See attached files

RUBRIC FOR THE EVALUATION OF WRITTEN ASSIGNMENTS

CRITERIA

NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

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EXCEPTIONAL

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CONTENT
(50%)

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FEWER THAN 20 POINTS

The writer demonstrates limited understanding of the subject matter in that theories are not well connected to a practical experience or appropriate examples, though the attempt to research the topic is evident, and materials are correctly referenced.

20 to 40 POINTS

The writer demonstrates an understanding of the subject matter by clearly stating the objective of the paper and links theories to practical experience. The paper includes relevant material that is correctly referenced, and this material fulfills the objective of the paper.

41 to 50 POINTS

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FEWER THAN 8 POINTS

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8 to 16 POINTS

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©2006 University of Phoenix. All rights reserved.

Week 2 – Criminal Justice Program Proposal, Part II

Assignment Content

Resource: “Seven Stage Model for Planned Change” located in the introduction and appendix of Criminal Justice Policy & Planning.

Research possible programmatic solutions by benchmarking best practices. Your program goals and objectives must be based on industry best practices.

Write a 1,050- to 1,400-word proposal for a program that solves the problem identified in the case study you selected in Week One. Address the following:

Identify two or three goals of your program.

Describe outcome objectives for each goal.

Determine the resources needed to implement the program.

Identify how you plan to elicit stakeholder participation.

Include terminology and concepts identified through the assigned readings.

Format your proposal consistent with APA guidelines.

WAYNE N. WELSH | PHILIP W. HARRIS
Temple University Temple University
WAYNE N. WELSH | PHILIP W. HARRIS
Temple University Temple University
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLICY &
PLANNING
3RD EDITION

Criminal Justice Policy and Planning, Third Edition
Copyright © 1999, 2004, 2008
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group
Newark, NJ
ISBN-10: 1-59345-508-9
ISBN-13: 978-1-59345-508-8
Phone 877-374-2919
Web Site www.lexisnexis.com/anderson/criminaljustice
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical
means including information storage and retrieval systems without permission in writing from the publisher.
LexisNexis and the Knowledge Burst logo are trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties, Inc.
Anderson Publishing is a registered trademark of Anderson Publishing, a member of the LexisNexis Group
Welsh, Wayne N., 1957-
Criminal justice policy and planning / Wayne N. Welsh, Philip W. Harris. — 3rd ed.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN-13: 978-1-59345-508-8 (softbound)
ISBN-10: 1-59345-508-9 (softbound)
1. Criminal justice, Administration of. 2. Criminal justice, Administration of–United States.
3. Criminal justice, Administration of–Planning. I. Harris, Philip W. II. Title.
HV7419.W45 2008
364.973–dc22 2008031227
Cover design by Tin Box Studio, Inc. EDITOR Ellen S. Boyne
ACQUISITIONS EDITOR Michael C. Braswell

http://www.lexisnexis.com/anderson/criminaljustice

Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to their families for all their love and
patience, especially during those times when we sequestered ourselves
to do the research and writing for this book. Thank you, Dea, Ilana,
and Ellen.
We appreciate the thoughtful guidance provided by Michael Bras-
well, Acquisitions Editor for LexisNexis Anderson Publishing, and the
helpful comments of Victor Kappeler at Eastern Kentucky University
during the developmental stages of the first edition. Comments by Pro-
fessor Frank Cullen at the University of Cincinnati on an earlier version
were most valuable in shaping this work and bringing it to fruition. We
thank our colleagues, Matt Hiller and Tara Tripp, for their helpful sug-
gestions and comments on the first two editions. We also thank Ellen
Boyne at LexisNexis Anderson Publishing for her careful and thoughtful
editing on all three editions. Of course, any errors or omissions are the
responsibility of the authors alone.
We express great appreciation to the many students who have served
as “clients” for this book in our university classes, and who gave us
extremely helpful comments and feedback each step along the way.
Last but not least, we thank the many fine men and women in crimi-
nal justice agencies, community programs, the private sector, and local,
state, and federal government whom we have had the good fortune to
work with and learn from in our criminal justice research.
iii

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Contents
Acknowledgments iii
Preface vii
Chapter 1
Introduction 1
Chapter 2
Analyzing the Problem 37
Chapter 3
Setting Goals and Objectives 93
Chapter 4
Designing the Program or Policy 125
Chapter 5
Action Planning 153
Chapter 6
Program/Policy Implementation and Monitoring 177
Chapter 7
Evaluating Outcomes 219
Chapter 8
Reassessment and Review 253
Appendix: A Seven-Stage Checklist
for Program and Policy Planning 273
About the Authors 279
Index 283
v

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Preface
The purpose of this book, broadly speaking, is to acquaint students,
practitioners, and policymakers with scientific techniques for analyzing
criminal justice problems and developing solutions. We offer guidelines
for developing new programs and policies, but we also analyze exist-
ing criminal justice interventions, asking to what degree such efforts
were guided by logic and planning, rather than partisan politics and
untested hunches.
Change, some of which is planned, touches every aspect of our
lives. In criminal justice, new interventions aimed at reducing crime
constantly seem to spring up. Some notable interventions of recent
years have included mandatory sentencing, “three strikes and you’re
out” laws (aimed at incapacitating repeat felony offenders), the Brady
Act (requiring waiting periods and background checks for prospec-
tive firearm purchasers), drug courts, boot camps, “Weed and Seed,”
prisoner reentry initiatives, and others. But to what degree are such
interventions guided by a rational planning approach? What problems
do they attempt to address, and what causal theory about crime do they
assume? What difficulties could have been anticipated (e.g., a shortage
of prison space; criticisms that programs or policies are inconsistent,
unfair, or even unconstitutional)?
Our point is this: what we call “planned change” encompasses a
multitude of criminal justice policies, programs, and projects that are
developed, implemented, revised, torn down, and recreated every year.
We are interested in how such policies, programs, and projects are cur-
rently developed, and in how they should be developed. Poor planning
and faulty problem analysis, we argue, are the primary reasons that so
many criminal justice interventions fail to live up to their promises.
Consider the example of three-strikes laws. Evidence suggests that
the laws are unfair, expensive, and ineffective. As Walter Dickey1
argued, “When the law’s hidden costs and unintended consequences
are assessed, its simple goal is obscured by effects that are alarming in
their scope” (p. 62). We illustrate some of the pitfalls of poor planning
in Case Study 1.1, using the seven-stage framework that guides our
work (see Chapter 1).
vii

Where the costs of unsuccessful intervention are high, in terms
of human suffering as well as finances, we can and must do better in
devising solutions to criminal justice problems. One should be skeptical,
even critical, but not cynical. In spite of the pitfalls of poor planning,
it is possible to address and reduce even the most pressing problems in
criminal justice. We invite students, practitioners, politicians, academ-
ics, and planners to subject their own assumptions, decisions, and plans
to scrutiny.
In this newly revised edition, we discuss several successful (and
unsuccessful) programs and policies. We include case studies and
examples that examine recently identified problems (e.g., club drugs,
terrorism) and innovations (e.g., restorative justice, performance-based
standards for juvenile justice, prisoner reentry, the USA PATRIOT Act,
specialized problem-solving courts, policing illegal gun markets). We
have also updated research findings relevant to numerous other pro-
grams and policies (e.g., the Brady Act, three-strikes laws). Highlights
of changes to the third edition include the following:
• We have updated statistics (e.g., drug abuse, prisoner reentry,
denials of firearm permits under the Brady Act) and examples
(e.g., the USA PATRIOT Act; Disproportionate Minority Confine-
ment) throughout to reflect the most recent changes and research
in the field.
• We have updated examples and added more recent references
throughout. For example, we have focused on specialized problem-
solving courts, and we’ve included discussions of cost-effectiveness
analyses and evidence-based practices.
• We have clarified concepts and definitions throughout, and we’ve
shortened several of the examples to be more concise.
• The analysis of three-strikes laws was updated and moved from
the Preface to Chapter 1 (see Case Study 1.1: The Pitfalls of Poor
Planning: Three-Strikes Legislation).
• We have made a clearer distinction between the use of the seven-
stage model for: (a) developing new interventions, and (b) ana-
lyzing existing interventions. Two tables in Chapter 1 summarize
major steps of the seven-stage model separately for each of these
two purposes. This distinction is maintained throughout the book,
noting differences between the two uses where appropriate.
• We have added more recent material on systems analysis, and
added an example on force field analysis in Chapter 2.
• We’ve revised, updated, and shortened the case studies in Chapter
2 (Case Study 2.2: Club Drugs; Case Study 2.3: Incorporating
Restorative and Community Justice into American Sentencing and
Corrections).
viii CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING

• We’ve added two new case studies (Case Study 4.1: The Philadel-
phia Drug Treatment Court; Case Study 7.1: Impact and Cost-
benefit Analysis of the Maryland Reentry Partnership Initiative).
• We’ve added a new section on fiscal monitoring in Chapter 6, and
we’ve added examples of monitoring requirements from federal
funding sources.
• We’ve added new sections on evidence-based programs, logic
modeling, and propensity score analysis in Chapter 7.
As authors, the challenge we face is to present and communicate
the methods of analyzing problems and interventions in a clear, concise
manner. We have found no existing book adequate to the task. Some
are simply far too jargonistic or technical; others are idiosyncratic,
abstract, or unfocused. And to make life even more difficult for us, no
existing book presents these methods using criminal justice problems
and interventions. This book attempts to meet these challenges. No
doubt, even in its third edition, it is still less than perfect, and we wel-
come all comments and suggestions for improvements. Could advocates
of planned change do any less?
Endnote
1 Dickey, Walter J. (1997). “The Impact of ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’ Laws:
What Have We Learned?” Corrections Management Quarterly, 1, 55-64.
PREFACE ix

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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1
C H A P T E R O U T L I N E
Examples of criminal justice interventions include gun control
and regulation (e.g., the Brady Act), “three strikes and you’re out”
laws, juvenile waiver laws, and specialized problem-solving courts
(community courts, drug courts, and domestic violence courts).
Planned change versus unplanned change. Any project, program,
or policy, new or revised, is intended to produce a change in some
specific problem. It is limited in scope, it is aimed at improving
quality of life for its clients, it includes a role for consumers, and
a “change agent” guides it.
There are three approaches to planned change. They include policy,
program, and project.
The need for planned change has been sharpened by three trends.
They are: declining resources, accountability, and expansion of
knowledge and technology.
The perils of planned change. Any change to existing procedures
and conditions is likely to be resisted. Two broad approaches to
change should be carefully considered: collaborative strategies
versus conflict strategies.
A seven-stage model for planned change specifies the sequence
of steps required for analyzing a problem, determining its causes,
and planning and carrying out some intervention. The seven
stages consist of (1) analyzing the problem, (2) setting goals and
objectives, (3) designing the program or policy, (4) developing an
action plan, (5) developing a plan for monitoring program/policy
implementation, (6) developing a plan for evaluating outcomes,
and (7)reassessment and review.

2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
There are many different types of “programs,” “policies,” and
“projects” in criminal justice: different interventions within govern-
ment (federal, state, and local), community, and private agencies. In
fact, one could argue that these many interventions comprise a major-
ity of what “criminal justice” really is all about: a series of constant
innovations and experiments attempting to discover “what works” to
meet the goals of criminal justice (e.g., to reduce criminal behavior, to
protect public safety). These numerous innovations attempt to change
individuals, groups, organizations, communities, and even societal and
cultural norms in some cases, to improve the achievement of criminal
justice goals. Criminal justice, then, is much more than just the daily
business of police, courts, and corrections that forms the grist for many
university courses and professional training in criminal justice. Here are
just a few examples of criminal justice interventions.
The problem is that many criminal justice interventions fall short of
their goals because of poor planning, poor implementation, and poor
evaluation. It is fair to say that we have not yet discovered “what works”
Figure 1.1
Examples of Criminal Justice Interventions
• Prisoner reentry initiatives and programs, including prison-based drug
treatment and community aftercare, vocational and basic education, post-
release employment assistance, and reintegration assistance.
• Specialized problem-solving courts (community courts that seek to improve
the quality of life in high-crime neighborhoods, drug courts that combine
criminal sanctions with treatment for addicted offenders, and domestic vio-
lence courts that emphasize victim safety and defendant accountability).
• Operation “Weed and Seed” (a federal initiative that “weeds” illegal drug
sales out of communities through intensive law enforcement and prosecu-
tion efforts, then “seeds” the communities with protective, economic, and
social resources).
• Mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence offenders.
• “Three strikes and you’re out” laws that aim to put away repeat offenders
for long periods of time.
• Juvenile waiver laws (serious juvenile offenses may be transferred to adult
courts, or automatically tried as adult offenses).
• Megan’s Law (federal law mandating that every state develop a procedure
for notifying residents of the location of convicted sex offenders residing
in their communities). Convicted sex offenders are required to notify
authorities of their current address at all times, and states are required to
make this information available to the public.

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 3
to reduce crime. What we truly need, though, is not more programs, or
new programs, per se; we need better programs. We need a better under-
standing of planned change, and the methods and processes through
which policies and programs are developed, implemented, evaluated
and managed, in order to improve the effectiveness of such interven-
tions. Such change is ubiquitous in governmental, community, private,
and nonprofit agencies. This book provides a systematic framework for
analyzing and improving existing interventions, but also for planning
new ones so as to maximize chances of success.
Planned Change versus Unplanned Change
Planned change involves
planning. Planning means that
some person or group of per-
sons has explicitly thought
about a problem and developed
a specific solution. However,
solutions (interventions) vary
considerably in the degree to which thorough, explicit, or deliberate
planning has been undertaken.
As the examples and case studies in this book will illustrate, inter-
ventions are often poorly planned or even unplanned. Unplanned
change means that little explicit or proactive planning has been under-
taken at all. Instead, unplanned change often comes about as a reac-
tion to a crisis, a dramatic incident publicized by the media, a political
opportunity, a lawsuit against criminal justice officials, or an untested
set of assumptions about a specific problem. Unplanned change, even
if it is motivated by sincere intentions, is more likely to be ineffective
and wasteful of valuable public resources.
Planned change improves the likelihood of successful intervention,
but it cannot guarantee it. Even when planned change is successful, it
may not be permanent. Planned change is dynamic, like the problems
it seeks to address. People who play critical leadership roles come and
go over time, initial shock about a problem and enthusiasm about an
intervention abates, the political environment changes, other problems
demand greater attention, and the impact of the intervention may be
unknown. Good planning, however, increases the odds of success by
explicitly considering such factors.
In general, planned change differs from unplanned change in at
least three ways:1
1. Planned change is limited in scope, and specific. It is confined to
specific goals and achievable objectives; it seeks to develop clear,
precise definitions of problems before developing solutions.
Planned Change
Any project, program, or policy, new or revised, intended
to produce a change in some specific problem. The
intended change may occur within individuals, groups,
organizations, systems of organizations, communities,
cities, regions, states, or, much more rarely, within entire
cultures or societies.

4 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
2. It includes a role for consumers. Programs and policies must
consider the unique perspectives and needs of the people affected
by the intervention. In addition to the “targets” of the interven-
tion (ex-offenders in a halfway house, for example), “consumers”
include those within a specific area likely to be affected by an inter-
vention. Neighbors, local schools, and crime victims are examples
of consumers who may be affected by a halfway house program.
Cooperative planning of the intervention is an important part of
program planning, monitoring, and evaluation.
3. A “change agent” guides planned change. Some individual must
be responsible for coordinating the planning and development of a
new program, or the revision of an old one. Such an individual will
guide the analysis of the problem to be solved, search for causes
of the problem, review similar interventions in use elsewhere,
and facilitate the collaboration of clients, staff, and consumers
Figure 1.2
The Birth of a Program or Policy: Examples
1. A nonprofit organization working with juveniles in poor neighborhoods
applies for state funding after reading a solicitation for proposals to
develop after-school delinquency prevention programs.
2. Following several tragic school shootings during the 1990s, hundreds of
school districts across the United States announced that they were revising
their disciplinary policies and installing tougher security measures.
3. A parolee shoots and kills a police officer after a routine traffic stop. Inten-
sive scrutiny and revision of state parole policies immediately follows.
4. A local police agency adopts a crime-mapping approach to detect crime
“hot spots” and reallocates police resources to address specific problems
in specific neighborhoods.
5. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Federal Government passed
the USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act , P.L. 107-56,
on October 26, 2001, granting federal officials widespread investigative
powers into suspected terrorist activities. Provisions included expanded
electronic surveillance capabilities, nationwide search warrants issued in
one jurisdiction but valid in any jurisdiction where evidence may be found,
seizure of suspected terrorist assets, and detention of noncitizens for at
least seven days without filing any charges.
How much planning do you think guided the development of these interventions?
1 2 3
Completely Some Very Thorough
Unplanned Planning Planning

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 5
involved in the planning process. This individual may come from
various backgrounds: she may be a program director appointed by
a specific agency such as county probation, a university professor
with a research grant, a director of a nonprofit agency such as
an ex-offender program, a consultant hired by a criminal justice
agency to formulate a plan, or perhaps even a state representative
who introduces new legislation authorizing the use of boot camps
for certain offenders as an alternative to incarceration.
Three Approaches to Planned Change:
Policy, Program, and Project
There are three general approaches to planned change, which differ
in terms of their specificity and complexity. The most specific type of
intervention is a project, the next most specific is a program, and the
most complex and comprehensive is a policy.
Policies vary on the complexity of the rule or guidelines (simple to
complex), and the amount of discretion afforded to those who apply
policies (constrained to flexible). How an instructor calculates grades
in a course is a matter of policy, and students
are typically informed of this policy at the start
of a course. The existence of a grading policy
helps to ensure that all students are treated
fairly. Similarly, police officers are required to
read Miranda warnings to people they have arrested, before beginning
to ask questions that might be used in court against the defendant. Both
of these examples pertain to relatively simple rules designed to protect
the interests of individuals. Discretion is relatively constrained, although
the Supreme Court has formulated specific exceptions. Sometimes poli-
cies are much more complex: the federal government may construct a
“social” policy, such as President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty in
the 1960s, designed to address large-scale social and economic prob-
lems. Organizations, too, create policies specifying how they are going
to expend their resources: the U.S. Health Department’s emphasis on
juvenile violence prevention was tied to its budget in such a way that
specific resources were set aside to deal with this problem. The policy
was relatively complex (different rules and guidelines applied to differ-
ent situations, and guidelines were quite broad) and flexible (the policy
allowed decisionmakers to use discretion to develop or fund specific
programs). Complexity and flexibility do not always correspond: for
example, state sentencing guidelines are generally complex (different
rules apply to different offenders and offenses) but vary considerably in
the amount of discretion afforded to the sentencing judge. We address
these issues in more depth in Chapter 4.
Policy
A rule or set of rules or guidelines for
how to make a decision.

6 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
An example of a program would be a local Boys and Girls Club
that creates an after-school program for minority juveniles residing
in a high-risk community. Another
example is a boot camp correctional
program that is created to reduce the
amount of time that offenders spend
in custody. Offenders are sentenced to
an intensive, short program of rigorous
physical and academic services that is followed by probation rather than
a term in prison. Theoretically, such programs reduce the cost of correc-
tions, increase the rehabilitative impact of corrections, and satisfy the
aim of retributive punishment. Programs, then, consist of services that
are linked together by a single set of goals and an organization.
Projects are usually intensive efforts by
groups within an organization, a system of
organizations, or a community to achieve a
short-term objective. Evaluating a community
corrections program, instituting a crackdown
on drunk driving, or conducting an assessment
of needs for a computerized information sys-
tem are examples of projects.
While the distinction between programs and projects is sometimes
ambiguous, depending on whether the intervention is permanent or
short-term, the distinction between programs and policies deserves more
careful attention. Two examples illustrate the differences between a
program and a policy, the two most common types of change. In each of
the two cases below, a program is but one small component of a much
larger policy formulated at the local, state, or federal level. In each case,
a policy (legislation in these two examples) authorized or mandated the
use of specific programs for certain populations.
Boot camps, rigid military-style drill camps intended as an alternative to
incarceration for certain offenders, were mandated and funded by the Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The federal govern-
ment allocated $24.5 million in competitive funds available for boot camps
in 1995, and authorized $7.9 billion in the time period 1996-2000.
Figure 1.3
Problem Program Policy
• Jail overcrowding Boot camps Federal Crime Bill
• Drug abuse Operation “Weed The federal “War on
and Seed” Drugs”
Project
A time-limited set of services provided
to particular individuals, groups, orga-
nizations, or communities, usually
focused on a single need, problem,
or issue.
Program
A set of services aimed at achieving specific
goals and objectives within specified individu-
als, groups, organizations, or communities.

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 7
Operation “Weed and Seed,” a U.S. Department of Justice initia-
tive launched in 1992 as part of President Bush’s continuing “War on
Drugs” campaign, is a two-pronged community intervention. First,
law enforcement agencies and prosecutors cooperate in “weeding out”
criminals who participate in violent crime and drug abuse and attempt
to prevent their return to the targeted area. Second, “seeding” involves
the development of community services including prevention, interven-
tion, treatment, and neighborhood revitalization. In each case, federal
policy led to the formulation and funding of specific programs.
Policies, therefore, often contain the authorization or impetus for
many specific programs, but policies often provide only very general
prescriptions for what kind of approach should be used to solve specific
problems. We can begin to see that the development of many programs
and policies arises out of a political process that determines not only
which problems will receive attention and priority in the first place,
but also what kind of intervention approach (e.g., changing individuals
versus changing specified conditions in a community) will be used to
address those problems.
The Need for Planned Change
The quest to find “what works” to achieve the goals of criminal
justice has not yet been fulfilled and will not likely be fulfilled anytime
soon. In fact, many people (policymakers, academics, politicians, and
citizens) disagree profoundly about the desirability of certain interven-
tion approaches (e.g., drug treatment for convicted offenders versus
tougher criminal sanctions to reduce drug abuse). Even if there were
not such strong disagreement in values, it would still be difficult to find
widespread agreement about how effective specific interventions have
been (e.g., school-based delinquency prevention programs).
Several factors fuel debates over program effectiveness. For one thing,
it is usually difficult to evaluate the long-term effects of social interven-
tions. There are many different social variables to measure and control
for, and this complexity often defies measurement. In addition, the objec-
tives themselves may be poorly defined. Or, the problem may be poorly
defined. Or, both the problem and the goals may be well defined, but the
intervention was not implemented correctly, and thus we cannot have
faith in any outcome results obtained by evaluation, whether they point to
program success or failure. Indeed, evaluation results that do not address
implementation problems should be treated with suspicion.
We will address these issues in more detail in subsequent chapters,
but our point is that there is currently little consensus about “what
works” in criminal justice. A major reason for this lack of consensus, we
argue, is a lack of sufficient attention to principles of planned change.

8 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Three ongoing trends have sharpened our needs for planned change:2
(1) declining resources; (2) accountability; and (3) the expansion of
knowledge and technology.
Declining Resources
Since 1980, there have been huge cuts in social services spending,
especially programs affecting the poor and minorities (e.g., subsidized
health care, welfare, daycare for working parents, school lunches, and
after-school programs).3 Since 2000, these cuts have continued.4 Part
of the explanation for these changes lies in public concern over high
taxes. However, it is obvious that taxes are the basis for the provision
of public services, and cuts in taxes mean cuts in services (somewhere).
Cuts in social services may have increased inequalities and magnified
social problems that already existed.5 For example, the problem of
homelessness was exacerbated by cuts in funding available for mental
health care, substance abuse treatment, and health care.6
Partly as a consequence of declining resources, many groups have
organized to promote change, both legally (through lawsuits) and politi-
cally (by advocating for changes in laws and government programs).
Advocacy efforts have often succeeded in raising awareness about a
particular problem and stimulating change. A good example is pro-
vided by the problem of domestic violence. In the early 1900s, women’s
groups organized and protested for numerous changes, including the
rights to vote and to work. Advocacy by women’s groups in the 1970s
and 1980s led to changes in police and court policies for dealing with
sexual harassment, rape, and domestic violence. Such advocacy con-
tributed greatly to the perception that existing programs and policies
were not working, and that some kind of change was needed.7 One can
find numerous examples of groups that have campaigned for change in
existing policies and programs (e.g., groups protesting welfare reforms
that restrict eligibility and benefits; groups advocating for programs and
policies to address problems of homelessness, AIDS, etc.).
Accountability
As public resources have dwindled, agencies have increasingly been
called upon to demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency in meet-
ing their goals. There has been suspicion by many that public money
has not always been well spent. A dialogue has resurfaced over the
past decade about how to make public institutions more effective and
accountable, although the means for achieving this goal are subject to
debate.8 This is especially the case within the public sectors of educa-

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 9
tion, human services, and welfare, where there is considerable public
expenditure, conflicting values and goals, and high stakes.9 Annual bud-
get hearings at the state and federal level are tense events for directors
of publicly funded agencies, who are increasingly called upon to justify
their funding requests with evidence of improved outcomes and cost-
effectiveness.10 There is currently a furor in criminal justice research and
practice over the need for “evidence-based” programming, but much
disagreement as to what the standards of “evidence” entail.11
According to a report to the U.S. Congress, the effectiveness of
most crime prevention strategies will remain unknown until the nation
invests more in evaluating them.12 Using rigorous, scientifically recog-
nized standards and methodologies, a review of more than 500 impact
evaluations revealed only a handful of definitive conclusions. Congress
can solve this problem, the authors suggested, by limiting the scope
of required evaluations but requiring that evaluations that are funded
receive sufficient funding to answer questions about effectiveness. In
order for this approach to be effective, Congress should match the
funding earmarked for program spending with corresponding funding
to pay for the evaluations.
Expansion of Knowledge and Technology
We have greater technological abilities than ever before, and these
changes have created both new opportunities and new problems.
Improvements in computing technology have dramatically increased our
information collection, storage, and retrieval capabilities. We now have
ready access to many types of criminal justice data, including information
about reported crimes, police arrests, convictions, sentencing, prison time
served, parole, and recidivism. Improved data collection and access mean
that our ability to analyze specific needs and problems has improved.
For example, improved justice information systems have contributed
to our understanding of problems such as racial disparities in sentenc-
ing.13 High-powered computers and statistical packages make it possible
to collect and compare data on the processing of thousands of defen-
dants in different regions over time, and statistically control for various
legal (e.g., previous criminal record) and nonlegal factors (e.g., race,
socioeconomic status) that influence sentencing. There are no longer
disputes about whether sentencing disparities exist or not, but rather
where, why, and how much. Computers have also increased the ability
of researchers to discover what works. The effects of juvenile and adult
correctional programs are increasingly the subjects of sophisticated
outcome evaluations and meta-analyses (see Chapter 7).
Other technological changes have improved our ability to detect
crime and monitor offenders. Computerized fingerprint identification

10 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
systems have greatly reduced the amount of time required to scan and
match individual prints, and both regional and national data banks of
criminal information and fingerprints are now available to criminal
justice agencies for investigation. DNA testing and analysis technolo-
gies have become increasingly sophisticated, and forensic DNA evidence
has been used with increasing frequency both to convict the guilty and
to exonerate the innocent.14 Many previously unsolvable cases became
solvable because viable suspects could be identified and arrested or
removed from suspect lists.
Electronic monitoring equipment has made it possible for probation
and parole agencies to more cost-effectively supervise certain offenders
in a community rather than a prison setting, at least as part of their
sentence. However, increasingly sophisticated drug-testing equipment
has also made it possible to detect minute amounts of prohibited drugs
in an individual’s body, leading to huge increases in the number of
parolees who fail to complete their parole terms successfully and return
to jail or prison.15
As computerized information systems have grown, a whole new
field of crime dubbed “computer crime” has evolved, in which perpetra-
tors attempt to break into secure computer systems of individuals and
corporations, usually for the purpose of illegally obtaining classified
information, money, or both (i.e., “identity theft”). Needless to say,
methods of detecting, investigating, and prosecuting this whole new
category of crime are evolving rapidly, but seemingly slower than the
rate of growth in the crime itself.16
The Perils of Planned Change
Any change to existing procedures and existing conditions carries a
certain amount of risk. The proposed change is likely to be resisted by
someone, perhaps even its intended beneficiaries (e.g., a city successfully
lobbies for state funds to build a new prison, but then faces vigorous
protests from communities being considered for the location of the new
prison). Regardless of the specific change proposed, universal consensus
is rare; resistance is the norm.
In many cases, people fear and resist change because it may threaten
their job security or bring about unwanted scrutiny (e.g., citizen review
boards of complaints against police). There is often a fear that the
change might only make things worse. For example, critics argued that
tough new government powers granted under the USA PATRIOT Act,
passed in October of 2001, led to the unwarranted harassment and
detention of large numbers of citizens and legal immigrants.17 The USA
PATRIOT Act provides a good example of how support for an innova-
tion can erode over time, as its actual consequences are fully realized.

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 11
Regardless of the many varied reasons for which resistance emerges
in any specific case, those who propose change must be prepared
for disagreement and resistance. Again, planned change, rather than
unplanned change or poorly planned change, can go a long way toward
minimizing resistance, especially if the “change agent” (the person or
agency that has introduced the proposed intervention) has involved dif-
ferent constituents in the planning process from the beginning.
Even prior to beginning work on planning a specific intervention,
the change agent should have identified potential sources of resistance,
and considered the potential costs and benefits of two very different
approaches to handling resistance: (1) collaborative strategies; or
(2) conflict strategies.18 While the actual outcomes of either strategy are
impossible to predict without knowing detailed circumstances of the
case in question, there are several serious costs associated with conflict
strategies that generally make them unattractive options:
• They create greater resistance;
• They require greater resources;
• They create more unexpected effects; and
• Change tends to be temporary (compliance) rather than long-term.
Collaborative strategies seek involvement from all parties concerned.
For example, a police com-
missioner might ask police
officers about their views on
community policing before it
is adopted as a department
policy and imposed on them.
State sentencing commissions
might ask judges about perceived difficulties in sentencing before draft-
ing, adopting, or imposing sentencing guidelines on them.
Conflict strategies are more likely to come into play where opposing
parties have a strong history of disagreement; leaders favor a dictato-
rial, authoritarian style of management; resources are scarce and there is
much disagreement over allocation;
the stakes of the proposed change
are high (i.e., large benefits to certain
parties and perhaps large costs to oth-
ers); time pressures are great; and the
likelihood of successfully suppressing
the opposition is perceived (correctly
or incorrectly) as high. A good example is provided by brutality lawsuits
launched against local police departments. Because citizens perceived the
existing system of reviewing complaints as ineffective and heavily biased in
Collaborative Strategies
Collaborative strategies emphasize participation from those
affected by change. Individuals, groups, or organizations
known to oppose the intervention in part or in toto are
included in the design and planning of the intervention.
Conflict Strategies
Conflict strategies approach resistance in an adver-
sarial manner. Those who resist the proposed
change are seen as opponents who must either be
persuaded or coerced to change their views.

12 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
favor of police, legal reform in complaint review procedures has evolved.
Another example is provided by lawsuits against local, state, and federal
prisons for overcrowding and other conditions of confinement. Such
lawsuits, some lasting as long as 13 years, usually followed a period of
unsuccessful and rancorous discussion and negotiation.19 Changes eventu-
ally resulted, but at considerable cost to human and fiscal resources.
A Seven-Stage Model for Planned Change
A “model” specifies the sequence of steps required for (1) analyzing
a problem, (2) determining its causes, and (3) analyzing (or planning
and carrying out) a specific intervention. The model presented in this
book may be used to plan new interventions, analyze existing interven-
tions, or both (e.g., revising a current program or policy).
Our model of planned change is based on a problem-solving approach:
the goal is to develop solutions to specific problems through a rational
process of planning. The 1968 President’s Commission report, The Chal-
lenge of Crime in a Free Society,20 was extremely influential in shaping
current conceptions of criminal justice as a “system,”21 and it stimulated
attempts to improve criminal justice programs and policies through com-
prehensive, coordinated planning. As Mark Moore22 suggests, “The Crime
Commission had two big things in mind: (1) how to produce an effective,
decent criminal justice system and (2) how to deal with crime. …They also
had a managerial or implementation vision [emphasis added], which was
a theory about how the processes and institutions of the criminal justice
system needed to be developed…” (167-168). This vision was to be guided
by data and knowledge rather than ideology and passion.
The Commission’s Report was the major impetus for passage of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the creation of
the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). While
Figure 1.4
Planning a New Intervention
• Critical activities can be enacted
(or avoided) so as to increase the
likelihood that a proposed inter-
vention will be implemented with
fidelity (as planned) and effectively
produce a desired change in a spe-
cific problem.
Analyzing an Existing Intervention
• Critical activities and decisions
that informed the planning process
can be identified and analyzed
so as to help understand why a
particular intervention did or did
not produce a desired change in a
specific problem.

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 13
rational criminal justice planning and the social justice it was intended
to foster remain elusive, those lofty goals remain as relevant as ever.
Reflecting on the positive contributions of the President’s Commission
report, Moore notes that: “The authorization to experiment has been
spread widely, and that turns out to be a very good thing for society”
(176-177). At the same time, the goals of rationality and social justice
have proven far more difficult to achieve than originally expected.23
We present our seven-stage model here with the assumption that a
program or policy is either being developed or analyzed. Because pro-
cedures differ slightly depending on whether a new intervention is being
planned or an existing intervention is being analyzed, we summarize
the stages separately for each (Tables 1.1 and 1.2).24 The seven stages
are only briefly described in this chapter; each is described in detail in
subsequent chapters.
Stage 1. Analyzing the Problem
The first step is to analyze the problem, carefully collecting infor-
mation about dimensions of the problem, the history of the problem,
who is affected by the problem, and potential causes of the problem.
For example, we ask the following questions: What and where is the
problem? How big is it? How long has the problem existed? Do differ-
ent groups of people have different definitions of the problem? Who
is affected by the problem? What causes the problem? What theories
do we have about causes of the problem? What kinds of interventions
have been tried elsewhere? Who is likely to support a certain course of
action, and who is likely to resist it?
The pitfalls of faulty problem analysis are enormous, and can
completely subvert effective intervention. Many interventions fail not
necessarily because the intervention itself is flawed, but because it
addresses the wrong problem (or an inadequately defined problem).
Major activities at this stage include the following:
• Document the need for change: collect and analyze data about the
problem.
• Describe the history of the problem.
• Examine potential causes of the problem.
• Examine previous interventions that have tried to change this
problem.
• Identify relevant stakeholders (those who have a legitimate interest
in the problem and/or the intervention).
• Identify barriers to change and supports for change.
• Conduct a systems analysis.

14 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
This last step, a systems analysis, involves conducting research on the
system within which the problem exists. Most problems are produced
by more than one source, and most solutions affect more than one part
of a system. It is important, then, to learn as much as possible about
how different conditions interact to produce the problem. For example,
Table 1.1
New Interventions: A Systematic Approach to Program and Policy Development
Stage 1.
Analyzing the
Problem
Document the need
for change.
Describe the history
of the problem.
Examine potential
causes.
Examine previous
interventions.
Identify relevant
stakeholders.
Conduct a systems
analysis.
Identify barriers to
change and supports
for change.
Stage 2.
Goals and
Objectives
Write goal statements.
Write specific outcome
objectives for each goal.
Seek participation in
goal setting.
Specify an impact
model.
Identify compatible and
incompatible goals in
the larger system.
Identify needs
for interagency
collaboration.
Stage 3.
Program or Policy
Design Stage
Choose from different
intervention options.
Program Design:
• Define the target
population.
• Define target
selection
procedures.
• Define program
components and
activities.
• Write job
descriptions of
staff and specify
skills required.
Policy Design:
• Define the target
population of the
policy.
• Identify the
responsible
authority.
• Define the
provisions and
procedures of the
policy.
Stage 4.
Action Planning
Identify resources
needed.
Plan to acquire or
reallocate resources.
Specify dates to com-
plete implementation
tasks.
Develop mechanisms
of self-regulation.
Specify a plan to build
support.
Program/Policy Revision

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 15
prison crowding is not simply the result of more crime, or even judges
sending more people to prison. Changes in laws and penalties specified
by law also contribute to increasing prison populations.25 Unless we
understand how these changes affect the prison population, we stand
little chance of developing effective solutions.
Stage 7.
Reassessment and
Review
Planning for Failure: Avoid
exaggerated claims.
Planning for Success: Ongo-
ing reassessment, learning,
and revision are crucial.
Learning and Adapting:
successful interventions
must adapt to change.
Initiate the Program
or Policy Design from
Stage 3.
Initiate the Action Plan
from Stage 4.
Initiate Monitoring of
Program/Policy
(Stage 5 plan).
Collect and analyze
evaluation data; provide
feedback to stakeholders
(Stage 6 plan).
Reassess the entire
program/policy plan
and make necessary
modifications to increase
fit with environment.
Stage 5.
Program or Policy
Implementation
Design instruments to
collect monitoring data.
Designate responsibility
to collect, store, and
analyze data.
Develop information
system capacities.
Develop mechanisms
to provide feedback to
stakeholders.
Stage 6.
Evaluating Outcomes
Develop outcome measures
based on objectives.
Specify the research design
to be used.
Identify potential
confounding factors.
Identify users and uses of
evaluation results.
Reassess the entire
program/policy plan.

16 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Table 1.2
Existing Interventions: A Systematic Approach to Program and Policy Analysis
Stage 1.
Analyzing the
Problem
How was the
need for change
documented?
Describe the history
of the problem.
Which potential
causes were
examined?
Were previous
interventions
examined? How?
Were relevant
stakeholders
identified? If so,
how?
Was a systems
analysis conducted?
If so, how?
How were barriers
and supports for
change identified and
addressed?
Stage 2.
Goals and
Objectives
Describe goals of the
program or policy.
Describe the outcome
objectives for each goal.
Who participated in
goal setting?
Specify assumptions
about the impact
model.
How were compatible
and incompatible goals
in the larger system
addressed?
How were needs
for interagency
collaboration identified
and addressed?
Stage 3.
Program or Policy
Design Stage
How was the
intervention approach
chosen?
Program Design:
• Define the target
population.
• Define target
selection
procedures.
• Define program
components and
activities.
• Give job
descriptions of staff
and specify skills.
Policy Design:
• Define the target
population of the
policy.
• Identify the
responsible
authority.
• Describe the
provisions and
procedures of the
policy.
Stage 4.
Action Planning
What resources were
needed (what type,
how much)?
How were resources
acquired?
Were implementation
tasks specified and
completed on time?
What mechanisms of
self-regulation were
developed?
How was support for
the program or policy
built?
Program/Policy Revision

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 17
Stage 7.
Reassessment and
Review
Were goals and objectives
realistic and measurable?
To what degree is ongoing
reassessment, learning, and
revision continuing?
What adaptations have
been made, or are still
needed?
Specify any intended
changes to program or
policy design (stage 3).
Specify any intended
changes in action planning
(stage 4).
Specify any intended
changes in procedures
used to monitor program
or policy implementation
(stage 5).
Specify any intended
changes in evaluation
procedures (stage 6).
Specify procedures
and time frame for
reassessment.
Stage 5.
Program or Policy
Implementation
Describe instruments
used to monitor
implementation. What
gaps were detected?
Who was responsible for
collecting, storing, and
analyzing data?
What information
systems were developed?
Were they adequate?
What mechanisms were
developed (if any) to
provide feedback to
stakeholders?
Stage 6.
Evaluating Outcomes
Describe outcome
measures used to assess
objectives.
Specify the research
design used.
Were potential
confounding factors
identified and addressed?
How were evaluation
results used, and by
whom?
What are the implications
of the results for further
program or policy
revision?

18 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Stage 2. Goals and Objectives
Every intervention attempts to achieve some kind of outcome, (i.e.,
some change in the problem), but sometimes it is difficult to figure out
what it is. Goals are broad aims of the intervention (e.g., reduce drug
abuse); objectives specify explicit and measurable outcomes. It is amaz-
ing how many expensive and otherwise well-designed interventions fail
to define the desired outcomes of the intervention adequately. Without
specific, agreed-upon criteria for success, it is impossible to determine
whether any intervention works. If you don’t know where you are
going, as the saying goes, don’t be surprised when you don’t get there.
Major activities at this stage include the following:
• Seek participation from different individuals and agencies in goal
setting.
• Write goal statements specifying the general outcome to be
obtained.
• Write specific outcome objectives for each goal: these should
include a time frame for measuring impact, and a specific measure
of impact.
• Specify an impact model: this is a description of how the interven-
tion will act upon a specific cause so as to bring about a change
in the problem.
• Identify compatible and incompatible goals in the larger system:
where do values of different stakeholders overlap or conflict?
Example 1.1
Prostitution as a Problem
After a series of well-publicized police sweeps and arrests, a community
identifies prostitution as a serious problem. The presumed cause, determined
by intuition rather than careful analysis, is that police have simply not taken
the problem seriously enough. The proposed intervention, then, is a police
crackdown, with intensive law enforcement targeted in areas frequented by
prostitutes and their customers. However, what if these causal assumptions
were wrong, or left out something important? What if it turns out that the
problem is mainly limited to the summer months, and the majority of prosti-
tutes are teenage runaways or drug addicts trying to make money to survive?
Such information might lead to very different types of interventions: perhaps
shelters, crisis counseling, drug treatment, or job training and assistance.

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 19
• Identify needs and opportunities for interagency collaboration. For
example, police and prosecutors may need to collaborate to make
a new drunk driving law work. Prosecutors could clarify the evi-
dence needed to obtain convictions; police officers could strategize
about the likelihood of obtaining different kinds of evidence.
Stage 3. Program or Policy Design
This is one of the most crucial and time-consuming stages in the
planning process. It often requires considerable review of information
collected during the first two stages of planning. It involves specifying,
in as much detail as possible, who does what to whom, in what order,
and how much? It is the “guts” of the program or policy, including its
staff, its services, and its clients. While the steps for analyzing programs
and policies are similar, at the design stage we find it best to distinguish
activities for programs and policies separately. Major activities for
program design include:
• Define the target population: Who is to be served, or changed?
This often involves specifying some level of need (e.g., level of
drug involvement) and characteristics of intended clients (e.g., age,
gender, geographic residence).
Example 1.2
The Goals of Drunk Driving Laws
A new state law is passed that provides tougher sentences for drunk driv-
ers. A mandatory 48-hour jail sentence is imposed on second-time offenders; a
mandatory three-month jail term is imposed on third-time offenders. The goal
is obvious: to reduce drunk driving. Six months after the law is passed, there
is widespread disagreement about whether the law is working. Advocates of
the law point to a 10 percent reduction in drunk driving arrests. Critics point
to insurance statistics that indicate an increase in traffic accidents involving
alcohol. Who is right? Does the law work or not? After much discussion, both
sides realize that they lack an agreed-upon criterion for judging the outcome
of the intervention. Eventually, they agree that a desirable outcome (change
in the problem) is that one year after the law was passed, there should be a
30 percent reduction in auto fatalities due to drunk driving. The difficulty, it
turns out, is that no specific objective was defined before the law was passed,
and without such an objective, multiple and conflicting criteria for judging
“outcomes” could be debated endlessly.

20 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
• Define client selection and intake procedures: How are clients
selected and recruited for the intervention? For example, drug
court programs are often intended for first-time, nonviolent
offenders. A list of eligible clients might be obtained from court
records; an application from the client may be required; an inter-
view and screening process may be required to determine the
client’s suitability for the program.
• Define program components: Specify the precise nature, amount,
and sequence of services provided. Who does what to whom, in
what order, and how much? Boot camp programs, for example,
might contain several components: military-style drills and
physical training, academic or vocational education, life skills or
problem-solving training, drug awareness education, social skills
training, and so on.
• Write job descriptions of staff, and define the skills and training
required. How many and what kind of staff are required to oper-
ate the program? What specific duties will they carry out? What
kind of qualifications do they need, and what further training will
be necessary? How much money is needed for staff salaries and
training?
Major activities for policy design include:
• Define the target population of the policy. Which persons or
groups are included, and which are not? For example, legislators
in various states had to write specific requirements for inclusion
and exclusion under new three-strikes laws. Which offenders (e.g.,
felony vs. misdemeanor) and offenses (e.g., violent vs. property)
should be included?
• Identify the responsible authority. Who will carry out the policy,
and what will their responsibilities be? For example, what roles
will judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and others play in any
case, and how can we ensure that each understands three-strikes
policy correctly? Will each party understand their individual
responsibilities and options? Will they need special training or
orientation? Are additional court or prison resources required?
• Define the provisions of the policy. A policy should identify
the sanctions, services, opportunities, or interventions that will
be delivered, and the conditions that must be met in order for
the policy to be carried out. Under one three-strikes policy, for
example, state legislators had to write specific rules for how case
processing and sentencing decisions were to be made: when and
how would the District Attorney’s office make charging decisions
under the new law? How would pretrial motions be handled?
Would trials be conducted in private or in public? What are the
appropriate terms of incarceration?

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 21
• Delineate the procedures that must be followed. Individuals
responsible for implementing a specific set of rules must clearly
understand the specific actions to be taken to ensure that the
policy is carried out consistently. For example, three-strikes laws
specify decisions regarding the charging, processing, and sentenc-
ing of repeat offenders. These might include the court’s procedures
for notifying a suspect and his or her attorney that the suspect is
about to be charged under three-strikes laws, including delivery of
written notice and clearly specifying the suspect’s legal rights and
options under the new law. Procedures may also specify who signs
such forms, other individuals or agencies that need to be notified,
and records that must be maintained.
Stage 4. Action Planning
Once the design is complete, the next stage is to develop an “action
plan” that specifies the sequence of tasks that need to be completed in
order to successfully launch, or “implement” the program or policy.
These include technical and interpersonal tasks (e.g., identifying and
Example 1.3
The Design of a Boot Camp Program
Boot camps for adults and juveniles proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s.26
Earlier boot camps stressed military discipline, physical training, and hard
work; “second-generation” camps emphasized rehabilitation by adding com-
ponents including drug treatment and prosocial skills training.27 Some added
intensive post-release supervision including electronic monitoring, home
confinement, and random urine tests. Some, particularly camps for juveniles,
emphasized educational and vocational skills instead of military discipline.
The Massachusetts Boot Camp Program offered a mix of rigid military
discipline with treatment approaches.28 This boot camp was an intensive 16-
week modified therapeutic community program. The camp provided a balance
of military-style discipline, community service, and programming (substance
abuse, adult basic education, wellness and life skills), focusing on account-
ability.29 Inmates received approximately 30 hours of programming per week.
Instructors focused on recovery-based themes (e.g., give 110 percent, partici-
pate, take the first step, see the situation clearly). Classrooms and barracks were
filled with visual symbols about decision-making techniques; tools of recovery;
being honest, open, and willing; and following an orderly direction.
Knowing simply that a program is a “boot camp” would not tell us very
much at all. In a review of studies published over a period of 10 years, Parent
found that each boot camp had a different design. This lack of uniformity
made it difficult to assess what components were and were not successful, and
it made comparisons of one boot camp to another extremely difficult.30

22 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
acquiring the necessary resources for the program; locating office space
and/or meeting space; hiring and training staff; designing client intake
and reporting forms; purchasing equipment and supplies; setting dates
and assigning responsibility for the completion of specific tasks). Major
activities at this stage include the following:
• Identify resources needed and make cost projections: How much
funding is needed?
• Plan to acquire or reallocate resources: How will funding be
acquired?
• Specify dates by which implementation tasks will be accomplished,
and assign responsibilities to staff members for carrying out tasks.
• Develop mechanisms of self-regulation (create mechanisms to
monitor staff performance and enhance communication).
• Specify a plan to maintain and build support.
• Anticipate sources of resistance and develop responses.
Stage 5. Program or Policy Implementation
At this stage, we attempt to find out if the program or policy was
implemented properly. Monitoring refers to the collection of informa-
tion to determine to what degree the program/policy design (Stage 3)
is being carried out as planned. Data is collected to find out what is
actually being delivered to clients (e.g., observations, surveys, inter-
views). The purpose is to identify gaps between the “program on paper”
(design) and the “program in action.” Adjustments then need to be
Example 1.4
Action Planning for a Delinquency Prevention Program
Major program components of a community-based delinquency prevention
program included a seven-day challenge course in which juveniles were encour-
aged to examine their lives and set goals; one-to-one mentoring of youths by
adult partners; and weekly follow-through meetings of all mentors and clients.31
The program’s funding proposal spelled out in necessary detail a myriad of
tasks, responsibilities, and costs required in order to launch the program. For
the mentoring component, adult mentors (volunteers) were trained to support
youths to participate fully in the seven-day course and the follow-through
program (1 Workshop Leader X 3 days X $350 per day = $1,050).

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 23
made to revise either the design of the program or policy (e.g., program
components) or its implementation. We ask the following types of ques-
tions at this stage: Are program/policy activities actually being carried
out as planned? Is the intended target population being reached? Are
staff carrying out their assigned responsibilities? Major activities at this
stage include the following:
• Design monitoring instruments to collect data.
• Designate responsibility for data collection, storage, and analysis.
• Develop information system capacities.
• Identify any gaps in implementation.
• Develop mechanisms to provide feedback to staff, clients, and
stakeholders.
Example 1.5
Monitoring Implementation of Prison-Based Therapeutic
Community (TC) Drug Treatment Programs
In recent years, modified therapeutic community (TC) drug treatment
programs have been widely implemented in prison settings. The aim of the TC
is total life-style change, including abstinence from drugs, elimination of anti-
social behavior, and development of prosocial attitudes and values. Individual
and group counseling, encounter groups, peer pressure, role models, and a
system of incentives and sanctions form the core of these programs. In spite
of the pervasiveness of the prison TC model, surprisingly little information is
available about the implementation of prison-based drug treatment programs
in local and state correctional systems.32
Taxman and Bouffard developed a monitoring technique to examine
the degree to which certain treatment components typically associated with
the TC model were present. Techniques included structured observations
conducted by well-trained researchers, in addition to structured interviews,
examination of official program documents, and collection of client-based data
(e.g., drug testing, infractions, disciplinary actions).33 Researchers examined
six TC programs in short-term jails. Overall, monitoring illustrated a lack of
correspondence between the prototypical TC model and the implementation
of these six programs:
• Program emphasis: Few of the programs implemented the overall
TC philosophy. Interviews with staff members indicated that they
did not use a particular program model, formal curriculum, or
structured treatment phases.

24 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Stage 6. Evaluating Outcomes
The goal of this stage is to develop a research design for measuring
program or policy outcome (a specific, intended change in the problem,
as defined by objectives). Did the program or policy achieve its intended
objectives? Why or why not? For a new program or policy, note that
all planning, up to and including the formulation of an evaluation plan,
should precede the actual start-up of the intervention (Stage 7). Major
activities at this stage include the following:
• Develop and analyze outcome measures based on objectives.
• Specify the research design to be used.
• Identify potential confounding factors (factors other than the
program that may have influenced measured outcomes).
• Identify users and uses of evaluation results.
• Reassess the entire program or policy plan.
Stage 7. Reassessment and Review
For a new program or policy, all six stages of planning should ide-
ally be completed prior to the initial start date. If a review of the plan-
ning process uncovers any discrepancies at any of the six prior stages,
these gaps should be carefully addressed before proceeding. Stage 7,
then, involves putting into motion the program or policy design and
action plan (stages 3 and 4), monitoring program or policy implementa-
tion (stage 5), and, if appropriate, evaluating outcomes (stage 6). Once
evaluation data is analyzed, feedback is provided to all stakeholders,
and the program or policy design should be thoroughly reassessed to
determine where revisions are necessary. At the end of the process, the
• Treatment process: Researchers observed a focus on awareness
training, emotional growth training, and peer encounter tech-
niques. The most commonly used activities, however, empha-
sized individual rather than group work, underutilizing activities
intended to facilitate community cohesion.
• Treatment style: In contrast to the TC model, informal (unsched-
uled and client-initiated) meetings were relatively rare, as indi-
cated by observational data and interviews with both counselors
and group members.
Example 1.5, continued

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 25
change agent asks whether further adjustments are necessary to meet
objectives. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the intervention?
Decisions may have to be made about whether an intervention should
be launched or continued, and whether it should receive funding or not.
Major activities at this stage include the following:
• Initiate the program/policy design and action plan.
• Begin monitoring program/policy implementation.
• Make adjustments to design or implementation as gaps are
found.
• Decide whether the program/policy is ready to be evaluated.
• Collect and analyze evaluation data.
• Provide feedback to users and stakeholders.
• Review and reassess the entire program/policy plan and make
modifications where needed.
Example 1.6
The Kansas City Gun Experiment
If police could get more guns off the street, would there be fewer gun
crimes? This was the question posed by the Kansas City Gun Experiment.34
The target beat was an 80-by-10-block area with a homicide rate about 20
times the national average.35 The population was mostly nonwhite; the area
had low property values and consisted predominantly of single-family detached
homes. A comparison beat had similar population demographics and crime
rates. For 29 weeks, the Kansas City Police Department focused extra patrol
attention on gun crime “hot spots” in the target area. Techniques included
stop-and-search frisks based upon reasonable suspicion, searches incident to an
arrest on other charges (i.e., the basis for a legitimate arrest has already been
established), and safety frisks associated with car stops for traffic violations.
Data on guns seized, computerized crime reports, calls for service data,
and arrest records were compared for both areas, 24 months before and 12
months after the intervention began. Gun seizures by police in the target
area increased significantly from a total of 46 before the intervention to 76
afterwards (an increase of 65 percent), while gun crimes declined significantly
from 169 to 86 (a decrease of 49 percent). The numbers of guns found dur-
ing car checks tripled. During the same time period, neither gun crimes nor
guns seized changed significantly in the comparison beat several miles away.
Further, drive-by shootings dropped from seven to one in the target area,
doubled from six to 12 in the comparison area, and showed no displacement
to adjoining beats. Homicides decreased significantly in the target area, but
not in the comparison area.

26 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
This last point is extremely important. Lots of changes are made
in the criminal justice system, but few stick. Several writers have com-
mented on the importance of mutual adaptation: both the intervention
and the environment must change if the new program or policy is going
to work.36 Imagine a family adopting a 12-year-old child. The family
system has to make room for this new member and shift some of its
time, attention, and emotional resources to meet the child’s needs. At the
same time, the child needs to make changes. She must learn the family’s
rules, routines, and norms, and learn the idiosyncrasies of each family
member. Both the child and the family adapt interactively in response
to each other’s actions and reactions. In much the same way, successful
implementation of a new program requires mutual adaptation.
In New York City, for example, staff at the Center for Alternative Sen-
tencing and Employment Services (CASES) wanted to make sure that their
clients fit the target population: jail-bound—not probation-bound—offend-
ers.37 The program was designed to provide intensive community services
that would enable offenders to stay in the community. A systems analysis
showed, however, that judges in the different boroughs of New York used
different criteria for placing offenders in jail. In Queens, for example, judges
required fewer jail sentences for offenders than did judges in Manhattan. In
order to prevent the CASES program from being used for probation-bound
cases, staff adjusted the criteria for accepting clients to the sentencing pat-
terns in each borough. Adaptation of the program increased its chances of
achieving its objective (keeping offenders in the community).
Conclusion
We need a systematic plan for any change effort. Good intentions are
rarely sufficient to bring about successful change. We must beware of the
“activist bias,”38 by which well-intentioned advocates of change assume
that they already know what the problem is and what is needed. Such advo-
cates may insist that we desist all this prolonged planning and simply “get
on with it.” The perils of unplanned or poorly planned change should by
now be obvious: expensive, poorly articulated, poorly implemented, inef-
fective programs and policies that are unable to successfully compete for
scarce funds. There are four key points to remember about this seven-stage,
systematic model of planned change that you are about to explore:
1. Program and policy planning is an interactive and ongoing process.
It is crucial to review and modify planning (where needed) at each
stage of the analysis. This takes time, but it is time well spent.
2. A rational planning approach provides a framework for developing
logical and effective programs and policies. The default (too often) is
to use unarticulated and untested assumptions to guide planning.

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 27
3. Keys to success are participation and communication with all stake-
holders (e.g., program staff, clients, individuals or agencies whose
cooperation is needed, funding sources, citizens affected by the inter-
vention, elected representatives) throughout the change process.
4. Rarely does planning go smoothly. We strongly believe that the
advantages of systematically attending to the elements of plan-
ning discussed in this book can greatly improve the chances of
developing effective policies and programs. We also recognize
that the environments in which this planning occurs are messy
and unpredictable. It takes willpower, a clear vision of what you
want to accomplish, and lots of communication to remain rooted
in the planning process. Planned change increases the likelihood
of successful intervention; it cannot guarantee it.
What’s to Come?
Chapter 2: This chapter discusses one of the most critical and most overlooked
stages of planning—defining and understanding the problem or issue that
is driving the planning process.
Chapter 3: Once we have an understanding of the problem or issue, then we can
identify what we want to achieve. Chapter 3 discusses the ways in which
goals and objectives are framed so that we can communicate around the
direction in which we want our change effort to move and know when we
are heading in the right direction.
Chapter 4: In this chapter, we focus on how to design effective policies and
programs. Design involves a number of critical decisions, such as who
specifically will benefit from the intervention, which will affect greatly our
ability to achieve our goals.
Chapter 5: Next we will learn about some of the more pragmatic aspects of
planning that are essential to the real world of planning, including budget-
ing and cost projections, orienting staff, and assigning responsibility for
completion of specific implementation tasks.
Chapter 6: This chapter gets us into the area of accountability. We decided
what we wanted to do and who would do what. Now we need to make
sure that we do it. We need to monitor our activities and learn about when
and why we drift away from what we set out to do.
Chapter 7: How can we learn about what’s working and what’s not? How can
we improve upon our past performance? These are questions that we dis-
cuss in the context of evaluation. The methods of evaluation are important
to understand in order to draw valid conclusions.
Chapter 8: Finally, Chapter 8 brings us into the arena of experience. As we
carry out our plans, new information is created that requires a response.
A program or policy may have looked good on paper, but it must adapt to
the real world of people, organizations, and competing goals. The results
of evaluation data should be used to guide a continuous process of reas-
sessment and improvement.

28 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
In the next seven chapters, we provide detailed discussions of the
seven stages of planning and the major concepts and terms associated
with each stage. We have placed a great deal of emphasis on provid-
ing case studies that illustrate these concepts and help the reader to
discover how these concepts can be applied in a variety of criminal
justice contexts.
EXERCISE 1.1
Describe briefly, in three paragraphs: (a) some problem in criminal justice. Why
is it a problem? What makes it a problem? (b) What is one possible cause of
this problem? (c) What is one possible intervention (a program or policy, as
defined earlier in this chapter) that might change this problem?
D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S
1. Describe three trends that have increased the need for planned
change.
2. Define “planned change,” and give an example.
3. Define “unplanned change,” and give an example.
4. Define and describe an example of each of the following:
(1) policy, (2) program, and (3) project.
5. Why are collaborative strategies of change preferable to conflict
strategies? Explain.
6. Briefly describe the first six stages of planned change (analyzing
the problem, setting goals and objectives, designing the program,
developing an action plan, monitoring program implementation,
and evaluating outcomes). What are the major questions we need
to ask at each stage?
7. How did the 1968 President’s Commission Report influence think-
ing about criminal justice planning?
8. Give an example of “mutual adaptation.”

Case Study 1.1
CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 29
1 Parent, D., T. Dunworth, D. McDonald, and W. Rhodes (1997). Key Legislative Issues in
Criminal Justice: Mandatory Sentencing (NCJ 161839). Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.
2 Cannon, A. (1996). “Survey: ‘Three-strikes’ Laws Aren’t Affecting Crime. The Federal Gov-
ernment and States Aren’t Hastening to Use Them. California is the Notable Exception.” The
Philadelphia Inquirer, Tuesday, September 10, 1996.
3 Greenwood, P.W, C.P. Rydell, A.F. Abrahamse, J.P. Caulkins, J. Chiesa, K.E. Model, and S.P.
Klein (1994). Three Strikes and You’re Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of California’s New
Mandatory-Sentencing Law. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Retrieved March 6, 2004, from the
RAND web site at: http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR509/
The Pitfalls of Poor Planning: Three-Strikes Legislation
Stage 1: Problem Analysis. The proper starting point for program or
policy planning is to ask what problem needs to be addressed. How does a
specific issue become targeted for change, and why? How big is the problem,
where is it, who is affected by it, and so on? What evidence has been used to
demonstrate a need for change?
There is a widespread misconception that crime rates have been steadily
rising in recent years, and that a larger and larger portion of serious crimes
is committed by recidivating felons. Nowhere in state or federal three-strikes
legislation can any evidence for such conclusions be found. In fact, crime
rates decreased steadily after 1993, while recidivism rates remained remark-
ably stable. It is doubtful that any coherent problem analysis guided policy
development in this arena.
Assumptions speak faster and louder than facts, and politicians may too
eagerly cater to the perceived public will rather than documented problems.
Three-strikes laws were a rapid and visible response to public outcries fol-
lowing heinous or well-publicized crimes.1 “We have a serious crime problem
in this country,” according to Walter Dickey, a University of Wisconsin law
professor. “We are sold this as a solution. It gets all kinds of energy and atten-
tion, and yet it is relatively ineffectual.”2
Stage 2: Setting Goals and Objectives. Before designing programs or
policies, we must be clear about the specific outcomes they are expected to
achieve, and what specific values guide choices to select one course of action
over another. The intent of three-strikes is to incapacitate violent offenders for
long prison terms—25 years to life. If the law successfully increases the impris-
onment rate, according to this logic, fewer offenders will be free to victimize
the population. The laws have no specific deterrent effect if those confined will
never be released, but their general deterrent effect could, at least in theory,
be substantial. Legislators convey the message that certain crimes are deemed
especially grave and that people who commit them deserve harsh sanctions.
Such laws may compromise values such as equity (fairness). A California
study3 found that blacks were sent to prison under the “three-strikes” law 13 times
more often as whites. Forty-three percent of the third-strike inmates in California

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR509/

Case Study 1.1, continued
30 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
4 Greenwood, P.W., S.S. Everingham, E. Chen, A.F. Abrahamse, N. Merritt, and J. Chiesa (1998).
Three Strikes Revisited: An Early Assessment of Implementation and Effects (NCJ 194106). Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.
5 Ibid, note 4.
6 Ibid, note 4.
were African-American, although they made up only 7 percent of the state’s popu-
lation and 20 percent of its felony arrests. Controversy still ensues over exactly
what outcomes three-strikes laws were expected to achieve, and whether numerous
unintended consequences, including racial disparity, could have been avoided.
Stage 3: Program or Policy Design. For any program or policy to have a
chance at being effective, it is absolutely essential that the target population
and all provisions, procedures, and services be clearly spelled out ahead of time.
In other words, there should be absolutely no doubt about who does what to
whom—in what order, how much, or how often. This has clearly not been the
case with three-strikes laws.
One might expect some consistency between three-strikes laws in different
states and between state and federal three-strikes laws. In reality, laws vary
widely across states in terms of the definition of a “strike,” the conditions
under which the law is triggered, and the severity of the sanctions. Some state
laws call for third-time offenders to receive life without parole. In others,
prisoners are eligible for parole after 30 or 40 years.4
Target populations for three-strikes laws seem particularly poorly defined.
During the first few years of the law’s implementation in California, about
1,300 offenders were imprisoned on third-strike felonies, and more than
14,000 criminals for second-strike felonies. California’s law calls for a doubling
of the prison sentence for a second felony and for a sentence of 25 years to life
for a third conviction. The California law was written to cover 500 felonies,
including many nonviolent offenses. Some of the felonies include petty theft,
attempted assault, and burglary. Thus, about 85 percent of all those sentenced
under the three-strikes laws were involved in nonviolent crimes. For instance,
192 marijuana possessors were sentenced for second and third strikes, com-
pared with 40 murderers, 25 rapists. and 24 kidnappers.5
Stage 4: Action Planning. Prior to implementing a new policy such as three-
strikes, a systematic plan is needed that assigns responsibilities for communica-
tion, coordination, and completion of specific tasks required to enact the new
law. Everyone involved must clearly understand his or her roles and responsibili-
ties. Possible obstacles and sources of resistance should be anticipated and sought
out. By the time the new three-strikes laws were implemented, everyone should
have understood and accepted their roles. Evidence suggests the opposite.
State prosecutors avoided the three-strikes laws because they saw little need for
them with existing sentencing laws.6 Another reason is that the laws were narrowly
written, making them difficult to apply. Plea bargaining and charge bargaining
became increasingly common methods for circumventing three-strikes laws.

