Q: Describe ecological virtue ethics and why this approach might be more useful than other approaches.

I need an essay answering the following question with 300 to 500 words:

Q: Describe ecological virtue ethics and why this approach might be more useful than other approaches.

Vol.:(0123456789)

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (2018) 31:723–738
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-018-9751-6

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ARTICLES

Dominika Dzwonkowska1

Accepted: 13 November 2018 / Published online: 19 November 2018
© The Author(s) 2018

Abstract
Virtue ethics (VE), due to its eudaimonistic character, is very anthropocentric; thus
the application of VE to environmental ethics (EE) seems to be in contradiction
with EE’s critical opinion of human centeredness. In the paper, I prove the claim
that there is a possibility of elaborating an environmental virtue ethics (EVE) that
involves others (including nonhuman beings). I prove that claim through analyzing
Ronald Sandler’s EVE, especially his concept of pluralistic virtue and a pluralistic
approach to the aim of ethical endeavor which is not only focused on personal flour-
ishing but also helps others (including nonhumans) to flourish. I start my analysis
with a close look at the application of anthropocentrism in VE, beginning by dis-
cerning the three types of anthropocentrism that are most often used in discussion
on EE and EVE, namely ontological, epistemological, and ethical. Subsequently, I
analyze the concept of personal flourishing, which is responsible for the anthropo-
centric/egoistic nature of VE, proving that VE is anthropocentric/egoistic only for-
mally, not in its content, and as such is only a rational theory, not a moral one.

Keywords Environmental ethics · Environmental virtue ethics · Ronald Sandler ·
Anthropocentrism · Eudaimonism · Ethical Egoism

Introduction

Environmental virtue ethics (EVE) is a result of applying virtue ethics (VE) to envi-
ronmental ethics (EE). Even though this approach can address the moral aspect of
protecting nature quite efficiently, there is a doubt that requires some consideration:
VE is heralded as an anthropocentric ethic and EE is at best non-anthropocentric
and often anti-anthropocentric. Thus the marriage of these raises questions about
their contradictory perspectives on the position of human in the world. In the paper,
I claim that the kind of anthropocentrism (or even egoism) present in VE does not

* Dominika Dzwonkowska
d.dzwonkowska@uksw.edu.pl

1 Institute of Ecology and Bioethics, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw,
Woycickiego 1/3, 01-315 Warsaw, Poland

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10806-018-9751-6&domain=pdf

724 D. Dzwonkowska

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prevent VE or EVE from including other human beings and nonhuman beings in the
moral consideration.

To understand the nature of the anthropocentric claim of VE, I look closer at
the meaning of the term ‘anthropocentrism’. I show that what is being discussed
under one term is at least three different meanings of anthropocentrism (ontologi-
cal, epistemological, and ethical). Secondly, I analyze how ethicists understand the
anthropocentric (or even egoistic) nature of VE. Here, I will analyze the concept
of personal flourishing (eudaimonism), which is blamed for anthropocentric/egoistic
nature of VE. I show how VE deals with the egoism charge and I prove that VE is
anthropocentric/egoistic only in a sense that is not a hindrance to VE or EVE devel-
oping an ethical standpoint involving others (including nonhuman beings). I present
my claim based on the example of Ronald Sandler’s naturalistic, pluralistic and tele-
ological concept of EVE.

Disambiguating Anthropocentrism

The discussion between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism has become
a cornerstone of environmental philosophy, since “anthropocentrism is for many
environmental philosophers the ethical attitude the field was created to overcome”
(Minteer 2008, 58). The effort to overcome anthropocentrism has been present in
environmental philosophy almost since its beginning: it has its origin in the claim
that human-centeredness is the cause of ecological crisis and has limited moral
standing to human beings. However, discussion about anthropocentrism is some-
times misleading, since the terms anthropocentrism and anthropocentric are used
with various (sometimes conflicting or overlapping) meanings. In this part of the
article, I will present the three most often used types of anthropocentrism, namely
ontological, epistemological, and ethical1 (see Minteer 2008).

Ontological Anthropocentrism

The first type of anthropocentrism is an ontological one. Ontological anthropocen-
trism assumes human-centeredness and the privileged position of human beings. It
claims a superior ontological position of human beings and perceives them as the
pinnacle of creation. This view has often been subject to criticism. According to
Minteer (2008, 59), White’s (1967) influential article on the roots of environmental
crisis has had a significant influence on the rise of criticism of anthropocentrism in
environmental ethics. White’s criticism is mostly against the ontological stance. In

1 In this paper, I decided to focus on three types of anthropocentrism described by Minteer (2008), even
though in the environmental literature one can find many types of anthropocentrism that designate either
the form of human-centeredness or the intensity of it (for example, strong, weak, prudential, or enlight-
ened anthropocentrism). Some forms of anthropocentrism, at least in some aspects, overlap with the
understanding of the types described here, like in the case of epistemological anthropocentrism. Some
philosophers (Ferré 1974; Thompson 2017) call the view presented in this paper perspectival or concep-
tual anthropocentrism.

