1. Should the refugee crisis be securitized (i.e., viewed as an existential threat, or be re-regarded as one of humanitarian struggles. In other words, can we realistically remove forced migration from the category of security?
2. Can Burden Sharing Improve outcomes for Refugees?
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3.What are some of the economic impacts of forced migration discussed by Dadush and Niebuhr (2016)? More specifically, what are the different outcomes in poor versus relatively wealthy and advanced states?
answer for only 1 of the 3.
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Uri Dadush and Mona Niebuhr
The Economic Impact
of Forced Migration
Policy Paper
April 2016
About the
OCP Policy Center
The OCP Policy Center is a Moroccan policy-oriented think tank striving to promote
knowledge sharing and to contribute to an enriched reflection on key economic
and international relations issues. By offering a southern perspective on major regional
and global strategic challenges facing developing and emerging countries, the OCP Policy
Center aims to provide a meaningful policy-making contribution through its four research
programs: Agriculture, Environment and Food Security, Economic and Social Development,
Commodity Economics and Finance, Geopolitics and International Relations.
On this basis, we are actively engaged in public policy analysis and consultation while
promoting international cooperation for the development of countries in the southern
hemisphere. In this regard, the OCP Policy Center aims to be an incubator of ideas
and a source of forward thinking for proposed actions on public policies within emerging
economies, and more broadly for all stakeholders engaged in the national and regional
growth and development process. For this purpose, the Think Tank relies on independent
research and a solid network of internal and external leading research fellows.
About the authors, Uri Dadush & Mona Niebuhr
Uri Dadush is a senior associate in Carnegie’s International Economics Program. He
focuses on trends in the global economy and is currently also tracking developments in the
eurozone crisis. Dadush is interested in the impact of the rise of developing countries for
financial flows, trade and migration, and the associated economic policy and governance
questions. He is the co-author of four recent books and reports: Inequality in America:
Facts, Trends and International Perspective (Brookings, 2012), Juggernaut: How Emerging
Markets Are Reshaping Globalization (Carnegie, 2011), Currency Wars (Carnegie, 2011),
and Paradigm Lost: The Euro in Crisis (Carnegie, 2010). He has published over a dozen
Carnegie papers and policy briefs as well as numerous journal articles.
Mona Niebuhr is an advisor on Global Public Goods and International Financial
Institutions in the Global Partnerships division at GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit). She previously worked for the World Bank’s Fragility, Conflict and
Violence group as well as the Operations Policy and Country Services unit. Within the
World Bank’s Global Program on Forced Displacement she supported the preparation of a
flagship report on forced displacement. Niebuhr has prior work experience in the Council
on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action, UNDP’s Washington Representation
Office, and the international NGO The Advocacy Project. She studied Political Science,
International Law, and Economics at Georgetown University (Washington DC), Ludwig
Maximilians University (Munich) and Sciences Po (Paris).
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author.
This publication can be downloaded for free at www.ocppc.ma Printed copies are also available. To
request a copy, thank you for sending an e-mail to contact@ocppc.ma
Abstract
The current refugee crisis is a catastrophe affecting millions of families, endangering the
stability of nations that are hosts to large numbers of migrants, and of the region around them.
Forced migration flows which are mismanaged, as at present, create large negative political
and economic externalities for the world as a whole. Concerns of advanced countries that
accepting forced migrants will cause job losses or falling wages, and place an undue burden
on the public purse, are largely unjustified. Although there is no perfect scheme for allocating
the burden, any solution must envisage increased numbers of refugees settling in the North and
increased aid for the countries in the South with the largest numbers of refugees.
4
1
The Economic Impact of Forced Migration
Uri Dadush and Mona Niebuhr1
The flow of forced migrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, Mali, and other localities beset by conflicts is
a human catastrophe of the first order, the cause of the uprooting of millions of families and of perilous journeys that have
led to thousands of deaths. It is also a crisis that has major international implications, from the risk of radicalization and
political instability, to the spread of infectious diseases, and to the risk of collapse of the visa-free European Schengen zone
under pressure of migrant flows and the inability to agree on an appropriate solution. Since the conflicts that are causing
the crisis are endemic and there is little likelihood that the vast majority of migrants can soon return to their homes, the
crisis may get worse before it gets better. As policymakers and politicians try to make sense of a complex reality, in a
political environment that has become even more explosive in the wake of terrorist attacks, it is important to get the facts
straight, and to understand some of the economic regularities associated with mass migration. What are the development
and economic implications of large flows of forced migrants? This, after all, is a phenomenon of which the world has many
examples and long experience, and which economists have widely studied.
This chapter deals mainly with refugees and asylum seekers, forced migrants who cross international borders, rather than
with internally displaced people. It draws on the extensive economic literature on voluntary and forced migration as well as
on the recent field experience of the World Bank, the UNHCR, and other national and international agencies. It makes the
following points:
• Forced migrants tend to arrive in places where there are few job opportunities for them. The problem of finding a
livelihood is far more severe in the ten or so poor countries or regions receiving large numbers of forced migrants than
in rich countries which, with few exceptions, receive tiny numbers of forced migrants relative to their population. In
poor countries or regions receiving large numbers of migrants, the depressing effect on the wages of native unskilled
workers can be extremely severe.
• When forced migrants arrive in large numbers in a poor region, they place enormous strain on public services and
infrastructure and on the public purse, and they can also severely fray the social and political fabric, leading to
deterioration of the investment climate.
• Concerns that accepting an increased number of forced migrants in advanced countries will cause job losses or falling
wages, and place an undue burden on the public purse are largely unjustified. In most instances in advanced countries,
the arrival of young people willing to work is likely to cause a proportionate expansion of investment and output, and
may also accelerate the economy’s long-term growth rate.
• The global gains from forced migrants settling in the South — those accruing to the migrant, the country of origin
(through remittances) and the country of destination – are much smaller than from migrants settling in the North.
Though most countries in the South receive very few forced migrants, when forced migrants arrive in large numbers in
fragile states or regions, net welfare losses may result.
• Forced migration flows which are mismanaged, as at present, create large negative externalities for the surrounding
region or even for the world. There is no perfect scheme for allocating the burden, but, absent political solutions to
conflicts, any scheme must envisage increased numbers of refugees settling in the North, redoubled efforts to integrate
refugees in their country of asylum, and increased development aid for the countries in the South with the largest
numbers of refugees. Such a scheme is more likely to materialize if it is based on voluntary – rather than compulsory –
targets to welcome refugees and provide aid, and if a new comprehensive framework for dealing with refugees is
adopted.
The chapter’s starting point is: what sets forced migrants apart from voluntary ones?
1 Uri Dadush is a Senior Fellow at the OCP Policy Center and a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Mona Niebuhr is an economist at GIZ and was previously a research assistant at the World Bank. This paper benefited greatly from
comments received at two World Bank seminars on a forthcoming flagship report on Forced Migration held in October 2015 and
January 2016, and also from numerous comments and discussion with Xavier Devictor, lead advisor in the conflict unit at the World
Bank.
2
Characteristics of Forced Migrants
The economic literature on migration is principally concerned with the implications of voluntary migration, while the
economic literature on forced migration, though growing rapidly, remains quite sparse. The literature on voluntary
migration does, nevertheless, help shed some light on the phenomenon of mass forced migration since there is overlap
between the two fields of study. For example, analysts of the effects of voluntary migration have often analyzed instances
of forced migration to identify the effects of the sudden “exogenous” arrival of large numbers of migrants2.
However, there are a number of differences between forced and voluntary migrants, which carry important economic and
policy implications. Voluntary migrants move for economic gain or to unify their family, and so go at a time and to a place
of their choosing, while forced migrants flee, often to the nearest safe haven, to avoid bodily harm. Thus, forced migrants,
unlike voluntary migrants, may lose most of their assets, and may end up in a place where job opportunities for them are
scarce or completely absent, and may be unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin regardless of how they fare
in their adopted place of abode. Compared to voluntary migrants, their adjustment to new conditions may take longer, and
may require more support from the host community or from others. These characteristics lead to a number of complex
economic challenges which are not present, or not not present to nearly to the same degree, in the case of voluntary
migration.
Moreover, the legal distinction between refugees, who are defined as forced migrants who seek and are granted asylum,
and economic migrants, who are voluntary migrants, has important bearing since under the 1951 UN Convention member
countries are obligated not to return refugees to their country of origin where they may be harmed (non-refoulement). Yet,
this legal distinction is often hard to draw in practice, and for the purpose of economic analysis the distinction is even
fuzzier. In reality, many refugees – while genuinely escaping from danger — do not leave at gunpoint but have some
latitude on the timing of their departure and their destination. Confronted with a threat, they will consider the risk and cost
of migration, and prospects at different destinations. Like voluntary migrants, a family fearing persecution or war may
decide to send first a young, able-bodied and enterprising member to explore. Conversely, some economic migrants may,
to all purposes, be forced to migrate by hunger and disease.
From an economic perspective, the passage of time may make the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants, or
between refugees and economic migrants, even less meaningful. Since for the vast majority of forced migrants the capacity
to work is the only asset, sooner rather than later they must settle and find a job. In many instances, this is sought in a
region or country other than that of first arrival, or, less commonly, in the country of origin to which the forced migrant
may be willing and able to return. Thus, a migrant who was initially forced to migrate subsequently acts much like a
voluntary migrant, and the analysis of the economic impact of voluntary migration can be even more useful in
understanding the effect of forced migration.
Still, there are four economic challenges which are uniquely associated with forced migration and which require specific
analysis. The short-term challenges include the job market mismatch problem, and the effect on the region of first arrival
of large numbers of forced migrants. The long-term challenges relate to the region of settlement of the forced migrant, and
specifically the overwhelmingly South-South nature of forced migration, as well as the international coordination problems
caused by the phenomenon. These challenges, which are all highly specific to forced migration, and are all related, are
treated in turn below.
Job Market Mismatch
The typical forced migrant breadwinner must find a good job, and quickly, to mitigate his or her family’s plight, and to
overcome the poverty, uncertainty, and humiliation frequently associated with dependence of humanitarian aid. Finding a
job, even a bad job, is also the key to their becoming productive members of their adopted society. Yet, there are many
impediments to this happening, including, in many cases, outright refusal of the permission to work. So, the forced
migrant’s job prospects are a good place to start in analyzing the economic impact of forced migration. While there is
2 These studies are often referred to as Card studies (after David Card, 1990; see also section on settlement in advanced countries,
below). Econometric studies of the effects of migration often resort to studies of mass forced migration to help get around the problem
of causality, and of identifying the independent effect of immigration on the host economy more precisely. It is easy, for example, to
mistake migration as the cause of growth of the host economy rather than the result of growth (Borjas,2003).
3
extensive evidence that voluntary migrants respond to the demand for their services, and they go where (and when) they
can find jobs (Papademetriou, Sumption & Somerville, 2009), there is also compelling evidence that forced migrants
seeking employment will more often than not find themselves in the wrong place, at least initially. If they are not allowed
to work, and are not permitted to move on, or are unable to cover the cost of another trip, or are simply unwilling to take
the risk of moving, their living standards as well as their ability to contribute to society are severely compromised.
Most countries – whether developed or developing — receive only very small numbers of forced migrants relative to their
population in a given year and the effect on their job market is minuscule. In those cases, the chances that a forced migrant
will eventually find decent work are reasonable even if they may not be as good as those of well-connected natives. The
problem arises when the inflow of forced migrants is large relative to the host population. Technically, the job mismatch
problem facing forced migrants can be defined as an excess supply of workers which can only be corrected by a fall in
wages, or by an increase in investment. Such a decline in wages may not be allowed to occur because it is too large to be
politically acceptable (leading to work permit denial) or because of the presence of other labor market restrictions that
protect incumbent workers. At the same time, new investments may occur too slowly or be deterred by a fragile investment
climate or by political instability, which is sometimes made even worse by a large inflow of migrants. The result is that
migrants are not absorbed into the labor force, become dependent on humanitarian aid. The available evidence suggests
that the job market mismatch problem facing forced migrants is always severe at first, including for the relatively small
number of refugees who find abode in the world’s richest countries, but it can be extreme and persistent for the much
larger number of forced migrants that find themselves concentrated in relatively poor regions and in a fragile political
environment. Where refugees are not allowed to work, many tend to become part of informal labor markets anyway, in a
part of the economy which is largely outside the tax net, work at extremely low wages, and are subject to exploitation and
abuse.
The evidence on the job market mismatch problem in both advanced and developing countries is partial and spotty, but,
while it is discomforting in developing countries receiving large numbers of forced migrants, it is far from uniformly bleak
in advanced countries. For example, Germans and Finns displaced after World War 2 and French and Portuguese displaced
in the wake of colonization who returned to their country of origin, were allowed to work and fared fairly well according to
the available studies (comp. De Lima & Carrington, 1996; Hunt, 1992). However, these groups are not representative of
present day forced migrations of people of diverse ethnic origins. In recent decades, most refugees – which tend to be
overwhelmingly unskilled – arrived in advanced countries without knowing the language and, often, without being able to
write in the Latin script. Some arrive illegally but even those who arrive legally often have to wait many months or years
before they are allowed to work. The refugees that have professional qualifications typically find that they are not
recognized and they must accept a lower status or pass new exams which take many years of preparation.
Even so, recent evidence suggests that, despite the increase in work permits granted to refugees in Germany – a country
that received large numbers of asylum seekers in 2015 – the national unemployment rate continued to fall in every month
compared to the same month in the previous year (IAB 2015, 2). The OECD estimates that the growth of the labor force
across the Euro area will barely reach 0.5% per annum in 2016-2017, with a significant part of that growth due to the large
net migration to Germany. While the medium and long-term impact will be determined by how well refugees are
integrated into the labor market, according to the OECD this inflow “could ease emerging wage pressures in the
comparatively-tight German labor market” and “also help to moderate demographic pressures due to population ageing”
(OECD 2015c, p. 16).
