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1
Chapter One
Laying the Foundations
Taizu, r. 1368–98
Censor Liu Ji, a laconic memoirist of middling rank, described the Mongol
Yuan dynasty’s last day in China and its sad retreat to the same steppes from
which it had emerged over a century before. The world empire of Chinggis-
khan, and the China-based regime of Khubilai-khan, were no more. In China,
a new actor, the ex-peasant Zhu Yuanzhang, posthumously known as Taizu,
founder of the Ming dynasty, after seventeen years of civil war, finally
forced the Yuan court to evacuate its capital city, Dadu, nowadays known as
Beijing.
The day was September 10, 1368. The Yuan emperor, Toghon Temur,
called a last meeting of his officials. He told them they all had to flee Dadu
immediately and relocate to the summer capital, Shangdu, in the steppes two
hundred miles directly north. No one said a word until an officer in the
Bureau of Military Affairs, one Kharajang, thought they should stay and
defend to the death until help came. No, said the emperor; Koko Temur is too
far away to help. So around midnight, the emperor, the palace ladies, the heir
apparent, and around one hundred civil and military officials plus some
troops exited the walled city on horseback. Many were left behind. There
were persistent rains that soaked everyone, and it was cold enough that some
men froze to death.
On September 17, the court learned that Dadu had fallen to the “bandits,”
that is, the Ming. Ten days later, the court reached Shangdu, only to find that
it had been wrecked during the civil wars and was scarcely habitable. The
emperor managed to confer with messengers from some semi-independent
Yuan warlords—Koko Temur in Shanxi and Naghachu in Manchuria. He
hoped to get help from Korea. The court discussed how they might all re-
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 12
group and fight their way back into China. But morale was low. There were
snowstorms on top of dust storms. Korea and Naghachu were of no help;
they were fighting each other. In March 1369, a Yuan commander raided
Tongzhou, twenty miles east of Dadu, but he couldn’t take it. The “bandit”
general Chang Yuchun launched an attack on the fugitive Yuan court during
the spring and summer and beat an opposing Yuan force on July 8. The court
decided that it wasn’t safe; they’d have to escape six hundred miles farther,
northwest to Kharakhorum, and regroup and plan the reconquest of China
from there. On July 20, the Ming army occupied Shangdu. On September 5,
Chang gave up the chase of the Yuan court, but he did capture ten thousand
troops, ten thousand carts, three thousand horses, and fifty thousand head of
cattle—a huge loss for the Yuan if the numbers were honestly reported.
Liu Ji ended his memoir on February 7, 1370. 1 For some years, the Yuan
court in exile thought it had been illegitimately deprived of its rightful pos-
session of China. Its rulers continued to think they might one day recover it
from the bandits who had ousted them.
* * *
Taken altogether, the Ming had some seven thousand miles of frontier to
defend, including Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. It wasn’t just the
north. 2 But the north, it’s fair to say, absorbed the lion’s share of China’s
manpower, resources, and attention every day of every year. Forming an
immense arc, the northern borderlands stretched some 1,700 miles from
around Songpan on the Sichuan-Tibet frontier as far as, say, Shanhaiguan on
the Gulf of Bohai and reaching out into Manchuria. It crossed sharp and
unglaciated mountains, rounded hills formed of windblown soil, deserts,
desert-steppes, grasslands, and forests. Beyond the arc lived non-Chinese
mainly, people the Ming variously and vaguely identified as Fan (Tibetans
and the like), Muslims (Hui), Monguors (Tuda), Oirat Mongols (Wala), Ta-
tars (Da, Dadan; the label “Mongol” was virtually never used), and Jurchens
(Nüzhen), just to name some. These posed a security challenge to the realm
much more closely and immediately threatening than what the United States
in 2019 is facing along its 1,300-mile border with Mexico, or indeed what the
United States faced driving away the Indian resistance in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. While the United States pushed its western frontier ever
farther west, the Ming infantry, cavalry, and artillery were placed in walled
forts, usually not in order to march forth and annex, but to remain in place
and protect China’s heartlands (the fuli, “stomach and innards”) from disor-
der, raids, and invasions. And somehow, for 276 years, despite many serious
lapses and several horrendous breakdowns, the system worked. The imperial
government held the line. This book tries to explain how it ever managed to
do that.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 3
* * *
As one traveled west to east along that northern frontier, one encountered at
least three ecologically and ethnically distinct regions. The most complex of
them lay in the west. There, Chinese settlers lived intermixed with Tibetans
and their nomad communities and sectarian Buddhist temples; with the Mon-
guors, a Mongol subgroup; with Uighur Turks; with Oirats; and with both
Chinese and Central Asian Muslims. This mixture was volatile. Violence was
common. Along the middle stretch, the Tatars (i.e., Mongols) predominated.
They were an aristocratic nomad society, dominated either actually or nomi-
nally by the Borjigin descendants of Chinggis-khan and Khubilai. The Tatars
were Ming China’s greatest threat until the rise of the Manchus in the seven-
teenth century. The eastern region consisted of Manchuria, whose rivalrous
Jurchen communities and states (guo) were, advantageously for China,
wedged between Korea to the south and the Tatars to the west and north,
whom they could ally with or fight, however their internecine struggles
might sway them. They were a manageable worry for the Ming, until the
dynasty neared its end.
One can begin the story in the west. How did Ming China, under the
personal control of one of the most powerful dictators world history had ever
seen (his contemporary, Tamerlane, lacked his rootedness and aptitude for
organization), develop its militarized face upon the outside world there to the
northwest?