Case Study 1.1, continued
CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 31
7 Tonry, M. (1987). Sentencing Reform Impacts. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice.
8 Ibid, note 2.
9 Ibid, note 3.
10 Ibid, note 6.
11 Ibid, note 6.
The criminal courts typically rely on a high rate of guilty pleas to speed
case processing and avoid logjams. Three-strikes laws disrupt established plea-
bargaining patterns by preventing a prosecutor from offering a short prison
term (less than the minimum) in exchange for a guilty plea. However, prosecu-
tors can shift strategies and bargain on charges rather than on sentences. The
findings of research on the impact of mandatory sentencing laws are instruc-
tive.7 Officials make earlier and more selective arrest, charging, and diversion
decisions; they also tend to bargain less and to bring more cases to trial.8
Stage 5: Monitoring. Following implementation of a policy such as three-
strikes, it is essential to monitor, i.e., collect data to determine to what degree
the actual provisions, procedures, or services are actually being implemented
as designed. Adjustments may be needed, but absolutely no valid evaluation
can be conducted if the laws are not being properly implemented. That would
be tantamount to arguing that “x caused y,” when we have no idea what “x”
(the policy) was. Three-strikes laws fare badly on this criterion also.
At the federal level, where three-strikes legislation was included in the 1994 crime
bill, the law had been used on only nine occasions two years later. Twenty-four other
federal cases were pending.9 At the federal level, the long-term impact was minimal
because less than 2 percent of violent felonies are resolved in federal courts.
Three-strikes statutes simply weren’t being used in many of the 25 states
that passed similar laws.10 Some states have not used them at all; others have
applied their laws infrequently and inconsistently. Even within a single state
such as California, there was considerable variability in how state laws were
interpreted and used across different counties.
Stage 6: Evaluation. We need measurable evidence that any policy, particu-
larly an expensive one such as three-strikes, effectively and efficiently achieves
what it was intended to do (i.e., reduce crime, protect public safety). Three-
strikes laws were intended to reduce serious crime by incapacitating repeat
offenders, and by deterring others from becoming repeat offenders.
A 1994 report by the RAND Corporation predicted a 28 percent decrease
in crime over the 25 years following passage of the law. RAND also predicted
tremendous increases in criminal justice costs, mainly through the construc-
tion and operation of additional prison cells necessitated by three-strikes
laws. Three-strikes laws, researchers expected, would also result in defen-
dants mounting more rigorous defenses to avoid severe sanctions, leading to
fewer guilty pleas and more trials, greater court workloads and backlogs, and
increased jail overcrowding. The existing evidence, so far, is mixed:11

Case Study 1.1, continued
32 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
12 See also: Stolzenberg, L., and S.J. D’Alessio (1997). “‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’: The
Impact of California’s New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates.” Crime &
Delinquency, 43, 457–469; Zimring, F.E., S. Kamin, and G. Hawkins (1999). Crime & Pun-
ishment in California: The Effect of Three Strikes and You’re Out. Berkeley, CA: Institute of
Governmental Studies Press.
13 Auerhahn, K. (2001). Incapacitation, Dangerous Offenders, and Sentencing Reform. Albany:
State University of New York Press.
• States with three-strikes laws did not experience greater declines
in crime than states without such laws.
• Three-strikes states did not experience greater increases in state-
wide incarceration rates (e.g., number of adults incarcerated per
10,000 population), although the likelihood of incarceration per
conviction (e.g., number of adults incarcerated per 10,000 convic-
tions) has increased substantially.
• The California prison population certainly increased in terms of
total numbers, but at a rate no faster than before the implementa-
tion of three-strikes laws. California already had one of the highest
incarceration rates in the country, and three-strikes laws did not
significantly change this rate of incarceration.
• No consistent effects in terms of dramatic workload increases or
court backlogs were found in California. Counties varied dramati-
cally in how the law was implemented. For example, some District
Attorneys followed the letter of the law more strictly than others.
Strikes were dismissed in one-quarter to one-half of all strike-eli-
gible cases in some counties.
While effects of three-strikes laws on crime rates so far have been negli-
gible, RAND researchers cautioned that the full effects of the laws will remain
unknown until offenders imprisoned under three-strikes laws have been
incarcerated longer than they would have been under previous laws. It is also
difficult (in any research study) to control for the many other social, political,
and economic factors (besides three-strikes laws) that may affect crime rates. In
sum, the data required to evaluate the effects of three-strikes laws adequately
are simply not available at this time.12
Stage 7: Reassessment and Review. Better planning in each of the areas
discussed above could have reduced widespread inconsistency and failures in
implementation, and could have helped reduce the number of unknown or
unintended consequences of the laws (e.g., impacts on court workloads and
backlogs, impacts on jail and prison crowding). Auerhahn (2001) illustrates
how sentencing reforms such as three-strikes laws and California’s Proposition
36 (intended to provide treatment to California’s incarcerated drug offender
population) result in impacts that are often far less (or far different) than what
political pundits claim.13

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 33
Case Study 1.1, continued
Questions
1. Briefly explain how the seven-stage model of planned change can be used
to analyze an existing policy such as three-strikes laws.
2. Using Table 1.2 as a guide, briefly describe one example of each of the
seven stages for three-strikes laws.
Endnotes
1 Kettner, P.M., J.M. Daley, and A.W. Nichols (1985). Initiating Change in Orga-
nizations and Communities. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
2 Ibid, note 1.
3 Gans, H. (1996). The War Against the Poor: The Underclass and Antipoverty
Policy. New York: Basic Books.
4 APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy (2004). American
Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality: Report of the American Political Science
Association Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy. Washington, DC:
American Political Science Association. Retrieved March 2, 2008, from the APSA
web site at: http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport ; See also: Jacobs,
L., and T. Skocpol (eds.) (2005). Inequality and American Democracy: What We
Know and What We Need to Learn. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
5 Piven, F.F. (2006). Response to “American Democracy in an Age of Inequality.”
Political Science and Politics, 39, 43-46.
6 Rossi, P. (1991). Down and Out in America: The Origins of Homelessness, 2nd ed.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
7 Buzawa, E.S., and C.G. Buzawa (2003). Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice
Response, 3rd ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
8 Welsh, W.N., and G. Zajac (2004). “Building an Effective Research Partnership
Between a University and a State Correctional Agency: Assessment of Drug Treat-
ment in Pennsylvania Prisons.” The Prison Journal, 84, 143-170.
9 Zajac, G. (1997). “Reinventing Government and Reaffirming Ethics: Implications
for Organizational Development in the Public Sector.” Public Administration
Quarterly, 20, 385-404.

http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport

34 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
10 See: Cohen, M.A. (2000). “Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Crime and Jus-
tice.” In D. Duffee (ed.), Criminal Justice 2000, v. 4 (pp. 263-314). Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (NCJ-182411); and
Welsh, B.C., and D.P. Farrington (2000). “Monetary Costs and Benefits of Crime
Prevention Programs.” In M. Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice, v. 27 (pp. 305-361).
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
11 Gandhi, A.G., E. Murphy-Graham, A. Petrosino, S. Schwartz Chrismer, and C.H.
Weiss (2007). “The Devil is in the Details: Examining the Evidence for ‘Proven’
School-Based Drug Abuse Prevention Programs.” Evaluation Review, 31, 43-74.
12 Sherman, L.W., D. Gottfredson, D. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter, and S. Bushway
(eds.) (1998). Preventing Crime: What Works ,What Doesn’t, What’s Promising.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
13 Tonry, M. (1995). Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America. New
York: Oxford University Press.
14 Lovrich, N.P., T.C. Pratt; M.J. Gaffney, and C.J. Johnson (2003). National Forensic
DNA Study Report (NCJ 203970). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice. Available at: http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/203970
15 Petersilia, J. (2003). When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry.
New York: Oxford University Press.
16 D’Ovidio, R. (2007). “The Evolution of Computers and Crime: Complicating
Security Practice.” Security Journal, 20, 45-49; Stambaugh, H., D. Beaupre,
D.J. Icove, R. Baker, W. Cassaday, and W.P. Williams (2000). State and Local
Law Enforcement Needs to Combat Electronic Crime (NCJ 183451). Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Retrieved January 16,
2008, from: http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/183451
17 Babington, C. (2006, March 8). “Congress Votes to Renew Patriot Act, With
Changes.” The Washington Post, p. A03.
18 Ibid, note 1.
19 Welsh, W.N. (1995) Counties in Court: Jail Overcrowding and Court-Ordered
Reform. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
20 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1968).
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. New York: Avon Books.
21 Walker, S. (1992). “Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The
American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953-1969.” Justice Quarterly, 9, 47-76.; see
also Chapter 2 of this book.
22 Moore, M. (1998). “Synthesis of Symposium.” In U.S. Department of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society: Looking Back, Looking Forward (pp. 167-178).
Symposium on the 30th Anniversary of the President’s Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice (NCJ 170029). Washington, DC: U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from the
U.S. Department of Justice web site at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reports/98Guides/
lblf/lblf

http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/

http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/183451

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reports/98Guides/

CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 35
23 U.S. Department of Justice (1998). The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society:
Looking Back, Looking Forward. Symposium on the 30th Anniversary of the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (NCJ
170029). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.
Retrieved January 16, 2008, from the U.S. Department of Justice web site at:
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reports/98Guides/lblf/lblf
24 Because projects differ from programs and policies mainly in terms of their shorter
duration and more focused intervention approach, the seven-stage model can be
easily applied to projects as well.
25 Blumstein, A., and A.J. Beck (1999). “Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-
1996” (pp. 17-61). In M. Tonry and J. Petersilia (eds.), Prisons: Crime and Justice,
v. 26. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
26 Parent, D.G. (2003). Correctional Boot Camps: Lessons From a Decade of
Research (NCJ 197018). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from
the NCJRS web site at: http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/197018
27 Ibid, note 21.
28 Ransom, G., and M.E. Mastrorilli (1993). “The Massachusetts Boot Camp: Inmate
Anecdotes.” The Prison Journal, 73, 307-318.
29 Valle, S. (1989). “Accountability for Addicted Inmates.” The Counselor, March/
April, 7-8.
30 Ibid, note 26.
31 Welsh, W.N., P. Harris, and P. Jenkins (1996). “Reducing Overrepresentation
of Minorities in Juvenile Justice: Development of Community-Based Programs in
Pennsylvania.” Crime & Delinquency, 42, 76-98.
32 Welsh, W.N., and G. Zajac (2004). “A Census of Prison-based Drug Treatment
Programs: Implications for Programming, Policy, and Evaluation.” Crime &
Delinquency, 50, 108-133.
33 Taxman, F., and J.A. Bouffard (2002). “Assessing Therapeutic Integrity in Modi-
fied Therapeutic Communities for Drug-involved Offenders.” The Prison Journal,
82, 189-212.
34 Sherman, L.W., J.W. Shaw, and D.P. Rogan (1995). The Kansas City Gun experi-
ment (NCJ-150855). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, National Institute of Justice.
35 Sherman, L.W., and D. Rogan (1995). “Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence:
Hot Spots, Patrol in Kansas City.” Justice Quarterly, 12, 673-693
36 Berman, P. (1981). “Thinking about Programmed and Adaptive Implementation:
Matching Strategies to Situations.” In H. Ingram and D. Mann (eds.), Why Policies
Succeed Or Fail. Beverly Hills. CA: Sage; Harris, P., and S. Smith (1996). “Develop-
ing Community Corrections: An Implementation Perspective.” In A.T. Harland (ed.),
Choosing Correctional Options that Work: Defining the Demand and Evaluating
the Supply. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; McLaughlin, M. (1976). “Implementation
as Mutual Adaptation: Change in Classroom Organization.” In W. Williams and
R.F. Elmore (eds.), Social Program Implementation. San Diego: Academic Press.

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reports/98Guides/lblf/lblf

http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/197018

36 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
37 Schall, E., and E. Neises (1998). “Managing the Risk of Innovation: Strategies
for Leadership.” Corrections Management Quarterly, 2, 46-55; see also Clear,
T.R., E. Cadora, S. Byer, and C. Swartz (2003). Community Justice. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
38 Sieber, S.D. (1981). Fatal Remedies. New York: Plenum.

CHAPTER 2
Analyzing the Problem
37
C H A P T E R O U T L I N E
Document the need for change. Collect and analyze data to define
what the problem is, where it is, how big it is, and who is affected
by it. What evidence of the problem exists?
Describe the history of the problem. How long has the problem
existed? How has it changed over time?
Examine potential causes of the problem. What causes the prob-
lem? What theories do we have? The intervention must target one
or more specific causes supported by research.
Examine previous interventions that have tried to change this
problem, identify the most promising interventions, and choose
a preferred intervention approach. We need to analyze available
information to direct decisions about a possible course of action.
Identify relevant stakeholders. Do different groups of people
have different definitions of the problem? Who is affected by the
problem?
Conduct a systems analysis. Conduct research on the system
within which the problem exists, and determine how the system
may create, contribute to, or maintain the problem.
Identify barriers to change and supports for change. Who is likely
to support a certain course of action, and who is likely to resist it?

38 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Some preliminary analysis is needed to identify the issues involved
with trying to change a particular problem. This important analysis sets
the stage for all subsequent planning activities. Beware of the activist
bias: the notion that we already know what to do, so let’s get on with
it. In almost all cases, the person who expresses such a view has a vague
definition of the problem and its causes, and little knowledge of suc-
cessful interventions. Without intending it, he or she is advocating a
process of unplanned change that maximizes the likelihood of a poorly
planned, poorly implemented, and ineffective intervention. The many
hours of hard work and the motivation that must surely guide any suc-
cessful change effort should not be wasted on unplanned change. How
we analyze the problem guides what kind of interventions we come
up with. If problem analysis is flawed, subsequent program or policy
planning is also likely to be faulty.
Document the Need for Change
We begin analysis of a problem by examining information about the
problem. We are interested in questions like the following: How do we
define the problem? How big is it, and where is it? Is there a potential
for change? We especially want to provide evidence for the existence
of a need or problem.
We need to be very careful here. The media, politicians, or even
criminal justice officials socially construct many problems. By social
constructions, we mean that certain problems are perceived, and deci-
sions are made to focus attention and resources on a particular problem.1
However, perceptions of a problem and reactions to it may be quite dif-
ferent than the actual size or distribution of a problem. We need methods
to document, describe, and analyze problems. At minimum, we need to
be sure that a problem actually exists before taking any specific action,
but we also need to know about the size and distribution of a problem
in order to plan effective solutions.
Although the distinction is somewhat arbitrary, it is often worthwhile
to differentiate a need from a problem. Students often point out that
many “conditions” could be stated either way: for example, if victims
of domestic violence lack access to shelters, then is there not only a need
but also a problem, such as
repeat incidents of abuse of this
population? However arbitrary
the distinction might appear at
first glance, it might make a
large difference in the problem
analysis (what kind of infor-
mation we collect), analysis of
Need
A lack of something that contributes to the discomfort or
suffering of a particular group of people. For example,
we might argue that there is a need for drug treatment
programs for convicted offenders, or that there is a need
for shelters for abused women. In each case, an existing
lack of services perpetuates the difficulties experienced by
the target population.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 39
causes (explanations of why certain conditions are lacking, versus why
other conditions are present), and identification of relevant interventions
(do we attempt to provide services that fill an important gap, or do we
attempt to apply some inter-
vention to change a problem?).
Needs and problems are clearly
related, but not identical.
Next, we attempt to apply
some boundaries to the problem.
For example, we might begin
by stating a concern with juve-
nile violence. However, we are
Example 2.1
School Violence: A Problem Out of Control?
Shootings in and around schools have fueled a national debate about
school violence. Following tragic incidents such as the Columbine High
School massacre in 1999, the Virginia Tech shootings in 2007, and other
widely publicized shootings on school properties, many school districts and
campuses have scrambled to improve their security measures and disciplin-
ary policies. While dramatic incidents fuel perceptions that school violence
is out of control, available data suggest a more modest interpretation. One
primary source of national data about school crime and safety is the annual
report, Indicators of School Crime and Safety.2 Using indicators from various
sources, including the School Crime Supplement added to the National Crime
Victimization Survey in 1989 (and repeated in 1991, 1995, 2001, 2003, and
2005), results showed that:
• Between 1992 and 2005, the total crime victimization rates for stu-
dents age 12 to 18 declined both at school and away from school.
• The self-reported nonfatal, violent victimization rate (simple
assault, aggravated assault, rape, sexual assault, and robbery) of
students ages 12-18 at school declined from 48 per 1,000 students
in 1992 to 24 per 1,000 students in 2005.
• Among youth ages 5-18, there were 17 school-associated violent
deaths from July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006 (14 homicides
and three suicides).
Fortunately, tragedies such as Columbine are rare. Based upon current
evidence, it is neither clear that school violence is out of control, nor that
revision of school security policies is the proper (or only) solution. Thorough,
localized problem analysis should precede the revision or development of
school policies in any district.
Problem
The presence of something that contributes to the dis-
comfort or suffering of a specific group. For example,
we might argue that a specific community experiences
a high rate of robberies committed by addicts to buy
drugs, or that there is a high rate of repeat incidents
of abused women applying to courts for protection
orders. In each case, there is a clearly defined condition
present that perpetuates the suffering of a particular
group of people.

40 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
quickly overwhelmed with information about the problem, different
causal explanations, and different interventions.3 Are we really con-
cerned with all types of juvenile violence, or with more specific set-
tings? Are we really interested in specific types of violence, such as gang
violence, school violence, gun-related violence, drug-related violence,
interpersonal conflicts versus violence committed against strangers, or
instrumental (goal-oriented) versus affective (emotional) violence? This
is an important point. We need to do some research first to narrow our
definition of the problem. It is entirely possible that we might decide
to focus not only on a specific type of violence, but upon a specific
age group (say, middle-school children), a specific jurisdiction (e.g., a
community with a high rate of violence, or a specific city, county, or
state), or a particular demographic group (e.g., poor children living
in inner-city areas). Whatever
our reasons for choosing to set
boundaries in particular ways
(personal, political, or theoretical
interests), identifying boundaries
involves making judgments about
how widely or narrowly to define
a problem.
We first attempt to document
the need for change through an
analysis of existing conditions.
Is there a problem? How big is
it? What is the level of “need”?
What is the evidence for a prob-
lem? One way of documenting a
problem is to look at its incidence
versus prevalence.
Where do we find this kind of statistical information, as well as
more descriptive information about the problem? We usually need to
look at some kind of data to estimate the degree and seriousness of a
problem. There are several techniques available; we’ll briefly review
four of them for now. Wherever time and resources allow, it is always
desirable to use as many techniques as possible to converge upon a
specific problem.
Social indicators are perhaps the most accessible and widely used
type of data for analyzing criminal justice problems. For example,
the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), collected by the FBI, consist of
all crimes reported to the police, and all police arrests for specific
crimes. Data are available for each state and for the nation as a whole.
These figures are widely used to calculate changes in the homicide
rate, for example, from year to year. Another widely used indicator is
the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which is a survey
Incidence
The number of new cases of a problem within a
specific time period (e.g., the number of new cases of
AIDS diagnosed in a specific calendar year). According
to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS,
an estimated 2.5 million people worldwide acquired
the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in 2007.4
Prevalence
The existing number of cases of a particular problem
as of a specific date (e.g., the total number of people
with AIDS as of a specific date). As of December 31,
2007, 33.2 million people worldwide were estimated
to be living with HIV/AIDS.5

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 41
administered to a national probability sample, asking respondents
to report whether they have been a victim of specific crimes within a
specific time period (e.g., the previous six months), as well as other
information about any victimization, such as degree of injury suffered
and characteristics of the offender (if known).
Examination of social indicators often leads to the definition of a
problem and attempts at change. For example, as part of a Community
Corrections Program Development Project, the National Institute of
Corrections entered into a contract with researchers at Temple Univer-
sity to provide consultation to agencies developing specific community
corrections programs. Orange County and Los Angeles Probation
Departments filed a joint application that was selected for assistance
under this project. Their analyses identified a small group of juveniles
(about 8% of the juveniles in their study) who accounted for the great
Figure 2.1
Data Collection Techniques: Documenting the Need for Change
• Key informant approach: We could conduct interviews with local
“experts” to assess level of need or seriousness of a problem (e.g., com-
munity leaders, police officers, social service agents, clergy, etc.). One
problem with this technique is that people to be interviewed need to be
selected carefully for their expertise. We need to be aware that their views
may be biased or inaccurate.
• Community forum: We could bring together a wide variety of people
interested in a particular problem. Through discussion and exchange of
ideas, we attempt to identify major problems or needs to be addressed.
One common difficulty is that the most vocal groups may not necessarily
be representative of a given community (e.g., special interest groups).
• Community survey: We may decide to conduct a survey by sampling
part of a community or specific areas in a city. We might ask people, for
example, “how serious would you rate the following problems in your
community…?” A common problem with this technique is that it requires
skilled researchers, and it can be very expensive and time-consuming.
• Social indicators: Social indicators are statistics reflecting some set of social
conditions in a particular area over time. For example, the U.S. Bureau
of Census collects and reports extensive data on unemployment, housing,
education, and crime. Common problems include difficulty in collecting
data on certain questions (e.g., underreporting of illiteracy due to embar-
rassment), and samples that are unrepresentative of the population (e.g.,
the census undercounts transients and unregistered immigrants).

42 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
majority of repeat referrals to juvenile court. Programming for this
high-risk population became known as the “8% Solution.”6 Various
county agencies (probation, health, mental health, social services, and
the school district) participated in a multi-agency task force to address
program planning.
Social indicators are extremely useful for identifying the seriousness
of a problem, how it varies across groups (e.g., income), and how it is
changing over time (is it getting better or worse?). Such data are not
without biases, however, and the potential user needs to be aware of
these.10 For example, crime victimization measures may be biased by
numerous factors (e.g., respondent misunderstanding of questions or
crime definitions; faulty recall of incidents and time periods; deliberate
underreporting due to fear, embarrassment, or the respondent’s par-
ticipation in illegal activities). Police-reported crime rates such as the
UCR also carry potential biases, including police errors in recording
and coding crime incidents. Many crimes are never even reported to the
police for various reasons (e.g., victim or witness fear, embarrassment,
or mistrust of the legal system). Social indicators, like the problems they
measure, can be viewed as social constructions rather than objective
indicators of reality. As Reiss and Roth noted: “Any set of crime sta-
tistics, therefore, is not based on some objectively observable universe
of behavior. Rather, violent crime statistics are based on the events
that are defined, captured, and processed as such by some institutional
means of collecting and counting crimes.…”11
Figure 2.2
Examples of Social Indicators for Criminal Justice Problems
Government documents and other public data sources provide valuable
(but free) information resources on a multitude of criminal justice topics.7
Here are two examples.
• Drug use by high school seniors. In 2006, in response to the ques-
tion “On how many occasions, if any, have you used marihuana/
hashish during the past 12 months?,” 32 percent of high school
seniors reported using these drugs at least once. This figure was
up from 27 percent in 1990, but down from 39 percent reporting
such use in 1997.8
• Domestic violence. In 2006, a “nonstranger” (i.e., a friend, acquain-
tance, spouse, ex-spouse, parent, child, brother/sister, other relative,
boyfriend/girlfriend) committed fully 70 percent of all nonfatal
violent crimes against females.9

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 43
Describe the History of the Problem
As part of a problem analysis, we need to know something about
the history of the problem: how long has a given problem existed, and
how has it changed over time? Some of this information will have been
gathered through research methods such as “key person” interviews,
community forums, surveys, or examination of social indicators. Most
likely, however, we will need to look further in published literature
for specific, important historical events that shaped the definition of
something as a social problem in need of attention, and how responses
to the problem changed over time. What significant event or events
helped shape the perception of certain conditions as a social problem
in need of change? Such historical events often include lawsuits, leg-
islation, dramatic public events, or specific social indicators such as
crime statistics.
Example 2.2
The New York Crime Story: Fact or Fiction?
The following example demonstrates some of the difficulties involved in ana-
lyzing problems and potential causes. How does this example illustrate the
points discussed so far in this chapter?
Should we hesitate before praising public officials for decreases in crime
(or blaming them for increases)? Former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani
and former Police Commissioner William Bratton claimed that reductions in
police-recorded crime rates from 1991 to 1996 (including a 55% decrease in
homicide rates) were due to improved crime-fighting strategies and their “zero-
tolerance” strategy toward crime. There were reasons to be skeptical.12
• The decline in the murder rate began in 1991, three years before
either Giuliani or Bratton took office.
• Murder and violent crime rates dropped nationwide for the same
time period; New York was not unique.
• Public officials often assume that police policies and resources
are the major influences on crime statistics. Much criminological
research over the past 50 years suggests otherwise.
• Many different factors influence crime rates, including changes in
illegal drug markets, weapon availability, social and economic con-
ditions, incarceration rates, age distribution of the population, and
youth involvement in legitimate labor markets. It is extremely diffi-
cult to parcel out specific causes for crime decreases (or increases).

44 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Lawsuits often fuel the perception of a problem, as they did with
domestic violence. Liability issues led police to seriously consider calls
for reform. The first of several major cases was Thurman et al. v. City of
Torrington (Connecticut).13 After the defense successfully demonstrated
that police showed deliberate indifference to continued pleas for help
from Ms. Thurman, the court awarded Ms. Thurman $2.3 million in
damages. This case not only raised awareness of the problem of domes-
tic violence, but led many police departments to favor a presumption
of arrest.
Legislation may also create an important push for change. For
example, changes in the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention (JJDP) Act led to ongoing state initiatives to reduce minority
overrepresentation in juvenile justice (see Example 2.3 below).
Dramatic, violent, well-publicized events often raise awareness of a
problem, as did riots at New York’s Attica prison in September of 1971,
which resulted in enormous damages and the deaths of 32 inmates and
11 guards. The Attica riots led to the most intensive investigation of
prison violence in U.S. history to date, and drove prison management
policies for years afterward.14
One useful technique for summarizing the history of responses to a
problem is to construct a “critical incidents” list: a chronology of spe-
cific events explaining how a problem was recognized as such and how
a specific type of intervention has developed. Once again, we caution
Example 2.3
A Critical Incidents List: Reducing Disproportionate Minority
Confinement (DMC) in Juvenile Justice
Here is a “critical incidents” list specifying major historical events and mile-
stones in an important national policy initiative.15
1988 DMC was brought to national attention by the Coalition for Juve-
nile Justice in its annual report to Congress, A Delicate Balance.
1988 In the 1988 Amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974, Congress required that states
address DMC in their state plans. Specifically, under the Formula
Grants Program, each state must address efforts to reduce the
proportion of youths detained or confined in secure detention
facilities, secure correctional facilities, jails, and lockups who are
members of minority groups if it exceeds the proportion of such
groups in the general population.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 45
1989 OJJDP developed a seven-point technical assistance strategy to
help states fulfill the DMC requirements of the JJDP Act: (1)
prepare instructions for the states; (2) conduct a national training
workshop on the requirement for State Juvenile Justice Specialists
and State Advisory Group members; (3) develop a work group to
advise OJJDP and serve as training and technical assistance (TA)
consultants; (4) prepare a TA manual; (5) provide training and TA
to states upon request; (6) conduct training workshops at regional
and national meetings; and (7) develop and distribute information
concerning innovative approaches to address DMC.
1989 OJJDP issued instructions for the states on the statutory and
regulatory requirements of the DMC core requirement.
1989 OJJDP’s Formula Grants Program training and technical assistance
to date (TTA) contractor provided such services upon request on all aspects
of this core requirement.
1990 OJJDP conducted a four-day national training conference, “Imple-
menting the Disproportionate Minority Confinement and Native
American Pass-Through Amendments: A Workshop for State
Planning Agencies and State Advisory Groups.”
1990 OJJDP issued the DMC Technical Assistance Manual to guide State
Juvenile Justice Specialists and State Advisory Groups to address
DMC in three phases—identification, assessment, and interven-
tion. Identification and assessment matrixes and the calculation
of index values were provided as a measure of proportionality.
1991-94 Through five competitively selected states (Arizona, Florida, Iowa,
North Carolina, and Oregon), OJJDP established the DMC initia-
tive to test various approaches to assessing DMC and experiment
with approaches to reduce DMC.
1992 In the 1992 Amendments to the JJDP Act, DMC was elevated to
a core requirement, with future funding eligibility (25% of the
states’ JJDP Formula Grants allocations) tied to state compliance.
Each year, OJJDP reviews states’ compliance with the DMC core
requirement.
1993 A report, The Status of the States: A Review of State Materials
Regarding Overrepresentation of Minority Youth in the Juvenile
Justice System, was based on material submitted by the states to
OJJDP through January 1993.
Example 2.3, continued

46 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
1993 Publication of an OJJDP Report, Minorities and the Juvenile Jus-
tice System: Research Summary.16 This report concentrated on the
official processing of minority youths. A comprehensive literature
search on the processing of minority youths in the juvenile justice
system from 1969 to early 1989 was conducted. The report identi-
fied existing programs and policies and examined methodological
problems with previous work in this area.
1994 Publication of OJJDP Fact Sheet, Disproportionate Minority
Confinement.17
1995-96 A national discretionary grants program was instituted to refine
previous assessment findings, improve data systems, develop new
interventions to reduce DMC, develop model DMC programs,
and encourage multidisciplinary collaborations at the community
level to reduce DMC. Eleven DMC discretionary grants were
awarded.
1996 Through a cooperative agreement with OJJDP, the Coalition for
to 2006 Juvenile Justice held the first National DMC Planning and Strat-
egy Meeting, and has since made the DMC Conference an annual
event with OJJDP financial support.
1997 Publication of Disproportionate Confinement of Minority Juve-
niles in Secure Confinement: 1996 National Report.18 This report
was based on a review and analysis of states’ 1994-96 JJDP Act
Formula Grants Comprehensive State Plans and the DMC Assess-
ment Reports submitted by states to OJJDP. It provided a national
summary of the nature and extent of DMC, the activities chosen
to address it, and challenges experienced by the states.
1997 OJJDP launched a National DMC Training, Technical Assistance,
to 2004 and Information Dissemination Initiative to foster development
of effective strategies nationwide, using training, technical assis-
tance, information dissemination, and public education. Recent
activities include: (1) conducting a DMC training of trainers,
(2) reviewing data-collection instruments and identifying strengths
and weakness, and (3) compiling a state-by-state status report on
state DMC activities.
1998 An OJJDP Bulletin, DMC: Lessons Learned From Five States,19
explained the DMC initiative and described how five pilot states
(Arizona, Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, and Oregon) assessed DMC
and implemented interventions to address identified problems.
Example 2.3, continued

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 47
1998 An OJJDP Bulletin, DMC: 1997 Update,20 summarized the strate-
gies promoted by OJJDP to reduce minority overrepresentation at
all points of the juvenile justice system. Pennsylvania’s multiyear,
systematic, and data-driven effort to reduce DMC was examined.
1998 The Building Blocks for Youth Initiative: This five-prong approach
to 2002 consists of: (1) conducting new research; (2) analyzing decision-
making in the juvenile justice system; (3) directing advocacy for
minority youths in the justice system; (4) building a constituency
for change at the local, state, and national levels; and (5) develop-
ing communications, media, and public education strategies.
1999 An OJJDP Bulletin, Minorities in the Juvenile Justice System,21
updated statistics on racial/ethnic makeup of juvenile offenders
from arrest, court-processing, and confinement records.
1999 The DMC Intensive Technical Assistance Project began with five
to 2002 states (Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and
South Carolina) and expanded to include three more (Arkansas,
California, and Tennessee).
2000 The DMC Technical Assistance Manual was published. This
report summarized lessons learned over the preceding 10 years,
and stressed the importance of ongoing DMC efforts to include
ongoing evaluation of DMC strategies and monitoring of DMC
trends.
2000 State DMC reports were compiled,22 offering a central repository
for historical records of DMC efforts and achievements in each
state. This catalog is continually updated.
2000 OJJDP created a DMC web site23 containing critical information,
useful tools, and relevant publications. This web site is updated
on an ongoing basis.
2000-01 OJJDP expanded DMC training for state personnel from one- and
two-hour sessions to one-day sessions at regional and national
training, and also provided one-day training at the OJJDP
National Conference and the CJJ’s National Pre-conferences.
2000 OJJDP encouraged states to designate State DMC Coordinators
to date to promote focused DMC efforts. The number of states with
designated State DMC Coordinators increased from 10 in 1999
to 35 in 2006.
Example 2.3, continued

48 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
2000 OJJDP’s DMC Coordinator assisted OJJDP’s State Representatives
to date to develop individualized DMC compliance determination letters
to states. The letters provide specific recognition of states’ accom-
plishments and provide guidance for ongoing plans.
2001 OJJDP provided a one-day, in-depth DMC training to its state
representatives to enable appropriate monitoring and the use of
uniform methodology in determining DMC compliance.
2001 OJJDP’s DMC Intensive Technical Assistance Project was
expanded to include three additional states (Arkansas, California,
and Tennessee).
2001 The Juvenile Justice Evaluation Center (JJEC) assists OJJDP in
building evaluation capacity in the states, especially as those efforts
relate to projects funded by the Formula Grants Program.
2002 A new OJJDP Bulletin, Disproportionate Minority Confinement:
A Review of Research Literature From 1989 Through 2001,24
provided an updated review and analysis of the literature.
2002 OJJDP sponsored a researchers’ focus group to help the office
develop a DMC research agenda.
2002 The JJDP Act of 2002, signed into law on November 2, 2002,
modified the DMC requirement of the Act: “Addressing juvenile
delinquency prevention efforts and system improvement efforts
designed to reduce, without establishing or requiring numerical
standards or quotas, the disproportionate number of juvenile
members of minority groups who come into contact with the
juvenile justice system.” This change required an examination of
possible disproportionate representation of minority youths at all
decision points along the juvenile justice system continuum.
2003 OJJDP convened seven research consultants to consider a range
of feasible methods to calculate disproportionality and to recom-
mend an improved method to be recommended to OJJDP. The
group recommended the DMC Relative Rate Index (RRI). Train-
ing on the new index was subsequently offered.
2004 As part of their FY 2004 Formula Grant applications, states
submitted DMC Relative Rates Indexes with the most recently
available data on various juvenile justice system contact points for
the state and three counties with the largest minority concentra-
tion/localities with targeted DMC-reduction efforts.
Example 2.3, continued

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 49
readers that reactions to a problem are social constructions, not objec-
tive indicators of the problem. An example is given below.
Examine Potential Causes of the Problem
This is a critical stage of the problem analysis. Different causes imply
different solutions. If you choose a solution before you examine causes,
it is likely that your intervention will be ineffective. Any intervention
should be aimed at a specific cause or causes. By attempting to change
2004 OJJDP published Disproportionate Minority Confinement: 2002
Update.25
2004 OJJDP awarded a two-year grant to the Youth Law Center to
develop new and accurate data-collection methods for Hispanic
youths and implement activities to reduce DMC at critical points
in the juvenile justice system at two sites.
2004 OJJDP provided two regional training sessions for state staff,
entitled: Diagnosis Determines Treatment: Interpreting and Using
the DMC Index Numbers.
2005 The Juvenile Justice Evaluation Center published Seven Steps to
Develop and Evaluate Strategies to Reduce Disproportionate
Minority Contact (DMC).26
2006 OJJDP launched its web-based DMC Data Entry System, provid-
ing a central repository of state and local data across the country,
and facilitating within-state or within-locality comparisons of
DMC changes over time.27
2006 OJJDP published online its DMC Technical Assistance Manual,
3rd edition,28 providing detailed guidance on DMC identification
and monitoring, assessment, intervention, and evaluation.
2006 OJJDP awarded an 18-month grant to the Justice Research and
Statistics Association to conduct an evaluation of the efficacy of
DMC reduction efforts of selected sites.
2007 In San Diego, CA, OJJDP conducted its first DMC Training of
Trainers for 13 experienced, state-designated DMC coordinators.
Example 2.3, continued

50 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
one or more causes, the goal is to bring about a specific change in the
problem. Causes mediate the effect of an intervention on a problem.
When we talk about examining causes, we are analyzing the etiol-
ogy of a problem: the factors that cause or contribute significantly to
a specific problem or need. A theory attempts to describe and explain
relationships between cause and effect (e.g., a specific problem). A
theory will describe causes of a specific problem, and it will outline
proposed relationships between different causes. A theory may also
suggest solutions to a problem: it provides a logical rationale for using
one intervention over another.
Causes may be identified at different levels of analysis ranging from
individual to social structural:
• Individual: Presumed causes lie within individuals (e.g., personality
traits such as “aggressiveness”).
• Group: Presumed causes lie within the dynamics of particular
groups to which a person belongs (e.g., patterns of roles and rela-
tionships within a family).
• Organizational: Presumed causes lie within the particular culture
and procedures of a specific organization, such as the police, courts,
or prisons (e.g., how police are recruited, selected, or trained).
• Community: Presumed causes lie within the behavioral patterns
and dynamics existing within a specific community (e.g., commu-
nity “cohesiveness”: degree of involvement in community orga-
nizations such as churches and community associations; attitudes
toward deviance; supervision of juveniles).29
• Social structural: Presumed causes lie within the underlying social
structure of society (e.g., the unequal distribution of wealth and
power engendered by the economic system of capitalism) or its cul-
tural attitudes regarding behaviors such as drug use, sexuality, edu-
cation, crime, and so on. Factors commonly examined at this level
of analysis include poverty, unemployment, and discrimination.30
Any individual or agency who proposes any intervention always has
some theory about what causes what, and at least a “hunch” about what
kind of strategy would solve a specific problem and why (even if they
haven’t clearly thought about it or articulated it). In planned change, we
very carefully think about theories and articulate them before we begin
some intervention. We must explicitly tell the rest of the world what our
causal assumptions about a specific problem are, and we must support
these assumptions before proposing a specific type of change.
Where do we find causes and theories? By reading published mate-
rial and doing library research on a problem. One should look at
journal articles, books, and government and agency reports (e.g., U.S.
Department of Justice, National Institute of Health). There are many

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 51
different theories of different kinds of social behavior, including crimi-
nal behavior. While some theories are very general, and most theories
are constantly refined, we highly recommend that anyone proposing
a criminal justice intervention acquire at least a basic knowledge of
criminological and criminal justice theories, either through a course
such as Criminological Theory, or by reading one of several excellent
books on criminological theory.31 As we investigate causes, we should
be guided by two major questions:
• What is the evidence for competing theories? No intervention
should be aimed at causes that are not supported by empirical
evidence of some sort.
• What kind of intervention is suggested by a particular causal
theory? How can a specific cause be affected by an intervention?
Examine Previous Interventions
Example 2.4
Causes and Correlates of Domestic Violence
There are at least four general categories of causes (theories) or correlates
of domestic violence.32
• Individual
• Family structure
• Organizational
• Social-structural
Individual-oriented theories: Researchers often examine characteristics of
offenders and victims that increase the likelihood of domestic violence. Causes
or contributing factors that lie within offenders may include poor self-control,
low self-esteem, immaturity, depression, stress, poor communication skills, and
substance abuse. Characteristics of victims contributing to domestic violence may
include low self-esteem, psychological and financial dependence, and passivity.
Family-oriented theories: Certain kinds of family structures or roles may create
high potential for violence. For example, social isolation of families neutral-
izes potential support and increases risk of abuse. The best family-centered
predictors of spouse abuse are: family conflict over male substance abuse,
and conflicts over control in the relationship. Such conflicts tend to escalate
over time. In addition, children who have been victimized themselves or who
have witnessed domestic violence in the home are at higher risk for domestic
violence (the “violence begets violence” thesis).

52 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Some thorough research is needed to discover what types of inter-
ventions have previously been attempted to change a specific problem.
Often, a single study will report both causal factors and the intervention
that was designed to address those causes, but this is not always the
case. The planner or analyst must attempt to find out what major inter-
ventions have addressed the problem of interest, and they should iden-
tify which specific causes the intervention was attempting to modify.
Excellent sources of information about interventions include key
persons working in justice-related positions, criminal justice journals and
books, and government reports. Numerous databases can be searched by
key words and terms. Criminal justice literature searches can be conducted
online, via university library systems and public web sites, including the
National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Justice.33 It is necessary to familiarize oneself with the
various search instruments and techniques available.
Organizational theories: Processes within criminal justice agencies may unin-
tentionally contribute to domestic violence. In particular, reluctance by police
to arrest suspected abusers received much criticism in the 1970s. Possible
reasons for the “hands-off” response included:
• Police culture and training: Police are socialized into a “crime-fight-
ing” culture; they dislike tasks that imply a “social worker” role.
• Disincentives: Police performance is often evaluated on the basis
of numbers such as arrest rates and clearance rates, not “media-
tion skills.”
• Perceived futility: Police perceive, often accurately, that few
arrests for domestic violence actually result in successful prosecu-
tion (e.g., victims drop charges; prosecutors decline to proceed).
Social-structural perspectives: Broad-based patterns of gender inequality
in Western society are seen by many researchers as significant contributors to
high rates of domestic violence. For example, patriarchal (male-dominated)
religions have been said to affirm a family structure dominated by the author-
ity and power of males. Economic patterns have also discriminated against
women: women’s traditional role as housewife was not as highly valued as
men’s “breadwinner” role, and women have historically been more economi-
cally dependent on men as a result. Other researchers point to the influence of
a class-based social system: men have traditionally exerted domination over
women in all areas of private and public life. According to this view, men
retain more power and social advantage than women in a stratified society.
Example 2.4, continued

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 53
Identify Relevant Stakeholders
Next, we identify the stakeholders in the change process. A stake-
holder is any person, group, or agency who has a legitimate interest
in the problem and/or the proposed intervention. We need to decide
whose views should be considered in the planning process. Some
stakeholders will provide essential cooperation; others may provide
potentially fatal opposition. If the intervention is to be successful, it
is important that the right individuals, groups, and organizations are
involved in the planning process. Otherwise, the intervention may run
into insurmountable difficulties stemming from a lack of adequate
information, resources, or cooperation. Who, then, should be included
in the planning phase?
• Experts?
• Agency heads?
• Agency staff?
• Clients?
• Community groups?
• Business people in the neighborhood?
• Other community organizations (e.g., church, school)?
Before we can answer these questions, we need to review the infor-
mation we have already collected, and answer some key questions. For
Client System
This includes the specific individuals, groups, organizations, or communities that are expected to benefit
from the change (e.g., juveniles, families, and their community might be expected to benefit from a
delinquency prevention program that requires performance of community service).
Initiator System
This includes those who bring the problem to the attention of the change agent. Initiators raise aware-
ness about a specific problem (e.g., professional lobbyists, national groups such as the ACLU, National
Organization of Women, the Urban League, etc.).
Change Agent System
Who begins the planning process to design an intervention? Who gets the ball rolling to address the prob-
lem? The change agent system usually includes the change agent and his or her sanctioning institution
(e.g., the State Department of Corrections announces plans for developing offender reentry programs).
Change agents come from many different backgrounds: legislators, criminal justice policymakers, pro-
fessional planners, administrators, and service professionals.

54 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
example, what expectations do various individuals and groups have for
change? What results are expected? Are there differences of opinion?
We can think of potential stakeholders in terms of several key roles
that participants may play in the change process.34 Major roles include
the following.
Sometimes, overlapping roles are possible. For example, the change
agent may be part of both the target system and the action system:
A Police Commissioner orders sweeping changes in police policy for
dealing with domestic assault complaints. In such a case, the change
agent, by virtue of overlapping roles, enjoys a degree of credibility or
authority with both patrol officers (target system) and their supervisors
who are responsible for implementing the new policies (action system).
Overlapping roles may also enhance continuity: for example, the same
person who initiates change (initiator system) carries it out (action
system) with the cooperation of other participants. On the other hand,
there are clearly instances in which overlapping roles are undesirable.
For example, the person or agency actually carrying out the intervention
should never be held responsible for program or policy monitoring and
evaluation, due to their potential subjectivity or bias.
Conducting a Systems Analysis
Current thinking about criminal justice as a “system” was largely
influenced by the 1967 President’s Commission report.35 Criminal
justice problems and policies, the Commission concluded, are shaped
by the interactive actions and decisions of various actors and agencies
in any jurisdiction (e.g., a particular city, township, county, or state).
At the same time, criminal justice projects, programs, and policies
are shaped in a volatile political environment. Diverse interest groups
and agencies compete for attention, and fragmented decisionmaking
is common. Because criminal justice officials and agencies often act
without consideration of how their decisions might affect those else-
Target System
This includes the person, group, or organization that needs to be changed in order to reach objectives.
For example, to reduce domestic violence, do we need to change abused women? Their spouses? The
police response? The court response?
Action System
This includes all those who, in some way, assist in carrying out the change plan, including program
planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Particularly important is the agency responsible
for providing programming or implementing a policy.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 55
where in the system, the criminal justice system has often been called
a “nonsystem.” While the past 20 years have occasionally witnessed
increased coordination among criminal justice units, there is still a
long road to travel.36
A system can be defined as “all aspects of criminal justice case
processing that relate to punishment or sanctions from the time of
arrest—including decisions about pretrial custody—through the execu-
tion and completion of a sentence—whether that sentence is served in
the community and/or in a correctional institution.”37 All individuals,
groups, and organizations that play a role in such decisions in a specific
jurisdiction are part of the relevant system.
The change agent, whether a consultant, a criminal justice or gov-
ernment official, or an academic, must identify relevant individuals and
agencies in the policy environment: those whose decisions potentially
have shaped the problem, and those whose decisions may potentially
shape the development and implementation of change (i.e., new or
modified policies, programs, or projects). Once identified, the change
Example 2.5
Examples of “Systems” Problems
Jail Overcrowding. Jails interact extensively with law enforcement agen-
cies, courts, probation, and local government. Local police decide whether to
arrest and book accused offenders, and thus control the major intake into the
jails. Local courts influence jail populations through pretrial release decisions
and sanctions for convicted offenders. Charging decisions by district attorneys
influence the efficiency with which pretrial suspects are processed. Probation
may administer both pretrial release programs, such as “ROR” (release on
own recognizance), and intermediate sanctions for sentenced offenders, such
as electronic surveillance, intensive supervision probation, and work release.
County government is responsible for financial and personnel allocations to
each of these agencies. In turn, county government decisions are affected by
financial allocations and legislation determined at the state level.38
Sentencing Disparities. Concerns about disparities in sentencing (i.e.,
individuals committing similar offenses receive different penalties), the use
of judicial discretion (wide variations in sentences across different judges and
jurisdictions), and perceptions of excessive leniency or harshness have led to
the development and revision of state and federal sentencing guidelines. But
actual “sentencing” policy in any jurisdiction is an outcome resulting from the
input of numerous individuals and agencies. Judges obviously impose criminal
sanctions, but they must do so within the limits of state criminal statutes, set
by the state legislature. Prosecutors make decisions about charging, which
depend upon the strength and quality of evidence supplied by police, the abil-

56 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
agent must consider how various officials and agencies have impacted
the problem and solutions in the past, and how they might do so in the
future. Many of the problems we seek to address in criminal justice are
“systems” problems. Consider the following examples.
Guidelines for Systems Analysis
A criminal justice system assessment involves gathering and analyz-
ing information that may exist in the experiences of individual decision-
makers, in agency information systems and databases, and in agency
reports and communications. In general, “a system assessment is a col-
laborative effort to synthesize individuals’ experiences with the criminal
justice system into a shared understanding of how things work now. This
provides a common base upon which to evaluate the present, to shape a
common vision for the future, and to make that vision a reality.”40
Based upon a model developed by the Center for Effective Public
Policy (CEPP),41 this approach assumes the presence of two key ele-
ments: (1) a set of policymakers are committed to understanding and
shaping their system to operate in a more collaborative manner (i.e.,
readiness to engage in a formal “systems” policy process); and (2) a
team of outside consultants committed to working with the jurisdiction
to complete the assessment. This approach requires the involvement of
key decisionmakers who have the authority to make major decisions
and who are willing to make a commitment to system-level policy analy-
sis and development. No single individual can develop system policy,
and absent system-level policy, criminal justice responses will continue
to occur randomly and unpredictably. Five broad steps for criminal
justice system assessment are described below; sources of information
ity and willingness of witnesses to testify, and so on. Prosecutors’ charging
decisions determine which criminal statutes apply to a case, and thus influence
legal procedures and outcomes. Pretrial service providers make decisions about
which defendants are eligible for release pending trial, which in turn affect a
defendant’s ability to assist in the preparation of his or her defense. Defense
attorneys participate in negotiations with prosecutors regarding admissible
evidence, appropriate charges, potential plea bargains, and so on. Proba-
tion usually prepares a presentence report on convicted offenders, and their
recommendations influence judicial options for sanctioning. At the time of
sentencing, elected judges also consider the values of their constituents, their
colleagues, and local justice officials. Judges must be at least to some degree
aware of and responsive to their local political environment.39
Example 2.5, continued

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 57
Category What is it? Where is it? How do we get it?
Table 2.1
Criminal Justice System Assessment: Steps and Information Sources
Map the
System
Document
and Assess
Current
Policy and
Practice
Gather
Information
on the
Offender
Population
A visual depiction and
description of how
offenders flow through
the criminal justice
system and of each
decision point in the
process.
A summary report
that describes the
policies, procedures,
and protocols of each
of the agencies that
impact the criminal
justice system.
Statistical analyses,
quantitative information,
and profiles of the
offender population.
Population analyses
could include trend
analyses, recidivism
studies, and/or
population studies.
• Agency operating
manuals.
• State statutes.
• Qualitative informa-
tion to be collected
through interviews
and focus groups.
• Legislation.
• Court decisions.
• Agency descriptions.
• Agency operating
manuals.
• Staff training curricula.
• State statutes.
• State sentencing
policies.
• Agency annual
reports.
• Audits.
• Program evaluations.
• Automated
information systems:
courts, probation,
parole, corrections.
• Manual records
such as offender
files, court records,
police reports.
• Manual data
collection.
• As a team, discuss
each decision point
in the criminal justice
system. Who are the
decisionmakers? Who
has influence on that
decision?
• Consult with other
practitioners and
policymakers to gain a
greater understanding
of the informal deci-
sion-making process.
• Make a list of all the
agencies and statutes
that guide sentencing
policy and the use
of sanctions.
• Compile written
documents from each.
• Note all policies (both
minor and major)
that impact the system.
• Note all agency descrip-
tions and summarize.
• Observe similarities
and differences between
agency goals and
priorities, policies and
procedures, guidance
about use of sanctions.
• Make a list of the
questions and/or
kinds of information
desired about the
offender population.
• Develop a data
collection instrument
and/or list of variables
to be collected.
• Determine a strategy
for collecting and
analyzing the data.

58 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Category What is it? Where is it? How do we get it?
Table 2.1 continued
Identify
Sanctions,
Services, and
Programs
Identify
Community
Resources
A description of
all of the options
available for offenders
and ex-offenders in
a jurisdiction. These
may be punitive inca-
pacitative, or rehabili-
tative in nature.
A summary of the
resources available
in the community
that can support the
team’s goals.
• Agency policy.
• Statutes/sentencing
laws.
• Court policy.
• Human services
directories.
• Bench books.
• Organizations’
annual reports.
• United Way reports.
• “ Health of the
community”
reports.
• Chamber of
Commerce reports.
• Brainstorm a list of
all of the sanctions
available to respond
to criminal offenses.
• Determine what is
known about each
sanction, and develop
a strategy for compil-
ing this information.
• Consider the develop-
ment of a bench
book and/or guide
for supervising agents
about each response
that is available and
for what kinds of
offenses, or update
an existing one.
• Observe the range of
sanctions. Are there
gaps? What are the
per diem costs of each
program? Is there
a set of principles
underlying the use
of sanctions?
• Make a list of all the
human service agencies,
businesses, charities,
civic organizations,
faith organizations,
community leaders,
and others that might
have an interest in
criminal justice.
• Conduct a community
survey or hold focus
groups to learn more
about the ways the
community is inter-
ested in participating
in criminal justice and
the resources that exist
in the community.
Source: Adapted from McGarry, P. and B. Ney (2006). Getting It Right: Collaborative Problem Solving for
Criminal Justice. Silver Spring, MD: Center for Effective Public Policy.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 59
are summarized in Table 2.1. Restorative justice, an approach ripe for
systems analysis, is presented in Case Study 2.3.
1. Map the System. How is the criminal justice system organized
to carry out its mission? How do offenders flow through the system
from time of arrest through sentencing? One effective strategy for gain-
ing a shared understanding of the entire criminal justice system is to
complete a map, or flowchart, of the criminal justice process. A policy
team documents all of the decision points in the criminal justice process,
the decisionmakers at each point, and the flow of offenders through
the process. A general model of case flow through the criminal justice
system in shown in Figure 2.3.42
There is enormous variety in how justice functions are distributed
across jurisdictions. At the state level, for example, typical actors and
agencies include a Commissioner and Department of Corrections, the
Attorney General, the Probation and Parole Department, officials in the
State Planning Agency and/or the Governor’s Office of Criminal Justice,
a Senate Judiciary Committee, and so on. Often, a state Sentencing
Commission or other state body sets policy and makes decisions about
the distribution of justice funds. The actual structure and operation of
policing, courts, and corrections vary substantially by state and locality.
At the county level, various public and private agencies may provide
pretrial assessment and services, prevention and treatment programs,
halfway houses, and so on. We want to find out what agencies have
responsibility for different elements of the sanctioning system, and how
they relate to each other.
2. Document and Assess Current Policy and Practice. Sentencing
and sanctioning policy in any jurisdiction is usually the result of for-
mal and informal interactions between diverse policymakers. Here, we
conduct an analysis of the formal policies in place in each agency that
provide the framework for how those agencies operate. We want to
develop a picture of how things work in a specific system: the steps in
the process, how long the steps take, and the kinds of options available
to decisionmakers.
Next, we want to develop an understanding of why things hap-
pen as they do. First, we complete a factual profile of each agency in
the system. Second, we gather and summarize those agencies’ policies
as they affect the system and its process. Part of understanding why
the process works as it does is to understand what each organiza-
tion within the system brings to its work in terms of its mandate, its
resources, and its policies.
However, formal policy often only begins to define the manner
in which decisions are made and processes are carried out. In most
communities, written policy guides only a small portion of activity.
Inevitably, informal practices emerge to fill the gaps. Informal practices

60 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
sometimes are developed with clear purpose and great care; sometimes
they simply evolve over time. Understanding informal practice is there-
fore as critical as understanding current policy; informal practice both
accounts for most of what occurs and is ultimately more readily changed
than formal policy.
3. Gather Information on the Offender Population. Who are the
offenders in the system and what do they look like? We need to know
about the volume and characteristics of offenders that move through
each stage of criminal justice processing and sanctioning. We need to
understand what types of offenders are receiving what types of sanc-
tions. Ideally, sanctions should be appropriate to individual offenders
(e.g., seriousness of offense, past record, specific needs, and level of
risk). For example, are scarce jail and prison beds being used for the
most high-risk offenders? Are community sanctions being used for
appropriate offenders?
4. Identify Sanctions, Services, and Programs. Here, we create an
inventory of all of the community-based and governmental resources
available to manage offenders or to respond to safety issues in the
community. Some resources are “official” (that is, part of the criminal
justice or local governmental system, such as health, mental health, or
education). Others exist outside the system, in the community. Some
are formal, such as nonprofit and faith-based organizations, businesses,
and associations. Others are informal, perhaps consisting of little more
than a group of neighborhood residents.
Sanctions and services may be punitive, incapacitative, or rehabili-
tative in nature. In addition to jail or prison beds, we want to record
treatment beds, educational programming slots, and community service
placements. We want to know the number of slots available, average
length of stay, per-day costs, and methods of referral or access.
For example, what are the typical options available to prosecutors in
charging and dismissal decisions? What discretion do Parole, Probation,
and the Department of Corrections have regarding the timing of release,
and the use of prerelease programs such as furlough and halfway house
placements? How often does the judge follow the recommendations in
a presentence investigation?
As we collect this information, we are looking for any major gaps in
services and supports (either missing altogether, or deficient in capacity
and accessibility to affected groups). As we look at the offender popula-
tion and its needs, are any obvious needs not being met? Can we identify
some groups that are more affected than others?
We also want to consider who pays for what in a specific jurisdic-
tion. To what degree are agencies and programs funded by local, state,
or federal funds? Private-sector funds? Nonprofit agencies? There
is often tension between state and local governments over budget

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 61
responsibility for public services such as criminal justice, education,
and health. We need to understand, then, how funding is provided for
various elements of sanctioning, the level of funding provided for each,
whether the funding is likely to decrease or increase, and what conflicts
or changes are likely in the near future.
5. Identify Community Resources. To what degree is the com-
munity involved in different aspects of criminal justice processing and
sanctioning? What are community attitudes toward existing forms of
sanctions? Who are active and vocal community leaders on criminal
justice issues?
Jurisdictions vary in the degree to which community involvement
has been invited or encouraged. For example, citizens may be involved
in town-watch and similar community policing efforts. In some cases,
citizens may be appointed to local criminal justice councils, police
review boards, and other policy groups. Lack of community involve-
ment can create suspicion and resistance; positive involvement can be
an asset to planning and policy development.
Identify Barriers to Change and Supports for Change
We have talked only a bit so far about resistance to change. Even
at this early stage, a decision must be made about whether to continue
forward. Is the change attempt possible? Are the necessary resources
and cooperation likely to be available? Before proceeding, we offer
some techniques to identify potential barriers to change. These sources
of resistance take many forms:
• Physical (e.g., the physical design of a jail prevents adequate
supervision)
• Social: (e.g., inequalities related to class, gender, race)
• Economic (e.g., inequalities related to income and employment)
• Educational (e.g., clients don’t understand or know about services)
• Legal (e.g., criminal justice agencies are often legally obligated to
do certain things and not do other things). For example, prison
industry programs that could reduce the costs of incarceration are
restricted by federal prohibitions regarding the movement and sale
of prisoner-made goods.
• Political (e.g., some groups have more power than others to
make their views heard; political processes can support or block
a change).

62
C
R
IM
IN
A
L JU
ST
IC
E P
O
L
IC
Y A
N
D P
L
A
N
N
IN
G
Source: President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office).
Figure 2.3
Criminal Justice System Flowchart
Nonpolice referrals
Police
juvenile
unit
Released or
diverted
Intake
hearing
Waived to
criminal
court Formal juvenile or youthful
offender court processing
Informal processing
diversion
Information
Refusal to indict
Grand jury
Information
Charges
dropped
or dismissed
Bail or
detention
hearing
Charges
dropped
or dismissed
Preliminary
hearing
Initial
appearance
Released
without
prosecution
Released
without
prosecution
Charges
filedArrest
Unsolved
or not
arrested
Investi-
gation
Reported
and
observed
crime
Felonies
Juvenile
offenders
Prosecution and pretrial servicesEntry into the system
What is the sequence of events in the criminal justice system?
Arraignment
Charge
dismissed
Arraignment Trial
Acquitted
Reduction
of charge
Guilty plea
Trial
Charge dismissed Acquitted
Sentencing
Sentencing
Probation
Revocation
Revocation
Revocation
Parole
Prison
Pardon and
clemency
Capital
punishment
Out of system
(registration,
notification)
Out of system
Out of system
Probation
Guilty plea
Adjudication
Sentencing
and sanctions Corrections
Diversion by law enforcement, prosecutor, or court
Unsuccessful
diversion
Convicted
Misdemeanors
Convicted
Appeal
Intermediate
sanctions
Jail
Out of system
Habeas
corpus
Note: This chart gives a simplified view of caseflow through the criminal justice system. Procedures vary among jurisdictions. The weights of the lines are not intended to show actual size of caseloads.
Released or
diverted
Probation or other
nonresidential disposition
Revocation
Out of system
Residential
placement
Aftercare
Revocation
Disposition
Released
Adjudication
Prosecution
as a
juvenile
Crime

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 63
• Technological (e.g., sophisticated information and communica-
tions systems may be required to implement a specific program
or policy).
Consider the following example. Under permanent provisions of
the Brady Act, effective November 1998, presale firearm inquiries are
made through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(NICS). State criminal history records are provided to the FBI through
each state’s central repository and the Inter-State Identification Index.
The index points instantly to criminal records that states hold. Although
the Brady Act required states to develop their criminal history record
systems and improve their interface with the NICS, states complained
bitterly that the federal government did not provide sufficient technical
or financial resources to implement the informational requirements of
the Brady Act (see Chapter 5).
Consider a second example. A county is under court order to reduce
its jail population. Everyone agrees that a new jail is needed. However,
when certain locations within the county are proposed as sites for
the new jail, citizens with economic and/or political power organize
community opposition to fight the construction of a jail in their own
neighborhood. This “NIMBY” response (“not in my back yard”)43 may
take the form of protests or even lawsuits by powerful citizens to block
construction. Is it fair that some can more effectively resist unwanted
change than others?
One particularly useful technique for analyzing sources of support
and resistance is called force field analysis. Remember that participa-
tion and communication are keys to change, and that collaborative
strategies are preferred to conflict strategies. This technique requires
us to consider diverse views and use collaborative strategies to reduce
resistance and increase support for change.
The technique of force field analysis, developed by Kurt Lewin,44 is
based upon an analogy to physics: a body will remain at rest when the
sum of forces operating on it is zero. When forces pushing or pulling in
Figure 2.4
Forces in Support Resistance
Equal Forces =
No Movement

64 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
one direction exceed forces pushing or pulling in the opposite one, the
body will move in the direction of the greater forces. The difference is
that, in planned change, we are dealing with social forces rather than
physical ones. To succeed in implementing any intervention, we want
to try to reduce resistance to change.
Social change, like physical change, requires one of three options:
(1) increasing forces in support of change; (2) decreasing forces against
change (usually creates less tension and leads to fewer unanticipated
consequences), or (3) doing both in some combination. There is always
resistance to change. At best, there is inertia that the change agent must
anticipate and overcome. Force field analysis is a valuable tool for
doing this. Figure 2.5 illustrates potential driving forces and restrain-
ing forces associated with a city initiative to remove abandoned cars
from the streets.
Generally, we focus on reducing, rather than overcoming, resistance.
Case Studies 2.1 and 2.3 provide opportunities to apply these concepts.
Three steps are involved in a force field analysis:
1. Identify driving forces (those supporting change) and restraining
forces (those resisting change).
2. Analyze the forces identified in Step 1. Assess (for each):
Figure 2.5
Objective: To remove abandoned cars from city streets by June 1.
Driving Forces (the pros)
• Interest in the problem has recently
been expressed by advocacy
groups.
• The public service director supports
the plan.
• The City Council supports the plan.
• Public climate favors cleaning up
the city.
• Local auto salvage yards have
agreed to take the cars at no cost.
• Health department cites old aban-
doned vehicles as potential health
hazards.
Restraining Forces (the cons)
• The definition of “abandoned
cars” is unclear to the public.
• Owners of older cars feel threatened.
• It is difficult to locate abandoned
cars.
• The cost of transporting the aban-
doned cars once identified.
• The expense involved in locating
and disposing of abandoned cars.
• Need a procedure to verify vehicles
declared “abandoned” and notify
owners.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 65
Figure 2.6
Kurt Lewin and “Action Research”
In our travels to academic conferences, we often hear complaints by
researchers that policymakers ignore the results of their research. In our
consultations with policymakers, we often hear complaints that researchers
use excessive jargon, research results are inconsistent, and research rarely
provides the timely and specific information needed to base decisions upon.
Clearly, researchers and policymakers need to interact more closely to facili-
tate relevant research and informed policy decisions.45 Few social scientists
took this task more seriously than Kurt Lewin, who asserted: “Research that
produces nothing but books will not suffice.”46
Lewin coined the term “action research” to describe an intentional pro-
cess of change whereby social science research intentionally and explicitly
informs and shapes social action (including organizational and public policy
decisions), and evaluates the results of that action. It involves fact-finding,
planning, execution, and evaluation. Results from action research provide
new information that gives planners a chance to learn and gather new insights
about the strength and weaknesses of their decisions. Lewin emphasized that
action research is a dynamic and interactive process. Successful action research
requires attention to the “field” or system in which particular decisions are
made, and identification of different “forces” (individuals, groups, or agencies)
pushing for and against a particular type of change.

66 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S
1. Define each of the following:
(a) Change agent system
(b) Initiator system
(c) Client system
(d) Target system
(e) Action system
2. Define: (a) “need,” and (b) “problem.”
3. Define: (a) “incidence,” and (b) “prevalence.”
4. What techniques can we use to estimate the degree and serious-
ness of a problem? Describe each method of documenting the need
for change: (a) key informant approach, (b) community forum,
(c) community survey, and (d) social indicators.
5. What does it mean to say that a problem is “socially constructed”?
Give an example.
6. (a) Define “etiology.” (b) Describe the five levels of etiology, and
give an example of each.
7. Define “theory.”
8. What is a “systems analysis”? Describe the five steps in a criminal
justice systems analysis. Use examples to illustrate your under-
standing of these concepts.
9. Discuss different types of barriers to change, and give an example
of each: (a) physical, (b) social, (c) economic, (d) educational,
(e) political, (f) legal, and (g) technological.
10. (a) Define “force field analysis.” (b) Describe each of the three steps.
11. Define “action research.”

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 67
Case Study 2.1
Domestic Violence
Instructions: Read the hypothetical case scenario on the next page. Then, break
into groups (assigned by the instructor) and answer the questions below. Each group
member should take some notes about the discussion, but the group will appoint a
spokesperson to report the group’s findings to the class. Plan on preparing a five-
minute summary.
A headline in a local newspaper, the Bigtown Chronicle, read: “Woman
killed by husband in domestic dispute.” Bigtown Police said that Betty Benson,
age 32, died of multiple stab wounds allegedly inflicted by her husband, Bill, age
34, following a violent argument in the couple’s home. Police had been called
to the home four times in the previous six months in response to complaints by
neighbors that “there was a lot of yelling, and she was screaming like she was
being beaten.” Ms. Benson had declined to press charges in each instance.
The next day, there was a noisy protest in front of city hall by a local group
called WASA (Women for Action against Spouse Abuse). WASA spokesperson
Sarah Smith told reporters, “This kind of nonsense has been going on far too
long. The police were called to that house four times before she got murdered,
and they didn’t do anything to help her. The police should be arresting sick
people like Bill Benson and putting them away for a long time, not just talking
to them and letting them go right back to beating their wives.”
Police Commissioner Frank Fine responded to the criticisms by pointing
out that the police don’t make the laws. “WASA can complain all they want,”
Fine said, “but the state legislature makes the laws regarding domestic assault,
and right now, the law says that police can’t make an arrest unless the victim
swears out a complaint. We can’t arrest people like Bill Benson just because
they appear to be unsavory characters.”
WASA began protesting in front of the state capital, and two days later,
Rep. Alan Atkinson introduced a new bill calling for sweeping changes in the
laws regarding spouse abuse. The bill called for mandatory arrest and a man-
datory 48-hour detention period, pending investigation, for anyone suspected
of spousal assault. According to the bill, the police would use “reasonable dis-
cretion” in enforcing the law. The local chapter of the ACLU (American Civil
Liberties Union) expressed outrage, arguing that the new bill would deprive
suspects of their constitutional rights of due process and give the police the
power to be “judge, jury, and hangman.”
Bob Bigheart, a spokesperson for the Bigtown Social Services Agency,
said that tough new laws were not the answer. Instead, he suggested, the
police should train officers in family crisis counseling so that they can medi-
ate domestic disputes and refer couples to community agencies to help solve
their problems. Police Commissioner Frank Fine says that is what the police do

68 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.1, continued
anyway: “We are a service-oriented police department,” Fine said, “and our
officers are among the best-trained in the nation.” Claiming that the Commis-
sioner was “arrogant and insensitive to the rights of victims,” WASA called
for Fine’s immediate resignation.
Questions
The governor has asked you, as members of the State Planning Agency, to
study the problem of domestic assault and make preliminary recommendations
about what to do, if anything, to deal with the problem. Include the following
in your answer:
1. Is there a problem here? If so, what is it? How can you tell?
2. Identify the participants and the role that each plays.
• Change agent system
• Initiator system
• Client system
• Target system
• Action system
3. Identify the specific change being proposed, and conduct a force field
analysis.
4. Who perceives the need for what kind of change? Are there differences
of opinion? Whose views need to be considered, and how do you choose
among competing views?
5. Do you need any additional information before you make your report to
the governor? Should some kind of change proceed?