Unfortunately, systematic studies of how modern day refugees have fared in advanced countries over the long run are few
and largely confined to the United States. These studies tend to concur that refugees find a job within a few months of
arrival, that they earn significantly less than natives with equal qualifications at first, and that knowledge of the English
language – which is often scant – is an important determinant of their income. Most refugees arriving in the United States
rely initially on government aid, but very few still depend on aid within 2 or 3 years of arrival. A disproportionate number
of refugees are small-scale entrepreneurs. While the income of refugees rises quite rapidly over time, there is insufficient
evidence to conclude that their incomes converge completely to those of natives. It is worth noting that the more abundant
evidence on voluntary immigrants suggests that their incomes do not converge completely (Alcobendas & Rodriguez
–
Planas 2009; Cortes 2004; Card 2005) even after many years.
A recent longitudinal study of the United States by Cortes (Cortes 2004) finds that refugees adjusted rapidly and –
surprisingly – that their income progression significantly outstrips that of economic migrants. While refugees earned 6%
4
less than economic migrants in 1980 and worked 14% fewer hours, by 1990 they earned 20% more, worked 4% more
hours, and improved their English skills by 11% more. She shows that refugees invested more in education. Cortes finds
that these results cannot be attributed to differences in the ethnic composition of economic migrants and refugees, and
speculates that they are due to the fact that refugees are more committed to remaining in the United States in the longer
term because they cannot return or do not want to return.
The available studies of the insertion of forced migrants in developing countries are also few, but as mentioned, they offer
a much less comforting picture. This is as might be expected, because in the instances studied – unlike in the United States
– the refugee inflow is very large relative to the domestic population, and the migrants, which are unskilled, tend to be
directly competitive with the local population, which is also predominantly unskilled. Moreover, in the instances studied,
wages are low and the job market situation is precarious to start with. According to a recent World Bank study, “The influx
of Syrian refugees [in Lebanon] is expected to increase labor supply by between 30 and 50 percent – with the largest
impacts on women, youth, and unskilled workers […] The overall unemployment rate and share of informal work in total
employment could both increase each by up to 10 percentage points” (Ianchovichina & Ivanic 2014). In a recent welfare
assessment of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, the World Bank found a high incidence of poverty, and -surprisingly
– that access to labor market was not a significant determinant in poverty levels (Verme 2015a), presumably as the only
jobs available to refugees are at wage levels which are extremely low.
An ILO study of forced migrants in Lebanon, where they are estimated to account for over 20% of the local population,
finds that Syrians (many of whom are allowed to work in Lebanon), have a 30% unemployment rate and their average
monthly wage is $277, which compares to the statutory minimum wage of $448. Syrian women earn a little above 1/3 of
the minimum wage (Masri & Srour 2014). In comparison, a similar ILO study on Syrian refugees in Jordan indicates
“wages for unskilled and semi-skilled wages of JD 4-JD 10 per day, […] insufficient to provide subsistence livelihoods”
(Aljuni & Kawar 2014, p. 21). In line with that, a World Bank welfare assessment on Jordan found that 69% of Syrian
refugees in Jordan were poor using the UNHCR poverty line (Aljuni & Kawar 2014; Verme 2015a).
A recent study of internally displaced people in Colombia, which are estimated at 4.7 million equivalent to roughly 10%
of the country’s population, concludes that localities that saw the largest number of displaced people have seen wages fall
very sharply, and, on average across the national territory, displacement has led to a reduction in wages of 28.4 percent in
urban areas (Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez 2009, p. 25). While wages and employment were not much affected in the highly
regulated Colombian formal sector, which represents 60% of the labor market (Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez 2015,
p.6),(Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez 2015, p. 6), the effects on the informal sector were especially severe, with wages declining
more sharply than they might have done in a more uniform labor market and with informal employment expanding
markedly. (Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez 2015).
The job market mismatch problem, which is clearly much more severe in developing countries absorbing large numbers of
forced migrants relative to their population than in advanced or developing countries absorbing small numbers, is only one
aspect of the impact on the region of first arrival, discussed next.
Impact on the Region of First Arrival
Forced displacement typically takes place in a relatively short time frame and involves large numbers, unlike the more
regular inflow of voluntary migrants. As mentioned, the refugee crisis affects specific countries and regions
disproportionately, while the vast majority of advanced and developing countries receive very few refugees in a given year;
this is a case where initial conditions and the size of the shock matter, and they matter greatly. Over and beyond the labor
market impact discussed above, forced displacement can constitute a large demographic shock causing a sudden mismatch
of supply and demand of public services and housing in the host community. In countries or regions where the investment
climate is inauspicious to start with and where the inflow of foreigners disrupts established social and political equilibria,
business expectations can be adversely affected. This can delay or indefinitely impede the private investment response to
rising demand for housing and services. Fiscal constraints can limit the required investment in public services, and, in
extreme cases, balance of payments constraints can lead to exchange rate devaluation and make the import of food, fuel
and other necessities more expensive.
The current media focus on the migrant crisis in European countries, most of which receive very few forced migrants
relative to their population, diverts attention from the far more severe challenge in a number of host communities in Africa,
the Middle East and South Asia. Over half of the refugees worldwide originate from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia and
5
over two thirds of displacement takes place within the region of origin (UNHCR 2015), in host communities where social,
economic and institutional capacities are low to begin with, and where fiscal space and capacity to borrow is limited. How
the arrival problem plays out depends greatly on the specific context of the host community as well as the socioeconomic
profile of the displaced population. By way of illustration, the cases of Germany, Italy, Jordan, and Lebanon, countries
which have recently attracted large absolute numbers of forced migrants, are compared in Table 1.
Table 1: Ability to Cope: Economy and Refugees 2014
Germany Italy Jordan Lebanon
Population (#) 80,889,505 61,336,387 6,607,000 4,546,774
Surface area (sq. km) 357,170 301,340 89,320 10,450
GDP (current US$ billion) 3,853 2,144 36 46
Average Annual Growth Rate GDP
(2010-2014 %)
1.96 (0.52) 2.70 3.02
GNI per capita, PPP (current int.
$)
46,840 34,710 11,910 17,400
Unemployment rate (% of total
labor force, modeled ILO estimate
2013)
5.30 12.20 12.60 6.50
Refugee Population (2014,
UNHCR)
216,973 93,715 654,141 1,154,040
Refugee Inflow (2014, UNHCR) 40,563 20,582 119,000 403,600
Estimated Net Annual Migration
(2011-2015 United Nations
Population Division, annual
average)
549,998 900,000 400,002 500,001
Refugees to host population ratio (#
of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants)
2.63 1.53 87.16 232.39
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
The difference in per capita incomes between Germany and Italy, and Jordan and Lebanon, after adjusting for purchasing
power, is about 3 or 4 to 1 in the case of Jordan, and 2 or 3 to 1 in the case of Lebanon.
Lebanon and Jordan rank high among countries hosting refugees. However, they are not among the top 10 host countries
when all forced migrants, including IDPs, are included. As Chart 1 shows. Syria, Colombia, and Sudan and South Sudan,
which are much poorer countries host far larger numbers of displaced people. Lebanon, Jordan, Italy and Germany do not
even currently feature among the largest hosts when all forced migrants are considered.
6
Chart 1: Major Host Countries
Source: UNHCR Database 2015
Germany received close to 1 million asylum seekers in 2015, equivalent to 1.2% of its population, the “largest annual
inflow of people seeking asylum of any OECD country ever recorded (OECD 2015). Still, even if most of these people
were granted asylum, the stock of refugees in Germany (less than 3 per thousand) would be tiny compared to Lebanon
(232 per thousand) and Jordan, (87 per thousand), as Chart 2 shows. Italy’s refugee population currently stands at less than
2 per thousand. In the United States, where Congress has just voted against admitting additional refugees absent a
draconian vetting process, and only up to 10,000 Syrian refugees per year, the number of refugees represents less than 1
per thousand of the population. Refugees also historically represent a small share of all migrants, some 7%, compared to
voluntary migrants. To put the current flow of refugees in perspective, Spain attracted around 4.3 million new,
overwhelmingly voluntary, immigrants over 2000-2008, equivalent to about 9% of its population.
Top 10 Forcibly Displaced Hosting Countries (Refugees, IDPs and
Asylum Seekers), UNHCR Global Trends 2014 (end-2014 data)
Refugees IDPs Asylum
7
Chart 1: Major Host Countries
Source: UNHCR, 2015
The flow of large numbers of displaced people in a short time affects the host community profoundly. Below, three
dimensions are examined: public services, fiscal balance, and political stability.
Public Services and Infrastructure
In developing countries, low incomes and fiscal constraints mean that the provision of health care, education and social
services barely satisfies the needs of the native population to start with, and excludes many, even before the arrival of
refugees. Over the period of 2012-2014, a World Bank assessment found that to restore access and quality to these services
in Lebanon to the level possible before the arrival of refugees would cost 1.4-1.6 USD billion, (World Bank 2013, p. 3).
Similarly restoring the level of Lebanon’s infrastructure services to that prior to the arrival of refugees – defined as water
and sanitation services, municipal services, electricity and transport – was estimated to cost 1.1 USD billion. In total the
social and impact assessment estimated “that an additional spending of USD 2.5 billion would be required for stabilization,
i.e., to reinstate the access to and quality of public services to their pre-Syrian crisis level” (World Bank 2013, p. 1). This
sum represents about 5.5% of Lebanon’s GDP.
Top 10 Forcibly Displaced Hosting Countries (Refugees, IDPs and Asylum
Seekers), UNHCR Global Trends 2014 (end-2014 data)
Refugees IDPs Asylum
8
Chart 2: Incidence of Refugees
Source: UNHCR Global Trends 2014
Because the inflow of migrants is relatively small and public services are better developed and funded to start with, OECD
countries have much larger capacity to deal with the immediate demand shock on public services than poorer hosts, even
though the concentration of refugees in some regions or cities can cause the shock to be uneven, as in the case of some
school districts receiving large numbers of immigrant children. Since the population of both Germany and Italy is projected
to decline with the natural increase across the EU turning likely turning negative for the first time in 2015 (OECD 2014,
p. 35), migrants can be accommodated without necessarily requiring expansion of the existing infrastructure, or of health
services which migrants, who are relatively young, draw on less intensively.
In contrast, the challenge for public services in the small number of developing countries confronted with a surge of forced
migrants is compounded by the composition of the migrants. In Jordan and Lebanon, the Syrian refugee population
consists of relatively vulnerable groups, placing even greater demand on education and maternal health. Compared to the
population of Syria, refugees are disproportionately children and the head of household is disproportionately female
(Verme 2015b, p. 5), many mothers are under 18, and the level of education of refugees is marginally lower. In contrast,
there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that those forced migrants who reach Europe have higher skills and larger assets. For
example, an OECD brief finds that “more than 40% of Syrians in the country [Sweden] in 2014 have at least upper
secondary education” compared to 15% of those in Lebanon and Jordan (OECD 2015, 8). Still, while refugees in Jordan
and Lebanon speak Arabic, those in Italy and Germany will require language training.
Immediate Fiscal Impact
A recent assessment of the fiscal impact of refugees in Lebanon concluded that “public finances that were structurally
weak prior to the Syrian shock are now becoming severely strained, with the deficit estimated to widen by USD 2.6 billion
[equal to roughly 1.4% of GDP] over the 2012-2014 time period”. (World Bank 2013, p. 2-6) No equivalent assessment is
available for Jordan, but the fiscal burden is expected to be less, since policy has been to settle refugees in camps – which
are funded by UNHCR – unlike in Lebanon where refugees draw directly on public facilities and resources.
Costs of hosting refugees in OECD countries are higher per refugee than hosting them in developing countries but much
smaller in proportion to GDP. Official statistics are difficult to find, but the German magazine Zeit, for example, estimates
that hosting a refugee will increase public spending by EUR 10,000-12,000 per refugee per year. Even if all the estimated
1 million asylum seekers in Germany in 2015 are granted refugee status, the costs would then come to EUR 10-12 billion
232
87
39 34
23 21 21 19 15 14
–
50
100
150
200
250
Top 10 Forcibly Displaced Hosting Countries: Refugees to 1,000
Inhabitants
End 2014 Data
9
for 2015. In the most extreme scenario, Zeit estimates added total public expenditures of EUR 65 billion for asylum
seekers and refugees through 2015-2018, which would be partly offset by about EUR 20 billion in increased government
revenues reflecting the expansion of output. The net costs of EUR 45 billion in the five year timespan would represent
around less than .3% of GDP and could be covered by drawing on Germany’s projected budget surplus, without raising
taxes or raising more debt (Zeit 2015). Italy is expected to receive a far smaller number of migrants but runs a fiscal deficit
and, unlike Germany, has a structural unemployment problem. Still, the fiscal impact of hosting more refugees in Italy over
the next five years is likely to be marginal.
Whether they are hosted in a developing or advanced country, the fiscal impact of forced migrant inflows depends
critically on policies designed to integrate them in the formal labor market, and the tax revenue they generate. Refugees
often have some limited assets to draw from on arrival, which tend to boost the consumption of local goods and services;
however, these funds run out quickly if refugees cannot replenish them through gainful employment3. Settlement
regulations also matter. Refugees in camps are less likely to become part of the formal labor market and to contribute
through taxes. In Jordan and Lebanon the employment opportunities in the formal sector are scarce. In Europe, asylum
seekers have to wait 9 months on average to receive a work permit, though in Germany the delay was recently cut down to
under 5 ½ months (OECD 2015c, p.18). One estimate suggests that If they are integrated into labor markets speedily, “the
influx of refugees could lift EU growth by 0.2 percentage points, due both to demand-side effects in the short run and to
supply-side ones in the longer run” (World Bank MFM GP 2015, p.5). Refugees can also boost tax revenue by facilitating
trade and investment flows between the origin and host communities, as appears to be happening in the case of Syrian
refugees moving their operations from Syria to Turkey (World Bank MFM GP 2015, p.2)(World Bank MFM GP 2015,
p. 2) but maintaining business links with Syria.
