. We will
guarantee their skills are developed and properly deployed. While many
other countries are concerned with aging populations, more than half of
the Saudi population is below the age of 25 years. We will take advantage
of this demographic dividend by harnessing our youth’s energy and by
expanding entrepreneurship and enterprise opportunities.
Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50
percent of our university graduates being female, we will
continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive
capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and
contribute to the development of our society and economy.
We will also enable those of our people with disabilities to
receive the education and job opportunities that will ensure
their independence and integration as effective members of
society. They will be provided with all the facilities and tools
required to put them on the path to commercial success.

ATTRACTING THE
TALENTS
WE NEED

Achieving our desired rate of economic growth will
require an environment that attracts the necessary
skills and capabilities both from within the Kingdom
and beyond our national borders. We will seek to
improve living and working conditions for non-Saudis,
by extending their ability to own real estate in certain
areas, improving the quality of life, permitting the
establishment of more private schools and adopting an
effective and simple system for issuing visas and
residence permits.
Our goal is to attract and retain the finest Saudi and
foreign minds, and provide them with all they need.
Their presence in the Kingdom will contribute to
economic development and attract additional
foreign investment.

SKILLS TO ACHIEVE THEIR PERSONAL
GOALS. TO THIS END, WE WILL
REINFORCE THE ABILITY OF OUR
ECONOMY TO GENERATE DIVERSE JOB
OPPORTUNITIES AND INSTITUTE A NEW
PARADIGM IN ATTRACTING GLOBAL
TALENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS.

37

A THRIVING ECONOMY..
REWARDING OPPORTUNITIES

38

Reducing the
unemployment rate from
12% to the World rating
7%

High input of Small and
medium facilities from
20% to 35% of GDP

Raise the percentage of
the Saudi women
employment rate from
12% to 40%

To increase SME contribution to GDP from 20% to 35%

To increase women’s participation in the workforce from 22% to 30%

To lower the rate of unemployment from 11.6% to 7%

AMONG OUR
GOALS BY
2030

39

AMONG OUR
COMMITMENTS..

AN EDUCATION THAT
CONTRIBUTES TO
ECONOMIC GROWTH

We will close the gap between the outputs of higher
education and the requirements of the job market. We
will also help our students make careful career
decisions, while at the same time training them and
facilitating their transition between different
educational pathways. In the year 2030, we aim to
have at least five Saudi universities among the top 200
universities in international rankings. We shall help our
students achieve results above international averages
in global education indicators.

To this end, we will prepare a modern curriculum
focused on rigorous standards in literacy, numeracy,
skills and character development. We will track
progress and publish a sophisticated range of
education outcomes, showing year-on-year
improvements. We will work closely with the private
sector to ensure higher education outcomes are in line
with the requirements of job market. We will invest in
strategic partnerships with apprenticeship providers,
new skills councils from industry, and large private
companies. We will also work towards developing the
job specifications of every education field. Furthermore,

40

A BIGGER ROLE FOR SMALL
AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) contribute
only 20 percent of our GDP whereas, in advanced
economies, this contribution can reach up to

70

percent.
Despite the efforts made to improve the business
environment in the Kingdom, SMEs can still endure
unnecessarily slow and complex legal and administrative
procedures. They also struggle to attract the necessary
skills, capabilities and funding with financial institutions
providing no more than 5 percent of the overall funding
– a far lower percentage than the global average. We will
strive to facilitate enhanced access to funding and to
encourage our financial institutions to allocate up to 20
percent of overall funding to SMEs by 2030.
The recently established SME Authority plans to review
laws and regulations thoroughly, remove obstacles,
facilitate access to funding, and enable youth and
entrepreneurs to market their ideas and products. At the
same time, we will establish additional new business
incubators, specialized training institutions and venture
capital funds. These will aid entrepreneurs in developing
their skills and networks. We will also support SMEs in
marketing and help export their products and services,
by leveraging e-commerce and collaborating with
international stakeholders.

we will build a centralized student database tracking
students from early childhood through to K-12 and
beyond into tertiary education (higher and vocational)
in order to improve education planning, monitoring,
evaluation, and outcomes.

41

DIVERSIFYING OUR ECONOMY IS VITAL
FOR ITS SUSTAINABILITY. ALTHOUGH OIL
AND GAS ARE ESSENTIAL PILLARS OF
OUR ECONOMY, WE HAVE BEGUN
EXPANDING OUR INVESTMENTS INTO
ADDITIONAL SECTORS,
WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE
COMPLICATED CHALLENGES AHEAD BUT
WE HAVE LONG-TERM PLANS TO
OVERCOME THEM. IN THE PAST 25 YEARS,
THE SAUDI ECONOMY HAS GROWN BY
AN ANNUAL AVERAGE RATE OF MORE
THAN 4 PERCENT, CONTRIBUTING TO
THE CREATION OF MILLIONS OF NEW