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 69
Case Study 2.2
1 National Criminal Justice Reference Service (2008). In the Spotlight: Club Drugs. Retrieved
January 28, 2008, from the NCJRS web site at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/
Summary.html
2 http://www.clubdrugs.gov/
3 http://www.drugabuse.gov/ClubAlert/Clubdrugalert.html
4 http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656p
5 http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656p
6 http://www.drugabuse.gov/ResearchReports/MDMA/default.html
Club Drugs1
“NIDA (National Institute on Drug Abuse)–supported research has shown
that use of club drugs can cause serious health problems and, in some cases, even
death. Used in combination with alcohol, these drugs can be even more dangerous.
No club drug is benign” (ClubDrugs.gov,2 National Institute on Drug Abuse).
“Club drug” is a vague term that refers to a wide variety of drugs, includ-
ing MDMA (Ecstasy), GHB, Rohypnol, ketamine, methamphetamine, and LSD.
Uncertainties about the drug sources, pharmacological agents, chemicals used
to manufacture them, and possible contaminants make it difficult to determine
toxicity, consequences, and symptoms (Community Drug Alert Bulletin: Club
Drugs,3 National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2004).
To some, club drugs seem harmless. In reality, these substances can cause
serious physical and psychological problems—even death. Often, the raves
where these drugs are used are promoted as alcohol-free events, which gives
parents a false sense of security that their children will be safe attending such
parties. These parents are not aware that raves may actually be havens for the
illicit sale and abuse of club drugs (Information Bulletin: Raves,4 National
Drug Intelligence Center, 2001).
Attendance at raves can range from 30 people in a small club to thousands in
a stadium or open field. Because MDMA can cause users to involuntarily grind
their teeth, ravers often chew on baby pacifiers or lollipops to offset this effect.
Additionally, ravers may use glowsticks and flashing lights to heighten the hal-
lucinogenic properties of MDMA and the visual distortions brought on by its
use (Information Bulletin: Raves,5 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2001).
There are numerous dangers associated with the use of club drugs. For example:
• MDMA can cause a user’s blood pressure and heart rate to increase
to dangerous levels, and can lead to heart or kidney failure. It can
cause severe hyperthermia from the combination of the drug’s
stimulant effect with the often hot, crowded atmosphere of a rave
(MDMA (Ecstasy) Abuse Research Report,6 National Institute on
Drug Abuse, 2005).

http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/

http://www.clubdrugs.gov/

http://www.drugabuse.gov/ClubAlert/Clubdrugalert.html

http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656p

http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656p

http://www.drugabuse.gov/ResearchReports/MDMA/default.html

70 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.2, continued
7 http://www.drugabuse.gov/ResearchReports/MDMA/default.html
8 http://www.drugabuse.gov/Infofacts/RohypnolGHB.html
9 http://www.drugabuse.gov/ClubAlert/Clubdrugalert.html
10 http://www.drugabuse.gov/ResearchReports/methamph/methamph.html
11 http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656p
12 http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/facts.html
13 http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/legislation.html
• Studies have shown that some heavy MDMA users experience
long-lasting confusion, depression, and selective impairment of
working memory and attention processes (MDMA (Ecstasy) Abuse
Research Report,7 National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2005).
• Rohypnol and GHB are predominantly central nervous system
depressants. Because they are often colorless, tasteless, and odor-
less, they can be added to beverages and ingested unknowingly
(InfoFacts: Rohypnol and GHB,8 National Institute on Drug
Abuse, 2006).
• Low-dose intoxication from ketamine results in impaired atten-
tion, learning ability, and memory. At higher doses, ketamine can
cause delirium, amnesia, impaired motor function, high blood
pressure, depression, and potentially fatal respiratory problems
(Community Drug Alert Bulletin: Club Drugs,9 National Institute
on Drug Abuse, 2004).
• Methamphetamine is a powerfully addictive stimulant associated
with serious health conditions, including memory loss, aggression,
and potential heart and brain damage. Users can also display a
number of psychotic features, including paranoia, auditory hal-
lucinations, mood disturbances, and delusions (Methamphetamine
Abuse and Addiction Research Report,10 National Institute on
Drug Abuse, 2006).
Because of the dangers associated with the use of club drugs, communi-
ties and law enforcement agencies are developing anti-rave initiatives to try to
curb the use of club drugs. For example, they are passing new ordinances that
establish juvenile curfews and licensing requirements for large public gather-
ings and are enforcing existing fire codes and health, safety, and liquor laws
(Information Bulletin: Raves,11 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2001).
The NCJRS Spotlight on Club Drugs contains the following information:
• Facts and Figures12 – Includes the latest information and statistics.
• Legislation13 – A sample of links to online federal and state legisla-
tion and testimony.

http://www.drugabuse.gov/ResearchReports/MDMA/default.html

http://www.drugabuse.gov/Infofacts/RohypnolGHB.html

http://www.drugabuse.gov/ClubAlert/Clubdrugalert.html

http://www.drugabuse.gov/ResearchReports/methamph/methamph.html

http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656p

http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/facts.html

http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/legislation.html

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 71
Case Study 2.2, continued
14 http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/publications.html
15 http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/programs.html
16 http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/training.html
17 http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/grants.html
18 http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/additional.html
• Publications14 – A sample of available resources.
• Programs15 – Examples of state and local programs and initiatives
available online.
• Training and Technical Assistance16 – A sample of training and
technical assistance opportunities available through nationally
recognized agencies and associations.
• Grants and Funding17 – Links to federal funding opportunities.
• Related Resources18 – Examples of nationally recognized agencies
and organizations that provide services or information.
Questions
Assume that you are part of a task force appointed by the White House to
address the growing problem of club drugs in the United States. Your committee
has just been given a briefing by top White House staff (i.e., the article you just
read). Your committee has been asked to answer the following questions:
1. Describe the need for change. What is the extent of the problem, and what
kind of data documents the need for change?
2. What kinds of causes does the report suggest or imply? Give examples.
3. What kinds of interventions might be suggested by this brief analysis? Give
examples.

http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/publications.html

http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/programs.html

http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/training.html

http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/grants.html

http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/club_drugs/additional.html

72 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.3
Incorporating Restorative and Community Justice
into American Sentencing and Corrections
Instructions: Read the report below and answer the questions that follow.1
Restorative justice and community justice represent new ways of thinking
about crime. The theories underlying restorative justice suggest that government
should surrender its monopoly over responses to crime to those most directly
affected—the victim, the offender, and the community. Community justice rede-
fines the roles and goals of criminal justice agencies to include a broader mis-
sion—to prevent crime, address local social problems and conflicts, and involve
neighborhood residents in planning and decisionmaking. Both restorative and
community justice are based on the premise that communities will be strengthened
if local citizens participate in responding to crime, and both envision responses
tailored to the preferences and needs of victims, communities, and offenders.
In contrast to this bottom-up approach, recent changes in sentencing law
are premised on retributive ideas about punishing wrongdoers and on the desir-
ability of controlling risk, increasing public safety, and reducing sentencing
disparities. Restorative and community justice goals of achieving appropriate,
individualized dispositions often conflict with the retributive goal of imposing
certain, consistent, proportionate sentences.
There are many ways to resolve this normative conflict. Restorative and
community justice initiatives could continue to confine their efforts to juvenile
offenders and people who commit minor crimes. This seems unlikely, as these
approaches are expanding rapidly and winning many new supporters who
want to extend their application. Alternatively, retributive sentencing laws
could be revised or narrowed. But this too seems unlikely in the near term.
How precisely the two divergent trends will be reconciled remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that restorative and community justice values will
to some extent become more institutionalized in criminal justice processes.2
1 Adapted from: Kurki, L. (1999). “Incorporating Restorative and Community Justice into
American Sentencing and Corrections.” Sentencing & Corrections: Issues for the 21st Century.
Papers from the Executive Sessions on Sentencing and Corrections, No. 3 (NCJ 175723).
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of
Justice. Retrieved January 30, 2008, at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/175723 .
2 This paper is one of four in the first “round” of publications from the Executive Sessions on
Sentencing and Corrections. Together the four constitute a framework for understanding the
issues raised in the sessions. The other three are Fragmentation of Sentencing and Correc-
tions in America, by M. Tonry (NCJ 175721); Reconsidering Indeterminate and Structured
Sentencing, by M. Tonry (NCJ 175722); and Reforming Sentencing and Corrections for Just
Punishment and Public Safety, by M.E. Smith and W.J. Dickey (NCJ 175724). All: Research in
Brief—Sentencing & Corrections: Issues for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, National Institute of Justice/Corrections Program Office, September 1999.

http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/175723

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 73
Case Study 2.3, continued
What is Restorative Justice?
Restorative justice has evolved from a little-known concept into a term used
widely but in divergent ways. There is no doubt about its appeal, although the
varied uses of the term cause some confusion. The umbrella term “restorative
justice” has been applied to initiatives identified as restorative by some but not
by others. Examples are sex-offender notification laws, victim impact state-
ments, and murder victim survivors’ “right” to be present at executions. Most
advocates of restorative justice agree that it involves five basic principles:
• Crime consists of more than violation of the criminal law and
defiance of government authority.
• Crime involves disruptions in a three-dimensional relationship of
victim, community, and offender.
• Because crime harms the victim and the community, the primary
goals should be to repair the harm and heal the victim and the
community.
• The victim, the community, and the offender should all participate
in determining the response to crime; government should surrender
its monopoly over that process.
• Case disposition should be based primarily on the victim’s and the
community’s needs—not solely on the offender’s needs or culpabil-
ity, the dangers he or she presents, or his or her criminal history.
The original goal of restorative justice was to restore harmony between
victims and offenders. For victims, this meant restitution for tangible losses
and emotional losses. For offenders, it meant taking responsibility, confronting
shame, and regaining dignity.
This notion has evolved, with the major recent conceptual development
being the incorporation of a role for the community. Many people still asso-
ciate restorative justice primarily with victim-offender mediation or, more
broadly (but mistakenly), with any victim-oriented services. The more recent
conceptualization—that offenses occur within a three-dimensional relation-
ship—may change the movement.
All three parties should be able to participate in rebuilding the relationship
and in deciding on responses to the crime. The distinctive characteristic is direct,
face-to-face dialogue among victim, offender, and increasingly, the community.
What is Community Justice?
The concept of community justice is less clear. It can be portrayed as a
set of new organizational strategies that change the focus of criminal justice
from a narrow, case-processing orientation: operations are moved to neighbor-

74 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.3, continued
hood locations that offer flexible working hours and services, neighborhoods
are assigned their own officers and are provided with more information than
is standard practice, and residents may identify crime problems and define
priorities for neighborhood revitalization. Most experience with community
justice is in the context of community policing, but prosecutors, judges, and
correctional officers are increasingly rethinking their roles and goals.
The most frequently cited standpoints for community justice are problem
solving and community empowerment. Problem solving is understood broadly:
first, as an effort to build partnerships between criminal justice and other
government agencies and between government agencies and neighborhoods;
and, second, as an attempt to address some of the complex social problems
underlying crime.
Community justice proponents suggest that criminal justice agencies change
the way they interact with the public, learn to listen to citizens, and work
together with local people to prevent crime and solve crime-related problems.3
Advocates of community justice believe that to maximize public safety and
optimize crime prevention, residents must work on an equal basis with govern-
ment agency representatives and elected officials. Dennis Maloney,
Director of the Deschutes County, Oregon, Department of Community
Justice has described the connection between citizen involvement and crime
prevention: “In a community justice framework, the goal is to engage as many
citizens as possible in building a better community . . . . People who share a
strong sense of community are far less likely to violate the trust of others. Their
stake in and bond with the community is the strongest force of guardianship
to prevent crime from flourishing.”
Should Restorative and Community Justice
be Incorporated into the Criminal Justice System?
Advocates of restorative justice and community justice often differ over the
desirability of becoming part of the official criminal justice system. Restorative
justice proponents believe in the efficacy of grassroots citizen efforts, and thus
many want to keep restorative justice initiatives separate from the criminal
justice system. Community justice advocates often support a total, systemwide
transformation that would incorporate the new principles. Both groups are
concerned about the role of government in these approaches and their growing
popularity. They emphasize that restorative and community justice represent
fundamental change: comprehensive philosophies or theories, not silver bul-
lets or fads.
3 Barajas, E., “Moving Toward Community Justice,” in Community Justice: Striving for Safe,
Secure, and Just Communities, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute
of Corrections, 1996.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 75
Case Study 2.3, continued
Proponents are also concerned that criminal justice agencies will add new
community or restorative justice programs to appear “fashionable” or to solve
a particular problem, but will do so without fundamentally rethinking their
missions. Ronald Earle, District Attorney in Travis County, Texas, summarized
this concern: “The question is how to focus the criminal justice system and
fashion programs on a new way of thinking, not just another way of doing.”
Some advocates are skeptical about whether the new goals and principles can
be meaningfully adopted by criminal justice agencies, which like many other
government agencies tend to value passionless, specialized, professionalized,
and routinized operations.
Another worry is that government agencies or experts will establish
guidelines, standards, and requirements for programs reflecting these values,
thereby bureaucratizing them and once again “stealing the conflicts” from
communities. As Ronald Earle put it, the “unstructured lack of standardiza-
tion is the genius of the movement,” but, at the same time, he added, “there
is a great temptation to create a national template for community justice
programs.” The challenge for government will be to encourage and support
the new initiatives without stifling the spontaneity, creativity, and grassroots
ties that are their strengths.
What is Happening Now?
A fundamental difficulty in documenting or estimating the impact of
restorative or community justice in the United States is the lack of systematic
data. No one knows how many or what kinds of programs there are; how many
offenders, victims, and volunteers participate; the amounts of restitution paid
or community service performed; or the effects on victims, communities, and
offenders. It is nearly impossible to monitor what is happening in different
states or regions.
Little evaluation research is available, and there is no consensus on how
to measure “success.” Most advocates contend that recidivism is not the cor-
rect or only measure. Evaluations might also consider such measures as victim
and offender satisfaction, amounts of restitution or community service, rates
at which reparative agreements are fulfilled, levels of volunteer participation
and community action, and victims’ and offenders’ quality of life.
Some advocates do not want to encourage rigorous evaluation because
that might create pressure to standardize and “expertize” the movements. But
because the varied programs and practices are what make restorative and com-
munity justice visible, concrete, and distinctive, it is important to document
their types, analyze their characteristics, and evaluate outcomes.
The dearth of information affects the writings of practitioners and academics.
There is, however, a sizable literature on the principles and goals of restorative
justice, how it differs from traditional criminal justice approaches, and its processes

76 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.3, continued
and terminology.4 Other works describe programs or present details of local proj-
ects.5 Most of the literature on community justice focuses on community policing,
with little information on community prosecution, courts, or corrections.
Restorative Justice Practices
Although something akin to restorative justice has long been observed in
premodern and indigenous societies, restorative justice principles, in the form
of victim-offender reconciliation programs, appeared in Western industrial-
ized countries only in the 1970s. The first program was established in 1974 in
Kitchener, Ontario. By the 1990s, such programs had spread to all Western
countries—at least 700 in Europe and 300 in the United States.
Victim-offender mediation. Victim-offender mediation is the most wide-
spread and evaluated type of restorative program. Offenders and victims meet
with volunteer mediators to discuss the effects of the crime on their lives,
express their concerns and feelings, and work out a restitution agreement. The
agreement is often seen as secondary to emotional healing and growth. Victims
consistently report that the most important element of mediation is being able
to talk with the offender and express their feelings, and offenders also empha-
size the importance of face-to-face communication. Advocates believe that
developing an offender’s empathy for the victim has preventive effects.
In many countries, victim-offender mediation is widely used. In Austria, for
example, it became an official part of the juvenile justice system as early as 1989.
Public prosecutors refer juveniles to mediation, probation officers coordinate cases,
and social workers serve as mediators. If an agreement is reached and completed,
the case is dismissed.6 In the United States, most programs are operated by private,
nonprofit organizations; handle largely juvenile cases; and function as diversion
programs for minor, nonviolent crimes. However, there is a movement to develop
programs established and operated (or at least initiated) by corrections depart-
ments, police, or prosecutors and used as a condition of either probation or drop-
ping charges. Most studies of mediation programs report high rates of success.7
4 Examples are Braithwaite, J., “Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts,” in Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, v. 25, M. Tonry (ed.), Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1999; and Van Ness, D., and K. Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice,
3rd ed. Newark, NJ: LexisNexis Matthew Bender, 2006.
5 Galaway, B., and J. Hudson, eds., Restorative Justice: International Perspectives, Amsterdam:
Kugler, 1996; and Messmer, H., and H.U. Otto, Restorative Justice on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials
of Victim-Offender Mediation, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1992.
6 Lösching-Gspandl, M., and M. Kilchling, “Victim/Offender Mediation and Victim Compensa-
tion in Austria and Germany— Stock-taking and Perspectives for Future Research,” European
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 5 (1997): 58–78.
7 Umbreit, M., Victim Meets Offender: The Impact of Restorative Justice and Mediation, Mon-
sey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1994. It should be noted that evaluations of restorative justice
conducted in the United States are usually not based on experimental and control groups, do
not often measure recidivism rates, and seldom use sophisticated research designs.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 77
Case Study 2.3, continued
Advocates are beginning to challenge the assumption that mediation is
not suitable for violent or sexual crimes. Increasingly, in the United States and
Canada, for example, victims and offenders meet in prisons. These meetings
are not oriented to a tangible goal such as a restitution agreement, nor does
the offender obtain benefits like early release or parole consideration. Usually
the meetings are held because the victim wants to meet the offender and learn
more about what happened to reach beyond fear and anger and facilitate heal-
ing. The results of a Canadian survey indicated that 89 percent of victims of
serious, violent crimes wanted to meet the offender.8
Serious violent crimes are usually mediated on a case-by-case basis, but
the need for permanent programs is growing. Such programs are offered, for
example, by the Correctional Service of Canada in British Columbia and the
Yukon Territory and by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
Family group conferencing. Family group conferencing is based on the
same rationales as victim-offender mediation, with two main differences.
Conferencing involves a broader range of people (family, friends, coworkers,
and teachers), and family members and other supporters tend to take collec-
tive responsibility for the offender and for carrying out his or her agreement.
The other difference is that conferencing often relies on police, probation, or
social service agencies for organization and facilitation.
Family group conferences originated in New Zealand, where they became
part of the juvenile justice system in 1989. There, the new juvenile justice
model, which incorporates Maori traditions of involving the family and the
community in addressing wrongdoing, has four dispositional options:
• An immediate warning by the police.
• “ Youth Aid Section” dispositions in which a special police unit
may require, for example, an apology to the victim or community
service.
• Family group conferencing.
• Traditional youth court sentencing.
About 60 percent of juvenile offenders receive a warning or go to the Youth
Aid Section, 30 percent go to conferencing, and 10 percent go to youth court.9
By the mid-1990s, family group conferencing had been adopted in every
state and territory of Australia. In South Australia, it is used statewide as a
8 Gustafson, D., “Facilitating Communication between Victims and Offenders in Cases of Seri-
ous and Violent Crime,” The International Community Corrections Association Journal on
Community Corrections 8 (1997): 4–49.
9 Maxwell, G., and A. Morris, Family, Victims, and Culture: Youth Justice in New Zealand, Wel-
lington, New Zealand: Social Policy Agency and Institute of Criminology, Victoria University
of Wellington, 1993.

78 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.3, continued
component of the juvenile justice system and resembles the New Zealand
approach. In Wagga Wagga, New South Wales, conferences (originally part of
a police diversion program) were organized and facilitated by police officers
who were often in uniform.10 Responsibility was transferred to juvenile justice
agencies in 1998, and trained community members now facilitate conferences.
In Canberra, the Federal Police set up a program called the Reintegrative Sham-
ing Experiment, which involved more than 100 trained police officers.
There is evidence that conferencing can be successful. An evaluation of the
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, Police Family Group Conferencing program revealed
that typical police officers were able to conduct conferences in conformity
with restorative justice and due process principles if adequately trained and
supervised, and that very high percentages of offenders, victims, and other
participants were pleased with the process.11 Evaluation of Canberra’s Rein-
tegrative Shaming Experiment showed similar results.12
Sentencing circles. Sentencing circles originated in traditional Native Canadian
and Native American peacemaking. They involve the victim and the offender, their
supporters, and key community members, and they are open to everyone in the
community. They attempt to address the underlying causes of crime, seek responses,
and agree on offenders’ responsibilities. The process is based on peacemaking,
negotiation, and consensus, and each circle member must agree on the outcomes.
Sentencing circles are so named because participants sit in a circle, and a
“talking piece” (a feather, for example) is passed from person to person. When
participants take the talking piece, they explain their feelings about the crime
and express support for the victim and the offender. Separate circles often are
held for the offender and the victim before they join in a shared circle.
In Minnesota, sentencing circles are used not only in Native American
communities but also in rural white, suburban, and inner-city black communi-
ties (see “Minnesota—A Pioneer in Restorative Justice”). Community Justice
Committees, established by citizen volunteers, handle organizational and
administrative tasks and provide “keepers” who lead the discussions. Judges
refer cases, and the committees make the final decision on acceptance. The
agreements reached are presented to the judge as sentencing recommendations.
10 Wundersitz, J., and S. Hetzel, “Family Conferencing for Young Offenders: The South Austra-
lian Experience,” in J. Hudson, A. Morris, G. Maxwell, and B. Galaway (eds.), Family Group
Conferences: Perspectives on Policy and Practice, Monsey, NY: Willow Tree Press, 1996.
11 McCold, P., and B. Wachtel, Restorative Policing Experiment: The Bethlehem Pennsylvania
Police Family Group Conferencing Project, Pipersville, PA: Community Service Foundation,
1998. This evaluation was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice.
12 Sherman, L., H. Strang, G. Barnes, J. Braithwaite, N. Ipken, and M-M. The, Experiments in
Restorative Policing: A Progress Report to the National Police Research Unit in the Canberra
Reintegrative Shaming Experiments (RISE), Canberra: Australian Federal Police and Australian
National University, 1998.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 79
Case Study 2.3, continued
In some cases, the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney participate in the
circle, and then the agreement becomes the final sentence.
Reparative probation and other citizen boards. Reparative probation in
Vermont involves a probation sentence ordered by a judge, followed by a
meeting between the offender and volunteer citizen members of a Reparative
Citizen Board. Together they draw up a contract, based on restorative prin-
ciples, which the offender agrees to carry out. Fulfilling the contract is the only
condition of probation (see “Vermont—Statewide Reparative Probation”).
Vermont’s program is different from most other restorative justice initia-
tives in the United States. Designed by the state’s Department of Corrections, it
operates statewide, handles adult cases, and involves a sizable number of citizen
volunteers. Compared with family group conferencing or sentencing circles, the
Reparative Citizen Boards work faster, require less preparation, and can process
more cases; however, they involve fewer community members. For example,
offenders’ and victims’ families and supporters usually are not present.
Citizen boards also may be established to adjudicate minor crimes. For
example, a Merchant Accountability Board in Deschutes County, Oregon, con-
sists of local business owners who adjudicate thefts of property valued at $50 or
less, and some more serious cases involving property valued at between $51 and
$750. Under an agreement with the district attorney, the police refer all minor
shoplifting cases directly to the program. If offenders decide to participate, they
are typically ordered by the board to pay fines, make restitution, or both.
Manitoba’s Restorative Resolutions Project offers an alternative to custo-
dial sentences for offenders who otherwise are likely to face a minimum prison
sentence of six months. Offenders and project staff develop sentencing plans,
and victims are encouraged to participate. The plans are presented to judges
as nonbinding recommendations. Most plans require restitution, community
service, and counseling or therapy. A recent evaluation revealed that offenders
who participate have significantly fewer supervision violations and slightly
fewer new convictions than those in comparison groups.13
Minnesota: A Pioneer in Restorative Justice
Minnesota has been a groundbreaker in restorative justice. Its Department
of Corrections created the Restorative Justice Initiative in 1992, hiring Kay
Pranis as a full-time Restorative Justice Planner in 1994—the first such posi-
tion in the country. The initiative offers training in restorative justice principles
and practices, provides technical assistance to communities in designing and
implementing practices, and creates networks of professionals and activists to
share knowledge and provide support.
13 Bonta, J., J. Rooney, and S. Wallace-Capretta, Restorative Justice: An Evaluation of the Restor-
ative Resolutions Project, Ottawa: Solicitor General of Canada, 1998.

80 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.3, continued
Sentencing circles. Besides promoting victim-offender mediation, family
group conferencing, and neighborhood conferencing, the department has
introduced sentencing circles. Citizen volunteers and criminal justice officials
from Minnesota have participated in training in the Yukon Territory, where
peacemaking circles have been held since the late 1980s. In Minnesota, the
circle process is used by the Mille Lacs Indian Reservation and in other com-
munities in several counties.
The circle process. The circle process usually has several phases. First, the
Community Justice Committee conducts an intake interview with offenders
who want to participate. Then, separate healing circles are held for the victim
(and others who feel harmed) and the offender. The committee tries to cultivate
a close personal relationship with victims and offenders and to create support
networks for them. In the end, a sentencing circle, open to the community,
meets to work out a sentencing plan. In the towns of Milaca and Princeton,
follow-up circles monitor and discuss the offender’s progress.
Vermont—Statewide Reparative Probation
A pilot reparative probation program began in Vermont in 1994, and the
first cases were heard by a Reparative Citizen Board the following year. Three
features distinguish this restorative justice initiative from most others in the
United States: (1) The Department of Corrections, headed by John Gorczyk,
designed the program; (2) it is implemented statewide; (3) and it involves a siz-
able number of volunteer citizens. In 1998, the program was named a winner
in the prestigious Innovations in American Government competition.
The process. The concept is straightforward. Following an adjudication
of guilt, the judge sentences the offender to probation, with the sentence sus-
pended and only two conditions imposed: the offender will commit no more
crimes and will complete the reparative program. The volunteer board mem-
bers meet with the offender and the victim and together discuss the offense,
its effects on victim and community, and the life situations of victim and
offender. All participants must agree on a contract, which is to be fulfilled by
the offender. It is based on five goals: (1) the victim is restored and healed,
(2) the community is restored, (3) the offender understands the effects of the
crime, (4) the offender learns ways to avoid reoffending, and (5) the commu-
nity offers reintegration to the offender. Because reparative probation targets
minor crimes, it is not meant as a prison diversion program.
The numbers. In 1998, the 44 boards handled 1,200 cases, accounting for
more than one-third of the probation caseload. More than 300 trained volun-
teers serve as board members. Ten coordinators handle case management and
organization for the boards. The goal is to have the boards handle about 70
percent of the targeted probation cases. That only about 17 percent of offend-

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 81
Case Study 2.3, continued
ers fail to complete their agreements or attend followup board meetings is a
measure of the program’s success. These offenders are referred back to court.
Related initiatives. Other practices based on restorative justice are under-
way. More than 150 volunteers or Department of Corrections staff have been
trained in family group conferencing. A Community Justice Center is operating
in Burlington, and others are being developed elsewhere. The department is
also looking into sentencing circles and ways to become more active in crime
prevention and early intervention.
Community Justice Practices
People who have no personal experience with community justice are often
preoccupied with what “community” means and who is involved. Explana-
tions vary. Reginald Wilkinson, Director of Ohio’s Department of Rehabili-
tation and Correction, says: “In a community, there would exist a sense of
hope, belonging, and caring . . . . A sense of commitment, responsibility, and
sacrifice would be basic tenets of a communitarian.” For Minnesota Depart-
ment of Corrections Restorative Justice Planner Kay Pranis, “Community
self-defines around the issue that surfaces, so everybody who sees themselves
as a stakeholder in a particular issue [makes up the community].” Vermont
Department of Corrections Commissioner John Gorczyk says: “Beyond place,
community is defined by relationships and the amount of interaction. In my
community, the quality of those interactions, doing favors for one another, is
what builds community.”
Although in “practicing” community justice it is essential to identify the
community and consider possible definitions, it is at least as important to think
about the community’s role. While many new approaches in criminal justice
have improved access to and satisfaction with justice services, often they have
not transformed the role of citizens from service recipient to participant and
decisionmaker.14 For many community justice advocates, the ultimate goal is
for communities to feel ownership of programs, but that can be achieved only
if citizens participate. Even then the question remains whether government
genuinely shares power or simply allows communities to supplement its power
and exercise it only in certain types of cases.
Community policing and prosecution. Experiences with community polic-
ing show there is no shared understanding of the community’s role, and that
it is difficult to generate citizen participation. Priorities and routines vary; for
example, some efforts rely on heavy street-level enforcement, while others
emphasize citizen involvement, better-quality public services, delivery of com-
14 Bazemore, G., “The ‘Community’ in Community Justice: Issues, Themes, and Questions for
the New Neighborhood Sanctioning Models,” Justice System Journal, 19 (1997): 193–228.

82 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.3, continued
munity-based treatment, or diversionary policing that withholds enforcement
as a way to build relationships with communities.
Few studies have attempted to measure the extent to which the rhetoric
of community empowerment, involvement, and partnership building becomes
reality, and the results are not particularly encouraging. Community input is
often limited to assisting law enforcement. Many evaluations have not shown
positive results, because implementation is often incomplete or partial.15
Many applications of community policing and prosecution are not fun-
damentally different from traditional approaches, although they may shift
control to local levels and include the community in law enforcement efforts.
They often promote tougher responses to crime than do traditional approaches
because the emphasis is on a broader view of crime control that takes seriously
minor, nuisance, and quality-of-life offenses. Some approaches, such as the
one taken by the District Attorney of Travis County, Texas, however, clearly
identify themselves as restorative (see “Travis County, Texas—Community
Justice as the Prosecutorial Response”).
Applications in courts and corrections. The first community court in the
United States, New York City’s Midtown Community Court, is based on
the idea of partnership with the neighborhood and focuses on quality-of-life
crimes. Several restorative elements are evident:
• Offenders are sentenced to work on projects in local neighbor-
hoods.
• Court staff try to link offenders with drug treatment, health care,
education, and other social services and thus combine punishment
with help.
• The community is encouraged to participate in shaping restorative,
community-based sanctions.16
Nearly 70 percent of those convicted are ordered to perform community
work, and of these nearly 70 percent complete it without violations. By the
Fall of 1996, almost 33,000 defendants had been arraigned.17 The court houses
health care and drug treatment providers, organizes education and job train-
ing, maintains mediation services for community-level conflicts, and provides
counseling rooms and space to perform community service.
15 Skogan, W.G., and S.M. Hartnett, Community Policing, Chicago Style, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
16 Feinblatt, J., and G. Berman, Responding to the Community: Principles for Planning and
Creating a Community Court, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 1997.
17 Midtown Community Court, The Midtown Community Court Experiment: A Progress Report,
New York: Midtown Community Court, 1997.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 83
Case Study 2.3, continued
The Manhattan Court opened in 1993 and was followed by several oth-
ers. The Portland (Oregon) Community Court began operations in 1998,
and plans for community courts are underway in Baltimore, Hartford (Con-
necticut), Hempstead (New York), Indianapolis, Minneapolis, St. Louis, and
no doubt elsewhere.
Deschutes County, Oregon, has made a comprehensive effort to implement
community justice in corrections (as distinct from traditional community cor-
rections), reinventing its Community Corrections Department as the Depart-
ment of Community Justice. Committed to principles of both community and
restorative justice, the department differs in this respect from most current
community policing and prosecution initiatives.
The Deschutes approach is especially ambitious (see “Deschutes County,
Oregon—Reinventing Community Corrections”). A true paradigm shift would
combine operational strategies and the crime prevention and citizen involvement
goals of community justice with the values and practices of restorative justice.
Travis County, Texas: Community Justice
as the Prosecutorial Response
Ronald Earle, District Attorney of Travis County (Austin), Texas, is
a strong advocate of restorative and community justice. Recognizing that
people’s natural reaction to crime is anger and fear, particularly if they lack
power to influence responses, he believes this wasted energy can fuel positive
change. This can be done if citizens are empowered and participate in planning
and deciding on the response to crime.
To promote such participation, he drafted the Texas law that authorizes in
each county a Community Justice Council and Community Justice Task Force.
The task force includes representatives of criminal justice agencies, social and
health services, and community organizations. With task force assistance, the
council, consisting of elected officials, handles planning and policymaking and
prepares a Community Justice Plan.
Many efforts are directed at juvenile offenses. In Austin, the Juvenile Pro-
bation Office offers victim-offender mediation for young people in trouble. For
misdemeanors, juveniles may be diverted from court to Neighborhood Confer-
ence Committees. These consist of panels of trained adult citizens who meet
with the juvenile offenders and their parents and together with them develop
contracts tailored to the case.
The Travis County Children’s Advocacy Center provides support and
help to abused children through collaboration among social and criminal
justice agencies, medical professionals, and private citizens. The Child Protec-
tion Team brings together police officers, social workers, and prosecutors to
improve responses to child abuse and to reduce traumatization when cases are
investigated and prosecuted.

84 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.3, continued
Can the Justice System Incorporate Restorative Principles?
Although many activists would prefer that restorative justice remain an
unofficial alternative to the criminal justice system, others contend that there
are reasons for a systemwide shift to incorporate its values.
Why Not the Best?
If restorative justice is a significantly better way to deal with crime, pro-
ponents ask why not implement it systemwide? If it really is a better idea, why
should it not become the governing principle of the whole criminal justice
system rather than be confined to small-scale, grassroots activities? Minne-
sota Restorative Justice Planner Kay Pranis emphasized the need to focus on
community when she said, “It is very important for us to recognize that our
current criminal justice interventions actually destroy community. So even to
get neutral would be a huge step for this system.”
No Significant or Lasting Effects on Values and Practices
Advocates contend that restorative justice is unlikely to have significant or
lasting effects on the official criminal justice system if it continues to operate
primarily as local, unorganized grassroots activities. It is doubtful whether
any program can be truly restorative in a system based on retributive values.
Even if restorative justice principles cannot completely transform the justice
system, they may turn criminal justice policy and values in another, arguably
better, direction.
Increased Control And Punishment
Advocates argue that if crime is seen in both traditional and restorative
ways—as an offense against the state and as harm to the victim and the com-
munity—a double system of punishment may be created. Offenders will first
be processed through the traditional system and receive punishment and then
move to the informal restorative programs to agree to a reparative contract.
As a consequence, they often will be subjected to greater social control and
more sanctions.
Deschutes County, Oregon:
Reinventing Community Corrections
Deschutes County, Oregon, is attempting to apply community justice
principles throughout its correctional system. In 1996 the County Board of
Commissioners passed a Community Justice Resolution, which recognizes com-
munity justice as “the central mission and purpose of the county’s community
corrections effort.” It calls for incorporating community justice principles

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 85
Case Study 2.3, continued
into corrections by striking a balance among prevention, early intervention,
and correctional efforts; ensuring participation by and restoration of victims;
including community decisionmaking in crime prevention and reduction; and
fostering offender accountability. In recognition of this major change, the Com-
munity Corrections Department, headed by Dennis Maloney, was renamed the
Department of Community Justice.
Basic principles. A lay citizen body, the Commission on Children and
Families, was assigned authority over the department’s budget. In 1998, it set
budget principles that for the first time included:
• Enhancing public safety.
• Paying particular attention to offender accountability, responsibil-
ity, and skill development.
• Incorporating the findings of research on cost-effective interven-
tions.
• Focusing on restoration and defining offenders’ accountability as
meeting their obligations to victims and the community.
• Encouraging volunteer involvement and reducing dependence on
service delivery by professionals.
• Managing crime problems as cost-effectively as possible.
• Directing reallocated resources to crime prevention.
• Viewing investment in prevention as the first order of business.
State law permits the county to apply any savings in juvenile detention to
crime prevention.
Community action and other initiatives. A number of former juvenile pro-
bation officers constitute a Community Action Team, which devotes most of
its time and resources to neighborhood crime prevention. The new Community
Justice Center contains space for juvenile custody facilities, houses a number of
criminal justice agencies as well as victim service and other nonprofit organiza-
tions, and has a meeting room available for community groups.
Deschutes County also offers victim-offender mediation in criminal cases
and dispute resolution in other conflicts. Merchant Accountability Boards,
consisting of local business owners, adjudicate minor shoplifting cases. Repara-
tive community service projects are operated through the collaboration of
business owners, neighborhood residents, and community leaders. As part of
these projects, offenders have built houses for Habitat for Humanity, cut and
distributed firewood for elderly citizens, and built and maintained parks.

86 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.3, continued
Trivialization of Restorative Programs
If the criminal justice system endorses restorative justice principles but does
not participate in designing, implementing, and monitoring programs based on
them, it is not likely to refer other than trivial cases. Criminal justice agencies
and officials understandably do not want to rely heavily on practices whose
outcomes they cannot comprehend, influence, predict, or trust. For the same
reason, judges often are reluctant to divert offenders to these programs.
No Resource Savings
Although restorative justice advocates emphasize that the goal is not
decreased criminal justice caseloads or costs, it is unrealistic not to consider
resource savings in the current climate of exploding correctional costs. Few
resources will be saved if restorative solutions only supplement traditional
punishments or are used only for minor crimes.
Inconsistent Practices and Outcomes
The most common argument against restorative justice is that practices
and outcomes vary with the particular program, and that fairness requires
comparable crimes and criminals to be punished equally. Restorative justice
involves individualized responses to crimes.
Proportionality and equality in punishment are often understood narrowly
as calling for the same sentence for people who have committed similar crimes.
However, they could just as well be interpreted as requiring comparable sen-
tences for comparable offenses. This would mean punishment or responses may
vary as long as they are meaningfully related to the nature and effects of the
crime. Thus, in principle, there is no reason restorative justice cannot respect
the tenets of proportionality and equality.
In practice, responses to crime will be different and inconsistent as long as
restorative justice is not implemented systemwide. Many people are concerned
that assigning substantial punishment power to lay volunteers will mean ran-
dom, inequitable, and capriciously severe sanctions. Restorative justice, with
its positive, constructive goals, attempts to move in the opposite direction. If
participants, including the offender, understand and accept restorative justice
principles, the requirements of fairness will not be circumvented and there will
be no extreme consequences.
If there is no systemwide shift, programs based on restorative justice will
probably continue to handle only minor offenses, and problems of inequity
will likely not become serious. It will not much matter whether one offender is
sentenced to 10 hours of community service and $50 in restitution and another,
who commits a similar crime, to 20 hours of service and $100 in restitution.
However, the more serious the crimes, the more unjust the differences could
become and the greater the need for consistent practices.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 87
Case Study 2.3, continued
Other matters of equity relate to socioeconomic considerations. Without
official encouragement and support, restorative justice initiatives are likely to
be concentrated in middle-class white neighborhoods or rural areas, and volun-
teers will disproportionately be white, middle-class, and middle-aged and older
individuals, as these are the demographic groups from which activists tend to
emerge. Moreover, if citizen activists work on their own, new practices may
be concentrated in areas with relatively minor crime problems. By contrast,
disadvantaged urban neighborhoods with large proportions of minority group
members and immigrants—who are disproportionately affected by serious
crime—would be unlikely to benefit.
The Future of Restorative and Community Justice
How deeply restorative and community justice ideas will penetrate the tra-
ditional justice system remains to be seen. So far, restorative justice approaches
are used much more for juveniles than for adults, and for minor offenses rather
than for serious crime. Experience with community justice has consistently
shown that generating citizen involvement and building relationships with
the community is a challenge. Both movements have spread rapidly, however,
and both are increasingly reaching out to encompass adult offenders, more
serious crime, and disadvantaged urban communities where, arguably, the
need is greatest.
Leena Kurki, who holds law degrees from the University of Turku, Finland,
and the University of Minnesota, is a Research Associate at the University of
Minnesota Law School and the Project Association of the Executive Sessions
on Sentencing and Corrections.
This study was supported by cooperative agreement 97–MUMU–K006 between
the National Institute of Justice and the University of Minnesota.
Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice.
The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Pro-
grams, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
and the Office for Victims of Crime.
This and other NIJ publications can be found at and downloaded from the NIJ
web site (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij).
NCJ 175723

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

88 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 2.3, continued
Questions
1. Describe how the case study illustrates the five basic steps of criminal
justice systems assessment. Give one example of each of the following
steps:
• Mapping the system.
• Documenting and assessing current policy and practice.
• Gathering information on the offender population.
• Identifying sanctions, services, and programs.
• Identifying community resources.
2. Assume now that the following hypothetical circumstances occur:
The governor makes an announcement that restorative and
community justice is about to become the preferred practice in
your state. The governor states that a new law will require all
counties within the state to reduce the number of their court
commitments to state prison by 50 percent within two years.
There will be substantial financial incentives for compliance
and substantial financial penalties for noncompliance. Assume
you have been assigned to a county planning committee that
has been asked to respond to this change in law.
Now, using force field analysis, do the following:
(a) Identify “driving forces” and “restraining forces.” Try to iden-
tify at least two of each.
(b) Analyze one of the restraining forces in part (a) in terms of its:
amenability, potency, and consistency.
(c) Describe two possible strategies to reduce this source of resistance.

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 89
• Amenability to change (How likely is it that this force can be
changed?)
• Potency (How much impact would reducing this source of
resistance have on moving the intervention forward?)
• Consistency (Does this force remain stable or change over
time?)
3. Identify alternative strategies for changing each force identified
in Step 1. Focus on reducing sources of resistance.
Endnotes
1 Spector, M., and J. Kitsuse (2001). Constructing Social Problems. New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction; Walker, Samuel (2005). Sense and Nonsense About Crime and
Drugs (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
2 Dinkes, R., Cataldi, E.F., and Lin-Kelly, W. (2007). Indicators of School Crime and
Safety: 2007 (NCES 2008-021/NCJ 219553). National Center for Education Statistics,
Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, and Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Washington, DC.
This publication can be downloaded from the World Wide Web at http://nces.ed.gov
or http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs
3 Riedel, M., and W. Welsh (2008). Criminal Violence: Patterns, Causes, and Pre-
vention (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
4 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and World Health
Organization (WHO) (2007). AIDS Epidemic Update. Retrieved January 24, 2008,
from the UNAIDS web site at: http://data.unaids.org/pub/EPISlides/2007/2007_
epiupdate_en
5 Ibid, note 5.
6 Kurz, G., and M. Schumacher (2000). The 8% Solution: Preventing Serious, Repeat
Juvenile Crime. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
7 For one valuable resource on social indicators for criminal justice, see the National
Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) web site at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/
8 See also: Johnston, L.D., O’Malley, P.M., Bachman, J.G., and J.E. Schulenberg.
(December 11, 2007). Overall, Illicit Drug Use by American Teens Continues
Gradual Decline in 2007. University of Michigan News Service: Ann Arbor, MI.
[Online]. Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the Monitoring the Future web site
at: http://www.monitoringthefuture.org
9 Rand, M., and S. Catalano (2006). Criminal Victimization, 2006. Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics. Retrieved January 30, 2008, from the Bureau of Justice Statistics web site
at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv06

http://nces.ed.gov

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs

http://data.unaids.org/pub/EPISlides/2007/2007_

http://www.ncjrs.gov/

http://www.monitoringthefuture.org

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv06

90 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
10 Biderman, A.D., and J.P. Lynch (1991) Understanding Crime Incidence Statistics.
New York: Springer-Verlag; see also Chapter 2 of Riedel, M., and W. Welsh
(2008). Criminal Violence: Patterns, Causes, and Prevention (2nd ed.). New York:
Oxford University Press.
11 Reiss, A.J., and J.A. Roth (eds.) (1993) “Appendix B: Measuring and Counting Vio-
lent Crimes and Their Consequences.” Understanding and Preventing Violence, v. 4.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, p. 404.
12 Blumstein, A., J. Wallman, and D. Farrington (eds.) (2000). The Crime Drop in
America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
13 Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (1984); Thurman v. City of
Torrington, USDC. No. H-84120 (June 25, 1985).
14 Riveland, C. (1999). “Prison Management Trends, 1975-2025.” In M. Tonry and
J. Petersilia (eds.), Prisons. Crime and Justice, A Review of Research, v. 26 (pp.
163-203). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
15 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2008). A Disproportion-
ate Minority Contact (DMC) Chronology: 1988 to 2007. Prepared by Heidi Hsia,
DMC Coordinator, State Relations and Assistance Division, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the OJJDP
web site at: http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/about/chronology.html
16 Pope, C., and W. Feyerherm (1995). Minorities and the Juvenile Justice System:
Research Summary. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention. Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the OJJDP web site at: http://www.
ncjrs.org/pdffiles/minor
17 Roscoe, M., and R. Morton (April, 1994). Disproportionate Minority Confine-
ment: FACT SHEET # 11 (FS-9411). Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the NCJRS
web site at: http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/fs-9411.txt
18 Community Research Associates (1996). Disproportionate Confinement of Minority
Juveniles in Secure Facilities: 1996 National Report. Washington, DC: Office of Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the NCJRS
web site at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=169882
19 Devine, P., K. Coolbaugh, and S. Jenkins (1998). Disproportionate Minority Con-
finement: Lessons Learned From Five States. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the NCJRS
web site at: http://www.ncjrs.org/94612
20 Hsia, H.M., and D. Hamparian (1998). Disproportionate Minority Confinement:
1997 Update. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion. Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the NCJRS web site at: http://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles/170606
21 Snyder, H.N., and M. Sickmund (1999). Minorities in the Juvenile Justice System.
Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Retrieved
January 24, 2008, from the NCJRS web site at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/179007
22 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2008). A Catalog of State
Research Reports on Disproportionate Minority Contact. Retrieved January 24, 2008,
from the NCJRS web site at: http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/tools/index.html

http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/about/chronology.html

http://www

http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/fs-9411.txt

http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=169882

http://www.ncjrs.org/94612

http://www.ncjrs

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/

http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/tools/index.html

CHAPTER 2 • ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 91
23 See http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/dmc/index.html
24 C.E. Pope, R. Lovell, and H.M. Hsia (2002). Disproportionate Minority Confinement:
A Review of the Research Literature from 1989 through 2001. Washington, DC:
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Retrieved January 24, 2008,
from the NCJRS web site at: http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/pdf/dmc89_01
25 Hsia, H.M., G.S. Bridges, and R. McHale (2004). Disproportionate Minority
Confinement: 2002 Update. Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the NCJRS web site
at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/201240
26 Nellis, A.M. (2005). Seven Steps to Develop and Evaluate Strategies to Reduce Dis-
proportionate Minority Contact (DMC). Juvenile Justice Evaluation Center, Justice
Research and Statistics Association (JRSA). Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the
JRSA web site at: http://www.jrsa.org/pubs/juv-justice/dmc-guidebook
27 See http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/dmcdb/index.html
28 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2006). DMC Technical
Assistance Manual, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention. Retrieved January 24, 2008, from the NCJRS web site at:
http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/dmc_ta_manual/index.html
29 Definitions of “community” vary considerably. Should it refer to a small number of
street blocks where regular, face-to-face interaction among residents occurs? Larger
clusters of homes, businesses, and places that are still recognized by residents as
distinct “communities”? City-designated wards or districts? Census tracts? Areas
that are demarcated by physical boundaries such as busy streets, rivers, railroad
tracks, parks? We do not attempt to resolve such debates here. The change agent
should be explicit, however, about which definition of “community” he or she
decides to adopt and why. For more detailed discussion, see: Bursik, R.J., Jr., and
H. Grasmick (1993). Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective
Community Control. New York: Lexington Books; Reiss, A.J., Jr.,. and M. Tonry
(eds.) (1986). Communities and Crime. Crime and Justice, v. 8. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press; and Sampson, R.J., S.W. Raudenbush, and F. Earls (1997).
“Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multi-level Study of Collective Efficacy.”
Science 277:918-924.
30 For examples, see LaFree, G. (1998). Losing Legitimacy: Street Crime and the
Decline of Social Institutions in America. Boulder, CO: Westview; and Messner,
S., and R. Rosenfeld (2006). Crime and the American Dream (4th ed.). Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth.
31 See, for example: Akers, R.L., and C.S. Sellers (2008). Criminological Theories:
Introduction, Evaluation, and Application (5th ed.) New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press; Lilly, J.R., F.T. Cullen, and R.A. Ball (2006). Criminological Theory:
Context and Consequences (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Vold, G.B.; T.J.
Bernard, and J.B. Snipes (2001). Theoretical Criminology (5th ed.). New York:
Oxford University Press.
32 Adapted from: Buzawa, E.S., and C.G. Buzawa (2002). Domestic Violence: The
Criminal Justice Response (3rd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
33 See http://www.ncjrs.org

http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/dmc/index.html

http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/pdf/dmc89_01

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/201240

http://www.jrsa.org/pubs/juv-justice/dmc-guidebook

http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/dmcdb/index.html

http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/dmc_ta_manual/index.html

http://www.ncjrs.org

92 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
34 Kettner, P., J.M. Daley, and A.W. Nichols (1985). Initiating Change In Organiza-
tions And Communities: A Macro Practice Model. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole;
Kettner, P.M., R.K. Moroney, and L.L. Martin (2007). Designing and Managing
Programs: An Effectiveness-Based Approach (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
35 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1968).
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. New York: Avon Books; Rossum, R.A.
(1978). The Politics of the Criminal Justice System. An Organizational Analysis.
New York: Marcel Dekker.
36 Wellford, C. (1998). “Changing Nature of Criminal Justice System Responses and
its Professions.” In U.S. Department of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society: Looking Back, Looking Forward (pp. 58-71). Symposium on the 30th
Anniversary of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice (NCJ-170029). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office
of Justice Programs.
37 Burke, P.; R. Cushman, and B. Ney (1996). Guide to a Criminal Justice System
Assessment: A Work in Progress. Washington, DC: National Institute of Correc-
tions, p. 7.
38 Welsh, W.N. (1995) Counties in Court: Jail Overcrowding and Court-Ordered
Reform. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Welsh, W.N., and H.N. Pontell
(1991). “Counties in Court: Inter-Organizational Adaptations to Jail Litigation in
California.” Law and Society Review, 25, 73-101.
39 Eisenstein, J.; R.B. Flemming, and P.F. Nardulli (1999). The Contours of Justice.
New York: Rowan and Littlefield.
40 Ibid, note 37, p. 8.
41 Adapted from McGarry, P., and B. Ney (2006). Getting It Right: Collaborative
Problem Solving for Criminal Justice. Silver Spring, MD: Center for Effective
Public Policy (CEPP). Retrieved January 30, 2008, from the CEPP web site at:
http://www.nicic.org/Library/019834
42 Bureau of Justice Statistics (2004). The Justice System: What is the Sequence of
Events in the Criminal Justice System? Retrieved February 5, 2008, from the BJS
web site at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/justsys.htm
43 Welsh, W.N., M.C. Leone, P.T. Kinkade, and H.N. Pontell (1991). “The Politics of
Jail Overcrowding: Public Attitudes and Official Policies.” In J.A. Thompson and
G.L. Mays (eds.), American Jails: Public Policy Issues. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
44 Lewin, K. (1951). Field Theory in Social Science. New York: Harper and Row.
45 Petersilia, J. (1991). “Policy Relevance and the Future of Criminology:” The
American Society of Criminology 1990 Presidential Address. Criminology, 29,
1-15; see also: Welsh, W.N. and G. Zajac (2004). “Building an Effective Research
Partnership Between a University and a State Correctional Agency: Assessment of
Drug Treatment in Pennsylvania Prisons.” The Prison Journal, 84, 143-170.
46 Lewin, K. (1947). “Group Decision and Social Change.” In T.M. Newcomb and
E.L. Hartley et al. (eds.), Readings in Social Psychology. New York: Holt and
Company, p. 202-203.

http://www.nicic.org/Library/019834

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/justsys.htm

CHAPTER 3
Setting Goals and Objectives
93
C H A P T E R O U T L I N E
Write goal statements specifying the general outcome to be
obtained. Consider the goals of criminal sanctions and normative
values driving desired outcomes.
Write specific outcome objectives for each goal. These should
include a time frame for measuring impact, a target popula-
tion, a key result intended, and a specific criterion or measure of
impact.
Seek participation from different individuals and agencies in goal
setting. Consider “top-down” vs. “bottom-up” approaches.
Specify an impact model. This is a description of how the interven-
tion will act upon a specific cause so as to bring about a change
in the problem.
Identify compatible and incompatible goals in the larger system.
Where do values of different stakeholders overlap or conflict?
Identify needs and opportunities for interagency collaboration.
Whose cooperation and participation is needed to achieve the
goals of this program or policy?

94 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Many interventions fail not because they lack good ideas, but
because of vague goals or disagreement about goals. Defining goals
and objectives is crucial to the rest of the plan-
ning process. It is amazing how many expensive
and otherwise well-designed interventions fail
to define the desired outcomes of the interven-
tion adequately. Without specific, agreed-upon criteria for success, it is
impossible to measure whether any intervention works. It is also likely
that without agreed-upon goals, program staff, directors, and various
stakeholders will frequently disagree on the mission of the program and
the type of intervention approach to use.
Every intervention attempts to achieve some kind of outcome—
some desired change in the problem. Both goals and objectives refer
to desired outcomes, but objectives are much
more specific. Goals are broad aims of the
intervention (e.g., to reduce drug abuse);
objectives specify explicit and measurable
outcomes (e.g., in a one-year follow-up of
ex-offenders who participated in a drug treatment program while in
prison, researchers predict that participants will have a lower re-arrest
rate than nonparticipants).
Identifying Goals and Values
Goals describe desired future states, some intended change in the
problem. Generally, goals are broad statements intended to provide
direction for change. While goals lack the specificity needed to measure
actual outcomes of the intervention, they provide some sense of mission
that may be crucial to gaining political support for the intervention. For
example, the goals of a shelter for abused women might be “to provide
temporary shelter for victims of domestic violence and reduce spouse
abuse”; the goals of a drug treatment program might be “to reduce
drug dependency and help clients lead productive, drug-free lives.”
Goal statements should be relatively brief (one or two sentences), but at
the same time they should accurately capture the intent of a particular
program or policy and explain the rationale (reasons) for its creation
and its particular structure.
Writing goal statements can be difficult, particularly where relevant
stakeholders (individuals, groups, and organizations) have widely dif-
fering viewpoints about the desired results of a proposed change. For-
mulating goal statements requires disclosure and discussion of personal
beliefs and values. It requires officials to be clear about what they are
doing and why they are doing it. Sometimes their political positions and
aspirations interfere with the need for transparency.
Objectives
Explicit and measurable outcomes of
an intervention.
Goals
Broad aims of an intervention.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 95
We present below a few brief examples of the most common goals
of criminal sanctions, and then some of the most common normative
values guiding the formulation of criminal justice programs and policies.
Case studies at the end of this chapter ask you to consider these issues
further and apply the concepts to specific examples. The change agent
and relevant stakeholders involved should seek to explicitly identify and
acknowledge the goals and values that underlie any specific program
or policy being considered.
The Goals of Criminal Sanctions
Often referred to as purposes of sanctioning, five different goals
(retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and restoration)
are commonly asserted as reasons for punishing particular offenders
and offenses in particular ways. Some authors1 have suggested that our
society alternates or cycles through punitive and rehabilitative extremes
over time, while others2 have argued that a more discrete progression
from one set of goals (e.g., rehabilitation in the 1950s and 1960s) to
another (e.g., incapacitation in the later 1980s and early 1990s) has
occurred. More recent policy developments emphasize offender account-
ability to victims and their communities. Regardless of the historical
perspective that one adopts, the dominance of any one goal at any one
time in history is never complete. The five goals below are currently
relevant and are likely to be hotly debated for some time.
Retribution
According to advocates of this position, the rightful purpose of pun-
ishment is to assign blame and punishment to the wrongdoer. No future
good for society is intended, only that the balance of justice be restored
by making the offender pay for his or her transgression against society.
Advocates of the death penalty often justify its use on such grounds.
Rehabilitation
The purpose of punishment, according to this view, is to reduce
the likelihood of future offending by diagnosing and treating its causes
within the individual. Implicit are theoretical notions that criminal
behavior is learned and can be unlearned, and that individual deficits
can be corrected. Programs may attempt to alter educational deficits
or psychological factors such as anger control, social, and problem-
solving skills.

96 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Deterrence
According to general deterrence, the purpose of punishment is to
send a message to other potential lawbreakers that the specific offense
being punished will not be tolerated. Potential lawbreakers, as a result
of fearing the punishment they see inflicted on others, should be
“deterred” from committing similar acts. This approach assumes that
people make a rational calculation of costs and benefits associated with
specific actions, and its advocates intend that the “pain” (of apprehen-
sion, prosecution, and punishment) outweigh the “gain” (the benefits of
criminal behavior). For specific deterrence, the message is not to others
who might be deterred, but to the specific individual being punished.
The individual is expected to learn his or her lesson and refrain from
future criminal acts. Many “shock incarceration” programs such as
Scared Straight and boot camps have been based on such premises.
Incapacitation
The simple purpose of incapacitation is to physically restrain the
offender from committing further crimes. The logic is simple: a person
cannot commit further crimes against society during the time they are
locked up or incapacitated. Long prison sentences for certain offenses
are often based, at least in part, upon such notions. Less severe forms
of incapacitation might include curfews, house arrest, intensive supervi-
sion probation, and day reporting centers. Advocates often believe that
crime rates can be reduced by incarcerating (incapacitating) the worst
offenders (“career criminals”) for long periods of time.3
Restoration
More recent than the other four types of goals, restoration or repa-
ration attempts to restore the victim and or the community to his or her
(its) prior state before the crime occurred. It is similar to retribution in
the sense that crime is viewed as a disruption of the peace. However,
restoration seeks to repair the harm that resulted from the offense,
where retribution seeks only to apply blame and punishment. Many
current programs are exploring options such as financial restitution to
victims, as well as requiring offenders to perform community service
work. Still others involve the offender, the victim, and family members
and friends of both parties in face-to-face encounters during which
reparation steps are negotiated and empathy is encouraged.4

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 97
Normative Values
Normative values are guiding assumptions held by individuals about
how the justice system should work. For example, Packer5 discusses two
very broad, competing value orientations of the criminal justice system.
To some officials, criminal case processing is like an “assembly line,”
through which cases should be processed and disposed of as quickly
as possible. Proponents of this view, the crime control model, believe
that for the most part, police, prosecutors, judges, and juries make
correct decisions, and the system effectively ferrets out the guilty from
the innocent. In contrast, those who lean more toward the due process
model view believe that the system is imperfect, and that individual offi-
cials frequently make hasty and incorrect decisions. As a result, many
safeguards are needed to protect the interests of the accused against
the much greater power of the state. Criminal case processing, accord-
ing to this view, is more like an “obstacle course” than an assembly
line. We warn the reader that neither model truly represents reality.
No individual should completely adopt one or the other orientations.
In Packer’s own words, “A person who subscribed to all of the values
underlying one model to the exclusion of all of the values underlying
the other would be rightly viewed as a fanatic.”6
Criminal justice officials hold normative values about what type of
change should be pursued and why, how important specific goals are,
and what results should be expected from a specific program or policy.
For example, the discussion of restorative justice at the end of Chapter
2 illustrated that a value orientation toward handling criminal cases
was dramatically at odds with the orientation of using traditional law
enforcement strategies to protect public safety. Any potential solution
had to account for at least the values and interests of police and court
personnel. Four very broad value orientations common to criminal
justice are described below.
Proportionality
Proportionality is a principle that punishment for criminal behavior
should not be any more onerous, intrusive, or painful than warranted
by the severity of the crime. At least in theory, this principle holds that
there is some logical hierarchy of crimes, and a corresponding (“pro-
portional”) hierarchy of appropriate punishments. One does not give
the death penalty to jaywalkers, for example.

98 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Equity
Equity is the principle that similarly situated offenders should be
treated similarly. For example, those accused of committing the same
criminal offense should receive similar punishments, unrelated to their per-
sonal or demographic characteristics (e.g., age, race, gender, or income).
Parsimony
Parsimony is the principle of using the least drastic and expensive
measure needed to produce a specific objective. For example, if a one-
year driver’s license suspension and probation term is sufficient to moti-
vate a first-time offender to abstain from drunk driving, a three-year
suspension and probation term would be overly harsh and wasteful.
Humane Treatment
Humane treatment is a principle meaning that the decision about
appropriate punishment is guided by a preference to seek the most
humane method to achieve specific objectives. One attempts to avoid
unnecessary humiliation, pain, and discomfort. For example, incar-
ceration and its associated deprivations of liberty can be considered
appropriate punishment in and of itself. Only considerations of appro-
priate sentence length, security classification, and perhaps rehabilita-
tion opportunities should guide the decision about where and how the
offender serves his or her sentence, and for how long. Under this prin-
ciple, one would not impose additional punishment by making prison
conditions as unbearable as possible (e.g., by denying inmates a heated
facility in cold weather).
What Are the “Right” Goals and Values?
We do not advocate any particular set of punishment goals or val-
ues in this book; we want to give you the tools you need to make such
decisions explicit. We also caution that different goals and values are
not necessarily mutually exclusive: it is possible that a specific program
or policy could attempt to address more than one goal or value simul-
taneously. A considerable amount of research has been conducted to
test assumptions and expectations that underlie the goals of policies
and programs. Excellent discussions of competing views and related
research evidence are provided elsewhere.7 Do rehabilitation programs
work sufficiently well to serve as a basis for correctional policy? Does

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 99
retributive justice result in satisfaction of the victim that justice was
done? Does the threat of punishment deter others from committing
crimes? Consulting the body of research that addresses these questions
will help to avoid unrealistic expectations and increase our capacity to
clearly identify and evaluate the intended outcomes of our programs
and policies.
It is important to understand that the pursuit of specific goals may
be driven by values, in spite of past failures to achieve these goals. The
goal of rehabilitation, for example, has been challenged consistently
over the past three decades, and yet we continue to believe that people
can change and that positive change can be supported by well-designed
interventions.8 Similarly, in spite of consistent evidence that capital pun-
ishment does not deter others from committing murder, death penalty
statutes continue to be supported because of the perceived deterrent
effect of executions.9
Write Specific Outcome Objectives for Each Goal
Objectives are much more specific than goals. Objectives should
define clearly and concisely exactly what outcome is to be achieved by
the intervention. Objectives precisely describe the intended results of
the intervention in measurable terms.
An intervention should have at least one specific goal, and each goal
should be accompanied by at least one specific objective. It is possible,
therefore, to have more than one objective for each goal. Because goals
are broadly defined, any program may have several specific objectives.
For example, the goal of a new drug treatment program is “to help
clients lead drug-free lives.” Two objectives are possible:
• Objective #1: Six months after leaving the program, fewer clients
will have been re-arrested on drug charges, compared to those who
didn’t go through the program.
• Objective #2: After six months, treated clients will score higher
(on average) on a “personal and family responsibility” scale.
Objectives, therefore, must always be measurable and specific.
Objectives should include four major components:
1. A time frame: date by which objectives will be completed
2. A target population: who will evidence the intended change?
3. A result: the key outcome intended; a specific change in the problem
4. A criterion: a standard for measuring successful achievement of
the result.

100 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Example 3.1
Four Components of an Objective:
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment
In the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment,10 researchers reviewed
major studies of police response to domestic violence. In various jurisdictions,
they found a rather low rate of arrest out of all calls reported to the police.
Other more frequently used police responses included: separation (ordering
the offender to leave the house for a cooling-off period, often overnight) and
mediation (officers encourage a couple to resolve the conflict).
The researchers hypothesized that, due to greater deterrent effects, man-
datory arrest for misdemeanor domestic assault would result in fewer repeat
offenses (recidivism) than either separation (order the suspect to leave for
at least eight hours), or mediation (try to restore peace, informally solve the
conflict). Researchers convinced police to randomly assign all misdemeanor
domestic violence cases in two precincts to one of these three interventions.
Six months later, researchers predicted, there would be a lower rate of repeat
incidents of domestic assault for cases where mandatory arrest was used. We
can summarize the four components of the objective as follows:
1. Time frame: six months.
2. Target population: the experiment included only misdemeanor
assaults, where police were empowered (but not required) to make
arrests under a new state law. Police had to have probable cause,
and felonies (e.g., obvious or serious injury) were excluded (i.e.,
felony suspects were always arrested). Two precincts with the
highest density of domestic violence were selected for the study.
3. Result: fewer repeat incidents of domestic abuse.
4. Criteria: two measures were used: (1) police arrest records (inci-
dent reports over a six-month period); and victim self-reports
(follow-up interviews were conducted with victims every two
weeks for 24 weeks, asking about frequency and seriousness of
any victimization).
Note that these four components could have been quite different depend-
ing upon the results of the problem analysis. First, a different time frame could
have been specified (e.g., one year? two years? three years?). Second, a differ-
ent target population could have been specified (e.g., different demographic
and income groups could have been studied in different neighborhoods). Third,
a different result could have been specified (e.g., victim satisfaction with the
police response they received). Finally, different criteria (measures) could have
been used (e.g., hospital records of injuries, incidents reported to social service
agencies or crisis lines). Any change agent should define the four components
of an objective, and explain the reasoning behind these specifications.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 101
Another distinction is sometimes made between process and out-
come objectives. Process objectives refer to short-term tasks that must
be completed in order to implement a program (e.g., within 30 days, all
police agencies will hold orientation sessions to acquaint officers with
a new domestic violence policy). Strictly speaking, these are not objec-
tives of the intervention at all, because they do not define any specific
change in the problem. We note this distinction only because it is likely
to arise as one reads published reports of interventions, and one should
be aware of the difference. We are concerned here with outcome objec-
tives (a specific, measurable change in the problem).
Seek Participation in Goal Setting
Is it necessary that everyone agree on the same goals for a specific
program or policy? What are the implications if they don’t? At the most
basic level, the implications are that different individuals (stakeholders)
perceive that they are each working toward some specific end point.
They may believe, correctly or incorrectly, that they are working toward
the same desired end. The problem is: if they have not articulated or
discussed their own goals and values with each other, they may find
out after considerable expenditure of energy and resources that they are
working toward very different ends. Certainly no effective program or
policy can be constructed if those responsible for designing the program
or policy hold widely disparate or conflicting goals. Participants need
some basic agreement about what is they are trying to achieve, and
why. Not every single stakeholder needs to agree on the final goals, but
those responsible for implementing the program or policy must be held
accountable for articulating what it is they are doing and why.
Once again, we stress the virtues of participation in program plan-
ning. Having the relevant stakeholders involved in setting program goals
is crucial to gaining the support and cooperation necessary to make the
intervention work. The first step, if it has not already been accomplished
(see Chapter 2), is to identify relevant participants for inclusion in the
goal-setting and objective-setting phase.
The change agent (e.g., the person responsible for coordinating the
program planning effort) should involve various participants in the
planning process, not just agency administrators. Participants might
include program staff, potential clients, citizens in the surrounding com-
munity, representatives from justice and social service agencies, schools,
and so on. This requires patience and negotiating skills, as there are
likely to be different assumptions and opinions regarding the problem,
its causes, and the type of intervention needed.

102 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Targets and clients are often overlooked at this stage: what should
they expect to result from this planned change? A major question to ask
at this point is whether goal-setting should proceed from a “top-down”
or “bottom-up” approach.
Typically, change follows a top-down format. This is often the case
because the change agent is likely to be working for, or contracted by,
the agency that is funding the intervention, and the change agent owes
some obligation to weight their definitions of goals more heavily. There
may be advantages to
this situation, as well as
costs. It may be the case
that those in the higher
levels of the organi-
zation have the most
experience with inter-
ventions of this type,
and they might indeed
be in the best position
to state realistic, fea-
sible outcomes to be
expected. They might
also be best equipped
to formulate goals that
can garner widespread
political support for the
program (e.g., support
from other stakehold-
ers). However, there
is a very real danger
in ignoring the views
of program staff and
clients. The danger is
that the goals handed
down from above may
be unrealistic to pro-
gram staff, or irrelevant
to the clients. In either case, the impact of the intervention could be
severely compromised: the goals might prove unrealistic, in which case
the program would be held accountable for unreachable goals; or cli-
ents and program staff might refuse to provide information to program
evaluators, or might provide incomplete or inaccurate information.
Regardless of which approach is used to formulate initial goals,
therefore, it is crucial that all stakeholders eventually have some input
into defining program goals. These issues are examined in more detail
in Case Study 3.1 at the end of this chapter.
Goal Setting: Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Approaches
Top-Down
The change agent begins by getting goal definitions from top
officials at the administrative level of his or her organization (e.g.,
the Chief of County Probation, the Chief of Police, the Director of
Social Services, etc.), and then gets responses from lower levels of
the organization: perhaps from agency supervisors, then program
staff, and eventually from potential clients. Thus, those at the top
of the organizational hierarchy have more “say” in defining the
program’s goals, because their definition is the first one, and it car-
ries more weight and more power as subordinates and clients are
asked to respond to it.
Bottom-Up
The change agent begins by seeking goal definitions at the client or
staff level. In contrast to the top-down approach, here the change
agent first gets definitions from clients and staff about what the
program goals are or should be, and then gets responses to these goal
definitions from successively higher levels of the agency responsible
for implementing the intervention, as well as the agency that is fund-
ing the intervention. Other stakeholders to approach may include
agency supervisors, administrators, and government representatives.
The views of clients and program staff are given more priority
using this format; their definitions guide subsequent responses.
Obviously, this approach is favored when it is widely viewed that
so-called “experts” are out of touch, and that front-line program
staff and/or clients are in a better position to state the needs and
goals of the target population. Many “grassroots” organizations
follow this format.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 103
Specify an Impact Model
We discussed causes and theories in Chapter 2. Examination of
theories helps us to formulate what is called an impact model: a pre-
diction that a particular intervention will bring about a specific change
in the problem. Formulating such a model forces us to answer several
important questions: What is the intervention? Why would a proposed
intervention work? Which causes will it address? In other words,
through what process will change occur, and why? What outcome (a
change in the problem) is expected? We can now illustrate how the
impact model is made up of three key elements we’ve discussed: the
intervention (policies and programs); the cause(s) to be addressed by
the intervention (theories about what causes the problem); and some
specific outcome, a desired change in the problem (goals and objectives).
We can analyze an existing intervention by working backwards, first
specifying the intervention, then the problem it addresses and the causes
of that problem. Program planning proceeds from problem analysis to
causal analysis to formulation of goals and objectives. Analysis of an
existing program simply reverses the process, even though it requires
going through the same three crucial steps.
Figure 3.1
The “Impact Model”
Intervention (Policy or Program)
Cause(s) of the Problem (Theories)
Change in the Problem (Goals and Objectives)

104 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Identify Compatible and
Incompatible Goals in the Larger System
As we discussed in Chapter 2, criminal justice problems and poli-
cies are shaped by the interactive actions of various decisionmakers and
agencies in any jurisdiction. We argued that a “systems assessment”
Example 3.2
An Impact Model for a Reentry Program11
The Problem
Texas has a prison population well in excess of 162,000. As far back as
1984, researchers in Texas reported that 38 percent of parolees were reincar-
cerated within a period of three years. Both the huge corrections costs and
the failure of parolees to succeed in the community produced a demand for
solving the parole failure problem.
The Program:
Project RIO (Re-Integration of Offenders) was started as a joint effort of
the Texas Department of Corrections and the Texas Workforce Commission.
Originally started in two cities as a federally funded pilot project, it is now
a statewide and state-funded program. Project RIO has assembled 12,000
employers who hire parolees, and every parolee in the state has access to its
services. Preparatory work with parolees begins while they are still in prison.
Six months prior to release, Project RIO staff conduct assessments of skills
and work history, and initiate job-readiness training. Vocational training is
made available, and many employers come to the prison to meet with inmates
and to encourage them during this difficult time of transition back to the com-
munity. Once released from prison, parolees receive more preparation and
help with job placement.
The Cause(s):
Several research studies have found that parolees with jobs are less likely
to reoffend and be returned to prison. Those with higher incomes were found
to reoffend less than those with low incomes. The lack of a job and means of
support is one factor that drives parolees back into crime.
The Intended Change in the Problem:
A study of recidivism conducted by a research team from Texas A&M
University found that participants in Project RIO were less likely to recidivate
than nonparticipants. For example, among high-risk parolees, 48 percent of
Project RIO parolees were arrested during the first year of parole, compared
with 57 percent of non-participants. Among this same group, 23 percent of
the Project RIO participants were returned to prison, compared to 38 percent
of nonparticipants.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 105
provides a common language to describe and evaluate the present state
of affairs (i.e., “the problem”), to shape a common vision for the future,
and to make that vision a reality.
It is the notion of shaping a common vision that is relevant to this
chapter. Based upon information collected in Stage 1, Problem Analysis,
we should be able to identify and describe the competing interests of dif-
ferent individuals and agencies. We try to determine where agreement and
disagreement about goals exists, and we try to get stakeholders to articu-
late and discuss their desired goals for any specific program or policy.
In Case Study 2.3 (Incorporating Restorative and Community
Justice into American Sentencing and Corrections), for example, we
saw that government control over criminal justice has not resulted in
safer and more closely knit communities. Proponents of restorative and
community justice strategies argue that communities should exercise
control over certain justice processes. On the one hand, communities
feel safer when there is a significant police presence and when the courts
imprison wrongdoers. But the problems that generate crime don’t go
away because of these criminal justice system responses, and victims
generally feel left out of the process. Community justice strategies
engage members of the community in the business of solving com-
munity crime problems. Restorative justice strategies involve victims
in the process of deciding on an appropriate sanction. Even members
of the offender’s family can have a role in efforts to restore victims to
pre-offense conditions.12
In another example, contracting out prison operations to private
companies (i.e., privatization of prison operations) is often seen by
elected officials as a benefit due to assumed cost savings. Other stake-
holders disagree about whether cost savings are likely, and whether cost
savings should be the goal at all. Several major objections to privatiza-
tion have emerged.13
• Correctional officers have initiated lawsuits alleging violation of
their collective bargaining agreements. Privatization, they argue, is
designed to drive down wages and benefits that were won through
hard-fought, legitimate union negotiations.
• Inmate advocates and attorneys, concerned with civil rights, argue
that turning over the power to punish from government to the
private sector is absolutely unethical. Private corporations are
motivated to make profits, not to rehabilitate prisoners, protect
public safety, or provide constitutionally mandated, humane con-
ditions of confinement.
• Private interests, many argue, will attempt to use inmates as a
source of cheap labor, or worse, indentured slavery. Such condi-
tions would mark a return to the barbaric days of inmate exploita-
tion and abuse prior to court intervention.