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Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric?

the paper, he notes that the Judeo-Christian tradition is contradictory to the pagan
unity of human beings and nature. White claims that in the Christian tradition man,
“was created separately from the rest of Creation, and he alone was given ‘domin-
ion’ over the creatures of the earth and commanded to ‘subdue’ them and the earth”
(Minteer 2008, 59). The reason for his privileged position is that “man shares, in
great measure, God’s transcendence of nature” (White 1967, 1205). White’s claim
has led to a refutation of anthropocentrism as a cause of ecological crisis and estab-
lished the trend of its criticism in environmental discussion.

However, it has to be emphasized that in philosophy human-centeredness
has been criticized at least since the second half of the nineteenth century. David
Gunkel,2 discussing the roots of anti-anthropocentrism, notes that “since at least
Nietzsche, philosophers, anthropologists, and social scientists have been increas-
ingly suspicious of the privileged position human beings have given themselves in
the great chain of being, and this suspicion has become an explicit object of inquiry
within the so-called human sciences” (Gunkel 2012, 109).3 Gunkel claims that
anthropocentrism is rooted in later times than White suggests: he points out that
it was actually Descartes who erected a wall between human beings and the rest of
creation when he divided the world into res cogitans and res extensa, thus putting
human beings outside the natural world.

Even though ontological anthropocentrism4 is a very important ontological claim,
it seems to be irrelevant in the discussion of ethics, since one can be ontologically
anthropocentric but still recognize the moral standing of nonhuman world: for exam-
ple, standpoints claiming that we are custodians of the Earth might assume ontologi-
cal anthropocentrism but can still recognize the moral standing of nonhuman world
(see Skolimowski 1984).

Epistemological Anthropocentrism

The second type of anthropocentrism is connected with the way we value the world.
As Minteer (2008, 59) notes, “all human values are human values, including the
intrinsic value that ethical non-anthropocentrists ascribe to nature.” This leads to an
epistemological anthropocentrism, according to which we will never go beyond the
human perspective. We know the world from the perspective from which we value,
reflect on, think about and analyze the world. Replying to Nagel’s (1974) question
about the world from the bat’s perspective, it can be noticed that “the problem with
non-anthropocentrism rests with our inability to access the required knowledge to
fully experience being a bat (or any other nonhuman living thing)” (Epting 2017,
136).

2 It has to be emphasized that Nietzsche’s criticism of the privileged position of the human being was
directed toward the concept of human-centeredness in the form of humanism of his time. Thus the con-
cept itself is different in character; however, the basic essence of human-centeredness is the same.
3 More about the Nietzschean approach to non-anthropocentrism can be found in Hatley (2017).
4 This approach can be seen in the philosophies of Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, or in neo-Thomistic
philosophy.

726 D. Dzwonkowska

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This type of anthropocentrism we cannot escape: whenever someone claims that
ethics is anthropocentric since human beings make ethical evaluations, he applies to
epistemological anthropocentrism. We will never be able to go beyond the human
point of view. It gives us a lens through which we perceive the world. Each ethic and
each philosophy is anthropocentric in an epistemological sense. As Parker (1996,
33) notes, “the human organism is inevitably the one that discusses value. This is so
because the human perspective on value is the only one we know as humans.”

This kind of epistemological anthropocentrism cannot be overcome: it is a neces-
sary kind of anthropocentrism. It is not ascribed to us because we are the only moral
agents: it is directly connected with our cognitive capabilities, which are limited to
knowing the world from our perspective only. We cannot understand how it is to be
a bat, and any ethics or philosophy is anthropocentric in the epistemological sense.
However, even perceiving the world from the human perspective only, we still can
go beyond anthropocentrism and recognize the intrinsic value of the natural world
(see Hargrove 1992). We will never literally think like a mountain (Leopold 1949,
114–118), but we can imagine the perspective of the nonhuman world and our deci-
sions may be more environmentally-oriented. Even though this kind of anthropocen-
trism is embedded in our nature, it is not a hindrance to elaborating an environmen-
tal ethic that includes nonhuman beings.

Ethical Anthropocentrism

Ethical anthropocentrism is the theoretical standpoint that limits intrinsic value to
human beings only and thus attributes moral standing only to humans. Even though
human beings evaluate the world, value does not depend on being recognized or on
some external valuation. The value of the nonhuman world has not been created by
human beings: it has been discovered (Rolston 1986). It has to be emphasized that
value is not the same as being valued, and beings do not have value only because of
human judgment (see Attfield 1991, 145–161). As Attfield notes, “valuable does not
mean ‘valued’ but applies to what there is reason to value, whether or not anyone
values it; and it is implausible that nothing had value (…) until humanity (or pos-
sibly until intelligent vertebrates) first appeared and began making judgments” (Att-
field 2008, 99–100). There are many examples of ethical approaches that emphasize
the value of the nonhuman world: one is the biocentric ethics of Paul Taylor who
claims that every living being has an intrinsic value as a teleological center of life
with a good of its own (Taylor 1981).