A THRIVING ECONOMY..
INVESTING FOR THE LONG-TERM

MAXIMIZING
OUR INVESTMENT
CAPABILITIES

The ongoing privatization of state-owned assets, including
leading companies, property and other assets, will bring in
new and more diverse revenues for the Saudi government.
This will further enhance our financial resources and
economic stability, which will be reinvested for long-term
impact.
We will develop further the sophistication of our investment
vehicles, particularly after transferring the ownership of
Aramco to the Public Investment Fund, which will become

the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world. We will
increase the efficiency of the fund’s management and
improve its return on investment, with the aim of diversifying
our government resources and our economy.
The Public Investment Fund will not compete with the
private sector, but instead help unlock strategic sectors
requiring intensive capital inputs. This will contribute towards
developing entirely new economic sectors and establishing
durable national corporations.

42

JOBS, ALTHOUGH WE ARE ALREADY
AMONG THE 20 LARGEST ECONOMIES IN
THE WORLD, OUR AMBITIONS ARE EVEN
GREATER. WE ASPIRE TO HAVE AN EVEN
HIGHER RANKING BY 2030, DESPITE THE
HEADWINDS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC
SLOWDOWN AND THE EXPECTED IMPACT
OF OUR STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC
REFORMS. THIS REQUIRES US TO INVEST
IN ALL OUR RESOURCES IN ORDER TO
DIVERSIFY THE ECONOMY, UNLEASH THE
CAPABILITIES OF OUR PROMISING
ECONOMIC SECTORS AND PRIVATIZE
SOME GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Building on the Kingdom’s leading position and historic
alliances, we plan to enter long-term partnerships with
neighboring and friendly countries for knowledge transfer
and trade.
Our Vision is to maximize our investment capabilities by
participating in large international companies and emerging
technologies from around the world. This will ensure that we
become market makers in selected sectors, as well as a leader
in competitively managing assets, funding and investment.

All of this will require the formation of an advanced financial
and capital market open to the world, allowing greater
funding opportunities and stimulating economic growth. To
this end, we will continue facilitating access to investing and
trading in the stock markets. We will smooth the process of
listing private Saudi companies and state-owned enterprises,
including Aramco. This will require deepening liquidity in our
capital markets, fortifying the role of the debt market and
paving the way for the derivatives market.

43

LAUNCHING
OUR PROMISING
SECTORS

We will support promising sectors and foster their success
so that they become new pillars of our economy. In the
manufacturing sector, we will work towards localizing
renewable energy and industrial equipment sectors. In the
tourism and leisure sectors, we will create attractions that
are of the highest international standards, improve visa
issuance procedures for visitors, and prepare and develop
our historical and heritage sites. In technology, we will
increase our investments in, and lead, the digital economy.

In mining, we will furnish incentives for and benefit from
the exploration of the Kingdom’s mineral resources.
At the same time as diversifying our economy, we will
continue to localize the oil and gas sector. As well as
creating a new city dedicated to energy, we will double our
gas production, and construct a national gas distribution
network. We will also make use of our global leadership
and expertise in oil and petrochemicals to invest in the
development of adjacent and supporting sectors.

A THRIVING ECONOMY..
INVESTING FOR THE LONG-TERM

44

PRIVATIZING
OUR GOVERNMENT
SERVICES

Although we believe strongly in the important role of the private
sector, it currently contributes less than 40 percent of GDP. To
increase its long-term contribution to our economy, we will open
up new investment opportunities, facilitate investment, encourage
innovation and competition and remove all obstacles preventing
the private sector from playing a larger role in development.
We will continue to improve and reform our regulations, paving
the way for investors and the private sector to acquire and deliver

services – such as health care and education – that are currently
provided by the public sector. We will seek to shift the
government’s role from providing services to one that focuses on
regulating and monitoring them and we will build the capability
to monitor this transition.
We will seek to increase private sector contribution by encouraging
investments, both local and international, in healthcare, municipal
services, housing, finance, energy and so forth.

45

A THRIVING ECONOMY..
INVESTING FOR THE LONG-TERM

46

15

Increase the value of
assets run by the
Public investment
fund to More than 7
trillion Saudi Riyal

To increase the localization of oil and gas sectors from 40% to

75

%

To increase the Public Investment Fund’s assets,
from SAR

60

0 billion to over 7 trillion

To move from our current position as the 19th largest
economy in the world into the top 15

AMONG OUR
GOALS BY
2030
47

AMONG OUR
COMMITMENTS..