Social and Political Imbalance
While this analysis has mainly focuses in on the economic effects of the sudden inflow of refugees into a host community,
there are also implications for the social and political fabric which can have economic repercussions. Indeed, although real
or perceived adverse economic effects can be an important cause of social tensions, concerns about maintaining the
political balance, preserving local mores, protecting national security, not to mention the ever-present xenophobia and
racism, have a dynamic of their own. In some instances, the inflow of displaced populations reignites preexisting tensions
among different ethnic groups over resources, territory, or influence. Examples include tensions caused by a large inflow
of Bangladeshis into Northern India (Times of India 2013), Mozambican refugees in Malawi, Eritreans in Eastern Sudan,
and displaced Ugandans clashing with native population within Northern Uganda (comp. Refugee Studies Centre 2011,
p. 78). The recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels and allegations of sexual harassment by immigrant men in Cologne
and Stockholm have ignited fears of communal tensions. These incidents, attitudes and concerns, as much as economic
effects, lie at the heart of the widespread resistance to welcoming large numbers of refugees. A demographic shock which
affects existing political, ethnic, religious, and social equilibria, creates new winners and losers in the system and can
exacerbate existing fragilities. Similar to the economic effects, some of these imbalances might resolve themselves or
create new acceptable equilibria, but others might be seen as unacceptably disruptive by specific minorities or even the
majority of the population.
Even a cursory examination of countries hosting large numbers of forced migrants reveals that these countries typically
exhibit a fragile investment climate. Thus, about half of the top ten hosts of forced migrants do not even feature in the most
recent World Economic Forum Competitiveness Rankings, while most of the rest of the group, as well as Lebanon and
Jordan, rank very low on the competitiveness list.
Often concerns hinge on security rather than on material well-being. Studies have shown that it is not just the size of the
displaced populations but also the duration of displacement and the pre-existing inter-group dynamics which determine
insecurity as in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Schmeidl 2002) or refugee-hosting areas in Tanzania (Rutinwa
and Kamanga 2003). Encampment of refugees can reinforce an ‘us versus them’ dynamic. Camps or enclosed spaces can
strengthen a national narrative, in a positive way, as in the ‘Mayan revival’ of Guatemalan refugees or contribute to
3 Increased consumption can also lead to increasing prices for essential goods, effectively worsening the situation for both displaced
and hosts. Alix-Garcia and Saah, for example, show negative real income effects on households in refugee hosting areas of western
Tanzania due to “large increase in the prices of non-aid food items and more modest price effects for aid-related food items” (2010, p.
148).
10
radicalization, as in the case of Palestinian refugees in the blockaded Gaza strip. But even refugees who become integrated
in the labor market and are self-sufficient, as in the case of urban refugees in Nairobi, still “remain vulnerable to arrest and
xenophobic violence, illustrating the significance of contextualizing employment levels with the broader political economy
of displacement” (Refugees Studies Centre 2011, p. 65, comp. Campbell 2006).
Still, there is clearly a link between the economic and political impact of mass forced migration host communities. The
inflow of refugees “has challenged the already delicate societal and inter-communal balance in Lebanon […];
overcrowding, saturation of basic services and competition for jobs are among the root causes for social tensions between
host and refugee communities” (Verme 2015a, p. 5). These relationships can work both ways, however. In Germany,
“opinion polls suggest that the more favorable economic situation is also linked with a more favorable public opinion
regarding receiving refugees, although this has not prevented xenophobic attacks. Public opinion at least appears better
prepared for immigration compared with the situation in the early 1990s.” (OECD 2015a, p. 11).
The preceding sections have shown that the immediate impact of a large and sudden flows of refugees creates challenges
for policy-makers and for forced migrants in any environment, but that the challenge is especially daunting when the
inflow of refugees is large relative to the native population, the host country is poor, has little fiscal space, and low
administrative capacity. Not surprisingly, while many migrants stay in the country or region of first arrival, many others
choose to move again if they can, and to settle permanently in another place, whether in the North or the South, where
there is a job for them. The next section examines the long-term impact of migration on the region of settlement.
Settlement, and the Predominantly South-South Nature of Forced Migration
In contrast to the wealth of data-driven research on the economic impact of migration into high income countries, the
literature on migration into low-and middle-income countries is sparse4. Yet, the stock of South-South migrants, at
82.3 million, which includes both voluntary and forced migrants, edges that of migrants from the South that reside in the
North (UNDESA 2013), at 81.9 million. However, the share of forced migrants that originate in the South and stay in the
South is overwhelming. “Refugees account for a relatively small proportion of the global migrant stock. In 2013, the total
number of refugees in the world was estimated at 15.7 million, representing about 7% of all international migrants. Nearly
nine of every ten refugees in the world had found asylum in developing regions“ (OECD, UNDESA 2013). The
implication is that about 10% of the South-South migrants are forced, compared to less than 2% of South-North migrants
(IOM 2013, 68) (see table 2). Thus, although much of the attention of researchers and journalists is focused on the refugees
in the North, their number is tiny, not only in comparison to the size of population but also compared to the number of
voluntary migrants in the North. Nevertheless, this section pays much attention to the impact of forced migration in the
North as well as to those countries in the South that attract many forced migrants, for two reasons. First, because, as is
made clear in the previous discussion, although the North allows entry to only relatively small number of forced migrants,
its capacity to absorb larger numbers is considerable. Second, because the rich vein of research on immigration in the
North can help shed insights on immigration in the South, albeit with caveats.
Settlement in the North
As discussed, with the passage of time, the economic impact of forced migrants who are allowed to work or who are
allowed to move to find work, comes to resemble that of voluntary migrants. Even though the initial decision to migrate is
forced, eventually those who are allowed to do so (or do so even if they are not allowed) decide where and when to seek
work. For example, the likely economic impact of large numbers of Syrian refugees in Germany where they are being
taught German and allowed to work, is similar in the long-term to that of voluntary migrants. For this reason, analyzing the
impact of forced migration on the region of settlement can draw usefully on the literature on voluntary migration as well as
that on forced migration.
The literature on permanent migration in the North, whether forced or voluntary, is primarily concerned with four issues:
the impact on the wages of natives, especially on the wages of native unskilled workers; the impact on unemployment; the
long-term fiscal impact of immigration (as distinct from the immediate fiscal cost of supporting refugees); and the impact
4 As in Ratha and Shaw (2007), here we classify countries of the South as those the World Bank classifies as low- and middle-income
countries; the countries of the North are the high-income countries
11
on aggregate economic growth through investment and increased productivity. Not surprisingly, these issues are closely
linked, since, for example, insofar as immigration affects investment and economic growth, it can be expected to affect the
wages and employment of natives, and to affect public finances, indirectly as well as directly; and, whether immigrants
find jobs affects their ability to pay taxes.
The Effect of Immigration on Economic Growth
Consider the following story. A country, Welcomia, receives a large number of forced (or voluntary) migrants. If migrants
are allowed to work, the labor market is flexible, and the investment climate is supportive, one would expect that the influx
of migrants will have a similar effect on the economy as an increase in young natives (migrants tend to be young) joining
the domestic labor force. The increased inflow of workers raises the demand for capital, including housing, and the return
to capital, and stimulates investment. In the longer run, one can expect the economy of Welcomia to return to the same
capital-labor ratio and initial wage. (Solow 1956) Thus, a large one-time influx of migrants simply scales up the economy
proportionately to the increase in the labor force associated with migration. Though the rise of wages of native workers
may slow or wages may decline temporarily while the adjustment takes place, increased investment will ensure that wages
rise again and are unchanged in the steady state compared to the counterfactual of no new migration. The adjustment to the
new equilibrium will occur faster in an open economy which can import capital to accompany the larger labor force and
where the expansion of labor-intensive export industries can expand to absorb the additional labor. Flexible and buoyant
economies with a conducive investment climate and efficient capital markets will adjust faster to a migration shock –- as to
any shock – than economies that do not display those characteristics.
The realism of this story hinges on the assumptions that the capital-output ratio is fairly constant, and that the capital stock
and the labor-force to grow tend to grow at similar rates over very long periods. It turns out that these are two long-
established empirical regularities in economics (Harrod 1926). Moreover, recent research in advanced countries suggests
that domestic investment is quite quickly stimulated by a migration surge, so that within a few years the capital-labor ratio
tends to return to its prior level in the face of a labor market shock. This conclusion is supported by studies such as
Ottaviano and Peri (2008) for the US, Brücker and Jahn (2011) for Germany, Cohen and Hsieh (2000), and Ortega and Peri
(2009) in a study of 14 OECD countries. Migration in advanced countries tends to occur at a moderate and quite steady
pace (typically adding about 0.5% to the labor force every year), so that its effects are embedded in business plans, making
the adjustment smoother. Currently, the inflow of refugees in advanced countries, with few exceptions such as Germany
and Sweden, represent a small share of this immigration.
Economic growth is driven not only by the increase in the stock of labor and capital that immigration can trigger, but also –
and even more importantly – by the growth in productivity of all factors of production. Unfortunately, few studies have
addressed the issue of how immigration affects productivity, and the available evidence is mixed. Orefice (2010)
speculates that not only does immigration generate investment opportunities, migrants can affect TFP in host countries in
many ways, such as boosting entrepreneurship, providing new opportunities for specialization among workers and to
exploit complementarities, increasing flexibility, reinforcing agglomeration economies, and populating remote locations,
thus raising the returns to capital as well as wages across the economy. He examines the effect of migration on per capita
income using bilateral migrant flows from 86 developing countries to 24 OECD countries from 1998 to 2007 and
concludes that, in this process, the skill level of migrants matters a lot. If migrants are high-skilled, they will tend to raise
per capita income and prompt a long-term increase in the economy’s capital-labor ratio; if, on the other hand, they are
predominantly low-skilled, they will reduce average income per capita in the short run and promote the adoption of less
productive, more labor-intensive technologies. In contrast, carrying out an analysis of the effects of migration on US states,
Peri (2009) and Peri and Sparber (2008) found that, at the state level, migration is associated with increased output per
worker in the long run, a reflection of increased investment and specialization effects as typically natives take on different
tasks, leading to efficiency gains through specialization. For example, in states with an influx of unskilled migration, who
are typically non-English speakers, natives take on an increased share of communications-intensive jobs. Over the long run
(10 years), a net inflow of migrants equal to a 1 percent of employment increases income per worker by 0.6-0.9 percent.
Other studies have found that while unskilled immigrants may initially lower average incomes and wages in the host
country, in the longer term they and their offspring can help accelerate the growth of income per capita, provided they
become integrated. In an attempt to evaluate the long-term impact of unskilled migration, Card (2005) examines the
earnings of first generation immigrants in the United States over time and also the educational attainment of their children.
He finds that first generation migrants close only about a quarter of the 40 percent-gap in earnings with respect to natives,
12
but their children tend to do slightly better than the children of natives. There is a strong correlation between the education
levels of children and those of their parents, but even the children of Mexican immigrants, whose parents have very little
education on average, close a very large part of the education gap with respect to the children of natives. A recent cross-
country study by the OECD (2009) found a marked difference in the achievement of children of migrants in the United
States and other traditional immigration countries, who matched that of the children of natives, and those of children of
migrants in Europe where they underperformed by a wide margin, after controlling for socio-economic differences. Results
consistent with these findings were reported by Dustmann (Card et al. 2012) and by a recent Johns Hopkins study (Hao and
Woo, 2012). Results consistent with these findings were reported by Dustmann (Card et al. 2012) and by a recent Johns
Hopkins study (Hao and Woo, 2012).
The Wages of Unskilled Workers
The fear that large inflows of unskilled migrants from the South will take jobs away from unskilled natives in the North
has motivated a very large literature. Going back to the story of Welcomia in the previous section, consider the different
effect of the inflow of large numbers of predominantly unskilled migrants on the native skilled and unskilled workers.
Skilled natives, who are complementary to the unskilled immigrants, will tend to end up better off in the new steady state
on account of both increased investment and having more unskilled workers to work with. However, the effect on unskilled
natives is a priori indeterminate, since, while they, too, benefit from increased investment, they will confront increased
competition from the unskilled migrants. Which of these effects dominates will depend critically on the extent to which the
unskilled migrants are close substitutes for domestic unskilled workers, a question that has been extensively studied. By
estimating a production function including groups of workers classified by education, experience, gender and origin,
Ottaviano and Peri (2008) for the U.S., Manacorda et al. (2006) for the UK, and for Brücker and Jahn (2011), D’Amuri and
Peri (2011) and Felbermayr et al. (2010) for Germany reach the conclusion that unskilled immigrants and natives are
imperfect substitutes. Immigrants who do not speak the language, often cannot read and write in Latin script, have scant
networks, and relatively low expectations, tend to do different jobs than unskilled natives, so compete with them only
indirectly.
Consistent with these findings, most – though not all – studies of the effect of unskilled migration on the wages of unskilled
workers find only small negative effects. The early literature on the subject typically concluded that a 1 percent increase in
the immigrant share in the population causes no decline in wages or a decline of 0.1 percent. These “area studies”
attempted to exploit the variation in migration incidence across countries, or more typically, across localities in the United
States. A partial list of these studies includes Altonji and Card (1991), Butcher and Card (1991), LaLonde and Topel
(1991), and Schoeni (1997).(1991), Butcher and Card (1991), LaLonde and Topel (1991), and Schoeni (1997). However,
as Borjas pointed out in a landmark contribution, the area studies often failed to contend with a serious endogeneity
problem, since the intensity of migrants in a specific locality is itself influenced by wage and employment opportunities,
tending to bias the estimated effect of migration on wages severely downwards (Borjas, 2003). The additional criticism on
studies that correlate the variation in immigration intensity across localities in the United States with wages, is that natives
(and other migrants) compensate for increased migration by moving elsewhere.
One solution – albeit imperfect – to the endogeneity problem, which also turns out to be highly relevant to the study of
forced migration, was to examine instances of mass migration which are prompted by political or other external events and
therefore are not plausibly in response to labor market conditions in the receiving country. In 1990, David Card published
his classic analysis of the influx of Cuban migrants to Miami during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift (named after the port in Cuba
where the boatlift took place) (Card 1990). Card found that, although the Mariel immigrants increased the labor force of
the Miami metropolitan area by 7 percent, they had virtually no effect on the wage rates or unemployment levels of less-
skilled non-Cuban workers, including blacks and other Hispanics. Effects on previously resident Cuban workers were also
very small. Instead, Card’s study finds that the Miami labor force was able to rapidly absorb the flood of predominantly
low-skilled, Cuban immigrants. He speculates that two factors may help account for the rapid absorption of the Mariel
immigrants: presence of industries in Miami, such as garments, able to expand and employ unskilled migrants, and a
compensatory reduction in the rate of migration into Miami from the rest of the United States following the influx of the
Mariel immigrants.