Ethical anthropocentrism is therefore not a necessary feature of ethical theoriz-
ing or philosophy in the way that epistemological anthropocentrism is. We as moral
agents can recognize the value of the nonhuman world and make decisions about
which beings we include in our moral consideration. Ethical anthropocentrism may
have its foundation in ontological anthropocentrism, since limiting the moral con-
sideration to human beings only may sometimes be connected with the ontological
view of human-centeredness or privileged position. This type of anthropocentrism is
the most relevant to the ethical discussion: due to the ethical perspective, the moral

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Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric?

agent can recognize the moral standing of the nonhuman world and employ a non-
anthropocentric point of view.

Is Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric?

As I have shown in previous part the problem with a discussion on anthropocen-
trism is that philosophers often mix the three types, going too easily from ontologi-
cal claims to either the ethical or the epistemological. Moreover, some philosophers
seem to think that ethical anthropocentrism is implied by the other forms of anthro-
pocentrism, which it is not. Confusing the three different types of anthropocentrism
not only blurs ethical discussion. It has to be emphasized that the three types of
anthropocentrism apply to three different levels and each has different consequences
for ethics, as well as for virtue ethics.

For VE the charge of anthropocentrism is connected with its eudaimonistic
character and means basically the agent-centeredness. VE is said to be anthropo-
centric; it is even charged with being the most anthropocentric approach to ethics
in all ancient tradition (see Jaśtal 2006, 45). Since environmental ethicists wanted
“to develop a non-anthropocentric ethical position” (Cafaro 2005, 40), VE has been
considered incapable of elaborating a theoretical standpoint adequate for environ-
mental discussion. Due to the charge of anthropocentrism, the marriage of VE and
EE seems to be at best controversial (Kallhoff and Schörgenhumer 2017; Rolston
2005), and interest in virtue theory in relation to environmental discussion is pos-
sible a quarter of a century after the revival of virtue in modern philosophy.5

In this part of the paper, I will look closer into the claim that VE is anthropo-
centric (or even egoistic). As seen above, the term’ anthropocentrism’ is used in
various meanings and the charge of anthropocentrism of VE adds up to a new under-
standing of human-centeredness, since VE is perceived as anthropocentric due to
its agent-centeredness. While environmental philosophers call this attitude anthro-
pocentric, virtue ethicists perceive it as a sign of egoism. The charge of egoism in
VE is in some sense analogous to the claim about anthropocentrism. It has the same
root cause, namely the concept of eudaimonism.6 In this part of the paper, I analyze
the charge of anthropocentrism/egoism of VE and prove that VE is only prima facie
anthropocentric/egoistic.

5 Cafaro (2010) points out that the beginning of environmental virtue ethics can be marked Thomas
Hill’s (1983) article on the Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environment, while the
revival of virtue discussion in ethics is attributed to Anscombe’s paper published in 1958.
6 It has to be emphasized that not all virtue ethics are eudaimonistic. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy lists four types of contemporary virtue ethics discussion: 1. eudaimonist virtue ethics; 2. agent-
based and exemplarist virtue ethics; 3. target-centered virtue ethics; and 4. Platonistic virtue ethics (see
Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2016).

728 D. Dzwonkowska

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The Charge of Anthropocentrism/Egoism of VE

VE is an agent-centered approach that begins ethical discussion by asking questions:
What sort of person would do that?7 How should I live? What is the best way to
live? What is a good life for human beings? (Van Zyl 2015, 183). These are the
questions that should help a moral agent to live a good, happy life and to flourish.8
Since ancient times, the cornerstone of virtue ethics was a eudaimonistic concept
of virtue, according to which virtues are conducive to a moral agent’s flourishing,
wellbeing and happiness. Thus, being virtuous is a way to eudaimonia, understood
as personal happiness.9

Even though aiming at personal happiness sounds like the best motivation to lead
an ethical life, it is a troublesome as well, since “eudaimonism is the view that the
fundamental intrinsic value in ethics is the human good. In particular […] an agent’s
own good” (Prior 2001, 325). This approach raises the consideration of others as
morally questionable; and while environmental ethicists see it as a sign of anthropo-
centrism, contemporary virtue ethicists (for example, Anscombe 1958, 42) are con-
cerned rather about the egoism of this ethical approach.

According to Annas (1993), agent-centered ethical theory is very much in line
with the nature of ancient ethics, which “begins with the agent’s concern for her
own life as a whole. Modern moral theories, by contrast, often begin by specify-
ing morality as a concern for others; morality is often introduced as a point of view
contrasting with egoism” (p. 127; see also Hurka 2001). It therefore seems that the
cornerstone of ancient ethical theories is the concern of an individual moral agent,
and the eudaimonistic concept of virtue is just an incentive to lead an ethical life.