THE NORTHWEST: TIBET AND THE SILK ROAD
The Ming march west set forth from Dadu, renamed Beiping, nowadays
Beijing, in December 1368. It was led by Xu Da. Like all of Taizu’s com-
manders, Xu Da was a peasant and a regional compatriot of the founder’s,
and ever since the onset of the civil wars in 1353, his favorite fighter. 3 At
Datong, stiff Yuan resistance was led by the controversial and headstrong
Koko Temur, actually a Chinese adopted as a boy by a Mongol family. By
this time, he was a powerful warlord, long in and out of favor with the Yuan
court. Caught by surprise one night, Koko Temur and a dozen of his horse-
men barely escaped from their tents. They galloped west toward Gansu. Xu
Da captured forty thousand of his leaderless troops and some forty thousand
horses. 4
In May 1369, Xu Da convened a conference of commanders. They were
in interior Shaanxi Province, needing to decide what to do next. Various
ideas were floated, but only Xu Da’s opinion counted. It was to head for
Lintao and the Tibetan frontier, still under Yuan control. If we take it, he
said, we can absorb the Yuan forces into ours. Their farms can supply us. All
the other cities will fall like ripe fruit. 5 The Yuan commander at Lintao was
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Chapter 14
an ethnic Chinese named Li Siqi. Xu, who was probably illiterate, had his
headquarters send Li an interesting letter, which I paraphrase: Either you can
surrender and save lives, or you can flee into the steppes. The barbarians may
obey you for a while, but they are not our kind. Their minds lie elsewhere.
Your men are from the central plains of China. They see the steppes as bleak
and desolate; they won’t like living there and will probably rebel. You’ll be
alone, unable to protect your own family. Back home you’re a hero, and your
ancestors’ graves are there; have you ever thought about that? You should
leave the foreigners and come back to China.
For a short while, Li hoped to join his foster son, Zhao Qi, and find refuge
with the Tibetans. Zhao Qi, also known as Toghto Temur, was a non-Chinese
borderland native. In the end, however, both he and Li surrendered. Lintao
fell to the Ming. 6
Xu Da marched on to Huizhou, one hundred miles northeast, where he
declined to requisition the local people’s horses and livestock. “We’re not
conducting a punitive expedition,” he said. “The people of the northwest
have always herded for a living. If we confiscate their animals, how will they
live?” In June, the city of Qingyang (150 miles northwest of the Shaanxi
provincial capital of Xi’an) surrendered, then rebelled, showing that the
Ming juggernaut could on occasion be slowed. 7 Back in China, meanwhile,
Taizu directed an edict announcing the Ming founding to the ruler of “Tibet”
(Tubo), whoever he thought that might be. No one responded to it. 8
Qingyang fell to the Ming on July 31, but it didn’t fall quietly. 9 Its
defender, a pro-Yuan fighter named Zhang Liangchen, thought he had an
advantage in his seven foster sons who were all eager to do battle. Koko
Temur was out there somewhere, and he might be able to help. Zhang’s own
brother, Zhang Sidao, was at Ningxia, two hundred miles northwest, too far
away. The Ming decided to starve the city into submission. That worked.
Zhang Liangchen committed suicide. The Ming put to death two hundred of
his men. 10 Taizu sent a letter to Koko Temur. He offered him and his men,
most of whom he said were Chinese, a chance to return home and take
positions with the Ming. No response to that is on record. 11
But while the siege was unfolding, Xu Da signaled Taizu that he needed
help. The emperor ordered his nephew and adopted son, Li Wenzhong, to
take forces from Beiping and go to Xu’s aid. Li reached Taiyuan in northern
Shanxi, some three hundred miles short of his goal, when messengers in-
formed him that Datong, 150 miles north, had fallen. This, as things turned
out, was the last attempt by the Yuan emperor, far away in the steppes, to
force a reentry into China. On his own authority, Li stopped his march and
turned to Datong. Like most Yuan-era cities, it was unwalled. The Yuan
commander, Torebeg, came out to fight. A furious clash lasted some six
hours. Li’s superior numbers won the day, and Torebeg was captured. No
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 5
hard feelings; Li untied his fetters and invited him to a banquet. Torebeg later
entered Ming service. 12
What does all this show thus far? Judging just from the events, Xu Da’s
army was large, well run, experienced, and very effective. For the first time,
they’d entered into a very complicated frontier environment. Chinese and
non-Chinese officials and generals put up a token defense, but their loyalties
to the Yuan were thin. They could be talked into surrender. But the ethnic
mix out in the northwest, and the livelihood mix of herding and farming,
would forever make a difficult environment for the maintenance of Ming
security. And at Lintao, Xu Da was operating some seven hundred miles
away from Beiping (Beijing). Yet the supreme command over everything
and everyone, Xu Da included, remained firmly in the hands of Taizu in his
capital at Nanjing. The emerging Ming machine was colossal in scale and
absolutely centrally directed.
In September, Taizu sent out detailed instructions to Xu Da telling him
how he wanted things arranged in the newly captured cities of Lintao, Lan-
zhou, Qingyang, and Taiyuan. Then he ordered Xu back to Nanjing for
consultation on future border actions. 13
* * *
Lintao, conquered in May 1369, came under some sort of Tibetan (Tubo)
threat five months later. As the Ming defenders hoped, ice formed on the
river that lay between them. The Ming army crossed and surprised the Tibe-
tans, who flung down their arms and surrendered. Their leaders were treated
nicely—given coats and caps and sent back to rally their people (buluo) to
the Ming side. 14 Few seem to have responded. In January 1370, Taizu issued
an edict to those “hiding in the mountains,” telling them that amnesties and
rewards were on offer if they came out and surrendered. 15 For as long as the
Ming lasted, the Tibetans (no longer called Tubo, but Fan) would at times
cooperate in the tea-horse exchange, and at times menace or raid Lintao and
the other hybrid border cities, like Hezhou and Taozhou.