Following Card, many other instances of sudden migration surges have been analyzed and yielded similar results (see Hunt
1992; De Lima & Carrington 1996) though some found somewhat greater effects on native wages, in the range of 1-2%.
In a contribution that exemplifies the broader economy-wide approach of the most recent literature, Peri and Ottaviano
13
(2008) refute Borjas’ findings that the effects of migration on the wages of unskilled workers are large. Like Borjas, they
examine the effects of migration of different age/education cohorts and their impact on the national labor market in the
United States, but, applying a standard production function model, they find instead that immigration over 1990-2006 had
small negative effects in the short run on native workers with no high school degree (-0.7 percent) and on average wages (-
0.4 percent), while it had small positive effects on native workers with no high school degree (+0.3 percent) and on
average native wages (+0.6 percent) in the long run. They also find a wage effect of new migrants on previous migrants on
the order of negative 6 percent. Ottaviano and Peri’s conclusions differ so markedly from Borjas’ mainly because they
account for the increase of investment over time and its employment-expanding effects, and they account more precisely
for the imperfect substitution between migrants and natives. An important benefit that natives – whether they are skilled or
unskilled – derive from unskilled migrants, and one that until recently was largely neglected, is that they help reduce the
prices of non-traded goods and services that natives use intensively, such as home care, food preparation, gardening, and
construction. Cortes (2008) finds that the surge in immigration in the Unites States during 1980-2000 may have reduced
the prices of these services by about 10 percent.
Effects on Employment
Many advanced countries, most notably in Europe, experience high and persistent unemployment over many years, even
when growth is near or above long-term potential. Especially at a time of prolonged high unemployment like today, the
worry that increased immigration will simply make the structural or cyclical unemployment problem worse resonates
widely.
Brucker and Jahn (2011) consider an economy where collective bargaining predominates in some “rigid” sectors and
where the labor market is very flexible in others. They find that migration can increase unemployment in the rigid sector.
The wage in the rigid sectors is determined in a standard wage bargaining model, where unions set the wage in function of
the level of unemployment and firms are free to determine employment in function of the prevailing wage. Increased
migration with the same education and experience distribution as previous migrants will then contribute to raise
unemployment in the rigid sectors (as some of the migrants will demand to work in those sectors) while having a relatively
small negative effect on wages in the rigid sector, and reduce the wage in the flexible sector where unemployment remains
low by definition. In the long run, these effects will dissipate as investment responds in a way similar to the perfect labor
market case. Thus, the model which assumes perfect labor markets tends to overestimate the impact of migration on
average wages and to underestimate the effect on unemployment. Brücker (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of studies
examining the effect of immigration on unemployment in the U.S. and Europe and found that in general an increase in
immigration by 1 percent of the population leads to an increase in unemployment of no more than 0.3 percent.
In contrast, studies of the U.S. labor market, which is among the most flexible, have found no significant effect of
immigration on employment opportunities for native workers (Peri 2009), including low-skilled native workers, between
1990 and 2007. Peri and Sparber (2008) report that migrants induce task specialization of natives. They found that, among
less-educated workers, those born in the United States tend to have jobs in manufacturing or mining, while migrants tend
to have jobs in personal services and agriculture, providing an explanation for why low-skilled migration has a limited
impact on employment. In fact, the share of migrants among the less-educated is strongly correlated with the extent of
U.S.-born worker specialization in communication tasks. In states with a heavy concentration of less-educated migrants,
U.S.-born workers have shifted toward more communication-intensive occupations. Those jobs pay higher wages than
manual jobs, and so such a mechanism has stimulated the productivity of workers born in the United States and generated
new employment opportunities.
Long-Term Fiscal Impact of Immigration
A commonly held belief is that unskilled immigrants come to “live off” the welfare state in advanced countries. It is true
that recently arrived voluntary immigrants generally have a less favorable net fiscal profile than natives, and forced
migrants have an even less favorable net fiscal profile as the previous sections suggest. However, this is mainly because
they contribute less to taxes and social security than natives, and their labor force participation rates are lower, not because
they use social services more intensively. Consequently, the fiscal profile of migrants improves over time if they are
allowed to, and find, work, and most studies find that immigration has a minimal fiscal impact on developed countries in
the long run.
14
Three approaches are employed in the literature to measure the fiscal impact of immigration: the accounting approach,
which examines the fiscal impact of resident immigrants in any given year; dynamic models, which examine the fiscal
impact of additional migration on future public budget balances; and macroeconomic models, which examine the fiscal
implications that flow from the overall impact of immigration on the economy. Assumptions regarding the extent to which
immigrants should bear the cost of public goods such as defense, infrastructure, and administration significantly affect
findings. Moreover, state and local governments tend to carry the burden of providing public services and welfare support,
and can see much larger effects in instances of high immigrant concentration.
A recent OECD Migration Outlook (2013) provides an overview of the literature on the fiscal impact of immigration on
OECD countries. Most studies indicate a small fiscal impact (less than +/-1 percent of GDP), subject to methodological
approaches and key assumptions. In many European OECD countries, raising immigrants’ employment rate relative to
natives would entail significant fiscal gains; in Belgium, France, and Sweden, this would have a budget impact of more
than 0.5 percent of GDP. Factors which affect the fiscal impact include characteristics of the immigrant population such as
age and reason for migration. The available literature suggests that young unskilled migrants who come to work, and who
are, moreover, employed, can be expected to be net fiscal contributors, with the turning point being between the age of 40
and 45. Labor migrants generally have a more positive fiscal impact on their host countries than migrants who emigrate for
family or humanitarian reasons.
Employment is the most important factor affecting the net fiscal profile of immigrants, especially in countries with
generous welfare states. Raising migrants’ employment rate to those of natives would boost public budget balances
significantly, in some countries by as much as 0.5 percent of GDP. Still, as the aforementioned OECD study affirms, “in
the long run for most countries, the overall conclusion [is that immigration] is neither a major burden nor a major panacea
for the public purse.” (OECD 2013, p.161). From the fiscal perspective, the big difference between immigrants and natives
is not in benefits received, but rather in taxes paid. In part because immigrants on average have less education, at each age
they earn less and pay substantially lower taxes of all kinds and to all levels of government.
This section has reviewed the evidence on the impact of immigration on growth of investment and output advanced host
economies, the wages and employment of unskilled natives, and on public finances, providing a fairly reassuring picture.
Yet, this only conveys part of the story. Broad studies conducted using computable general equilibrium models (e.g. World
Bank 2006) suggest that not only do the natives of advanced countries derive modest net gains from immigration (with
native skilled workers and capital owners clear net gainers, while native unskilled workers are small net losers), but also
migrants see a very large increase in real incomes and the country of origin can also derive large benefits from increased
remittances. The next section examines how these conclusions hold up in the case of South-South migration.
Settlement in the South
As already mentioned, according to the United Nations, the stock of South-South migrants – comprising both voluntary and
forced migrants – is slightly larger than that of South-North migrants. However, the latter has been growing more rapidly,
more than doubling since 1990, while the former grew by over 40% (UNDESA Population Division 2013). Chart 3 shows
that the major South-South migration corridors are among countries in Asia and among countries in Africa. Thus,
53.8 million migrants have moved from one country of Asia to another country in Asia, and 15.3 million migrants have
moved within Africa. The overwhelming majority of migrants from the South either stay in their region of origin or head to
Europe or to North America. Very few migrants from the South head to a developing region outside their own.
15
Chart 3: International Migrant Population by Major Area of Origin and Destination
Source: UNDESA Population Division, 2013
Migration among countries of the South appears to depend greatly on proximity: 80 percent of South-South migration
occurs between countries with contiguous borders. These migration corridors are less restricted, entail less cost, pose less
risks, and appear to build on networks of families and friends even more than South-North migration, which allows even
migrants with limited resources and without travel documents to move across borders (Ratha & Shaw 2007, p. 19). Due to
these low financial, social and cultural costs of migration, differences in country income appear to play a lesser role in
South-South migration than in South-North migration: remarkably “About 38 percent of identified South-South migrants
come from countries with higher incomes than their host country” (Ratha & Shaw 2007, p. 18). Individual opportunities
may of course be greater than these averages indicate, since, even if they are moving to a lower average income location,
migrants are still responding to incentives for increased earnings or immediate economic survival needs.
Chart 4: Major refugee-hosting countries (end 2014)
Source: UNHCR Global Trends 2014
53,8
37,8
25,9
18,6
15,7 15,3
8,9 7,6 5,4 4,6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Top 10 International Migrant Pathways by Major Area of
Origin and Destination, UNDESA Population Division 2013, in
millions (Origin-Destination)
–
200 000
400 000
600 000
800 000
1 000 000
1 200 000
1 400 000
1 600 000
1 800 000
Turkey Pakistan Lebanon Iran Ethiopia Jordan Kenya Chad Uganda China
Top 10 Refugee Hosting Countries, UNHCR Global Trends 2014 (end-2014
data)
16
From an intra-household decision perspective, these movements help families diversify their sources of income thereby
reducing the risk of a complete loss of income in case of crisis in their home community (Lucas 2005, World Bank 2005).
Migration within low and middle-income countries is also often used for more temporary goals such as seasonal work or as
a transit stop on the way to a high income country (Campillo-Carrete 2013; UNDESA, OECD 2013). The different patterns
of motivation translate into a different profile of migrant population who is more likely to be poor and less educated than
their counterparts who make it to the North. Data is inadequate, but there is a consensus in the existing literature that
migration within and between developing countries involves an even higher share of unskilled migrants(Hujo & Piper
2007) than South-North migration. OECD estimates suggest that “in the North, 24 per cent of all migrants have completed
tertiary education, while only 15 per cent of migrants in the South have reached this level of education” (IOM 2013, p.68).
The flow of refugees is far more skewed towards the South-South corridor than the flow of migrants. As Table2 shows,
close to 8 million refugees are from the South and find abode in the South, while only 1.8 million refugees find abode in
the North. Moreover, refugees represent just 2% of the total flow of South-North migrants, but they represent 11% of the
flow of South-South migrants.
When the migration is forced, the selection of migrants that remain in the South also appears to be skewed towards the
most vulnerable segment of the population, those with small or no assets, low education levels, children and young
mothers (Verme 2015a; Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez 2009). This pattern fits with the OECD’s findings on the current inflow
of Syrian refugees to Europe with a comparatively high level of education and assets. As already mentioned, only the ones
who are the most skilled and have assets to start with can even make it on the arduous journey from their first displacement
in Syria to a country in Europe (OECD 2015).
Table 2: Number of refugees, share of global refugee stock and share of migrant stock, 2010
Refugees by Migration Pathway
South-
North
North-
North
South-
South
North-
South
Stock (in thousands) 1,756 19 7,939 61
% of global refugee stock 18.0% 0.0% 81.0% 1.0%
% of total migrants (in each
pathway)
2.0% 0.0% 11.0% 1.0%
Source: UNHCR, 2010
When the migration is forced, the selection of migrants that remain in the South also appears to be skewed towards the
most vulnerable segment of the population, those with small or no assets, low education levels, children and young
mothers (Verme 2015a; Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez 2009). This pattern fits with the OECD’s findings on the current inflow
of Syrian refugees to Europe with a comparatively high level of education and assets. As already mentioned, only the ones
who are the most skilled and have assets to start with can even make it on the arduous journey from their first displacement
in Syria to a country in Europe (OECD 2015).
The characteristics of migrants that settle in the South combined with the limited hosting capacity of countries result in a
rather different picture of economic impact as compared to migration to the North. The most obvious difference lies in the
smaller income gap between the country of origin and the country destination in the case of South-South migration. The
South-South migrant moves from a low-productivity environment to another low -or even lower- productivity
environment, so the resulting gains for the migrant, and the country of origin (through remittances) are likely to be far
smaller than South-North migration. While individual voluntary migrants may, nevertheless, be making significant income
gains from moving that are concealed by these averages (just as there are migrants from the North that move to the South
to exploit specific opportunities), migrants that are forced to move from one country or region of the South to another may
not improve their income or may lose outright.
To estimate the differential impact between South-South to South-North migration, Ratha and Shaw apply an appropriately
calibrated global computable general equilibrium model and perform a simulation of an increase in migration to compare
movement of 14.2 million workers (equal to 3% of the labor force of advanced countries) from developing countries to
advanced countries, and from developing countries to developing countries. The results of the simulations find just a
17
60 percent wage increase for South-South migration compared to an over 2300 percent increase in wages for South-North
migration. The gain for migrants moving from low -to high-income countries in this simulation appears to be inordinately
large but may be a reflection of the income gap that persists between the countries of origin with large populations, many
of which are very poor, and the advanced countries5. Moreover, the authors caveat that this comparatively large real wage
increase in high-income countries comes with higher upfront migration costs, and higher taxes. While these factors reduce
the overall welfare gains from South-North migration, it is fair to assume that the welfare gain differential would remain
extremely large even after adjustment.
Confirming these model projections, the comparatively lower increase in wages for the South-South migrant results in
smaller remittances to the country of origin. UN data suggests that in 2010, North-South remittance flows came to
$267 billion versus $55 billion in South-South remittances. [Note that these flows include remittances originating in
countries such as Russia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, which the World Bank has recently classified as high-income; to be
checked]. So, while South-South migrants make up almost half of international migration stock, they only remit a less than
a quarter of all remittances. Once again the data on remittances flowing to and from low and middle income countries is
not very reliable, so an even larger amount of remittances is likely flowing unrecorded through formal and informal
channels6 than is the case for North-South remittances. No data is available that allows identification of remittances from
forced migrants to their country of origin; one can speculate that if, as is often the case, whole families eventually leave
(even if the able-bodied leave first), remittances by forced migrants are relatively small and short-lived, and also flow
predominantly through informal channels7.