At first glance, it looks like aiming at personal flourishing, explained in such a
way, is not merely a sign of anthropocentrism, as environmental ethicists claim. The
moral consideration of VE is not so wide as to include the whole of humanity, but
is focused on an individual agent’s flourishing. Thus the concept of eudaimonism

7 As is the case in Thomas Hill’s article (1983), where he narrates the story of covering a beautiful gar-
den with asphalt and asks the question: what sort of person would do that? He does not try to carry out a
deontological or consequentialist analysis of this action: instead, he asks about person’s attitude toward
nature and connected virtues.
8 It has to be emphasized that virtue ethics is often presented as contrary to predominant ethical
approaches (deontological and consequentialist). Even in environmental discussion, “there is a split
between those who regard environmental virtue ethics as a complement to the predominant theoretical
approaches to environmental ethics (e.g., consequentialist and deontological), and those that regard it
an alternative approach” (Sandler 2018, 224). The modern revival of virtue ethics started with criticism
of these conceptions of ethics (Anscombe 1958, 5). However, this does not mean that it is limited just to
reflection on the flourishing of the moral agent: other elements of theory (like theory of value and nor-
mative theory) are important areas of ethical discussion as well.
9 However, ancient philosophers disagree on whether virtue is the only condition for happiness. Sto-
ics claims that it is sufficient for a happy life, while Aristotle emphasizes that alongside virtue, external
goods (like health and wealth) are also needed. Modern virtue ethicists have different points of view:
McDowell (1980, 359–376) supports the claim that virtue is necessary and sufficient for human flourish-
ing, while Hursthouse (1999) claims that bad luck can prevent a virtuous person from leading a happy
life, and Swanton (2003) uses the example of a moral saint to present that a link between virtue and hap-
piness is not as strong as its supporters claim (Van Zyl 2015, 183, 191–192).

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Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric?

disables even the inclusion of other human beings, since VE framed in this way
employs only the human perspective (epistemological anthropocentrism) and limits
the moral consideration to human beings only (ethical anthropocentrism) or even
only to individual moral agents (egoism).10 Although VE might seem to be anthro-
pocentric or egoistic, not all philosophers agree with the point of view presented
above. In the next part of the paper, I will examine how ethicists answer the charge
of the egoistic character of eudaimonism.

The Anthropocentrism/Egoism of VE Revisited

VE is considered anthropocentric because of its agent-centeredness and aim at per-
sonal flourishing. Taken as such, it represents epistemological anthropocentrism,
since the moral agent is the one that takes the moral decision from the very human
perspective, and every ethical approach is an example of epistemological anthro-
pocentrism. Moreover, virtue ethics understood in such a way represents ethical
anthropocentrism since the moral consideration is limited to the moral agent him-
self. However, what is being stated by the egoistic charge is not the full picture of
virtue.

First of all, some of the virtues are directly connected with our care for the good
of other people. The virtue of friendship, highly esteemed by Aristotle, involves
personal flourishing as well as our friend’s flourishing. Moreover, Annas (1993)
emphasizes that virtues are not developed to achieve the end goals of the moral
agent: if a moral agent acts just for the purpose of personal aims, then his actions are
not virtuous at all. Virtues are the dispositions that direct our actions to do what is in
line with our virtuous character traits. Thus “an ethics of virtue is therefore at most
formally self-centered or egoistic; its content can be fully as other regarding as that
of other systems of ethics” (Annas 1993, 127).

Annas also confutes the argument that a self-centeredness of VE is problematic
for virtue ethics. She claims that the good of the other can be important for the moral
agent independently of his own interests. Good of the other is often opposed to one’s
own interests. However, Annas (1993) claims that the good of other people can be
as important for a moral agent as his own good, or it can be a motivation. There are
even virtues whose nature is caring for the interests of the other more than for our
own, like the virtues of care. Anscombe (1958, 42) also refutes her concerns about
the egoism of VE, contending that her consideration of the agent’s centeredness on
his own aims distinguishes between morality and rationality: the former considers
questions about the rightness and wrongness of action, while the latter asks about
the moral agent’s reasons for performing the action and whether those are egoistic.11

Thus it seems that virtue ethics is egoistic only formally, or is taken as a rational
theory. One reason why virtue ethics may have been recognized as an egoistic theory

10 It has to be emphasized that some philosophers claim that VE should accept some forms of ego-
ism—not the one understood very broadly, but still egoism in some form should be a part of our ethical
endeavor (see Toner 2015, 345).
11 See also Hursthouse (1997).

730 D. Dzwonkowska

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is the misleading translation of eudaimonia as happiness. Eudaimonia is not just a
good mood,12 excitation or anything that is attributed to this term in common par-
lance; it is a special type of happiness, a moralized concept of happiness (see Swan-
ton 2003, 87–90). It is a virtue-driven concept of a happy life, where what is satisfy-
ing for a virtuous person is not what is satisfying for an unvirtuous one: “Pleasure is
not even in one’s self-interest (good for one) unless it is infused with suitable virtue”
(Swanton 2003, 87). As an example, Swanton gives the virtue of friendship that was
so much appreciated by Aristotle. According to her, the virtue, if it is used only for
complaint and lamentation, is harmful for both friends: only a virtuous person has
the kind of character traits that enable a genuine human flourishing and happiness
for good reasons.