In June 1370, Ming commander Deng Yu marched fifty miles west to
Hezhou, on the edge of eastern Tibet. The ruler ordered that a guard commu-
nity (wei) be set up at or near Hezhou, a mixed Sino-Tibetan city. The city
was empty. Corpses were strewn everywhere. The soldiers had wanted to
abandon it, but their commander made them rebuild it as a defense fixture
against the Tibetans. Some months later, eighteen or more Tibetan lineages
(zu) came and offered their submission. The Ming authorities wanted yet
more submissions, so they sent an interpreter, a soldier with a Tibetan name,
out to make the contacts. In January 1371, Hezhou was incorporated into
Ming China as a hybrid frontier city, Ming in its organization, Tibetan and
Mongol in its ethnic makeup. A Tibetan was made a hereditary vice com-
mander of the guard, with two other ethnics, probably Mongols, as assistant
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Chapter 16
commanders. Then the larger region of which Hezhou was a part was inocu-
lated with military strongpoints, eight battalions at Minzhou and other places
and one tribal battalion at Taozhou, plus eight squadrons. 16 In June 1371, a
leader with a Chinese name, having come to Nanjing with tribute, was ap-
pointed vice commander of the Wenzhou Han-Bo (Sino-Tibetan) Brigade—a
fort on the extreme southern edge of today’s Gansu Province, near Sichuan,
on the north bank of the Baishui River, a beautifully scenic place, forested
and mountainous. 17 Six months later, Hezhou was reconfigured, as a large
delegation had arrived in Nanjing with a stunning tribute offering consisting
of horses, iron armor, swords, arrows, and other goods. Taizu realized Nan-
jing’s July heat was hard on the men, who were used to a cooler climate, so
he praised their goodwill, gave them all gifts, and appointed a whole new
cadre of officers for Hezhou. The new officers included, judging from their
names, a mix of Chinese, Mongols, and Tibetans. 18 In March 1372, two
commanders with Mongol names came to Nanjing with tribute and were
given gifts. 19
The hybrid character of Hezhou as a frontier city is clear. It was in part an
incorporated element of the Ming military, but at the same time it was like a
little non-Han foreign country, part of Ming China’s international relations
system. And one of the Mongols at Hezhou was treated with unusual respect
by Taizu. Thus when in 1370 a commander named Bunala surrendered to the
Ming at Hezhou and the ruler was informed that Bunala was a descendant of
Khubilai-khan’s seventh son, Taizu was deeply impressed by that and made
his position hereditary; and when he died three years later, Taizu granted him
a short obituary and burial at government expense. 20 In 1388 a local Fan
monk with a Tibetan name arrived in Nanjing with a tribute offering of
horses and was rewarded with Ming money. 21 In 1393, Taizu set up two
Buddhist registries in the Hezhou Guard city, one for the Han Chinese, the
other for the Fan, both headed by clerics. 22 These data are testimony to the
ethnic hybridity of Hezhou.
Hezhou soon became a center for the Ming acquisition of quality Tibetan
horses, desirable as mounts for China’s northwestern frontier cavalry. In
October 1380, the Ministry of War reported getting 2,050 horses for 58,892
catties of brick tea, produced by the tea monopolies in Sichuan and Shaanxi
Provinces. One catty was equivalent to 20.7 ounces, so the total came to
some thirty-eight tons of tea. 23 The Ming government dictated the prices:
thus in 1383, forty catties of tea for a grade-A horse, thirty for grade B, and
twenty for grade C. Taizu himself endorsed those rates. 24
Border trade was fraught with complexities. Should government control
all of it? Not totally. In 1394, Taizu moved to protect the private economy
along the China-Tibet frontier. He’d been informed that local officials were
banning all but government transactions in horses and livestock. That was
wrong. The western people, he said, depended on horses, oxen, and sheep for
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 7
their livelihood. Soldiers and civilians should not be forbidden to buy those
animals, provided they were unbranded and not government property. He
ordered placards to be posted on the frontier to inform everyone of official
policy on this matter. 25 Easy possibilities for corruption were a perpetual
temptation for local border officials. In 1393, the ruler sent envoys out to
Hezhou and elsewhere, wherever Ming China dealt with the Fan lineages, to
issue tallies to the lineages so that they needn’t yield to the demand of any
but official emissaries who held the other halves of the tallies. 26
Corruption in the official tea-horse exchange was by no means small
scale and local only. In July 1397, no less a dignitary than one of the ruler’s
own sons-in-law, Ouyang Lun, was executed for smuggling tea. He’d sent
housemen out to Shaanxi Province to buy tea; he used intimidation tactics to
commandeer carts and force their way through the police checkpoints, and at
Hezhou sell the tea at a lower rate than what the Ming government was
offering. 27
Taizu saw tea smuggling as not just an economic crime, but as a threat to
China’s very security. The greed of barbarians, he noted in 1397, was by
definition insatiable. Unless they’re restrained, barbarians encroach on us
and humiliate us. But tea smuggling by Chinese from the China side makes
tea cheaper and horses more expensive, which increases the barbarians’ ten-
dency to toy with us. So the ruler put two of his sons, the armed princes of
Qin and Shu, to work patrolling the whole frontier from Songpan up to
Hezhou and Lintao, two hundred rugged miles, to stop the contraband. He
said that the aim of this policy was not to profit the state; it was to control the
barbarians. 28 The damage caused by smuggling, he said, was exacerbated by
low-level border officials who tried to force their Fan trading counterparts to
accept government tea at a price above the going private rate. 29
* * *
Furthermore, Hezhou was a gateway to the vast hinterlands of Tibet proper.
A special brigade led by non-Han officers was set up under Hezhou supervi-
sion, tasked with relations to the west. Between that brigade and the deep
Tibetan interior at dBus-gTsang, there lay Tibetan groups with larceny in
mind. A 1373 tribute mission from a Tibetan Buddhist hierarch, the Namkha
dpal-bzang-po, managed to make it to Nanjing, although along the way he
complained that “Tubo” bandits had looted their baggage. Taizu ordered up
an expedition under Deng Yu to go after them. 30
China understood outermost Tibet to be a center of civilization, not bar-
barism. Thus in February 1373, a large delegation bearing Buddhist statues,
holy books, and relics led to Taizu’s authorizing a temple to house all this. 31
And more. He ordered up a grand Tibetan guard unit, the dBus-gTsang mDo-
khams Military Command, with sixty local officers and a Buddhist preceptor
of state. The ruler ordered them all to obey Ming law, keep the peace among
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Chapter 18
their people, and have the lamas teach the people to do good. He assigned a
judge from the Hezhou Guard to accompany the return mission and to call on
all the Tibetan chiefs who hadn’t yet submitted to do so. 32 The ruler also set
up at Taozhou, some hundred miles south of Hezhou, headquarters for six
brigades, nine squadrons, with seventeen officers to supervise eighteen line-
ages (zu) of non-Han border people. Thus the whole of Tibet, out as far as the
Himalayas, came under the Ming embrace. But it was all symbolic. Nanjing
never posted any Chinese troops or personnel out there.