106 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
• Cost-cutting motivations, it is feared, will lead to lapses in prison
security that threaten public safety (e.g., higher inmate-to-guard
staffing ratios).
The change agent, consultant, or analyst guiding the change effort
should constantly carry a systems perspective throughout the seven-
stage planned change process. A systems perspective is no less impor-
tant at the goal-setting stage than any other stage, and perhaps more
so because the fundamental assumptions developed at this stage will
critically shape the design and structure of the entire program or policy.
Case Study 3.2 at the end of this chapter further examines these issues,
using mandatory sentencing as a context for analysis.
We offer six guidelines to identify compatible and incompatible
goals or values in the larger system:
1. Have the appropriate stakeholders been identified via a thorough
problem analysis (see Chapter 2)?
2. Review the five goals and four values described earlier in this
chapter: do different stakeholders disagree over specific goals and
values? Have their assumptions about the problem, its possible
causes, and possible solutions been described?
3. Do individuals within the same agency agree or disagree about the
goals or values of the proposed change? How?
4. Do individuals within different agencies agree or disagree about
the goals or values of the proposed change? How?
5. Has a systems analysis been conducted to provide stakeholders
with relevant information about criminal case processing in this
jurisdiction? Is all the information needed to make decisions about
goals available, or does some information need to be developed?
6. Do any group mechanisms (e.g., a Criminal Justice Cabinet) exist
for bringing stakeholders together to discuss the goals of a pro-
posed change? Is it necessary to create or further develop such a
group before proceeding?
Identify Needs and Opportunities
for Interagency Collaboration
It is highly likely that any criminal justice intervention will at some
point require the cooperation of other agencies to achieve its goals.
Many criminal justice interventions, to be successful, require the par-
ticipation of police, courts, and corrections to carry out their program
plans. Other public agencies such as schools or social service agencies
may also be called upon, depending upon the problem to be addressed
(e.g., juvenile violence) and the type of intervention to be attempted.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 107
The change agent, as part of the planning process, needs to consider
his or her program’s and/or his or her agency’s “external environment”
when attempting any kind of change. Different types of collaboration
or support may be required: political support, shared information,
exchange of services, joint client intake or assessment, and perhaps even
cross-referrals of clients among different agencies.14 Such forms of coop-
eration, obviously, must be negotiated and agreed upon. Each agency
must perceive tangible benefits from undertaking such cooperation.
Interagency cooperation is not always possible or even desirable,
however. Political relationships and administrative structures occasion-
ally preclude opportunities for collaboration.
The Benefits of Goal Conflict
Under some circumstances, planning partnerships may not be desir-
able. Kevin Wright, for example, argues that a complex justice system
in a complex society cannot and should not have any common set of
goals and values.15 There is (and should be) a certain tension between
different criminal justice agencies, because they do not (and should not)
all have the same goals. For example, prosecutors tend to emphasize
goals of crime control while defense attorneys emphasize goals of due
process. Such goal “tension” helps protect the competing interests of
victims and suspects. Moreover, distinctions need to be made between
goal conflicts and agency conflicts. Opposition on specific goals does
not imply that agencies cannot work together under all circumstances.
There will be many situations in which collaboration will serve the
purposes of agencies that represent different interests. Plea bargain-
Example 3.3
Agency Politics: Roadblocks to Collaboration?
In a recent project, we found that the juvenile court, part of a state agency,
was resistant to participating in the development of an information system that
would benefit a group of city agencies. The purpose of the information system
project was to create an integrated system that would link the databases of
the juvenile court, the department of human services, the police, the district
attorney, the public defender, and the school district. Sharing information
electronically was viewed as a primary means of supporting effective deci-
sions and avoiding fragmented planning for individual youths and families.
The juvenile court resisted involvement because pre-existing political conflicts
with other agencies had not been resolved and because of its stated desire to
protect confidential court data from misuse by other agencies.

108 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
ing between prosecutors and defense attorneys is perhaps the classic
example of such exchange relations.
Loose Coupling and Criminal Justice Agencies
The concept of loose coupling further illustrates the need for inter-
agency cooperation in criminal justice. Loose coupling refers to agencies
that are responsive to one another and yet maintain independent identi-
ties.16 In such systems, “structural elements are only loosely linked to
one another and to activities, rules are often violated, decisions often
go unimplemented, or if implemented have uncertain consequences, and
techniques are often subverted or rendered so vague as to provide little
coordination.”17 In other words, the criminal justice “system” has been
called a “nonsystem” due to its decentralized and fragmented nature.18
Example 3.4
Goal Conflict in Criminal Justice:
Roadblocks or Speedbumps for Interagency Collaboration?
According to Wright, there are at least three reasons why goal conflict
within the criminal justice system is desirable: (1) reflective diversity, (2) media-
tion of interests and system adaptation, and (3) efficient offender processing.
1. Reflective Diversity: Fragmentation and lack of integration allows
different interests to be incorporated into the system. Conflict may
be necessary to mediate among conflicting interests in the com-
munity, including competing demands for crime prevention, public
order, justice, due process, efficiency, and accountability.
2. Mediation of Interests and System Adaptation: Conflicting goals
promote a system of checks and balances. No single component
of the system can dominate others, nor can any unitary interest
be overemphasized. Conflict establishes and maintains a balance
of power within the structure of the system [e.g., a prosecutor
gives an overly stiff sentence in reaction to public sentiment, but
corrections (parole) may modify that sentence and balance out
the fairness (and vice versa)].
3. Offender Processing: Conflict and fragmentation may actually
promote and support rather than hinder the processing of offend-
ers. Prosecution, for example, may be smoother and more efficient
precisely because police officers do consider decisions about pros-
ecution, and that tension reduces the likelihood that prosecutors
will need to void illegal, improper, or weak arrests.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 109
For example, prosecutors and defense attorneys may appear together
in criminal trials, but each group answers to a different administrative
head, and their goals reflect very different missions. Different agencies
interact with one another, but only rarely do different agencies cooper-
ate effectively or efficiently to process criminal cases.
For example, narcotics enforcement and white-collar crime pros-
ecution require a departure from the loose coupling that dominates
criminal justice organizations.19 While reactive police work based on
loosely coupled processes is the norm, proactive policing requires more
tightly coupled interagency relations. Narcotics work requires police
to use more controversial tactics to obtain evidence, including under-
cover work, entrapment, and informants.20 Police officers are more
dependent upon prosecutors for feedback on the legal permissibility of
evidence, and prosecutors are more dependent upon police officers for
extensive information and cooperation in the preparation of cases. Such
information exchange influences charging decisions and plea bargains
engineered to develop cooperation from informants and codefendants.
Hagan argues that the proactive prosecution of white-collar criminals
requires similar leverage to “turn witnesses.” Judges must participate
in these decisions as well, because their approval is necessary to imple-
ment charge reductions or negotiated sentences.
Using loose coupling as an explanatory concept, Hagan describes
how sudden changes in the external environment of an organization
(e.g., a riot; a murder committed by an escaped prisoner; court orders
to reduce jail overcrowding) create demands for tighter coupling.21 The
distinction between proactive and reactive problem solving is crucial.
For example, proactive policing or prosecution implies that officials
actively target certain problems for attention. Proactive problem solv-
ing, however, requires a departure from the norm of “loose coupling”: it
necessitates cooperation and planning from multiple agencies and actors.
In an analysis of urban riots in Los Angeles and Detroit, Balbus22 sug-
gested that black suspects were rounded up en masse, at least initially, to
serve an ostensible order maintenance function (“clearing the streets”).
This initial increase in restrictiveness was followed by “uncharacteristic
leniency” as bail release became much more frequent than usual (“clear-
ing the jails”). This shift from “normal” court operations required a
tightening of the relations between the police, prosecutorial, and judicial
subsystems, so that bail decisions became less variable.
Similarly, most criminal justice agencies today have computerized
information systems that are used to gather, analyze, and provide
reports. In many jurisdictions, the same information on offenders is
collected and stored by several agencies, producing considerable waste
of resources. More critically, important information about an offender
may be available inside of an agency such as a police department but
may never reach the court where important decisions need to be made.

110 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
The implications of this agency fragmentation perspective are illustrated
in Example 3.5 below.
Example 3.5
Reorganizing the Federal Government
to Meet the Threat of Terrorist Attacks23
In the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration proposed the reorganiza-
tion of those federal agencies responsible for protecting U.S. citizens and the
creation of a Department of Homeland Security. Those attacks demonstrated
the vulnerability of our country to terrorist attacks and caused our leaders to
perform a quick analysis of our sources of weakness. The problems identi-
fied included an inability to share and use existing intelligence information,
lack of strategic coordination of resources among those agencies responsible
for our national security, and a lack of technical preparedness for the kinds
of weapons likely to be used by terrorists. In fact, several federal agencies,
including the FBI and CIA, had information relevant to this tragedy, but this
information was not shared. Competition and administrative barriers among
these agencies had created a security system that was so loosely coupled that
it was incapable of adequately meeting national security needs.
The proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security was passed
quickly by Congress, and former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was
appointed to head the new agency. The “impact model” looks like this:
Intervention: Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security
Cause(s): “Loose Coupling”
Problem: Vulnerability to Terrorism and Its Consequences
The overall Homeland Security strategy was designed to enhance resources
that are designed to prevent terrorist attacks, such as increased airline security;
to reduce our vulnerability to attacks by doing such things as increasing border
controls; and to increase our capacity to respond to attacks if and when they
occur. Under the Department of Homeland Security, 22 smaller agencies were
brought together under one administrative entity, thus eliminating some of
the “loose coupling” that existed. The Department of Homeland Security also
was made an intelligence-analysis and reporting hub for all intelligence-gather-
ing agencies, including state and local law enforcement agencies. In addition
to creation of this new agency, other agencies such as the CIA and FBI were
restructured in light of the mission laid out by the White House in its National
Strategy for Homeland Security.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 111
Conclusion
Failure to clearly identify the goals, values, and expectations guiding
the development of an intervention can spell certain failure. At best, con-
tinued disagreement over intended goals and outcomes can be expected
long after the program or policy is implemented. While discussion between
stakeholders of competing goals and values can initially heighten conflict,
it may also direct us toward eventual compromise or collaboration, more
effective planning, and a reduction in the problem of concern.
D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S
1. At the end of Chapter 1, we asked you to write a short essay
describing one possible intervention to address a specific
problem in criminal justice. You are also likely to be doing
one of the following in this course: (a) writing about a specific
problem and/or intervention as a class assignment, or (b) par-
ticipating in the development of a specific program or policy
within the agency you work for. Briefly describe a specific
criminal justice program or policy, and then describe one goal
and one objective for this intervention.
2. Define: (a) goal, and (b) objective. (c) Describe the difference
between the two.
3. Describe the four components of an objective.
4. Some argue that goal-setting should proceed from the bottom up;
others argue it should proceed from the top down. (a) Describe
each of these positions. (b) Which position do you agree with?
Why?
5. Describe five common goals of punishment.
6. Describe four common value orientations in criminal justice.
7. Describe an example of incompatible goals within the criminal
justice system, and explain why it is important.
8. Discuss advantages and disadvantages of interagency collabo-
ration. Give specific examples.
9. Describe the concept of “loose coupling,” and explain why it
is important using a specific example.

112 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 3.1
Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Goal Setting: Responding to
Negative Information about Conditions of Juvenile Confinement
Instructions: Read the case study below, and then answer the following questions.
1. Was the original goal-setting in this example top-down or bottom-up? Explain,
and give evidence to support your answer.
2. How are performance standards similar to and different from objectives? How
were goals and objectives developed?
3. What kinds of resistance to the creation of performance standards did the
designers of PbS face? How did they address this resistance? Be specific, using
concepts discussed in this chapter.
By the early 1990s, the juvenile justice system was declared “broken,” delin-
quent youths were labeled “super predators” needing the severity of criminal
prosecution and adult prison. What happened within the walls and razor wire
of the “kiddie prisons” was little known or cared about. The public perception
of juvenile justice was formed by the media coverage of a single horrendous
crime committed by a youth. Juvenile justice leaders (nationally and locally)
and youth workers were highly frustrated with the inability to demonstrate
the positive things they do for delinquents. The public was similarly frustrated
with the inability to hold the facilities and government agencies accountable
for operations and expenditures of tax dollars.
In 1994 the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)
of the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, released a report
that showed deplorable conditions in the facilities housing juvenile delinquents
across the country.1 The Congressionally mandated study found that in the
nearly 1,000 facilities operating at that time, there were “substantial and wide-
spread deficiencies” in living space, security, control of suicidal behavior, and
health care. The facilities were overcrowded, youths and staff were suffering
high rates of injuries, suicidal behavior was frequent and health and mental
health care was inadequate and sometimes unavailable. The report also found
that the conditions were no better in facilities that met correctional accredita-
tion standards. Joining businesses and government in the movement toward
standards that indicate performance rather than process, OJJDP called for the
development and implementation of national performance-based standards
and a new way of doing business for juvenile corrections.
1 Parent, D., V. Leiter, S. Kennedy, L. Livens, D. Wentworth, and S. Wilcox (1994, August).
Conditions of Confinement: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facilities (Research Report).
Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of
Justice.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 113
Case Study 3.1, continued
The Performance-based Standards (PbS) for Juvenile Correction and Deten-
tion Facilities project developed and directed by the Council of Juvenile Cor-
rectional Administrators (CJCA) directly addresses the problems cited in the
COC report.2 PbS is a system for juvenile agencies to demonstrate improvement
and success in treating confined youths through national standards and per-
formance outcome measures. The PbS data collection–analysis–improvement
planning and implementation cycle provides a quality improvement structure
and monitoring tools. The supporting PbS tools—the table of practices and
processes that are expected to lead to better outcomes and performance, visits
and support by experienced consultants, and links to other resources—provide
facilities and agencies with a blueprint to move from deplorable conditions to
safe, productive, and cost-effective management of youths in government care.
PbS capitalized on Internet advances to build a secure national data-collection
and reporting system that provides easy access across the country and quick
feedback to facilities.
PbS asks facilities to report data twice a year on 106 outcomes that indicate
performance toward meeting 30 standards derived from seven goals—one goal
for each of the following components of facility operations: safety, security,
order, programming (including education) health/mental health, justice, and
reintegration. In this case, standards are objectives that are defined in terms
of the values of the system and best practices among facilities nationally.
Facilities collect the data from administrative records, youth records, youth
exit interviews, incident reports, and climate surveys of youths and staff. The
information is entered into the web portal and is reported back in easy-to-read
bar graph reports. Each outcome is reported for the current data-collection
period as well as any past data collections, allowing for comparison over
time. The reports also include the average outcome of the field, indicated by a
vertical intersecting the bar graph, which provides a quick analysis of whether
the facility is doing better or worse than other PbS facilities. The outcomes
include critical rates such as injuries, suicidal behavior, assaults, time in iso-
lation, percentages of youths receiving suicide and mental health screenings,
changes in academic achievement from admission to release, and percentages
of youths completing educational, life skills, behavior management, and other
programming curriculum.
Leaders at the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) conceived PbS following the release of the Conditions of Confinement
Study. OJJDP at that time envisioned the development of national performance-
based standards setting the highest goals for facilities and providing outcome
measures (numbers such as rates, percentages) to monitor progress meeting the
standards. CJCA was awarded the competitive bid on September 30, 1995.
2 For information on the Performance Based Standards Project, the technical web site is http://www.
pbstandards.org/; the general web site is http://www.cjca.net/sitecode/cjca_projects_pbs.html

http://www

http://www.cjca.net/sitecode/cjca_projects_pbs.html

114 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 3.1, continued
As part of the proposal, OJJDP required the creation of a project Advi-
sory Board with members representing national organizations and relevant
government entities. OJJDP believed that the major government entities and
national organizations should define and guide PbS’ development in order to
create widely accepted and supported national standards and encourage vol-
untary participation. The strategy was effective in creating a comprehensive
set of standards and establishing a respected group of leaders to initiate and
promote PbS. The breadth of the Advisory Board continues as a solid basis
for PbS’ unique position as the only performance-based standards for juvenile
facilities. The Advisory Board membership included a seat for:
• CJCA, representing the juvenile correctional agencies;
• American Correctional Association (ACA), representing the adult
agencies and staff of both adult and juvenile facilities;
• National Juvenile Detention Association (NJDA), representing
county detention centers;
• National Association of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
(NAJFCJ), representing the judicial branch;
• National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC),
representing correctional medical field;
• The National GAINS Center for People with Co-Occurring
Disorders in the Justice System, representing mental health and
substance abuse field;
• American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Center, working to
improve access to counsel and the quality of representation for
children in the juvenile justice system;
• Youth Law Center, representing juvenile advocates; and
• Correctional Education Association, representing correction teachers.
OJJDP has served throughout the development and implementation of PbS
as an active contributor. The federal project monitor has participated in all
major meetings and project discussions since 1995. OJJDP has worked with
CJCA each funding cycle to assess progress, identify expansion opportunities
and discuss priorities for resources. Additionally, OJJDP separately funded
the ongoing evaluation by the National Academy of Public Administration to
help PbS succeed.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 115
Case Study 3.1, continued
Government agencies have found tremendous benefit to PbS data. Histori-
cally agencies feared data because it counted mistakes and poor practices with-
out a vehicle to show how they responded. For example, if a facility screened
youths for risk of suicide and the screen indicated the youth was at risk, the
facility would be liable for addressing the needs of any youth and keeping him
or her safe. Lacking data to demonstrate activities to keep the youths safe,
too many facilities in the past opted not to collect data and relied in part on
good luck to protect youths. PbS gives facilities the opportunity to show how
they deal with and improve negative data. In South Dakota, a federal court
judge approved the settlement agreement (Christina A. v. Bloomberg), giving
the agency one year to abolish the use of restraints as punishment, limit the
use of isolation, and increase mental health and education services for the
youths—and demonstrate that the practices had changed. Under the watchful
eye of the Youth Law Center, the agency implemented less punitive behavior
management systems and presented to the court its PbS data demonstrating
no incidences of restraints, reduced use of isolation, and increased services
delivered to the youths. In December 2001 the federal court judge found the
state in substantial compliance and ended its involvement.
The state agency directors (CJCA’s members) have played a very significant
role, beginning with letters of support for CJCA’s application to OJJDP from
25 state and county governments. The juvenile correctional CEOs have served
as advisors to development strategies and volunteered employees in expertise
areas when needed. The juvenile CEOs also were instrumental in opening their
facilities to the first PbS pilot test visits and data collection. The positive expe-
rience of those agencies opened doors and peaked interest in other states and
counties so PbS could grow and learn. Continually CJCA members volunteer
to participate in PbS and educate their peers, staff, legislator and the public
about its value. Because PbS is not mandated and is not attached to funding,
the reason to participate was because an administrator wanted to improve.
But the risks were high—data could discover problems. It was the encourage-
ment and belief in PbS by other juvenile CEOs that moved many agencies to
join PbS. The support and leadership of CJCA members was critical to PbS’
development and continues to aide PbS’ goals of expansion and self-sustain-
ability within the field.

116 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 3.2
The Goals of Mandatory Sentencing1
Instructions: Read the case study below, and then answer the following questions.
1. What goals and normative values guided the creation of mandatory sentencing
policies? Explain and give evidence.
2. Identify and describe any incompatible goals or values of different stakeholders.
3. Describe one objective that could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of man-
datory sentencing policies. Pay careful attention to the four components of an
objective discussed in Chapter 3.
By 1994 all 50 states had enacted one or more mandatory sentencing
laws,2 and Congress had enacted numerous mandatory sentencing laws for
federal offenders. Furthermore, many state officials have recently considered
proposals to enhance sentencing for adults and juveniles convicted of violent
crimes, usually by mandating longer prison terms for violent offenders who
have a record of serious crimes.3
A second frequently mentioned mandatory sentencing enhancement is
“truth-in-sentencing,” provisions for which are in the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. States that wish to qualify for federal aid
under the Act are required to amend their laws so that imprisoned offenders
serve at least 85 percent of their sentences.
Rationale for Mandatory Sentencing
Mandatory sentences are based on two goals—deterrence and incapaci-
tation. The primary purposes of modest mandatory prison terms (e.g., three
years for armed robbery) are specific deterrence, which applies to already
sanctioned offenders, and general deterrence, which aims to deter prospective
offenders. If the law successfully increases the imprisonment rate, the effects
of incapacitation also will grow because fewer offenders will be free to victim-
ize the population at large. The intent of three-strikes (and even two-strikes)
is to incapacitate selected violent offenders for very long terms—25 years or
even life. They have no specific deterrent effect if those confined will never be
released, but their general deterrent effect could, in theory, be substantial.
1 Excerpted from: Parent, D., T. Dunworth, D. McDonald, and W. Rhodes (1997). Key Legisla-
tive Issues in Criminal Justice: Mandatory Sentencing (NCJ-161839). Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.
2 Tonry, M. (1995). Sentencing Matters, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
3 In mid-1996 the California Supreme Court ruled the state’s three-strikes law an undue intru-
sion on judges’ sentencing discretion. State legislative leaders immediately announced plans to
introduce legislation that would reinstate the law.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 117
Case Study 3.2, continued
By passing mandatory sentencing laws, legislators convey the message that
certain crimes are deemed especially grave and that people who commit them
deserve, and may expect, harsh sanctions. These laws are a rapid and visible
response to public outcries following heinous or well-publicized crimes. The
high long-term costs of mandatory sentencing are deferred because the difficult
funding choices implicit in this policy can be delayed or even avoided.
Impact of Mandatory Sentencing Laws
Mandatory sentencing has had significant consequences that deserve close
attention, among them its impact on crime and the operations of the criminal
justice system. The possible differential consequences for certain groups of
people also bear examination.
Crime. Evaluations of mandatory sentencing have focused on two types
of crimes—those committed with handguns and those related to drugs (the
offenses most commonly subjected to mandatory minimum penalties in state
and federal courts). An evaluation of the Massachusetts law that imposed
mandatory jail terms for possession of an unlicensed handgun concluded that
the law was an effective deterrent of gun crime,4 at least in the short term.
However, studies of similar laws in Michigan5 and Florida6 found no evi-
dence that crimes committed with firearms had been prevented. An evaluation
of mandatory gun-use sentencing enhancements in six large cities (Detroit,
Jacksonville, Tampa, Miami, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh) indicated that the
laws deterred homicide but not other violent crimes.7 An assessment of New
York’s Rockefeller drug laws was unable to support the claim for their efficacy
as a deterrent to drug crime in New York City.8 None of the studies examined
the incapacitation effects of these laws.
The Criminal Justice System. The criminal courts rely on a high rate of guilty
pleas to speed case processing and thus avoid logjams. Officials can offer induce-
ments to defendants to obtain these pleas. If only in the short term, mandatory
sentencing laws may disrupt established plea-bargaining patterns by preventing
4 Pierce, G.L., and W.J. Bowers (1981). “The Bartley-Fox Gun Law’s Short-Term Impact on Crime
in Boston,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 455:120-132.
5 Loftin, C., M. Heumann, and D. McDowall (1983). “Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms
Violence: Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control,” Law and Society Review 17:287-318.
6 Loftin, C., and D. McDowall (1984). “The Deterrent Effects of the Florida Felony Firearm
Law,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 75:250-259.
7 McDowall, D., C. Loftin, and B. Wiersema (1992). “A Comparative Study of the Preventive
Effects of Mandatory Sentencing Laws for Gun Crimes,” Journal of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nology 83:378-394.
8 Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation (1978). The Nation’s Toughest Drug
Law: Evaluating the New York Experience. A project of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, the City of New York and the Drug Abuse Council, Inc. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.

118 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 3.2, continued
9 Tonry, M. (1987). Sentencing Reform Impacts. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice.
10 Ibid.
a prosecutor from offering a short prison term (less than the new minimum) in
exchange for a guilty plea. However, unless policymakers enact long-term man-
datory sentences that apply to many related categories of crimes, prosecutors
usually can shift strategies and bargain on charges rather than on sentences.
The findings of research on the impact of mandatory sentencing laws on
the criminal justice system have been summarized by a prominent scholar.9
He found that officials make earlier and more selective arrest, charging, and
diversion decisions; they also tend to bargain less and to bring more cases to
trial. Specifically, he found that:
• Criminal justice officials and practitioners (police, lawyers, and
judges) exercise discretion to avoid application of laws they con-
sider unduly harsh.
• Arrest rates for target crimes decline soon after mandatory sentencing
laws take effect.
• Dismissal and diversion rates increase at early stages of case process-
ing after mandatory sentencing laws take effect.
• For defendants whose cases are not dismissed, plea-bargain rates
decline and trial rates increase.
• For convicted defendants, sentencing delays increase.
• Enactment of mandatory sentencing laws has little impact on the prob-
ability that offenders will be imprisoned (when the effects of declining
arrests, indictments, and convictions are taken into account).
• Sentences become longer and more severe.
The research review concluded that mandatory sentencing laws:
• Do not achieve certainty and predictability because officials
circumvent them if they believe the results are unduly harsh.
• Are redundant with respect to proscribing probation for serious cases
because such cases generally are sentenced to imprisonment anyway.
• Are arbitrary for minor cases.
• May occasionally result in an unduly harsh punishment for a
marginal offender.10

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 119
Case Study 3.2, continued
Racial and Ethnic Minorities. One issue that has received considerable
attention in recent years is whether racial or ethnic minorities are treated
unfairly in the courts’ application of mandatory minimum sentences. The
question cannot be answered simply by comparing the proportion of minority
offenders sentenced before and after introduction of, or changes in, mandatory
sentencing laws. If, for example, it is objectively determined that minorities are
more likely than the general population to commit offenses that carry manda-
tory sentences, an equitable application of the law would result in an increase
in the proportion of imprisoned minorities—and probably in the lengths of
their average sentences.
Consequently, the central question is whether criminal justice officials’
discretionary choices in the application of mandatory sentencing laws are made
in a racially neutral manner.
Results of particular studies are relevant. In one study involving cases of
federal offenders sentenced for crimes subject to mandatory minimums, the
researcher examined whether sentencing severity varied by amount and type of
drugs involved in the current crime, weapons, offense record, role in offense,
history of drug use, age, gender, and race.11 She found sentencing differences
associated with the offender’s race, even after accounting for differences
associated with these other characteristics. However, the magnitude of this
difference was small.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission expanded this study and found significant
differences in the proportion of whites (54%), Hispanics (57%), and African
Americans (68%) who received mandatory minimum sentences for the most
serious offense charged against them.12 A reanalysis of the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission data drew different conclusions, however.13 The reanalysis
showed that when legally relevant case-processing factors were considered, a
defendant’s race/ethnicity was unrelated to the sentence. Also examined in the
reanalysis was why more than 40 percent of the cases apparently eligible for
mandatory sentences did not receive them. Reasonable explanations include
evidentiary problems and instances in which defendants provided substantial
assistance to prosecutors in preparing cases against others.
11 Meierhoefer, B.S. (1992). General Effect of Mandatory Minimum Prison Terms. Washington,
DC: Federal Judicial Center; Meierhoefer, B.S. (1992). “Role of Offense and Offender Charac-
teristics in Federal Sentencing,” Southern California Law Review 66:367-404; and Meierhoefer,
B.S. (1992). General Effect of Mandatory Minimum Prison Terms: A Longitudinal Study of
Federal Sentences Imposed. Washington, DC: Federal Judicial Center.
12 U.S. Sentencing Commission (1991). Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the Opera-
tion of the Guidelines System and Short-Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of
Incarceration, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining. Washington, DC: U.S.
Sentencing Commission.
13 Langan, P. (1992). “Federal Prosecutor Application of Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Racially Dispa-
rate? Widely Evaded?” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

120 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 3.2, continued
In an analysis of the federal sentencing guidelines, other researchers found
that African Americans received longer sentences than whites, not because of
differential treatment by judges but because they constituted the large major-
ity of those convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine—a crime Congress had
singled out for especially harsh mandatory penalties.14 This pattern can be
seen as constituting a “disparity in results” and, partly for this reason, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission recommended to Congress that it eliminate the legal
distinction between crack and regular cocaine for purposes of sentencing (a
recommendation Congress rejected).15
Future Issues
In the interviews conducted for this review of mandatory sentencing, state
policymakers expressed the need to respond to the public’s fear of crime and
call for tougher sanctions, but also recognized the need to rein in spiraling costs
of corrections. If the costs of government are cut, spending more on prisons
means spending less on other public purposes. The fiscal analysis of California’s
three-strikes law, for example, has implications for that state’s future.
In a major study of sentencing policy, Michael Tonry of the University of
Minnesota suggested that states consider the following options:16
• Pursue presumptive rather than mandatory sentences.
Presumptive sentences, which are developed by sentencing com-
missions and set forth as guidelines, can shift overall sentencing
patterns in ways acceptable to policymakers. For example, they can
seek to imprison more violent offenders and fewer property offend-
ers. A sentencing commission can help maintain sentencing policy
while still preserving ultimate legislative control. Presumptive sen-
tences have generally achieved their intended goals, and research
shows high rates of conformity to the sentences by judges.
In the rare instance in which a presumptive sentence is inappro-
priate (i.e., either too harsh or too lenient, given the facts of the
case), judges can depart from the guidelines by providing in writ-
ing reasons that can be reviewed by higher courts. If legislatures
so instruct sentencing commissions, they can craft the guidelines
to control future costs and, at the same time, toughen sentences
for repeat violent offenders.
14 McDonald, D.C., and K.E. Carlson (1993). Sentencing in the Courts: Does Race Matter? The
Transition to Sentencing Guidelines, 1986-90. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics.
15 Greenwood, P.W., C.P. Rydell, A. Abramse, J.P. Caulkins, J. Chiesa, K. Model, and S.P. Klein
(1994). Three Strikes and You’re Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of California’s New
Mandatory-Sentencing Law. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994.
16 Tonry, Sentencing Matters.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 121
Case Study 3.2, continued
• Include “sunset provisions” to require periodic reconsideration of the
propriety of the laws, if mandatory sentencing laws are enacted.
• Limit the duration and scope of mandatory sentencing laws.
Crime is, quite literally, an activity of young men. As the study
of the California law emphasized, extremely long mandatory sen-
tences (e.g., 25 years to life) are inefficient because they confine
offenders for long periods (at great cost) after they would have
“aged out” of crime. Sentencing could be mandated for only a few
especially serious crimes. If such laws are aimed at repeat serious
offenders, they could include a requirement that only particularly
serious prior and current convictions trigger them.
• Conduct some form of periodic administrative review to determine
if continued confinement of the offender is required, in the event
mandatory sentences are imposed.
• Closely link sentencing and fiscal policy decisions to enhance the
legislative process. Legislatures could ensure that they know the
financial impact of proposed sentencing legislation and, where
substantial long-term costs will be incurred, a funding plan might
be a required provision of the enabling law. This would prevent
today’s legislature from avoiding the fiscal implications of its
sentencing policies.
Cultivating Alternative Sanctions
Legislatures also may want to develop policy that makes more effective and
systematic use of intermediate sanctions, if the twin objectives of punishment
and lower correctional costs are to be achieved. Such policy might specify goals
for each particular sanction, locate each category of intermediate sanctions
along the continuum between standard probation and total confinement, and
define target populations for each category. For example, it could specify which
confined offenders will be considered for early release, which sanctions should
enhance standard probation, and which offenders need treatment or services.
In addition, states may want to develop a financial structure to steer
development of intermediate sanctions in intended directions. This could be
a variant of current community corrections acts, for which a central state
agency sets standards for local programs and administers performance-based
financial aid to local governments. For intermediate sanctions, the state could
provide greater support to jurisdictions whose program met or exceeded the
performance objectives specified by the agency.

122 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 3.2, continued
Finally, states that make greater use of intermediate sanctions may want
to develop policies that govern their use in individual cases. Examples are the
development of presumptive guidelines for nonconfinement as well as confine-
ment sanctions. Such policies could be designed to ensure that overall use of
nonconfinement sanctions is consistent with goals established by the legislature
and broad principles that govern sentencing generally (e.g., proportionality,
uniformity, and neutrality). In particular, guidelines could limit additive use
of sanctions (imposing two or three nonconfinement sanctions on a particular
offender) and control revocation decisions in order to minimize needless con-
finement for minor rule violations.

CHAPTER 3 • SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 123
Endnotes
1 Rothman, D.J. (1980). Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and its Alterna-
tives in Progressive America. Boston: Little, Brown.
2 Von Hirsch, A. (1985). Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness
in the Sentencing of Criminals. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
3 Auerhahn, K. (2001). Incapacitation, Dangerous Offenders, and Sentencing
Reform. Albany: State University of New York Press.
4 Braithwaite, J. (1999). “Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts.” In Michael Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, v. 25
(pp. 1-127). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
5 Packer, H.L. (1968). The Limits of the Criminal Sanction. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
6 Packer, note 5, p. 154.
7 For example, see: Walker, S. (2001). Sense and Nonsense about Crime and Drugs
(5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
8 Andrews, D.A., I. Zinger, R.D. Hoge, J. Bonta, P. Gendreau, and F.T. Cullen (1990).
“Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically
Informed Meta-analysis.” Criminology, 28, 369-404.
9 Ibid, note 7.
10 Sherman, L.W., and R.A. Berk (1984). “The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest
for Domestic Assault.” American Sociological Review, 49, 261-272.
11 Summarized from Finn, P. (1998). Texas’ Project RIO (Re-Integration of Offenders).
Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National
Institute of Justice.
12 Further information on restorative justice is available at: http://www.realjustice.org
13 Shichor, D. (1995). Punishment for Profit: Private Prisons/Public Concerns. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
14 Rossi, R.J, K.J. Gilmartin, and C.W. Dayton (1982). Agencies Working Together.
A Guide to Coordination and Planning. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
15 Wright, K.N. (1999). “The Desirability of Goal Conflict Within the Criminal Jus-
tice System.” In: S. Stojkovic, J. Klofas, and D. Kalinich (eds.), The Administration
and Management of Criminal Justice Organizations (4th ed.) (pp. 37-49). Prospect
Heights, IL: Waveland.
16 Cohen, M.D., J.G. March, and J.P. Olsen (1972). “A Garbage Can Model of Orga-
nizational Choice.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 1-25; Hagan, J. (1989).
“Why Is There So Little Criminal Justice Theory? Neglected Macro- and Micro-
level Links between Organization and Power.” Journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency, 26, 116-135; Welsh, W.N. (1992). “The Dynamics of Jail Reform
Litigation: A Comparative Analysis of Litigation in California Counties.” Law
and Society Review, 26, 591-625; Weick, K. (1976). “Educational Organizations
as Loosely Coupled Systems.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 21, 1-19.

http://www.realjustice.org

124 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
17 See Hagan, note 16, p. 119.
18 Eisenstein, J., and H. Jacob (1977). Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis of
Criminal Courts. Boston: Little, Brown; Feeley, M. (1983). Court Reform on Trial:
Why Simple Solutions Fail. New York: Basic Books; Forst, M.L. (1977). “To What
Extent Should the Criminal Justice System Be a ‘System’?” Crime & Delinquency,
23, 403-416; Gibbs, J. (1986). “Punishment and Deterrence: Theory, Research,
and Penal Policy.” In L. Lipson and S. Wheeler (eds.), Law and the Social Sci-
ences. New York: Russell Sage; President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice (1968). The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. New
York: Avon Books; Reiss, A. (1971). The Police and the Public. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press; Rossum, R.A. (1978). The Politics of the Criminal Justice
System. An Organizational Analysis. New York: Marcel Dekker.
19 See Hagan, note 16.
20 Skolnick, J. (1966). Justice Without Trial. New York: John Wiley.
21 See Hagan, note 16.
22 Balbus, I. (1973). The Dialectics of Legal Repression. New York: Russell Sage.
23 Office of Homeland Security (2002). National Strategy for Homeland Security.
Washington, DC: The White House.

CHAPTER 4
Designing the
Program or Policy
125
C H A P T E R O U T L I N E
Choosing an intervention approach involves integrating the
information assembled in previous stages to decide how a policy
or program can best achieve the goals that have been specified.
How can the information collected at previous stages be used to
decide what the substance of an intervention will be? How will a
specific goal be accomplished?
Major activities for program design include the following: (1) Define
the target population: who is the intervention aimed at? (2) Define
participant selection and intake procedures: how are program
participants selected and recruited for the intervention? (3) Define
program components: the precise nature, amount, and sequence
of activities provided must be specified. Who does what to whom,
in what order, and how much? (4) Write job descriptions of staff,
and define the skills and training required.
Major activities for policy design include the following: (1) Define
the target population of the policy. Which persons or groups are
included and which are not? (2) Identify the responsible author-
ity. Who is required to carry out the policy, and what will their
responsibilities be? (3) Define the provisions and procedures of
the policy. Provisions specify the sanctions or services that will
be delivered, and the conditions that must be met in order for the
policy to be carried out. Individuals responsible for implementing
a specific set of rules must also clearly understand the specific
sequence of actions to be taken (procedures) to ensure that the
policy is carried out consistently.

126 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
You will recall that policies differ from programs in that policies
are rules, principles, or guidelines that govern actions, while programs
are structures created to address specific needs or problems of a tar-
get population (see Chapter 1). Stage 4 involves specifying all of the
program’s activities or the policy’s rules and procedures. Although
planning for programs and for policies share many common features
(e.g., analyzing the problem, setting goals and objectives), the two types
of intervention are quite different in substance (design). This chapter
will treat program design and policy design separately in order to keep
these two intervention approaches clear.
Choosing an Intervention Approach
Choosing between a policy or program involves integrating the infor-
mation assembled in previous stages. For example, your goal might be
to reduce youth violence, but how will that goal be accomplished? What
will be the substance of the intervention—creating a boot camp, enforcing
a curfew, developing community recreation programs, applying tougher
punishment, or something else? How do you decide? Up to this point, you
have collected and analyzed data, you have an idea of the intervention
options that fit the problem or need, and your goals and objectives have
been established. Your force field analysis (see Chapter 2) has revealed
critical sources of resistance and support, and your systems analysis
(Chapter 2) has identified important characteristics of the organizational
environment in which the change effort will take place. These data help
inform choices about which intervention approach to choose.
We can learn about the potential costs of an option by examining its
use in other settings. In cases in which the policy results in the creation
of a new agency, the costs can be very high. The Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 was developed to improve state-
level planning for combating juvenile crime and to halt the practice of
confining status offenders with delinquents. One of the Act’s provi-
sions was the creation of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention within the Department of Justice. Between 1974 and 1980,
Congress increased funding for this act from $25 million to $100 mil-
lion. By 2005, the OJJDP budget had risen to $362.9 million.
Program and policy options are often weighed in terms of cost. One
option is to compare to another in terms of its expected benefits in rela-
tion to its costs, and its costs in relation to available resources. In 1997,
for example, Joan Petersilia listed the typical annual costs of different
types of intermediate sanctions and treatment approaches to assist the
California Department of Corrections in making its choices.1
Some people are surprised to learn that a residential treatment pro-
gram can be more costly than imprisonment or that an in-home drug

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 127
treatment program can cost more than a boot camp. Similarly, many
states have chosen to invest in developing community-based correctional
programs to reduce dependency on costly prisons. But these community
programs, if run well, can be costly too. Are offenders in these programs
expected to work or go to school? If so, will it be necessary to purchase
training, assist with job searches, monitor their behavior on the job, or
intervene when conflicts occur at the place of employment? Programs that
include treatment are considerably more expensive than those that do
not, and yet treatment improves the effectiveness of intensive probation
programs.2 These are facts that must be known in order to avoid wasteful
planning or eventual program failure because of inadequate resources.
Designing a Program
In general, in designing a program we must answer the following
questions as specifically as possible: who does what to whom, where, in
what order, how much, and how often? How will the program be set up?
How are participants selected? What activities are delivered, and how?
What training and qualifications are required for staff? By the time you
reach this stage of analysis, you should have information about:
• The problem or need to be addressed
• Etiology (causes) and theory
• Possible interventions
• Potential barriers to change
• Goals and objectives
Figure 4.1
OPTION COST
1997 2001
State prison $21,000 $30,929
County jail 19,700 22,611
Boot camps (121 days prison plus
244 days intensive probation) 11,700
House arrest with electronic monitoring 3,500-8,500
Parole 4,000 3,364
Routine probation/parole supervision 200-2,000
Substance abuse treatment programs
Residential 22,400
Social model (drug-free home) 12,500
Outpatient 2,900
Methadone maintenance 2,500

128 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
If you were acting as a program “analyst,” you would look at
an existing program and specify in detail exactly what it does. When
designing a new program, however, the change agent’s task is to design
the “nuts and bolts” of the new program. The goals and objectives that
have previously been specified must now be translated into specific tasks
and activities, and the appropriate sequencing and timing of each activ-
ity must be defined. Examples are provided in Case Studies 4.1 and 4.2
at the end of this chapter.
Define the Target Population of the Program
Who is to be targeted, or changed? This process often involves
specifying some level of need on the part of potential targets (e.g., level
of drug involvement) and the characteristics of the intended target
population (e.g., age, gender, geographic residence, type of offense,
prior criminal record, etc.). In Chapter 2, recall that we discussed five
levels of causality. We now need to clarify exactly who or what is the
target of change. Are we trying to change:
• Individuals? (e.g., via counseling, teaching problem-solving skills)
• A group or groups? (e.g., via support groups, peer groups, family
counseling)
• An organization? (e.g., via police training)
• A community? (e.g., via community policing, neighborhood watch,
community service)
• Social structural conditions? (e.g., via welfare reform, job training,
employment assistance)
In order to specify the target population, two major steps are
required: defining eligibility and specifying numbers to be served.
1. Define Eligibility: Who is eligible for the program? What kind of
individuals is the program intended for, and which targets are best
suited to the intervention approach? Eligibility is often based on
age, residence, income, gender, ethnicity, or other demographic
variables. It is also based on level of need: What is the appropriate
population to be targeted, in terms of how significant or urgent
their needs are?
2. Specify Numbers to be Served: Given scarce resources, how are
program funds most widely spent? How many resources are
available to serve how many people? How many individuals can
the program accommodate over a time period of six months?
One year?

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 129
Assessing Risk and Needs
One of the most common tools for defining a target population and
matching individual needs with appropriate programming is a risk/needs
assessment. Risk typically refers to the likelihood of a negative outcome,
like re-arrest, while needs pertain to problems that may be causing
them to engage in antisocial behavior. The risk/needs assessment tools
most commonly used are empirically based; that is, they were devel-
oped from research on actual individuals from the targeted population.
Among the most widely used of these tools with delinquent youths are
the Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory, developed by
Robert Hoge and Don Andrews,3 The Massachusetts Youth Screening
Instrument, Second Version (MAYSI-2), developed by Thomas Grisso
and Richard Barnum,4 and The Psychopathy Checklist—Youth Ver-
sion (PCL-YV), developed by Robert Hare.5 The YLS/CMI is a general
screening tool designed to assess a youth’s criminogenic needs and the
risk that the youth will commit an offense in the future. The MAYSI-2
is a tool for identifying youths who may have mental health problems
and require further diagnostic testing. The Psychopathy Checklist is
used to identify the extent to which a youth’s delinquent behavior is
due to ways of thinking about antisocial acts.
Define Participant Selection and Intake Procedures
Now that we know who the targets of change are, the next question is:
How are program participants recruited and selected for the intervention?
Given that targeted individuals and potential referral sources (e.g., police,
courts, schools, probation, social services, etc.) are initially unaware of the
program (or perhaps hostile toward it), how will we make them aware of
this program, and how will we encourage them to use it? For example,
boot camp programs are often intended for first-time, nonviolent offend-
ers. The court might identify eligible offenders; an application from the
individual may be required; an interview and screening process may be
required to determine the applicant’s suitability for the program.
Keep in mind that eligibility does not guarantee selection. A number
of issues aside from being eligible affect selection for a program. The
following five issues should be considered when defining how partici-
pants will be selected.
1. Access: How are potential participants “recruited” (i.e., how
do they become aware of the program)? How are they informed
of program operations and activities? Are referrals made to the
program by any outside agencies? If so, by whom and for what
reasons? How do referral sources learn about the program?

130 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
2. Screening: How are referrals or applicants screened for eligibility?
Is some kind of needs assessment or other assessment tool used?
Are application procedures required? How do they work? How is
it decided who will be admitted to the program and who will be
excluded?
3. Intake: Is an intake form used to record basic information when
an individual is referred to the program, such as name, age, source
of referral, reason for referral, etc.?
4. Individual Records: Is information to be recorded or stored
throughout an individual’s participation in the program? What
kinds of information are needed for agency reporting purposes?
For feedback to the individual? For treatment planning?
5. Retention: How long are participants to be retained in the program?
What procedures will encourage them to complete the program?
Define Program Components
Program components fall into the following categories: services,
service delivery, dosage levels, and outputs. First, the precise nature,
amount, and sequence of activities provided by a program must be
specified. Service delivery refers to all those parts of the program that
involve the dispensing of some “services” to targets. Who does what to
whom, where, in what order, how often, and how much? What is the
sequence of activities?
A boot camp program, for example, might contain several compo-
nents: rigid military-style drills and physical training; academic or voca-
tional education; life-skills or problem-solving training; drug awareness
education; social skills training, and so on. We need to describe how
frequently each activity is provided (e.g., how many times a week?) and
how much (e.g., one hour per session?). Program evaluators often refer
to these measures of exposure to a service as dosage. We need to specify
which staff will be responsible for providing each activity, and exactly
how it will be done (e.g., how are “life skills” taught? what approach
is used: text, lectures, speakers, films, role plays, individual or group
counseling?). We need to describe the sequence of activities: what hap-
pens when an individual is first admitted? What order of activities is
followed: upon admission? in a daily routine? on a weekly basis? How
long does the program last (e.g., six weeks? six months?). How are
targets “graduated” from the program?
Output refers to criteria for defining when the program has been
completed (some unit of intervention provided to a specific individual).
For example: 10 counseling sessions, eight weeks of boot camp, 12
problem-solving skills training sessions, and so on.

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 131
When we review applications for funding, general program descrip-
tions, or even academic articles, we are often surprised by the vague-
ness of the actual activities specified by the program. For example, we
are told only that a program offers “counseling for battered women.”
We ask: How are women referred to this program? By whom? How
is eligibility determined? Who delivers counseling? How? What kind
of counseling (e.g., psychotherapy? behavior modification? cognitive
restructuring?) How often is counseling given? For how long? In what
setting (inpatient, outpatient)? Obviously, the simple information that
“counseling” is provided is, by itself, insufficient to understand any-
thing about the program’s service delivery.
Write Job Descriptions of Staff, and
Define the Skills and Training Required
How many and what kinds of staff are required to operate the
program? What specific duties will they carry out? What kind of
qualifications do they need to possess, and what further training will
be necessary? How much money is needed for staff salaries and train-
ing? Service tasks include writing job descriptions of all program staff,
their qualifications and training, and the major activities that are to be
completed by them.
Designing a Policy
Policies are rules, principles, or guidelines that govern actions,
while programs are organizations created to address specific needs or
problems of a target population. Often programs are created to carry
out large-scale policies. For example, the policy of requiring drug-
abusing defendants in criminal court to participate in drug treatment
has produced both new drug treatment programs and, more recently,
drug courts.6 Drug courts possess more specialized knowledge of drug
addiction and are better equipped to address the unique problems of
the addicted defendant.
Policies are never designed by individuals working alone. Instead,
because the decisions of a great many people will be affected, policy
design occurs within a legislative process. Elected legislators of govern-
ment bodies typically vote on policies designed by subcommittees. In
private organizations, a similar process occurs through the board of
directors. In other words, the creation of rules is usually the business
of a legitimate body of rule-makers.

132 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
In Chapter 1, we noted that policies vary in terms of their complex-
ity. For example, a policy states that visitors to the offices of a program
must sign a visitors’ log. This is not a rule that typically requires discus-
sion by a legislative body. Instead, these lower-level policies are handled
at an administrative level. We will concern ourselves here, however, with
broader policies created to address significant criminal justice problems.
The design of a policy involves specifying in detail the elements of
the policy that make it possible for others to use it appropriately. In
other words, if the provisions and procedures of the policy are not laid
out clearly, actions may be taken that are inconsistent with the intent
of the policymakers. In addition, if elements of the policy are missing,
then incomplete implementation may result.
As an example, in the early 1980s, Philadelphia’s Municipal Court
initiated a new policy for handling drunk drivers. The idea was that
small amounts of punishment combined with education and treatment
would be more effective than punishment alone. Consequently, new
penalties that included jail sentences of only a few days were created,
requirements were added that immediately after sentencing the offender
would be tested for alcohol abuse problems, and contracts were estab-
lished with private programs to provide alcohol abuse treatment and
education. But a critical piece was missing. No one was made responsible
to see that the sentence was carried out, and no record of participation
was maintained. Over time, offenders learned that if they ignored the
sentence, nothing would happen. Ironically, the more times an offender
was sentenced, the less likely it was that the sentence was completed.7
In designing a policy, the change agent typically identifies:
• The target population, or who will be affected by the policy,
• The decision authority, or who has the authority to carry out the
policy,
• The provisions of the policy (what members of the target population
will receive), and the steps that must be followed (procedures).
Define the Target Population of the Policy
Policies affect people. Much like programs, they are intended to
benefit or punish specific groups of people through the actions of deci-
sionmakers. A policy that certain juveniles will be automatically tried
as adults (“direct file” or “automatic exclusion”) must clearly specify
the characteristics of individuals and their offenses that will make them
eligible for trial in criminal court. How old must they be? What offenses
are included? Do they need to have a record of prior offenses? Must
the prior offenses be serious? Is there any way that these juveniles can
be tried in juvenile court?

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 133
For other types of policies, the question is often one of selection:
whether the rule applies to everyone or whether only certain persons
or groups are being targeted. Recent research has shown that serious
juvenile crimes occur at specific times of day. Many cities have instituted
curfews to reduce crimes that occur between 11:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M.
This type of policy applies to all persons within a specific age range. In
a South Carolina study, however, researchers found that most violent
crimes occur around 3:00 P.M., right after school. This information
implies that more after school programming is needed.8
Identify the Responsible Authority
Who is to carry out the policy, and what will the responsibilities of
those persons be? Many states, for example, have implemented sentenc-
ing guidelines that limit the ranges of sentences that judges can give to
offenders, depending on current and prior offense information. Judges are
required to stay within the specified reasons or to provide written justifica-
tion for giving a sentence that is outside the range. In this case, the judge
is the responsible authority, and the judge must consult the guidelines
before assigning the sentence. This assignment of responsibility to an orga-
nizational unit or to persons occupying a specific role in an organization
is important to the policy’s success. It assures that relevant knowledge,
credibility, and lines of authority are consistent with other policies.
In some cases, a new policy results in the creation of new agencies. In
the case of sentencing guidelines, many states have created commissions
that monitor implementation of the guidelines, including training judges,
prosecutors, defenders, and others who need to know the new rules.
Importantly, these sentencing commissions monitor use of the guidelines
and learn from the application of the guidelines how to improve them.
For example, if judges routinely make exceptions to the guidelines in cases
involving use of a weapon or drug addiction, then the commission needs
to review the guidelines to see if changes are needed. It may be that the
justifications provided by judges are consistent and convincing, and that
the guidelines should reflect the values and beliefs being expressed by these
judges. This example shows how important it is to assign responsibility for
carrying out a policy to the right persons. Not only will implementation be
more effective; the policy itself has a better chance of being improved.
Specify Policy Provisions and Procedures
In order for a set of principles or rules to be implemented well,
individuals responsible for carrying them out must understand what is
to be done (provisions) and the steps that must be taken (procedures)

134 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
so that the policy is carried out consistently. In the case of a curfew for
juveniles, the rule about “who gets what and in what order” is clear. In
other cases, however, the policy statement must be more detailed. It is
critical that provisions and procedures be developed and stated clearly
in order to ensure consistency, fairness, and control of costs associated
with the policy’s implementation. Typically the policy identifies:
• Provisions: What is to be done: the goods, services, opportunities,
or interventions that will be delivered to members of the target
population
• Procedures: The steps that need to be followed and the conditions
that must be met to apply the policy.
For example, state Community Corrections Acts (CCAs) are policies
that specify how community correctional programs should be developed
to control the growth of prison populations. The provisions of state
CCAs vary on at least four dimensions:9
1. The degree of decentralization of authority from state to local
levels (e.g., administrative control granted to city/county networks
v. state-run programs).
2. The nature of citizen participation in the design, governance, and
operation of community corrections programs (e.g., citizen advi-
sory board, role in case screening).
3. Relative emphasis on deinstitutionalization of offenders (e.g., the
degree to which reductions in local or state prison populations are
explicitly mandated; funding incentives or disincentives are tied to
prison populations).
4. The nature and scope of individualized sanctions and services to
be offered (e.g., relative emphasis on rehabilitation, reintegration,
restitution, restoration, or control).
We see that provisions may overlap to some degree with decision
authority and target identification. The decision authority who chooses
to keep some prison-bound offenders in the community may be bound

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 135
by strict eligibility criteria that include the type of crime the offender
committed, their prior court history, and their family or employment
situations. In another setting the policy may specify a requirement
(provision) that a certain proportion of prison-bound offenders must
stay in the community. How these offenders are selected may or may
not be left to the discretion of decisionmakers.
When specifying the provisions of a policy, it is also important to
specify the specific steps or procedures to be followed. For example,
Emergency Release Acts are controversial policy options that require a
local or state correctional agency to release certain prisoners in order to
bring the population down to an acceptable level.10 Obviously, such a
policy is not popular with everyone. Letting prisoners out before their
sentence is completed may be regarded as cheating. After all, the judge
handed down a sentence that seemed fair. The fact that the prison is
crowded doesn’t change the appropriateness of the sentence. The fact is,
however, that criminal justice agencies are not given infinite resources.
They must do the best that they can with limited resources. In designing
an Emergency Release policy, then, it is important to state clearly the
sequence of actions (procedures) that must be taken when the prison
population reaches a specified level:
• Prison populations are to be monitored daily.
• Projections are made about immediate crowding problems.
• Responsible persons are designated to make release decisions.
• The governor’s office must be consulted in specific cases.
• Persons with specific authority must sign orders.
• Arrangements must be made for those inmates about to be
released.
• Notification to other agencies (e.g., law enforcement) may be
required.
These steps are especially important when the rights of individuals
are affected, eligibility might be challenged, resources are limited, and
public objections are likely. Clear procedures help to ensure consistency
and fairness in the application of a policy.

136 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Conclusion
Once the intervention approach is chosen, it is necessary to specify
clearly and in detail the design of the program or policy. Vague descrip-
tions are not sufficient. Not all “boot camps” provide the same program-
ming, for example, nor do all mandatory sentencing policies contain the
same provisions. We want to know, in detail, who does what to whom
in what order, how much and how often (see the summary table below).
Only when the program or policy design has been clearly defined are we
ready to move to the next stage of planning or analysis.
Figure 4.2
Critical Elements of Program and Policy Design
Program Design Policy Design
Who (does) Staff Decision authority
What “Services” (program Provisions
components and activities)
To whom Target population Target population
In what order “Service delivery” (sequence Procedures
of program activities)
How much and “Service delivery” (dosage Provisions
of each service)
How often “Service delivery” (frequency Procedures
of program activities)

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 137
D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S
1. (a) Briefly describe the design of a program discussed in class, or
use one that you have found while doing library research for a
class paper. (b) Do you have enough published material to do this
analysis? If not, what information do you need, and how might
you get it?
2. What factors should you consider in choosing an intervention
approach? Give a brief example to illustrate your answer.
3. What is meant by the term “service tasks”? Describe the different
aspects that need to be specified.
4. What is meant by the term “service delivery”? Describe the differ-
ent aspects that need to be specified.
5. What is meant by the term “policy provisions”? Give an example.
6. What kinds of factors are considered in defining the target population?
7. Identify a criminal justice policy and outline its major components,
including its target population, provisions, responsible authority,
and procedures.
8. Describe each of the following concepts:
• Access
• Screening
• Needs/Risk Assessment
• Intake
• Client Records
• Retention
• Direct File
• Emergency Release Acts

138 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 4.1
Program Design: The Philadelphia Drug Treatment Court
Instructions: Read the case study below, and then answer the question at the end
of the material.
Drug Courts
Many individuals enter the criminal justice system on drug-related charges.
Recently, instead of just punishing these offenders, specialized drug courts have
been implemented in order to respond to the offense and interrupt the cycle of
drugs and crime. By merging court processing with substance abuse treatment,
such courts serve as an alternative to sending individuals to prison. The special-
ized courts usually provide diversionary or deferred sentencing programs, mean-
ing that successful completion of the program results in dismissal of charges.
The Philadelphia Treatment Court
The Philadelphia Treatment Court was developed through a collaboration
of several criminal justice agencies, treatment agencies, and key stakeholders.1
A Drug Court Planning Committee was formed in December 1995 under super-
vision of Judge Louis Presenza, Supervising Judge for the Criminal Division of
the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The committee consisted of representatives
of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, the Court of Common Pleas, the Phila-
delphia District Attorney’s Office, the Defender Association of Philadelphia,
Pretrial Services, the Public Health Department, and Temple University. A
comprehensive plan for a drug court in Philadelphia was completed in Decem-
ber 1996 and set into execution in April of 1997.
Goals
The development of a drug court in Philadelphia was initiated to address
high levels of drug involvement among the adult offenders. This court was
designed as an alternative to incarceration to provide treatment to substance-
abusing defendants. Its goal is to reduce a defendant’s involvement in crime
and recidivism, to reduce the overcrowding of Philadelphia’s prison population,
and to increase offenders’ chances of functioning more productively as citizens
by providing treatment as a part of the criminal justice process. The Treatment
Court is structured as a partnership between the criminal justice system and
a network of treatment providers that respond to the clinically determined
needs of participants. It delivers treatment and other supportive services to
1 Goldkamp, J.S., D. Weiland, M. Collins, and J. Moore (1999). The Implementation of the
Philadelphia Treatment Court: A Descriptive Analysis of Early Stages of Implementation.
Technical Report. Philadelphia: Temple University, Crime and Justice Research Institute.

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 139
Case Study 4.1, continued
more fully address treatment, health, housing, literacy, educational, and other
social service needs presented by drug-involved defendants.
Target Population
The Planning Committee defined a target population and specific criteria
for selecting participants. Eligible participants were limited to nonviolent, seri-
ously drug-involved felony offenders who had been recently arrested. Medium-
to high-risk individuals were targeted. Defendants with more than two prior
nonviolent convictions (including juvenile adjudications) or diversion disposi-
tions did not qualify, and neither did those offenders with any prior violent
conviction. Strong objections by a victim could also preclude participation.
Participation Selection Procedures
Identification of potential candidates are identified immediately follow-
ing arrest, triggered by eligible charges. Pretrial Services then continues the
screening through an interview with the defendant. The Municipal Court Bail
Commissioner is then alerted by Pretrial Services and determines eligibility by
assigning a medium-high-risk release. Referrals are assessed for drug abuse
treatment needs and appear before the Treatment Court. Defendants deter-
mined not to be in need of drug treatment are returned to the normal process-
ing. Final eligibility of defendants in need of treatment is decided by the District
Attorney’s Office by reviewing the current charges, criminal history, and social
history. Participation is also voluntary on the part of the defendant.
Program Components
As soon as a plea is entered, the participant begins an intensive drug treat-
ment program designed to last for 12 months. Frequent drug testing and visits
to an Intensive Supervision Center (ISC) are regular components of the court’s
requirements. This component is staffed by members of the Pretrial Services
Unit of the court. The treatment itself is divided into five phases: (1) nonmedical
detoxification, (2) intense treatment, (3) life-skills training, (4) pre-graduation,
and (5) aftercare. Treatment services are provided by private providers, through
contracts with the court.
Throughout these phases, participant behavior is acknowledged by means
of rewards and sanctions. Sanctions include writing essays, court hearings,
increased drug testing, restarting a phase, electronic monitoring, brief incar-
ceration, and treatment termination with plea entered. Rewards include rec-
ognition in court, less frequent court appearances, unobserved drug testing,
graduation, dismissing of case, and expungement of the offender’s record.
Although expected time periods are defined for each phase, moving from one
phase to the next requires completion of the previous stage. Let’s look at each
phase in a bit more detail.

140 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 4.1, continued
Phase I: Orientation, nonmedical detoxification, and assessment takes
one month. During this phase participants must comply with pretrial release
conditions, attend all hearings, and complete substance abuse assessment. They
must attend treatment intake, where an initial treatment plan determined by
the assessment is implemented. They must attend all treatment sessions, making
up ones they have missed and supply five consecutive negative drug tests.
Phase II: Intense Treatment is planned to last three months. Services
include substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, life-skills training,
and counseling. Participants are required to attend and participate in required
treatment sessions and be actively involved in meeting treatment goals. They
must maintain 90 consecutive days with negative drug tests and attend self-
help sessions at least twice a week. They must not accumulate more than two
sanctions. Drug testing is administered twice a week, court appearances are
monthly, and ISC visits are once or twice a month.
Phase III: Focus on Life Skills, and Phase IV: Pre-graduation. Phase III and
Phase IV are similar. Each phase lasts about four months. Life-skills training,
vocational and housing assessment, relapse prevention, and an aftercare plan
are all addressed during these two phases. Clients must continue substance
treatment and attend all court hearings. They are required to attend AA/NA
meetings at least once a week and participate in relapse prevention at least two
hours per week. They also must be drug-free for 120 days. Weekly random
drug testing is given, monthly court hearings are set, and monthly ISC contacts
are required. Graduation follows the successful completion of Phase IV.
Finally, an aftercare phase lasts about 12 months. Participants follow an
aftercare plan agreed on with the court. Participants must attend Treatment
Court alumni/support groups and NA/AA meetings. If participants are not
arrested with convictions and there is no evidence that the defendant is engaging
in drug use, their arrest is expunged from their record. If they are arrested or it
becomes apparent that they are abusing drugs, their arrest remains on record.
Questions
1. Review the program description in Case Study 4.1, and critically evaluate
it. How well is the design of this program described? Is there any other
information about the program design that should be included? What
questions might you ask to gain more information about the program
design?
2. Is the program design logically linked to its goals? Why or why not?