LOCALIZED
DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

The benefits of localizing our own defense industries are not
limited to solely reducing military spending. It also stimulates
other industrial sectors such as industrial equipment,
communications and information technology, which in turn
creates more job opportunities.
Although the Kingdom is the world’s third biggest military
spender, only 2 percent of this spending is within our Kingdom.
The national defense industrial sector is limited to only seven
companies and two research centers.
Our aim is to localize over 50 percent of military equipment
spending by 2030. We have already begun developing less
complex industries such as those providing spare parts, armored
vehicles and basic ammunition. We will expand this initiative to
higher value and more complex equipment such as military
aircraft. We will build an integrated national network of services
and supporting industries that will improve our self-sufficiency
and strengthen our defense exports, both regionally and
internationally.
Localization will be achieved through direct investments and
strategic partnerships with leading companies in this sector. These
moves will transfer knowledge and technology, and build national
expertise in the fields of manufacturing, maintenance, repair,
research and development. We will also train our employees and
establish more specialized and integrated industrial complexes.

48

A MINING SECTOR
CONTRIBUTING TO THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AT
FULL POTENTIAL

We have been blessed with rich mineral resources such
as aluminum, phosphate, gold, copper, uranium and
other raw materials. Although the mining sector has
already undergone improvements to cater to the needs
of our industries, its contribution to GDP has yet to meet
expectations. As such, we are determined to ensure it
reaches SAR 97 billion by 2020, creating 90,000 job
opportunities in the process.
We are planning a number of structural reforms, which
include stimulating private sector investments by
intensifying exploration, building a comprehensive
database of the Kingdom’s resources, reviewing the
licensing procedures for extraction, investing in
infrastructure, developing funding methods and
establishing centers of excellence.
We will also form strategic international partnerships and
raise the competitiveness and productivity of our
national companies. This will boost their contribution to
the sector’s growth, as well as to the localization of
knowledge and expertise.

A RENEWABLE
ENERGY MARKET

Even though we have an impressive natural potential for
solar and wind power, and our local energy consumption
will increase three fold by 2030, we still lack a competitive
renewable energy sector at present. To build up the
sector, we have set ourselves an initial target of
generating 9.5 gigawatts of renewable energy. We will
also seek to localize a significant portion of the renewable
energy value chain in the Saudi economy, including
research and development, and manufacturing, among
other stages.
From inputs such as silica and petrochemicals, to the
extensive expertise of our leading Saudi companies in
the production of different forms of energy, we have all
the raw ingredients for success. We will put this into
practice with the forthcoming launch of the King Salman
Renewable Energy Initiative. We will review the legal and
regulatory framework that allows the private sector to
buy and invest in the renewable energy sector. To localize
the industry and produce the necessary skill-sets, we will
also encourage public-private partnerships. Finally, we
will guarantee the competitiveness of renewable energy
through the gradual liberalization of the fuels market.

49

OPENING SAUDI ARABIA FURTHER
FOR BUSINESS WILL BOOST
PRODUCTIVITY AND SMOOTH OUR
JOURNEY TO BECOME ONE OF THE
LARGEST ECONOMIES IN THE
WORLD. WE WILL IMPROVE OUR

A THRIVING ECONOMY..
OPEN FOR BUSINESS

IMPROVING
THE BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENT

We will further pursue public-private partnerships, continue
to facilitate the flow of private investment and improve our
competitiveness. We will develop the necessary capabilities
to increase the quality and reliability of our services. We will
coordinate with legislative authorities to review current
regulations with the aim of improving the business
environment and enforcing contracts.
Where it exists in strategic locations, we will also capitalize on
the government’s reserves of real estate. We will allocate
prime areas within cities for educational institutions, retail
and entertainment centers, large areas along our coasts will
be dedicated to tourist projects and appropriate lands will be
allocated for industrial projects.
We will enable banks and other financial institutions to adapt
their financial products and services to the needs of each
sector, ranging from large project capital funding to short-
term working capital for small businesses. We will also
facilitate and expedite licensing procedures based on our
national economic priorities. We will apply international legal
and commercial regulations strictly and create a business
environment conducive to long-term investment.
We will strive to facilitate the movement of people and
goods, and to simplify customs procedures at our ports.
As a result, we will create an environment attractive to both
local and foreign investors, and earn their confidence in the
resilience and potential of our national economy.

REHABILITATING
ECONOMIC
CITIES

We are aware that the economic cities of the last
decade did not realize their potential. Work has halted
in several cities, and others face challenges that
threaten their viability.
We have worked in cooperation with Aramco to
restructure Jizan Economic City. We will strive to salvage
other economic cities, especially those with comparative
advantages. To achieve this, we will work with the
companies owning those cities to revamp them and
transfer vital facilities. This effort will depend on the
readiness of these companies to work with the
government. Our aim is for these cities to contribute in
the development of the economy and to attract quality
investments as well as local and international talent, all
kept in line with our national priorities.

50

ESTABLISHING
SPECIAL
ZONES

We will create special zones in exceptional and
competitive locations. We shall take into account the
comparative advantages of the Kingdom’s different
regions, assess their feasibility for promising sectors,
and then establish special zones, such as logistic,
tourist, industrial and financial ones. Special commercial
regulations to boost investment possibilities and
diversify government revenues will be applied to these
zones.