For example, if a caring person decides to help a friend in need and to make a
big effort to relieve the friend’s suffering, even though for the other it might seem to
be a huge sacrifice, the moral agent would not consider it a sacrifice; or even if he
finds it a sacrifice, he still sees a higher good in helping the friend than in what had
to be sacrificed. Ronald Sandler (2018, 227) calls this an integrative effect of vir-
tue, that makes an environmentally-committed person take pleasure in activities the
other might perceive as a burden. Thus, the moral agent is able to act for the other
and does not consider it as a sacrifice or a loss even if it is. Virtues are good for the
moral agent as well as for his community. According to Foot (2002, 2–3), some vir-
tues are beneficial for the moral agent, while some are good for his community.

However, it has to be emphasized that all virtues make the moral agent excel-
lent in some way—namely, in the context of benefits we can distinguish intrinsic
and consequential benefits. In some sense, virtues are beneficial for the agent him-
self and/or for others. Prior (2001, 329–330) emphasizes that in Aristotelian virtue
ethics, “a good life is essentially characterized by excellence in rational activity,13
every act that makes excellent use of reason, every virtuous act, contributes essen-
tially to the good life of an agent”. Thus every virtuous action will benefit the moral
agent intrinsically at least at some level (sometimes only due to the rational activity
described above) and some virtuous actions in certain situations may also benefit
the moral agent’s community. Virtues bring benefits not only for the moral agent but
also for the wider community. Stoic philosophy also supports the claim that eudai-
monism can exceed self-centeredness. Annas (1993) notes that even though the sto-
ics begin from a point of concern about the moral agent and his happiness, they “end
up claiming that the end of this development will precisely be a position where, as
far as the claims of morality go, one is indifferent between one’s own interests and
those of someone one has no knowledge of in a far-away country” (p. 128).

Eudaimonistic VE is only formally14 self-centered or even egoistic (Annas 1993,
127), or it is such only as a rational theory, not as a moral one (Anscombe 1958).
Even though it is only prima facie anthropocentrism or egoism, it may be delusive:

12 For more on this, see Russel (2013, 11–18).
13 Rational activity and practical wisdom are crucial concepts in virtuous action. McDowell (1979)
claims that virtue is actually practical wisdom.
14 It seems to be egoistic or anthropocentric, but its content is not such at all.

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Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric?

“The chief fault with eudaimonism in the minds of modern moral philosophers is its
grounding of ethical motivation in the good of an agent. This runs counter to a wide-
spread intuition among moral philosophers that the business of moral philosophy is
the justification of action that is entirely objective and other-regarding” (Anscombe
1958, 338). It has to be recognized that virtues are beneficial for the moral agent in
many ways that are not contradictory to the concept of others flourishing. VE can be
as other-involving as other ethical approaches; furthermore, it does not have to be
limited to moral consideration of human beings only, which proves Ronald Sandler’s
virtue-oriented ethics.

An Example of Ethically Non‑Anthropocentric EVE: Sandler’s EVE

The claim that virtue ethics is anthropocentric has been a reason for excluding this
approach from environmental ethics for so long. However, a eudaimonistic VE
is only prima facie anthropocentric and it enables elaborating the ethical stand-
point that includes others, as well as nonhuman others. There are many interesting
approaches to EVE which prove this. Among them, some should be mentioned as
the most elaborated theories: Philip Cafaro’s approach, which is built on the founda-
tion of Thoreau’s philosophy (Thoreau 1854; Cafaro 2004); Louke van Wensveen’s
(2000) dirty virtues ethics; Brian Treanor’s (2014) narrative approach; and Ronald
Sandler’s (2007) virtue-oriented environmental ethics.15 Even though each of these
approaches is a very insightful and interesting input into the virtue discussion in
environmental ethics, in this paper I focus only on Sandler’s approach, since this
EVE employs the pluralistic and teleological approach that is conducive to human
and nonhuman flourishing.

In my opinion, Sandler’s EVE makes an important contribution to the anthropo-
centrism discussion.16 His approach is inspired by Hursthouse’s (1999) and Foot’s
(2001) naturalistic virtue ethics approach. Thus Sandler’s EVE is naturalistic, as
well as pluralistic and teleological. According to Sandler, the good life is the realiza-
tion of those needs that are important for us as a specific kind of species. According
to this approach, a human being is virtuous:

insofar as she is well fitted with respect to her (i) emotions, (ii) desires, and
(iii) actions (from reason and inclination): whether she is thus well fitted is
determined by whether these aspects well serve (1) her survival, (2) the con-
tinuance of the species, (3) her characteristic freedom from pain and char-
acteristic enjoyment, (4) the good functioning of her social group, (5) her
autonomy, (6) the accumulation of knowledge, (7) a meaningful life, and (8)
the realization of any noneudaimonistic ends (grounded in noneudaimonistic

15 However, many more philosophers have made an interesting contribution to EVE, including Rosalind
Hursthouse, Jennifer Welchman, Allen Thompson, Geoffrey Frasz, Bill Shaw, Holmes Rolston III, Lisa
Newton, Isis Brooke, John O’Neil, Thomas Jr. Hill, Val Plumwood, Jason Kawall, and Rebecca Walker.
16 Even though Fox (2008, 421) claims that Sandler’s ethics is anthropocentric, it has to be noted that
this approach to EVE makes an important input that goes beyond anthropocentrism.