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 141
Case Study 4.2
Program Design: The Checkmate Program
Instructions: Read the case study below, and then answer the question at the end
of the material.
The Checkmate Program was one of four community-based delinquency
prevention programs funded by the state of Pennsylvania under its initiative to
reduce minority overrepresentation in juvenile justice.1 The following program
description was excerpted from an evaluation report to the state.2
Target Population and Target Selection
The Checkmate Program was intended to serve Philadelphia’s 25th Police
District through a close cooperative relationship with Stetson Middle School.
Because the Alternative School next door to Stetson received disciplinary
transfers from the rest of the school system, including Stetson, youths from the
Alternative School were also eligible to attend the Checkmate Program. Inclusion
criteria included truancy and disruptive behavior in school. Program staff stated
that the only exclusion criteria were if “youths are too much to handle.”
Programs were mandated, as a condition of PCCD [Pennsylvania Commis-
sion on Crime and Delinquency] funding, to select at least half of their clients
from youths having had prior contact with the justice system. While these cri-
teria were originally interpreted to mean “at least one prior arrest,” this literal
interpretation proved too restrictive and not enough eligible clients at Stetson
could be found. Thus, after discussions with PCCD staff, eligibility criteria
were broadened. “Police contact” was no longer limited to an arrest; it could
include a warning from the police or being questioned by the police. In addi-
tion, if information were available to suggest that a youth was in a gang, he or
she would be eligible. Following these changes in target selection, Checkmate
achieved the mandated criteria.
Intake, Exit, and Follow-up Procedures
Stetson Middle School was the major source of referrals when the pro-
gram began. Police made a couple of referrals; a few clients were residents of
Hancock Manor (self-referrals or referrals from parents living in the building
where the Checkmate Program was located); a small number came from word
of mouth. A mailing was sent to all potential referral sources explaining the
purpose of the program and services provided for youths.
1 Welsh, W.N., P.W. Harris, and P.H. Jenkins (1995). Evaluation of Minority Overrepresenta-
tion Programs. Appendix to Report 2: Individual Program Reports. Philadelphia: Temple
University, Department of Criminal Justice.
2 An Internet site that stores a number of designs of programs for delinquent youths is http://
www.temple.edu/prodes. Click on PDI to access the Program Design Inventory.

http://www.temple.edu/prodes

http://www.temple.edu/prodes

142 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 4.2, continued
About two-thirds of the referrals came from schools. Program staff also
had “house meetings” (meetings with teachers at each grade level) in the first
year of the program to recruit students. These efforts were so successful that by
the next year the program had received a surplus of referrals, but had already
admitted the maximum number of clients they could serve. As a result, house
meetings were no longer held. School referrals came mostly from the vice-prin-
cipal, counselors, and teachers. Reasons for referral included truancy, cutting
classes, inappropriate behavior, and causing trouble in class.
The demand for services proved quite high. Within the first three months,
the Checkmate Program had already received 100 applications. Within six
months, they had received about 200 applications, with room for only 50
clients at one time. Part of the reason for high demand was that Checkmate
staff were very visible in schools. This was necessary, according to staff, to
maintain good relations with the school and with students.
After the referral was received, there was an intake interview by a member
of the staff (all staff conducted interviews). At the interview, the benefits of the
program were explained. Youths were also advised of their obligations if they
chose to enroll in the program. After the intake interviews, the interviewer met
with the rest of the staff to discuss the applicant’s suitability for the program.
At the case conference, staff discussed whether there was a “good fit” between
the youth’s needs and the program. If the youth had no real problems, he or
she was excluded from the program. Once a decision was made, each applicant
was given a verbal orientation of the rules and regulations of the program.
While youths could be terminated from the program for poor attendance
and/or failure to participate, the program preferred to encourage good atten-
dance and participation by providing incentives, which included: field trips
(i.e., aquarium, ball games), recreation, and after-school homework assistance.
Rewards were contingent upon fulfilling obligations. For example, if a youth
completed his or her homework, he or she was allowed to participate in rec-
reation activities.
General Program Goals and Intervention Philosophy
In its original program proposal, the Checkmate Program provided the
following goal statement: “The intent of the Impact Checkmate Program is to
establish an accountability system for youth with school activities, supplemental
education services, evening and weekend personal development and leader-
ship training activities, and other services that will result in positive behaviors
in school and in the community.” A cornerstone of the program has been its
emphasis on the “Four As”: attendance, academics, athletics, and attitude.
Definitions of program success and failure, as provided by staff, were mod-
est but clear. For example, staff stated that just getting youths to attend school
is a major achievement. Staff also expected progress in each youth’s attitude and

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 143
Case Study 4.2, continued
behavior, physical fitness, and academic performance. The most crucial factors
needed for program success, according to staff, were consistent leadership and
meaningful interaction with the clients.
Perceived obstacles to program success included a lot of attrition due to
the transitional nature of the neighborhood and the age of the youths. Staff felt
that there was too much of a “revolving door” policy regarding attendance.
Efforts were made to contact youth and encourage attendance. Unfortunately,
parents were sometimes a part of the problem. Program staff were limited by
lack of resources in their ability to reach out to parents who resisted or did not
seek assistance.
The school setting (Stetson) provided serious obstacles as well as support.
For example, original target selection procedures were not successful. “Block
Rostering” of students (i.e., identifying eligible students; scheduling classes to
enable program clients to attend Checkmate activities) never happened. There
were also problems in classroom scheduling (Checkmate originally offered its
life skills classes at Stetson). Often, neither staff nor students knew in advance
which classroom they were going to be in, creating delays and confusion.
Security and safety at the school was an issue. For example, random searches
with metal detectors and fire alarms that were frequently set off by students
caused disruption. In addition, program staff reported that about six to eight
serious incidents had occurred since the beginning of the school year, and there
was inadequate protection for students. “Two trained counselors cannot pro-
vide effective service delivery to the school population of approximately 1,000
students.” In addition, transportation from the Alternative School was stopped
because of discipline problems on the bus, and this created an important gap.
At the conclusion of the first school year, Checkmate maintained its rela-
tions with the school, but began providing services to youths in a different
physical setting (Hancock Manor). Checkmate staff members began visiting the
schools at least three times per week to provide support for participants and
recruit clients. There was a strong relationship with school staff.
Program Content (Service Delivery)
Program activities and objectives are diagrammed in Figure 4.3. The program
offered two weekend retreats (two and one-half days each) as part of its regular
programming. The first retreat was a general orientation and introduction to the
program that allowed the staff to assess individual strengths and weaknesses, and
encouraged youths to develop a sense of teamwork. Orientation at the beginning
of the program was important for setting expectations about the program. A lot
of youths had no experience with sharing or teamwork. Now, the orientation
was provided only for new clients. Participants eventually recognized their own
commitment toward progress and learning. They worked through goal setting,
participated in “trust” activities, had several sporting activities, and attended

144 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 4.2, continued
several presentations (i.e., life skills, group norms). Although both retreats were
intensive, the second retreat was aimed at furthering individual and group devel-
opment, including leadership skills.
The Checkmate Program emphasized truancy reduction and follow-
up. Program staff telephoned the school to make sure that youths attended
school, and followed up if students did not attend (phone calls, neighborhood
“roundup,” home visits). Over time, limited resources (i.e., too few program
staff and inconsistent police assistance) resulted in less intensive truancy fol-
low-up, although school attendance was still closely monitored.
The Checkmate Program offered regular life-skills classes. These classes
discussed a variety of issues, such as dealing with anger and communicating
effectively. The program’s staff had a very well-organized curriculum, including
lesson plans and discussion questions. At first, a “Homework Club” was origi-
nally scheduled for one hour each day after school. Staff members encouraged
clients to do their homework and provide assistance. It was very difficult to
get students to do homework, however, and limited resources resulted in this
component being offered mainly on a voluntary basis. To develop the desire
to learn, the staff provided educational activities and games. Staff members
found that they needed to focus on very basic skills. During the second year of
the program, the educational component was less intensive because there was
no educational coordinator. On Monday, Wednesday, and Friday life skills
were taught, and on Tuesday and Thursday homework/ academic work was
stressed. Activities included homework assistance, but also games, discussions,
and other activities. Those youths that did not have homework were allowed
to participate in a game (i.e., chess), read, draw, or do other activities.
The evening recreation program was provided eight to 12 hours per week
and two hours on Saturday. Structured activities (i.e., basketball, games) and
supervision were provided. In the first year of the program, the “Four As”
were stressed: attendance, attitude, athletics, and academics. The “Four As”
were not emphasized as much in the second year. Physical activities were seen
as a means to specific objectives: increased sense of teamwork, increased self-
esteem, improved motor skills, and development of leadership skills. Games
like chess also teach an important process, according to the Program Director:
chess teaches rules, self-discipline, and thinking skills.
The Computer Learning Center, located at Hancock Manor, provided
computer resources and training. Assistance in developing basic skills (math,
science, and reading) was offered. Staff stated that they were working on
new plans to get more clients involved, and were setting up some software.
Unfortunately, the computers were frequently in need of repair. An educa-
tional coordinator was subsequently hired, and the educational program
was reorganized.

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 145
Case Study 4.2, continued
Field trips to museums and cultural and sporting events included attending
a conference on multicultural disabilities, workshops on cultural awareness,
and a school fair (college and career options).
In 1992-93 program staff originally stated that they provided mediation
and counseling for clients, but later agreed in discussions with evaluators that
this component was really only an occasional part of their job descriptions
(i.e., regular interaction with youths), and not a structured service.
The Police-Community Interracial Task Force provided Nonviolent Con-
flict Resolution Training on a contract basis. The basic curriculum was a 30-
hour package including presentations, discussions, and assignments.
A group “rap session” where youths regularly met and discussed their
goals, problems, and progress was originally planned and implemented, but
this was no longer being done because of problems with poor attendance and
high client turnover. Five “subgroups” were planned (i.e., Rooks, Bishops,
etc.). Each group was supposed to have a weekly rap session. In place of rap
sessions, staff provide more one-on-one counseling.
One-to-one mentoring with adults was also intended in the original
program proposal, but this component did not fully materialize due to lim-
ited resources. The program made increasing use of “student mentors” over
time, however. Volunteers from local high schools and colleges assisted with
program supervision and helped monitor the program’s clients. The program
intended to increase the number of mentors to one for each client, and began
more intensive recruiting of volunteers from sources such as high schools (com-
munity service program), colleges, the United Way, St. Christopher’s Church,
and Temple University.
A parent support group was also intended in the original proposal, but
this got off to a very slow start due to lack of interest by parents. Participation
increased gradually, however, due to persistence by staff. A handful of parents
(six or seven) met regularly once a month to discuss their children’s progress
(in the program, at school, at home) and strategies to facilitate progress, and
provide support for each other. Other activities included life-skills workshops,
guest speakers, and parenting skills. A stress-reduction clinic and a session on
parents’ rights were also offered.
Youths were provided with some assistance in the area of career devel-
opment. George C., the project coordinator, used an assessment tool called
“The Self-Directed Search” (Form E). His goal was to assess needs and skills
of youths and mentors, then match up pairs with similar interests and talents.
George also used the “Career Directions Series” available at the Philadelphia
Free Library to provide information about careers and facilitate planning with
youths. The objectives were to assist staff and support youths in their progress
toward their goals. A monthly “mentors” meeting was held; about 12 volun-
teers attended regularly.

146 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 4.2, continued
Program Goals
The primary program goals were as follows:
• Improve attendance and achievement at school
• Increase self-awareness and self-esteem
• Improve problem-solving skills
• Improve communication skills
• Increase respect for others
• Improve school performance
• Improve basic skills (i.e., reading, writing)
• Widen the range of experiences and opportunities
• Develop life skills (i.e., job skills)
• Encourage less aggressive behavior toward others
• Increase cultural sensitivity
• Learn to resolve disputes peacefully
Program Staffing
Mike M., the Program Director, carried out administrative, coordinating,
and monitoring duties. The Project Coordinator, George C., planned program
activities, supervised project staff, recruited and supervised volunteers, main-
tained program records, and completed required reports (i.e., funding). He
supervised the evening recreation program, taught life skills at the Alternative
School (Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday), and provided counseling. Lela
B. was the Educational Coordinator and Administrator: she served as a liaison
with teachers, and helped with truancy reduction, homework, and counseling.
Yvette S., the Youth Vocational Counselor, taught life skills, provided liaison
with parents, and assisted with truancy-reduction efforts. She also provided
counseling and referral services, maintained case notes and other pertinent
information in youth files, and met with school personnel to review youths’
academic performance. An Evening Recreation Director, McKinley W., was
added in March of 1994. Katia V. was a part-time clerical assistant, and Dar-
ren C. was a part-time recreational assistant.
Question
1. Review the program description and chart in Case Study 4.2, and critically
evaluate it. How well is the design of this program described? Is there any other
information about the program design that should be included? What questions
might you ask to gain more information about the program design?

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 147
Case Study 4.2, continued
Figure A
Checkmate Program Model
Activities Goals
Two Weekend Retreats • Assess individual needs
(21⁄2 days each) and strengths
Life Skills Training • Improve self-esteem
(90 minutes weekly) • Improve communications skills
• Increase respect for others
• Learn problem-solving skills
Truancy Reduction and Follow-up • Reduce truancy
(daily checks with school)
After-School Club • Improve school behavior
(3:30 P.M.- 5:00 P.M., and performance
Monday – Friday) • Provide homework assistance
Evening Recreation: • Develop leadership skills
Organized Sports and Games • Develop teamwork
(6:00 P.M. – 9:00 P.M., Monday – Friday; • Improve self-esteem
and 10:00 A.M. – 2:00 P.M. Saturday)
Field Trips • Increase cultural awareness
(1 – 2 per month) • Increase awareness of diversity
• Practice life skills in the field
Computer Learning • Improve basic skills in math
(optional) and reading
Nonviolent Conflict Resolution • Learn to resolve disputes
(30-hr. curriculum) peacefully
• Encourage less aggressive
behavior toward others
• Increase cultural sensitivity
Youth Mentoring • Assist staff in evening program
and support youths.
Career Development • Provide information about
careers and facilitate planning
with youths.
Date: June 1994

148 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 4.3
Getting Tough with Juvenile Offenders
Instructions: Read the material below, and then answer the questions at the end
of the case study.
The juvenile court underwent a number of changes, largely through legisla-
tion, during the 1980s and 1990s. Both the media and some academic scholars
portrayed delinquents as increasingly violent, predicting a wave of violence as
the adolescent population increased in size. During the 1990s, almost every
state passed new legislation making it easier to transfer juveniles to the crimi-
nal courts for trial and removing many protections, such as the confidentiality
of juvenile court records. The waiver of juvenile cases to the criminal court
was facilitated by removing the decision from the juvenile court and making
transfer automatic under certain circumstances, thus placing the decision in the
hands of prosecutors. Moreover, the language of these new laws indicated that
the purpose of the juvenile justice system had shifted from one of rehabilita-
tion to the protection of public safety and holding youths accountable for their
offenses. Thus, legal and social scholars and researchers raised questions about
the “rehabilitative ideal” on which the system was founded.1
The experience of Pennsylvania illustrates well these changes.2 In 1994,
the state’s District Attorney’s Association asked the legislature to change the
Juvenile Act. The recommended change was to give prosecutors the option of
filing criminal charges directly in adult court when the offense was serious,
violent, or if the offender was at least 16 and a chronic offender. Armed with
factual evidence of increasing youth violence and arguments that the juvenile
justice system was inadequate to deal with the problem, they pressed their case
even harder when a new governor was elected in November of 1994.
The juvenile court judges of the state strongly opposed this proposed
change. Instead, the judges proposed enhancements of the juvenile justice sys-
tem that would support a comprehensive, community-focused effort to control
violent juvenile delinquency. With greater resources and continued control over
the decision to transfer juveniles to the adult system, the judges believed that
youth violence could be reduced.
The new governor, Tom Ridge, addressed these initiatives aggressively
when he came into office in January of 1995. Within a year, new legislation had
been passed that change the purpose of the juvenile court from one of rehabili-
tation to one of “balanced and restorative justice,” or “balanced attention to
1 Harris, P.W., W.N. Welsh, and F. Butler (2000). “A Century of Juvenile Justice.” In G. LaFree
(ed.), Criminal Justice 2000, v. 1 (pp. 359-426). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice (NCJ-182408).
2 Information on juvenile laws in other states can be found at the web site of the National Center
for Juvenile Justice: http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles

http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 149
Case Study 4.3, continued
the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability to victims for
offenses committed and the development of competencies to enable children to
become responsible and productive members of the community.” Importantly,
this legislation shifted the status of beneficiary of programs from the child to
the community. Other major changes also were brought into law:
• The police were now authorized to fingerprint and photograph
any child alleged to have committed a misdemeanor or felony,
• Parents could now be required to participate in summary offense
hearings,
• Schools and the police must now be notified of the disposition of
a case,
• Juvenile records of former juvenile offenders could now be used
at bail hearings, and
• Juvenile hearings were now open to the public in cases in which
the juvenile was charged with a felony.
The District Attorney’s Association also got what it wanted: a number of
offenses were excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, thus enabling prosecu-
tors to try these cases in adult court. The excluded offenses, which apply only
to youths 15 and older, are: rape, involuntary sexual intercourse, aggravated
assault, robbery, robbery of a motor vehicle, aggravated indecent assault,
kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter, and an attempt to commit murder. If the
juvenile can demonstrate that a trial in juvenile court would be better for the
public, then the criminal court can choose to transfer the case back to juvenile
court. In addition, juvenile court judges are now to consider primarily the
“public interest” when deciding to transfer other cases. Again, it is the public,
not the juvenile, which now is seen as the beneficiary of the law.
Obviously, each of the provisions listed above requires detailed procedures
for judges, administrators, prosecutors, and probation staff to follow. Let’s
take the direct file provision, known as Act 33. This act not only specifies what
offenses are excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, but it defines in detail each
offense so that fairness can be achieved. For example, aggravated assault includes
an intentional attempt to cause bodily harm to a public official, an attempt to
cause bodily harm with a deadly weapon, or an attempt to cause bodily harm
to a teacher or student while he or she is engaged in school activities.
One of the most difficult implementation issues regarding this law has been
translating the goals of public safety, victim restoration, and competency devel-
opment into operational terms. In particular, if the development of youth com-
petencies is a goal, what does it mean in practice? Is competency development
the same thing as rehabilitation? Is it just education, vocational training, and

150 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 4.3, continued
the acquisition of life skills? Questions as to how courts and programs should
translate the concept of competency development into concrete objectives and
program services took some effort to resolve. The results can be found in a
white paper produced by the National Center for Juvenile Justice at: http://ncjj.
servehttp.com/ncjjwebsite/publications/topical/topicalbalance.htm
Questions
1. Review the policy description given in Case Study 4.3 and critically evalu-
ate it. Is the policy design (as described here) adequate? Why or why not?
Is anything missing?
2. Consider what decision issues are raised by shifting the emphasis of
the juvenile justice system from “the best interests of the child” to “the
protection of the community,” and what cost considerations should be
addressed.
3. For Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act, what is the law’s target population? What
are its provisions? Who is the authority responsible for carrying it out?
What procedures have been provided, and what procedures still need to
be addressed?

http://ncjj

CHAPTER 4 • DESIGNING THE PROGRAM OR POLICY 151
Endnotes
1 Petersilia, J. (1997). “Diverting Nonviolent Prisoners to Intermediate Sanctions:
The Impact of California Prison Admissions and Corrections Costs.” Corrections
Management, 1, p. 10. To get these figures, we went to the California Department
of Corrections web site (http://www.corr.ca.gov/default.asp) and the web site of the
Criminal Justice Institute (http://www.cji-inc.com/). The latter gave us jail figures
for three California jurisdictions (Los Angeles, Riverside, and Santa Clara), which
we averaged.
2 Petersilia, J., and S. Turner (1993). “Intensive Probation and Parole.” In M. Tonry
(ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, v. 17. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press.
3 Hoge, R., and D.A. Andrews (1996). The Youth Level of Service/Case Management
Inventory (YLS/CMI). Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University.
4 Grisso, T., and R. Barnum (2000). Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument-2:
User’s Manual and Technical Report. Worcester, MA: University of Massachusetts
Medical School.
5 Hare, R., McPherson, L., and A. Forth (1988). “Male Psychopaths and Their
Criminal Careers.” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56, 710-714.
6 See Gottfredson, D., S.S. Najaka, and B. Kearley (2003). “Effectiveness of Drug
Treatment Courts: Evidence from a Randomized Trial.” Criminology and Public
Policy, 2, 171-196; Goldkamp, J. (2003). “The Impact of Drug Courts.” Crimi-
nology and Public Policy, 2, 197-206; Harrell, A. (2003). “Judging Drug Courts:
Balancing the Evidence.” Criminology and Public Policy, 2, 207-212.
7 Rourke, N.E., and P.W. Harris (1988). “Evaluating Your DUI System: It Can Be
Sobering.” Judicature, 27, 14-18, 45-49.
8 Juvenile Justice Update (February/March, 1996). Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 5.
9 Harris, M.K. (1996). “Key Differences Among Community Corrections Acts in the
United States: An Overview.” The Prison Journal, 76, 192-238.
10 Welsh, W.N. (1993). “Changes in Arrest Policies as a Result of Court Orders
Against County Jails.” Justice Quarterly, 10, 89-120.

http://www.corr.ca.gov/default.asp

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CHAPTER 5
Action Planning
153
C H A P T E R O U T L I N E
Identify resources needed and make cost projections. How much
funding is needed to implement a specific intervention? Identify
the kinds of resources needed, estimate costs and make projections,
and develop a resource plan.
Plan to acquire or reallocate resources. How will funding be
acquired? Identify resource providers, and be prepared for making
adjustments to the resource plan.
Specify dates by which implementation tasks will be accomplished,
and assign responsibilities to staff members for carrying out tasks.
A Gantt chart is particularly useful for this purpose.
Develop mechanisms of self-regulation. Create mechanisms to
monitor staff performance and enhance communication, including
procedures for orienting participants, coordinating activities, and
managing resistance and conflict.
Specify a plan to build and maintain support. Anticipate sources
of resistance and develop responses.

154 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Action planning is Stage 4 of the seven-stage model used in this
book. We assume that the first three stages of analysis have been com-
pleted at this point in time: Stage 1 (problem analysis), Stage 2 (goals
and objectives), and Stage 3 (program or policy design). Recall that the
steps involved for developing a new program or policy or analyzing
an existing one are similar (see
Chapter 1). If developing a new
program or policy (Table 1.1),
you now have the program or
policy design specified, and it
is time to develop a plan to
put it into motion. If analyzing
an existing program or policy
(Table 1.2), you want to collect
information to determine how critical decisions were made to imple-
ment the program (e.g., how resources were estimated and acquired,
how support was built).
Developing an action plan is like writing the instructions explain-
ing how to assemble a new computer system. Let’s say you’re about to
assemble a complex system of electronic equipment by carefully fol-
lowing all the manufacturer’s instructions. You have all the necessary
components laid out in front of you; you hook up all the wires and
cords according to the instructions, and you hook up the power supply.
Now it is time to turn on the switch. Then: Will it run at all? If so, will
it run effectively and efficiently? What do you do if it doesn’t? Needless
to say, simply having all the components doesn’t do much good unless
the instructions effectively explain what is needed to get the thing going.
One needs a plan for putting the system into operation and making sure
that it is working properly.
Here’s another analogy: developing an action plan is like the blue-
print for building a house. In addition to the description of the house
(e.g., a four-bedroom, two-story brick house with a deck, modern
kitchen, and landscaped yard), you need a blueprint that specifies all
the necessary materials, supplies, and tools required, what goes where,
and how things are supposed to fit together. Without the blueprint, you
can’t even begin. We find out how good the blueprint is when we actu-
ally put it into action step-by-step. Alas, the blueprint didn’t just fall
out of the sky into our waiting
hands. Someone (the architect)
put considerable thought and
effort into explaining how to
translate her vision of a house
into reality. In essence, devel-
oping an action plan is like
writing a blueprint.
Action Planning
Charting the entire sequence of activities and completion
dates required to implement the program or policy design.
It involves specifying, in clear and concise detail, the steps
required to implement the program or policy design. It is,
in essence, a “blueprint” explaining how to translate a
vision of the program or policy into reality.
Implementation
The initiation, management, and administration of
the action plan (see Chapter 6). Once the program or
policy actually begins, we want to minimize discrepancies
between what was planned (i.e., the program or policy
design) and what was actually done (i.e., the “program
or policy in action”).

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 155
Programs and policies are similar—we need a blueprint. We may
have the program or policy design on paper (i.e., descriptions of target
selection procedures, job descriptions and qualifications of staff, and
all the program/policy components or services to be delivered), but that
is not sufficient. You need to develop an action plan, a blueprint that
methodically specifies the sequence of tasks that need to be completed in
order to launch or implement the program or policy successfully. These
include technical and interpersonal tasks (e.g., identifying and acquiring
the necessary resources for the program or policy; locating office space
and/or meeting space; hiring and training staff; designing client intake
and reporting forms; purchasing equipment and supplies; setting dates
and assigning responsibility for the completion of specific tasks).
Naturally, as with the hypothetical computer system above, you
want the program or policy to run properly after you’ve spent so much
time, money, and energy on it. If you have planned carefully, you will
minimize (but not eliminate) unanticipated problems that can surface
when the program or policy actually begins operations.
Identify Resources Needed
and Make Cost Projections
We need to identify all the specific resources necessary to implement
an intervention. In real life, this is extremely important. One cannot
launch any program or policy
without the fiscal and personal
resources needed to translate a
vision into reality. One needs to
start by developing a resource
plan, which enumerates all the
specific costs associated with each
program or policy component,
including staff salaries, benefits, and training, supplies, physical space,
and so on.
A resource plan attempts to achieve the following goals:
• It matches resources to objectives. One must carefully ensure that
all the resources necessary to achieve the objectives of the program
or policy are in place. It forces us to impose a test of feasibility:
either resources must rise to the level needed to achieve the stated
objectives of the program or policy, or the objectives must be
downscaled to match the level of resources available.
• It identifies the availability of current resources and resources still
needed to implement the program or policy design properly.
Resource Plan
A comprehensive statement of the specific fiscal, mate-
rial, and social resources required to implement an
intervention. All program or policy costs are estimated,
including personnel, training, equipment, supplies,
facilities, travel, and so on.

156 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
• It attempts to control expenditures, usually by specifying how
much money is to be spent over specific periods of time, such as
each quarter (a three-month period) and year.
• It provides data for monitoring fiscal aspects of the program or
policy and providing feedback to funding sources and other stake-
holders (e.g., annual reports, or quarterly grant reports).
We offer a few simple guidelines for developing the resource plan.
We emphasize that one need not be a financial wizard, an economist,
or an accountant to understand and use basic principles of resource
planning. We will not be discussing professional budgeting models such
as incremental models, performance-based budgeting, program budget-
ing, or zero-based budgeting. The interested reader can find detailed
discussions on these specialized techniques elsewhere.1 Suffice it to say
we believe in the principles of program-based budgeting (also called
functional budgeting). We present two basic principles of resource
planning. First, we identify the kinds of resources needed. Second, we
estimate costs for each type of resource needed.
First, list the different categories of resources that are needed to
achieve each program or policy objective. Work closely from the pro-
gram or policy design (see Chapter 4). The resource list should include
everything that costs anything. For example:
• Staff: how many, with what qualifications?
• Staff training: what kind, and how much will be needed?
• Supplies: e.g., paper, printing and copying, office supplies?
• Advertising: e.g., brochures, flyers, public service announcements?
• Equipment: e.g., computers, telephones, copiers?
• Rental costs: office space, meeting space, and other specialized
space, if required (e.g., private interviewing rooms?
• Utilities: Telephone, electrical, heat, and water bills?
Some types of costs can be anticipated and calculated fairly precisely
(e.g., salaries, rent); others may vary a great deal (e.g., telephone, photo-
copying, supplies). How do you find out? Ask around; do some research
on similar programs or policies. Consult directors of other programs
and agencies; see if it is possible to look at proposals that other agencies
have prepared. Contact potential funding sources (e.g., state or federal
government) to see if they will allow you to look at selected proposals
they have funded in the past (probably with confidential financial infor-
mation such as individual salaries removed, but with basic categories
of costs such as personnel costs intact). Many evidence-based program
databases include basic resource estimates.2

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 157
Those involved with the day-to-day operations of the program or
the implementation of the policy (e.g., program or agency staff, coordi-
nators, and directors) should have some input into what fiscal and social
resources are needed to run the program or administer the policy. Too
often, especially in applications to government agencies for funding, we
see resource plans that were developed entirely by professional grant
writers outside of the agency. The problem is that those grant writers
have had little or no contact with the daily operations of the program
or agency, and their estimates of resources needed may not correspond
very closely with the experience of the staff or the clients. Again, we
emphasize the value of participation: do not exclude the input of staff
or clients to aid resource planning.
Next, we ask how much of each kind of resource is needed? It is
very important to be realistic about cost estimates. If you estimate too
little, the program or policy is likely to fail. If you estimate too much,
the proposal may not get funded, or the agency may face accusations
of waste. A good budget will not only describe all estimated costs, but
will provide a clear justification for each expenditure item.
In general, we are attempting to estimate all the costs involved with
processing all clients or targets through all phases of the program or
policy over a specific period of time (e.g., one year). As we are trying
to estimate these costs associated with each program or policy design
component, we try to be as thorough as possible. In addition to paying
staff salaries, how much will it cost to train staff? How much will it cost
to print and duplicate the client intake forms and other record-keeping
forms needed? How much will it cost to acquire the supplies needed
to deliver specific services (e.g., textbooks, learning aids, computer
software, etc.)? How much will it cost to pay electrical, telephone, and
water bills for the rooms or offices that are to be used?
Start-up costs are generally higher than costs for subsequent years.
This is because we need to purchase new equipment and supplies, and
set up management systems, staff recruitment systems, and referral
systems. Often the flow of clients into a program is below capacity for
the first year, or is unstable for the first couple of years. This creates
fiscal instability that needs to be planned for.
Some funding sources are limited to a short period of time: one to
three years. These funders often want to know how their funds will be
replaced once their grant ends. They won’t want to invest in a program
that can’t sustain a flow of needed resources.
Again, we recommend working closely from the program or policy
design. Estimate the costs involved for each program or policy design
component. For example, counseling is one of several program compo-
nents in a state halfway house for ex-offenders. How much staff time
will be needed for each client over a specific time period, and how much
will that staff time cost? Case Study 5.1 provides an example of such
estimation procedures.

158 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Some will complain that in this era of scarce resources and shrinking
budgets, funding agencies expect programs to do everything for noth-
ing, that is, provide comprehensive, intensive services on a shoestring
budget. How, they may ask, can you tell us to make program-based
estimates when doing so may inflate our already overstretched budgets?
Program directors may complain that they are already committed to
providing services far beyond what their meager budgets actually pay
for. But how can they provide more services than what their budgets
allow for? By overworking and burning out their most motivated staff
persons, by pushing untrained staff to provide specialized services (e.g.,
life-skills training, conflict-resolution training), by constantly training
and recruiting new staff to replace the ones who left, by working hard
to provide the impression (a “front”) that the program is really “work-
ing,” and by actively covering up any negative information that might
threaten the program’s survival. Such a situation is untenable. A good
resource plan would never allow such a fiasco.
Plan to Acquire or Reallocate Resources
The task of obtaining funds to implement the program or policy
requires a combination of experience, dedication, persistence, and
patience. In most cases, the change agent or another specifically
appointed individual (e.g., the program director or the agency’s execu-
tive director) will scour the grant announcements of government, pri-
vate, and nonprofit agencies, attempting to find some match between
the interests of potential funding providers and the type of services the
program is designed to provide. The interests of funding providers are
usually clearly spelled out in Annual Program Announcements, Grant
Announcements, or Solicitations for Proposals. In other cases, the
change agent will lobby to get individuals or agencies interested in put-
ting up funding for the program, arguing that it addresses a compelling
problem or need within the mission of the funding provider. Consider
the following types of funding sources.
Acquiring the necessary resources to implement the program may
involve any or all of a combination of activities: writing a formal fund-
ing application to a government or nonprofit agency; lobbying local,
state, or federal politicians for funding; making informal inquiries,
presentations, and solicitations to various agencies; and familiarizing
oneself with the entire funding terrain of potential funding sources.

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 159
Figure 5.1
Potential Funding Sources
• Local, state, or federal government agencies: Does the program or policy
address a compelling need or problem that fits within the mission statement
and jurisdiction of a government agency? Federal agencies are most likely
to have specific grant announcements; local (city or county) agencies are
most likely to fund specific programs that address their mission.
• Governmental funds designated for special purposes: Find out if city, state,
or federal agencies have designated specific funds for certain programming
areas (e.g., crime prevention, drug awareness education, violence prevention,
etc.). Funding priorities or targeted programming areas change from year to
year, so one must stay up-to-date with each agency’s funding priorities.
• User fees: In some cases, nominal fees may be charged to the clients,
although these fees are usually far less than actual program costs. In many
criminal justice programs, such “user fees” are unpopular, but we have seen
more creative user fees in recent years (e.g., a probation agency charges a
daily fee to all participants to help offset costs of electronic surveillance; the
incentive to pay such fees resides in offenders’ motivations to be supervised
in the community, rather than prison, to maintain full-time employment,
and be closer to their families).
• Private and nonprofit agencies (e.g., the MacArthur Foundation, the
United Way, the Pugh Foundation): These agencies often provide funding
for programs that address their specific mission statements.
• Donations from businesses: Many large corporations and even many small
community businesses have become increasingly involved in providing sup-
port for programs or policies that address community needs. In addition to
“giving something back to the community” by being good citizens, many
business people may qualify for valuable tax breaks by making donations
of equipment, goods, services, or money.
• Volunteers: Many programs and agencies make extensive use of volunteers
to provide some services (e.g., tutoring and mentoring in after-school delin-
quency prevention programs). Of course, volunteers need to be qualified
and trained to provide specific services, and the program or agency must
be prepared to support its volunteers.
• Fund-raising projects: Special projects may occasionally be undertaken to
raise money for the program’s services.

160 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Specify Dates by Which
Implementation Tasks Will Be Accomplished
The next task, probably the most important one at this stage, is to
develop a program or policy time line, sometimes called a Gantt Chart
(see Example 5.1), which specifies three elements: (1) all the specific
implementation activities that need to be accomplished, (2) assignment
of responsibility for each specific task to one or more individuals, and
(3) a specific date by which each task is to be completed. This process
may seem tedious, but it is a far more effective alternative than merely
“winging it” or “improvising” program/policy implementation. With-
out a specific plan that incorporates all three elements listed above, the
program or policy is likely to experience difficulty (or even mortality)
before it even gets off the ground. A Gantt chart is a blueprint for put-
ting all the program or policy elements into operation: step-by-step
instructions explaining how to implement the program.
Example 5.1
A Gantt Chart for a Delinquency Prevention Program
Recall Example 1.4 (Chapter 1). We examined an excerpt from a funding
proposal submitted by a delinquency prevention program applying for state
funds. Major program components included: a seven-day challenge course
in which juveniles were encouraged to examine their lives and set goals;
one-to-one mentoring of youths by adult “committed partners”; and weekly
“follow-through” meetings of all mentors and clients. The proposal spelled
out exactly who was responsible for completing numerous activities required
to launch the program. Specific job titles and descriptions were provided in
Example 1.4. Activities included training, travel, site costs, seven-day course
costs, and follow-through costs.
Here is the time line (Gantt Chart) submitted with the proposal. While
specific completion dates are not shown here, the time line clearly indicates
a time period for beginning and ending each task; it indicates clearly the
sequence of activities to be accomplished (and by whom) in implementing the
program. Note that the “consultants” referred to are subcontractors, trainers
from a well-established national youth program. Note that additional techni-
cal tasks (e.g., acquiring office space, meeting space, etc.), while not shown,
could easily be specified in such a chart.

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161
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xam
ple 5.1, continued
Time Schedule (in months)
Activity Person Responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Hire Program Coordinator. Consultant.
2. Project Coordinator training Consultant.
and coaching.
3. Recruit and train volunteers Three trainers provided
(Youth Enrollment Coaches, by consultant.
Outreach, Facilitators).
4. Market the program. Project Coordinator;
Outreach volunteers.
5. Youth enrollment training. Youth Enrollment Coaches.
6. Recruit and orient youth Project Coordinator;
participants. Youth Enrollment Coaches.
7. Conduct pre-course Three trainers provided
volunteer orientation. by consultant.
8. Conduct youth violence Specialists, professionals
clearance, medical exams. provided by consultant.
9. Conduct 10-day intensive Facilitators, Coaches, Course
curriculum. Production Team, Situation
Intervention Team, Security.
10. Conduct parents’ orientation. Project Coordinator.
11. Assign adult mentors Project Coordinator.
and introduce to
their youth partners.
12. Conduct monthly mentor Project Coordinator.
coaching sessions.
13. Conduct monthly youth and Project Coordinator;
partner follow-through sessions. two Workshop Leaders
provided by consultant.
14. Manage weekly youth/partner Project Coordinator.
communications.
15. Provide life skills counseling, Project Coordinator;
educational and job training, adult mentors.
referral and placement.

162 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Develop Mechanisms of Self-Regulation
Orienting Participants
Everyone involved in the program or policy, including staff and
clients, should know what their role is. Expectations for what kind of
behavior is expected should be clearly spelled out, along with specific
rewards and punishments. The program or agency director or coordi-
nator should communicate a clear message about the rationale, values,
and intent of the change effort. Prior to beginning intake of clients,
for example, it is particularly important to clarify job descriptions and
expectations about the program or policy, and allow program or agency
staff to ask questions.
Coordinating Activities
Like the conductor of an orchestra, the change agent (with assistance
from the individuals and agencies comprising the action system described
in Chapter 2) must coordinate the activities of several different individu-
als and groups. A program’s departments and individual staff need to
be monitored and managed on a regular basis. Program managers must
hire and train their staff; they must build good relations with potential
referral sources (e.g., police, schools, probation); they must train staff to
use required intake forms and keep client records; they must build good
relations with citizens and businesses in the neighborhood; and they must
provide regular reports of program progress to their funding providers.
Three guidelines help ensure smooth coordination (see Figure 5.2).
Managing Resistance and Conflict
Some resistance is inevitable with the start-up of any new program
or policy (recall force field analysis from Chapter 2). Resistance may
come from any of the participants involved: clients, targets, even the
program or agency’s own staff (i.e., the action system). Any kind of
change threatens people because it creates discomfort and uncertainty.
Change challenges long-standing values and views of the world; it
introduces risk. If participants have had input into the planning pro-
cess, resistance can be anticipated and perhaps minimized. However,
resistance that surfaces should be dealt with fairly and seriously.
Conflict is not something to be avoided at all costs. It may provide
the opportunity to identify and resolve misunderstandings, and it may
also point out difficulties in implementation that deserve attention. Four
general guidelines for conflict resolution are helpful.

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 163
Specify a Plan to Build and Maintain Support
With all the different interests represented by stakeholders and
participants, one can expect that some public relations work goes with
managing any program or policy, especially criminal justice interven-
tions. The program or agency director is always trying to strengthen
sources of support for the program or policy: within the staff, the com-
Figure 5.2
Three Guidelines for Coordinating Activities
1. Maintain consistency: Make sure that the actual job duties of staff are con-
sistent with their job descriptions. Develop reward systems and incentives
for good performance, and communicate to staff what these rewards are.
Poor managers tend to wait until something goes wrong, and then blame (or
punish) their staff. Proactive managers find that better performance results
from communicating clear expectations and rewards. Such rewards include
not just money, but privileges, responsibilities, and access to resources. For
example, most staff are interested in professional development, and a paid
trip to a local or national conference could be a substantial, appreciated
reward. Staff development activities are usually permissible budget items,
if someone had the forethought to include them in a grant proposal.
2. Maintain clear and frequent communication among staff members, and
between staff and supervisors: Various means can be used: staff meetings,
memos, conferences, informal conversations, and performance evalua-
tions. Such mechanisms need to be explicit, though, and must be done on
a regular basis. Staff must also feel that their opinions count. The program
or agency director should encourage honest opinions and reporting about
difficulties as well as successes. Some of the worst programs we have seen
are those in which the director communicates a “don’t rock the boat”
philosophy, with the result that staff are afraid to report any problems
until they reach crisis proportions.
3. Keep an eye on the time-line: Make sure that activities required for success-
ful progression from one step to the next are carried out on time (e.g., make
sure that staff are hired and trained by the dates specified in the action plan;
make sure that all record-keeping forms are printed, and procedures are
clearly understood by staff). Imagine if 100 clients had to be turned away
because a program wasn’t ready to begin when it was supposed to. Perhaps
a required staff position wasn’t filled, the office space or meeting space
wasn’t ready, or the referring agency had specific reporting requirements
that weren’t met by the program. Such events, although relatively rare, are
tragic: the program suffers damage to its credibility and reputation.

164 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
munity, across other agencies with which the program links, with his or
her superiors, with the funding agency, with the news media, and with
clients. Time for maintaining and increasing support needs to be built
into one’s schedule, and the person responsible for doing it needs to
make sure that different stakeholders are contacted on a regular basis
throughout the year.
Conclusion
The program or policy in action will never perfectly match the
program or policy on paper (i.e., the program design). Developing a
good “blueprint,” or action plan, however, should markedly reduce
subsequent problems with program or policy implementation and will
help launch an effective intervention. So does looking for implementa-
tion difficulties, as we will see in the next chapter.
Figure 5.3
Four Guidelines for Conflict Resolution
1. Avoid the use of force or coercion: Using force is not often very effective,
even when one has legitimate power and authority. Attempts to stifle oppo-
sition often create or increase resistance, produce unintended side effects,
and lead to intentional subversion of the program’s long-term goals.
2. Try to work for a “win-win” solution, not a “win-lose” outcome: Look for
common ground, if possible. There may be options based upon a principle
of exchange (i.e., each party gives up something in order to get something)
that would reduce resistance at little cost.
3. Generate alternatives and options to deal with problems (i.e., brainstorm-
ing): Identify all possible options before evaluating them. Only after a list
of options is developed should parties begin discussing costs and benefits
of specific strategies or negotiating outcomes (e.g., brainstorming).
4. Use “principled negotiations”: There are four basic rules for negotiating
fairly.3 First, separate the people from the problem (don’t take it person-
ally). Second, focus on interests, not positions: each party should identify
and communicate their needs, preferences, values, or concerns. Each party
should understand what elements need to be included in a reasonable solu-
tion. Third, invent options for mutual gain: generate new options that are
based on shared interests or an exchange of divergent interests. Finally,
insist on objective criteria: both parties should agree on what criteria will
be used to evaluate possible solutions.

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 165
D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S
1. Define and describe the following terms: (a) “action planning,”
and (b) “resource plan.”
2. Describe the purposes (goals) of a resource plan.
3. What does it mean to “estimate the costs involved for each pro-
gram component”? How does one do this?
4. What is a “time line” or “Gantt chart”? What does it attempt to
do?
5. Describe three guidelines for coordinating activities. Give an
example.
6. Describe four guidelines for conflict resolution. Give an example.

166 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 5.1
Halfway Houses in Ohio: Costs and Benefits1
Instructions: Estimates of anticipated program costs and demonstrations of potential
cost-effectiveness are often critical considerations for planning. Such considerations
may either help win support or present nearly insurmountable roadblocks for the inter-
vention. As Cohen points out: “Forcing analysts to quantify expected costs and benefits
sheds new light on the merits of alternative programs and will undoubtedly change
the focus of the debate in many criminal justice program areas. Whereas one could
previously claim that ‘prevention is cheaper than prison’ or ‘three strikes and you’re out
pays for itself,’ the benefit-cost framework allows decision makers to examine these
claims more carefully and begin to make more rational, scientifically based judgments.”2
The following case study illustrates how the costs of halfway house programming and
traditional incarceration can be effectively estimated and compared.
All adults convicted of felonies for which the statutory minimum is at least
six months enter Ohio’s prison system. If eligible, convicted felons who have
served a specific amount of time in prison can be placed back into the community
through Parole/Post Release Control and Transitional Control. Many ex-offend-
ers are sent to halfway houses to enhance their reentry process. Prisoner reentry
includes all activities and programming conducted to prepare ex-convicts to
return safely to the community and to live as law-abiding citizens.3
Given the social and fiscal costs of current sentencing policies, and the
impacts on individuals, families, and communities, there is a compelling need
for valid, scientifically based research to develop better knowledge on methods
of successful reintegration. Ohio was selected to participate in a 10-state reentry
study conducted by the Urban Institute.4 The following figures described Ohio’s
correctional population as of 2002:5
• Number of institutions statewide: 33
• Total design capacity: 36,270
• Total population: 44,936
1 Adapted from: Power, A. (2003). Halfway House Utilization: The Key to Reentry A Cost
Savings Report. Cincinnati: Power & Associates. Available at: http://www.occaonline.org/
ohiocostsavings
2 Cohen, M.A. (2000). “Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Crime and Justice.” In Duffee, D.,
(ed.), Measurement and Analysis of Crime and Justice. Criminal Justice 2000, v. 4 (pp. 263-
315). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs (NCJ 182411).
Available at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04f
3 Petersilia, J. (2003). When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry. New York:
Oxford University Press.
4 For a wealth of information on reentry, see the Office of Justice Programs Reentry web site
at: http://www.reentry.gov/
5 Ibid, note 5.

http://www.occaonline.org/

http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04f

http://www.reentry.gov/

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 167
Case Study 5.1, continued
• Population as percentage of rated capacity: 124%
• 2002 admissions: 22,035
• 2002 releases: 25,773
• Average stay in prison: 3.14 years
• Average cost per inmate: $63 daily; $22,257 annually
• Number of parole/PRC violators: 3273
• Number of technical violators: 692
Halfway houses are community residential programs providing supervision
and treatment services for offenders released from state prisons, referred by
Courts of Common Pleas, or sanctioned because of a violation of conditions of
supervision. Halfway houses in Ohio provide services such as alcohol and other
drug treatment, electronic monitoring, job placement, educational programs,
and specialized programs for sex offenders and mentally ill offenders.
• In fiscal year 2002, the Bureau contracted for more than 1,626
halfway house beds in 26 facilities to house felony offenders and
provided subsidized funding to divert more than 7,351 offenders
from prison and local jails throughout Ohio.
• At an average length of stay in a halfway house of 90 days, these
1,626 beds turn over four times in one year, saving 2,373,960
prison “man days” per year (1626 x 365 x 4).
A study funded by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections6
found a 63.9 percent successful termination rate for offenders in halfway houses.
During fiscal year 2002, 58 percent were employed full- or part-time at the time
of discharge. During the same year, offenders placed in Ohio halfway houses:
• Earned $6,637,013 in income,
• Paid $32,308 in restitution,
• Paid $73,828 in court costs,
• Paid $90,828 in child support, and
• Completed 48,546 community service hours.
6 Lowenkamp, C., and E.J. Latessa (2002). Evaluation of Ohio’s Community Based Correctional
Facilities and Halfway House Programs, Final Report. Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati
Division of Criminal Justice Center for Criminal Justice Research. Available at: http: //www.
uc.edu/criminaljustice/ProjectReports/HH_CBCF_Report1

http://www

168 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 5.1, continued
The total cost for all beds in 2002 was $32,089,140, and the average per diem
rate was $54.03 (approximately a 1% decrease from the 2001 rate of $54.72).
Transitional Control
The Transitional Control program is available to inmates who are deter-
mined eligible by the Ohio Parole Board. Upon the sentencing judge’s approval,
inmates may be placed on Transitional Control and transferred to a halfway
house to complete up to the last 180 days of their prison term.
Transitional Control offenders pay subsistence fees. With an additional
3,200 offenders in 800 halfway house beds annually, there would be a large
increase in subsistence fees. This increase in funds could be allocated to offset
costs for funding halfway house beds. Transitional Control offenders may also
be stepped down from residential placement and put on electronic monitoring
in an appropriate home placement, saving further costs.
Researchers at the University of Cincinnati found significant reductions
in recidivism—an average reduction of 15 percent—when offenders complete
Transitional Control programs in a halfway house.7 Transitional Control
offenders had the highest successful completion rate of all offenders in the
study—76 percent as compared to 64 percent overall.
In 2002 the Ohio Parole Board considered 3,899 offenders for Transitional
Control. Of these, 107 were approved; 1,643 were approved pending judicial
review; 1,583 were denied; and 566 were rescheduled.
In fiscal year 2002, 1,353 offenders released on Transitional Control
supervision earned $2,606,651, paid $24,102 in child support, and completed
7,680 hours of community service.
Halfway house placement has thus proven successful with the Transitional
Control populations, successfully lowering recidivism rates. This group could
profitably be expanded as a target group for additional halfway house beds.
Cost Savings Analysis and Implications
Increasing the number of halfway house beds by 800 would provide reen-
try services to an additional 3,200 offenders and save more than $12 million
per year.
For every 100 funded halfway house beds (utilized for reentry prerelease/
transitional control, or for parole violators in lieu of returning to prison), 400
offenders could be served annually, for an annual cost savings of approximately
$2 million. The following figures were used for the cost savings analysis:8
7 Ibid, note 10.
8 Estimates assumed that 800 new halfway house beds would be available without additional
capital investments.

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 169
Case Study 5.1, continued
• State prison costs: $63.23 per day
• Halfway house costs: $55.64 per day
• Electronic monitoring/case management costs: $26.00 per day
Halfway House Costs
One hundred halfway house beds can provide 180 days of programming
and supervision for 400 offenders per year at an average cost of $7,247 per
offender.
• 90 days in residential halfway house programming (90 @ $55.64
per day = $5,007)
• 90 days of electronic monitoring/case management (90 @ $26.00
per day = $2,340)
Total cost per offender = $7,347
Prison Costs
One hundred prison beds can hold 200 inmates at 180 days each per year
at an average cost of $11,381 per offender.
• 180 days in prison (180 @ $63.23 per day = $11,381)
TOTAL Cost per offender = $11,381
Costs Savings per Offender
• Total prison cost per offender = $11,381
• Total halfway house cost per offender = $7,347
• Total cost savings per offender = $4,034 (difference)
Annual Costs Savings for each 100 Halfway House Beds
One hundred halfway house beds can provide 180 days of programming
and supervision for 400 offenders per year at a cost of $2,938,800.
• Total cost savings per offender = $4,034
• Total cost savings per 400 offenders = $1,613,600

170 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 5.1, continued
Annual Costs Savings for 800 Halfway House Beds
One hundred halfway house beds = annual cost savings of $1,613,600
• 800 halfway house beds = annual cost savings of $12,908,800
[$1,613,600 x 8]
• Annual prison cost for 3,200 offenders (180 days) = $36,419,200
[$11,381 x 3200]
• Annual halfway house cost for 3,200 offenders = $23,510,400
[$7347 x 3200]
• Annual cost savings = $12,908,800 (difference) [$36,419,200
– $23,510,400]
Overall, estimates of substantial reductions in costs and recidivism help make
a convincing argument for further adoption of halfway house programming.
Questions
Recall that the annual halfway house cost per offender is $7,347, consisting
of 90 days in residential halfway house programming (90 @ $55.64 per day =
$5,007) and 90 days of electronic monitoring/case management (90 @ $26.00
per day = $2,340). Assume that 100 ex-offenders are enrolled in one of these
programs at one specific site.
1. Break down the resources required for the halfway house program into at
least three specific cost categories. For example, how much money might be
allocated for: Staff supervision? Counseling? Program materials? Security?
Other costs? Provide cost estimates and show your calculations.
2. Is there likely to be enough money to meet all ex-offenders’ needs? Why or
why not?
3. What other program components might be needed? Try to identify
at least one additional resource that might strengthen this program.
Describe the resource, explain why you think it is important, and pro-
vide cost projections.

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 171
Case Study 5.2
The Brady Act: Why Action Planning is Needed1
Instructions: Controversies about the Brady Act extended far beyond arguments
about the desirability of tougher handgun regulation. Disagreement ensued about
who was going to pay to update and automate local criminal records information
systems to comply with provisions of the Brady Act. This is a major reason why the
National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) described below was cre-
ated. NCHIP was an excellent example of “action planning.” Without this enabling
legislation and funding, problems in gaining state compliance with the new Act could
have been insurmountable. Similarly, the Firearm Inquiry Statistics (FIST) Program
was needed to monitor implementation of the Act over time. Read the material
below, and then answer the questions at the end of this case study.
The Federal Gun Control Act (GCA), 18 U.S.C. 922, prohibits transfer of
a firearm to a person who:
• Is under indictment for, or has been convicted of, a crime punish-
able by imprisonment for more than 1 year
• Is a fugitive from justice
• Is an unlawful user of, or is addicted to, any controlled substance
• Has been adjudicated as a mental defective or committed to a
mental institution
• Is an illegal alien or has been admitted to the United States under
a nonimmigrant visa
• Was discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions
• Has renounced U.S. Citizenship
• Is subject to a court order restraining him or her from harassing,
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner or child
• Has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domes-
tic violence.
The GCA categories of prohibited persons are the prevailing minimum for
all states. Many states have similar prohibitions and have enacted additional
1 Adapted from: Bowling, M., G. Lauver, M.J. Hickman, and D.B. Adams (2003). Background
Checks for Firearm Transfers, 2002 (NCJ 200116). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics; Bureau of Justice Statistics (2006).
Survey of State Procedures Related to Firearm Sales, 2005 (NCJ 214645). Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

172 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 5.2, continued
categories of prohibited persons, such as those who have committed alcohol-
related or juvenile offenses.2
Following seven years of political battles and NRA opposition, the Brady
Act amended the GCA and included interim provisions, 18 U.S.C. 922(s), which
were in effect from February 29, 1994, until November 29, 1998.3 The U.S.
Department of Justice developed the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System (referred to as NICS) during the 57-month interim period, as
authorized by the permanent provisions of the Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. 922(t).
Interim provisions were intended to allow states a reasonable period of
time to comply with the new law, which required dramatic changes in state
criminal background information systems. The interim provisions of the Act
required that licensed firearm dealers request a presale check on all potential
handgun purchasers from the Chief Law Enforcement Officer (CLEO) in the
jurisdiction where the prospective purchaser resides. The CLEO must make “a
reasonable effort” to determine if the purchaser is prohibited from receiving
or possessing a handgun. The federal firearms licensee must wait five business
days before transferring the handgun to the buyer unless earlier approval is
received from the CLEO. The “interim provisions” also permitted states to
follow a variety of alternatives to the five-day waiting period, including issuing
firearm permits (e.g., Missouri), performing “instant checks” (e.g., Virginia),
or conducting “point-of-sale” checks (e.g., California).
This interim system remained in effect until November 30, 1998, when
an instant background check was to become mandatory for purchasers of all
firearms. Under the “permanent provisions” of the Brady Act, presale inquiries
were to be made through the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System (NICS). The background check would determine, based on available
records, if an individual was prohibited under the Federal Gun Control Act
or state law from receiving or possessing firearms. The act required the NICS,
operated by the FBI, to be established no later than November 1998.
In a close 5-4 decision on June 27, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the federal government cannot require local police to conduct background
checks on people who want to buy handguns.4 Justice Antonin Scalia noted in
his opinion that the federal government cannot force states to enact or admin-
ister a federal regulatory program (a controversy known as federalism). The
2 See: Bureau of Justice Statistics (2006). Survey of State Procedures Related to Firearm Sales,
2005 (NCJ 214645). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ssprfs05
3 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act), PL 103-159.
4 Printz, Sheriff/Coroner, Ravalli County, Montana v. United States 117 S.Ct 2365,138L.Ed.2d
914 (1997).

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ssprfs05

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 173
Case Study 5.2, continued
five-day waiting period specified by the Act was ruled constitutional, as long
as the states retained discretion to perform the background checks or not.5
Under the FBI’s NICS program, state criminal history records are provided
through each state’s central repository and the Inter-state Identification Index.
The Index, maintained by the FBI, points instantly to criminal records that
states hold. In addition, the FBI provides records of federal offenses, Feder-
ally maintained state data, and federal data on nonfelony disqualifications.
States responding to NICS inquiries for nonfelony prohibitions provide their
records directly.
To ensure availability of complete and accurate state records, the Brady
Act established a grant program, the National Criminal History Improvement
Program (NCHIP). The program was designed to assist states in developing or
improving existing criminal history record systems and to establish interface
with the NICS.
The Firearm Inquiry Statistics Program (FIST) was established under the
NCHIP to develop data on the impact of presale firearm checks on the iden-
tification of prohibited firearm purchasers. Data summarizing the number of
inquiries, rejections, and reasons for rejections is summarized and released
annually by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (see Case Study 6.2).
ATF issued an FAQ (frequently asked questions) sheet addressing 60 spe-
cific questions about who is responsible for doing what under the permanent
provisions of the Brady law found in section 922(t) of the Gun Control Act.6
These provisions became effective on November 30, 1998. Ten examples are
provided below.
1. Q. Who must comply with the requirements of the Brady law?
A. Federally licensed firearms importers, manufactures, and dealers
must comply with the Brady law prior to the transfer of any firearm to a
nonlicensed individual.
2. Q. When did the provisions of the permanent Brady law take effect?
A. The permanent Brady law went into effect on November 30, 1998.
Accordingly, any transfer occurring on or after November 30, 1998, is
subject to the requirements of this law.
3. Q. Is NICS operated by ATF?
A. No. NICS is operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
5 For additional information regarding Brady Act design and implementation, go to the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) web site (http://www.atf.gov ). Choose
“Search” from the menu, and enter the words “Brady Act.” You will find a wealth of relevant
information about the Brady Act.
6 The full text of 60 questions and answers can be found at: http://www.atf.gov/firearms/
bradylaw/q_abrady.htm

http://www.atf.gov

http://www.atf.gov/firearms/

174 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 5.2, continued
4. Q. Do all NICS checks go through the FBI’s NICS Operations Center?
A. No. In many states, licensees initiate NICS checks through the State
point of contact (POC).
5. Q. If the State is acting as a point of contact (POC), does that mean that
all NICS checks go through the POC rather than the FBI?
A. That depends on the state. In some states, the POC conducts back-
ground checks for all firearms transactions. In other states, licensees
must contact the POC for handgun transactions and the FBI for long gun
transactions. In some POC states, NICS checks for pawn redemptions are
handled by the FBI.
6. Q. How does a licensee know whether to contact the FBI or a State point
of contact (POC) in order to initiate a NICS check?
A. Prior to November 30, 1998, ATF sent an open letter to licensees in
each state, providing the licensees with instructions as to how to initiate a
NICS check in their state. ATF has alerted FFLs if their State’s procedures
have changed since this time. Your local ATF office can advise you on the
appropriate point of contact for NICS checks or you can check the ATF
webpage at http://www.atf.gov
7. Q. Is there a charge for NICS checks?
A. The FBI does not charge a fee for conducting NICS checks. However,
states that act as points of contact for NICS checks may charge a fee
consistent with state law.
8. Q. Must licensees enroll with the FBI to get access to NICS?
A. Licensees must be enrolled with the FBI before they can initiate NICS
checks through the FBI’s NICS Operations Center. Licensees who have
not received an enrollment package from the FBI should call the FBI NICS
Operations Center at 1-877-444-6427 and ask that an enrollment pack-
age be sent to them. Licensees in states where a state agency is acting as a
point of contact for NICS checks should contact the state for enrollment
information.
9. Q. Does the Brady law apply to the transfer of long guns as well as
handguns?
A. Yes.
10. Q. Does the Brady law apply to the transfer of antique firearms?
A. No. Licensees need not comply with the Brady law when transferring
a weapon that meets the Gun Control Act’s definition of an “antique
firearm.”

http://www.atf.gov

CHAPTER 5 • ACTION PLANNING 175
Case Study 5.2, continued
Questions
1. Choose three specific questions and answers about the Brady Act prepared
by the ATF: http://www.atf.gov/firearms/bradylaw/q_abrady.htm
(a) Discuss how the Q & A format illustrates concepts discussed in this
chapter (e.g., Developing Mechanisms of Self-Regulation; Managing
Resistance and Conflict). (b) Analyze how well the answers provided by
the ATF address the three questions you chose. Is anything still unclear?
Should any further difficulties in implementing the Act be anticipated?
Why or why not?
2. Read one of the dissenting opinions of the four Supreme Court Justices
who opposed the majority decision in Printz v. United States. Dissenting
and concurring opinions are available at: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/
html/95-1478.ZS.html
(a) Identify the judge who wrote the opinion, and summarize his or her
arguments in your own words. (b) Do you agree or disagree with those
arguments? Why or why not? Provide evidence to support your position.

http://www.atf.gov/firearms/bradylaw/q_abrady.htm

http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/

176 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Endnotes
1 See Kettner, P.M., R.K. Moroney, and L.L. Martin (2007). Designing and Manag-
ing Programs: An Effectiveness-Based Approach (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage; Miller, G., J. Rabin, and W.B. Hildreth (2000). Performance-Based Budget-
ing: An ASPA Classic. Boulder, CO: Westview.
2 See, for examples: (1) the OJJDP Model Programs Guide, available at: http://www.
dsgonline.com/mpg2.5/mpg_index.htm; (2)Blueprints for Violence Prevention,
available at: http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/; and (3)SAMHSA: National
Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP), available at: http://
www.nrepp.samhsa.gov/
3 Fisher, R., W. Ury, and B. Patton (2003). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In. New York: Random House.

http://www

http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/

http://www.nrepp.samhsa.gov/

http://www.nrepp.samhsa.gov/

CHAPTER 6
Program/Policy Implementation
and Monitoring
177
C H A P T E R O U T L I N E
“Monitoring” must be done. This refers to the collection of infor-
mation to determine to what degree the program or policy design
(see Chapter 4) was carried out as planned. How will we know
whether the intended target population was reached? Were pro-
gram/policy activities or provisions actually carried out as planned?
Were appropriate staff or responsible authorities selected and
trained, and did they carry out their assigned duties?
Design monitoring instruments to collect data (e.g., observations,
surveys, interviews). Data is collected to find out what is actually
being delivered to clients or targets. The purpose is to identify
gaps between the “program/policy on paper” (design) and the
“program/policy in action.”
Fiscal monitoring. Funding sources require regular financial
reports detailing how funds were spent. Once the program or
policy is implemented, one may find that adjustments to the budget
become necessary.
Designate responsibility for data collection, storage, and analysis.
Ensure that there is no ambiguity about what information is to be
collected, who is responsible for collecting it, or how it is to be
collected, stored, and analyzed.
Develop information system capacities. Information systems may
consist of written forms and records that are filed, or fully com-
puterized data entry and storage systems.
Develop mechanisms to provide feedback to staff, clients, and
stakeholders. Depending on the results of monitoring analyses,
it may be necessary to make adjustments either to what is being
done (“the program or policy in action”) or to the intended design
(“the program or policy on paper”).

178 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Before continuing the planning process, we need to develop a
strategy to observe the program or policy in action. History has taught
us that good intentions alone are insufficient: planning and imple-
menting an intervention are two different things. The example below
illustrates how the same strategy can be implemented very differently
in different locations.
Example 6.1
Is “Weed and Seed” Bearing Fruit?
Initiated in 1991, Weed and Seed now includes more than 250 sites
nationwide.1 Weed and Seed is a federally funded strategy to mobilize and
coordinate anti-drug resources in high-crime communities. Four key compo-
nents are included:2
1. Weeding: Concentrated and enhanced law enforcement efforts to
identify, arrest, and prosecute violent offenders, drug traffickers,
and other criminals operating in the target areas.
2. Seeding: Human services, including afterschool, weekend, and
summer youth activities; adult literacy classes; parental counsel-
ing; and neighborhood revitalization efforts to prevent and deter
further crime.
3. Enhanced Coordination: Coordinated analysis of local problems
and developing strategies to address them. The federal oversight
responsibility for each participating site rests with the U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office for the corresponding district.
4. Community Policing: Proactive police/community engagement and
problem solving in which police officers are assigned to specified
geographic locations. This effort is seen as the bridge between
weeding and seeding. By gaining the trust and support of the
community, police engage residents and businesses as problem-
solving partners in the law enforcement effort (e.g., neighborhood
watches, citizen marches and rallies, and graffiti removal).
A national evaluation of eight cities examined program implementa-
tion and effects on crime and public safety.3 Each site had high rates of
violent crime related to drug trafficking and drug use. The study included
a review of funding applications and other program documents; interviews
with key program administrators, senior law enforcement staff, managers
of seeding activities, service providers, and community leaders; analyses of
automated, incident-level records of crimes and arrests; group interviews
with participants in seeding programs; and two surveys of residents in
target areas.

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 179
Developing appropriate seeding strategies in specific communities proved
to be more difficult than anticipated. Seeding efforts (e.g., youth prevention
and recreation programs, family support services, community economic
development) required participation and commitment from many diverse
organizations with many different goals. Community participants discovered
that much more time was needed for planning, relationship building, and
gaining consensus and commitment. Weeding, in contrast, had a relatively
clear mission and was carried out within the more established structures of
law enforcement and criminal justice.
Within the target areas of each site, evaluators compared Part 1 crime
trends for the year prior to implementation of Weed and Seed and the second
year after Weed and Seed began. Five target areas had double-digit percent-
age decreases: (Stowe Village in Hartford, 46 percent; Crawford-Roberts in
Pittsburgh, 24 percent; North Manatee, 18 percent; the Shreveport target area,
11 percent; and the Central District in Seattle, 10 percent). One target area
(West Las Vegas) had a single-digit decrease (6 percent), and three target areas
experienced increases in Part 1 crime (South Manatee, 2 percent; Meadows
Village in Las Vegas, 9 percent; and Salt Lake City, 14 percent).
Because a controlled experimental study was not possible, researchers
could not state definitively the extent to which Weed and Seed or other fac-
tors contributed to observed changes in crime. Available evidence, however,
suggested that Weed and Seed had little effect on crime rates. Crime rates in
the surrounding (non-target) areas mirrored increases or decreases in the target
areas. For example, Hartford and Pittsburgh achieved the largest Part 1 crime
decreases in their target areas, but they also experienced the largest Part 1 crime
decreases in non-target areas (i.e., areas where there was no intervention).
Changes in drug arrest rates appeared to be associated with changes in the
overall Part 1 crime rates. Among six target areas for which arrest data were
available, the four areas reporting decreases in Part 1 crime from the year prior to
Weed and Seed through the second year of implementation (Hartford, Pittsburgh,
North Manatee, and Shreveport) all experienced initial high rates of drug arrests,
suggesting an initial period of intense weeding activities followed by declining
drug arrest rates. Assuming that levels of law enforcement remained somewhat
constant, this trend may reflect some success in reducing drug activity.
Participant interviews and community surveys were also conducted.
According to the residents interviewed, the seeding programs provided services
that otherwise would not have been available in the target areas. Most of those
interviewed indicated that participation in the seeding programs was a positive
experience that helped them feel more secure emotionally, physically, or both.
Benefits perceived by participants included providing additional structure and
discipline in the lives of target area youths, and opportunities and assistance
for adults to work toward personal and professional growth.
Community surveys, however, suggested inconsistent effects. Residents in
only two areas (Manatee and Pittsburgh) perceived substantial improvements
in police effectiveness and decreases in crime severity. Residents in Akron and
Example 6.1, continued

180 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Previously, in the design stage (Chapter 4), we talked about identify-
ing “who does what to whom in what order, how much, and how often?”
At the monitoring stage, we are concerned with finding out whether the
intended design is (or was) properly implemented, or whether it was
implemented differently at different sites. Monitoring, as we will see
shortly, requires ongoing data
collection throughout the life
of the program or policy. It is
useful to distinguish implemen-
tation from monitoring.
At the monitoring stage,
we attempt to find out if the
program or policy was imple-
mented properly. Sometimes
called “process evaluation,”
monitoring refers to the collec-
tion of information to determine
to what degree the design or
blueprint (the program or policy
“on paper”) is being carried out
as planned. Data (e.g., observa-
tions, surveys, interviews) are collected to find out what is actually being
delivered to clients (the program or policy in action). Adjustments may
then need to be made to revise either the design of the intervention (e.g.,
either service delivery or policy provisions) or to make what is currently
being done conform to the intended design. The example below illustrates
monitoring requirements of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), a
major source of federal funding for local and state justice programs.
Seattle perceived slight reductions in drug-related crime; Hartford residents
perceived some reduction in violent and gang-related crime. Residents in three
areas (Las Vegas, Salt Lake City, and Shreveport) perceived little improvement
in general public safety or the severity of specific types of crime.
In sum, the implementation and effectiveness of weeding and seeding
activities varied considerably across the eight sites. Pre-existing community
features (e.g., community cohesion) likely played a key role in enhancing or
weakening Weed and Seed efforts. Important factors included the strength of
the existing social and institutional infrastructure (e.g., an established network
of community-based organizations and community leaders), the severity of
crime problems, geographical advantages favoring economic development,
and transience of the population. Finding the appropriate mix and sequence
of “weeding” and “seeding” activities for specific communities remains a
compelling challenge.
Example 6.1, continued
Implementation
The initiation, management, and administration of
the action plan (see Chapter 5). Once the program or
policy actually begins, we want to minimize discrepancies
between what was planned (i.e., the program or policy
design) and what was actually done (i.e., the “program
or policy in action”).
Monitoring
An attempt to determine whether program or policy
implementation is proceeding as planned. Monitoring is
a process that attempts to identify any gaps between the
program or policy on paper (design) and the program or
policy in action (implementation).

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 181
Outline the Major Questions for Monitoring
Monitoring relates directly back to the design stage (Chapter 4).
How do we measure whether the critical elements of program or policy
design have been implemented properly? We can specify all the key
questions for monitoring in terms of their corresponding program or
policy design features (see Chapter 4).
We can illustrate the correspondence between program or policy
design and monitoring by referring to the chart in Figure 6.4, and
we can easily see what kinds of questions we need to ask. In Column
1, we summarize all the key design features in terms of targets, staff
or responsible authority, and program components or policy provi-
Example 6.2
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Monitoring Requirements4
BJA grantees are required to submit Progress Reports on project activities
and accomplishments. In order for BJA to capture even more valuable and perti-
nent information on a consistent basis, BJA has added seven new questions to the
Progress Report template in the Grants Management System (GMS) Performance
Metrics section. The new questions, that always appear as the first seven, will not
only provide BJA with sufficient information to monitor grant implementation
and goal achievement, but also will highlight innovative programs and capture
information essential to BJA’s mission. The seven new questions are:
1. What were your accomplishments within this reporting period?
2. What goals were accomplished, as they relate to your grant
application?
3. What problems/barriers did you encounter, if any, within the
reporting period that prevented you from reaching your goals or
milestones?
4. Is there any assistance that BJA can provide to address any prob-
lems/barriers identified in question #3 above? (Please answer YES
or NO only.)
5. Are you on track to fiscally and programmatically complete your
program as outlined in your grant application? (Please answer
YES or NO. If no, please explain.)
6. What major activities are planned for the next six months?
7. Based on your knowledge of the criminal justice field, are there
any innovative programs/accomplishments that you would like to
share with BJA?