INCREASING THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF OUR
ENERGY SECTOR

We plan to raise the efficiency of the government’s support
system and make the best use of its benefits by redirecting it
and targeting eligible citizens and economic sectors. For
example, we understand that providing subsidies with no
clear eligibility criteria is a substantial obstacle to the energy
sector’s competitiveness. Free market prices shall, in the long
term, stimulate productivity and competitiveness among
utility companies and open the door to investment and
diversification of the energy mix in the Kingdom. We will also
seek to set clear subsidy criteria based on the maturity of
economic sectors, their ability to compete locally and
internationally and their actual need for subsidies, without
endangering promising and strategic sectors.

BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT,
RESTRUCTURE OUR ECONOMIC
CITIES, CREATE SPECIAL ZONES AND
DEREGULATE THE ENERGY MARKET
TO MAKE IT MORE COMPETITIVE

51

A THRIVING ECONOMY..
OPEN FOR BUSINESS

52

10

Having the contribution
of the private sector
reach from 40% to 60%
of the total local
production

To increase foreign direct investment from 3.8% to the
international level of 5.7% of GDP

To increase the private sector’s contribution from 40% to 65% of GDP

To rise from our current position of 25 to the top 10 countries on the
Global Competitiveness Index

AMONG OUR
GOALS BY
2030

53

AMONG OUR
COMMITMENTS..

54

A RESTRUCTURED KING
ABDULLAH FINANCIAL
DISTRICT

In the last decade, works started at the King Abdullah
Financial District, without consideration of its economic
feasibility. The objective was to prepare the land in
order to allow the business and financial communities
to invest and build real estate. When this objective was
not reached, the government decided back then to
develop and rent the real estate. Challenges were
deepened by the development of the real estate project
in one single phase, which caused a significant increase
in construction costs and several delays in delivery. This
resulted in large oversupply of commercial space for
the years to come. Without any dramatic shift in
direction, renting the three million square meters of
built-up areas at reasonable prices, or even achieving
decent occupancy ravtes, will be very challenging.
With this in mind, we have reviewed the economic
feasibility of and designed a new fundamental strategy
for the district in order to increase the chances of
profitability and success. We will seek to transform the
district into a special zone that has competitive
regulations and procedures, with visa exemptions, and
directly connected to the King Khaled International
Airport.

We will also seek to repurpose some of the built-up
areas and change the real estate mix, increasing the
allocation for residential accommodation, services and
hospitality areas. We will seek to build and create an
integrated and attractive living and working
environment. The district will be the headquarters of
the Public Investment Fund, the largest sovereign
wealth fund, which will contribute to creating an
environment attractive to financial, investment and
other corporations.

55

AMONG OUR COMMITMENTS..

56

A FLOURISHING
RETAIL SECTOR

Over the past decade, the retail sector achieved an
annual growth rate in excess of 10 percent. It currently
employs 1.5 million workers, of which only 0.3 million
are Saudis. Traditional retail also still dominates 50
percent of the market in the Kingdom compared to 20
percent in a number of countries in the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), with our retail market suffering from
limited penetration of modern trade and e-commerce.
We aim to provide job opportunities for an additional
million Saudis by 2020 in a growing retail sector that
attracts modern, local, regional, and international
brands across all regions of the country. We also aim to
increase the contribution of modern trade and
e-commerce to 80 percent of the retail sector by 2020.
This will be achieved by attracting both regional and
international retail investors and by easing restrictions
on ownership and foreign investment.
To this end, we will facilitate local and regional flow of
goods and develop necessary sectoral regulations. We
will also increase financing of small retail enterprises to
stimulate their growth and development.

A DEVELOPED DIGITAL
INFRASTRUCTURE

A sophisticated digital infrastructure is integral to
today’s advanced industrial activities. It attracts
investors and enhances the fundamental
competitiveness of the Saudi economy.
We will partner with the private sector to develop the
telecommunications and information technology
infrastructure, especially high-speed broadband,
expanding its coverage and capacity within and around
cities and improving its quality. Our specific goal is to
exceed 90 percent housing coverage in densely
populated cities and 66 percent in other urban zones.
We will also develop building standards to facilitate the
extension of broadband networks.
We will strengthen the governance of digital
transformation through a national council. Additionally,
we will improve our regulations and establish an
effective partnership with telecom operators to better
develop this critical infrastructure. We will also support
local investments in the telecommunications and
information technology sectors.