732 D. Dzwonkowska

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goods or values) in the way characteristic of human beings (i.e., in a way that
can rightly be seen as good) (Sandler 2007, 28).

The concept of pluralism is here crucial for elaborating ethics that include in our
moral consideration not only the moral agent or his species but a wider circle of
entities. First of all, this approach assumes a pluralistic account of virtue in terms of
whom we should include in our moral consideration. This enables the inclusion of
a wide variety of beings (also nonhuman entities) in our moral choices. Secondly,
it offers a pluralistic view on the teleological approach.17 It does not limit the con-
cept of the aim of ethical endeavor to personal eudaimonia and it enables including
noneudaimonistic goals. Thus the happiness of the other might be the aim of our
actions. Moreover, our care for others is not limited to human beings only. In the
following paragraphs, I will present those aspects of a pluralistic approach to virtue
and teleology that are conducive to including nonhuman entities in our moral con-
sideration and thus overcoming egoism and anthropocentrism.

The Pluralistic Account of Virtue and Teleology

Sandler’s approach to virtue may be very productive in overcoming the concept
of human transcendence claimed by White or the ‘wall’ erected by Descartes. As
Sandler claims, environmental ethics must avoid metaethical dogmatism: “we ought
not believe […] that only one sort of environmental ethics, such as anthropocentric,
holistic, or intrinsic value-based environmental ethics, can be adequate” (Sandler
2007, 119). This approach, which is very often included in environmental ethics, is
often depicted in the form of concentric circles. This starts from the individual (ego-
ism), and some claim that VE can be classified here. The circle grows bigger, limit-
ing moral consideration to one’s family (nepotism), fellow citizens (patriotism), all
humanity (anthropocentrism), all sentient beings (sentientism), all living individuals
(biocentric individualism), and finally reaching moral considerability of all ecosys-
tems (ecocentrism) (see Sandler 2007, 40).

As the circle expands, it seems to salve our conscience with the idea that we have
included in our moral considerability every being that should be included. However,
there are some difficulties here, like the one raised by Thomas Birch, who claims
that moral considerability is an exclusive concept that is built on mark/marks of
membership to the club of consideranda (Birch 1993, 315). It raises a wall between
those who enter the circle and those who are outside it; so, whatever ‘centrism’
there is, it is still not as wide and encompassing as it could be. In whatever way we
define the criteria for moral considerability, it remains a very imperfect theoretical
construct. It is not inclusive enough, always exclusive on the basis of some mark/s,
always erecting a wall in the same sense as Descartes has done. So, even though
we may push the Cartesian wall further in some sense, it is still not a fully satisfac-
tory approach. I do not mean that boundaries are wrong and that our ethics should

17 Since pluralism in terms of both virtue and teleology applies to moral considerability, they will be
presented together instead of splitting the two concepts into two separate paragraphs.

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Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric?

include all entities: that would be unfeasible; however, I wanted to highlight that any
circle creates theoretical problems, like epistemological grey areas or inadequacy of
our ethical experience (Sandler 2007, 40).

This is why the pluralistic approach to moral considerability is necessary. For
Sandler, “pluralism in moral considerability is accommodated within the purview of
different virtues, which are differentiated by the types of objects, events and proper-
ties to which they are responsive (their bases of responsiveness) and the types of
reactions and activities they involve (their forms of responsiveness)” (Sandler 2007,
40–41). For compassion, the basis of responsiveness might be the suffering of the
other and the forms of responsiveness might be many, among them concern for the
other, a desire to assist the other, or taking action to alleviate the suffering of the
other.

“Moreover, there is no mechanism […] for establishing one type of moral consid-
erability as superordinate to another in principle” (Sandler 2007, 40). The numerous
environmental virtues respond to the multifariousness of objects, events or proper-
ties (virtue’s basis of responsiveness) in multiple ways (forms of responsiveness).
The pluralistic approach is one example of how Sandler’s EVE escapes the anthro-
pocentrism-non-anthropocentrism dichotomy, or the circle’s exclusion problem.
Sandler recognizes that the multifariousness of our relations with nature cannot be
fully expressed by one basis/form of responsiveness. Different virtues respond to
various stimuli in multiple ways: thus a virtue cannot be limited to one centrism.
Virtue-oriented ethics proves that virtues can be helpful in recognizing the moral
standing of nonhuman entities. Moreover, this approach can be conducive to going
beyond the goals set by eudaimonistic ethics.