182 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
sions. We should have all this information available from our previous
assessment of program or policy design (Chapter 4). Then, as Column
2 indicates, we need some method of collecting data (to be discussed
shortly) to find out whether intended design features were properly
implemented. In Column 3, we report the results of monitoring: how
was the program or policy actually implemented? Finally, in Column
4, we summarize any gaps detected between program or policy design
and implementation (compare Column 1 with Column 3). Information
collected from monitoring analysis is vital for modifying the program
or policy to correct any implementation gaps detected.
Figure 6.2
Program Components or Policy Provisions
• Who did what to whom in what order, how much, and how often? We
need some unit of measuring what was done. In a drug treatment program,
for example, one way of measuring services delivered to clients is to record
the total hours of counseling that were actually delivered to clients. We
could also measure the number of clients admitted, attendance at regular
program sessions (e.g., group meetings), and the number of clients who
successfully completed a program. For three-strikes laws, in addition to
describing the rules for charging and processing suspects, we could count
the number of people charged and convicted.
• Were there variations in how program services or policy provisions were
delivered? In a program, for example, did one client receive different amounts
or types of services than another (e.g., frequency or quality of treatment)?
Was there more than one site or location where a program or policy was
carried out, and if so, were services administered consistently across differ-
ent sites? Within a state, for example, were courts in some cities or counties
more active than others in charging under three-strikes provisions?
Figure 6.1
Target Population
• Were appropriate targets selected? What were the characteristics of the
actual persons targeted by the program or policy?
• Did the program or policy meet its specified criteria in terms of client eli-
gibility (e.g., age, sex, income, region, etc.), and numbers to be served?
• Were proper target recruiting, referral, screening, and intake procedures
followed? How were target selection decisions made?

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 183
Instruments to Collect Monitoring Data
There are four major data-collection techniques for monitoring:5
(1) Observational Data, (2) Service Records (documents), (3) Service
Provider Data (staff), and (4) Participant Data (targets). Wherever pos-
sible, it is best to use more than one technique, and, depending on the
time and resources available, as many as possible. Each has its advan-
tages and limitations.
Observational Data
Observational data may provide a rich and detailed source of informa-
tion about program activities and policy provisions. By observational data,
we mean that evaluators and/or trained observers actually participate in
or observe the program or policy in operation. For example, in the classic
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment,6 trained observers rode along
in police cars to observe how police handled domestic violence calls, and
to determine whether they followed agreed-upon procedures for admin-
istering one of three interventions (arrest, mediation, or separation). Good
observational data, however, is rarely obtained simply by “hanging out”
at the program or policy site. Observers must be trained in how to make
observations and how to record their observations. We need some sys-
tematic method for making and recording observations. Three main
observational techniques are possible: (1) the narrative method, (2) the
data guide method, and (3) the structured rating scheme.7
When using the narrative method, an observer records events in
detail, in the order in which they occur. This is very much like a diary. It
is the least structured of the three observational methods, but it may pro-
vide rich detail on implementation. The observer describes what services
were provided, how the clients reacted, how the staff acted, and so on.
Figure 6.3
Program Staff or Individuals Designated to Implement the Policy
• For a program: Were proper staff selected and trained? Did they fit the
specified job descriptions? Did staff understand their duties and perform
them as expected? Did different program staff provide services in a dif-
ferent manner?
• For a policy: Were the individuals responsible for carrying out a policy
clearly identified? Did they understand the policy and their specific respon-
sibilities? Were proper procedures for implementing a specific policy
consistently followed by the designated authorities? Did different policy
authorities implement the same rule differently?

184
C
R
IM
IN
A
L JU
ST
IC
E P
O
L
IC
Y A
N
D P
L
A
N
N
IN
G
Figure 6.4
Monitoring Analysis
Targets
(e.g., eligibility, num-
bers to be served, access,
screening, intake).
Program Staff or
Individuals Responsible
for Implementing the
Program or Policy
(e.g., selection, training,
duties).
Program Components or
Policy Provisions
(e.g., specific goods,
services, opportunities,
or interventions to be
delivered).
1.
What was intended?
(i.e., the program or
policy on paper, the
design of the program
or policy).
2.
How was monitoring
done? (i.e., which of
the four data collec-
tion methods were
used?)
3.
What were the results
of monitoring? (i.e.,
how was the program
or policy actually
implemented?)
3.
What gaps were found
between the program or
policy on paper (design)
and the program or
policy in action
(implementation)?

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 185
In the data guide method, the evaluator or change agent gives observ-
ers specific questions that they are required to answer from their obser-
vations. This technique is more structured than the narrative method, but
less structured than the structured rating scheme. For example, observers
may go out with police to observe DUI stops. Observers are given a list
of questions that they attempt to answer for each stop:
• How did police officers select the vehicle for a DUI check?
• How many people were in the car?
• What kind of car was it (model, year)?
• Describe the driver (age, sex, race).
• Was the suspect: respectful? cooperative?
• Was the officer respectful? Did the officer explain the purpose of the stop?
• What police action was taken (e.g., sobriety test; breathalyzer;
warning; other; none)?
• Did anything unusual or significant happen during this stop?
The structured rating scheme is the most constrained of the three
observational methods. We can ask observers to rate some kind of
behavior on a standardized scale or checklist. Using the same example
as above, where observers go out on police DUI stops, the observer may
be given a checklist that he or she completes for every police stop. The
checklist may contain items such as the following:
Figure 6.5
Observer Checklist for DUI Stops
Name of observer:
Type of vehicle:
Observer Instructions: Rate the behavior of the suspect and the police officer
on the five-point scales provided below. Circle the number that best fits your
perception of what happened.
1. The suspect was: 1 2 3 4 5
polite abusive
2. The police officer was: 1 2 3 4 5
polite abusive
3. The police instructions were: 1 2 3 4 5
clear vague
4. Action taken (check one):
_____ Field sobriety test _____ Breathalyzer
_____ Warning _____ No action taken
_____ Other (Please specify: ________________________________________ )
Date and time of
DUI stop:

186 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
In general, the major advantage of observational methods lies
in the firsthand description of program activities that observers can
provide. The major problem with these techniques is that the presence
of observers may actually alter the behavior of program personnel or
participants. Would police officers, for example, be more guarded in
their speech and actions when they know a civilian observer is watching
them? A less frequent, but not unusual problem is that observers may
not report or record information consistently or accurately. The less
structured the observational scheme is (e.g., the narrative method), the
greater the concerns with observer reliability and subjectivity.
Service Record Data
Service record data refers to written, typed, or computerized records
that are kept by staff. Many programs require staff to collect certain
information on program clients, service delivery, and staff duties. One
simple example is program attendance data: staff may be required to
record whether clients are absent or present for scheduled meetings, or
they may be required to record the total number of hours each client
participates in the program. The first author once worked at a federal
forensic prison in Canada. This facility provided psychological assess-
ments for the courts and treatment services for convicted offenders.
Because the facility was an accredited hospital, as well as a prison,
medical records had to be kept. Staff (e.g., psychiatric nurses, psycholo-
gists, psychiatrists, and research staff) were required to make an entry
in a medical records binder each and every time they visited a prisoner,
describing the purpose of the visit, the length of the visit, what hap-
pened, the client’s state of mind, and whether any action was taken
with that client. In general, for many programs, we could ask program
staff to make regular entries in a logbook describing what they did with
each client, how much time they spent on different activities, and so on.
These records may provide a good source of monitoring information,
depending upon their complexity and reliability.
Service record data have at least two advantages: such data is (1) inex-
pensive, and (2) easily obtainable. However, service record data also
present two common disadvantages: (1) program records may not contain
sufficient information needed to monitor clients and the services provided
adequately, and (2) staff may not record this information consistently,
accurately, or completely. There may be sizable gaps in the information
that is actually recorded. There are three possible solutions to these
problems: (1) seek participation by staff in developing monitoring instru-
ments, (2) train staff in how to use these instruments, and (3) conduct
regular quality-control checks to make sure that records are being kept
properly. There are three key guidelines for using service record data:

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 187
1. It is better to gather a few items of data consistently and reliably
than to gather a lot of data poorly.
2. Recording forms should be structured as checklists whenever pos-
sible to simplify usage by program staff.
3. Service records should be checked immediately after completion for
consistency and accuracy. Checks should be conducted on a regular
basis, and corrective feedback should be given to staff as needed.
Service Provider Data
Service provider data refers to information that the evaluator or
change agent obtains from program or agency staff members directly.
As opposed to service records, for example, we could ask staff about
the specific activities and services being provided. We could ask them
whether client participation was high/low, how much time was spent
on different activities, how clients responded, and so on. We could use
relatively informal or more structured interviews to obtain staff percep-
tions, or we could use questionnaires or surveys. The major advantage
of this technique is that program or agency staff have regular involve-
ment in the intervention, and they can often provide detailed, firsthand
experience and knowledge. The major problem is potential subjectivity:
program staff or policy authorities may answer questions so as to make
themselves or the program/policy look good. Staff may also dislike the
extra time or work required by this method (e.g., more paperwork),
so the researcher or change agent must make sure that the information
provided by staff is not incomplete or inaccurate.
Participant Data
Participant data refers to information that the evaluator or change
agent obtains from clients or targets directly. Too often, client percep-
tions of interventions are ignored. It is important to get clients’ percep-
tions not only of what services were actually delivered, but often their
degree of satisfaction with program services or policy provisions. In
asking about services provided by a D.A.R.E. (Drug Awareness Resis-
tance Education) program, for example, we might ask participants
whether the information they received was understood, and whether the
information was utilized (e.g., were students less likely to use drugs as
a result of participating in the program?). Evidence has suggested that
information provided by D.A.R.E. programs may be well understood
but rarely utilized.8
As was the case with measuring staff perceptions of program ser-
vices, we can assess client perceptions by using questionnaires and/or

188 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
interviews. The advantages of obtaining client perceptions are that
clients have abundant firsthand experience with program or policy ser-
vices, and they are the only ones who can provide the perspective of the
intended targets of change. Disadvantages to be considered are possible
subjectivity (clients or targets may want to make the intervention look
either “good” or “bad,” depending on their personal experience), and
their possible mistrust of unfamiliar evaluators or “outsiders.” It takes
some skill to get valid responses from participants, but these problems
are by no means insurmountable.
Fiscal Monitoring
An additional type of monitoring data is always required by funding
sources: regular (usually quarterly or semi-annually) financial reports
detailing how funds were spent during project, program, or policy
implementation. It is necessary to have a sound accounting and financial
reporting system in place prior to implementation of the intervention
(see Resource Planning, Chapter 5), and it is necessary to comply fully
with the reporting requirements of the funding agency. An example of
federal accounting requirements is provided below.
Example 6.3
Standards for Financial Management Systems:
Excerpts from the Office of Justice Programs Financial Guide9
All recipients are required to establish and maintain accounting systems
and financial records to accurately account for funds awarded to them. These
records shall include both Federal funds and all matching funds of State, local,
and private organizations, when applicable. State recipients shall expend and
account for grant funds in accordance with State laws and procedures for
expending and accounting for their own funds. Subrecipients of States shall
follow the financial management requirements imposed on them by States.
(State and local procedures must ensure that subrecipients comply with the
financial management standards found at 28 CFR Parts 66 and 70.)
Accounting System
The recipient is responsible for establishing and maintaining an ade-
quate system of accounting and internal controls for itself, and for ensuring
that an adequate system exists for each of its subrecipients. An acceptable
and adequate accounting system:
• Presents and classifies projected historical cost of the grant as
required for budgetary and evaluation purposes;

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 189
• Provides cost and property control to ensure optimal use of funds;
• Controls funds and other resources to assure that the expenditure
of funds and use of property conform to any general or special
conditions that apply to the recipient;
• Meets the prescribed requirements for periodic financial reporting
of operations; and
• Provides financial data for planning, control, measurement, and
evaluation of direct and indirect costs.
Recipient and Subrecipient Accounting Responsibilities
1. Reviewing Financial Operations. Direct recipients should be famil-
iar with, and periodically monitor, their subrecipients’ financial
operations, records, system, and procedures. Particular attention
should be directed to the maintenance of current financial data.
2. Recording Financial Activities. The subrecipient’s award or
contract obligation, as well as cash advances and other financial
activities, should be recorded in the books of the recipient in sum-
mary form. Subrecipient expenditures should be recorded on the
books of the recipient or evidenced by report forms duly filed by
the subrecipient. Non-Federal contributions applied to programs
or projects by subrecipients should likewise be recorded, as should
any program income resulting from program operations.
3. Budgeting and Budget Review. The recipient should ensure that
each subrecipient prepares an adequate budget on which its award
commitment will be based. The detail of each project budget
should be maintained on file by the recipient.
4. Accounting for Non-Federal Contributions. Recipients will ensure
that the requirements, limitations, and regulations pertinent to
non-Federal contributions are applied.
5. Audit Requirements. Recipients must ensure that subrecipients
have met the necessary audit requirements contained in this Guide
(see Part III, Chapter 19: Audit Requirements).
6. Reporting Irregularities. Recipients and their subrecipients are
responsible for promptly notifying the awarding agency and the Fed-
eral cognizant audit agency of any illegal acts or irregularities and of
proposed and actual actions, if any. Please notify the OC Customer
Service Center at 1–800–458–0786 if any irregularities occur. Illegal
acts and irregularities include conflicts of interest, falsification of
records or reports, and misappropriation of funds or other assets.
Example 6.3, continued

190 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Making Adjustments to the Resource Plan
Once the program or policy is implemented, one may find that
adjustments to the budget become necessary because resources prove
inadequate, or potential funding providers cannot fully fund the proposed
budget. In the first instance, program expenditures after implementation
may begin to get too high (e.g., beyond the limit of available funds),
necessitating cutbacks on the program’s activities and/or its objectives.
Better to cut back now than to find out later that we simply didn’t have
the necessary resources to implement our intended program design. If
the program fails to achieve its stated objectives, nobody is interested in
hearing the excuse that “we just didn’t have enough resources”; that is
tantamount to saying: “we didn’t know what we were doing when we did
our budget.” Such excuses do not inspire confidence in funding providers.
In the second instance, a potential funding source may receive the appli-
cation for funding, favorably review it, then ask the proposal writer to
cut program or policy expenses by, say, 25 to 30 percent. Or worse, the
funding agency may run into fiscal difficulties after the intervention has
already begun, and ask the grantee to cut costs by 25 to 30 percent.
As a result, the change agent and/or members of the action system
(e.g., the program director) must be ready to make adjustments.10 Four
options for adjusting resources are possible should available resources
prove inadequate to implement the intended program or policy design.
7. Debarred and Suspended Organizations. Recipients and subrecipi-
ents must not award or permit any award at any level to any party
which is debarred or suspended from participation in Federal
assistance programs. For details regarding debarment procedures,
see 28 CFR Part 67, Governmentwide Debarment and Suspension
(Nonprocurement) and 28 CFR Part 83 Governmentwide Require-
ments for Drug-Free Workplace (Grants).
8. Bonding. The awarding agency may require adequate fidelity bond
coverage where a recipient lacks sufficient coverage to protect the
Federal Government interest (see OMB Circular A-110, Attach-
ment, Subpart C, paragraph 21(c)).
Where the conduct of a program or one of its components is delegated
to a subrecipient, the direct recipient is responsible for all aspects of the
program including proper accounting and financial recordkeeping by the
subrecipient. Responsibilities include the accounting of receipts and expen-
ditures, cash management, the maintaining of adequate financial records,
and the refunding of expenditures disallowed by audits.
Example 6.3, continued

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 191
Designate Responsibility to
Collect, Store, and Analyze Data
We emphasize that monitoring requires collecting information. This
usually means more work for program or agency staff, on top of their
service delivery duties. Such information is indispensable, however, and no
program or agency can survive or grow without it. For example, all pro-
grams need to record some basic information for accountability purposes.
Examples might include the number of contacts made with clients in an
intensive supervision probation program, the number of hours of partici-
pation in an after-school delinquency prevention program, and weekly
attendance at group counseling sessions in a substance abuse program.
In the authors’ work with nonprofit groups and criminal justice
agencies, we have often found that funding agencies or program supervi-
sors do not always clearly communicate or emphasize the information
reporting requirements for programs, and we have found that staff
who have been assigned the responsibility for collecting monitoring
data often lack the training, skills, and time needed to fulfill such
tasks. These are not excuses. The program manager or director bears
full responsibility to make sure that certain information is recorded
consistently and accurately. Expect that stakeholders will want regular
Figure 6.6
Making Adjustments to the Resource Plan: Four Options
1. Try to increase funding to cover costs: Multiple funding sources may be
required to fund the program’s expenses. Maybe more than one grant will be
needed. Sometimes funding providers will ask the agency applying for funds
to match the provider’s contribution, with the requirement that no award
will be made until the applying agency comes up with matching funds.
2. Redefine target selection and/or eligibility criteria: This might involve
restricting the eligibility of clients (e.g., to those most in need), or lower-
ing the number of clients to be served (e.g., perhaps only 30 high-risk
youths can be effectively served by an after-school delinquency prevention
program, rather than the originally intended 50).
3. Reduce or modify program objectives (e.g., reduce the number of objec-
tives): Rather than provide substance abuse counseling, life skills training,
and vocational education and job preparation, limit the program’s objec-
tives to one goal, such as employment.
4. Modify the program design: Eliminate one or more program components,
beginning with the least essential components of the program, or shorten
the length of the program.

192 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
reports on the numbers and characteristics of clients served, their level
of need, their progress and participation in the program, and, eventu-
ally, their outcomes.
Someone must take responsibility to make sure the job gets done. If
the program manager assigns responsibility to staff to undertake these
tasks, he or she is also responsible to make sure that it gets done. If there
is any ambiguity at all about what information is to be collected, who
is responsible for collecting it, or how it is to be collected, recorded,
and stored, the program manager must make sure such ambiguities are
cleared up before the program or policy begins operations. If such gaps
are detected afterwards, they must be filled. The risk of not taking such
“mundane” considerations seriously is the potential death of the pro-
gram or policy when those funding it or authorizing it lose faith in it.
Develop Information System Capacities
A good information system can serve several purposes. First and
foremost, a good information system can demonstrate accountability
to funding agents, the community, and other stakeholders who may
provide either critical support
or resistance. A good informa-
tion system is also useful for
planning: it allows program
managers or policy authorities
to see how well plans are going,
what problems emerge, and
make decisions about adjustments. A useful information system allows
for continuous monitoring over time: it is sensitive to both intended
and unintended changes in program or policy design. Several guidelines
should facilitate the development of a useful information system.
First, it is vital to gain staff acceptance. Extra paperwork or online
data entry is unwelcome unless you can show that it provides meaning-
ful and useful information. For example, staff may be more receptive to
doing the work if they find out that they receive useful feedback about
client performance, program services, and their own performance.
Cost is another consideration: even printing new forms can be
expensive for a small, nonprofit agency. Certainly purchasing new
computers or setting up a coordinated computer network can get very
expensive. The bigger the agency, and the greater the number of clients,
however, the greater the likelihood that more sophisticated information
storage systems are needed. Greater needs are also implied by detailed
and regular client assessment and reassessment procedures (e.g., risk
and needs classifications of ex-offenders), and sophisticated, multiple
services provided to a diverse clientele.
Information Systems
Information systems are ongoing methods of collecting data
about clients, staff, and program or policy activities. They
may consist of written forms and records that are filed, or
fully computerized data entry and storage systems.

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 193
We should also consider compatibility: what information is already
being collected? Can current information systems be modified some-
what, rather than designing a brand new information system? Is there
a need to share information with other agencies?
Safeguarding of information is important. In a delinquency pre-
vention program, for example, staff need to protect the identity of the
juvenile. To assess a juvenile’s needs adequately, however, the program
needs sensitive information about the juvenile’s previous criminal record
and his or her current school performance. Strict procedures must be
developed for handling, using, and storing such information.
In general, training of staff is essential if good information is to be
collected. Never just give someone an overview of an online system or
hand over a package of forms and explain, “instructions are enclosed.”
Make sure that staff members understand what is being asked of them
and why. Consider these guidelines as you read Case Study 6.3.
Develop Mechanisms to
Provide Feedback to Stakeholders
Finally, make plans for how monitoring information is to be used.
The change agent should identify the appropriate stakeholders (e.g.,
program clients, staff, other agencies, legislators, funding agencies, com-
munity representatives), and schedule individual and/or group meetings
to communicate results. Some reporting, particularly to funding agencies,
will come in the form of program reports or research reports. Wherever
gaps are detected, corrective action should be discussed and implemented.
The bottom line is that any effective organization, private, public, or
nonprofit, requires monitoring information on a regular basis to figure
out how well it is doing. Can you imagine an effective business that only
examines its sales once a year? A stock market that reports transactions
only once a month? A television network that examines ratings only at the
end of the season? Ignoring monitoring is not good business. In extreme
cases of inattention, it is likely to be fatal to the program or policy.
Conclusion
Monitoring is a process that attempts to identify any gaps between
the program or policy on paper (design) and the program or policy
in action (implementation). We can specify all the key questions for
monitoring in terms of corresponding program or policy design features:
what was intended in terms of targets, staff, and program/policy ser-
vices? Second, how do we collect data to determine the degree to which
these design features are actually being implemented? Third, what gaps

194 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
exist (if any) between the program or policy on paper, and the program
or policy in action? Where gaps are found, adjustments must be made:
either the design (the program or policy on paper) must change, or the
way the program or policy is being implemented (the program or policy
in action) must change.
We emphasize that the purpose of monitoring is not simply to ensure
compliance with the original program or policy design. There is always
some drift between the original design and actual implementation of any
program or policy. Over time, as conditions in the environment change,
and as unanticipated difficulties emerge, modifications to the original
design are inevitably made. Leadership changes, staff persons come and
go, and services are altered. Sometimes these changes are necessary and
for the better. We discuss the need for innovations to learn continually
and adapt more fully in Chapter 8. What we are seeking, after all, is
better programs and policies, not blind obedience to a piece of paper.
If monitoring is timely and consistent, we can observe these changes in
program or policy design and make explicit, intentional decisions about
whether to adopt certain changes.
Consider this example. A residential drug treatment program’s fund-
ing from the county is in jeopardy because it is serving too few clients
with serious drug abuse problems. Monitoring data has indicated that
the staff persons responsible for client intake have been turning away
seriously addicted clients because they are too disruptive. Different
options are possible. First, less stringent client eligibility criteria might
be adopted to maintain funding levels. Alternatively, the program may
seek funding from a different sponsor that will be more sympathetic
to their existing client selection and treatment procedures. In the first
case, changes in client selection (e.g., more clients with more serious
drug abuse problems) will also necessitate changes in program design
(e.g., type of counseling and total hours of counseling needed for seri-
ously addicted clients). In the second case, changes in program funding
may affect the program’s entire mission and goals. We emphasize: Any
deviations from the original program or policy design should be con-
sciously intended, explicit, and visible. Monitoring facilitates deliberate
decisions about program or policy design, and helps prevent unintended
or invisible “drift.”
Monitoring provides essential, continuous information that can be
used to satisfy accountability requirements, improve program services
or policy implementation on a regular basis, and move toward desired
outcomes. As we will see in the next chapter, thorough monitoring
should precede and accompany any valid evaluation of a program or
policy. Though the two are linked, monitoring more closely emphasizes
process; evaluation emphasizes outcome.

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 195
D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S
1. (a) What is meant by the term “monitoring”? (b) What is the
purpose of monitoring?
2. What questions do we need to ask about a program or policy
at the monitoring stage? Be specific, and give examples to
illustrate your answer.
3. Describe each of the four methods that can be used to collect data
for monitoring. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each.
(a) Observational methods
(b) Service records
(c) Service provider data
(d) Program participant data
4. What options are possible when resources prove to be inad-
equate?
5. What are the purposes of an information system? Describe
three major guidelines for developing such a system.
EXERCISE 6.1
Read the SEARCH report, Drug Court Monitoring, Evaluation, and Manage-
ment Information Systems,11 or read a different one assigned by your instruc-
tor. Complete a monitoring analysis by using the Monitoring Analysis Chart
as a guide (see Figure 6.1).

196 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.1
Program Monitoring: The Correctional Program
Assessment Inventory (CPAI)
Professors Don Andrews and Paul Gendreau have inquired extensively into
the characteristics of effective correctional treatment programs and how those
characteristics can effectively be shaped to improve treatment outcomes. This
approach is based upon empirical evidence that rehabilitation is sometimes
effective, at least with certain offenders under certain circumstances. Following
a review of relevant outcome literature, and using a technique called meta-anal-
ysis, they examined the average “effect size” produced by different programs
with different characteristics. They wanted to know what the characteristics of
“effective” programs are (i.e., programs that have produced larger than aver-
age decreases in reoffending)? Their argument is simple but convincing: there
are identifiable characteristics of effective programs that can be assessed and
adjusted so as to improve the achievement of program outcomes (e.g., reduc-
tion of recidivism). According to Andrews et al., effective programs evidence
the principles of risk, need, and responsivity.1
1. Risk: Effective programs clearly differentiate between low-risk
and high-risk clients. The largest effects on recidivism are likely
to be achieved by targeting high-risk rather than low-risk offend-
ers. High-risk cases should receive high levels of intervention and
services; low-risk cases should receive minimal intervention.
2. Needs: Criminogenic needs are dynamic (i.e., changing) risk fac-
tors that are predictive of recidivism (e.g., antisocial cognitions
and emotional states, association with antisocial peers, substance
abuse, weak self-control, and problem solving skills). Programs
that effectively target and reduce such individual needs accomplish
larger decreases in reoffending.
3. Responsivity: Programs that appropriately target the specific
needs and learning styles of their clients are more effective. For
example, clients who are interpersonally and cognitively immature
require more structured services, but more mature clients benefit
1 Andrews, D.A., I. Zinger, R.D. Hoge, J. Bonta, P. Gendreau, and F.T. Cullen (1990). “Does
Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-
analysis.” Criminology, 28, 369-404; see also: Cullen, F., and P. Gendreau (2000). “Assessing
Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice and Prospects. In J. Horney (ed.), Criminal Justice
2000, Volume 3 (pp. 109-175). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, National Institute of Justice (NCJ-182410). Retrieved February 26, 2008, from the
NCJRS web site at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_3/03d

http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_3/03d

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 197
Case Study 6.1, continued
from more flexible approaches. Andrews et al. argue that the
most effective styles of treatment have been cognitive-behavioral
and social learning strategies that focus on skill development in a
variety of areas. Conversely, programs that incorrectly target the
criminogenic needs of their clients may actually increase rather
than decrease re-offending.
The Correctional Program Assessment Inventory (CPAI) was designed
to assess, in a fairly structured and objective manner, the degree to which a
program has been adequately designed and implemented. It is sensitive to the
three principles of risk, need, and responsivity derived from empirical research.
The instrument is still being developed and studied, but it has demonstrated its
usefulness in a wide variety of correctional settings so far.2 The CPAI assesses
a specific program by tabulating the presence, number, and variety of the best-
validated elements of effective correctional programs. There are six primary
sections of the CPAI:
1. Program implementation: This section assesses the qualifications
and involvement of the program director, the extent to which the
treatment literature was considered in the program design, and
whether the program is consistent with existing values in the com-
munity, meets a local need, and is perceived to be cost-effective.
2. Client pre-service assessment: This section examines the program’s
offender selection and assessment processes to ascertain the extent
to which clients are appropriate for the services provided. It also
addresses the methods for assessing risk, need, and responsivity
factors.
3. Characteristics of the program: This section examines whether
the program is targeting criminogenic attitudes and behaviors,
the specific treatment modalities employed, the use of rewards
and punishments, and the methods used to prepare the offender
for release from the program.
4. Characteristics and practices of the staff: This section identifies
the qualifications, experience, stability, training, and involvement
of the program staff.
2 Andrews, D.A. (1995). Assessing Program Elements for Risk Reduction: The Correctional
Program Assessment Inventory (CPAI). Paper presented at the “Research to Results” confer-
ence, sponsored by IARCA, Ottawa, Canada, October 11-14, 1995; Gendreau, P., and
D.A. Andrews (1994). Correctional Program Assessment Inventory (4th ed.). St. John, New
Brunswick: University of New Brunswick.

198 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.1, continued
5. Evaluation: This section centers on the types of feedback, assess-
ment, and evaluations used to monitor how well the program is
functioning.
6. Miscellaneous: This final section of the CPAI includes miscella-
neous items pertaining to levels of funding and community support
for the program.
Each section of the CPAI consists of six to 26 items for a total of 77
items designed to operationalize the principles of effective intervention. The
number of items in each section represents the weight given to that particular
section relative to the other sections of the instrument. Each item is scored as
“1” or “0.” To receive a “1” programs must demonstrate that they meet the
specified criteria (e.g., the director is involved in some aspect of direct service
delivery to clients; client risk of recidivism is assessed through a standardized,
quantifiable measure).
Based on the number of points earned, each section is scored as either “very
satisfactory” (70% to 100%); “satisfactory” (60% to 69%); “satisfactory, but
needs improvement” (50% to 59%); or “unsatisfactory” (less than 50%). The
scores from all six areas are totaled and the same scale is used for the overall
assessment score. Some items may be considered “not applicable,” in which
case they are not included in the scoring. Data for the CPAI are gathered
through structured interviews with program staff at each of the sites. Other
sources of information include the examination of program documentation, the
review of representative case files, and some observation of program activities.
As you read the example below, think of the basic elements of program design
and monitoring discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, and note how the CPAI assesses
critical features of program design.
Example: The MonDay Community Correctional Institution. The MonDay
Community Correctional Institution (MonDay), located in Dayton, Ohio, is a
state-funded, community-based facility for both male and female felony offend-
ers. Offenders are sentenced to MonDay in lieu of prison for a period not to
exceed six months. In October 1997, MonDay was awarded a federal grant for
the purpose of implementing a Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program
(RSAT). Thirty beds (20 male and 10 female) were designated as RSAT beds
for offenders identified as needing long-term residential treatment. In conjunc-
tion with the RSAT grant, MonDay developed a Therapeutic Community (TC)
that was fully implemented by January 1, 1998. The University of Cincinnati
conducted a process evaluation that included a CPAI assessment.3
3 Fulton, B., E. Latessa, and J. Pealer (2001). MonDay Community Correctional Institution:
RSAT Process Evaluation, Final Report. Retrieved February 26, 2008, from the NCJRS web
site at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/188871

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CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 199
Case Study 6.1, continued
The average overall CPAI score for 150 programs across the United States
was 54.4; MonDay’s RSAT program scored a commendable 74.2 percent. The
following areas were identified as program strengths:
• Both the Program Director and the Clinical Director have extensive
experience working with offender populations and the requisite
educational background. Both have been intricately involved in all
aspects of program development. The program development process
was extremely thorough and included a comprehensive literature
review, a formal pilot period, and a needs assessment that identified
many offenders in need of long-tern residential treatment.
• A comprehensive screening and assessment process that includes
the Level of Service Inventory (LSI-R), the ASUS [Adult Substance
Use Survey], and a social history interview facilitates the identifi-
cation of appropriate clients for the RSAT program. Combined,
these instruments provide MonDay with a quantifiable measure
of client risk and need and a detailed assessment of the offender’s
substance abuse history.
• The treatment and services offered by MonDay’s RSAT program
are designed to target criminogenic needs.
• The program is theoretically based: the TC model is rooted in a
social learning approach that provides opportunities for modeling
and behavioral rehearsal techniques that engender self-efficacy;
and the specific treatment groups provided within the TC (e.g.,
chemical dependency education, relapse prevention, criminal
thinking errors, anger management, problem-solving) incorporate
a cognitive behavioral approach that aims to challenge antisocial
attitudes and develop self-control procedures.
• Close offender monitoring and detailed treatment manuals con-
tribute to the consistency in services and help maintain program
integrity.
• Treatment is individualized for the RSAT participants with the
duration, intensity, and nature of treatment varying according to
the level of client risk and need.
• The RSAT staff are well qualified with appropriate educational
backgrounds and licensures. Turnover is low, and staff are
involved in program development and modifications.
• MonDay has several mechanisms in place to monitor how well the
program is functioning. First, ongoing quality assurance mecha-

200 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.1, continued
nisms include file reviews, group observation, and client satisfac-
tion surveys. Second, client progress in treatment is monitored
during treatment team meetings and through a reassessment of
client risk using the LSI-R. Third, MonDay is participating in an
outcome evaluation of RSAT that incorporates a quasi-experimen-
tal design.
The following areas were identified as needing improvement:
• The clinical director is not systematically involved in the delivery
of direct services to offenders (e.g., conducting groups, assessing
offenders, individual counseling). This is recommended as a means
of staying abreast of the challenges faced by staff and clients and
the skill level and resources necessary for the effective delivery of
services.
• Information regarding responsivity factors, or personal charac-
teristics that may interfere with treatment, were not available to
treatment staff for consideration in treatment planning. Assessing
and disseminating this type of information facilitates improved
treatment matching (e.g., between client and program; between
client and staff).
• The MonDay program utilized both rewards and punishments in
response to client behavior. These rewards and punishments, how-
ever, could be used more systematically to ensure achievement of
the recommended ratio of at least four rewards to one punishment
and to promote consistency and immediacy in the administration
of punishment.
• MonDay has developed specific program completion criteria to
guide successful terminations that are based on the acquisition and
demonstration of prosocial attitudes, skills, and behaviors. The
180-day maximum stay mandated by the state, however, negates
the ability of the program to keep clients who could benefit from
a longer stay.
• MonDay does not systematically involve family members or sig-
nificant others in the offender’s treatment.
• Because of the number of different county probation departments
responsible for post-release supervision, there is inconsistency in

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 201
Case Study 6.1, continued
the extent to which aftercare and/or booster sessions are provided
to MonDay clients.
• Staff training is accomplished primarily through a 40-hour on-
the-job orientation. It is recommended that program staff receive
three to six months of formal training in theory and practice of
interventions employed by the program.
• Although the clinical staff receives group supervision, it is recom-
mended that individualized clinical supervision be provided on
a routine basis for the purpose of discussing problem cases and
enhancing clinical skills.
CPAI Results of MonDay Correctional Institution Compared
to National Average Scores
A CPAI assessment provides valuable data for programs to articulate what
they are about: for example, who is served, with what intent, in what ways, and
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
MonDay National Average
Im
plem
entation
A
ssessm
ent
Program
Staff
Evaluation
O
ther
O
verall Score
90.9
73.2 72.7
46.5
59
43
62.5
60
100 100
34.8
83
74.2
54

202 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.1, continued
with what intermediate and long-term changes expected. Similar to the process
of “evaluability assessment,”4 examination and clarification of program goals
and structure can provide valuable learning opportunities for program staff
and directors, and can inform useful and necessary program adjustments prior
to undertaking formal outcome evaluation (see Chapter 7).
What Andrews, Gendreau, and their colleagues prescribe for correctional
programs may be applicable to a wider variety of interventions: drug treatment
programs, delinquency prevention programs, counseling programs for domestic
violence offenders, and so on. Their approach is based on sound principles
of program development, and it utilizes a scientific approach that reduces the
subjectivity of judgments about adequate program functioning.
Question
1. Describe how the CPAI assesses basic dimensions of program design
and monitoring. Using Figure 6.1 (“Monitoring Analysis”) as a guide,
briefly describe one example for each of the cells in Column 1 (“what was
intended”: clients, staff, and program services) and Column 4 (“gaps”:
clients, staff, and program services).
4 See: Rutman, L. (1984). Planning Useful Evaluations: Evaluability Assessment. Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage; Wholey, J.S. (1994). “Assessing the Feasibility and Likely Usefulness of Evaluation.”
In J.S. Wholey, H.P. Hatry, and K.E. Newcomer (eds.) (1994). Handbook of Practical Evalu-
ation (pp. 15-39). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 203
Case Study 6.2
Monitoring Presale Firearm Checks Under the Brady Act1
Recall that the Firearm Inquiry Statistics program (FIST) was established to
provide monitoring data on presale firearm checks, as specified by the Brady Act
(see Case Study 5.2). This type of data collection is essential to planned change.
We want to determine the degree to which a policy is actually used and enacted as
planned (i.e., the policy as specified “on paper” by the provisions of the Brady Act).
Of course, we are also interested in the degree to which there are any gaps between
what was planned and what was actually done (i.e., the policy “in action”).
Instructions: Read the case study below,2 and then answer the questions at the end.
You may find it helpful to review concepts in Chapter 4 (“Designing the Policy”) and
Chapter 5 (esp. Case Study 5.2).
Highlights3
• Nearly 70 million background checks have been conducted under
the Brady Act through 2005; more than 57 million since the per-
manent provisions took effect on November 30, 1998.
• 1.6 percent of the 8.3 million applications for firearm transfers or
permits in 2005 were rejected by the FBI (66,700 applications) or
state and local agencies (65,200 applications).
• Among state and local checking agencies in 2005, 46 percent of all
rejections for firearm transfers (about 30,000 applications) were
due to a felony conviction or indictment.
• About 15 percent of state and local rejections (10,000 applica-
tions) were due to a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction
or restraining order.
• The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearm and Explosive’s (ATF)
field offices investigated 9,575 National Instant Criminal Background
Check System (NICS) denials that were referred by the FBI in 2005.
• In 2005, agencies reported 1,400 arrests of persons denied a fire-
arm or a permit.
• In 2005, U.S. attorney offices accepted for prosecution 135 NICS
denial cases investigated by ATF.
1 Adapted from: Bowling, M., G. Lauver, M.J. Hickman, and D.B. Adams (2006). Background
Checks for Firearm Transfers, 2005 (NCJ 214256). U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/
bcft05.htm
2 This report is one in a series. More recent editions may be available. To view a list of all in the
series, go to http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#bcft
3 The complete BJS report in portable document format (pdf) and in ASCII and its related sta-
tistical data and tables—including two appendix tables—are available at the BJS web site at:
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/bcft05.htm

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#bcft

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/bcft05.htm

204 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.2, continued
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) mandates crimi-
nal history background checks on persons applying to purchase firearms from
federally licensed firearm dealers. The Act established the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (NICS) and requires a background check
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)or a state point of contact (POC) on
persons applying to receive firearms from a Federal Firearm Licensee (FFL).
In order to provide national estimates of the total number of applications and
rejections resulting from the Brady Act and similar state laws, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS) in 1995 began the Firearm Inquiry Statistics Program (FIST). The
FIST program collects information on background checks conducted by state and
local agencies, and combines this information with FBI NICS transaction data.
In 2005 about 8.3 million applications for firearm transfers or permits
were subject to background checks under the Brady Act and similar state laws.
This was an increase of 2.4 percent from the 8.1 million applications in 2004.
The FBI processed nearly 5.0 million of these applications (60%), and state
and local agencies processed 3.3 million (40%).
Table A
Number of applications and estimates of rejections
for firearm transfers or permits, 1994-2005
Number of applications
Rejection
Received Rejected Rate
Total 69,912,000 1,360,000 1.9%
Interim period, 1994-1998a 12,740,000 312,000 2.4%
Permanent Brady 57,170,000 1,048,000 1.8
1998b 893,000 20,000 2.2
1999 8,621,000 204,000 2.4
2000 7,699,000 153,000 2
2001 7,958,000 151,000 1.9
2002 7,806,000 136,000 1.7
2003 7,831,000 126,000 1.6
2004 8,084,000 126,000 1.6
2005 8,278,000 132,000 1.6
Note: Counts are rounded to the nearest 1,000. National totals from 1999 to 2005 com-
bine FIST estimates for state and local agencies with actual transactions and rejections
reported by the FBI.
For information about FIST estimates before 1999 see Presale Handgun Checks, the Brady
Interim Period, 1994-98 (NCJ 175034) .
a March 1, 1994 to November 29, 1998.
b November 30 to December 31, 1998. Counts are from the National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS) Operations Report (November 30, 1998 – December
31, 1999) and may include multiple transactions for the same application.

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CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 205
Case Study 6.2, continued
FBI Rejection Rates Affected by Separate
State or Local Background Check Requirements
In states where the FBI conducted both long gun and handgun background
checks in 2005, rejection rates ranged from 2.1 percent for Alaska to less than
1 percent for Kansas, Massachusetts, Maine, Missouri, Rhode Island, and West
Virginia (Table B). NICS rejection rates in Massachusetts (0.1%) and Rhode
Island (0.7%) were low as a result of separate background checks by local agen-
cies. Rates in Delaware (1.4%) were reduced by prior checks conducted by the
state police (3.8% rejection).
Table B
Rejection rates for selected FBI States, 1999-2005
2005 1999-2005
Total Total Rejection Total Total Rejection
transactions rejections rate transactions rejections rate
Total 3,510,580 40,566 1.2% 21,572,811 308,785 1.4%
Alaska 44,514 923 2.1 275,121 6,846 2.5
Alabama 235,873 3,165 1.3 1,556,215 25,529 1.6
Arkansas 164,001 2,470 1.5 1,069,735 20,403 1.9
Delaware 17,121 242 1.4 117,829 1,833 1.6
Idaho 80,343 1,285 1.6 466,111 9,883 2.1
Kansas 98,311 840 0.9 675,488 7,207 1.1
Kentucky 232,589 2,334 1 1,584,505 21,365 1.3
Louisiana 207,954 3,847 1.8 1,237,420 23,664 1.9
Massachusetts 105,347 82 0.1 366,497 828 0.2
Maine 50,319 290 0.6 344,211 2,291 0.7
Minnesota 224,165 2,420 1.1 1,224,528 14,142 1.2
Missouri 214,241 1,938 0.9 1,398,170 16,210 1.2
Mississippi 167,713 1,778 1.1 1,075,761 13,174 1.2
Montana 84,060 1,150 1.4 506,018 8,931 1.8
North Dakota 36,000 448 1.2 218,027 2,474 1.1
New Mexico 82,051 1,167 1.4 556,128 8,762 1.6
Ohio 313,159 3,818 1.2 2,084,227 31,526 1.5
Oklahoma 182,031 1,936 1.1 1,112,272 15,206 1.4
Rhode Island 9,649 63 0.7 70,239 565 0.8
South Dakota 50,768 494 1 296,018 4,031 1.4
Texas 738,793 8,393 1.1 4,232,150 62,034 1.5
West Virginia 133,667 957 0.7 880,892 8,345 0.9
Wyoming 37,911 526 1.4 225,249 3,536 1.6
Note: States are those for which the FBI conducted all checks under permanent Brady.
Total for seven-year period includes December, 1998.

206 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.2, continued
Statewide Rejection Rates Ranged from 0.3 Percent to 3.8 Percent
In 2005, statewide data were obtained from 16 NICS Point-of-Contact
(POC) states (where state agencies conduct background checks instead of or
in addition to the FBI) and Delaware. These states processed checks for 2.7
million applications, rejecting 51,000 or 1.9 percent (Table C).
The rejection rates for these states ranged from 0.3 percent in Connecti-
cut and New Jersey to 3.8 percent in Delaware. Instant checks in New Jersey
(0.3%) and Illinois (0.6%) reported among the lowest rejection rates in 2005;
in these states, an instant check at the time of transfer is the second step
required for firearm owners. During the first step of the process—an appli-
cation for the requisite permit or ID card—the rejection rate is considerably
higher in Illinois (2.6%), more similar to the national average.
Higher rejection rates in 2005 mainly occurred in states that implemented
an instant approval system, such as Colorado(3.1%) and Tennessee (3.5%).
Approval systems established before passage of the Brady Act, such as Cali-
fornia (1%), Virginia (1.2%), and Wisconsin(1.5%), typically had lower rates.
These rates have varied little from year to year.
In 2005 local agencies received 568,000 applications for purchase permits
and exempt carry permits. Around 11,000, or 1.9 percent, were rejected.
Rejection rates for both types of permits were highest in jurisdictions with a
population over 100,000 and lowest in those under 10,000.
Overall, local agency rejection rates in 2005 were higher for purchase
permits than for exempt carry permits.
Table C
Number of firearm purchase applications received and rejected
by state agencies, 1999-2005
2005 1999-2005
Total Total Rejection Total Total Rejection
transactions rejections rate transactions rejections rate
All statewide
agencies 2,709,823 51,154 1.9% 18,524,321 396,590 2.1%
California 344,847 3,470 1 2,554,582 25,517 1
Colorado 151,758 4,734 3.1 962,117 40,078 4.2
Connecticuta 57,874 146 0.3 405,004 1,159 0.3
Delaware 10,803 415 3.8 69,582 3,110 4.5
Florida 350,790 8,103 2.3 1,938,862 45,816 2.4
Georgiab 81,204 1,402 1.7 1,332,201 46,904 3.5
Hawaiic 8,695 110 1.3 … … …

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 207
Case Study 6.2, continued
Table C (continued)
2005 1999-2005
Total Total Rejection Total Total Rejection
transactions rejections rate transactions rejections rate
Illinoisa,c 386,326 6,950 1.8 2,765,023 49,089 1.8
Purchase permits 231,693 5,981 2.6 1,646,936 40,592 2.5
Instant checks 154,633 969 0.6 1,118,087 8,497 0.8
Maryland 24,287 396 1.6 190,779 3,373 1.8
Nevada 61,539 1,391 2.3 … … …
New Hampshired 14,628 116 0.8 94,440 1,107 1.2
New Jerseya,c 77,386 778 1 555,764 6,365 1.1
Purchase permits 39,379 682 1.7 297,147 5,543 1.9
Instant checks 38,007 96 0.3 258,617 846 0.3
Oregon 139,797 2,549 1.8 746,154 15,821 2.1
Tennessee 211,308 7,336 3.5 1,500,104 67,772 4.5
Utahe 72,564 2,332 3.2 473,089 13,802 2.9
Virginia 217,051 2,668 1.2 1,384,560 17,688 1.3
Wisconsind 35,254 530 1.5 231,273 3,511 1.5
Note: Each listed State reported complete statewide data for applications and rejec-
tions in 2005. Pennsylvania reported 371,338 instant checks for 2005, but the number
rejected is unavailable.
… Not available or not applicable.
a Connecticut, Illinois, and New Jersey conduct checks on permits or identification cards
and again at the time of firearm transfer.
b Counts in 2005 for January through June only.
c Hawaii and New Jersey permits are issued locally, but counts are reported by the state.
d Counts in this table include handguns only for these states.
e Applications for carry permits are listed separately.
25 States Had Fully Automated Criminal History Records
in 2003; 24 States Partially Automated
All states maintain databases that record felony convictions, and many main-
tain data on other disqualifying factors such as fugitive status, court restraining
orders, mental illness, and domestic violence misdemeanor convictions. States
differ as to the degree of automation used in record searching and whether
records are in a central database or in county courts or other local agencies.
In 2003, 49 states had automated at least some records in their criminal
history files. The number of states with fully automated criminal history files
increased from 21 to 25 between 1999 and 2003.
Checking agencies often encounter delays when they access incomplete
records. The most frequent delays occur when researching the final disposi-

208 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.2, continued
tion of a criminal charge in an arrest or indictment record. If the final dis-
position cannot be found during the time allowed for a background check,
the agency must decide, based on federal or state law, whether the applica-
tion will be approved, denied, or delayed pending further research. A state’s
rejection rate may tend to be lower if an approval is mandated and higher if
a denial is mandated.
The Brady Act allows a transfer to proceed if a disqualifying record is not
found within the three-business-day limit for a NICS check. Some states have
laws and regulations that allow their agencies to deny or delay a transfer if an
incomplete record is being researched when the time limit expires.
Felony Convictions, Indictments, Leading Reason
for Rejections In 2005
In 2005 the FBI reported that 37 percent of its rejections were for felony-
related reasons (about 25,000 applications), followed by other criminal history
disqualifiers (about 18,000 applications, or 27%), which include state-specific
prohibitions.
A domestic violence misdemeanor conviction or restraining order
accounted for more than 15 percent of the rejections (about 10,000 applica-
tions). Other common reasons for rejection were an applicant’s drug use (9%)
or status as a fugitive (5%).
Forty-six percent of all rejections for firearm transfers among state and
local checking agencies(about 30,000 in 2005) occurred because the applicant
either had a felony conviction or was under felony indictment. The second most
common reason for rejection was a domestic violence misdemeanor convic-
tion or restraining order(about 15% of rejections, or approximately 10,000
applications).
Other common reasons for rejection were the presence of a state law pro-
hibition(9.6% of rejections) and an applicant’s status as a fugitive (8.3%).
Local Agencies More Likely to Reject on State or Local
Prohibitions, Drug Addiction, or Mental Illness
Although a felony conviction or indictment was the most common reason for
rejection by both state and local law enforcement during 2005, the state agencies
rejected for this reason more frequently (58%) than the local agencies (28%).
State agencies were more likely to reject an applicant because of fugitive
status, while local agencies were more likely to base a rejection on a state or
local prohibitor, drug addiction, or mental illness.

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 209
Case Study 6.2, continued
Table D
Reasons for rejection of firearm transfer applications,
by state or local agency, 1999-2005
Reason for rejection State Local
Total 100% 100%
Felony indictment/conviction 58.2 27.5
Domestic violence
Misdemeanor conviction 10.4 10.8
Restraining order 3.4 1.8
State law prohibition 6.6 14.7
Fugitive 6.8 1.2
Illegal alien 0.5 0.4
Mental illness or disability 1.3 4.2
Drug addiction 0.7 7.4
Local law prohibition 0 6.2
Other* 12 25.7
* Includes juveniles, persons dishonorably discharged from the Armed Services, persons
who have renounced their U.S. citizenship, and other unspecified persons.
In 2005, 1,400 Arrests of Persons Denied Firearm or Permit
In 2005, agencies reported 1,400 arrest of persons denied a firearm or a
permit. During the permanent Brady period, more than 9,700 persons have
been arrested, according to checking agencies that reported arrests to FIST.
Persons prevented from receiving a firearm or a permit by a background
check may be subject to arrest and prosecution if they are wanted in an out-
standing warrant or have submitted false information on their application.
When a check identifies a wanted person, the checking agency generally will
inform the agency that entered the warrant, in addition to notifying the agency
with jurisdiction over the fugitive’s location or place of residence. A statewide
fugitive apprehension unit may also be informed.
Components of the National Firearm Check System
About 3,000 federal, state, and local agencies conduct background checks
on persons who apply to purchase a firearm or for a permit that may be used
to make a purchase. Variations in federal and state procedures for determining
firearm possession eligibility are summarized below.
Overview of the NICS
Prospective firearm transferees undergo a NICS check requested by a dealer
or present a state permit that the ATF has qualified as an alternative to the
point-of-transfer check. Qualifying permits are those that:

210 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.2, continued
1. Allow a transferee to possess, acquire, or carry a firearm, and
2. Were issued not more than five years earlier by the state in which
the transfer is to take place, after verification by an authorized
government official that possession of a firearm by the transferee
would not be a violation of law.
A permit issued after November 29, 1998, qualifies as an alternative only
if its approval process included a NICS check. Many qualifying permits may
be used for multiple purchases while valid. State laws also often provide that
a permit will be revoked if the holder is convicted of an offense or otherwise
becomes ineligible after receiving the permit.
Prior to transferring a firearm subject to permanent Brady requirements, a
licensee must receive a completed Firearm Transaction Record(ATF form 4473).
A licensee initiates a NICS check by contacting either the FBI or a point of
contact (POC) agency designated by state government. Most inquiries are initi-
ated by telephone. In 2002 the FBI added online checking (known as E-Check)
as another means to contact the NICS. About 101,000 inquiries were made by
this method in 2005, double the number of E-Check inquiries in 2004.
The FBI or POC checks available federal, state, and local databases and
responds with a notice to the licensee that the transfer may proceed, may not
proceed, or is delayed pending further review of the transferee’s record.
State and Local NICS Participation
Each state government determines the extent of its involvement in the NICS
process. Three forms of state involvement currently exist:
• A full POC requests a NICS check on all firearm transfers origi-
nating in the state.
• A partial POC requests a NICS check on all handgun transfers;
licensees in the state are required to contact the FBI for NICS
checks for long gun transfers.
• The state does not maintain a POC; licensees are required to con-
tact the FBI for NICS checks on all firearm transfers originating in
the state.
The FBI conducts all NICS checks for 29 states. POC agencies conduct
all NICS checks in 13 states. In eight states NICS checks are conducted by
POC agencies on handgun transfers and by the FBI on long gun transfers. The
FBI conducts all NICS checks for the District of Columbia, Guam, Northern
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The only change
in state participation during 2005 occurred on July 1, when the FBI assumed
responsibility for Georgia NICS checks.

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 211
Case Study 6.2, continued
Participation in the NICS by POC agencies includes initiating checks on
persons who apply for qualified state permits. Most POC agencies conduct a
background check that incorporates federal and state requirements. In a few
states with full or partial participation, the FBI conducts the NICS check on
certain pawn transactions instead of the POC. Most states have designated a
single agency with statewide jurisdiction as their NICS point of contact; some
states have multiple points of contact, which are usually county sheriffs or
local police departments.
Appendix A.
National Instant Criminal Background Check System: Checking agencies—
FBI or State point of contact—for firearm transfers, 2005
FBI conducts POC conducts POC –
checks for all checks for all handguns FBI –
State firearms firearms long guns
Alabama X
Alaska X
Arizona X
Arkansas X
California X
Colorado X
Connecticut X
Delaware X
Florida X
Georgia X
Hawaii* X
Idaho X
Illinois X
Indiana X
Iowa* X
Kansas X
Kentucky X
Louisiana X
Maine X
Maryland X
Massachusetts X
Michigan* X
Minnesota X
Mississippi X
Missouri X
Montana X
Nebraska* X
Nevada X

212 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.2, continued
Appendix A. (continued)
FBI conducts POC conducts POC –
checks for all checks for all handguns FBI –
State firearms firearms long guns
New Hampshire X
New Jersey X
New Mexico X
New York X
North Carolina* X
North Dakota X
Ohio X
Oklahoma X
Oregon X
Pennsylvania X
Rhode Island X
South Carolina X
South Dakota X
Tennessee X
Texas X
Utah X
Vermont X
Virginia X
Washington* X
West Virginia X
Wisconsin X
Wyoming X
Total 29 13 8
Note: Includes check on purchase or permit required for purchase.
*States with multiple points of contact.

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 213
Case Study 6.2, continued
Questions
When we are doing monitoring, we want to find out the degree to which
the policy design was actually carried out as planned. Review the section in
Chapter 4 titled “Designing a Policy.” Recall that at this stage the change
agent typically identifies: (1) the target population, or who will be affected
by the policy; (2) the provisions of the policy, or what members of the target
population will receive; (3) the decision authority, or who has the authority
to carry out the policy; and (4) the procedures that must be followed by the
decision authority.
1. Briefly describe the four policy components of the Brady Act (i.e., “policy
design”).
2. Now, using the Monitoring Analysis in Figure 6.4 as a guide, describe the
degree to which these four design components have been carried out, and
describe any gaps that you find. For example: Is the Brady Act doing what
it is designed to do, and are state and local officials doing what they are
supposed to be doing? What specific data reported in Case Study 6.2 helps
to answer these questions?

214 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.3
Why Drug Courts Need Good Information Systems1
Drug courts are a growing phenomenon. Drug courts represent a unique,
information-intensive approach to managing drug-related cases. Drug courts
were developed to reduce substance abuse and recidivism through techniques
such as treatment, judicial supervision, and graduated sanctions.
Typically, each drug court team—judge, drug treatment providers, court
coordinator, prosecutor, defense attorney, and other integral players such as
probation and pretrial services—carefully monitors and continually reports
on the nonviolent defendant’s journey to a drug-free life. For example, almost
all drug courts require participants to obtain a General Educational Develop-
ment (GED) diploma, to keep a job, and to pay current financial obligations,
including drug court fees and child support (where applicable).
As team members track participants’ compliance with program require-
ments, the “total progress picture” must be available quickly and accurately
so drug court team members can manage the participants effectively. The drug
court team must be able to analyze and summarize these progress pictures to
provide the data that drug courts need to monitor their day-to-day operations,
evaluate their processes and impact, and demonstrate the costs and benefits of
their programs to their communities.
Unfortunately, most programs began and continue without the benefit
of rigorous evaluation plans or automated management information systems
(MIS). In recognition of this gap, the Drug Courts Program Office (DCPO)
established initiatives to quantify the courts’ needs for information technology
and evaluation training and technical assistance, and to develop training and
technical assistance solutions to address drug court priority needs.
More than 75 percent of the drug courts in the United States participated
in a national survey designed to help those dealing with large drug caseloads
assess their needs for enhanced information-gathering tools. The survey que-
ried the entire population of known drug courts in the United States. Survey
responses were received from 257 of the 340 (76%) drug courts that were
operational at the time of the survey. The major findings were summarized in
10 key points:
1. Although there was widespread access to personal computers,
vital data were not generally entered into automated systems,
and there was not widespread, appropriately shared access to
1 Adapted from: SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics.
(2003). Drug Court Monitoring, Evaluation, and Management Information Systems: National
Scope Needs Assessment (NCJ 195077). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance. Retrieved February 26, 2008, from the NCJRS
web site at: http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/195077

http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/195077

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 215
Case Study 6.3, continued
data among drug court team members. Less than one-quarter of
courts surveyed use automation to help judges interact with their
caseload of defendants.
2. A strong relationship existed between automation and the time
it took for the judge to receive results of a failed drug test. The
critical factor was the importance that the drug court places on
the value of information.
3. An overwhelming majority of the drug courts surveyed expressed
their willingness to use every technical assistance option offered to
acquire the proper automation, maintain the technology, and obtain
the education needed to generate regular productivity reports.
4. A lack of funding was the number-one reason drug courts did
not acquire the additional automation needed and the training
and technical assistance to improve the administration of drug
court justice.
5. In addition to funding barriers, drug courts also listed difficulty
with linking to other systems as a prime barrier to automation.
6. The largest drug courts—those with 200 or more participants—
were highly automated with good MIS support. The majority of
courts (the smaller ones), however, lacked such resources.
7. Drug courts clearly specified that they needed technical assistance
with all aspects of automation—including help with initial steps,
such as developing needs assessments and technology plans and
preparing funding proposals for stakeholders.
8. Surveyed drug courts expressed a desire for additional education
and training to deal specifically with evaluation and management
information systems. Targeted workshops and videotaped training
sessions dedicated to monitoring, evaluation, and MIS develop-
ment rated highly among surveyed courts.
9. Difficulty with data entry and sharing were not a result of drug
court indifference to the need to provide regular evaluation infor-
mation. Indeed, fewer than half of the drug courts surveyed rated
their current systems as good or very good at providing informa-
tion for evaluations.
10. Less than 15 percent of all surveyed courts reported that they had
completed the necessary automation required to produce reports
needed for overall program evaluation.

216 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 6.3, continued
The results of the survey clearly showed that the automated support being
provided to the drug courts by existing computer systems is inadequate. Without
technology, it is difficult for drug courts to link the information about their results
with the goals of the court. It is also difficult to produce the reports and evalua-
tions needed to persuade stakeholders to allot more funding for technology.
Questions
1. Describe the information needs of different stakeholders for drug courts.
How well do current information systems satisfy those needs?
2. What improvements might be needed? Review the guidelines for developing
useful information systems discussed in Chapter 6, and discuss how they
apply to this case study:
• Staff acceptance
• Cost
• Compatibility
• Safeguarding of information
• Staff training
• Staff understanding

CHAPTER 6 • PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 217
Endnotes
1 Community Capacity Development Office (2008). Weed and Seed. U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Retrieved February 26, 2008, from the
CCDO web site at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ccdo/ws/welcome.html
2 Dunworth, T., and G. Mills (1999). National Evaluation of Weed and Seed (NCJ-
175685). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
3 Dunworth, T., G. Mills, G. Cordner, and J. Greene (1999). National Evaluation of
Weed and Seed: Cross-site Analysis (NCJ-176358). Washington, DC: U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
4 Bureau of Justice Assistance (2008). GMS Progress Report Module Update: New
questions added in January 2007. Retrieved February 29, 2008, from the BJS web
site at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/ProgressReport.html
5 For further information, see: Rossi, P.H., M.W. Lipsey, and H.E. Freeman (2003).
Evaluation: A Systematic Approach (7th ed.) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
6 Sherman, L.W., and R.A. Berk (1984). “The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest
for Domestic Assault.” American Sociological Review, 49, 261-272.
7 Ibid, note 4.
8 Ringwalt, C.L., J.M. Greene, S.T. Ennett, R. Iachan, R.R. Clayton, and C.G. Leu-
kefeld (1994). Past and Future Directions of the D.A.R.E. Program: An Evaluation
Review. Draft Final Report, September 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. Retrieved February
26, 2008, from the NCJRS web site at: http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/darerev.txt ; for
a review, see: Gottfredson, D.C. (1998). “School-based Crime Prevention” (Ch. 5). In
Sherman, L.W., D.C. Gottfredson., D. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter, and S. Bushway
(eds.), What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising: A Report to the United States
Congress. Prepared for the National Institute of Justice [Online]. Retrieved February
26, 2008, from the NCJRS web site at: http://www.ncjrs.org/docfiles/wholedoc
9 Office of Justice Programs (2006). Financial Guide. U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, Office of the Comptroller. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. Retrieved February 29, 2008, from the OJP web site
at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/financialguide/finguide2006
10 See Chapter 2 for discussion of different types of stakeholders.
11 SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics (2003).
Drug Court Monitoring, Evaluation, and Management Information Systems: National
Scope Needs Assessment (NCJ 195077). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance. Retrieved February 26, 2008,
from the NCJRS web site at: http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/195077

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ccdo/ws/welcome.html

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/ProgressReport.html

http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/darerev.txt

http://www.ncjrs.org/docfiles/wholedoc

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/financialguide/finguide2006

http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/195077

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CHAPTER 7
Evaluating Outcomes
219
C H A P T E R O U T L I N E
The evidence-based paradigm. Recently, we have seen widespread
adoption of a new normative value: that criminal and juvenile
justice systems should implement programs that have been proven
through rigorous evaluation research to be effective.
Types of evaluation. Impact, performance, and efficiency. Is the
program or policy achieving its objectives, how do outcomes change
over time, and is it worth the investment of resources devoted to its
implementation? Additionally, meta-analysis combines the results
of many individual program evaluations to determine if different
intervention approaches or methods work better than others.
Two prerequisites for evaluation must be met. (1) Objectives must
be clearly defined and measurable, and (2) the intervention must
be sufficiently well designed and well implemented.
Evaluability assessment and logic modeling. These are two methods
for examining the components of a program in preparation for evalu-
ation. Both methods also help clarify program and policy designs.
Develop outcome measures based on objectives. Good outcome
measures should be valid and reliable.
Identify potential confounding factors (factors other than the
intervention that may have biased observed outcomes). Common
confounding factors include biased selection, biased attrition,
and history. There are three major techniques for minimizing
confounding effects: (1) random assignment, (2) nonequivalent
comparison groups, and (3) propensity score analysis.
Specify the research design to be used. Examples include: the simple
pre-post design; the pre-post design with a control group; the pre-
post design with multiple pretests; the longitudinal design with
treatment and control groups; and the cohort design.
Identify users and uses of evaluation results. Who is the intended
audience, and how can results be effectively and efficiently com-
municated? How will the results be used?