Despite all these new arrangements, violence broke out here and there in
the China-Tibet borderlands. March 1373 saw a raid by the Fan (the new
term for the Tibetans) on Longde County in the Liupan Mountains, seventy-
five miles southwest of Qingyang. A commander of the Pingliang Guard
marched fifty miles west, captured or killed seventy men, and drove the
raiders’ horses, mules, and oxen back to Pingliang. In August, Hezhou suf-
fered a night raid. A brigade commander got killed. Marquis Chen De drove
the raiders away. In September, Chen De moved his forces out to a place
called Dalahaizi Pass and imposed a horrendous defeat upon the “Hu” there,
Mongols perhaps, killing six hundred, capturing seven hundred including
their leader, and seizing a thousand head of horses, camels, sheep, and
oxen. 33
There was yet more to the China-Tibet interface. In February 1373, Taizu
thrust a new salient into the borderlands, establishing a guard community at
Xining, near the edge of today’s Qinghai Province. Yuan officials still held
it. They were divided on the question whether they should submit to Ming
authority. Dorji-shige, a Mongol and a mid-level provincial official, opted to
join the Ming. He and Ming commander Feng Sheng attacked his colleague,
Dorjibal (Yuan prince of Qi). They seized his brother, his seals, his troops,
and his horses and sent them all on to Nanjing. So Taizu appointed a Chinese
as commander and made Dorji-shige himself assistant commander of the new
guards. 34 That wasn’t quite the end of the story. In August 1373, some non-
Han officers set out from Taozhou on a hunting expedition. They chanced
upon Dorjibal. They all got up a plan to raid Hezhou and Lanzhou. Com-
manders from the Xining Guard had some success beating the raiders off. 35
Xining remained important as a Ming presence on the edge of the Tibetan
world. Troops came and enlarged its wall in 1387. Its function was military
for the Ming, religious for the Tibetans. Taizu was pleased to confer a name
upon one of its lamaist temples in 1393, when he also authorized the creation
of a Buddhist registry (Senggangsi) there, run by native clerics, with admin-
istrative jurisdiction over all local temples and monks. 36
The Tibetan world was vast, remote, and fractured. 37 Lhasa was some
1,500 straight-line miles from Nanjing. Closer in was the region known as
mDo-khams (i.e., Amdo and parts south), highland country in what is now
Qinghai and western Sichuan Provinces. The Yuan had connections to these
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 9
places, and Taizu hoped to resume those connections. In October 1373, there
arrived in Nanjing a delegation of Buddhist hierarchs from mDo-khams with
a petition asking permission to do for the Ming what they’d done for the
Yuan and act as frontier guardians in return for certain privileges. One of the
prelates had to listen to a lecture from Taizu. The ruler told him that Bud-
dhism originated in the west a thousand years ago and came to China. Wise
monks spoke of Heaven, man, and wonderful karma. Intelligent people be-
lieved them, and everyone was enlightened. That’s how powerful the Buddha
was, said Taizu, a Buddhist mendicant himself when he was a teenager.
Taizu advised the lama to keep up his meditations. The Ming state would
enforce his teachings and punish any misbehavior among the laity. But Taizu
denied the delegation’s request to gather in “scattered and lost people.” Ming
forces would do that themselves. 38
So mDo-khams voluntarily accepted a token Ming suzerainty. During the
fifteenth century, its name would fade, and its component groups and local-
ities would be dealt with piecemeal by the Ming. But in January 1375, the
Ming established out there a pacification office with six commissions, four
chiliarchies, and seventeen battalions. This followed the Yuan pattern. How-
ever, none of the appointees to offices there were Chinese, and the militariza-
tion implied by the Ming nomenclature was rather a veneer over a herding
society in fact run by Buddhist clerics, based in their lamaseries. A few
months later, after Ming envoys contacted them, a similar regime was created
for dBus-gTsang and Mna-ris in far Tibet. During the whole of his reign,
Taizu welcomed their occasional missions, bringing tribute in the form of
horses, Buddhist texts, and other goods. 39
Generally speaking, the Ming under Taizu dealt effectively with the Tibe-
tan world. The ruler liked dealing with their Buddhist prelates, and distant
Tibetans were, with some exceptions, willing to accept a sort of pro forma
tributary integration into the Ming realm and exchange their religious goods
plus horses for tea, silk, salt, or cash. Neighboring Tibetans in frontier cities
like Hezhou and Xining lived alongside Chinese settlers, but much the same
expectations were laid upon them. However, south from Hezhou, along the
foothills of the Tibetan massif down to Songpan, things were much more
violent.
TROUBLES ALONG THE SILK ROAD
Not far northeast of the semi-Tibetan world of Hezhou, Taozhou, and Min-
zhou lay a troubled war zone—nowadays Gansu Province and the Ningxia
Hui Autonomous Region, but in the Ming both were part of Shaanxi. Here
the founders faced a more complex security problem. Out along the Silk
Road lived a volatile mix of Chinese soldiers and civilians, Tibetans, Turks,
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 110
Mongols, Oirats, Monguors, and the people called Hui, defined by their
religion (Islam) rather than by their ethnicity, which could be either Chinese
or Turkic or Mongol. Some ethnics farmed, others herded sheep and oxen,
others were traders, and many found careers raiding their neighbors for
slaves and livestock. Through the long, dangerous gauntlet called the Gansu
Corridor came a steady stream of caravans from the city-states of eastern
Turkestan and the Middle East. Misunderstandings, flare-ups, and serious
security crises were a constant occurrence.