57

SAUDI ARABIA IS RIGHT AT THE
CROSSROADS OF IMPORTANT
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ROUTES,
BETWEEN THREE CONTINENTS: ASIA,
EUROPE AND AFRICA. WE WILL
THEREFORE MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS
FROM OUR EXCEPTIONAL AND
STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHIC POSITION,
AGREE NEW STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIPS TO GROW OUR

A THRIVING ECONOMY..
LEVERAGING ITS UNIQUE POSITION

BUILDING A UNIQUE
REGIONAL
LOGISTICAL HUB

We have already invested heavily in the construction of
ports, railways, roads and airports. To take full advantage
of these investments, we plan to work with the private
sector and enter into a new series of international
partnerships to complete, improve and link our
infrastructure internally and across borders. We will also
unlock our “hard” infrastructure with systems that can
drive higher performance, including more rigorous
governance, leaner processes and a more efficient
customs system. We will improve and implement
existing laws and regulations. Air, maritime, and other
transport operators will be encouraged to make the
most of their capacity: achieving durable links between
existing trade hubs, as well as opening new trade
routes. This will reinforce our position as a distinctive
logistical gateway to the three continents.

INTEGRATING
REGIONALLY AND
INTERNATIONALLY

With a GDP of SAR 2.4 trillion, our economy is
already the largest in the Middle East. We enjoy
close economic ties with the Gulf Cooperation
Council and other Arab countries, as well as
constructive relations with Islamic and foreign
countries. We will seek to establish new business
partnerships and facilitate a smoother flow of
goods, people and capital.
Among our top priorities is to fortify and extend our
interconnectivity and economic integration with
other Gulf Cooperation Council countries. We will
strive to complete the process of implementing the
GCC common market, unifying customs, economic
and legal policies, and constructing shared road and
railway networks.
We will seek to effectively link with other countries
in the region, through enhanced logistics services

58

and new cross-border infrastructure projects,
including land transport projects with Africa
through Egypt. Logistical and trade exchanges will
be streamlined, further cementing our pre-eminent
position as a major trade hub.

ECONOMY AND HELP SAUDI
COMPANIES TO INCREASE EXPORTS
OF THEIR PRODUCTS. WE WILL
LEVERAGE THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF
ENERGY SOURCES AND OUR
DISTINCTIVE LOGISTICAL OFFER TO
STIMULATE A NEW PHASE OF
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TO
CATALYZE EXPORTS AND RE-EXPORTS

SUPPORTING
OUR NATIONAL
COMPANIES

Rather than competing generically across the board,
we will concentrate on our comparative advantages,
national strengths and the areas that will assure
leadership status. Initially, our priority will be to fully
support major national companies, which have already
gained a leading market share, by promoting their
products and services regionally and globally, especially
in the fields of oil, petrochemicals, banking,
telecommunications, food, health care, and retail. We
will also seek to support Saudi companies with
promising growth opportunities so they develop into
new regional and global leaders. Finally, we will fully
support our national industries, assisting them to
market themselves abroad and to export their products.

59

A THRIVING ECONOMY..
LEVERAGING ITS UNIQUE POSITION
60

25

To raise the share of non-oil exports in non-oil GDP from 16% to 50%

To raise our global ranking in the Logistics Performance Index
from 49 to 25 and ensure the Kingdom is a regional leader

AMONG OUR
GOALS BY
2030

61

AN AMBITIOUS
NATION

3
62

63

64

AN AMBITIOUS NATION..
EFFECTIVELY GOVERNED

THE ROLES AND REQUIREMENTS OF
GOVERNMENT HAVE GROWN
SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE KINGDOM
OF SAUDI ARABIA’S FOUNDING.
GOVERNMENT – ANY GOVERNMENT –
NEEDS TO EVOLVE AND IMPROVE
CONTINUOUSLY, IF ONLY TO KEEP
PACE WITH RISING EXPECTATIONS
AND NEW CHALLENGES. THIS
REQUIRES US TO MEET HIGH

STANDARDS OF TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY. WE ARE
COMMITTED TO MANAGING OUR
FINANCES EFFICIENTLY AND
EFFECTIVELY, AND TO CREATING
AGILE PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS AND
TO TRACKING BOTH THEIR OWN
PERFORMANCE AND THAT OF THE
GOVERNMENT OVERALL

65

EMBRACING
TRANSPARENCY

PROTECTING
OUR VITAL RESOURCES

We will continue to build safe and sufficient
strategic food reserves, to better guard against
emergencies. Aquaculture will be promoted, as
will strategic partnerships with countries
blessed with natural resources such as fertile
soil and water reserves. In Saudi Arabia, the use of
water in agriculture will be prioritized for those
areas with natural and renewable water sources. We
will also continue to collaborate with consumers, food
manufacturers and distributors to reduce any
resource wastage.

WITH AGILI

AN AMBITIOUS NATION..
EFFECTIVELY GOVERNED
66

20To raise our ranking in the Government Effectiveness Index, from 80 to 20

To increase non-oil government revenue
from SAR 163 billion to SAR 1 Trillion

To raise our ranking on the E-Government Survey Index from our current
position of 36 to be among the top five nations

AMONG OUR
GOALS BY
2030

67

AMONG OUR
COMMITMENTS..