The lower wage differential for migrants moving from the South to other countries in the South compared to those moving
to the North signals higher competition and less complementarity with native workers. As set out above, South-South
migration flows are made up of a very high share of low-skilled, uneducated workers, and that proportion is even higher
among forced migrants, and the labor force of developing countries is also predominantly unskilled. Evidence on Syrian
migration to Turkey and on regionally displaced Colombians, for example, confirms this (Del Carpio 2015, Ceritoglu
2015, Calderon Ibanez 2009). The increased competition at the low-skill end of the income distribution leads to increased
downward pressure on already low wages, with significant and adverse distributional impacts (Maystadt and Verwimp
2009). These trends can be aggravated by the need to find jobs for the rapidly growing young population in poor countries8.
Beyond the immediate labor market factors, as already discussed in previous sections, the host countries in the South also
have lower capacity to provide for social and public services and to handle additional population pressures: “Western
industrialized countries with well-established institutions, powerful economies and stable societies are actually not
comparable to developing countries with severe economic, political and bureaucratic deficiencies.” (Czaika 2005, 103)
Developing countries also have low capacity to manage the social tensions resulting from large flows of migrants:
“policies to manage immigration are lacking while control of the same is failing to contain the inflow of migrants due to
scarce resources, weak administrative capacity, and porous borders.” (Ratha, Mohapatra, Scheja 2011, 14; comp. Adepoju
2005; Crush 2000).
5 The results from this general equilibrium exercise need to be taken with a grain of salt because as the authors point out since for one
“the parameters driving the results (such as elasticity of wages with respect to changes in the supply of workers) have only a limited
empirical foundation” and, second, “the model cannot account for many issues that affect the wage gains from migration (such as the
legal status of migrants, effects of migration on workers’ productivity, the potential impact on investment of a greater supply of
workers, and adjustment costs faced by migrants)” (Ratha and Shaw 2007, 25). Despite these difficulties, these simulations give us the
best available estimate of the relative economic impact of South-South versus South-North migration.
6 Ratha and Shaw estimate that the true size of these flows, is believed to be at least 50 percent larger (Ratha and Shaw 2007).
7 It is also important to note that even if flows between countries in the South are smaller, they are nevertheless important for
development especially in the least developed countries who received two thirds of their remittances from other countries in the South
(UNCTAD, 2012). This can be explained by the fact that “migrants from LDCs mainly move to other developing countries and only
one out of four migrates to a developed country.” (IOM 2013,71)
8 Some studies, however, find complex distributional effects. Displacement of households in Northern Uganda “… had a positive effect
on the value of assets in households that originally had little or no assets but reduced the value of assets of all other households by
between 17% and 26%” (Fiala 2009, p. 1). While circumstances of displacement will determine how distributional effects play out, it
remains true that the movement will invariably cause ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (comp. Maystadt & Verwimp 2009; Alix-Garcia & Saah
2010).
18
In cases where large amounts of humanitarian aid flow into a very poor region hosting refugees, the effects on the native
population or at least on the land and capital owners can be positive. A study of the Dadaab camp in Kenya for example
finds annual benefits for the host community of “USD 82 million through increased trading and business opportunities,
camp-related employment, improved infrastructure” (Zetter 2014, p. 5). These positive effects emanating from
humanitarian aid flows will only be sustainable, however, if the region receiving the aid develops a viable source of
earnings from exportable products or services or from labor income from a nearby town.
Returning to the example of Welcomia in the previous section, the country that receives large numbers of migrants and
allows them to work, in principle Welcomia could be either a developing or advanced country, and in either case one could
see output and investment expand with the arrival of refugees. Indeed, in the many instances where the inflow of refugees
is small relative to the size of the population, and the investment climate is favorable, a developing country might derive
significant benefits in terms of increased output and investment, even if they might need help to cover the fiscal cost of
initially sustaining the refugees. However, these conclusions do not apply in instances where the inflow is very large and
causes such large frictions that the investment climate – which may already be fragile to start with – deteriorates. In those
instances, while supporting low-capacity hosting countries with aid and technical assistance helps, it is unlikely to
represent a durable solution to the forced migration challenge.
Coordination Problem
The rising number of forced migrants and their concentration in a small number of relatively low-income regions creates
daunting problems and large costs for those regions, great suffering for the migrants, and a humanitarian challenge of the
first order for the international community. But that is only a part of the story. The concentration of “unabsorbed” forced
migrants also creates large negative effects on the surrounding region and on the rest of the world. These negative
externalities include the risk of political instability and alienation and radicalization of large groups, worsening of fiscal
and balance of payment imbalances in host countries which can result in economic shocks and inability to repay debt,
increased threat of infectious disease, and large and disorderly movements of refugees to countries where economic
opportunities exist. The presences of these externalities, as well as the obvious limits in the capacity of countries of first
arrival to cope create, the need for an internationally coordinated response.
Over and beyond the humanitarian response to the crisis, which will or should involve all countries, as well as civil society
and individuals willing and able to help, dealing with the economic and political externalities of the crisis requires
spreading its costs in function of countries’ capacity to pay or to carry the burden by hosting the migrants, on the one hand,
and the negative impact on them if the crisis is not adequately dealt and mitigated on the other. A number of schemes have
been proposed in this regard, and they all envision some combination of hosting forced migrants and covering the costs of
other countries that host them but are unable to carry the full cost.
Though some authors have tried (Czaika 2005, 2009; Dennis 1993; Hoertz & GTZ 1995; Rapport 2014; Schuck 2010), it is
difficult, if not impossible, to envision a scheme that allocates these costs “rationally” and precisely, since while the direct
costs of hosting refugees may be quantified with some degree of precision (the cost of shelter, food, infrastructure, etc.),
the indirect costs (e.g the effect on the social and political fabric) cannot be. As argued above, in advanced countries there
can be significant benefits, as well as costs, for the host population from absorbing refugees, and these will vary in function
of the investment climate and demographic trends. And the benefits accruing to individual countries from resolving or
mitigating the crisis are even more difficult to quantify: what is the value of avoiding radicalization and who gains the
most? Moreover, schemes that attempt to “allocate” refugees across countries according to simple formulas such as the
share in the population run into a fundamental obstacle, which is that refugees are not objects but people, and they
naturally have their own views as to where they will be welcomed and where they want to live and work.
Nevertheless, even the most cursory review of the distribution of forced migrants suggests that the burden is currently
distributed extremely unequally, and that a few relatively poor countries are carrying an entirely disproportionate share of
the burden. Constructing an index of the forced migration burden that depends on the size of the forced migrant stock, and
indicators such as per capita income, and institutional strength in 2003 Czaika found no high-income country among the
top 20 most burdened (Czaika 2005, 116).
The preceding discussion suggests some general principles that can help improve the response of the international
community.
19
– Any durable solution to the refugee crisis must provide jobs for the refugees; any other scheme – whether envisaging
increased humanitarian aid in the country of first arrival or return to country of origin or transfer to a third country –
does not represent a durable solution unless it provides for jobs.
– The developing country of first arrival must prepare for an extended period of adjustment to large flows of forced
migrants, and working with international donors, should formulate a development plan capable of absorbing a vastly
expanded labor force. Even though it cannot and should not carry the full cost of hosting refugees, the country of first
arrival has the greatest interest in helping resolve the crisis on account of its geographic proximity to the crisis.
– Countries which have a strong investment climate, more flexible labor markets, solid macroeconomic fundamentals,
and aging populations, need immigration and are especially capable to absorb refugees. Advanced countries and
developing countries that fit these characteristics should allow a much larger number of forced migrants to enter and
settle.
– A large share of the costs of housing refugees in developing countries of first arrival should be borne by advanced
countries. Advanced countries with large current account surpluses and large net foreign assets and that are
geographically closest to the crisis are especially well positioned to do more. Countries of first arrival which are host to
large numbers of migrants and with large fiscal and balance of payments deficits need the most help.
– The International Community must ensure that the funding of humanitarian and development agencies is adequate for
the task of relieving the suffering of refugees and helping countries absorb them. Care must be taken to avoid situations
of extended dependency.
Long experience with attempts to deal with international externalities in other areas, such as climate change, customs
and trade facilitation, and financial regulation suggests that hard, enforceable targets, are unlikely to be agreed by
sovereign nations, or to be applied even if they are agreed. As shown most recently by the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change, it is nevertheless possible to make progress with a combination of hard commitments on principles and more
flexible, voluntary, arrangements on specific targets. It is, for example, possible to envisage the adoption of general
principles on how to deal with refugees which go beyond the 1951 convention, and also to undertake firm
commitments to transparency and monitoring of policies regarding refugees. Agreement on this general framework can
be combined with voluntary targets on absorption of refugees and on aid flows, and on their periodic revision in light
of the evolving situation.
20
Conclusion
The current refugee crisis is a catastrophe affecting millions of families, endangering the stability of nations that are hosts
to large numbers of migrants, and of the region around them. There is little likelihood at present that large numbers of
forced migrants will return to their homes. There is no magic bullet. Managing the crisis and mitigating its worst effects
requires courage, leadership and political will. A cold-eyed economic assessment such as attempted in this chapter can
only help clarify the choices facing political action, not substitute for the willingness to undertake it.
Drawing on the literature on voluntary and forced migration as well on the recent field experience of international
agencies, the chapter has identified the centrality of finding jobs for forced migrants, and has highlighted the difficulty of
doing this in poor, low-capacity environments, and where public services and the political fabric are fragile to start with. At
the same time, the chapter has shown that concerns that accepting forced migrants in advanced countries will cause job
losses or falling wages, and place an undue burden on the public purse are largely unjustified, and that the global gains
from forced migrants settling in the South are much smaller than migrants settling in the North, and may result in net
welfare losses in some instances.
Forced migration flows which are mismanaged, as at present, create large negative political and economic externalities for
the world as a whole. There is no perfect scheme for allocating the burden, but, absent political solutions to conflicts, any
scheme must envisage increased numbers of refugees settling in the North and increased development aid for the countries
in the South with the largest numbers of refugees. Such a scheme is more likely to materialize if it is based on the adoption
of basic principles as well as voluntary – rather than compulsory – targets to welcome refugees, combined with firm
commitments to transparency and monitoring.
21
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10
UNHCR and the Securitization of
Forced Migration
Anne Hammerstad
A BSTR AC T
Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after the terror attacks of 11
September 2001 in the United States, refugee movements have increasingly been
portrayed by state policy makers, the media, and even the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees as a threat to security. This development is intrinsically
linked to the widening of the concept of security in the post-Cold War period
beyond the traditional Realist notion of national security as the military protec-
tion of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. This trend can be seen in the
academic literature as well as in the discourses of states, regional organizations,
and the UN. It is a phenomenon that can be observed in the industrialized
North as well as in the developing South, albeit in different manifestations.
The securitization of forced migrants, whether they be mass infl uxes of refugees
in the global South or asylum seekers in the North, has had a signifi cant impact
not only on how we talk about displacement, but also on what solutions we deem
appropriate for dealing with their situation. Using the securitization approach of
the Copenhagen School, this chapter will trace the process of securitization of
forced migration over the past two decades. It will then discuss the consequences
of this securitization for the treatment of asylum seekers in the North and mass
refugee fl ows in the South. The links between, on the one hand, Northern atti-
tudes and actions to deter and return asylum seekers, and on the other hand, an
increased unwillingness to receive refugees in the South will also be explored.
INTRODUCTION
We must attempt to reduce complex political questions in the minds of nations into
simple moral and humanitarian components for the heart to answer. (Sadruddin
Aga Khan, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, November 1974)
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 06/08/2010, SPi
Population displacement, whether internal or international has gone beyond the
humanitarian domain to become a major political, security and socio-economic
issue, affecting regional and global stability, as the crises in former Yugoslavia,
Somalia and Rwanda have clearly shown. (Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, October 1994)
These quotations are by the two longest-serving UN High Commissioners for
Refugees: Sadruddin Aga Khan, who dominated UNHCR throughout the
1970s, and Sadako Ogata, in charge of the refugee agency for almost the entire
decade of the 1990s. The quotations provide an apt snapshot of how percep-
tions of the refugee problem have changed over the decades. When even
UNHCR, which oversees the international refugee regime and is tasked with
protecting the rights of refugees, takes on a discourse of security, we can be
fairly confi dent that the refugee problem has gone through a process of secu-
ritization. This process—how it started, how it has unfolded, and what are its
consequences—is the concern of this chapter.
There is by now what seems to be a broad consensus among scholars that,
since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after the terror attacks of
11 September 2001 (9/11) in the United States, refugee movements have
increasingly been portrayed as a threat to security by state policy makers, the
media, and even UNHCR. In the IR literature, scholars began studying refu-
gees through the analytical prisms provided by Security Studies in the early
1990s (pioneers including Weiner (1993) and Loescher (1992) ). This happened
at the same time as the so-called ‘widening debate’ took off within the
academic fi eld of Security Studies at the end of the Cold War (see, e.g.,
Mathews 1989; Buzan 1991; Deudney 1990; Booth 1991; Baldwin 1997; Krause
and Williams 1997; Paris 2001). The securitization of refugee movements is
intrinsically linked to the widening of the concept of security in Security
Studies, beyond the traditional Realist notion of national security as the
protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity against military threats
and beyond the narrow defi nition of Security Studies as ‘the study of the
threat, use, and control of military force’ (Walt 1991: 212). Refugees were as
such not the only newcomers on academic and state security agendas in the
early 1990s; they were in the erstwhile company of other perceived emerging
global threats such as migration (in general) (Wæver et al. 1993) and the
environment (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994; Myers 1993).
The aim of this chapter is to track the securitization of refugee movements,
not in academic literature, but in the discourse of political elites who are
more directly responsible for maintaining the international refugee regime.
Securitization denotes the process wherein ‘an issue is presented as an exis-
tential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside
the normal bounds of political procedure’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23–4).
UNHCR and the Securitization of Forced Migration 239
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 06/08/2010, SPi
The securitization of displacement is a phenomenon that can be observed in
the industrialized North as well as in the developing South, albeit in different
manifestations. I will aim to document this process by focusing on the evolu-
tion of UNHCR’s offi cial discourse.