The geographical profile of extreme western Shaanxi, where it juts into
what is now Gansu Province, looked something like a syringe. In the bulb of
the syringe sat a handful of interior prefectures, places like Pingliang, Gong-
chang, Lintao, Lanzhou, and Qingyang, which were under civilian adminis-
tration but were often involved in war. In the long, thin tube of the syringe,
heading west along the Silk Road, sat Zhuanglang, Liangzhou, Yongchang,
Ganzhou, and Suzhou, which were military command centers (zhen), or as
Hucker renders it, defense commands, managed by a regional commander,
not a civilian but a member of the Ming armed forces. From Zhuanglang it
was some three hundred miles west to Suzhou. At the far end, the citadel of
Jiayuguan marked Ming China’s terminus, where embassies from the west
had to halt for customs inspections. 40
Beyond Jiayuguan lay eastern Turkestan and its famous oasis cities: Hami
(Qamil, Qomul), three hundred miles west; then Turfan, three hundred miles
beyond Hami; and then Beshbalik, yet another three hundred miles out. On
the other side of the Pamirs, three thousand straight-line miles from Nanjing,
lay Samarkand, capital of another empire builder, Tamerlane, known to Tai-
zu as Temur, the son-in-law who married into the house of Chinggis-khan
and through it ruled the Ulus Chaghatai. Beginning in 1387, Tamerlane sent
yearly missions to Nanjing, each bearing amicable donations of horses and
camels. More horses came each time: 15 at the outset, to 1,095 in 1396. None
of these missions was ever disturbed by robbers. Apparently Tamerlane was
just that powerful. 41
An unfamiliar embassy arrived in Nanjing in the summer of 1374, with
gifts of armor and swords. They were Sarigh Uighurs. They took pains to
explain that they were a branch of the Tatars; that their large territory lay
1,500 li (500 miles) west of Ganzhou and Suzhou; that their settlements were
unwalled; that many of them lived in felt tents and herded camels, horses,
oxen, and sheep; and that their king’s name was Buyan Temur. 42 It appears
the king hoped to strengthen his rule by accepting seals and other badges of
Ming authority that would allow him to parcel out some settlements as nomi-
nal Ming guard units (wei) under appointees of his. But there soon followed a
bloodletting in which the king and then his killers were killed, one after the
other. Nothing more was heard of these people until 1391, when a mission
arrived from Azhen, one of the Sarigh Uighur wei set up in 1374. 43
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 11
A few months later, a mission from Kheidir Khoja, king of Beshbalik,
arrived in Nanjing bearing gifts of eleven horses and some hunting falcons.
Actually, the mission was Chinese. It had to be explained that when Lan Yu
fought the Tatar-Mongols at Buyur Lake in Mongolia in 1388 (of which
more later), he caught several hundred Samarkand merchants, whom he sent
back home under escort. The escort, on its return to China, passed through
Beshbalik, where the king took advantage of their protection to attach his
own envoys. 44
The mission was delayed for a long time at Hami. The king of Hami,
Unashiri, a descendant of the Mongol house of Chaghatai, was blocking and
looting the Uighur tribute missions. This behavior Taizu could not tolerate.
Although the core issue was rivalry between the two states of Turkestan and
had nothing to do with Ming China directly, the effect was to cede to Hami
the power to decide who could and could not engage with Nanjing. Ming
preeminence was challenged, with who knows what larger reverberations on
China’s place in the world if the challenge weren’t met. So, in September
1391, Taizu launched a surprise campaign on Hami. An army of unstated
size surrounded Hami in a nighttime maneuver. King Unashiri and his family
escaped, but the result was an utter rout. Hami fell to the Ming. 45
Taizu followed that with an embassy to Beshbalik, bearing a letter for
King Kheidir Khoja. In it, the emperor outlined China’s approach to the
world. I paraphrase: Heaven and earth support many rulers, he said. Separat-
ed as they are by mountains and seas and customs, they all share a common
proclivity to love and hate, and they all share a common endowment of blood
and vital energy. I regard all of them with equal benevolence, so as to ensure
that the common people of all guo (states, nations) large and small, whatever
their species, will prosper. Their duty, in turn, is to “serve the great.” So it
was indeed praiseworthy when our escort taking the Samarkand merchants
home returned through your territory, and you joined them, and thereby
showed your correct decision to “serve the great.” 46 This was serious propa-
ganda. The ruler meant every word of it.
In 1391, Lan Yu—winner in the 1388 battle at Buyur Lake, and in Tai-
zu’s effusive rejoicing the greatest steppe fighter in all history—was sent out
with an army to eastern Turkestan to dispose of certain troublemakers. By
May 1392, they’d not had much success. Lan Yu’s officers wanted to call off
the fighting and negotiate. Lan Yu vetoed that and pressed ahead into Sarigh
Uighur territory. The enemy eluded him. Then came orders from Taizu to
exit Turkestan and undertake a long march of easily a thousand miles down
to Jianchang, a zhen (defense command) 350 miles south of Songpan, 225
miles south of Chengdu, on the Sichuan-Tibet frontier, where a big-time
rebel named Orug Temur was creating a major disturbance. Lan Yu insisted
on taking a perilous route that hugged the edge of the Tibetan highlands. He
drove his men across rain-swollen rivers. Many of the men knew Taizu
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 112
wouldn’t have wanted that, and they deserted. So Lan Yu had to take an
easier route.
By June 1392, with Lan Yu still on the march, Regional Military Com-
missioner Qu Neng brought Orug Temur to terms. The foe offered to surren-
der. Many thought the offer false. It was a delaying tactic. Qu disagreed. And
Orug Temur successfully made an escape. 47
Taizu learned about all this and decided that a major effort was needed to
secure that part of the Ming frontier. He set up two tribal civil and military
commands (junmin zhihuisi) plus a chiliarchy and sent out fifteen thousand
troops from Nanjing and Shaanxi, all in response to the threat posed by Orug
Temur. The ruler’s orders to the commanders stated that many ethnic
groups—Bo, Baiyi, Lolo, Moso, and western Fan—had deserted Orug Temur
(who was apparently a Mongol) and had gone home to their native villages.
The commanders were asked to identify their households and assign one man
from each of them to military duty and live intermixed with the Chinese in
the garrisons, but under their own leaders. They were to farm or herd live-
stock if they weren’t fighting. A bounty of 1,000 taels silver was on offer for
Orug Temur’s capture, and 250 for his head.