68

KING SALMAN PROGRAM
FOR HUMAN CAPITAL
DEVELOPMENT

We have yet to identify and put into effect the best
practices that would ensure that public sector
employees have the right skills for the future. However,
by 2020, we aim to have trained, through distance
learning, 500,000 government employees. All ministries
and government institutions will be required to adopt
best practices in human capital development. We will
continue to hire individuals according to merit and
work towards building a broad talent base, so they may
become leaders of the future.
The King Salman Program for Human Capital
Development will establish HR centers of excellence in
every government agency, and provide training. We
will work to raise the productivity of employees to the
highest levels possible, by implementing proper
performance management standards, providing
continuous training for professional development, and
sharing knowledge. We will develop targeted policies
to identify and empower future leaders, and will furnish
a stimulating environment that provides equal
opportunities and rewards for excellence.

SHARED SERVICES TO
OUR GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES

We are working towards shared services across our
government agencies. This will contribute to achieving
our goal of increasing productivity and raising the
efficiency of government spending. Shared services in
our government will also aim to increase quality, cut
costs, unify our efforts, and provide a suitable work
environment for all parties at the lowest cost.
Shared services can be applied globally and locally in
many sectors. This is our long-term goal, and we will
implement it gradually. As a first step therefore, we will
examine the status of support services in government
sectors, set the scope of work and develop
comprehensive priorities and implementation plans.
We will follow best practices in employing shared
services, with a robust set of performance indicators
that will measure quality, workflow improvement, cost
reduction and knowledge transfer.

69

AMONG OUR COMMITMENTS..
70

“QAWAM”:
INCREASING SPENDING
EFFICIENCY

We are committed to making our public spending
radically more efficient, using our resources more
effectively, and limiting waste. We will launch the
“Qawam” program as a reflection of the Qur’anic verse
that calls for moderation in spending between excess
and parsimony. Allah the Almighty says: “And those who,
when they spend, are neither extravagant nor niggardly,
but hold a medium (way) between those (extremes)”
Through this program, we will comprehensively review
financial regulations in all government agencies. The
program is intended to move away from a narrow reliance
on process auditing, and move towards a more integrated
approach with effective and efficient spending controls,
and specific and measurable goals, while sustaining
resources and assets. We will raise awareness and reward
a culture of efficient spending throughout all
administrative levels. Specialized training for employees
and other key stakeholders will be provided as required,
boosting the performance of finance departments and
internal auditing.

EFFECTIVE
E-GOVERNMENT

We have made remarkable progress in e-government.
The scope of online services has already been expanded
over the last decade to include employment programs,
online job searches, e-learning services, traffic,
passports and civil affairs, online payment services,
online issuance of commercial registers, among others.
This has improved Saudi Arabia’s ranking on several
global indicators. In the UN e-Government Index, for
instance, we ranked 36 in 2014, up from 90 in 2004.
We will expand the scope of current online services
further to include areas such as geographic information,
health care and education. Quality will be improved by
streamlining processes, and diversifying communication
channels. We will also support the wider use of online
applications in government agencies, such as cloud
applications, data sharing platforms and HR
management systems. Finally, we will strengthen the
governance of online services within the government
itself.

71

THE NATION WE ASPIRE TO BUILD WILL
NOT BE REALIZED WITHOUT A GRAND,
COLLECTIVE NATIONAL EFFORT WHERE
EVERYONE CONTRIBUTES. WE ALL HAVE
ROLES TO FULFILL, WHETHER WE ARE
WORKING IN THE PUBLIC, PRIVATE OR

AN AMBITIOUS NATION..
RESPONSIBLY ENABLED

BEING RESPONSIBLE
FOR OUR LIVES

We have already faced and overcome many
challenges and accomplished much, by the grace of
Allah and our brotherhood. We have contributed to
building our country. We have been, and still are, a
great example in assuming responsibility. Today, as
we face fresh challenges, new roles and
responsibilities are required. We should feel great
confidence in our capabilities, in our understanding
of our obligations and in our ability to achieve
excellence for our nation, our society, our families
and ourselves.
We are each personally responsible for our own
futures. As such, we will develop ourselves and will
work to become independent and active members
of society, developing new skills in the process. We
will remember our lifelong obligations to our
families. In the workplace, we will be committed
and disciplined, acquire new experience and pursue
our ambitions.
We will create the right environment to enable us to
fulfill these responsibilities. We will promote greater
financial independence by providing planning tools
such as mortgages, savings portfolios, and
retirement options. We will set up a regulatory
framework that empowers the non-profit sector.

This will all be achieved by adhering closely to
Islamic principles, Arab values and our national
traditions. As we build our own long-term future, we
will remember our duty to respect these principles,
which include supporting the vulnerable and needy,
helping our neighbors, being hospitable to guests,
respecting visitors, being courteous to expatriates,
and being conscientious of human rights.