220 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Now the time has come to measure the impact of the intervention:
Has the program or policy achieved its intended effect(s)? How can we
tell? The goal at this stage is to develop a research design for measuring
program or policy outcomes (a specific, intended change in the problem,
defined by objectives). Did the program or policy achieve its intended
objectives? Why or why not?
In spite of how obvious the need for evaluation may seem, many
programs and policies have never been evaluated. Cost is often given
as a reason for not conducting evaluations, but we must also recognize
that evaluation can be threatening to stakeholders because their public
image, political power, and/or agency budget is linked to the success
or failure of a specific program or policy. Sometimes not evaluating is
an effective means of avoiding accountability.
Increasingly, however, funding agencies are demanding accountabil-
ity for outcomes. Grants made to public and private agencies by federal
agencies such as the National Institute of Justice typically require an
evaluation component, and often an independent researcher must do
the evaluation. In the fields of health and mental health, managed care
agencies carefully measure outcomes and costs in order to ensure that
the money they manage is being used effectively. This kind of thinking
is making its way into the criminal justice system.
Remember, when we construct objectives, we identify a result and
a criterion (standard for measurement) for each objective (Chapter 3).
These objectives become the focus of evaluation.
The Evidence-Based Paradigm
Recently, we have seen widespread adoption of a new normative value:
that criminal and juvenile justice systems should implement programs that
have been proven through rigorous evaluation research to be effective.
This process of replicating proven program designs implies that existing
programs that are ineffective are being replaced by programs that have
been tested and found to work. The term “evidence-based” is now part of
the language of policymaking, and several organizations are working hard
to promote the use of these proven program designs, particularly in the
areas of juvenile justice and behavioral health. These sources include:
• National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice (NCMHJJ):
Evidence-based practices are defined as interventions that involve
standardized treatment and that have been shown through con-
trolled evaluation research to produce improved outcomes across
multiple research groups. Evidence-based practices suggested by
NCMHJJ include: Multi-systemic Therapy (MST), Brief Strategic
Family Therapy (BSFT), and Therapeutic Foster care (see http://
www.ncmhjj.com).

http://www.ncmhjj.com

http://www.ncmhjj.com

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 221
• Blueprints for Violence Prevention (BVP): BVP, a project devel-
oped by the University of Colorado at Boulder, with funding from
the Colorado Division of Criminal Justice, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime
and Delinquency, and Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP), has researched programs that are considered
“model programs” as well as “promising programs” based on
the following criteria: evidence of deterrent effect with a strong
research design, sustained effects, and multiple-site replication.
Programs identified by BVP include Multisystemic Therapy (MST),
Functional Family Therapy (FFT), and Aggression Replacement
Therapy (ART) (see http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints).
• OJJDP: The Model Programs Guide (MPG) was developed by
OJJDP to assist practitioners and communities in implementing
evidence-based prevention and implementation programs. OJJDP
uses a rating system based on the evaluation of the literature of
specific prevention and intervention programs based on four cri-
teria: the conceptual framework of the program; program fidelity;
the evaluation design; and empirical evidence demonstrating the
prevention or reduction of problem behavior, the reduction of risk
factors related to problem behavior, or the enhancement of protec-
tive factors related to problem behavior. Model programs include:
Cognitive Behavioral Treatment (CBT), Functional Family Therapy
(FFT), and Wraparound Case Management (see http://dsgonline.
com/mpg2.5/mpg_index.htm).
Types of Evaluation
Before you define what kind of evaluation data to collect, it is
important to know about different approaches to evaluation. First, we
need to be clear about the kinds of evaluative questions we are going
to ask before designing the evaluation. Evaluations of programs and
policies typically take one of three major approaches: (1) impact assess-
ment, (2) continuous evaluation, or (3) efficiency analysis.
Note that we do not intend (or pretend) in this chapter to cover
evaluation methods in all their complexity.1 We do intend that readers
should become familiar with some basic concepts necessary to under-
stand evaluation. We will not attempt to teach students or practitioners
how to design their own measures in this book; that is a task for a good
course in research methods.
Impact Evaluation
The most common type of evaluation, and the type we focus on
mainly in this chapter, is an impact evaluation. To assess impact, we

http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints

http://dsgonline

222 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
want to compare actual outcomes to desired outcomes (objectives). In
order to do this, we will need valid measures of the desired outcomes
and information about the status of clients on these measures prior to
their exposure to the intervention. For example, the fact that a high
proportion of clients of a delinquency prevention program end the pro-
gram with high self-esteem is meaningless if they started the program
with high self-esteem. It is not sufficient to know simply that a change
occurred: we need to determine whether the program or policy in ques-
tion caused the observed change. We need to know that this change
wouldn’t have happened without the intervention. To know this, we
will also need information on similar types of persons who were not
exposed to the intervention. If the same change occurred in this second
group, then we are unable to attribute the change to the intervention.
We may also be interested in long-term effects of a program. Recidi-
vism, for example, is not something we measure prior to the program,
but is a result of changes that the program is designed to bring about
(e.g. increased attachments to other, improved anger control, or aca-
demic achievement). In order to assess the impact of a program on a
long-term outcome, we need a comparison group of persons that did not
receive the program. If recidivism among those who attended the pro-
gram is no different from the comparison group, and the two groups are
identical in terms of those characteristics believed to be associated with
recidivism, then we have evidence that the program does not work.
Performance Evaluation: Outcome-based
Information Systems
One weakness of many impact evaluations is that their results are
limited to a specific point in time. Programs, in particular, are constantly
changing in terms of their staff, clients, services, and goals. Staff turnover,
intervention fads, changes in the political environment, and changes in
the characteristics of incoming clients can all produce changes in program
outcomes. The results of even the best-designed impact evaluation gradu-
ally become obsolete. Performance evaluation offers an alternative: why
not collect and analyze outcome information on all clients on a perma-
nent basis? This way, stakeholders could learn from the outcome data,
make adjustments, and see the consequences of their responses over time.
The growth of computerized information systems within criminal justice
is making this approach increasingly viable and useful.
This incremental learning process incorporates much of what we
talked about in the last chapter with regard to monitoring, but the focus
is on improving outcomes rather than assessing the adequacy of imple-
mentation. Moreover, this interactive approach to evaluation incor-
porates the concept of “action research” that was introduced by Kurt

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 223
Lewin (see Chapter 2). In terms of design, an outcome-based information
system is a multiple cohort design (see the section called “Specify the
Research Design” in this chapter) in which the outcomes for each cohort
(a specific group of clients) can be compared as a trend over time.
Let’s add one more step to this idea: such a system of learning is
even stronger when outcome information is monitored in an entire
system of programs. For example, a city or state could monitor specific
outcome data on all programs that serve a specific population of clients,
such as drug offenders or juvenile delinquents. With this information,
comparisons of programs over time generate more information about
why certain outcomes are being produced. The control group is not
made up of clients who receive no services, but very similar clients (a
matched control group) who receive different services.
Computerized information systems are increasingly common within
criminal justice. Although the focus of such systems is typically on man-
agement needs—for example, personnel, finance, and case control—
client-specific outcome information can easily be added to enhance the
capacity of the organization to assess a program or policy’s success.
Efficiency Evaluations
Lastly, we may want to know how efficient a given program or
policy is. Two types of analyses are useful for this purpose: cost-benefit
and cost-effectiveness analyses. In cost-benefit analysis, we ask if the
amount of change that is being produced (the benefit) is worth the cost
(usually in monetary terms). Cost-effectiveness analyses, in contrast,
express outcomes in substantive terms so as to compare programs and
policies that produce similar outcomes. In this case we are viewing
programs or policies as competitors, using both cost and outcomes as
criteria for judging relative benefit.
For example, let’s look at a three-month school-based curriculum
for teaching problem-solving skills to eighth graders determined to be
at high risk for delinquency. If desired changes are taking place, then
various measures of benefit can be established (e.g., a unit increase in
problem-solving skills as measured by a standardized test; the number of
children who avoid any subsequent arrest up to age 18). The costs, some
of which may be less obvious than others, must now be accurately mea-
sured. For example, how much money did it cost to buy course materi-
als (notebooks, videos, etc.) and train classroom teachers to administer
the curriculum? Was there a cost in terms of what students didn’t get
(e.g., a reduction in mathematics or science training to make way for
the problem-solving skills curriculum)? We may then compare the dif-
ference between total dollars saved by preventing each arrest (e.g., costs
of arresting, processing, charging, and supervising each adjudicated

224 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
delinquent), and dollars expended on operating the problem-solving
skills curriculum. In other words, we calculate ratios of costs to ben-
efits. A moderate gain at a low cost may often signal a more worthwhile
program than a slightly higher gain at a much more substantial cost. A
cost-effectiveness analysis of the same program might estimate the total
dollars spent to convert a cohort of delinquents into nondelinquents,
and then compare this approach with others that attempt to produce
similar outcomes (e.g., secure detention). We can then judge which
program is most efficient in producing desired outcomes.
We can also compare actual costs against projected costs: an “effi-
cient” program might be one that came in on budget or under budget,
but produced a tangible benefit. In many cases, the costs of achieving
the same level of benefit can be compared across different programs,
policies, or even settings. Efficiency analyses, therefore, can provide
valuable information to assist stakeholders and policymakers in making
choices from among competing programs, policies, and projects.
Exactly how specific costs and benefits should be defined, how-
ever, is a matter of some controversy, and procedures for conducting
efficiency analyses tend to be quite complex. For all three types of
evaluation, we expect our readers to be aware of why, how, and where
such analyses are used, but their actual conduct requires sophisticated
training and expertise. This is particularly true of efficiency analyses.2
Meta-Analysis
Although an impact evaluation can tell us about the success or
failure of a particular program, we can’t be sure what components of
the program are causing the observed outcomes. Most programs pro-
vide several discrete activities, such as group counseling, recreation,
behavioral contracting, and education. How can we be sure which of
these activities or which combination of activities is causing success?
Of course, programs are more than activities: there are other clients
attending the program, the staff, the facility, and the management of
the organization providing the program. All of these program charac-
teristics can affect a client’s experience in a program, and consequently
affect program outcomes.
In order to discover whether certain treatment approaches work,
researchers like Mark Lipsey3 and Paul Gendreau4 have made use of
a statistical method that allows us to examine alternative causes of
program outcomes. Often selecting only those evaluations that are
well designed, meaning that the study used an experimental or suitable
quasi-experimental design, meta-analysis involves calculating the size
of the difference between those that received the intervention and those
that did not in each study, called an “effect size,” and then combining

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 225
these effect sizes across different studies into one measure of the impact
of the treatment approach.5
To date, meta-analyses have found that behavioral and cogni-
tive-behavioral methods are more effective for delinquent youths than
various types of client-centered, nondirective therapies.6 For adult cor-
rectional treatment, cognitive-behavioral and behavioral approaches
work better than other treatments. Intensive prison drug treatment
appears to be effective, especially when combined with community
aftercare. Education, vocational training, and prison labor programs
have modest effects. The effects of sex offender treatment are uncertain.
Findings of meta-analyses, we caution, are often limited by method-
ological weaknesses of the studies analyzed (e.g., selection bias), a lack
of detailed information about the subjects and the treatment, and/or
questionable implementation or program fidelity.7
Two Prerequisites for Evaluation
Before actually evaluating a program or policy, two main criteria
(prerequisites) must be satisfied. If either prerequisite is not met, any
attempt at evaluation is likely to be unsuccessful, and the results will
be unconvincing. Indeed, an entire methodology called “evaluability
assessment”8 has been developed to address these critical concerns.
Evaluability Assessment
Under those circumstances in which we are intending to evaluate
an existing intervention, it is often advisable to first examine the pro-
gram or policy to determine what aspects of the intervention can be
measured. It may be that a program has clearly articulated goals but
Figure 7.1
Two Prerequisites for Evaluation
1. Program or policy objectives must have been clearly specified, and those
objectives must be measurable (see Chapter 3).
2. The intervention should have been sufficiently well designed (see Chapter
4) and sufficiently well-implemented so that there is no question that its
critical elements (activities) have been delivered to clients as planned.
Remember, this is why you do monitoring: to find out whether the “pro-
gram or policy in action” matches the “program or policy on paper” (see
Chapter 6).

226 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
has not completed the task of creating measurable objectives. If one
program goal is to see an improvement in offenders’ perceptions of
their opportunities for the future, how will the program know if these
perceptions have changed? It may also be the case that different pro-
gram staff members have different opinions regarding the program’s
goals. To the extent that these differences exist, the evaluation may be
targeting the wrong objectives.
An evaluability assessment is a method for uncovering actual pro-
gram components and isolating those elements that can be measured.9
This evaluable model of the program is the program that is tested in
the evaluation. Any program elements that cannot be measured are put
aside. The assessment typically involves reading written documents that
describe the program, interviewing administrators and line staff mem-
bers, reading case files, and even interviewing program clients. Each of
these sources of information is queried as to program goals and objec-
tives, program activities, impact models, program resources, planning
mechanisms, and areas in which change is needed. The result of the
evaluability study is a single program model that is then reviewed by
program administrators and staff for accuracy. The model often forces
program personnel to confront their differences and for the first time
achieve consensus regarding important facets of their program.
Logic Modeling
You will recall from Chapter 3 that an impact model links an
intervention to the causes of a problem, and the cause of the problem
to the problem itself (see Figure 7.3). The logic of the model is that the
intervention will change the causes of the problem in order to affect
the problem. When we evaluate interventions, it is often useful to map
out the logic of the program or policy. These maps, which are actually
drawn on a page, are called logic models. Logic models are a concise
way to see how a program is designed.
The logic model summarizes the main components of the program
and shows how the activities of the program are related both to the
program’s objectives and to measurable outcomes. An example of
a logic model is shown in Figure 7.2.10 A logic model can be used
both to communicate effectively with stakeholders the intent of the
program or policy and its underlying strategy, and it can provide a
framework for designing an evaluation. It makes clear the outcomes
that should and can be measured in order to test the effectiveness of
the intervention.

C
H
A
P
T
E
R 7 •
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V
A
L
U
A
T
IN
G O
U
T
C
O
M
E
S
227
PROBLEM SUBPROBLEM(S) ACTIVITIES OUTPUT MEASURES OUTCOME MEASURES
Short-Term Long-Term
What general
problem is this
innovation
designed to
address? In the
case of prisoner
reentry, we
might identify
the number of
parolees that
return to prison
due to new
offenses and
parole violations.
What does this
program do?
For example,
does it provide
employment
support services
to inmates who
are returning to
the community
after a period
in prison? Such
services might
include voca-
tional training,
team building,
how to interview
for a job, and
job placement.Relevant goals
would be to
prevent recidi-
vism, prevent
reincarceration,
and increase
the likelihood
of successful
community
reintegration.
Here we specify
the problems
that will be
affected by
implementation
of this program
or policy?
Inmates, for
example, may fail
to adjust to life
in the community
because of their
inability to find
employment.
These are measure-
able outcomes,
such as improved
vocational and
job-seeking skills,
and job placement.
What does the
program produce?
For example,
how many
returning inmates
are served by the
program each
month? How
many hours of
job preparation
training does
each parolee
receive? How
many parolees
were placed in
jobs compared
to the number
needing jobs.
These are results
measured quanti-
tatively at the end
of the program.
They are initial
program results.
The program, for
example, might
measure changes
in knowledge,
attitudes and
awareness, as
well as success in
obtaining
employment.
These are changes
in behavior and
decisionmaking
measured quanti-
tatively several
months after the
end of the program.
These measures
relate directly to
the goals of the
program. For
example, we
might want to
measure recidi-
vism, whether
or not inmates
are returned to
prison within the
first year after
program partici-
pation, and
success in
maintaining
employment.
Goal(s) Objective(s)
Figure 7.2
Logic Model

228 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Why Develop a Logic Model?
Logic models have numerous uses and benefits. A logic model can
be used for at least four different purposes:
1. Strategic and Program Planning—Developing a logic model is a
form of strategic planning. The process forces you to identify your
vision, the rationale behind your program, and how your program
will work. This process is also a good way to get a variety of
program stakeholders involved in program planning and to build
consensus on the program’s design and operations.
2. Effective Communications—Logic models allow you to provide a
snapshot view of your program and intended outcomes to funders,
staff, policymakers, the media, or other colleagues. They are particu-
larly useful for funding proposals as a way to show that what you are
doing is strategic, and that you have a plan for being accountable.
3. Evaluation Planning—A logic model provides the basic frame-
work for an evaluation. It identifies the outcomes you are aiming
for—based on your program’s design—and puts those outcomes
in measurable terms.
4. Continuous Learning and Improvement—A completed logic model
provides a point of reference against which progress toward achieve-
ment of desired outcomes can be measured on an ongoing basis.
Develop Outcome Measures
To develop outcome measures, refer back to objectives. How will
we adequately measure these objectives? Remember that an adequate
objective contains four components (see Chapter 3): time frame, target
population, a key result, and a criterion for measurement. We are try-
ing to determine whether a specific intervention (program or policy)
produces an intended change in the problem. Recall from Chapter 3
that an impact model specifies such a prediction or hypothesis.
Establishing the impact of a program amounts to establishing cau-
sality. In other words, we want to determine whether the intervention
produces a specific effect, an intended change in the problem. To do so,
we need adequate measures, and an adequate research design.
The validity of a measure refers to the degree to which any mea-
sure or procedure succeeds in doing (measuring) what it purports to
do. Most experts refer to this type of validity as construct validity. In
other words, how can you tell whether your measure actually assesses
the construct or concept that it is supposed to assess?
For example, we might be using a measure of self-esteem, such as the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale,11 or we might be using a measure of self-

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 229
reported drug use, such as the National Survey on Drug Use and Health.12
The question is: How accurate is each measure? Is it a good indicator of
the construct you are trying to measure? These questions are often inves-
tigated through research that attempts to demonstrate that the measure
relates to some known indicator of the same concept. We might measure
a student’s self-esteem, and then correlate self-ratings with ratings from
that student’s friends and family members. We want to see if there is a
relationship between our measure and some other indicator of the same
concept. Or, we might validate self-reported drug use with actual drug-
testing technology to determine if self-reports are under- or over-inflated.
Wherever possible, we try to use existing measures for which previous
research has indicated reasonable evidence of validity.
The reliability of a measure refers to its consistency. For example,
what is the probability of obtaining the same results upon repeated
use of the same measuring instrument (i.e., test-retest reliability)? We
want to be sure that the measure is somewhat consistent over time,
and that results don’t vary dramatically from one time to the next.
For example, self-esteem is seen as a relatively stable personality trait.
Any reliable measure should not yield wildly disparate results about a
person’s self-esteem from one week to the next. Attempts to establish
reliability of a self-report measure such as self esteem usually examine,
through research, the internal consistency of the items in a measure (i.e.,
do items correlate with one another), or relationships between scores
obtained from two or more separate administrations of the same test.
Identify Potential Confounding Factors
Establishing the impact of a program, as we noted above, amounts
to an attempt to establish causality. Did the intervention produce an
observed change in the problem? Before we look at a few basic research
designs, we need to discuss confounding factors (sometimes called
confounds). These refer to any factors, other than your program, that
may account for observed changes on the outcome measure (e.g., an
increase or decrease in the problem). Confounding factors bias the
measurement of program outcomes. In research design textbooks, these
confounding factors are often labeled threats to the internal validity of
the experiment.
Biased selection is one common confound of which to be careful. In
many criminal justice interventions, especially offender treatment and
post-release programs, researchers view reducing recidivism as a pri-
mary objective. However, upon close inspection of many interventions,
we often find out that many of the clients who were selected to receive
the treatment weren’t high-risk to begin with. If youths in a delinquency
prevention program had no observable risk factors at the start—such

230 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
as previous arrests, truancy, academic failure, or family problems—it is
not surprising if such youths, upon graduation from the program, show
a low rate of recidivism. Does this mean that the intervention worked?
Or does it mean that client selection was so biased that we have no way
of knowing whether the program actually works?
When we refer to confounding factors, we are saying that something
else (other than the intervention itself) may have caused the observed
change in the problem, or something may have disrupted (“con-
founded”) the way we measured a change in the problem. Confounding
factors introduce bias into our measurement of outcomes. You need to
anticipate potential confounds and design your evaluation to minimize
them. The evaluation of each and every intervention should address
potential confounds. Here are three of the most typical confounds:
1. Biased selection: Systematic bias in client selection procedures
results in the treatment group not including adequate numbers of
clients with demonstrated needs or problems. Sometimes called
“creaming,” this problem occurs when a program deliberately or
unknowingly selects those clients most likely to show a favorable
outcome, rather than those clients most in need of the interven-
tion. For example, many private drug treatment programs claim
phenomenal rates of success, but we often find that they have
limited their client selection to those with the least severe prob-
lems. In other words, clients most in need were not selected, and
our suspicions are further aroused if there was no control group
against which to compare program outcomes. We have no faith
whatsoever in such results.
2. Biased attrition: Bias is introduced into the outcome measure
because subjects dropped out of one comparison group at higher
rates than subjects in other comparison groups. For example, it is
a common difficulty in drug treatment programs that those with
the most severe problems drop out before the end of program.
The observed result is that those who remained in the treatment
program had lower rates of relapse than similar subjects in a con-
trol group. The result is biased, however, because the treatment
program lost those subjects who were most likely to show the
highest rates of relapse.
3. History: Some unanticipated event, occurring between the begin-
ning and the end of the intervention, introduces bias into the mea-
surement of program objectives. For example, if a major change
in a state’s law regarding domestic violence occurred during the
course of a mandatory arrest experiment, the new law, rather than
the intervention, might explain the observed result of increased
arrests for spousal abuse.

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 231
Example 7.1
Potential Confounds in the
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment13 has been criticized for
potential confounding factors. Some suggest that we cannot adequately deter-
mine from this experiment whether a mandatory arrest policy works better
than mediation or separation. One measure used was a follow-up interview
with victims to ask about victimization following the police intervention. Vic-
tims were interviewed immediately after the intervention, then every two weeks
for 24 weeks. Researchers reported a decrease in the problem, as measured by
fewer victim reports of repeat abuse. Of couples that received the mandatory
arrest intervention, only 19 percent of victims reported further abuse in the
follow-up study, compared to repeat abuse rates of 33 percent and 37 percent,
respectively, in the separation and mediation interventions.
Here is the difficulty: what if women were scared to report further inci-
dents of abuse because they had been threatened or beaten by their spouse
following the previous police intervention (arrest, mediation, or separation)?
Sherman and Berk reported that a substantial number of victims in their sam-
ple dropped out of the study. Initial interviews with victims were completed
in only 62 percent of all cases. Others couldn’t be found, or they refused to
be interviewed. Biweekly interviews were completed for only 49 percent of
subjects in the original sample. The study may have lost many of those who
were victims of repeat abuse following the experiment.
Sherman and Berk reported that of those victims who they actually con-
tacted, there was no “differential” attrition (i.e., the victim dropout rate for
the experiment was about the same for each of the three interventions).14 How-
ever, we have no way of knowing how many of those not contacted actually
experienced further abuse. Critics expressed doubts about the experimental
results because of this potential confound.15 In addition, attempts to replicate
the results of the Minneapolis experiment in other jurisdictions have not been
very successful.16
In summary, it is not entirely clear that the intervention (mandatory arrest)
was responsible for the observed results (a decrease in reported incidents of
abuse). We cannot completely rule out the possibility that the results were
biased due to the attrition (dropping out) of more than half of the original
subjects. We are suspicious that those victims who refused to be interviewed
in the follow-up study might have been more likely to experience further
victimization than those who agreed to be interviewed. The observed reduc-
tion in repeated incidents of abuse may be due to the fact that victims who
dropped out of the experiment were afraid to report further incidents of abuse
to police or interviewers.

232 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Major Techniques for
Minimizing Confounding Effects
There are three major techniques for minimizing confounding
effects: (1) random assignment, (2) nonequivalent comparison groups,
and (3) propensity score analysis. Each involves creating a comparison
group: a different group of clients that is equivalent to the treatment
group on any factors that might influence the outcome measure, such
as recidivism, but doesn’t receive the intervention.
Random Assignment
Random assignment means that researchers randomly assign eligible
clients to separate treatment and control groups. This is not the same as
random selection, which would make absolutely no sense whatsoever.
Students often have a hard time keeping these two concepts separate.
As a sampling strategy, one might randomly select subjects to partici-
pate in a survey or opinion poll. The purpose would be to obtain a
representative, random sample of the population. In contrast, nobody
would ever randomly select clients for an intervention; they would
instead determine who is eligible for the program, and who needs the
program. Once the eligible pool of clients is determined, they might then
randomly assign subjects to the treatment and control groups. Clients
in any intervention are not randomly selected; they are deliberately
selected on the basis of need and eligibility. Once selected, they might
be randomly assigned to treatment or control groups.
What random assignment does, in theory, is equalize two different
groups on unknown differences (e.g., intelligence, previous criminal
history, etc.) that might bias the outcome results. With a large enough
sample, the chances of equally distributing characteristics of subjects
across the treatment and control groups is very good. This is the best
method for dealing with confounds, when possible. For ethical and
practical reasons, however, random assignment is not always possible.
In many social interventions, those most in need of the intervention
must be selected, and randomization would be unfair or even unethical
(see the example at the end of this chapter).
Nonequivalent Comparison Groups
Often we cannot randomly assign subjects to treatment and control
groups, but we can attempt to construct treatment and comparison
groups made up of clients with similar characteristics. It is especially

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMESS 233
important that the two groups are similar in terms of their level of
need, and in terms of characteristics that might influence the outcome
of interest (e.g., recidivism). We must decide with care exactly which
factors might be important to control for. We usually look to previous
research to determine important variables. We might then attempt to
create matched control groups, so that average client characteristics are
distributed relatively equally across the two groups (aggregate match-
ing), or so that every client in the treatment group is matched one-to-
one with a similar nonclient in the control group (individual matching).
Aggregate matching is much easier than individual matching, unless one
is dealing with an extremely large pool of eligible clients. Individual
matching is more precise, but we lose a very large number of poten-
tial cases as we try to match individuals rather than groups on a large
number of variables. For example, we may be measuring recidivism
as a program outcome. It would be important to match our treatment
and control groups on variables known to influence recidivism, such
as previous criminal behavior, age of offender, employment and job
skills, and so on.
Propensity Score Analysis
Recent evaluation studies have illustrated that it is possible to
identify comparison groups when random assignment is not possible,
using methods that control for naturally occurring differences between
the treatment and comparison groups. A method known as propensity
scoring allows researchers to estimate treatment effects by collapsing
variables known to be associated with the decision to place individuals
into the program into a single score, and controlling for that score.17
This creates comparison and treatment groups that can be considered
comparable on all known covariates that are believed to be related
to the outcomes of interest. Propensity score analysis approximates a
randomized control trial by matching subjects on a single score that
represents all known factors that may have been associated with their
being assigned to the program being evaluated.
Specify the Research Design
In this section, we attempt to acquaint readers with a few of the
most basic research designs used to evaluate program impacts. In gen-
eral, such designs specify when and how measures will be collected to
assess program impact. Each involves comparisons of certain groups of
subjects, and measurement on specific variables, over particular time

234 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
periods, to evaluate outcome. We will diagram and describe several of
the most commonly used research designs.
You might want to think of an example as you go through the
diagrams and descriptions of different research designs. Imagine, for
example, a six-week prevention program designed for adolescents at
high risk of abusing drugs. The program attempts to raise youths’
self-esteem. The program’s rationale is that increasing self-esteem is a
means of increasing one’s ability to make independent decisions without
being unduly influenced by one’s peers. In order to measure change in
self-esteem, a self-report self-esteem instrument such as the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale is used.18
The Simple Pretest-Posttest Design
The Simple Pretest-Posttest Design (see Figure 7.4) is an easy-to-
use design, but it is not a good one. Because there is no comparison or
control group, we cannot adequately determine whether the program
or some other unmeasured influence (confounding factor) produced
the observed change from O1 to O2. How do we know, for example,
if self-esteem wouldn’t have increased (or decreased) even without the
intervention? How do these clients compare to a similar group who
didn’t receive the intervention?
Figure 7.3
Legend For Diagrams of Research Designs
In each of the diagrams below:
“X” represents the intervention or “treatment”
“O” represents the observation or measure
“PRE” refers to a pre-intervention observation, and
“POST” refers to a post-treatment observation
Figure 7.4
The Simple Pretest-Posttest Design
O1 X O2
PRE TREATMENT POST
PASSAGE OF TIME

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 235
The Pretest-Posttest Design with Control Group
The Pretest-Posttest with Control Group (see Figure 7.5) is a much
better design than the simple pretest-posttest design. A control group
gives us some means of comparing initial measures with later measures.
If the two groups are relatively equivalent on variables likely to influ-
ence the outcome measure, we can compare the outcomes observed for
the two groups to evaluate program impact. If change in the outcome
measure for the treatment group is significantly better than change on
the same measure for the comparison group,, we have evidence that the
program is effective.
The Pretest-Posttest Design with Multiple Pretests
The Pretest-Posttest Design with Multiple Pretests (see Figure 7.6)
is a slight improvement over the pretest-posttest with control group
design. It gives us a better assessment of clients’ and nonclients’ con-
dition before treatment. This design allows us to obtain a baseline of
Figure 7.5
The Pretest-Posttest Design with Control Group
O1 X O2 (treatment group)
O1 O2 (control group)
PRE TREATMENT POST
PASSAGE OF TIME
Figure 7.6
The Pretest-Posttest Design with Multiple Pretests
O1 O2 O3 X O4 (treatment group)
O1 O2 O3 O4 (control group)
PRE TREATMENT POST
PASSAGE OF TIME

236 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
behavior or attitudes for each group before the intervention begins. A
baseline is always preferable to a one-shot (cross-sectional) assessment
of pre-intervention characteristics. This is valuable because it gives us
a much better indication of how stable or unstable the specific behav-
ior we might be interested in is, and whether treatment or comparison
groups differ in their baselines prior to treatment. In Figure 7.6, you
can see that the design calls for separate but identical assessments of
the outcome measure before treatment begins.
The Longitudinal Design with Treatment
and Control Groups
The Longitudinal Design with Treatment and Control Groups (see
Figure 7.7) is the most favorable design, but it tends to be expensive,
takes a long time, and is difficult to conduct. It is the most favorable
because it gives us a baseline for both the treatment and control groups,
both before and after the intervention begins. With this design, we
measure the outcome at several points after the treatment has ended in
order to be certain that our outcome results are stable.
Figure 7.7
The Longitudinal Design with Treatment and Control Groups
O1 O2 O3 X O4 O5 O6 O7 (treatment group)
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 (control group)
PRE TREATMENT POST
PASSAGE OF TIME
Figure 7.8
The Cohort Design
O1 X O2 (1997-98 Cohort)
O1 O2 (1996-97 Cohort)
PRE TREATMENT POST
PASSAGE OF TIME

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 237
The Cohort Design
When it is difficult to actually assign clients to treatment and
control groups, the evaluator may decide to use a Cohort Design (see
Figure 7.8), which uses similar groups of people who go through the
same system or experience but at different times. One cohort gets the
intervention program, the other cohort (the control group) doesn’t. This
design is often used for school studies. For example, you’ve identified
the ninth grade in one school as a group particularly vulnerable to
experimentation with drugs, but still “reachable.” The following steps
might be taken to set up a cohort design.
1. Measure self-reported drug use of the ninth-grade class in 2009-
2010.
2. At the beginning of the next school year (2010-2011), you start a
drug awareness education program in the new ninth grade.
3. At the end of the school year (2010-2011), you measure the level
of drug use in this second cohort.
4. You determine whether drug use is lower in the second group
(the 2010-2011 cohort) than the first cohort (2009-2010), the
one that didn’t receive the program. This design assumes that all
other conditions in the school (e.g., funding, security measures)
have remained relatively constant from one year to the next.
Identify Users and Uses of Evaluation Results
Who will be interested in the results of this evaluation, and how
will they use the information? If any evaluation is to be useful, it should
serve the information needs of the program or policy and its stakehold-
ers (see Chapter 2). Major stakeholders include the funding agency, but
any intervention has multiple stakeholders such as citizens, politicians,
criminal justice officials, volunteers, targets, and so on. The time spent
previously (at Stage 1) identifying stakeholders should not be wasted.
Evaluation is a critical means of demonstrating accountability, and
hopefully, effectiveness, to stakeholders.
Typical evaluation uses are the expansion and replication of suc-
cessful programs and policies, elimination of unsuccessful ones, and an
investment in developing promising programs. Evaluation results can be
used solely to make judgments about programs and policies, or they can
become part of a process of continuous improvement. In the latter case,
changes are made to the program that are thought to improve chances
of better results, and then this revised program design is retested.

238 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
The change agent should develop plans and assign responsibility for
packaging and communicating evaluation results to different users. It is
particularly important to find means of communication that different
audiences can understand. Even at academic conferences, for instance,
many eyes in the audience glaze over when a presenter puts up over-
heads cluttered with complicated statistical results. If the results are
to be useful, and used, one must create means of communication that
intended audiences could understand and react to. Stakeholders must be
able to participate in a dialogue with the report writer or presenter.
D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S
1. What is meant by the term “evaluation”?
2. What are the main differences between performance and impact
evaluations?
3. How can an automated information system increase the availabil-
ity of evaluation data?
4. Define and describe an example of efficiency analysis.
5. What are the two prerequisites for evaluation? Explain.
6. What can we learn from developing a logic model?
7. Define: (a) reliability, and (b) validity.
8. (a) Define confounding factors. (b) Describe the three most com-
mon types of confounding factors.
9. Refer back to Example 7.1 (the Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment). How were confounding factors illustrated by this
example?
10. How does one minimize possible confounding effects in an evalu-
ation? Make sure you discuss the two major techniques.
11. How are intermediate and ultimate outcomes different?
12. Describe each of the following research designs: (a) simple pretest-
posttest, (b) pretest-posttest with a control group, (c) pretest-post-
test with multiple pretests, (d) longitudinal design with treatment
and control groups, and (e) cohort design.

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 239
EXERCISE 7.1
Your instructor may ask you to analyze a published evaluation study. One good
example is the Kansas City Gun Experiment summarized briefly in Chapter 1.19
Retrieve and read the article and answer the following questions: (a) What were
the program’s intended outcome objectives? (Hint: remember the distinction
between process versus outcome objectives: see Chapter 3). (b) To what degree,
if any, did the program achieve its intended outcome objectives? Give specific
examples and evidence from the article to support your answer.

240 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 7.1
Impact and Cost-benefit Analysis of the Maryland Reentry
Partnership Initiative1
John Roman, Lisa Brooks, Erica Lagerson, Aaron Chalfin, and Bogdan Tereshchenko
Instructions: Read the case study below, then answer the question that follows.
The Maryland Reentry Partnership is a coalition of organizations that
provide services to prisoners returning to three neighborhoods in Baltimore
City. These services include housing assistance, substance abuse treatment,
mental health counseling, education, and vocational training. The goals of
this Partnership are: (1) to increase public safety by reducing recidivism, (2) to
increase offender accountability for behavior and reparation to the community,
and (3) to increase the capacity of the correctional system to assess prisoner
needs and match services to those needs. Returning prisoners have needs that
can be subdivided into three categories: individual (medical, mental health, and
social), community (need for support networks and informal social controls),
and systems (information sharing and coordination among state corrections,
state probation and parole, the Mayor’s Office of Employment Development,
and the police department). The Partnership is designed to address all three
types of needs.
Qualified inmates are indentified about six months before release from
prison. The program is offered to those inmates who will be residing in one of
the three participating neighborhoods, thus participation is voluntary. Three
types of offenders are ineligible: those with outstanding warrants, those who
have been convicted of sex offenses, and those with convicted for offenses
against children.
Services are individualized, based on a needs assessment, and each partici-
pant has a case manager that links the prisoner to services. Participation can
last up to two years, but many inmates leave by choice prior to that time. They
can also be ejected from the program if there is a new arrest, a parole violation,
reincarceration, or a change of residence outside the targeted neighborhoods.
Ejected participants can be reinstated at a later point in time.
The evaluation research design was a quasi-experimental comparison
of program participants and inmates released to Baltimore neighborhoods
other than those targeted by the program. Since all but one of the program
participants were African-American men, all comparison subjects were also
African-American men. The final sample was constructed using propensity
score analysis. This involved assigning cases based on a score that reflected
the likelihood of their being admitted to the program if it had been offered
1 J. Roman, L. Brooks, E. Lagerson, A. Chalfin, and B. Tereshchenko (2007). Impact and Cost
Benefit Analysis of the Maryland Reentry Partnership. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, Justice
Policy Center.

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 241
Case Study 7.1, continued
to them. This sample selection resulted in 229 program participants and 370
in the comparison group. On average, the average age of both the treatment
and comparison groups was 37. All of the data analyzed were taken from
administrative databases of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services.
The cost-benefit data included estimates of reduced cost to crime victims and
reduced cost to public agencies, as well as the cost of delivering the program. The
Partnership program’s annual cost per inmate was $6,900. Cost savings can be
thought of in terms of fewer members of the community being victimized, fewer
parolees returning to prison, and fewer offenders on probation.
Recidivism was measured in terms of new arrests and new convictions, as
well as the frequency of new arrests and the amount of time between release
from prison and the first arrest. The analysis also controlled for age, prior
criminality, current offense, and the amount of time that had elapsed since
release from prison.
The evaluators found that the Partnership program produced a significant
reduction in recidivism: 77.6 percent of the comparison group and 72 per-
cent of the program participants recidivated. Other differences in recidivism
suggested a positive effect, but were not statistically significant. From a cost-
benefit perspective, the program produced a cost-benefit of $21,500 for each
participant. Most of the benefit was in reduced crime, with a savings of $7.2
million accruing to victims over three years, and a $3.5 million savings to the
justice system.
Questions
1. What program outcomes were measured by Roman and his col-
leagues?
2. How did these researchers account for confounding factors that
might bias observed outcomes?
3. Do you see any limitations to the cost-benefit argument?
Explain.

242 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 7.2
Evaluating Outcomes of
Community-Based Delinquency Prevention1
Instructions: Read the case study below, then answer the question that follows.
The Problem, Program Design, and Goals
To assess concerns of minority overrepresentation in the Pennsylvania
juvenile justice system, and to respond to changes in federal guidelines for
states participating in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP)
Formula Grant Program, the Minority Confinement Subcommittee of the Penn-
sylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) Juvenile Advisory
Committee concluded that some action could be taken to slow the entry or
reentry of minorities into the juvenile justice system, and they recommended
the development and support of community-based intervention activities. Five
programs were funded in Dauphin County (Harrisburg) beginning in 1991-92;
those programs concluded their third and final year of PCCD funding early
in 1994. It was expected that programs would obtain their own funding after
two and a half years of initial funding from PCCD.
All programs stressed the value of supervised activities to keep youths out
of trouble. All provided “life skills training,” which often included training in
problem-solving skills, conflict resolution, and cultural diversity and awareness
training. Most provided homework or tutoring assistance, structured recreation
and/or field trips, some form of career development or vocational training, and
community service. All programs, as requirements of their PCCD funding, had
two mandated goals: (1) to reduce future involvement with the juvenile justice
system, and (2) to improve school behavior and performance.
Research Design
We were contracted as evaluators quite some time after the programs began
operations, and agencies were already utilizing diverse referral sources. Because
neither randomization nor matched constructed control groups were possible,
our choices for forming comparison groups were limited. We had no control over
client selection and referrals, and referrals came from different sources (e.g., self
and family, probation, school, and police). Requirements of informed consent
also limited research design options. To gain access to inspect agency records
(e.g., police, probation, school) for individual program clients, we were required
1 Adapted from: Welsh, W.N., P.H. Jenkins, and P.W. Harris, (1997). Reducing Minority Over-
Representation in Juvenile Justice: Results of Community-Based Intervention in Pennsylvania,
1992-95. Philadelphia: Temple University, Department of Criminal Justice. See also: Welsh,
W.N., P.H. Jenkins, and P.W. Harris (1999). “Reducing Minority Over-representation in
Juvenile Justice: Results of Community-based Delinquency Prevention in Harrisburg.” Journal
of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 36, 87-110.

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 243
Case Study 7.2, continued
to obtain a release form signed by the client and a parent. As a result, a strict
“control” group was not possible (i.e., one that was identical to the intervention
group in all respects except that no treatment was delivered). It was not pos-
sible to obtain police and school records for nonclients unless they had already
granted consent but never subsequently participated in any of the programs.
Comparison groups were constructed on the basis of frequency of cli-
ent participation in the programs. Numerous studies have suggested that the
intensity of treatment (e.g., frequency of contacts; number of contact hours)
is one of the most crucial variables influencing the success of intervention,
including alcohol and other drug treatment and delinquency prevention.2 We
would expect that if a program works at all, a critical variable affecting client
outcome is treatment intensity or degree of exposure to the program. We were
aided by the fact that many of the clients referred to the programs signed a
release of information form, but they never attended the programs.
To determine the adequacy of these constructed comparison groups for each
cohort, we examined the possibility of biased selection (i.e., did the groups differ
on critical preselection variables that might affect the outcomes of interest?).
While our data allow us to examine group differences on numerous risk factors,
the most crucial factors to examine are those most likely to affect the dependent
variables. Recidivism, for example, is known to be related to previous delin-
quent activity and age (older juveniles are at greater risk of arrest and rearrest).
Sources of referral could potentially bias comparison groups (e.g., probation
referrals may be more likely to have been arrested than other referrals). For
analyses of school outcomes, it is advisable to examine possible preselection dif-
ferences that could influence educational outcomes (suspensions, truancy, and
core GPA). We also examined demographic factors that could have influenced
selection (e.g., ethnicity, family structure, parental employment).
We report results for two separate client groups in Harrisburg: those who
attended programs during the 1992-93 school year, and those who attended
programs during the 1993-94 school year.
The 1992-93 sample consisted of 187 clients. Our first comparison group
(the “control” group) was made up of 80 clients (43%) who never participated
in any program. The second comparison group was made up of 45 clients
(24%) who participated occasionally but accumulated less than 30 total pro-
gram hours over the 1992-93 school year. Our third comparison group was
made up of 62 clients (33%) who accumulated greater than 30 program hours
during the 1992-93 school year. The three groups did not differ significantly in
terms of prior arrests, gender, family structure, parental employment, previous
truancy, or prior suspensions. However, the comparison groups did differ in
terms of age (high attenders were slightly younger); referral source (probation
referrals had poorer attendance; self or family referrals had higher rates of
2 Palmer, T. (1992). The Re-Emergence of Correctional Intervention. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

244 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 7.2, continued
attendance); ethnicity (75% of the total sample were African American, but
Latino children were slightly overrepresented in the low- and high-attendance
groups); whether the student was promoted the previous school year; and aca-
demic performance the previous year (nonattenders had slightly lower grades
and were less likely to have been promoted). Because randomized assignment
of subjects to comparison groups was not possible, we cannot rule out the
possibility that comparison groups differed on other, unmeasured pre-inter-
vention variables related to the dependent variables of interest. For analyses
of recidivism and educational outcomes, we can be assured that factors of
most concern (prior arrests, suspensions, and truancy) do not contaminate the
results. All preselection factors that statistically differentiated the comparison
groups (e.g., age, referral source, ethnicity, previous school promotions, and
grades) were examined in statistical analyses as control variables.
In the 1993-94 sample, 97 clients were examined. Our first comparison group
(the “control” group) was made up of 32 students (33%) who never participated
in the programs. The second comparison group was made up of 31 clients (32%)
who participated occasionally, but accumulated less than 50 total program hours
over the 1993-94 school year. Our third comparison group was made up of 34
clients (34%) who accumulated greater than 50 program hours during the 1993-
94 school year. To determine the adequacy of these constructed comparison
groups, we examined the possibility of biased selection (i.e., did the groups dif-
fer on critical preselection variables that might affect the outcomes of interest?).
Upon intake, the three comparison groups did not differ significantly in terms
of prior arrests, age, gender, ethnicity, family structure, parental employment,
academic retention (92-93 SY), prior suspensions (92-93 SY), or core GPA (92-93
SY). The comparison groups did differ in terms of referral source (probation and
police referrals had poorer attendance; self or family referrals had higher rates of
attendance; referrals from human services had the highest rates of attendance);
and truancy the previous school year (nonattenders and low attenders had higher
rates of truancy than high attenders). Once again, because randomized assign-
ment of subjects to comparison groups was not possible, we cannot rule out the
possibility that comparison groups differed on other, unmeasured preselection
variables related to the dependent variables of interest. For analyses of recidi-
vism and educational outcomes, then, critical factors (prior arrests, age, previous
suspensions, previous grades) do not contaminate the results. All preselection
factors that differentiated the comparison groups (i.e., referral source, truancy)
were examined in statistical analyses as control variables.
Results
Recidivism. Results for the 1992-93 Harrisburg sample suggest that
programs had success in reducing recidivism for high-risk clients. The rate of
recidivism over a three-year period for the high-attendance group (25.8%) was

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 245
Case Study 7.2, continued
impressive, especially considering that nearly half of these clients had previous
arrests prior to their referral. In contrast, the control group had a recidivism
rate of 53 percent for the same period.
Recidivism results for the 1993-94 Harrisburg sample were less positive.
The rate of recidivism over a two-year period for the high-attendance group
(23.5%) was satisfactory, but nearly the same proportion (about one-fourth)
of these clients had previous arrests prior to their referral. A prior arrest, then,
rather than programmatic intervention, was the strongest influence of recidi-
vism. Compared to the previous year (1992-93), programs in 1993-94 targeted
clients who were much younger and much less likely to have previous arrests.
Academic Performance. Impacts on academic performance were somewhat
disappointing, although missing data resulted in smaller samples than desirable
for multivariate tests. For both the 1992-93 and 1993-94 samples, Harrisburg
programs had no significant effects on academic performance. For the 1993-94
sample, academic performance either remained stable or declined slightly for
all comparison groups over a two-year period, and statistical analyses sug-
gested that programs had no significant effect on grades. The absence of any
directional improvement in grades over time suggests that programs have made
little progress in impacting upon their clients’ educational performance.
Dropout Rates. For the 1992-93 sample, Harrisburg programs had no sig-
nificant effects on dropout rates. Only previously poor academic performance
significantly explained dropout rates. Although the 1993-94 sample was young
and the follow-up period brief, results did not reveal any statistically significant
program effect on dropout rates. However, results for the 1993-94 sample were
in a positive direction (the high program attendance group had a dropout rate
of 4.3 percent compared to 26.9 percent for the control group).
Truancy. For the 1992-93 sample, Harrisburg programs had no significant
effects on truancy. All comparison groups showed a large increase in truancy
from 1991-92 to 1993-94. Although the sample was young and the follow-
up period brief, results for the 1993-94 sample were similarly disappointing.
However, while no statistically significant programmatic effect on truancy was
found, results were in a positive direction (i.e., there was a slight but statisti-
cally nonsignificant decrease in truancy from 1993-94 to 1994-95). The only
significant predictor of post-intervention truancy for the 1993-94 sample was
previous (pre-intervention) truancy.
Implications
Although the results were somewhat disappointing, it is important to rec-
ognize that results do not reflect the total success or failure of the programs.
For example, findings about recidivism were compromised by the fact that
there were so few youths with prior arrests in the 1993-94 sample. Academic
performance, dropout rates, and truancy did not improve significantly, but it

246 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 7.2, continued
may be unrealistic to expect dramatic changes in youths who participated in
the programs only sporadically. Further, programs may influence educational
outcomes only to a small degree compared to the more pervasive effects exerted
by schools and families.
Results may be influenced by various factors, some of which we can
account for in our data (e.g., gaps in the delivery of program services, incon-
sistent patterns of youth participation in programs, insufficient program
resources, inadequate measures of client skills and attitudes), and some that
lie outside the parameters of our evaluation (e.g., inadequate funding for
public schools, poverty, and family trauma). It may also be the case that some
programs evaluated individually, rather than as a combined sample, would
produce more positive results. Unfortunately, because the number of clients
in each program was so small, and there was so much missing data, we could
not effectively evaluate outcomes for individual programs.
Another problem is presented by the need for adequate measures of additional
objectives that programs attempt to achieve (e.g., improved self-esteem, problem-
solving skills, and interpersonal behavior). We vigorously attempted to measure
such outcomes using self-report measures and staff ratings of client behavior in the
1994-95 cohort, but program staff did not have the time or resources to complete
the assessment process at required three-month intervals. Thus, there may be areas
of program impact that we were unable to measure adequately.
Concern was raised by the diverse nature of referral sources during the
1993-94 school year. Rather than selecting clients on the basis of their suit-
ability for each program, intakes during the 1993-94 school year were marked
by a high diversity of client characteristics and needs, perhaps indicating a
desperate attempt by the coalition to get referrals from anywhere possible.
Program funding, therefore, may not yet have stabilized to the degree neces-
sary for programs to concentrate more intensively on defining their intended
target population and strengthening their service delivery to meet specified
client needs.
Question
1. Explain how Case Study 7.2 illustrates concepts discussed in Chapter 7,
providing evidence to support your answer: (a) reliability and validity;
(b) nonequivalent comparison groups; (c) confounding factors; and
(d) reassessing the entire program or policy plan.

CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 247
Case Study 7.3
1 Welsh, W. (2003). Evaluation of Prison-Based Therapeutic Community Drug Treatment
Programs in Pennsylvania: Executive Summary. Philadelphia: Department of Criminal Justice,
Temple University. Available at: http://www.pccd.state.pa.us/pccd/site/
Evaluation of Prison-Based Therapeutic Community
Drug Treatment Programs in Pennsylvania1
Instructions: Read the case study below, then answer the question that follows.
This project was built upon a collaborative research partnership between
Temple University and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PA-DOC)
that began in 1999. A Steering Committee consisting of senior executive and
research and treatment personnel from the Pennsylvania Department of Cor-
rections and researchers from the Center for Public Policy at Temple Univer-
sity in Philadelphia was formed to guide research activity and facilitate the
department’s overall research agenda. This group continues to meet regularly
to provide oversight of the research process and consider the larger organiza-
tional and policy issues that the research raises. Steering Committee members
participated in the entire oversight of this project. Findings were presented
and discussed at Steering Committee meetings, and members provided helpful
comments on an earlier version of this report.
An in-prison Therapeutic Community (TC) is an intensive, long-term, highly
structured residential treatment modality for hard-core drug users convicted of a
criminal offense. TC emphasizes the necessity of the inmate taking responsibility
for his or her behavior before, during, and after treatment. Several evaluations
of in-prison TC have produced promising results. However, studies have been
criticized for small sample sizes, faulty research designs (e.g., selection and attri-
tion biases), and inadequate attention to interactions between inmate charac-
teristics, treatment process, and treatment outcomes. No studies have examined
prison-based TC across multiple sites or attempted to include programmatic
and contextual variations in analyses of outcome. Numerous questions remain
about the potential impacts of unmeasured variations in inmate characteristics,
treatment programs, and multiple outcome measures.
In this study, we examined in-treatment measures and multiple post-release
outcomes for 2,809 inmates who participated in TC drug treatment programs
(n = 749) or comparison groups (n = 2,060) at five state prisons. Matched com-
parison groups made up of TC-eligible inmates participating in less intensive
forms of treatment (e.g., short-term drug education and outpatient treatment
groups) at the same five institutions were constructed based upon known predic-
tors such as drug dependency, need for treatment, and criminal history. Process
and outcome measures incorporated a range of institutional, intermediate (e.g.,
attitudinal and behavioral change, participation in treatment) and post-release
measures (e.g., drug relapse, rearrest and reincarceration, employment, levels