During July, Qu Neng battered the enemy in some fierce mountain bat-
tles, but Orug Temur still eluded him. During August, detailed plans were
approved to build a highway closely hugging the Tibetan side of Shaanxi and
Sichuan, which route Lan Yu had been forced to abandon earlier. This was a
hard task, involving bridges, cantilevered plank roads, and post stations
above the reach of the malaria-bearing mosquitoes at lower elevations. 48
By October 1392, Lan Yu reached Jianchang. Taizu sent him precise
instructions. Orug Temur, he said, was a villainous ignoramus who cared
nothing about spilling blood. His two chief aides were Yang Bashi and a
Tatar chiliarch. He’s likely to send one of them to any parley. If so, arrest
him. Don’t believe any peace overtures. Mobilize the native soldiers. Kill all
turncoat leaders, but pardon their followers and put them to work farming or
herding. 49
The end came in December. Lan Yu’s men tricked and caught Orug
Temur, whom they sent to Nanjing for execution. 50
Lan Yu submitted an extended review of the whole frontier problem.
China’s defenses were too thin, he argued. Taizu ordered the ministries to
discuss Lan Yu’s ideas about all the new guard units he thought were neces-
sary. Lan also insisted that an all-out war had to be waged against all the
ethnic minorities of the borders who up to now were beyond Ming control.
To accomplish this, militias had to be raised from among the Chinese popula-
tion of Sichuan. Taizu firmly vetoed this idea. The civilians, he said, were
already suffering from the demands on them for grain hauling. And it would
take four hundred thousand men to wage such a war. So no. Lan Yu and Qu
Neng were ordered to return to Nanjing. 51
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 13
The whole western flank of Ming China would remain forever troubled
and violent. One especially difficult and turbulent node along that frontier
was Songpan. It lay at a fairly high elevation and was very hard to reach and
supply, but it was a key to controlling a vast craggy hinterland populated
mainly by Qiang (Tanguts, Minyag), whose religion was not Buddhist but
the older Tibetan Bön. Taizu’s reign saw constant administrative readjust-
ments, bandit outbreaks, and ethnic risings; tea-horse exchanges; and small-
scale warfare in as beautiful a landscape of mountains and forests as can be
imagined. 52
* * *
In Turkestan, meanwhile, King Unashiri managed somehow to return to
Taizu’s good graces. His embassy of January 1393 was duly received in
Nanjing, where he presented the court with forty-six horses and sixteen
mules. 53
In May 1396, Taizu sent a young messenger (Chen Cheng, of future fame
as a Ming envoy to Samarkand and Herat) out to Turkestan to reorganize the
Sarigh Uighur as the Anding Guard military command. On the face of it, this
would appear to be a blatant annexation, a direct takeover by Ming adminis-
tration, and the effacement of Beshbalik’s Turkic identity. In fact, the
changeover came at the request of the would-be ruler, desperate to impose
control after the murders of Buyan Temur and others and the internecine
fights that followed upon Lan Yu’s aborted campaign. The prince of Su,
Taizu’s fourteenth son, based at Suzhou in the Gansu Corridor, was asked to
extend his good offices, which he did. So Taizu sent Chen Cheng with fifty-
eight bronze seals for distribution to all the officers of the new guards. And in
November 1396, the new guard chief, Tasun Khudlugh, accompanied Chen
Cheng back to Nanjing with a gift of forty horses. 54 So this move, accom-
plished in order to enhance Ming security, was no annexation but rather an
outsourcing of Ming organizational power and prestige to a foreign society in
order to strengthen that society’s mechanisms of internal control.
Anding remained quite independent of far-off Nanjing, as it showed in
February 1397, when King Kheidir Khoja of Beshbalik detained for some
reason Taizu’s embassy, which was on its way to Samarkand. Taizu wrote
the king in a tone of hurt. We’ve always dealt kindly with merchants from the
Western Regions, he said. Recall how we escorted back all those Samarkand
merchants we came across in Mongolia. So why are you detaining our em-
bassy? In retaliation, I did detain your Muslim (Huihui) embassy here, pend-
ing your release of ours. But those men so ached to see their parents, wives,
and children that I’ve let them accompany another westbound embassy of
ours. Don’t block them and start a war with us, he warned. 55
* * *
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 114
Developments along the hundreds of miles of frontier from Gansu on east
during Taizu’s reign show just how complex and demanding a task it was to
keep China safe. Unlike elsewhere, the scuffles here were mostly local and
small scale. The emperor didn’t often intervene personally, but he was by no
means unaware of the threats there.
Out through the Gansu Corridor and beyond Jiayuguan lay Shazhou, the
famous Buddhist town now known once again as Dunhuang. It was three
hundred miles west of Suzhou and not a part of Ming China. The farther west
one traveled, the thinner and poorer the population of Chinese, and the thick-
er the presence of Turks, Tibetans, Mongols, and others, the more tenuous
the administrative links to China proper and the greater the likelihood of
local turmoil.
One positive sign was that the civil prefectures of Pingliang, Qingyang,
and Guangchang at the outer edge of the Ming interior had by the mid-1370s
grown in population and productivity and could now provide more tax grain
for the armies in the corridor to the west. 56
In and around the corridor, continuing campaigns and defensive buildups
by the Ming met continuing raids by ex-Yuan troops and local ethnics. In
December 1376, a new guard community was set up in Liangzhou. In March
1378, these guards reported the capture of 25 ex-Yuan officers and 1,960
local people. Taizu took note and ordered that they all be given relief and be
taken to Pingliang prefecture for resettlement “so that they can learn to
respect the teachings of the sages of our China, gradually absorb decorum
and righteousness, and shed their old customs.” 57
There are two things to point up here. One is that it seems to have been
Taizu’s policy more generally to remove civilian populations away from the
frontier war zones and put those places under fully military occupation and
administration. More will be said about that later. The second thing is that the
people being moved away from Liangzhou were in all likelihood not ethnics
but rather Chinese who’d been partly assimilated into the culture of their
non-Chinese neighbors. It was never Ming policy to convert to Confucianism
foreign peoples living outside China. It was fear of such cultural deracination
and the spread of illiteracy that prompted the Ming to establish Confucian
schools in the frontier guards (wei) and make the sons of military families
eligible for the civil service examinations. 58
In 1379, the Shaanxi branch military commission was moved from
Zhuanglang west to Ganzhou, the midway point along the corridor. 59 From
there, Ming forces fanned out to Lingzhou and Etzina; a campaign was
readied to secure the road out to Hami so that embassies and merchant
caravans might use it safely. These moves were quite successful. Several ex-
Yuan leaders were seized and their people and horses taken. 60 Post stations
were installed, each with ten horses obtained at Hezhou in exchange for tea.