72

NON-PROFIT SECTORS. WE WILL
THEREFORE WORK CONTINUALLY TO
ACHIEVE OUR HOPES AND FULFIL OUR
ASPIRATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO
OUR COUNTRY, OUR SOCIETY, OUR
FAMILIES, AND TO OURSELVES

BEING RESPONSIBLE
IN BUSINESS

We aspire to have businesses that contribute to
developing our society and our country, not be
geared solely towards generating profits. We expect
our companies to observe their social responsibilities
and contribute to creating a sustainable economy,
including by creating the stimulating opportunities
for young men and women that can help them build
their professional careers. We will encourage the
businesses that follow through on this commitment
to participate in our country and to address national
challenges.

BEING RESPONSIBLE
TO SOCIETY

The values of giving, compassion, cooperation and
empathy are firmly entrenched in our society. We have
already played an influential role in providing social aid
locally, regionally and globally. In the future, we will
formalize and strengthen the organization of our social
and compassionate work so that our efforts have the
maximum results and impact.
Today, we have fewer than 1,000 non-profit foundations
and associations. In order to increase the resilience and
impact of this sector, we will continue to develop
regulations necessary to empower non-profit
organizations. We will review our regulations to
encourage endowments to sustainably fund the sector
and to encourage corporations and high net worth
families to establish non-profit organizations.
Government support will be directed to the programs
with highest social impact and we will support training
workers to encourage volunteering and careers in the
non-profit sector. Enabling non-profit organizations to
attract the best talents in order to ensure best
management practices and the transfer of knowledge,
which will strengthen these institutions over the long-
term. This will ensure that the non-profit sector plays an
enhanced and more efficient role in critical sectors such
as health care, education, housing, research, and
cultural and social programs.

73

AN AMBITIOUS NATION..
RESPONSIBLY ENABLED
74

Access household savings
From 6% to 10% of
disposable income of
households

To raise the non-profit sector’s contribution to GDP from less
than 1% to 5%

To increase household savings from 6% to 10% of total household income

To rally one million volunteers per year (compared to 11,000 now)

AMONG OUR
GOALS BY
2030
75

AMONG OUR
COMMITMENTS..

76

A MORE IMPACTFUL NON-
PROFIT SECTOR

Today, we have fewer than 1,000 non-profit and
charitable foundations and associations. They
contribute just 0.3 percent of our GDP, much less than
the global average of 6 percent. Currently, just 7 percent
of projects are focused on generating social impact or
are aligned with the long-term national priorities. By
2020, more than one third of our non-profit
organizations’ projects should have measurable and
deep social impact.
The recently published regulations on non-profit
organizations and on the General Authority for
Endowments will help the non-profit sector become
more institutionalized, formalized and more efficient.
We will accelerate this shift further by supporting
projects and programs with high social impact and by
facilitating the establishment of non-profit organizations
by high net worth families, which will promote rapid
growth of the non-profit sector. We will support this
growth by creating a supportive and cooperate
environment in which the sector’s institutions and
government agencies can collaborate.

At the same time, we will encourage the non-profit
sector to apply proper governance standards, facilitate
high quality training to staff and promote a culture of
volunteering and full-time careers in the sector.

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HOW TO ACHIEVE
OUR VISION?

78

WE HAVE OUTLINED A
COMPREHENSIVE AND AMBITIOUS
VISION FOR SAUDI ARABIA UNTIL THE
YEAR 2030. IT IS THE FIRST STEP ON
OUR JOURNEY TOWARDS A BETTER,
BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR OUR
COUNTRY AND OUR CITIZENS. TO
ACHIEVE OUR ASPIRATIONS AND
HOPES, WE HAVE ALREADY
LAUNCHED MANY TRANSFORMATIVE
PROGRAMS THAT HAVE PAVED THE
WAY FOR THE VISION AND WILL HELP
US ACHIEVE OUR GOALS.
THESE INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT
LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:

THE GOVERNMENT
RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM

Around the world, governments are organizing
themselves with agility, continuously restructuring and
aligning their systems to national priorities. We have
already started moving along this path by eliminating
supreme councils and establishing the Council of
Political and Security Affairs and the Council of
Economic and Development Affairs. These reforms have
helped to speed strategy development and decision-
making, as well as enhance performance. We will
continue this careful restructuring, comprehensively
and gradually, based on our clear priorities.

THE STRATEGIC
DIRECTIONS PROGRAM

We have approved the strategic directions determined
by our government agencies. Existing roles have been
reviewed to align with our future economic and social
needs. Decisions are based on detailed studies and
benchmarks, as well as comprehensive analysis of each
agency’s programs, plans and relevant performance
indicators.

79

80

THE FISCAL
BALANCE PROGRAM

After the Council of Economic and Development Affairs
was established, we began examining our existing
capital expenditures, their approval mechanism and
their measureable economic impact. We have formed
committees and introduced new departments tasked
with reviewing relevant regulations and taking the
necessary action on the expenditures. As a consequence,
last year, we increased our non-oil revenues by 30
percent, and we plan to continue diversifying our non-
oil revenues in the coming years, by introducing new
measures.