The other form of going beyond the questions raised by anthropocentrism criti-
cism is the problem of eudaimonism understood as aiming at personal flourishing.
Sandler’s EVE goes beyond eudaimonistic determinations by introducing a pluralis-
tic account of teleology. He contends that environmental virtue is not limited to the
realization of eudaimonistic aims only: it recognizes the role of noneudaimonistic
aims in human flourishing. Furthermore, the concept of flourishing is not limited to
human beings only, and environmental virtue can be conducive to nonhuman flour-
ishing, since the human being is a part of both the natural and the cultural world.

The Others (Human) Flourishing

The virtue that enables us to go beyond personal flourishing the most is benevo-
lence. Sandler points out that benevolence is important in two respects: 1) if it pro-
motes personal eudaimonia; and 2) if other entities have worth or value that the
moral agent has a reason to respond to. There are two types of benevolence: passive
(considerateness and nonmaleficence) and active (for example, helpfulness, compas-
sion, or charitableness) (Sandler 2007, 53). The virtues of benevolence are crucial
for the moral agent to flourish in society, to live well as a member of a community,
and these are the virtues that are conducive to the realization of both eudaimonistic
and non-eudaimonistic ends.

734 D. Dzwonkowska

1 3

Environmental virtues are a special type of virtue that can contribute to human
flourishing in various ways. Environmental virtues are “appropriate attitudes in
addressing nature and in profiting from nature” (Kallhoff and Schörgenhumer 2017,
194). There is no doubt that human beings benefit from nature in many ways, start-
ing from the very basic naturalistic implications of our reliance on the services pro-
vided by the ecosystem. Thus recognition of their value and aiming at ecosystem
sustainability (see van Wensveen 2000; 2001) is not a matter of a sophisticated ethi-
cal dispute. It is a matter of protecting our existence.18

Ronald Sandler presents a wide spectrum of mutual benefits of cultivating
environmental virtues. For example, virtues of environmental activism19 can not
only bring benefits to nature but can help individuals to succeed in other domains
(Sandler 2007, 49); or the benefit of wonder for the natural world can, according to
Rachel Carson, provide joy, exhilaration, or satisfaction and is a gateway to love,
gratitude, appreciation, and care (Sandler 2007, 50). Thus the other types of ecosys-
tem service are also important for us as human beings, either in a naturalistic way
or more subtly.20 Recognition of the value of nature is itself an element of human
flourishing. It helps to shape a “person’s ethical outlook to reflect what things are
actually worth” (Sandler 2007, 31). On the one hand, it promotes the Aristotelian
way of perceiving virtue, which is connected with excellence in rational activity; on
the other hand, it supports promoting agent and agent-independent ends.

Nonhuman Others’ Flourishing

Thus environmental virtues can be beneficial for human beings’ flourishing; how-
ever, the crucial question is whether they can also contribute to nonhuman flour-
ishing. According to Sandler’s definition, environmental virtues are those character
traits that promote human and nonhuman flourishing.21 The pluralistic account of
virtue enables a moral agent to recognize the value of natural goods and respond to
them in a virtuous way. This is environmentally responsive virtue—i.e. the type of
virtue “for which environmental entities are morally considerable” (Sandler 2007,
42). The other type of environmental virtue is the one that is environmentally jus-
tified. This kind of virtue is when “a character trait is justified as a virtue at least
in part by environmental goods and values—be they instrumental goods (e.g., nat-
ural resources or ecosystem services) or final values (e.g., natural value or inher-
ent worth)” (Sandler 2018, 224). When a certain character trait is conducive to the
accomplishment of environmental ends or goals (e.g., it promotes sustainability or
contributes to the flourishing of nonhuman organisms) then it is an environmentally

18 Even though this notion brings several theoretical problems (see Sandler 2007, 44–49).
19 For example, cooperativeness, perseverance, optimism, creativity.
20 For example, cultural ecosystem services that enable us to create pieces of art including nature or
inspired by nature, or spiritual or recreational experiences in natural surroundings, or making nature a
subject in science or education.
21 Sandler Ronald, An Interview with Ronald Sandler, available at: accessed: 26.03.2018.

https://cup.columbia.edu/author-interviews/

https://cup.columbia.edu/author-interviews/

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Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric?

productive virtue. The concept of environmental virtue includes non-agential ends.
It can aim at promoting nonhuman flourishing (environmentally productive virtue),
its justification may be care for the environment (environmentally justified virtue),
and it recognizes the moral standing of the nonhuman world.