Eleven or twelve men manned each station to care for the horses and farm on
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 15
the side. Tea smugglers and Tibetan bandits were suppressed: in 1387, Re-
gional Military Commissioner Nie Wei beheaded 472 such bandits and
seized 1,440 of their horses plus 6,890 oxen and sheep. 61 The training and
subsequent shunting of troops from one base to another proceeded apace.
Also, in September 1392, twenty-nine post stations were placed at twenty-
mile intervals from Gongchang and Liangzhou out to the corridor, each with
thirty Tibetan horses obtained at Qinzhou and Hezhou. Local people were
made to supply the grooms. 62 The regularity of Hu-Lu (Mongol?) raids
prompted Nanjing to order crack cavalry to go on patrol, especially at plant-
ing and harvest times. 63 In 1396, Nanjing was told that Suzhou, at the far end
of the corridor, was dependent on grain shipped from Liangzhou, a round trip
of two thousand li (some seven hundred miles), and that instead Ganzhou
should supply the grain, as long as merchants could ship grain there in return
for government monopoly salt vouchers. It was further explained that all the
post stations and transport offices from Liangzhou out to Suzhou were
staffed by convicts from interior China who were badly abused, underfed,
and dressed in rags, and that their families couldn’t help them because their
properties had been confiscated, forcing them to run away. Taizu ordered that
these men be issued clothing and three dou (three-tenths of a picul) of grain
monthly. 64 Random data like these give a true if fragmentary picture of life
on China’s northwestern frontier in the early Ming years.
To help manage the northwestern frontier with all its problems, Taizu
posted an old comrade-in-arms, Geng Bingwen, to the Shaanxi provincial
capital of Xi’an as a kind of viceroy, a position he held from 1369 to 1390,
and again in 1391 and 1397. At Xi’an, he commanded developments both in
the interior as well as on the frontier. Unlike Lan Yu, he was low key and
subservient, more a military administrator than a fighting general. 65 From the
huge jumble of data from the northwest that Nanjing received over the years,
it’s hard to escape the impression that the whole region was hopelessly
violent, corrupt, and impoverished, but that can’t be wholly correct. After all,
it was the job of the Ming government to take on and remedy each problem
as it arose. Thus it was predominantly problems that crossed the desk of the
emperor and his advisers. So we read about a raid here, a supply shortfall
there, a lapse over yonder, and neglect in the larger picture, which would
surely depict a protective shield that was effective much of the time, and not
at the price of unrelieved misery for everyone involved.
* * *
Northeast of the Gansu Corridor, one comes upon Ningxia (nowadays Yin-
chuan in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region). Ningxia lay about four
hundred miles north of Xi’an on the west shore of the Yellow River. In April
1373, an assistant minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud, one Liang Esen
Temur (whose hybrid name suggests he may have been a native of the area)
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 116
sent up a proposal to redevelop Ningxia, laid waste during the Yuan-to-Ming
civil wars. He said it was extensive, fertile, and accessible to boats and that
refugees ought to be moved there to farm it. A top-grade military man should
take charge. Taizu approved. Ningxia’s revival got underway. 66
THE CENTER: MONGOLIA
With the northbound flight of the Yuan court in September 1368, all of the
people and resources of north China fell under Ming control and had to be
sorted out and reorganized. It was entirely likely that the dynasty in exile
would try to reinvade the north in an effort to reclaim their heritage. And that
was why in July 1369 Taizu launched a major expedition into the steppes to
capture Toghon Temur, who was at the time at Shangdu. The intrepid young
Chang Yuchun led the expedition. He headed a force of some ten thousand
cavalry and eighty thousand infantry. The Yuan ruler escaped. The Ming
chased but failed to catch him. But they did capture ten thousand troops, ten
thousand carts, and fifty thousand head of cattle. Chang died of some illness
shortly after his return to China. 67 In November, Taizu sent the Yuan emper-
or a letter, advising him that come next spring when the grass was green he
could expect an attack that would last until the frost and snow of winter. 68
The Beiping area, meanwhile, was swarming with steppe refugees. Taizu
directed that the strong ones be inducted into the Ming army and issued
monthly rations. The rest were to be resettled somewhere in south China. 69 It
worried Taizu that imperial social control was under threat from people
muddling their ethnic and genealogical identities. So in May 1370 he forbade
Mongols and semu (Central Asians) from taking Chinese names. He’d been
told that many men in civil and military positions were doing that. They
should remember that they all are the ruler’s “children” (chizi) and must not
put their descendants in danger of forgetting their origins and their blood-
lines. 70 Later history, however, showed that this injunction was completely
ignored.
Late in January 1370, Taizu made good on his threat to attack the Yuan
court. He directed Xu Da to march west to Shaanxi and take on Koko Temur.