THE PROJECT
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

The Kingdom’s agencies are currently undergoing a
wave of reforms and transformation. To manage this
momentum and ensure all efforts are coordinated, we
adopted an effective approach to project management
and established expert project management offices
(PMOs) in the Council of Economic and Development
Affairs and many other government agencies. We also
set up a central Delivery Unit.

THE REGULATIONS
REVIEW PROGRAM

Over the past year, we reviewed many current laws and
enacted new laws that have been years overdue. These
include the company law, the non-governmental
organizations’ law, the law concerning fees on non-
used lands, the General Authority for Endowments
(Awqaf ) law, among others. We will continue to review
all laws to ensure they are in line with the Kingdom’s
priorities.

THE PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT PROGRAM

We adopted the principle of performance measurement,
and made sure it is properly used in our evaluation of
all government agencies, their programs, initiatives and
executives. We established the Center for Performance
Management of Government Agencies to institutionalize
these efforts for the long-term and built performance
dashboards to promote accountability and
transparency.

81

THE PUBLIC INVESTMENT
FUND RESTRUCTURING
PROGRAM

Having worked on restructuring the fund, we are now
refining its investment capabilities and enabling the
fund to manage a broader portfolio of current and new
assets. We aim to transform it into the largest sovereign
wealth fund in the world and will announce a
comprehensive plan to achieve this goal.

THE HUMAN
CAPITAL PROGRAM

Because human capital is a crucial factor in the success
of any substantial project, we aim to launch a thorough
program for nurturing our human talent. This program
will measure, assess and analyze the efficiency of our
civil service. It will also support our government
agencies with staff, studies, consultations, and strategic
partnerships related to human capital.

TO ENSURE THE
REALIZATION OF
SAUDI ARABIA’S
VISION FOR 2030,
WE ARE
PREPARING TO
LAUNCH A GROUP
OF EXECUTIVE
PROGRAMS THAT
WILL HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT
IMPACT ON
IMPLEMENTATION.
THESE INCLUDE،
BUT ARE NOT
LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING:

THE SAUDI ARAMCO
STRATEGIC
TRANSFORMATION
PROGRAM

We believe that Saudi Aramco has the ability to lead
the world in other sectors besides oil, and it has
worked on a sweeping transformative program that
will position it as a leader in more than one sector.

82

THE STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIPS PROGRAM

We are working with our economic partners around the
world to build new strategic partnerships for the
twenty-first century, in harmony with our national
Vision, so that we can be a trade hub connecting three
continents and enhance our exports.

THE PRIVATIZATION
PROGRAM

We are in the process of determining additional sectors
suitable for privatization. Our goal is to create a
comprehensive privatization program. We will make
use of international best practices, transfer knowledge
and achieve our goals in a balanced and scientific
manner.

THE NATIONAL
TRANSFORMATION
PROGRAM

In a new approach, our government agencies have
been working through numerous workshops to
examine their role in implementing the initiatives
necessary for delivering on national priorities. We are
identifying opportunities for partnering with the
private sector, as well as innovative administrative and
funding approaches. We are detailing specific initiatives
that have clear performance indicators..

THE PROGRAM FOR
STRENGTHENING
PUBLIC SECTOR
GOVERNANCE

We will work on restructuring our government agencies
continuously and with flexibility. We will eliminate
redundant roles, unify efforts, streamline procedures
and define responsibilities. We shall also enable our
agencies to deliver on their mandate, to be accountable,
to ensure business continuity and to show adaptability
in the face of new challenges. Under the Council of
Economic and Development Affairs, we will establish a
strategic management office to focus on coordinating
all government programs and ensuring their careful
alignment with the national Vision. The office will also
prevent gaps, duplication or contradiction between
agencies’ policies and programs, and ensure that all
components of the Vision are detailed in proper sectoral
strategies. We will also establish a Decision Support
Center at the Royal Court to support decision-making
through analytical and evidence-based information
and reports.

83

OUR COMMITMENT TO
ACHIEVING THE GOALS
OF THESE PIVOTAL
PROGRAMS AND OUR
COLLECTIVE
CONTRIBUTION SHALL BE
THE FIRST STEP
TOWARDS ACHIEVING
SAUDI ARABIA’S VISION
FOR 2030. WE WILL
CONTINUE TO LAUNCH
NEW PROGRAMS IN THE
UPCOMING YEARS AS
REQUIRED, AND WE WILL
CONTINUOUSLY REVIEW
AND ASSESS OUR
PERFORMANCE IN
ACHIEVING THIS VISION

MAY ALLAH BLESS US
AND GUIDE US TO THE
RIGHT PATH.

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www.vision2030.gov.sa