The chapter is structured as follows: I begin by sketching UNHCR’s tradi-
tional discourse, dominated by descriptions of the refugee problem as non-
political and humanitarian and the refugee agency’s own role as purely legal
and neutral. I then trace the evolution of this discourse over the decades, with
particular emphasis on the adoption of a fully fl edged security discourse in
the 1990s. After mapping these dramatic discursive changes, I discuss the
reasons why this shift took place.
The fi nal section looks at the impact and implications of this securitization
process on the functioning of the international refugee regime, and provides
evidence suggesting that viewing forced migration through a security prism
has encouraged an atmosphere where the hosting of refugees is understood
by states as a zero-sum game rather than a question of solidarity (with each
other and with refugees). This takes us to the question of desecuritization:
‘the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining
processes of the political sphere’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). I discuss the desira-
bility of desecuritizing forced migration, and view this against the many
reasons given for securitizing the issue in the fi rst place. I agree with Wæver’s
view (1995) that, in general, desecuritization is desirable. More specifi cally, I
argue that the reasons for securitizing the refugee problem have been
outweighed by the problems caused by viewing forced migrants through a
security prism. I also discuss some trends that seem to suggest that such a
desecuritization, or at least partial desecuritization, of forced migration is
indeed currently taking place within UNHCR’s discourse.
W H Y U N HCR?
Before turning to the main analysis, it would be prudent to say some words
about its relevance. Some may question the choice of UNHCR as the main
subject of study. Why not instead investigate the discourse of more powerful
actors such as the United States; of major refugee-hosting states in the South
such as Thailand and Tanzania; or of major asylum destinations in the North
such as Sweden and the United Kingdom? The fi rst reason is methodological:
Although it has grown to become one of the UN’s largest agencies, UNHCR
has a relatively narrow mandate and a unique structure where the person of
the High Commissioner enjoys an unrivalled position as the voice of refugees
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 06/08/2010, SPi
on the international arena. This means that UNHCR is an unusually
contained and unitary actor that lends itself well to discourse analysis.
Second, UNHCR’s offi cial discourse is worth analysing because it is linked
to, and refl ects, a broader securitization trend. The refugee agency would not
have developed and refi ned a discourse of security if this did not refl ect
changes in the perceptions and interests of key states. UNHCR relies on states
for funding,1 and for access to refugee populations, and therefore feels keenly
the need to remain relevant and responsive to their fears and needs. In the
words of High Commissioner Thorvald Stoltenberg:
If UNHCR is static and unresponsive to the political realities surrounding us, we
become meaningless both to the refugees and to the internal [sic] community which
have [sic] established us. If on the other hand, we are dynamic in analysing, under-
standing and responding to the very same political realities, we would be in a posi-
tion not only to serve those who need us directly, but we will also be occupying an
important and meaningful place on the world stage (. . .) (Stoltenberg, 17 January
1990a) 2
It is unlikely that UNHCR would have taken on a security discourse without
the belief that this resonated with the perceptions of core donor (in partic-
ular) and refugee host states. Having said that, it is also unlikely that the
refugee agency would have adopted a security discourse unless it thought it
could harness this discourse to further the cause of protecting refugees and
fi nding solutions to their plight. This means that UNHCR’s security discourse
varies in its emphases and its conceptualizations of security from the
discourses of states.
W H Y DISCOU R SE A NA LYSIS ?
But is securitization really that interesting? Is it not merely a matter of rhet-
oric? The study of refugees and security indicates that discourse does matter.
How we perceive and understand an issue affects how we act on it. Changing
perceptions of forced migrants, whether mass infl uxes of refugees in the
global South or asylum seekers arriving individually in the North, have had a
signifi cant impact not only on how we talk about refugees but also on what
actions we deem appropriate and acceptable for dealing with their situation.
According to UNHCR, part of whose mandate it is to monitor states’ adher-
ence to the international refugee regime, the protection climate for refugees
has deteriorated markedly in recent years (e.g. Feller 2008). In this chapter I
argue that, due to security language’s ‘specifi c capacity for fabricating and
UNHCR and the Securitization of Forced Migration 241
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 06/08/2010, SPi
sustaining antagonistic relations between groups of people’ (Huysmans 2006:
xii), the deterioration in the protection climate is linked to the securitization
of the refugee problem.
However, I would exaggerate the importance of discourse if I were to imply
that there is some direct and one-way causal link between the securitization
of refugee movements (the cause) and a deterioration in the international
protection climate (the effect). Instead, taking as a starting point the securi-
tization approach of the Copenhagen School, this chapter attempts to analyse
the process of securitization of forced migration as a form of hermeneutical
spiral between discourse and practice. The way we talk about a phenomenon
helps shape how we react to it. But our actions—and their consequences—in
turn help shape how we discuss the phenomenon.3 Thus, for the analysis to be
complete, in addition to studying the securitization of how we talk about
forced migration, the chapter will also discuss how changing realities on the
ground have facilitated such a securitization process.
U N HCR’S SECU R ITIZ ATION OF FORCED MIGR ATION :
A N I N TELLECT UA L HISTORY
An analysis of UNHCR’s offi cial discourse from its inception in 1951 until
today reveals startling changes in the refugee agency’s understanding and
presentation of the refugee problem through the decades.4 From a timidly
legalistic and non-political discourse studiously avoiding controversy in the
1950s, UNHCR had by the mid-1990s abandoned caution for a high-profi le
interventionist outlook, ready to deal with the root causes of displacement,
even when that meant being actively involved in humanitarian action in the
midst of war. Instead of its traditional emphasis on its uniqueness as the
world’s only refugee protection agency, UNHCR began to routinely describe
itself as a central cog in the UN’s international security mechanism. In its
own words, UNHCR’s discourse shifted from a ‘reactive, exile-oriented and
refugee-specifi c’ paradigm to a ‘proactive, homeland-oriented and holistic’
one (UNHCR 1995: 43).
UNHCR’s discursive evolution was a gradual one. In its fi rst decade, the
1950s, the agency stuck to a strictly legal self-defi nition, focusing (in dry tones
and general terms) on monitoring state signatories’ implementation of the
1951 Refugee Convention. In the 1970s, the agency’s language became more
humanitarian in its outlook, and more fl amboyant in style. In this period,
material assistance to refugees took an increasingly central place in the agen-
cy’s discourse. The 1980s saw the advent of a human rights agenda and a more
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political approach to the refugee problem. In this period UNHCR would
admonish states to deal with the ‘root causes’ of fl ight, not just leave the
refugee agency to alleviate the symptoms of the underlying political ills
causing displacement. Finally, a security discourse emerged in the early
1990s.
While there has been a gradual evolution of key concepts and ideas in
UNHCR’s discourse throughout its existence, the securitization of the refugee
problem happened surprisingly swiftly. For instance, a statistical analysis of
the frequency of the use of the term ‘security’ in UNHCR’s annual Reports to
the General Assembly shows a clear trend. From 1970 to 1986 you hardly see
the term (average 3.5 times per report). From 1986 to 1987 the mention of
‘security’ more than trebles, and the average frequency for one Report in the
period between 1987 and 1999 is 17.5. The trend continued upwards in the
early 2000s, with a peak in 2001 of thirty-eight mentions of security in its
different permutations. The average frequency in the years 2000 to 2006 is
21.7, but there is a clear downward trend from 2002 onwards, down to only
ten mentions of security in the 2006 report. The word frequency count thus
shows a sharp growth in the use of the term ‘security’ from the late 1980s
onwards, with a gentler but clear decline in the new millennium. A similar
trend can be found when counting the term ‘security’ in UNHCR’s annual
Notes on International Protection over the same period.5
Not only was the term security employed more frequently since the early
1990s but it evolved into an overarching framework within which UNHCR
embedded its other core concepts and which provided a new reason for the
refugee agency’s very existence. This can be seen when broadening the
discourse analysis beyond word frequencies to an analysis of the High
Commissioners’ speeches, the occasional publication The State of the World’s
Refugees (fi ve issues over a fi fteen-year period), editorial themes of Refugees
Magazine, various funding appeals, and a range of other central UNHCR
policy documents. My discourse analysis of these texts attempts to determine
the core concepts of UNHCR’s discourse; how these core concepts relate to
each other; how their meaning is adjusted and changed over time (for instance,
how the meaning of being ‘non-political’ changes dramatically over the
years); and how new concepts emerge (especially security), while other recede
in their signifi cance and centrality.
If one were to pinpoint a ‘watershed’, a moment when security terminology
seized centre stage in UNHCR’s discourse, it would probably be High
Commissioner Stoltenberg’s speech in October 1990, where he describes
UNHCR as a global security organization. The speech outlines three ambi-
tions for UNHCR and relates all three to the goal of furthering global secu-
rity. The fi rst ambition, to promote voluntary repatriation, is justifi ed as ‘a
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concrete contribution to peace and security’. The second, safeguarding
asylum, which must be done through containing economic migration through
the alleviation of poverty, is a task that is both ‘a moral issue and (. . .) a
problem of our collective security’. The third ambition, ‘to have the interna-
tional community recognize the importance of the issues of refugees and
migration and to place them fi rmly on the international political agenda’, is
necessary in order to overcome the narrowly defi ned, and now obsolete, secu-
rity thinking of the Cold War period. Instead we must recognize ‘the interde-
pendence of states and the need to confront together the common problems
and challenges to our global security’ (Stoltenberg 1990b).
Stoltenberg’s tenure was short. However, his successor Sadako Ogata inten-
sifi ed the process he started. With a background as a Japanese diplomat and a
former professor of International Relations, she redefi ned UNHCR’s purpose
from the narrower goal of protecting the rights of refugees to the broader
purpose of furthering international peace and security. She aimed to place
UNHCR at the centre of the attempt in the early 1990s to create a post-Cold
War ‘new world order’ of peace and stability. She argued that in order ‘to
reach a new order, the problem of displacement must be addressed effectively
and humanely’ (Ogata 1992a). Peace and security became, throughout the
1990s, a routine topic of Ogata’s speeches.
The Nature of UNHCR’s Discourse in the 1990s
The Ogata decade saw the consolidation and expansion of UNHCR’s security
discourse throughout the agency’s various publications and offi cial utter-
ances. But how did UNHCR understand and employ the concept of security
in the 1990s? A brief look at the publications The State of the World’s Refugees
gives a clear idea of both how central the concept of security was to UNHCR’s
discourse and how this concept developed over time. The 1997 edition gave
the concept of security an exceptionally prominent role: The fi rst chapter set
out UNHCR’s understanding of ‘security’ and the term was subsequently
employed as a guiding concept throughout the survey. At the same time the
1997 edition exemplifi ed how the refugee agency attempted to redefi ne secu-
rity into a more refugee-friendly concept. This was also a theme of Ogata’s
speeches: in 1995 she declared that a ‘major test for the coming decades (. . .)
will be to develop a humanitarian perspective of security’ (Ogata 1995).
This more humanitarian perspective took the form, in UNHCR’s
discourse, as the adoption of the concept of human security towards the end
of the 1990s. UNHCR’s advocacy of holistic approaches to the refugee problem
led the agency also to advocate a holistic notion of security: a concept of
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human security that aimed to incorporate all aspects of security from the
individuals to states and the international community. UNHCR, in common
with many other advocates of human security, did not go into detail about
how this could be achieved. The message was simply that by focusing on
human rights and dignity, ‘food security’, and other aspects of bettering the
life of individuals, the security of states and the international community
will—eventually—follow. Human security was endorsed as a new humani-
tarian and superior notion of security, which had the potential of replacing
narrow, short-sighted, and egotistical national security concerns with a
broader and longer-term perspective of collective security.
The introduction of the concept of human security into UNHCR’s offi cial
vocabulary made away with any dualism between the security of states and
regions and that of individuals. Instead, the security of individuals and that
of states and the international community became inextricably—and harmo-
niously—linked. Matching UNHCR’s post-Cold War mantra of comprehen-
sive and holistic approaches to solving the refugee problem, then, was the
refugee agency’s new comprehensive and holistic concept of security. The
agency had travelled a long way from when UNHCR’s discourse was framed
around the concepts of being non-operational and non-political. In the 1970s,
High Commissioner Aga Khan had understood his role to be to keep refugee
issues out of the sphere of international politics and security. Ogata stressed
the opposite: Population movements could no longer ‘be dealt with through
charity’, she said: there ‘must now be a clear realization that movements of
people are likely to become both a major political and security issue in the
near future’ (Ogata 1992b).
W H Y DID U N HCR SECU R ITIZE THE R EFUGEE PROBLEM ?
Since 2001, there has again been a considerable shift in UNHCR’s discourse,
this time away from the use of security language, at least to some extent.
Before I turn to a more detailed analysis of how and why this partial desecu-
ritization has occurred, this section will look at some of the political, opera-
tional, and bureaucratic reasons why UNHCR adopted a security discourse
in the fi rst place. I do this by placing UNHCR’s discursive evolution in the
context of
1. the agency’s operations on the ground;
2. the discourse and actions of core donor and refugee host states;
3. the emergence of more people-friendly conceptualizations of security; and
4. some bureaucratic shifts within the refugee agency itself.
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Changes in the Agency’s Operations on the Ground
Changes in UNHCR’s operational environment have had a signifi cant impact
on the agency’s security language. UNHCR began as a non-operational
agency, which then gradually became more involved in the fi eld, fi rst indi-
rectly through ‘implementing partners’, and then increasingly through the
fi eld presence of its own staff. It is now one of the largest humanitarian relief
agencies in the world, with most of its staff located in remote fi eld offi ces
rather than at the Geneva headquarters. But not only has UNHCR become
increasingly operational but the nature of its operations has also changed.