http://www.pccd.state.pa.us/pccd/site/

248 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING
Case Study 7.3, continued
of parole supervision). At the time of this report, 462 TC inmates and 1,152
Comparison inmates had been released from prison, with follow-up periods
extending up to 26 months (mean = 13 months). The two groups did not differ
significantly on amount of time at risk since their release from prison. We con-
tinue to track releases and recidivism for the entire sample. Below we summarize
our major findings, recommendations, and conclusions. Details of analyses and
further discussion are provided in the full Final Report for this project.
Major Findings
• Offenders in TC received 15 times the treatment “dose” that the
Comparison group received.
• We found positive effects of TC treatment upon reincarceration
and rearrest rates, but not drug relapse rates (Table A).
• Post-release employment strongly and significantly reduced the
likelihood of drug relapse, rearrest, and reincarceration (Table B).
Table A
Effects of TC vs. Comparison Group on Three Measures of Recidivism
Comparison Group TC Group
Reincarceration Rate 41% 30%*
Rearrest Rate 33% 24%*
Drug Relapse Rate 39% 35%
*p < .05 Note. Statistics shown are based on logistic regression results where all control variables including a categorical variable indicating membership in the TC vs. Comparison Group were entered into analyses. Results shown thus reflect outcomes controlling for the effects of all other variables (see Results section in full report for further detail). Table B Effects of Post-Release Employment on Three Measures of Recidivism Unemployed and Unemployed and Full-Time Part-Time Able to Work Unable to Work Reincarceration Rate 17% 26% 24% 65%* Rearrest rate 21% 34% 27% 41%* Drug Relapse rate 30% 39% 38% 44%* * p < .05 Note. Statistics shown are based on logistic regression results where all control variables including a categorical variable indicating membership in the TC vs. Comparison Group were entered into analyses. Results shown thus reflect outcomes controlling for the effects of all other variables (see Results section in full report for further detail). CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 249 Case Study 7.3, continued • Treatment outcomes were generally invariant across institutions, with one important exception. Significantly higher rates of drug relapse were observed for inmates treated at Cresson (44%) and Houtzdale (43%), compared to Waymart (24%), Huntingdon (32%), and Graterford (35%). • TC inmates evidenced numerous, positive improvements in psy- chosocial functioning and involvement in treatment over the first six months of treatment, as indicated by subscales of the TCU Resident Evaluation of Self and Treatment (REST) form, and the TCU Counselor Rating of Client (CRC) form. TC inmates showed significant decreases in depression and risk-taking behavior, and significant increases in self-esteem, therapeutic engagement, personal progress, trust in group, opinions of program staff, and perceptions of counselor competence. The strongest area of con- sistency across the five TC programs was in the high ratings that inmates gave of counselor rapport and counselor competence. • Each unit, while implementing the basic TC philosophy, also exhibited some programmatic variations. For example, two of the five TC units were rather large (100+ inmates). Large units make it difficult to implement the TC philosophy properly, which depends heavily upon positive peer interactions. Second, while the overall termination rate for TC (26%) was reasonable, one program (Waymart) was very low (5%), and another (Graterford) was very high (71%). • Eighteen REST scales and eight CRC scales measuring various dimensions of inmate psychosocial functioning and responses to treatment were then entered into logistic regression analyses as predictors of the three measures of recidivism (controlling for all other variables). Significant predictors of reincarceration included anxiety, hostility, therapeutic engagement, counselor rapport, ratings of program structure, and rapport with other inmates. No additional predictors of rearrest were statistically significant. Significant predictors of drug relapse included self-efficacy, risk taking, and self-confrontation. • The validity of our findings were bolstered by the fact that we were able to precisely account for total treatment exposure for all inmates in our sample, and we examined the effects of treat- ment exposure as a control variable. Previous studies have failed to do so. 250 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING Case Study 7.3, continued Limitations • The major limitation was the brevity of the follow-up periods and associated sample sizes available for multivariate analyses so far. As more inmates are released, and as average time at risk increases, we will revisit the analyses and conclusions formulated in this report. • Our ability to examine post-release outcomes was limited by the unavailability of automated data regarding participation in after- care treatment. Aftercare may interact with employment and other observed predictors to influence outcomes. Further research should examine ways to better integrate prison-based drug treatment with post-release needs and resources. • It was difficult to determine the degree to which employment was a cause or an effect. To do so, it would be useful to obtain more detailed information on parolees’ type of post-release employment, employee performance, income, etc. To disentangle potential causes, research should also determine how other factors (e.g., intelligence, cognitive abilities, education, in-prison and pre-prison work history, job training) might interact with drug treatment to influence post-release outcomes (employment, drug relapse, rein- carceration, and rearrest). • However, none of the control variables examined in this study (e.g., assessed level of need for drug treatment, prior and current offense severity, age) substantially weakened the observed relationship between employment and reduced recidivism, leading us to con- clude that the effect of post-release employment is quite robust. Question 1. Explain how Case Study 7.3 illustrates concepts discussed in Chapter 7, providing evidence to support your answer: (a) reliability and validity; (b) nonequivalent comparison groups; (c) confounding factors; and (d) reassessing the entire program or policy plan. CHAPTER 7 • EVALUATING OUTCOMES 251 Endnotes 1 For more thorough discussions of evaluation concepts and methods, we recommend the following works: Berk, R.A., and P.H. Rossi (1998). Thinking About Program Evaluation (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage; Patton, M.Q. (1996). Utilization- Focused Evaluation: The New Century Text. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Rossi, P.H., M.W. Lipsey, and H.E. Freeman (2003). Evaluation: A Systematic Approach (7th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Wholey, J.S., H.P. Hatry, and K.E. Newcomer (eds.) (1994). Handbook of Practical Evaluation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 2 See, for example: Thompson, M. (1980). Benefit-Cost Analysis for Program Evalu- ation. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; and Stokey, E., and R. Zeckhauser (1978). A Primer for Policy Analyses. New York: Norton. 3 Lipsey, M.W., and D.B. Wilson (1993). “The Efficacy of Psychological, Educa- tional and Behavioral Treatment: Confirmation from Meta-analysis.” American Psychologist, 48, 1181-1209. 4 Gendreau, P., and T. Little (1996). “A Meta-analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!” Criminology, 34, 575-608. 5 For a detailed description of meta-analysis, see Lipsey, M.W., and D.B. Wilson. (2001). Practical Meta-Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 6 Ibid, note 3. 7 Gaes, G.G., T.J. Flanagan, L.L. Motiuk, and L. Stewart (1999). “Adult Correc- tional Treatment. In M. Tonry and J. Petersilia (eds.), Prisons: Crime and Justice, A Review of Research, v. 26 (pp. 361-426); Welsh, W.N., and G. Zajac (2004). “A Census of Prison-based Drug Treatment Programs: Implications for Programming, Policy and Evaluation.” Crime & Delinquency, 50, 108-133. 8 Rossi, P.H., M.W. Lipsey, and H.E. Freeman (2003). Evaluation: A Systematic Approach (7th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Rutman, L. (1984). Planning Useful Evaluations: Evaluability Assessment. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; Wholey, J.S., H.P. Hatry, and K.E. Newcomer (eds.) (1994). Handbook of Practical Evaluation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 9 Wholey, J.S. (1994). “Assessing the Feasibility and Likely Usefulness of Evalu- ation.” In J.S. Wholey, H.P. Hatry, and K.E. Newcomer (eds.), Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation (pp. 15-39). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 10 The template for this logic model was retrieved March 1, 2008, from the OJJDP web site at: http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/grantees/pm/logic_models.html 11 Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the Adolescent Self-Image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 12 Available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda.htm 13 Sherman, L.W., and R.A. Berk (1984). “The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault.” American Sociological Review, 49, 261-272. 14 Ibid, note 12. http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/grantees/pm/logic_models.html http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda.htm 252 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING 15 Lempert, R. (1989). “Humility is a Virtue: On the Publicization of Policy-relevant Research.” Law and Society Review, 23, 145-161. 16 Sherman, L.W. (1992). Policing Domestic Violence: Experiments and Dilemmas. New York: Free Press. 17 Rosenbaum, P.R., and D. Rubin. (1983). “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects.” Biometrika, 70, 41-55; Rosenbaum, P.R., and D. Rubin (1985). “Constructing a Control Group Using Multivariate Matching Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score.” The American Statisti- cian, 39, 33-38; Rubin, D.B. (1997). “Estimating Causal Effects from Large Data Sets Using Propensity Scores.” Annals of Internal Medicine, 127, 757-763. 18 Ibid, note 17. 19 Sherman, L.W., J.W. Shaw, and D.P. Rogan (1995). The Kansas City Gun Experi- ment (NCJ-150855). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. Retrieved March 4, 2008, from: http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/kang http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/kang CHAPTER 8 Reassessment and Review 253 C H A P T E R O U T L I N E Planning for failure. Exaggerated goals can hasten implementation failure. Planning for success. Ongoing reassessment, learning, and revi- sion are crucial elements of successful interventions. Four tasks increase chances of success: (1) communication with stakehold- ers, (2) building internal capacities for leading and learning, (3) studying information about program or policy performance, and (4) increasing the fit between needs and characteristics of the environment and capacities of the program or policy. Learning and adapting. Interventions, their organizations, and surrounding environments change over time, and successful interventions must adapt to change by consciously tailoring the program or policy. A caution about program and policy survival. Interventions some- times survive long after they are known to be ineffective. Survival is often dependent on how well the intervention serves the personal goals of key stakeholders. The tasks of implementation. Plans from Stages 3 to 6 are finally implemented: Initiating the Design (implementing Stage 3 plans); Initiating the Action Plan (implementing Stage 4 plans); Monitor- ing Program/Policy Implementation (implementing Stage 5 plans); and Evaluating and Providing Feedback to Users and Stakeholders (implementing Stage 6 plans). 254 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING At this point, the program or policy is ready to be launched. Ideally, all six stages of planning should be completed prior to the initial start date for the intervention. We recognize, however, that time constraints imposed on the planning process may result in less than optimal pro- gram designs and action plans. Nonetheless, at this stage, for the first time, our program or policy takes on life. While planning and reviewing is a continuous process, we now begin doing what we have planned. We rarely have any control over the environments within which policies and programs are implemented: they have lives of their own, driven by visions and goals that may be independent of our new innova- tion. Or, they may be wholly driven by political and financial arrange- ments that often appear irrational and chaotic. Because our program or policy operates in a dynamic organizational or system environment, we need to pay attention to changes that occur in areas such as political climate, fiscal health of funding sources, key policymakers, and poli- cies related to our intervention. Sometimes these changes will occur independently of our intervention, but in other cases our interventions will cause reactions that require adaptation. As we discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to force field analysis, some of the forces that sustain a problem or issue over time are more potent than others. As these potent forces shift in strength, it becomes critical for programs and policies to change. As an example, consider the economic issues surrounding the export of jobs to other countries. Example 8.1 Exporting Jobs and the Global Economy While the development of a global economy and a growth in busi- nesses that span international boundaries are inevitable, there is growing concern in the United States that outsourcing production to countries that can provide cheaper labor will harm our own economy. Because fewer jobs are being created here at home, and because health care and energy costs are rising, worries are growing about how workers who have lost their jobs can be trained and supported to move on to jobs that are likely to be available. As companies in other countries develop and compete with American companies, companies here at home will have to find ways to cut costs, or will need to constantly innovate in order to stay ahead of advances elsewhere. But the answer is often to seek cheaper labor overseas. At the same time that we need resources to train workers who have lost jobs, the federal government has cut back on support for community colleges, a likely source of this training. CHAPTER 8 • REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 255 We repeat our warning from Chapter 1: planned change improves the likelihood of successful intervention, but it cannot guarantee it. Good planning increases the odds of success by explicitly considering important factors that might lead to failure or success. Example 8.2 Criminal Justice Planning and the Lesson of Jurassic Park Our preference for rational planning is a value that guides our writing and research. We are not so naïve, however, to believe that careful planning always produces successful outcomes. Even the most carefully crafted plans can have no effect, make problems worse, or create unintended effects. There are other times when energy and resources are wasted because planning processes are terminated prematurely. In general, subtle facets of the criminal justice system (see Chapter 2) can frustrate good planning. In real life, systems don’t always behave the way we want them to. In Jurassic Park,1 Ian Malcolm, a mathematician (played in the 1993 film by Jeff Goldblum2), warns of the larger, more powerful natural rhythms of nature that can undermine what appear to be great scientific advancements. “My point is that life on earth can take care of itself,” he raves.” In the thinking of a human being, a hundred years is a long time. ... But to the earth, a hundred years is nothing. A million years is nothing. This planet lives and breathes on a much vaster scale. We can’t imagine its slow and powerful rhythms, and we haven’t got the humility to try. We have been residents here for the blink of an eye. If we are gone tomorrow, the earth will not miss us.” Eugene Doleschal3 sounded a similar warning, this one directed at criminal justice reform efforts. He argues that forces that continually shape the justice system should be allowed to interact naturally. When reforms are imple- mented, the results are often the opposite of those intended. For example, many efforts intended to reduce prison populations through the creation of community-based program have failed to do so. Instead, community programs have often extended supervision and control over less serious offenders. Other examples include policy changes intended to reduce discretion that only moved discretion to other, less visible decision points in the system. He likens these reforms to a program conducted in Alaska and Canada to protect herds of caribou from their natural predator, the wolf. By shooting the wolves, envi- ronmentalists hoped to increase the caribou population. Instead, old and sick caribou that previously were killed and eaten by the wolves faced death by starvation and disease. Rather than give up on planning, we can learn from these experiences. In many cases, failures become the means for discovering the nature and strengths of forces we are trying to change. Sometimes we may decide that our knowl- edge and resources are inadequate to the task, but in other cases we become better equipped to try again. 256 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING In Chapter 1, we noted that you may be assessing an existing program rather than planning the launch of a new one. Evaluating the effectiveness of an intervention involves examining the extent to which it has been adopted by organizations and individuals in its operational environment. By examining strategies used to adapt the innovation locally, we can gain a better understanding of the factors that have contributed to its success or failure, popularity or unpopularity, or even its expansion or demise. Planning for Failure Failure of any program or policy is related to two broad types of diffi- culties: (1) insurmountable obstacles within the implementing agency or its environment, and (2) breakdowns or omissions in the planning process. First of all, it is possible for a program or policy to fail even when its designers have planned thoroughly and carefully. It may be the case that certain obstacles are too big or too powerful to overcome, or inadequate resources are available to do so. As we discussed in Chapter 2, such obstacles may be physical (e.g., the physical design of a courthouse precludes more efficient case processing), social (e.g., existing barriers related to class, gender, or race are unchanged by the program or policy), economic (lack of sufficient funding), educational (e.g., special training or education is required to implement an interven- tion), legal (e.g., criminal justice agencies are legally obligated to do certain things and prohibited from doing other things), political (e.g., motivations of partisan stakeholders can block a specific change), or technological (e.g., problems with managing the information system required to implement a new policy). A criminal justice systems analysis and a force field analysis should help planners anticipate such obstacles and develop strategies to overcome them. Such activities increase the probability of success. Figure 8.1 Common Planning Deficits at Each Stage Stage 1: Analyzing the Problem • Insufficient information about the problem has been examined. We don’t really know how big the problem is, where it is, or who is affected. We may not even have a clear definition of the problem. • No theory guided the intervention. We don’t know how or why the expected change should have occurred. • Inadequate examination of previous interventions: we may have recre- ated the wheel, or recycled an old, broken wheel by failing to learn about previous attempts to change the problem. CHAPTER 8 • REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 257 • Important stakeholders were not identified or included in the planning process. • Inadequate examination of the larger system or environment was conducted. Stage 2: Setting Goals and Objectives • Goals and objectives were not clearly stated. • Substantial disagreement about goals or objectives persists amongst stakeholders. • Incompatible goals or values in the larger system were not identified. • Needs for interagency collaboration were not sufficiently addressed. Stage 3: Designing the Program or Policy • No specific intervention approach was identified. • Target populations and selection were not adequately identified. • Program components or policy provisions and procedures were unclear. • Responsibilities of program staff or policy authorities were unclear. Stage 4: Developing an Action Plan • Required resources have not been properly identified. • Required resources have not been acquired. • Responsibilities for implementation have not been clearly assigned. • Insufficient attention was devoted to maintaining support and anticipating resistance. Stage 5: Developing a Plan for Monitoring Program/Policy Implementation • No monitoring of program or policy implementation was attempted. • Information systems for monitoring were inadequate. • Monitoring instruments were unreliable. • Responsibilities for data collection, storage, or analysis were unclear. • Monitoring data was not used to make necessary adjustments to the pro- gram or policy. Stage 6: Develop a Plan for Evaluating Outcomes • Prerequisites for evaluation were not adequately met. • Outcome measures were not reliable or valid. • The research design was inadequate to determine outcomes. • Confounding factors were not adequately addressed. • Users of evaluation results were not adequately identified or consulted. Stage 7: Initiating the Program or Policy Plan • Inadequate review of the planning process was undertaken before imple- mentation began. • Substantial obstacles within the implementing agency or its environment subverted the aims of the program or policy. • Planning breakdowns, errors, or omissions occurred. • The change agent failed to learn and adapt during implementation. • The change agent failed to execute plans properly. 258 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING The second set of difficulties concerns planning breakdowns, omis- sions, or deficits: one or more critical planning tasks have not been properly executed. The examples and case studies presented in Chapters 2 through 7 illustrate some of the most likely deficits in the planning process. We reiterate here common difficulties at each stage. Consider the following example: Wilson and Davis evaluated a prisoner reentry program in New York City, called Project Greenlight, that utilized evidence-based program design components. From the design, we would expect that the program would have been successful, but Project Greenlight was not.4 In fact, the Greenlight participants did significantly worse than the control group. The authors reject selection bias or program design explanations for this outcome. Instead, they highlight implementation problems such as doubling the number of participants in cognitive skills classes and poor relationships between some case managers and participants, suggesting that some staff were not qualified for the roles they were asked to play. Moreover, the risk-assessment tool originally adopted was dropped, so that some participants were poorly matched to the program. Wilson and Davis observe that poorly implemented programs may not simply fail, they may actually produce harm. Implementation failure easily occurs when leaders overstate the goals of a program or policy (Stage 2) in order to garner support from stakeholders in the larger political environment (Stage 1). When innova- tions are oversold, stakeholders feel deceived and cheated. Todd Clear and his colleagues5 observe with humor the range of promises attached to intensive probation services (IPS): “Advocates of IPS programs are not humble in the claims they made for these programs. Commonly, IPS is expected to reduce prison crowding, increase public protection, rehabilitate the offender, demonstrate the value of probation, and save money. Even a skeptic is bound to be impressed” (p. 32). These exag- gerated objectives eventually spelled trouble for the evaluation (Stage 6). Petersilia and Turner6 found in their evaluation of 14 IPS programs that the primary purposes of intensive supervision were rarely achieved: • The programs did not alleviate prison crowding and may have increased it in some sites. • They cost considerably more than is generally realized (Stage 5). • They were no more effective than routine probation and parole in reducing recidivism. The best that can be hoped for in the wake of such disappointing outcomes is a careful reassessment of the entire planning process, fol- lowed by necessary adjustments (Stage 7), especially a more realistic accounting of goals and objectives (Stage 2). CHAPTER 8 • REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 259 Planning for Success The important point to keep in mind at the implementation stage is that the planning process has not yet ended. In fact, it never will. New information pertinent to the program or policy will emerge, some of it though evaluation research, that may suggest modification to the original design. This is what learning is about. The organization’s capacity to learn will largely determine the extent to which the goals of the innovation are achieved. There are four tasks that need emphasis at this point in order to increase the chances of success. 1 Communicate: Continually communicate to constituents and potential opponents the need for the program or policy. Develop advocates for the program or policy among a wide range of public officials so that the vision of what you are up to is passed on to others who may be asked about the need for it. Publicize widely and frequently information on the program and its performance. 2. Build internal capacities for leading and learning: Those persons who are carrying out the activities articulated in the design are your most valuable assets. Their command of the vision, goals, and activi- ties described in the design are critical to the innovation’s success. Their ability to lead, support each other, think strategically, adapt, and carry out their assigned tasks are essential to a program’s suc- cess. Your organization needs to invest in their development. 3. Study: The need for information is essential for learning to occur. Data regarding implementation of the program or policy’s design, data on performance, and data on changes in the environment need to be tracked and brought into discussions among key stakeholders. 4. Increase the fit: Purposefully permit the innovation to take shape as new information about the needs and characteristics of the environment emerge and as the capacities of the program or policy develop. The better it fits the needs and priorities of the political environment, the greater will be the level of acceptance. These four tasks will become a permanent part of managing an effective program or policy, and can be used to assess the quality of a program’s administration. Learning and Adapting In Chapter 1, we mentioned the concept of mutual adaptation: the program (or policy) and the organizational environment in which it operates will both change during the implementation process. Programs change over time. Not only is there continual reshaping of a program 260 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING design before it is put into action, programs continue to change fol- lowing the point at which “the tire meets the road.” It is this change in program characteristics that makes components of a program design poor predictors of program success. Then, too, program staff, program clients, and decisionmakers, rather than being passive participants in the implementation process, directly affect how the innovations are used, adapting the innovation to existing organizational structures and norms, and using them to serve their own purposes. In addition, the same program design can produce drastically dif- ferent results in different settings, thus supporting the conclusion that context is critical to outcome. You may recall from our discussion in Chapter 2 regarding systems analysis that the private sector has played a critical role in criminal justice for many years. Some local criminal justice systems, however, have had disastrous experiences with pri- vate-sector programs. In corrections, for example, the promised fiscal advantages of private corrections have not always materialized.7 But it is not only innovations that undergo change during the implementation process; the organization within which the innovation is used also undergoes change. Specifically with regard to a probation program in Texas, Markley8 observed that when program management personnel changed, line staff became “demoralized.” Their commitment to the program was dependent on the leadership provided by a few individuals. Other common disruptions include the transfer of personnel to a new program, the hiring of outsiders (new staff) to staff the new program, and the requirement that staff acquire new skills in order to continue doing their jobs. Implementation of a program or policy in any organizational setting requires both adaptation by individuals and adaptation of the innova- tion in order for the implementation process to succeed.9 This process of mutual adaptation implies that the same innovation can look very different across different settings.10 The crucial point to be made is that unless a program or policy is carefully tailored to the setting in which it is to be used, successful implementation is unlikely. An excellent example of this kind of tailoring of the innovation can be seen in the approach that The Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services (CASES) in New York City has taken to ensure that its clients fit their target population: jail-bound rather than proba- tion-bound offenders. Data on sentencing in New York revealed that sentencing practices differed across the five boroughs. Judges in Queens, for example, require fewer misdemeanor offenses than do those in Manhattan before sentencing an offender to serve significant jail time. In order to prevent use of the CASES Community Service Sentencing Project (CSSP) from being used as a replacement for probation, criteria for accepting offenders into CSSP are adjusted to sentencing patterns at the borough level.11 CHAPTER 8 • REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 261 Not only does tailoring itself promote effective adaptation, so do the structural characteristics of organizations. Decentralization of program control, for example, permits different sites to develop a program design at their own pace and allows the program to adapt to the idiosyncrasies of each site in ways that improve chances for successful implementa- tion. It may be that a program is more effective under some conditions than under others, but it may also be the case that different modes of adaptation make it possible for an innovation to adapt to a variety of organizational environments. Another way in which programs adapt is when a change occurs in the target population or our knowledge about the target population. Both adult and juvenile correctional programs have traditionally been designed for males. Girls make up a small proportion of cases in the juvenile justice system, so programs for delinquent youths of both sexes are typically based on problems and needs derived from stud- ies of boys. The risk factors associated with delinquency among girls, however, are different than those found among boys. Granted, there are strong similarities among adolescents of both sexes, but programs need to be tailored to meet the unique needs of girls. Some of the risk factors found among girls that require program modification are: fam- ily conflict; sexual, physical, and emotional abuse; low self-esteem; and substance abuse.12 Girls are much more likely than boys to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Several states have engaged researchers and experts to assist them in adapting their correctional programs to the specific needs of girls. It is critical during implementation to uncover any changes in the intended program or policy design and describe them. These changes are deviations from the original plan and must be understood before a sound evaluation can be conducted. A Caution about Survival Mutual adaptation also means that acceptance of and continued support for an innovation may serve the personal goals of decisionmak- ers. For example, if a program can screen cases and make admission decisions rapidly, life is made easier for referring agents such as proba- tion officers and judges. A policy may be passed that gives prosecutors greater discretion (power). This has been the case in many mandatory sentencing schemes in which it is the charges that determine the sen- tence. David Rothman13 refers to these latter motivations as convenience in contrast to the benevolent interests (what Rothman calls conscience) that may have served to motivate the creators of the innovation. Unfortunately, even in the face of clear evidence that an innova- tion is failing, these interests of convenience may be powerful enough 262 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING to sustain the innovation. Valuable resources can then be wasted that could be put to better use in the service of promising programs and policies. To counter this problem, evidence of what works and what doesn’t should be shared as widely as possible. If evaluation data are not collected and results are not disseminated, or if they are kept confi- dential to protect the political interests of individuals, we run the risk of “convenience” (self-interest) winning out. Sharing outcome information among all stakeholders creates an environment in which system values can dominate policymaking. The Tasks of Implementing a New Innovation Implementing the program or policy plan (Stage 7) involves putting into motion the program design (Stage 3) and the action plan (Stage 4), monitoring implementation (Stage 5), and, if appropriate, evaluat- ing outcomes (Stage 6). Once evaluation data are analyzed, feedback is provided to all stakeholders, and the program should be thoroughly reassessed to determine where revisions are necessary. At the end of the process, the change agent asks whether further adjustments are neces- sary to meet program objectives. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the program? Decisions may have to be made about whether the program should be continued, and whether it should receive further funding. Reassessment and review of the program or policy should occur periodically from this point on. Initiating the Program/Policy Design In Chapter 4, we examined how a program or policy is constructed. Every program or policy must have a clearly defined design that includes: targets (e.g., eligibility, numbers to be served, access, screening, intake), program staff or individuals responsible for implementing the program or policy (e.g., selection, training, duties), and program components or policy provisions (e.g., specific goods, services, opportunities, or interventions to be delivered). Initiating the design, then, requires doing everything that was previously specified. Together with the action plan, the design lays out the major tasks for implementation. Initiating the Action Plan In Chapter 5, you learned how to develop an action plan that specified the entire sequence of tasks that need to be completed in order to success- fully launch or implement the program or policy. These included techni- CHAPTER 8 • REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 263 cal and interpersonal tasks (e.g., identifying and acquiring the necessary resources; locating office space and/or meeting space; hiring and training staff; designing client intake and reporting forms; purchasing equipment and supplies; setting dates and assigning responsibility for the completion of specific tasks). The action plan is, in essence, a “blueprint” explaining how to translate a vision of the program or policy into reality. Like the director of an orchestra, the change agent must coordi- nate the program or policy activities of all the different individuals and groups associated with the program or policy. Managers must hire and train their staff; they must build good relations with poten- tial referral sources (e.g., police, schools, probation); they must train staff to use required intake forms and keep client records; they must build good relations with citizens and businesses in the neighborhood; and they must provide regular reports of progress to their funding providers. Remember three guidelines to ensure smooth coordination: (1) maintain consistency between staff job descriptions and actual tasks, (2) maintain clear and frequent communication among staff members, and between staff and supervisors; and (3) keep an eye on the time-line: make sure that activities required for successful progression from one step to the next are carried out on time (e.g., make sure that staff are hired and trained by the dates specified in the action plan; make sure that all record-keeping forms are printed, and procedures are clearly understood by staff). Remember that some resistance is inevitable with the start-up of a new program or policy. Resistance may come from any of the participants involved: clients, targets, or even the intervention’s own staff (i.e., the action system). Resistance that appears should be dealt with fairly and seriously. Conflict is not something to be avoided at all costs. It may pro- vide the opportunity to identify and resolve misunderstandings, and it may also point out difficulties in implementation that truly deserve attention. Begin Monitoring Program/Policy Implementation At Stage 6 (see Chapter 5), you laid out a plan for monitoring pro- gram or policy implementation. As program or policy operations begin, it is time to start monitoring. Implementation refers to the initiation, management, and administration of the action plan. Once the interven- tion actually begins, we want to minimize discrepancies between what was planned (i.e., the program or policy on paper) and what is actu- ally done (i.e., the program or policy in action). Monitoring attempts to determine whether program/policy implementation is proceeding as planned. Monitoring is a process that attempts to identify any gaps between the program or policy on paper (design) and the program or policy in action (implementation). 264 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING For the target population, monitoring data should assess the follow- ing questions: What were the characteristics of the actual individuals targeted by the intervention? Were targets selected who were truly in need or at risk? Is the intervention meeting its specified criteria in terms of target eligibility (e.g., age, sex, income, region), and numbers to be served? Were proper recruiting, screening, and intake procedures fol- lowed? How were referrals made? For program components, monitoring data should answer the following questions: who did what to whom in what order, how much, and how often? Were there variations in service delivery or activities? Did different staff deliver programming in a dif- ferent manner? Was there more than one program site or location, and if so, were program activities administered consistently across different sites? Make sure that monitoring data also provide information about service tasks and responsible authorities: Were proper staff or authori- ties identified? Did they fit the specified roles and job descriptions? Did they understand their duties and perform them as expected? Begin Evaluating and Providing Feedback to Users and Stakeholders If any evaluation is to be useful, it should serve the information needs of the intervention and its stakeholders (see Chapter 2). Most notably, the program or policy’s major stakeholders include its funding agency, but any intervention has multiple stakeholders such as the community, businesses, politicians, criminal justice agencies, volunteers, clients, and so on. The time spent previously (at Stage 1) identifying stakeholders should not be wasted. Evaluation (Stage 6) is a critical means of demon- strating accountability, and hopefully, effectiveness, to stakeholders. The change agent should now assign individual responsibility for packaging and communicating evaluation results to different users. If the results are to be useful, and used, one must create means of communication that intended audiences could understand and react to. Planning Tasks for an Existing Program or Policy In reassessing an existing program or policy, we will want to ensure that planning tasks are continuing. After all, our experience with an innovation over time generates valuable information that can be used to improve the innovation or more effectively replicate it elsewhere. In Table 1.2 in Chapter 1, we laid out the core of those planning tasks that are ongoing. First, we need to examine the goals and objectives in terms of whether they were realistic and whether we were able to measure the objectives in a way that is informative. If, for example, a CHAPTER 8 • REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 265 program is attempting to increase employment among participants in a prisoner reentry program, and the objective is 100 percent employment within six months of admission, it may be that 100 percent employment is overly ambitious. Another critical question is whether there is ongoing reassessment, learning, and revision of the program design (this step is less relevant in the case of policy). Evaluations of intermediate and long-term out- comes should be ongoing. After all, client turnover, staff turnover, and changes in the larger system may affect the delivery of program services. We should never assume that because a program was evalu- ated once, that it will be effective forever. Evaluation is also a tool for continuous program development. Changes in the environment surrounding an intervention may require a program or policy to change—to adapt. If a city that had implemented a community policing strategy is encountering rapid gen- trification of an area, the police will need to adapt both to the chang- ing population of that area and to pressures put on areas where poorer citizens are relocating. Expectations of and attitudes toward the police will be quite different in the gentrified area compared to the situation that had existed in the past. In addition, the area to which lower-income residents are being displaced may become less stable, producing higher levels of conflict among neighbors. Changes to a program design, then, are likely as time passes. Both knowledge development and changes in needs and demands of the local environment make it necessary to revisit the design of a program or policy, consider changes to the action plan, improve monitoring meth- ods, and upgrade evaluation procedures. Conclusion Implementation is an ongoing process of adaptation, negotiation, and communication. In order to maximize the mutual fit between a program or policy and the environment within which it is initiated and allowed to develop, both the innovation and the environment must change. At this point, we hope that you have a good idea of the kind of analyses and kind of questions we need to ask to figure out what works to reduce or prevent any specific problem. We have argued throughout this book that many criminal justice interventions fall short of their goals because of poor planning, poor implementation, and poor evalu- ation. What we truly need is not more programs and policies, or new programs and policies, per se: we need better programs and policies. We need a better understanding of planned change to improve the effec- tiveness of criminal justice interventions. Such change is ubiquitous in governmental, community, private, and nonprofit agencies. This book 266 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING has attempted to provide a systematic, seven-stage framework for ana- lyzing and improving existing interventions, but also for planning new ones so as to maximize chances of success. Major steps of analysis were summarized in Figure 1.1. Which of the following interventions are effective? How would you know, or how would you find out? • Prisoner reentry initiatives and programs, including prison-based drug treatment and community aftercare, vocational and basic education, post-release employment assistance, and reentry courts that provide assessment and treatment services in conjunction with traditional criminal sanctions. • Drug Awareness Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) for elementary, middle school, and high school students. • Federal “Weed and Seed” Program (dual policy of first stamping out drug sales in specific communities, then “seeding” the com- munities with protective, economic, and social resources). • Shelters, counseling, and victim assistance for abused women. • Mandatory arrest policies for suspected wife abusers. • Juvenile waiver laws (serious juvenile offenses may be transferred to adult courts, or automatically tried as adult offenses). We reiterate a few major propositions to conclude this endeavor. First, we need a systematic plan for any change effort. Interventions, both new and old, need to be subjected to thorough scrutiny and analysis. Successful interventions are a product of hard work, careful planning, and a willingness to revise where necessary. Second, good intentions are rarely sufficient to bring about success- ful change. Beware of the “activist bias,”14 by which well-intentioned advocates of change assume that they already know what the problem is and what is needed. Such advocates may insist that we desist all this prolonged planning and simply “get on with it.” The perils of unplanned or poorly planned change should by now be obvious: expensive, poorly articulated, poorly implemented, ineffective programs and policies that are unable to successfully compete for scarce funds. Third, program or policy planning is an interactive and ongoing process. It is crucial to review and modify planning (where needed) at each stage of the analysis. This takes time, but it is time well spent. CHAPTER 8 • REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 267 Fourth, a rational planning approach provides a framework for developing logical and effective programs and policies. The default (all too commonly) is to use unarticulated and untested assumptions to guide planning. Finally, participation of and communication with all key actors, or stakeholders (e.g., program staff, clients, individuals or agencies whose cooperation is needed, funding sources, citizens affected by the intervention, elected representatives) throughout the change process are keys to success. While careful planning and analysis cannot guarantee success, it will increase the probability of success. D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S 1. Why should program planning and management occur on a regular basis? Why is it necessary to continually revise and reassess? 2. What can be done to increase the chances that an innovation will succeed? What factors increase the chances of failure? 3. What steps (activities) are involved in “initiating the program or policy plan”? 4. What is meant by the phrase, “coordinating program activi- ties”? Give two or three examples to illustrate your answer. 5. How do different organizational structures affect the ability of a program or policy to adapt to environmental demands? 6. What is mutual adaptation, and why is it important? Give an example. 7. Why might a program that is known not to work continue to receive support? 8. How can you tell when a program or policy is ready to be evaluated? 268 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING Case Study 8.1 Implementation Woes: Providing Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) for Inmates in State Prisons Instructions: First read the background below, then read the article that follows. Answer the questions at the end of the case study. “The best laid plans ‘o mice and men gang aft aglay… .” Scottish poet Robbie Burns said it well. No matter how carefully “wee timorous beasties” or humans plan for the future, things never work out exactly as planned. Even when planned change is successful, it may not be permanent. Why not, you may ask? People who played critical roles (“stakeholders”) including leadership roles come and go over time, initial enthusiasm abates, the political environ- ment changes, the priority assigned to a specific public problem shifts, and the actual change that resulted may not have been sufficiently dramatic to maintain or recruit new support. Planned change is dynamic, like the problems it seeks to address. The need for substance abuse treatment among prison inmates is widely accepted. Developing effective methods to address those needs is quite another. The following case study summarizes some of the implementation problems that have been faced by a federally sponsored initiative.1 Background The Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) Program was created as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to meet the needs of state correctional systems for resources to address a growing problem. Through the act, state authorities gained access to funds, technical assistance, and a network of innovators that could help them build their own local treatment programs. Every state took advantage of these funds, and by March of 2001, more than 2,000 RSAT programs were involved in providing services to adult inmates and parolees, as well as juvenile offenders. With so many programs in place, the need to learn about the effectiveness of different treatment approaches was immense. Consequently, the federal government sponsored a national evaluation program. From a monitoring perspective, large numbers of inmates and parolees were receiving treatment, but to learn about what works takes time. In the meanwhile, information regarding implementation was assembled and became part of the strategy for continued program development. Some of the major implementation difficul- ties encountered by RSAT programs are summarized below. 1 Harrison, L.D., and S.S. Martin (2003). Residential Substance Abuse Treatment for State Prison- ers: Implementation Lessons Learned. NIJ Special Report (NCJ 195738, web-only document). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. Retrieved March 17, 2004, from: http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/195738 http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/195738 CHAPTER 8 • REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 269 Case Study 8.1, continued Program Difficulties. The most severe problems reported by state officials involved locating or constructing appropriate facilities, recruiting trained treat- ment staff, and contracting with treatment providers under lengthy or complex bidding and proposal processes. More than half (53%) reported moderate or severe delays related to difficulties in locating facilities for the residential treatment program, and 37 percent reported delays resulting from the need to construct or physically alter existing structures. About one-fourth of the states (28%) reported encountering difficulties as a result of state regulations, and one-fifth (21%) reported delays due to state bidding or competitive processes. Nearly two-thirds (62%) of the states reported difficulties in obtaining train- ing for treatment staff. Lack of aftercare. The National Evaluation’s report expressed concern over the lack of aftercare, particularly because the RSAT Request for Proposal (RFP) for states emphasized that in-prison programs with aftercare services should be given preference. Aftercare was not funded, however, and RSAT funds could be used only for the residential treatment component. The National Evaluation found that work release (23%) or halfway houses (20%) were incorporated as aftercare programs in less than half of the RSAT programs. A few others had parole-supervised treatment as part of aftercare, but these numbers were not reported in the National Evaluation. The National Evaluation determined that 86 percent of RSAT in-prison treatment programs have either specified how graduates may continue treatment in the community or indicated their intention to do so. Continuity of care is an important element in treatment for offenders and is strongly linked to reductions in recidivism and drug use. Merging of treatment components. The National Evaluation also expressed concern over the merging of treatment components. RSAT programs are “intended to develop the inmate’s cognitive, behavioral, social, vocational, and other skills,” which lends itself to a multifaceted approach. Yet the evaluators pointed out that therapeutic communities, and 12-step programs in particular, are based on different theories and practices. The 12-step programs are spiritu- ally based, which is different from professional therapy. Nevertheless, 12-step programs have worked in conjunction with therapeutic communities for many years. The National Evaluation accurately pointed out that combination treat- ments have not been fully evaluated and that many combinations may result in watered-down components, leading to less effective treatment. Other problems. The National Evaluation showed that 55 percent of the RSAT programs lacked one or more operational treatment components, and 53 percent of program directors still considered their programs to be in the “shakedown” phase rather than stabilized at the RSAT midpoint. Programs had difficulty recruiting staff trained in the therapeutic-community and/or cog- nitive-behavioral methods as suggested in the RSAT RFP. Many states encoun- tered difficulties employing ex-offenders and recovering addicts as counselors 270 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING Case Study 8.1, continued in prison therapeutic communities; often, individuals with criminal records were not allowed to enter the institutions to work or visit. Evidence regarding therapeutic community staff effectiveness, however, shows that staff should consist of a mixture of recovered therapeutic-community graduates and other counseling (social work, educational, or mental health) professionals.2 Question 1. Using the chart in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.1) as a guide, identify two major steps in the seven-stage model of planned change that could help explain what happened with the RSAT programs nationally. Use specific concepts from the text, and provide evidence from the article to support your answer. 2 Wexler, H.K. (1997). “Therapeutic Communities in American Prisons: Prison Treatment for Substance Abusers.” In F. Cullen, L. Jones, and R. Woodward (eds.), Therapeutic Communities for Offenders (pp. 161–179). Chichester, NY: John Wiley and Sons. CHAPTER 8 • REASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 271 Endnotes 1 Crichton, M. (1990). Jurassic Park. New York: Ballantine. 2 Universal Films (1993). Jurassic Park. Directed by Steven Spielberg. Produced by K. Kennedy and G.R. Molen. Written by M. Crichton and D. Koepp. Based on the novel by M. Crichton. Photographed by D. Cundey. Edited by M. Kahn. Music by J. Williams. 3 Doleschal, E. (1992). “The Dangers of Criminal Justice Reform.” Criminal Justice Abstracts, March, 133-152. 4 Wilson, J.A., and R.C. Davis (2006). “Good Intentions Meet Hard Realities: An Evaluation of the Project Greenlight Reentry Program.” Criminology & Public Policy, 2, 303-338. 5 Clear, T., S. Flynn, and C. Shapiro (1987). “Intensive Supervision in Probation: A Comparison of Three Projects.” In B. McCarthy (ed.), Intermediate Punishments: Intensive Supervision, Home Confinement, and Electronic Surveillance (pp. 31-51). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. 6 Petersilia, J., and S. Turner (1990). “Comparing Intensive and Regular Supervi- sion for High-risk Probationers: Early Results from an Experiment in California.” Crime & Delinquency, 36, 87-111. 7 Shichor, D. (1995). Punishment for Profit: Private Prisons/Public Concerns. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 8 Markley, G. (1989). “The Marriage of Mission, Management, Marketing and Measurement.” Research in Corrections, 2. 9 Berman, P. (1981) “Thinking about Programmed and Adaptive Implementation: Matching Strategies to Situations.” In H. Ingram and D. Mann (eds.), Why Policies Succeed or Fail. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; McLaughlin, M. (1976). “Implementation as Mutual Adaptation: Change in Classroom Organization.” In W. Williams and R.F. Elmore (eds.), Social Program Evaluation. New York: Academic Press. 10 Ellickson, P., and J. Petersilia (1983). Implementing New Ideas in Criminal Justice. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 11 Neises, E. (1993). Report: The Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employ- ment Services. New York: The Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services. 12 Bloom, B., B. Owen, E.P. Deschenes, and J. Rosenbaum (2002). “Moving Toward Justice for Female Juvenile Offenders in the New Millennium.” Journal of Con- temporary Criminal Justice, 18, 37-56. 13 Rothman, D.. (1980). Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and its Alterna- tives in Progressive America. Boston: Little, Brown. 14 Sieber, S.D. (1981). Fatal Remedies. New York: Plenum. This page intentionally left blank Appendix: A Seven-Stage Checklist for Program and Policy Planning Stage 1: Analyzing the Problem A. Document the need for change: Collect and analyze data to define what the problem is, where it is, how big it is, and who is affected by it. What evidence of the problem exists? B. Describe the history of the problem: How long has the problem existed? How has it changed over time? C. Examine potential causes of the problem: What causes the problem? What theories do we have? The intervention to be chosen must target one or more specific causes supported by research. D. Examine previous interventions that have tried to change this prob- lem. Identify the most promising interventions and choose a preferred intervention approach. E. Identify relevant stakeholders: Do different groups of people have dif- ferent definitions of the problem? Who is affected by the problem? F. Conduct a systems analysis: Conduct research on the justice system where the problem exists, and determine how the system may create, contribute to, or maintain the problem. G. Identify barriers to change and supports for change: Who is likely to support a certain course of action? Who is likely to resist it? Stage 2. Setting Goals and Objectives A. Write goal statements specifying the general outcome to be obtained. Consider the goals of criminal sanctions and normative values driving desired outcomes. B. Write specific outcome objectives for each goal: These should include a time frame for measuring impact, a target population, a key result intended, and a specific criterion or measure of impact. 273 274 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING C. Seek participation from different individuals and agencies in goal setting. Consider top-down versus bottom-up approaches. D. Specify an impact model: This is a description of how the interven- tion will act upon a specific cause so as to bring about a change in the problem. E. Identify compatible and incompatible goals in the larger system: Where do values of different stakeholders overlap or conflict? F. Identify needs and opportunities for interagency collaboration: Whose cooperation and participation is needed to achieve the goals of this program or policy? Stage 3. Designing the Program or Policy A. Choose an intervention approach: Integrate the information collected at previous stages to decide what the substance of an intervention will be. Decide whether a program or policy approach is appropriate. B. Program design requires four major activities: (1) Define the target population: Who is to be served, or changed? (2) Define client selection and intake procedures: How are clients selected and recruited for the intervention? (3) Define program components: The precise nature, amount, and sequence of services provided must be specified. Who does what to whom, in what order, and how much? (4) Write job descriptions of staff, and define the skills and training required. C. Policy design requires four major activities: (1) Define the target population of the policy. Which persons or groups are included, and which are not? (2) Identify the responsible authority. Who is required to carry out the policy, and what will their responsibilities be? (3) Define the provisions of the policy. A policy should identify the goods, services, opportunities, or interventions that will be delivered, and the conditions that must be met in order for the provisions to be carried out. (4) Delineate the procedures that must be followed. Individuals responsible for implementing a specific set of rules must clearly understand the specific steps and actions to be taken to ensure that the policy is carried out consistently. APPENDIX • A SEVEN-STAGE CHECKLIST FOR PROGRAM AND POLICY PLANNING 275 Stage 4. Developing an Action Plan A. Identify resources needed and make cost projections: How much funding is needed to implement a specific intervention? Identify the kinds of resources needed, estimate costs and make projections, and develop a resource plan. B. Plan to acquire or reallocate resources: How will funding be acquired? Identify resource providers, and be prepared for making adjustments to the resource plan. C. Specify dates by which implementation tasks will be accomplished, and assign responsibilities to staff members for carrying out tasks: A Gantt Chart is particularly useful for this purpose. D. Develop mechanisms of self-regulation: Create mechanisms to moni- tor staff performance and enhance communication, including proce- dures for orienting participants, coordinating activities, and managing resistance and conflict. E. Specify a plan to build and maintain support: Anticipate sources of resistance and develop responses. Stage 5. Developing a Plan for Monitoring Program/Policy Implementation A. Design a monitoring system to assess to what degree the program or policy design (see Chapter 4) is being carried out as planned. Is the intended target population being reached? Are program/policy activities or provisions actually being carried out as planned? Are appropriate staff or responsible authorities selected and trained, and are they carrying out their assigned duties? B. Design monitoring instruments to collect data (e.g., observations, surveys, interviews): Collect data to find out what is actually being delivered to clients or targets. The purpose is to identify gaps between the program/policy on paper (design) and the program/policy in action. C. Designate responsibility for data collection, storage, and analysis: Ensure that there is no ambiguity about what information is to be collected, who is responsible for collecting it, or how it is to be col- lected, stored, and analyzed. D. Develop information system capacities: Information systems may consist of written forms and records that are filed, or fully computer- ized data entry and storage systems. 276 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING E. Develop mechanisms to provide feedback to staff, clients, and stake- holders: Depending on the results of monitoring analyses, it may be necessary to make adjustments either to what is being done (the program or policy in action) or to the intended design (the program or policy on paper). Stage 6. Develop a Plan for Evaluating Outcomes A. Decide which type of evaluation is appropriate, and why: Do major stakeholders (including those funding the evaluation) want to know whether the program or policy achieving its objectives (impact), how outcomes change over time (continuous outcomes), or whether it is worth the investment of resources devoted to its implementation (efficiency)? B. Determine whether two prerequisites for evaluation have been met: (1) Are objectives clearly defined and measurable? (2) Has the inter- vention been sufficiently well designed and well implemented? C. Develop outcome measures based on objectives: Good outcome mea- sures should be valid and reliable. D. Identify potential confounding factors (factors other than the intervention that may have biased observed outcomes): Common confounding factors include biased selection, biased attrition, and history. E. Determine which technique for minimizing confounding effects can be used—random assignment or nonequivalent comparison groups: Each involves creating some kind of comparison or control group. F. Specify the appropriate research design to be used: Examples include: the simple pretest-posttest design; the pretest-posttest design with control group; the pretest-posttest design with multiple pretests; the longitudinal design with treatment and control groups; and the cohort design. G. Identify users and uses of evaluation results: Who is the intended audience, and how can results be effectively and efficiently commu- nicated? How will the results be used? H. Reassess the entire program or policy plan: Review the entire plan- ning process from start to finish, looking for any inconsistencies, contradictions, or inadequacies. Stage 7. Reassessment and Review A. Initiate the program or policy design and the action plan developed at Stages 3 and 4: Make sure that specific individuals are responsible for coordinating all program or policy activities. APPENDIX • A SEVEN-STAGE CHECKLIST FOR PROGRAM AND POLICY PLANNING 277 B. Begin monitoring program/policy implementation according to plans developed at Stage 5. C. Make adjustments to program or policy design as monitoring detects gaps. D. Determine whether the program or policy is ready to be evaluated. E. Implement the research design developed at Stage 6. Collect and analyze evaluation data. F. Provide feedback to stakeholders. G. Reassess the entire program/policy plan and make necessary modi- fications to increase fit with the program or policy’s environment. This page intentionally left blank About the Authors Wayne N. Welsh is a Professor of Crimi- nal Justice at Temple University. He received his Ph.D. in Social Ecology from the Uni- versity of California, Irvine, in 1990 and his M.A. in Applied Social Psychology from the University of Saskatchewan (Canada) in 1986. Undergraduate courses he has taught include Introduction to Criminal Justice; Violence, Crime, and Justice; Environmen- tal Criminology; and Planned Change in Criminal Justice. Graduate courses include Violence, Crime, and Aggression; Criminal Justice Organizations: Structure, Process, and Change; and Rehabilita- tion, Re-entry, and Recidivism. He is the author of Counties in Court: Jail Overcrowding and Court-Ordered Reform (1995) and Criminal Violence: Patterns, Causes and Prevention, 2nd ed., with Marc Riedel (2008). His articles have appeared in Criminal Justice and Behavior, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, Crime & Delinquency, and Criminol- ogy and Public Policy. Welsh served as Deputy Editor of The Prison Journal from 1993 to 2000. He has conducted research in two broad areas: (1) applications of organizational theory to criminal justice and examinations of organizational change, and (2) theories of violent behavior and intervention/prevention programs. Welsh has been Principal Investigator on numerous federal and state-funded research grants. Based upon a collaborative research partnership between the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) and Temple University, a series of projects have examined critical interactions between inmate characteristics, treatment program characteristics, responsiveness to treatment, and post-release outcomes such as recidivism, relapse, and employment. The development of an ongoing research relationship between DOC and Temple University has been a primary goal, increasing the capacity of both agencies to produce useful knowledge. Previous research projects include a school violence study titled “Building a Culture and Climate of Safety in 279 280 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING Public Schools: School-Based Management and Violence Reduction in Philadelphia” (1993-1995). With a sample of more than 7,000 middle- school students and 400 teachers, this project examined multi-level predictors (individual, neighborhood, and school characteristics) of school violence in Philadelphia, and examined recommendations for violence prevention. Welsh was also principal investigator on a three- year study (1993-95) funded by the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, “Reducing Over-Representation of Minorities in the Juvenile Justice System.” This study evaluated nine community-based programs designed to reduce the overrepresentation of minorities in the juvenile justice system. Phil Harris is an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Temple University. He received his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from the State Univer- sity of New York at Albany in 1979. His teaching and research have focused primar- ily on the areas of juvenile justice, juvenile correctional strategies, and organizational and system development. He serves as the strategic planning adviser to the Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, which he helped found in 1994, and is a member of Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Committee. Prior to arriving at Temple in 1980, he served as a professional services administrator for a private juvenile correctional agency in Montreal, where he was responsible for assessment services and staff training. Beginning in 1992, he and Peter Jones designed and implemented an outcome-based information system, ProDES, that for 10 years provided a continuous flow of outcome information on all programs that receive youths from Philadelphia’s Family Court. Output from this system has included multiple evaluations of more than 90 programs. In 1999, ProDES was a finalist in the Innovations in American Government competition sponsored by Harvard University and the Ford Foundation. Harris is now directing an NIJ-funded project on the “Simultaneous Effects of Individual, Program and Neighborhood Attributes on Juve- nile Recidivism.” His publications include articles such as “Identifying Chronic Juvenile Offenders,” in Justice Quarterly (2001); “A Century of Juvenile Justice,” in NIJ’s volume, The Nature of Crime: Continu- ity and Change (2000); “Substance Abuse and Race in a Delinquent Population” in The System in Black and White, edited by Michael W. Markowitz and Delores D. Jones-Brown (2000), and “Differentiating Delinquent Youths for Program Planning and Evaluation,” in Criminal ABOUT THE AUTHORS 281 Justice and Behavior (1999). He recently completed an evaluation of a juvenile sex offender program, and is currently working on a book on matching delinquent youths to programs. Harris is the 2001 recipient of the Alva and Gunnar Myrdal Government Service Award, given annu- ally by the American Evaluation Association, and the 2005 Marguerite Warren and Ted Palmer Award from the Sentencing and Corrections Division of the American Society of Criminology. This page intentionally left blank A Access, of participants, in program design, 129 Accountability, of agencies, 8–9 Action planning (stage 4), in seven-stage model action plan, defined, 155 activities during, 22 case studies Brady Act: Why Action Planning Is Needed, 171–175 Halfway Houses in Ohio: Costs and Benefits, 166–170 Pitfalls of Poor Planning: Three- Strikes Legislation, 30–31 checklist, 275 cost projections, identifying resources for, 153, 155–158, 166–170. See also Resource plan date for accomplishing, 160–161 defined, 154 delinquency prevention program example, 22, 160–161 described, 21–22 for existing intervention, 16 implementation, defined, 154 implementation dates, 153 Gantt Chart, 160–161 in implementing new innovations, 262–263 initiating action plan, 262–263 for new intervention, 14 planning deficits during, 257 resources, acquiring/reallocating, 153 activities for, 158 funding sources, 159 requirements, 158 self-regulation mechanisms, 153 coordinating activities, 162, 163 managing resistance and conflict, 162, 164 orienting participants, 162 support, building/maintaining, 153, 163–164 systematic approach to analysis and, 16 to development and, 14 Action research, 65, 222–223 Action system in identifying stakeholders, 54 resource plan adjustment by, 190 Activist bias, 26, 38 Adaptation, 26 goal conflict and, 108 for success, 253, 259–261 Adjustments, 31 Advocacy groups, 8 African Americans mandatory sentencing and, 119–120 three-strikes laws and, 29–30 Aftercare, 2 After-school program, as program of planned change, 6 Age, of student crime victims, 39 Agencies. See Criminal justice agencies; Interagency collaboration Agency politics, 107 Aggregate matching, 233 Aggression Replacement Therapy (ART), 221 AIDS/HIV, incidence and prevalence of, 40 Analysis, preliminary, 38. See also Problem analysis Andrews, Don, 129, 196–202 Arrest, mandatory, 2, 100. See also Three-strikes-and-you’re-out legislation Attica prison riot (1971), 44 283 Index 284 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING Auerhan, K., 32 Authority for carrying out policies, 133 identifying, 20 B Background checks, for firearms purchases, 203–213 Balbus, I., 109 Barnum, Richard, 129 Berk, R.A., 231 Bias activist, 26, 38 in data, 42 Biased attrition, 219, 230 Biased selection, 219, 229–230 Blacks. See African Americans Blueprints for Violence Prevention (BVP), 221 Boot camps, vii components, 20, 130 program design of, 21 as program of planned change, 6 program/policy and, 6 Bottom-up approach, to goal setting, 102, 112–115 Bouffard, J.A., 23–24 Boundaries, in problem analysis, 39–40 Brady Act, viii, 1 action planning and, 171–175 defined, vii presale firearm checks under, 203–213 resistance to changes by, 61, 63 Bratton, William, 43 Brief Strategic Family Therapy (BSFT), 220 Brooks, Lisa, 240–241 Brutality lawsuits, 11–12 Budgeting, program-based (functional), 156. See also Resources Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), monitoring requirements, 181 Bush, George H.W., 7 Bush, George W., 110 C California mandatory sentencing, 121 three-strikes laws and, 29–32, 120 Case studies. See individual stages of seven-stage model for planned change Causality, establishing, 228–229 Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services (CASES; New York City), 26, 260–261 Center for Effective Public Policy (CEPP), 56 Chalfin, Aaron, 240–241 Challenge of Crime in Free Society (President’s Commission Report; 1968), 12–13 Change. See also Planned change barriers to and supports for, 37, 61, 63–65 bottom-up format, 102 documenting need for, 37, 38–43 resistance to, 10–12, 61, 63–65, 162 social and physical, 63–64 top-down format, 102 Change agents, 1 defined, 11 goals and values of, 95 as guide for planned change, 4–5 identification of sources of resistance by, 11 resource plan adjustment by, 190 responsibilities of, 4–5 as selector of participants in goal setting, 101–102 successful, 11–12 systems analysis and, 55 systems perspective and, 106 Change agent system, in identifying stakeholders, 53 Change process, roles of participants in, 52–54 Charge bargaining, three-strikes laws and, 30–31 Checkmate Program (program/policy design), 141–147 Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 115 Circle process, 80 Clear, Todd, 258 Client selection, 20 Client system, in identifying stakeholders, 53 Club drugs (problem analysis), 69–71 Coalition for Juvenile Justice, 44 Cognitive Behavioral Treatment (CBT), 221 Cohen, M.A., 166 INDEX 285 Cohort Design, 236–237 Cohorts, defined, 237 Collaboration. See Interagency collaboration Collaborative strategies defined, 11 for handling resistance, 11 planned change and, 1, 11 Columbine High School massacre (1999), 39 Communications, logic modeling and, 228 Community aftercare, 2 Community-based delinquency prevention programs, 141–147, 242–246 Community-based programs, 255 Community Corrections Acts (CCAs), 134–135 Community Corrections Program Development Project (National Institute of Corrections), 41 Community court, 2, 82–83 Community forum approach, in documenting need for change, 41 Community justice/community policing compatible and incompatible goals and, 105 problem analysis and, 72–88 weed and seed programs and, 178 Community resources, identifying, 61 Community survey approach, in documenting need for change, 41 Community theories, in problem analysis, 50 Comprehensive drug courts, 1, 2 Computer crime, 10 Computerized fingerprint identification, 9–10 Computerized information systems, 223 Computers, 9–10 Conflict. See Goal conflict Conflict resolution, 162, 164 Conflict strategies costs, 11 defined, 11 for handling resistance, 11–12 planned change and, 1 Confounding factors (confounds). See Outcome evaluation Constrained-to-flexible guidelines, in policies, 5 Construct validity, 228–229 Consumers, change and, 4 Continuous learning and improvement, 228 Control groups, 233, 235–236 Convenience versus conscience innovations, 261–262 Correctional Program Assessment Inventory (CPAI), 196–202 Corrections, problem analysis and, 72–88 Cost-benefit analysis, 223–224, 240–241 Cost-effectiveness analysis, 223–224 Costs of conflict strategies, 11 cuts in social-services spending, 8 halfway houses in Ohio: costs and benefits, 166–170 of information system capacities, 192–193 intervention approach choices and, 126–127 projections of, in action planning, 153, 155–158 Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators (CJCA), 113–115 Creaming, 230 Crime control model, of criminal case processing, 97 Crime prevention strategies, effectiveness of, 9 Crime victimization measures, bias in, 42 Crime victimization rates, 39 Criminal justice as a nonsystem, 54, 108–109 as a system, 12, 54 Criminal justice agencies, loose couplings and, 108–110 Criminal justice interventions. See also Planned change approaches to, 5–7 essence of, 2 examples, 1, 2 falling short of goals, 2–3 maximizing success, 3 notable and recent, vii poorly planned, 3 Criminal justice planning, 255 Criminal justice problems, social indicators for analyzing, 40–42 Criminal justice system assessment, steps and information sources, 57–58 286 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING flowchart, 62 restorative and community justice and, 72–88 Criminal sanctions. See Goals and objectives Criminogenic needs, 196 Critical incidents list, 44–49 Curfews, 133 D D.A.R.E. (Drug Awareness Resistance Education program), 187–188 Data collection techniques, 41 See also Program/policy implemen- tation and monitoring Data guide method, of observational data collection, 185 Dauphin County (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania) community-based delinquency programs, 242–246 Davis, R.C., 258 Decentralization, of program control, 261 Delinquency prevention program, 22, 160–161 Department of Homeland Security, 110 Deschutes County, Oregon, community justice in corrections in, 79, 83, 84–85 Design. See Program/policy design Deterrence, as goal of criminal sanctions, 96, 116 Dickey, Walter, vii, 29 Discretion, in policy enforcement, 5 Disparity in results, of mandatory sentencing, 120 Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC), viii, 44–49 Diversity, reflective, 108 DNA testing, 10 Doleschal, Eugene, 255 Domestic violence advocacy efforts and, 8 causes and correlations, 51–52 mandatory arrests for, 2, 100 Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 100, 183, 231 perception of problem, 44 problem analysis, 67–68 as social indicator, 42 Dosage levels, as program component, 130 Drug courts, vii, 214–216 Drug testing, technology for, 10 Drug treatment, 2 Residential Substance Abuse Treat- ment (RSAT) Program, 198–202, 268–270 therapeutic community (TC) programs, 23–24, 247–250 Drug use, as social indicator, 42 Drunk-driving laws, goals and objectives for, 19 Due process model, of criminal case processing, 97 E Earle, Ronald, 75 Economic patterns, domestic violence and, 52 Effective programs, 196 Effect size, 196, 224–225 Efficiency evaluation, 219, 223–224 Electronic monitoring equipment, 10 8% Solution, 41–42 Eligibility of participants, in program design, 129–130 Emergency Release Acts (ERAs), 135 Environment of policies and programs, 254. See also Mutual adaptation Equity as a normative value, 98 three-strikes laws and, 29–30 Ethnic minorities, mandatory sentencing and, 119–120 Etiology, of problems, 49–50 Evaluability assessment, 219, 225–226 Evaluation. See Outcome evaluation Events, as fuel for change, 44 Evidence-based paradigm, 219, 220–221 Evidence-based program design, 9, 258 Exportation of jobs, 254 F Failure, planning for. See Program/policy initiation Family group conferencing, 77–78 Family-oriented theories, in problem analysis, 51 Family structures, potential for violence and, 51 Fear, resistance to change based on, 10–12 INDEX 287 Federal Gun Control Act, 171 Feedback, to staff, clients, and stakeholders, 177, 193, 264 Fingerprints, computerized identification, 9–10 Firearm Inquiry Statistics (FIST) program, 173 Firearms. See also Brady Act Kansas City gun experiment, 25 presale checks, 203–213 Fiscal monitoring, 177, 188–190 Force field analysis, 162 defined, 63 intervention approach and, 126 social change and, 63–64 steps, 64 Formula Grants Program (OJJDP), 44–49 Fragmentation, 108 Functional (program-based) budgeting, 156 Functional Family Therapy (FFT), 221 Funding sources, 158, 159 G Gantt Chart, 153, 160–161 Gender inequality, 52 Gendreau, Paul, 196–202, 224–225 General deterrence, 96 GHB, 69, 70 Giuliani, Rudolph, 43 Global economy, 254 Goal conflict benefits of, 107–108 in criminal justice, 108 Goals defined, 18, 94 of resource plan, 155–156 Goals and objectives (stage 2), in seven-stage model activities during, 18–19 case studies Goals of Mandatory Sentencing, 116–122 Pitfalls of Poor Planning: Three- Strikes Legislation, 29–30 Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Goal Setting: Responding to Negative Information about Conditions of Juvenile Confinement, 112–115 checklist, 273–274 compatible and incompatible goals, 93, 104 examples, 105–106 guidelines for, 106 criminal sanctions deterrence, 96 incapacitation, 96 purposes of, 95 rehabilitation, 95 restoration, 96 retribution, 95 described, 18–19 drunk-driving laws example, 19 for existing intervention, 16 goal conflict, benefits of, 107–108 goals, defined, 94 goals and values identification, 94–95 goal statements, 93, 94 impact model, 93, 103–104 interagency collaboration goal conflicts and, 108 needs and opportunities for, 106–107 loose couplings and criminal justice agencies, 108–110 for new intervention, 14 normative values crime control model, 97 defined, 97 due process model, 97 equity, 98 humane treatment, 98 parsimony, 98 proportionality, 97 “right” goals and values, 98–99 value orientations, 97–99 objectives, defined, 94 outcome objectives, 93 components, 99–100 measurable and specific, 99 Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 100 process objectives versus, 101 participation in setting, 93, 101–102 planning deficits during, 257 systematic approach to analysis and, 16 to development and, 14 three-strikes legislation and, vii top-down versus bottom-up approaches, 102, 112–115 Goal statements, 93, 94 288 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING Gorczyk, John, 80, 81 Government services. See Accountability, of agencies Grants Management System (GMS), 181 Grisso, Thomas, 129 Group theories, in problem analysis, 50 Guilty plea, three-strikes laws and, 31 Gun control, 1 Guns. See Firearms H Hagan, J., 109 Halfway houses, costs and benefits, 166–170 Hare, Robert, 129 Hispanics, mandatory sentencing and, 119 History (confound), 219, 230 HIV/AIDS, incidence and prevalence of, 40 Hoge, Robert, 129 Homeland Security. See Department of Homeland Security Homicides, by and of students, 39 Humane treatment, as a normative value, 98 I Identity theft, 10 Impact evaluation, 219, 221–222 Impact model defined, 93, 103 for Department of Homeland Security, 110 elements, 103 logic modeling and, 226–228 outcomes and, 228 reentry program example, 104 steps of, 103 Implementation. See also Program/policy implementation and monitoring; Program/policy initiation accomplishing, with action plan, 153, 160–161 defined, 154, 180, 263 difficulties with, 268–270 Incapacitation as goal of criminal sanctions, 96 mandatory sentencing and, 116 Incidence defined, 40 prevalence distinguished from, 40 Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 39 Individual matching, 233 Individual-oriented theories, in problem analysis, 51 Individual records, of participants, in program design, 130 Individual theories, in problem analysis, 50 Information gathering, sources for, 40–42. See also Program/policy implementation and monitoring Information system capacities, 177 defined, 192 guidelines for, 192–193 Information systems computerized, 223 defined, 192 Initiation. See Program/policy design; Program/policy initiation Initiator system, in identifying stakeholders, 53 Innovations, convenience versus conscience, 261–262. See also Program/policy initiation Intake procedures, 20, 129–130 Intensive probation services (IPS), 258 Interagency collaboration, 93, 106–107, 108 Inter-State Identification Index, 63 Intervention approach, in program/policy design, 125, 126–127 Interventions. See also Criminal justice interventions failure of, reasons for, 94 new versus existing, 12, 14–17 notable and recent, vii previous, in problem analysis, 37, 51–52 J Jail overcrowding, as “systems” problem, 55 Job descriptions, for program staff, 20, 131 Job exportation, 254 Johnson, Lyndon B., “War on Poverty” and, 5 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 40 Jurassic Park, 255 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act, 44–49, 126, 242–246 INDEX 289 Juvenile justice system, goal-setting approaches to, 112–115 Juvenile offenders (program/policy design), 148–150 Juveniles community-based delinquency prevention, 242–246 confinement of, goal-setting for, 112–115 curfews for, 133 getting tough with, 148–150 homicides by and of, 39 treatment for girls versus boys, 261 Juvenile violence prevention, 5 Juvenile waiver laws, 1, 2 K Kansas City gun experiment, 25 Ketamine, 69, 70 Key informant approach, in documenting need for change, 41 Knowledge, expansion of, 9–10 Kurki, Leena, 87 L Lagerson, Erica, 240–241 Law Enforcement Assistance Administra- tion (LEAA), 12–13 Lawsuits, perception of problems fueled by, 44 Learning to adapt program, 253, 259–261 Legislation, change and, 44 Lewin, Kurt, 63, 65, 222–223 Lipsey, Mark, 224–225 Logic modeling, 219, 226–228 Longitudinal Design with Treatment and Control Groups, 236 Loose coupling, 108–110 LSD, 69 M Maloney, Dennis, 74, 85 Mandatory arrest, 2, 100 Mandatory sentencing, vii, 116–122, 261–262 Manitoba, Restorative Resolutions Project of, 79 Maori traditions, 77–78 Markley, G., 260 Maryland Reentry Partnership Initiative, 240–241 Massachusetts Boot Camp Program, as program/policy design example, 21 Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument, Second Version (MAYSI-2), 129 Matched control groups, 233 MDMA (Ecstasy), 69–70 Mediation, victim-offender, 76–77 Mediation of interests and system adaptation (goal conflict), 108 Megan’s Law, 2 Meta-analysis, 219, 224–225 Methamphetamine, 69, 70 Mille Lacs Indian Reservation, 80 Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 100, 183, 231 Minnesota restorative justice in, 79–80, 84 sentencing circles in, 78–79 Minorities Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) in juvenile justice and, 44–49 mandatory sentencing and, 119–120 three-strikes laws and, 29–30 Miranda rights, 5 Model, defined, 12 Model Programs Guide (OJJDP), 221 MonDay Community Correctional Institution (Dayton, Ohio), 198–202 Monitoring. See also Program/policy implementation and monitoring analysis (chart), 184 defined, 177, 180, 263 three-strikes legislation, 31 Moore, Mark, 12–13 Multi-systemic Therapy (MST), 220, 221 Mutual adaptation, 26, 259–262 N Narrative method, of observational data collection, 183 National Center for Juvenile Justice, 150 National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice, 220 National Crime Victimization Survey, 39, 40–41 National Criminal History Improvement Program, 173 290 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 52 National Instant Criminal Background Check System, 61, 63, 172, 203–213 National Institute of Corrections, 41 National Institute of Health, 50 National Institute of Justice, 220 National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), 69 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 110 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 229 Native American sentencing circles, 78–79 NCJRS Spotlight on Club Drugs, 70–71 Needs criminogenic, 196 defined, 38 effective programs and, 196 for interagency collaboration, 93, 106–107 problems distinguished from, 38–39 risk/needs assessment, 129 Negotiations, principled, 164 New York, Attica prison riot (1971), 44 New York City Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services (CASES), 26, 260–261 Midtown Community Court, 82–83 problem analysis and potential causes, 43 Project Greenlight, 258 New Zealand, 77–78 “NIMBY” (“not in my backyard”), as resistance to change, 63 Nonequivalent comparison groups, 219, 232–233 Normative values, evidence-based paradigm as, 219, 220–221. See also Goals and objectives O Objectives. See also Goals and objectives components of, 99–100 defined, 18, 94 process versus outcome, 101 Observational data, collecting advantage of, 186 data guide method, 185 defined, 183 narrative method, 183 structured rating scheme, 185 Offender population, 60 Offender processing, 108 Office of Justice Programs Financial Guide, 188–190 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), 44–49, 112–115, 126, 221 Ohio halfway houses in: costs and benefits, 166–170 MonDay Community Correctional Institution, 198–202 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (1968), 12–13 Operation Weed and Seed (1992), 7 Opportunities, for interagency collaboration, 93, 106–107 Oregon, Deschutes County, community justice and corrections in, 79, 83, 84–85 Organizational theories, in problem analysis, 50, 52 Outcome-based information systems (performance evaluation), 219, 222–223 Outcome evaluation (stage 6), in seven- stage model activities during, 24 case studies Evaluating Outcomes of Community-Based Delinquency Prevention, 242–246 Evaluation of Prison-Based Therapeutic Community Drug Treatment Programs in Pennsylvania, 247–250 Impact and Cost-benefit Analysis of the Maryland Reentry Partnership Initiative, 240–241 Pitfalls of Poor Planning: Three- Strikes Legislation, 31–32 checklist, 276 confounding factors (confounds), 219 biased attrition, 230 biased selection, 229–230 history, 230 minimizing techniques, 232–233 nonequivalent comparison groups, 232–233 potential, in the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experi- ment, 231 INDEX 291 propensity score analysis, 233 random assignment, 232 described, 24 evaluability assessment, 219, 225–226 evaluation, types of, 219 efficiency, 223–224 impact, 221–222 meta-analysis, 224–225 performance (outcome-based information systems), 222–223 evidence-based paradigm, 219, 220–221 for existing intervention, 17 Kansas City gun experiment example, 25 logic modeling, 219, 226–228 for new intervention, 15 outcome measures, 219, 228–229 planning deficits during, 257 prerequisites for evaluation, 219, 225 purpose of, 220 reasons not to evaluate, 220 research design, 219, 233 Cohort Design, 236–237 diagrams of, legend for, 234 Longitudinal Design with Treatment and Control Groups, 236 Pretest-Posttest Design with Control Group, 235 Pretest-Posttest Design with Multiple Pretests, 235–236 Simple Pretest-Posttest Design, 234 systematic approach to analysis and, 17 to development and, 15 users and uses of results, 219, 237–238 Outcome measures, 219, 228–229 Outcome objectives defined, 93, 99, 101 writing, for goals, 99–101 Output, in program design, 130 P Packer, H.L., 97 Parsimony, as a normative value, 98 Participant data (targets), 187–188 Participants orienting, 162 selection of, 129–130 Participation, in goal setting, 93, 101–102 Pennsylvania juvenile offenders (program/policy design), 148–150 Philadelphia Drug Treatment Court (program/policy design), 141–147 prison-based Therapeutic Commu- nity drug treatment programs, 247–250 Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD), 141–147 Performance evaluation (outcome-based information systems), 219, 222–223 Petersilia, Joan, 126, 258 Philadelphia Drug Treatment Court (program/policy design), 138–140 Philadelphia Municipal Court, 132 Planned change activist bias and, 26 approaches to, 1, 5–7 change agent and, 1, 3–5, 11 characteristics of, 3–5 collaborative strategies and, 1, 11 components of, vii conflict strategies and, 1, 11–12 defined, 3 need for, trends causing, 7 accountability, 8–9 declining resources, 8 expansion of knowledge and technology, 9–10 perils of, 1, 10–12, 26 problem-solving model, 12–13 resistance to, 10–12 trends affecting, 1 unplanned change versus, 1, 3–5 Planning, poor, three-strikes legislation example, 29–32 Planning deficits, during each stage, 256–257 Plea bargaining, three-strikes laws and, 30–31 Police brutality, conflict strategies and, 11–12 Policy. See also Program/policy design birth of, examples, 4 defined, 5, 131 designers of, 131 design of, activities for, 20–21 planned change and, 5–7 programs distinguished from, 6–7 provisions of, 20, 182 292 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING Policy and program development and analysis, systematic approach to, 14–15 Policy implementation, staff for, 183 Politics, agency, 107 Portland, Oregon, Community Court, 83 Pranis, Kay, 79, 81, 84 Presenza, Louis, 138 President’s Commission Report (The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society; 1968), 12–13 Presumptive sentencing, 120 Pretest-Posttest, Simple, 234 Pretest-Posttest Design with Control Group, 235 Pretest-Posttest Design with Multiple Pretests, 235–236 Prevalence defined, 40 incidence distinguished from, 40 Principled negotiations, 164 Prison-based drug treatment, 2 Prison-based therapeutic community (TC) drug treatment programs, 23–24, 247–250 Prisoner reentry initiatives, vii, 166, 258 as criminal justice intervention, 2 impact model example, 104 Prisons, privatization of, 105–106 Probation, reparative, 79 Problem analysis (stage 1), in seven-stage model activities during, 13 case studies Club Drugs, 69–71 Domestic Violence, 67–68 Incorporating Restorative and Community Justice into American Sentencing and Corrections, 72–88 Pitfalls of Poor Planning: Three- Strikes Legislation, 29 causes of problem, 37 domestic violence example, 51–52 family-oriented theories, 51 individual-oriented theories, 51 levels of, 50 organizational theories, 52 social-structural perspectives, 52 sources of information about, 50–51 change, barriers to and supports for, 37 “action research” and, 65 examples, 61, 63 force field analysis, 63–64 Kurt Lewin and, 65 resistance to change, 61, 63–64 change, documenting need for, 37 boundaries and, 39–40 data-collection techniques, 40–42 incidence versus prevalence, 40 narrowing definition of problem, 40 need, defined, 38 problem, defined, 39 problem distinguished from need, 38–39 questions to ask, 38 school violence example, 39 social indictors and, 40–42 checklist, 273 difficulties with, New York City example, 43 for existing intervention, 16 for new intervention, 14 planning deficits during, 256–257 previous interventions, 37, 51–52 problem history, 37 critical incidents list and, 44–49 perceptions, fueled by lawsuits, legislation, and events, 44 questions to ask, 43 prostitution example, 18 questions to ask, 13 stakeholder identification, 37, 52–54 systematic approach to analysis and, 16 to development and, 14 systems analysis, 37, 54 assessment activities, 56 change agent and, 55 elements, 56 examples, 55–56 guidelines for, 56–61 information sources, 57–58 model for, 56 steps for, 56–61, 62 system, defined, 55 Problem analysis, faulty. See also Problem analysis Problems. See also Problem analysis boundaries to, 39–40 defined, 38, 39 etiology of, 49–50 INDEX 293 examining information about, 38 history of, 37 incidence versus prevalence, 40 levels of, causes of, 50 needs distinguished from, 38–39 perceptions of and reactions to, 38 potential causes of, 37 social indicators leading to, 40–42 Problem-solving model. See Seven-stage model for planned change Process evaluation. See Program/policy implementation and monitoring Process objectives defined, 101 outcome objectives versus, 101 Program-based (functional) budgeting, 156 Program planning, logic model and, 228 Program/policy design (stage 3), in seven-stage model activities for, 19–21 activities for policy design, 125 activities for program design, 125 boot camps example, 21 case studies Getting Tough with Juvenile Offenders, 148–150 Pitfalls of Poor Planning: Three-Strikes Legislation, 30 Program Design: The Checkmate Program, 141–147 Program Design: The Philadelphia Drug Treatment Court, 138–140 checklist, 274 costs of options, 126–127 critical elements, 136 described, 19–21 for existing intervention, 16 intervention approach, 125, 126–127 for new intervention, 14 planning deficits during, 257 policy, specifically about, 131–132 provisions and procedures, 133–135 responsible authorities, 133 target population, 132–133 program, specifically information needed, 127 participation selection and intake procedures, 129–130 program components, 130–131 risk/needs assessment, 129 staff job descriptions and skills/ training required, 131 target population, 128 systematic approach to analysis and, 16 to development and, 14 Program/policy implementation and moni- toring (stage 5), in seven-stage model activities during, 23 case studies Monitoring Presale Firearm Checks Under the Brady Act, 203–213 Pitfalls of Poor Planning: Three- Strikes Legislation, 31 Program Monitoring: The Cor- rectional Program Assessment Inventory (CPAI), 196–202 Why Drug Courts Need Good Information Systems, 214–216 checklist, 275–276 data collection, storage, and analysis, 177, 191–192 data-collection techniques observational data, 183, 185–186 participant data (targets), 187–188 responsibility for, 191–192 service provider data (staff), 187 service record data (documents), 186–187 described, 22–23 for existing intervention, 17 feedback, to staff, clients, and stakeholders, 177, 193 fiscal monitoring, 188–190 implementation, defined, 180 information system capacities, 177, 192–193 monitoring analysis (chart), 184 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) requirements, 181 data-collection techniques, 177, 183–188 defined, 177, 180 fiscal, 177, 188–190 for prison-based therapeutic com- munity (TC) drug treatment programs, 23–24 program components or policy provisions, 182 questions for, 181–183 294 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING staff/individuals to implement policy, 183 target population, 182 for new intervention, 15 planning deficits during, 257 resource plan, adjustments to, 190–191 systematic approach to analysis and, 17 to development and, 15 Weed and Seed example, 178–180 Programs birth of, examples, 4 boot camps/Operation Weed and Seed, 6–7 components, defining, 20 defined, 6 design of, activities for, 19–20 effective, 7, 196 planned change and, 5–7 policy distinguished from, 6–7 projects distinguished from, 6 Project Greenlight (New York City), 258 Project RIO (Re-Integration of Offenders), 104 Projects defined, 6 planned change and, 5–7 programs distinguished from, 6 Propensity score analysis, 219, 233 Proportionality, as normative value, 97 Prosecution, community policing and, 81–82 Prosecutors, three-strikes laws and, 30–31 Prostitution, analyzing the problem, in seven-stage model, 18 Psychopathy Checklist—Youth Version (PCL-YV), 129 Punishment, purpose of, 95 R Race. See African Americans; Hispanics; Minorities Racial disparities, technology for tracking, 9 Racial minorities, mandatory sentencing and, 119–120 Random assignment, 219, 232 RAND report (1994), three-strikes legislation and, 31–32 Raves, 69–70 Reassessment and review (stage 7), in seven-stage model. activities during, 25–26 case study Implementation Woes: Provid- ing Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) for Inmates in State Prisons, 268–270 Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services (CASES), 260–261 checklist, 276–277 criminal justice planning example, 255 described, 24–26 existing programs/policies, planning tasks for, 264–265 exporting jobs and global economy example, 254 failure, planning for, 253 breakdowns, omissions, deficits, 258 obstacles, 256 planning deficits at each stage, 256–257 for existing intervention, 17 for new intervention, 15 implementation tasks for new innovations action plan, 262–263 design, 262 evaluating and providing feedback, 264 monitoring, 263–264 in case study: Pitfalls of Poor Planning: Three-Strikes Legislation, 32 learning and adapting, 253, 259–261 mutual adaptation, 26 planning deficits during, 257 success, planning for, 253, 259 survival caution, 253, 261–262 systematic approach to analysis and, 17 to development and, 15 three-strikes legislation, 32 Reentry programs, 240–241. See Prisoner reentry initiatives Reflective diversity (goal conflict), 108 Rehabilitation, as goal of criminal sanctions, 95 INDEX 295 Reiss, A.J., 42 Reliability, of a measure, 229 Reparative probation, 79, 80–81 Research design, 233. See Outcome evaluation Residential Substance Abuse Treat- ment (RSAT) Program, 198–202, 268–270 Resistance to change fear as cause of, 10–12 forms of, 61, 63 handling, strategies for, 11–12 managing, 162, 164 Resource plan. See also Resources adjustments to, 190–191 defined, 155 goals of, 155–156 guidelines for, 156–158 program-based budgeting (functional budgeting) and, 156 Resources acquiring/reallocating, 153, 158–159 declining, planned change and, 8 funding sources, 159 identifying, 61, 153, 158–159 Responsivity of programs, 196–197 Restoration, as goal of criminal sanctions, 96 Restorative justice arguments for, 105 problem analysis and, 72–88 victims and, 105 Retention, of participants, in program design, 130 Retribution, as goal of criminal sanctions, 95 Ridge, Tom, 110, 148–149 Risk, effective programs and, 196 Risk/needs assessment, in program design, 129 Rohypnol, 69, 70 Roman, John, 240–241 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, 228, 234 Roth, J.A., 42 Rothman, David, 261 S Sanctions. See also Mandatory sentencing criminal deterrence, 96 incapacitation, 96 purposes of, 95 rehabilitation, 95 restoration, 96 retribution, 95 documenting and assessing policy and practice, 59 identifying, 60 Scalia, Antonin, 172–173 Scared Straight, 96 School Crime Supplement (National Crime Victimization Survey), 39 School violence, problem analysis example, 39 Screening, of participants, in program design, 130 “Second-strike” felonies, 30 Seeding, 178 Self-regulation, of program or policy activity coordination, 162, 163 creating mechanism for, with action plan, 153 participant orientation, 162 resistance and conflict management, 162, 164 Sentencing documenting and assessing policy and practice, 59 mandatory, vii, 116–122, 261–262 presumptive, 120 restorative and community justice and, 72–88 Sentencing circles, 78–79, 80 Sentencing disparities as “systems” problem, 55–56 technology for tracking, 9 September 11, 2001, 110 Service delivery, as program compo- nent, 130, 143–147 Service provider data (staff), 187 Service record data (documents), 186–187 Seven-stage checklist for program and policy planning. See individual stages Seven-stage model for planned change. See also individual stages about, 12–13 key points, 26–27 poor planning model (three-strikes legislation), vii–viii Stage 1. analyzing the problem, 13–16, 18, 29. See also Problem analysis 296 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING Stage 2. goals and objectives, 14, 16, 18–19, 29–30. See also Goals and objectives Stage 3. program or policy design, 14, 16, 19–21, 30. See also Pro- gram/policy design Stage 4. action planning, 14, 16, 21–22, 30–31. See also Action planning Stage 5. program or policy implemen- tation, 15, 17, 22–24, 31. See also Program/policy implementation and monitoring Stage 6. evaluating outcomes, 15, 17, 24, 25, 31–32. See also Outcome evaluation Stage 7. reassessment and review, 15, 17, 24–26, 32. See also Reassessment and review summarized, 1 three-strikes legislation, 29–32 Sex offenders, Megan’s Law and, 2 Sherman, L.W., 231 Shock incarceration programs, 96 Shootings, problem analysis and, 39 Simple Pretest-Posttest Design, 234 Simple-to-complex rules/guidelines, in policies, 3 Skills, defining, for program staff, 131 Social change, 63–64 Social constructions, 38 Social indicators biases in, 42 in documenting need for change, 40–42 examples, 40–41 problems with, 42 as source for criminal justice systems analysis, 42 Social isolation, 51 Social structural theories, in problem analysis, 50, 52 Specific deterrence, 96 Stakeholders evaluation results and, 219, 237–238 feedback to, 177, 193, 264 goals and values of, 95 identifying, for problem analysis, 37, 52–54 as participants in goal setting, 101–102 States. See also Three-strikes-and- you’re-out legislation Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) and, 44–49 gun purchase background checks, 203–213 mandatory sentencing, 116–122 sex-offender information and, 2 Strategic planning, logic modeling and, 228 Structured rating scheme, of observational data collection, 185 Students, crime victimization rates and, 39 Success, planning for, 253, 259 Support, building and maintaining, 163–164 Supreme Court. See U.S. Supreme Court Survival, of programs/policies, 253, 261–262 System, defined, 55 System adaptation (goal conflict), 108 Systems analysis, 37 assessment activities, 56 change agent and, 55 conducting, 54–61 criminal justice as a “system,” 54 elements, 56 examples, 55–56 guidelines for, 56–61 intervention approach and, 126 model for, 56 restorative justice, 72–88 steps for, 56–61 system, defined, 55 T Target populations defining for a policy, 132–133 for a program, 128 for program/policy design, 19, 20, 21 for intervention, 4 monitoring and, 182 program adaptation effect on, 261 three-strikes laws and, 30 Target selection, for interventions, 129–130 Target system, in identifying stakeholders, 54 Taxman, F., 23–24 Technology computerized information systems, 223 INDEX 297 expansion of, 9–10 Tereshchenko, Bogdan, 240–241 Terrorism, federal government response to, 110 Texas disruptions to programs and morale, 260 Project RIO (Re-Integration of Offenders), 104 Travis County community justice program, 82, 83 Theory, defined, 49–50 Therapeutic community (TC) drug- treatment programs, 23–24, 198–202, 247–250 Therapeutic Foster Care, 220 Three-strikes-and-you’re-out legislation. See also Mandatory sentencing circumventing, 30–31 as criminal justice intervention, 2 effects of, on crime, 31–32 intent of, 29 monitoring, 31 plea or charge bargaining and, 30–31 poor planning of, 29–32 problems with, vii prosecutors and, 30–31 reassessment and review, 32 seven-stages of planning and, 29–32 target populations and, 30 Thurman et al. v. City of Torrington, 44 Tonry, Michael, 120 Top-down approach, to goal setting, 102, 112–115 “Total progress picture,” 214 Training, defining, for program staff, 131 Travis County, Texas community justice as prosecutorial response, 83 community policing and prosecution in, 82 Truth-in-sentencing, 116 Turner, S., 258 U Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) biases in, 42 contents of, 40 United Nations, 40 Unplanned change, defined, 3. See also Planned change USA PATRIOT Act, viii as birth of program/policy, 4 fear about, 10 provisions, 4 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 41 U.S. Department of Justice, 7, 50, 52 User fee, as funding source, 159 U.S. Health Department, 5 U.S. Sentencing Commission, 119 U.S. Supreme Court discretion, exceptions to, 5 on handguns, 172–173 V Validity, of a measure, 228–229 Value orientations, 97–99 Values identification of, 94 normative, 97–99 “right,” 98–99 Vermont, reparative probation in, 80–81 Victim-offender mediation, 76–77, 85 Victims characteristics of, contributing to domestic violence, 51 restorative justice and, 105 Violence begets violence thesis, 51 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994), 6, 116, 268 Virginia Tech shootings (2007), 39 W War on Drugs (Bush), 7 War on Poverty, 5 Weed and seed programs, vii as criminal justice intervention, 2 implementation and monitoring of, 178–180 Operation Weed and Seed (1992), 7 Weeding, 178 “What works,” in criminal justice, 2–3 lack of consensus concerning, 7 Whites, mandatory sentencing and, 119 Wilkinson, Reginald, 81 Wilson, J.A., 258 Win-win/win-lose solutions, 164 Women. See Domestic violence Wraparound Case Management, 221 Wright, Kevin, 107, 108 298 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND PLANNING Y Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (YLS/MI), 129 Cover Page Title Page Copyright Page Acknowledgments Preface Contents Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Analyzing the Problem Chapter 3: Setting Goals and Objectives Chapter 4: Designing the Program or Policy Chapter 5: Action Planning Chapter 6: Program/Policy Implementation and Monitoring Chapter 7: Evaluating Outcomes Chapter 8: Reassessment and Review Appendix: A Seven-Stage Checklist for Program and Policy Planning About the Authors Index

Review each team member’s selected case study for the Criminal Justice Program Proposal, Part I individual assignment due in Week One.

Discuss and provide feedback on the proposed interventions presented in each individual assignment.

Explain how diverse teams can either strengthen or weaken the program evaluation process.

Submit a 100-word summary of the team discussion.

Format your summary consistent with APA guidelines.

This is the case study my team member chose:

Juvenile Justice Correctional Facilities in regards to the lack of programs for rehabilitation and stated that a program such as Multisystemic Therapy should be placed into juvenile facilities. Multisystemic Therapy (MST) is an intensive family and community-based treatment for serious juvenile offenders with possible substance abuse issues and their families. The primary goals of MST are to decrease youth criminal behavior and out-of-home placements