As Swanton (2003, 92–93) notes, “some virtues […] serve ends other than
human flourishing; for example, the flourishing or integrity of natural objects and
systems, whether sentient, living or non-living”.. Sandler supports this claim in ref-
erence to virtues of benevolence and provides arguments that show how virtues of
interpersonal benevolence can promote both human and nonhuman flourishing. He
contends that a benevolent person will contribute to the protection of environmental
goods, since they are necessary for humans’ health and survival. Thus interpersonal
benevolence is an important factor in promoting environmental wellbeing, as well as
caring for human flourishing.22

The benefits of virtue cultivation are not limited to human flourishing. Virtues
are not cultivated in a societal vacuum and the virtuous person is the one that is
disposed to act in a way that is beneficial for her and for her surroundings. Environ-
mental virtues are those character traits that promote human and nonhuman flourish-
ing. For example, if we practice moderation, it helps us to develop various qualities
that are beneficial for ourselves, such as discrimination (to analyze whether we need
to buy a new good), self-restraint, patience, and many others. Meanwhile, we also
make a contribution to a more reasonable resource usage and reduce resource waste,
which is crucial to stop ecosystem degradation. It is beneficial for both the moral
agent himself as well as for his surroundings and for nature. Thus environmental
virtues help the moral agent to flourish while being beneficial for nonhuman flour-
ishing. This approach to EVE is non-anthropocentric in three ways: 1) nonhuman
ends are the justification of virtue; 2) agent flourishing can involve nonhumans; and
3) virtue can be productive of nonhuman flourishing.

However, a consideration regarding epistemological anthropocentrism is raised
by Holmes Rolston III. He points out that

environmental virtues, as achieved by humans, will initially involve concern
for human quality of life. But our deeper ethical achievement needs to focus on
values as intrinsic achievements in wild nature. These virtues within us need to
attend to values without us … The other cannot be seen simply as a source of
personal transformation. We must make the model at least an ellipse with two
foci: human virtue and natural value” (Rolston 2005, 69).

Ronald Sandler addresses this problem by applying to the relational nature of vir-
tues, that are not “excellent in themselves […] They are excellences in relating to
the world. (…) The bases of the virtues, therefore, include entities with inherent
worth and values « without us»” (2007, 112–113). Thus we are able to perceive and

22 However, there are still problems included in this issue, like equal share of resources (especially in
areas or communities where there is limited access) or priority of the virtues of benevolence in an envi-
ronmental context over other types of virtue that are not conducive to securing environmental goods, or
very anthropocentric reasons to protect nature.

736 D. Dzwonkowska

1 3

include into our moral choices the values and worth of the natural world. The plural-
istic bases of responsiveness make it possible to include the values and worth of the
natural world. This approach is therefore still able to go beyond the limiting of flour-
ishing to human beings only. Sandler’s EVE is an example of ethics that enables
the realization of eudaimonistic and noneudaimonistic aims. This is an approach to
ethics that includes a wider scope of moral consideration than does eudaimonistic
ethics. Thus it enables including human beings as well as providing benefits for non-
human beings.

Summary

The effort to overcome anthropocentrism has become a cornerstone of environmen-
tal discussion. Even though many brilliant philosophers have contributed to it, the
problem has not been solved in a satisfactory way. Moreover, proposed solutions
(like biocentrism or ecocentrism) have brought some theoretical problems that are
difficult to overcome. One of the biggest difficulties in overcoming anthropocentrism
is not the problem itself, but the terminological chaos that is present in the discus-
sion. The term anthropocentrism is most often used in three meanings: 1) ontologi-
cal anthropocentrism, 2) ethical anthropocentrism, or 3) epistemological anthropo-
centrism. It is important to make a distinction here, since each of these approaches
brings different consequences for the ethical theory. It is also important to recognize
that ethical anthropocentrism is the one that is of primary importance for ethical dis-
cussion and it is the concept that can help to deal with an ecological crisis.

The crucial aspect of criticism toward virtue ethics is that it is agent-centered and
focused on human flourishing. In the paper, I have shown that agent-centeredness
does not enable VE to elaborate the ethical approach that is including the others.
Ronald Sandler’s ethics is an example of virtue-oriented ethics that is non-anthro-
pocentric in an ethical sense and that recognizes virtue as a tool for both human and
nonhuman flourishing.

Acknowledgements The paper is the result of research carried out within the research project “The scope
of moral reflection in Ronald Sandler’s environmental virtue ethics” financed by the National Science
Center in Poland (Decision no 2017/01/X/HS1/01491). I owe huge thanks to Ronald Sandler, who has
read numerous versions of this paper and given lots of insightful comments. I also thank John Basl for
valuable remarks on the paper’s draft.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

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https://archive.org/details/waldenorlifeinwo1854thor

Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric?
Abstract
Introduction
Disambiguating Anthropocentrism
Ontological Anthropocentrism
Epistemological Anthropocentrism
Ethical Anthropocentrism
Is Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric?
The Charge of AnthropocentrismEgoism of VE
The AnthropocentrismEgoism of VE Revisited
An Example of Ethically Non-Anthropocentric EVE: Sandler’s EVE
The Pluralistic Account of Virtue and Teleology
The Others (Human) Flourishing
Nonhuman Others’ Flourishing
Summary
Acknowledgements
References