Traditionally UNHCR used to sit on the other side of the border waiting for
refugees to fl ow out. This sat well with its discourse of being a non-political
and humanitarian agency. In UNHCR’s 1970s discourse, security is never
mentioned without pairing it with politics, and both concepts are considered
as negative, alien elements in the refugee discourse, as in this example:
If a [formal refugee status determination] procedure does not exist, there is no guar-
antee that a bona fi de asylum seeker will be treated according to accepted humani-
tarian standards, and that extraneous considerations, such as those of a political,
economic or security nature, will not infl uence the case. (UNHCR 1971, para. 12,
emphasis added)
Since UNHCR was so remote from the confl icts and crises that created refu-
gees, it was relatively easy for it to take a stance wherein the agency would
never comment on why refugees in its care had fl ed their own country:
Since UNHCR is strictly a humanitarian and non-political organization, it is not for us
to comment on the cause [of refugee fl ight]—which is debated in many other forums
of this Organization [the UN]—but only to fi nd rapid and durable solutions to the
effect. (Sadruddin Aga Khan, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, November 1970)
While the emphasis on operational presence happened gradually over the
decades, a qualitative shift took place after the end of the Cold War regarding
the nature of the operational environment in which the agency deployed its
fi eld teams. In the early 1990s, beginning with the assistance of Iraqi Kurdish
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the so-called safe haven of Northern
Iraq in 1991, the agency became increasingly involved in providing assistance
and protection (to the degree protection was possible) in the midst of confl ict.
No longer does the agency sit on the other side of the border awaiting the
arrival of refugees. It acts proactively in any situations where displacement is
a threat or a reality, regardless of whether this displacement takes place across
borders or not. As a result, there are for instance today more IDPs than refu-
gees among the ‘population of concern’ to UNHCR.6
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This in-confl ict nature of operations has put UNHCR staff in harms way
at unprecedented levels. It has also put the refugee agency in relations of close
cooperation with traditional security actors, such as the Security Council,
NATO, and UN peace keeping forces. Adding these operational experiences
in war zones together with these new institutional relationships with political
and military actors resulted in an operational environment in which the
language of security came more naturally to the agency’s staff and leadership.
Experiencing confl icts fi rst-hand allowed UNHCR to see the security impli-
cations of forced migration on the ground. Thus, in the 1990s, UNHCR began
to paint a franker, often quite pessimistic, picture of the refugee problem,
such as in this 1997 Note on International Protection:
Militarized populations in exile, particularly on a large scale, can carry domestic
confl icts across borders, sustaining and exacerbating those confl icts, as well as
igniting fresh violence in other States. Such fl ashpoints can rapidly become unman-
ageable if the international community remains passive even when the ground rules
of asylum are ignored. (UNHCR 1997)
This frankness stands in stark contrast to the agency’s discursive history:
throughout most of its existence UNHCR did its utmost to refute all claims,
when made by states, that refugees constituted security threats. In contrast,
the Notes from the latter half of the 1990s routinely warned about ‘the impor-
tance for refugees and asylum seekers to conform to the laws and regulations
of the host country and refrain from actions that would undermine local
security’ (UNHCR 1999: para. 10). This message came most starkly across in
High Commissioner Ogata’s speeches:
Refugee problems invariably affect key state interests. They are related to matters of
national, regional and even international peace and security. Humanitarian crises in
our times increasingly are strategic crises, although they are infrequently dealt with
as such. (Ogata 1997: 4, emphasis in the original)
This less benign view of refugee populations stemmed in particular from
UNHCR’s experiences in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where civilians
and armed perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide were mixed together in
refugee camps and UNHCR had no means with which to separate militants
from refugees. Part of the rationale behind UNHCR adopting such security
language was to spur decisive international political and military action to
demilitarize the camps by appealing to the security interests of states.
However, UNHCR also highlighted the security costs of coping with mass
infl uxes in general. The High Commissioner often argued that refugees, apart
from being victims of insecurity, had ‘also become a major source of insta-
bility and confl ict’ (Ogata 1999).7 As seen above, even the protection and
rights-oriented Notes warned of refugees as potential security burdens.8
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Changes in the Discourse and Action of Core
Donor and Refugee Host States
With the end of the Cold War superpower rivalries, the early post-Cold War
era became a period of searching for new threats and enemies, both in the
academic security studies literature and among policy makers. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, one immediate fear was that of fl oods of migrants
from former Soviet satellites into Western Europe. This never really material-
ized, but the wars in the former Yugoslavia created a major refugee crisis on
Western Europe’s doorstep and the rise in asylum seekers in the early 1990s
was comet-like. Asylum soon became securitized as a problem of societal or
identity security, and all sorts of measures were put in place to deter, stem,
and return the fl ow of asylum seekers from Europe’s shores.
UNHCR cannot afford not to remain relevant to states—and especially to
its main donor states. As refugees and asylum seekers were increasingly
described in security terms by policy makers, the media, and academic
experts alike, UNHCR had to relate to these asylum fears and the language of
security enveloping them. It did so in two ways: First, by attempting to ensure
that refugees never reach the shores of Europe at all, through getting involved
in ‘in-country protection’ and preventive activities, often in the midst of
confl ict; to strengthen the capacity of refugee-hosting states in the South to
cope with large refugee populations; and by advocating that the international
community deal with the ‘root causes’ of fl ight (i.e. resolve confl icts) in order
to prepare the ground for repatriation of refugees. For instance, in Ruud
Lubbers’ fi rst speech as High Commissioner (2001), a major theme was how
European states and UNHCR together could ‘explore the possibilities of
meaningful preventive action in countries of origin and for a serious commit-
ment to building the capacity of refugee hosting countries’.
Second, UNHCR responded to the fears and concerns of refugee and
asylum hosting states by taking on the language of security itself—for
instance, as shown above, by pointing to the security implications of forced
migration to refugee host and sending states alike. But to understand the
particular characteristics of UNHCR’s security discourse, it is necessary to
turn to the opening up of the security debate in the post-Cold War period.
The Emergence of More People-friendly
Conceptualizations of Security
UNHCR’s mandate is to protect and assist vulnerable refugees, and to fi nd
humane and durable solutions to their plight. It would be a deeply unfair
exaggeration to argue that UNHCR is so beholden to donor agendas as to
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unquestioningly mimic a xenophobia-tainted, knee-jerk reaction of panic
and fear against asylum seekers just to please European states. A more
convincing analysis is based on the power inherent in the concept of security.
High Commissioner Ogata (and Stoltenberg before her) thought she could
harness the power of security to increase refugee protection and to use the
urgency of security language to garner a level of resources and attention to
address the refugee problem that had never before been seen.
UNHCR thus latched onto the rise in the post-Cold War era of hopes that
security could be turned into a more collaborative and people-friendly
concept, away from national security and towards ‘our common security’ or
later, human security. Indirectly and in the longer term, UNHCR suggested,
by protecting, assisting, and fi nding humane and durable solutions for IDPs
and refugees, we improve global security. And by improving global security
we contribute to improving the national security of donor states themselves.
Bureaucratic Changes within UNHCR
Last, but possibly not least, some bureaucratic shifts within UNHCR itself, as
well as within the UN as a whole, contributed to making the adoption of the
language of security more likely. Turning to internal developments fi rst, there
was in the 1990s a clear decline in the importance of the international lawyers
within the refugee agency. As UNHCR became increasingly operational and
increasingly involved in confl ict zones, many more staff were employed in
fi eld offi ces than in Geneva headquarters. As the agency expanded massively,
more of the numerous new recruits came from a social science, and even
International Relations, background, and fewer from a legal one. The once
mighty International Protection division became less prominent in the
organizational hierarchy. This bureaucratic shift helps explain the discursive
shift taking place away from the emphasis on legal protection, and towards
the political, social, and security implications of forced migration.
Occurring parallel with these internal changes is the humanitarian reform
process within the UN family as a whole—an ongoing (possibly infi nite)
process aimed at strengthening communication and coordination and clari-
fying the division of labour and responsibilities between the UN’s many
specialized agencies and the head offi ce in New York. In the 1990s, UN
humanitarian reform tended to strengthen UNHCR’s security discourse in
that it was regularly called upon by the Secretary-General to become lead
agency in some of the largest humanitarian operations of the decade, including
the war in the former Yugoslavia. UNHCR cherished this new-found centrality
in humanitarian politics: it relabelled itself as a humanitarian organization
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rather than a refugee agency, and defi ned its work according to the contribu-
tions it made as part of the UN family in promoting international peace and
security.
CONSEQU ENCES OF SECU R ITIZ ATION —A ND
THE PATH TO DE SECU R ITIZ ATION
UNHCR’s discursive journey had taken the agency from fi rst adopting the
language of security in the early 1990s to endorsing ‘human security’ as a
new, humanitarian, and superior notion of security at the end of the decade.
However, soon after the turn of the century, a return of to a more cautious
discourse can be discerned. Increasingly UNHCR seemed to doubt the
usefulness and propriety of enmeshing problems of displacement in a secu-
rity language. The use of the term security decreased in the annual Reports to
the General Assembly and Notes on International Protection. Ditching almost
completely the concept of human security, the refugee agency instead adopted
the UN buzzword responsibility to protect as its new rallying cry. At the same
time, the old distaste for security language displayed by Sadruddin Aga Khan,
re-emerged in statements such as in this speech by Antonio Guterres, who
took over as High Commissioner in 2005:
And as we look for new ways to deliver protection it has become harder to get public
opinion to recognize the need for it. Unfortunately, public opinion in many societies
is increasingly led by fear and suspicion. (Guterres 2005)
Although there has been a process of desecuritization in UNHCR’s discourse,
and although there are similarities between the discourse we see emerging
from UNHCR today and that of three decades ago, we cannot say that
UNHCR has come full circle back to its 1970s non-political, non-operational
self. In the 1970s, the term security was hardly uttered, and if mentioned was
pronounced as if it gave a bad taste in the mouth. In the late 2000s, UNHCR
still uses the term security, but in more discrete ways, in particular to describe
the operational challenges it faces in the fi eld.
Having set out in the section above the many reasons why UNHCR adopted
a security discourse in the 1990s and adapted it to its own mandate, why then
did the use of the concept of security wane again in the 2000s? The desecuri-
tization trend certainly had something to do with Ogata leaving offi ce—she
was (and still is) a particular champion of the agency’s security discourse,
and especially the concept of human security. However, the retreat was
gradual. Ruud Lubbers, the new High Commissioner in 2001, although
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adopting a lower profi le than Ogata, did not abandon her security language.
In addition, the desecuritization trend has also been observed among other
actors, most notably by Huysmans and Buonfi no (2008) in UK parliamentary
debates. Thus, although individual High Commissioners certainly wield a lot
of power within UNHCR, it would be too simplistic to pin the fl owing and
ebbing of a security discourse onto personality alone.
Instead we must seek an answer by studying the consequences of
securitization—some of which became particularly visible after the terror
attacks on the United States in 2001. The marked deterioration in the inter-
national protection climate taking place in the months and years after 9/11
spurred a renewed scepticism within UNHCR of what the concept of security
could achieve for the work of the agency in particular and for the future of
refugee protection in general. A cottage industry of academic literature on
the security dimensions of refugee movements (see, e.g., Loescher 1992;
Weiner 1993; Dowty and Loescher 1996; Posen 1996; Poku and Graham 1998;
Suhrke 1999; Newland et al. 2002; Terry 2002; Guild 2003; Lischer 2005;
Martin 2005; Guild and Van Selm 2005; Loescher and Milner 2005; Muggah
2006; Huysmans 2006); the routine invocation by states of security as a reason
to curb asylum and immigration; the constant lumping of asylum seekers
and illegal immigrants together in states’ terminology; the conundrum of
so-called ‘mixed fl ows’; the linking of terrorism and asylum in the North,
and of confl ict and refugees in the South: all these factors meant it was time
for UNHCR to seek out a more positive image of refugees, or at least a less
scary and off-putting one. This section looks at two of the factors that led to
this new discursive shift within UNHCR: First, the impact of the war on
terror and, second, the fraught burden-sharing relationship between refugee
hosting states in the South and donor and asylum states of the North. In the
analysis I suggest that both these aspects of the deterioration of the refugee
protection climate have clear links to the securitization process of forced
migration that started in the 1990s.
THE WA R ON TER ROR A N D THE DETER IOR ATI NG
PROTECTION CLIM ATE
Some of the hopes for what a more comprehensive and people-friendly
concept of security might achieve waned after 9/11. States resorted to a more
traditional realist conception of national security, not least displaying a
renewed concern with old-fashioned border security. This type of security
thinking is diffi cult to adapt to a more refugee-friendly conception of security:
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it was about keeping people out, not letting them in. British Home Secretary
David Blunkett displayed the new fears of asylum seekers as terrorists in
November 2001:
This is our home—it is our country. We have a right to say that if people seek to abuse
rights of asylum to be able to hide in this country and organise terrorist acts, we must
take steps to deal with them. (quoted in Huysmans and Buonfi no 2008: 773)
Guild (2003) argues that the link between terrorism, foreignness, and asylum
was made from the outset after 9/11 by the US administration. The same
was the case for many other western governments. The UN Security Council
set the tone with its Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001), which mentions
twice the possibility of terrorists abusing the asylum system (despite none of
the 9/11 terrorists being asylum seekers or refugees). The resolution further
stipulates that states should not harbour individuals who ‘fi nance, plan,
support or commit terrorist acts’, but does not defi ne the term terrorism or
set out safeguards regarding individual rights, due process, and fair trial
(Blake 2003). Zard (2002: 32) suggests that Resolution 1373 ‘generated a wave
of new and restrictive laws and regulations [to curb asylum] at a national
level’. Blake (2003: 445–7) argues that the use of the UN Refugee Conven-
tion’s exclusion clauses and defi nitions of ‘political crime’ has in the climate
after 9/11 been left more to executive discretion and less to judicial scrutiny.
All in all, in the post-9/11 period, national security thinking seemed to be
getting the upper hand on the legal obligations set out in the international
protection regime.
It should be remembered, however, that terrorism is only one way in which
forced migration has been securitized in the North. Recent literature on the
topic tends to overlook the fact that the securitization drive started in the
early 1990s, when it took the form of claims of societal or identity insecurity
(Wæver et al. 1993). This securitization of refugees and asylum seekers took
more the form of a ‘politics of unease’ than a ‘politics of exception’, except
perhaps in the fi rst few frantic months of legislation after 9/11.9 It was these
more amorphous and ill-defi ned fears and unease over immigration and
asylum that UNHCR had tried to counter with its human and comprehensive
security discourse in the 1990s.
But when such societal insecurity fears became compounded by perceived
threats of international terrorists arriving through asylum channels, it
became increasingly diffi cult for UNHCR to hold on to a belief that its own
security discourse could modify states’ perceptions of their own security
interests. Far from it, by employing the language of security itself, there was a
risk that UNHCR was helping to legitimize states’ use of security reasoning
to limit the rights of refugees and asylum seekers to seek and receive protection
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outside their country of origin. This realization can be seen in the fi rst state-
ment made by UNHCR in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. High Commis-
sioner Lubbers warned that ‘[a]s emotions run high and while Americans
and the rest of the world grieve following last Tuesday’s terrorist attacks, we
should refrain from pointing fi ngers and inciting hatred against innocent
groups such as refugees’ (UNHCR 2001a). This was followed up a few days
later by the Director for Protection, Erika Feller (now Assistant High Commis-
sioner for Protection). She placed states’ post-9/11 security-based efforts to
restrict asylum within a broader context of the increasing criminalization of
asylum seekers and refugees, and called for resolute leadership ‘to de-drama-
tise and de-politicise the essentially humanitarian challenge of protecting
refugees and to promote better understanding of refugees and their right to
seek asylum’ (UNHCR 2001b).
North–South Burden-sharing
Another aspect of the international refugee regime that has deteriorated
(although it never worked smoothly) is the institution of burden-sharing.
According to UNHCR’s ExCom, burden-sharing is intrinsic to the proper
functioning of the refugee regime, because:
(. . .) respect by States for their protection responsibilities towards refugees is strength-
ened by international solidarity involving all members of the international
community and (. . .) the refugee protection regime is enhanced through committed
international cooperation in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility and burden
sharing among all States (UNHCR 2004a).
While in theory burden-sharing is about solidarity and cooperation, in prac-
tice it has mostly boiled down to fi nancial contributions from rich countries
in the North to help host states and humanitarian organizations cope with
refugee situations in poorer regions of the South (e.g. almost all of UNHCR’s
billion-dollar budget is provided by ten donors in the North). However, in the
opinion of refugee host states, burden-sharing goes beyond the question of
who pays. In addition to economic, political, and even in some cases military
support, it should include sharing the burden of actually hosting refugees,
through asylum and resettlement channels. Efforts by Northern States,
particularly the European Union, to contain refugee fl ows within their region
of origin and to negotiate agreements to return asylum seekers to ‘safe’ fi rst-
countries of asylum, have raised shackles in refugee host countries coping
with the vast majority of the world’s refugee population. Despite the rhetoric
in European capitals, only 14 per cent of the global refugee population makes
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it out of their own region (UNHCR 2008: 27). Disagreements between the
North and South became particularly visible during Ruud Lubbers’ tenure
(2001–5), when his Convention Plus initiative was viewed with suspicion by
refugee-hosting states, who interpreted it as UNHCR taking on an EU agenda
for burden shifting of refugees away from European soil.10
It seems appropriate to analyse the deterioration of the institution of
burden-sharing in light of the securitization of forced migration. As discussed
in the introduction to this chapter, the mindset of national security ‘favours
zero-sum thinking’, which frames a problem ‘into a highly competitive game
in which a state can only gain benefi ts at the cost of other states’ (Huysmans
2006: 23). It also tends to frame problems in black and white: other actors are
either friends or enemies; they are either ‘with us or against us’. This makes
the task of cooperating and identifying common ground and mutual interests
more diffi cult (Deudney 1990). Burden-sharing thus becomes harder when
the problem is phrased in the zero-sum survivalist language of security. From
the perspective of the South, which hosts the large majority of the world’s
refugees, why, if a few asylum seekers are portrayed as security threats to the
North, should not the mass infl uxes of refugees in the South be an even worse
security threat? Rather than creating a common incentive to deal with the
‘root causes of fl ight’ and fi nd durable solutions to refugee situations, the
security framing of the debate has contributed to a race to the bottom. Condi-
tions of refuge have deteriorated not only in the North but also in the South,
where the ‘warehousing’ in insecure camps with little chance of solutions has
become a common reality for an increasing number of refugees. In 2004,
around two-thirds of the world’s refugee population was in ‘protracted refugee
situations’ with no solution in sight (Loescher, Betts, and Milner 2008: 60).
UNHCR’s recent response to the lack of good-will and solidarity in the
burden-sharing institution is very different to its attempt at humanizing
security in the 1990s. Instead of trying to reinterpret security, the refugee
agency has in recent years mostly rejected the appropriateness of security
language to describe the refugee problem, and has returned to a discourse
focused around protection. This discursive change was accompanied by insti-
tutional changes, especially the creation of an Assistant High Commissioner
for Protection. In the proposal to the UN General Assembly to create this
position, UNHCR performed a discourse analysis of its own, arguing that the
confl ation of terrorists, criminals, and refugees/asylum seekers has led to a
lack of political will among states in the North as well as the South to fulfi l
their protection obligations:
The fulfi lment of these protection responsibilities has become an ever more diffi cult task
in light of signifi cant changes in the environment in which the organization operates.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 06/08/2010, SPi
Disillusionment on the part of many governments, and at the highest levels, with the
capacity of States to manage their asylum responsibilities has resulted in curtailment
of protection opportunities and in asylum being offered on ever more unfavourable
terms. Illegal migration, growth in people smuggling syndicates, and the post-Sep-
tember 11 fallout have compounded the problems by confusing refugees and asylum-
seekers, in the public mind and the policies of some States, with abusers of the system,
criminals and terrorists. All this is coupled with a strong sense on the part of major
host States that there is no good system of burden-sharing in place and that they are
too often left with a disproportionate share of responsibilities which, in light of the
protracted nature of many situations, they are less and less inclined to meet. (UNHCR
2004b: para. 5)
BACK TO THE FU TU R E : DE SECU R ITIZ ATION
AS U N HCR’S R A ISON D’ÊTR E ?
Why desecuritize refugee movements? At a general level, because human
movement is natural. The movement of people has helped shape the trajec-
tory of history for as long as human communities have existed. It is a catalyst
for change, sometimes in the form of upheavals but other times in the form
of improvement, enriching people’s economic, social, and cultural lives. If
population movements—whether forced or voluntary—is inevitable, it seems
counterproductive to securitize it, since, as Jef Huysmans (2006: xii) succinctly
puts it, security knowledge has ‘a specifi c capacity for fabricating and
sustaining antagonistic relations between groups of people’.
On the other hand, there are situations where particular refugee move-
ments, or particular groups or individuals within them, do warrant a secu-
rity label, as for instance did the militarized refugee camps on Rwanda’s
borders in 1994–6. It is also true, as High Commissioners Stoltenberg and
Ogata were aware, that politicizing and securitizing the refugee problem
ensures more sustained and urgent efforts to deal with it. This leads us to the
question: is it possible to sustain a limited security discourse that reaps the
benefi ts from the propensity the language of security has for keeping refugee
issues at the forefront of policy makers’ minds while avoiding this language’s
pernicious effects? Is it possible to strike the right balance between security
and protection?
Looking back at UNHCR’s discursive trajectory, it seems that the agency’s
security discourse, although it had some spectacular successes in soliciting
funding and support for particular operations in the 1990s, never found that
balance. This became particularly obvious in the aftermath of 9/11. As a
result there is already a discernible trend towards desecuritization. And this
UNHCR and the Securitization of Forced Migration 255
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 06/08/2010, SPi
desecuritization is not only taking place in the language of UNHCR. Huys-
mans and Buonfi no (2008) argue that the peak of securitization of forced
migration took place in the United Kingdom in the fi rst couple of years after
9/11. In the case of UNHCR, the desecuritization trend began at the same
time, but did not become pronounced until the arrival of the new High
Commissioner, Antonio Guterres, in 2005.
In the period since then, UNHCR’s preoccupations with security have
been limited in scope to an operational issue. A major theme has been the
‘shrinking of humanitarian space’, where warring factions prey on the civilian
population and view humanitarian staff as parties to the confl ict and thus as
legitimate targets rather than neutral actors. UNHCR is continually
conducting an internal and external debate on how to counteract this
problem. The refugee agency’s response seems to be, on the one hand, a deep
preoccupation with the personal security of staff and refugees in confl ict
areas, while on the other, interpreting its own role as that of depoliticizing
and desecuritizing displacement through the performance of its non-polit-
ical and humanitarian mandate. For instance, The State of the World’s Refu-
gees 2006 argues that ‘( . . . ) the security concerns of states as well as refugees
are best met by ensuring that the multilateral and humanitarian character of
refugee protection is maintained’. It promotes ‘preventive and “soft” meas-
ures integrated into refugee protection and assistance’ in order to ‘defuse
many of the security threats faced by refugees and their hosts alike’(UNHCR
2006: 63 and 64).
These last two quotes are illustrative of how UNHCR’s discourse has trans-
formed itself (again). Security language has not disappeared—after all a
whole chapter of The State of the World’s Refugees 2006 is dedicated to secu-
rity. UNHCR remains painfully aware that states harbour an array of security
concerns over refugees, and that ‘the challenge of integrating the differing
security interests and strategies of the various parts of the international
refugee regime has grown more complex’ (UNHCR 2006: 64).
It is clear from these quotes that UNHCR takes a constructivist view on
state security concerns: threats can be defused and refugee movements dese-
curitized by responding to them in a particular manner. Desecuritization can
be achieved through, using the terminology of the Copenhagen School,
speech-acts of affi rming the neutral, non-political, and humanitarian nature
of asylum and refugee protection, committing to the international refugee
regime, and giving UNHCR the necessary support to provide international,
multilateral, and non-political refugee protection. Thus, in one deft move,
UNHCR has both described a solution to states’ security concerns (desecuri-
tization through multilateralism) and asserted its own indispensable role in
achieving this solution (as the multilateral agent responsible for refugees).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 06/08/2010, SPi
The (diffi cult) task ahead for UNHCR is to convince states of this particular
interpretation of the security challenges posed by displacement. In the words
of the Assistant High Commissioner for Protection:
UNHCR’s ability to extend protection is challenged in many regions by the absence
of political will to support it and the disinclination to recognise that asylum is a non-
political and humanitarian act. Asylum is viewed through the security prism in
many parts of the world. (Feller 2008)
While in the 1990s, UNHCR was one of the key securitizing actors in the
discourse on displacement, the agency has now become a voice of desecuriti-
zation. This move is also a step back to a previous era of UNHCR’s history,
during the reign of Sadruddin Aga Khan. In the 1974 speech quoted in the
introduction to this talk, he admitted that refugee fl ows could lead to ‘the
most strenuous tensions’ (he was loath to use the term security), but the aim
was to overcome these tensions by attempting ‘( . . . ) to reduce complex polit-
ical questions in the minds of nations into simple moral and humanitarian
components for the heart to answer’. The jargon and terminology is very
different in 1974 from 2006, but the argument is the same: UNHCR’s neutral,
non-political, and humanitarian mandate to protect and assist refugees is
there in order to desecuritize refugee issues. UNHCR’s mandate thus helps
increase the security of states as well as that of refugees and the humanitarian
staff aiding them.
This was arguably the aim of states from the outset when they decided to
create the two corner stones of the international refugee regime, the 1951 UN
Refugee Convention, and UNHCR. By taking forced migration out of the
political and the controversial, leaving it in the hands of a non-political multi-
lateral institution, reduces the risk of tensions between states. UNHCR had
archived this part of its history in the 1990s and the fi rst half of the 2000s, but
it is now brushing the dust off the insights of its founders as the effects of
securitizing population movement on community relations and human
rights standards have become increasingly clear—and as Huysmans argues,
increasingly pernicious.
NOTE S
1. Only around 3 per cent of UNHCR’s billion-dollar annual expenditure is allo-
cated automatically from the UN’s central budget. The remaining 97 per cent
must be raised annually from donors. Ten Western donors, headed by the US (30
per cent), account for almost 80 per cent of UNHCR’s budget (Loescher et al.
2008: 91–3).
UNHCR and the Securitization of Forced Migration 257
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 06/08/2010, SPi
2. Remaining relevant or useful to states has been a core theme of all High Commis-
sioners, but particular of Stoltenberg and his successor Sadako Ogata.
3. Loosely, and simplistically, based on Gadamer (2004), who asserted that our
consciousness is ‘historically effected’ and that learning takes place in a herme-
neutic circle between the text we try to interpret and the existing prejudices (or
pre-judgements) and experiences found in our own horizon. Thus our under-
standing of the world is coloured by the historical, social, and cultural practices
in which we are embedded.
4. This analysis is based on the reading of a broad range of UNHCR offi cial docu-
ments, speeches, and publications, only some of which is directly quoted or
referenced in this chapter.
5. All the Reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Notes
on International Protection, 1970–2006, can be found on UNHCR’s research tool,
Ref World, available through its web site www.unhcr.org, with the exception of
the Reports from 1995, 1996, and 1999. These three have been counted in the
old-fashioned way. The Reports and Notes constitute suitable material for a quan-
titative study, since they are produced every year to the same audience and in
similar format and style.
6. In 2007, out of a total population of concern of 31.7 million people, 11.4 were
refugees, while 13.7 million were IDPs. The rest were asylum seekers, returnees,
stateless persons, and ‘others of concern’ (UNHCR 2008: 7).
7. Statements like this, as well as UNHCR’s involvement in the Rwandan refugee
crisis, show that the refugee agency by the mid-1990s no longer followed the UN
Refugee Convention in using the term ‘refugee’ solely to describe civilian, non-
militarized persons. UNHCR advocated the demilitarization of refugee camps,
but neither its discourse nor actions in the 1990s signalled that militarized exile
populations such as the Rwandan Hutus were considered to be outside the agen-
cy’s competence.
8. See the 1998 Note for another example (UNHCR 1998: para. 17).
9. Huysmans and Buonfi no (2008: 781) show how migration and asylum ques-
tions in Parliamentary debates are framed within a ‘general context of societal
insecurities’.
10. For an account of the fate of Convention Plus, see Loescher, Betts, and Milner
(2008: 62–6).
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