Li Wenzhong would meanwhile march directly north to fight Toghon Temur,
who wouldn’t be expecting as deep a raid as they were going to conduct. 71
By February, reports came in that Koko Temur, having been repulsed at
Lanzhou, was now based about seventy-five miles to the southeast, where
he’d unleashed his men to go raiding all over. 72 Probably that was the only
way he could supply them. In March, Nanjing heard that Li Wenzhong had
so far advanced to a place in the steppes called Chaghan Naur (White
Lake). 73
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 17
In April, word came that Xu Da had reached Gansu and advanced to
Shen’er yu, some twenty miles north of the city of Dingxi, and was attacking
Koko Temur. Taizu warned Xu Da to be alert for Koko Temur’s feints and
Mother Nature’s spring floods. 74 And at Shen’er yu, in a long-remembered
battle, Xu Da inflicted a major defeat on the Yuan dynasty’s principal com-
mander. Between the two opposing armies lay a deep ravine. At first Koko’s
horsemen crossed it, panicking some of Xu’s officers. Xu beheaded the cow-
ards and spurred the others into a counterthrust inside the ravine. That proved
unexpectedly successful. It’s not clear why Koko’s men performed so poorly.
Were many of them Chinese, uprooted from a sedentary life and tired of
nomadic wandering? Did they not wish to die for the lost cause of the Yuan?
Whatever the reasons, beaten they were. 75 The Ming captured two Yuan
princes of the blood, plus some 1,800 other officers, 84,500 troops, and
15,280 horses, plus camels, mules, and various other livestock. Xu Da later
marched many of the captured soldiers off to Sichuan for resettlement. Koko
Temur, his wife and children, and a few others escaped north, crossed the
Yellow River by clinging to driftwood, and ended up at Kharakhorum in
northern Mongolia, where the remnants of the Yuan court welcomed them. 76
Li Wenzhong’s expedition, meanwhile, fought its way to Shangdu by
early June. Four officers with Mongol names surrendered. It wasn’t all
smooth sailing: two Ming commanders were killed in action. 77
Taizu sent two Tatar captives back to Mongolia with a letter for the Yuan
ruler. Two earlier envoys of mine haven’t yet returned, he wrote. Was that
because I was once a commoner and it’s beneath the Yuan ruler’s dignity to
reply to me? It’s thanks to the Mandate of Heaven, and not to my own doing,
that I rule China. You and I should exchange envoys amicably. You and your
people should feel free to pasture near the China border, but you’d better not
raid. 78 The Ming founder, always in awe of men of aristocratic descent,
showed here that he was keenly aware of his own lowly social origins.
China’s meritocratic preferences looked a bit shabby compared to the Tatar-
Mongol insistence on inherited nobility.
While that letter was on its way, Li Wenzhong reported some stunning
news. He’d advanced to a point below Yingchang, two hundred miles direct-
ly north of Beiping, when a captured horseman told him that on May 23,
1370, the Yuan emperor Toghon Temur had died there. The horseman was
on his way south to tell people at Shangdu. So Li proceeded north, sur-
rounded Yingchang, and on June 10 took it. Since Yingchang was the Yuan
capital of the moment, Li’s haul was huge. It included Toghon Temur’s little
grandson Maidiribala and a number of palace ladies, plus officials, soldiers,
seals, horses, and livestock. Two generals with Chinese names surrendered
36,900 and 16,000 men respectively. The new Yuan ruler, Ayushiridara, and
a small party escaped north to Kharakhorum. There, Koko Temur, having
escaped his own disaster at Shen’er yu, joined him. 79
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 118
Military action was taking place on several fronts all at the same time. As
Li Wenzhong continued his march north, Xu Da’s lieutenant Deng Yu led
forces from Lintao and seized Hezhou, some fifty miles farther west. 80 And
on the Mongolia-Manchuria border sat Naghachu, a semi-independent Yuan
warlord. Taizu wrote him a letter, reminding him how years earlier during
the civil wars inside China he’d captured and released him. But that doesn’t
mean, Taizu warned, that you are now safely beyond the reach of the Ming
forces. If you surrender, however, rest assured that you’ll be well treated. 81
In early July, after a thousand-mile journey, Li’s report of his victory at
Yingchang finally reached Nanjing. Taizu gave Toghon Temur a posthu-
mous name: Shundi, the “compliant” last emperor. He complied with the will
of Heaven when he fled China. Taizu also ordered that placards be posted
forbidding anyone who had once served the Yuan in any official capacity
from celebrating. He didn’t like the government’s draft of a public victory
announcement. It was too boastful. China’s literati would say nothing, but
inwardly they’d reject it. The Yuan rise and fall were due entirely to the
forces of destiny (qiyun). Taizu himself didn’t will it. So the draft was toned
down. The Yuan ruler’s grandson, a child, accompanied the messengers
bringing Li’s report. Taizu refused to present him as a trophy at the imperial
ancestral temple. He let him keep wearing Mongol clothing. He assigned him
a mansion and a stipend. His court ladies were given Chinese dresses. If his
consort found Nanjing’s heat too much and needed her usual diet of meat and
koumiss, she was free to return to Mongolia. 82
Taizu then sent out a general edict to all the Yuan rulers, officials, and
people. He promised Ayushiridara good treatment if he surrendered. Offi-
cials who once served the Yuan could expect Ming appointments if they
came over. Leaders without such experience would be given seals and offi-
cial titles. The Ming needed nothing from Mongolia and would impose no
demands there. 83
There was really no unified Yuan government anymore. There were two
princes of the blood, known only as the “Third Big King” and his brother the
“Fourth Big King,” who gathered people in the mountains of northern
Shanxi, where they built a stockade and raided Datong and other places. In
July 1370, the Ming drove them off. The Fourth Big King escaped, but the
Third was caught and sent to Nanjing, where Taizu gave him and some other
Tatars, princesses included, stipends. The Fourth, based now in the Taihang
Mountains, kept raiding for years. In 1376, Taizu read the stars and predicted
another raid on Shanxi. He wrote Xu Da about that. He said the ex-Yuan
Fourth Big King has now less than two hundred men, yet we can’t catch him.
He had no horses, but now he has fifteen of them; where did he steal them?
Surround and catch him. 84 In the summer of 1377, commoners accusing each
other of following the king in banditry were brought to Nanjing for prosecu-
tion. Taizu said that the king was a remnant bad element from the Yuan. He
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 19
hides in the mountains, gathers runaways, and harms and plunders people,
who are compelled to follow him. They’re not real bandits. These mutual
accusations are likely to spread, leading to the forming of gangs. So we’ll
release them all, give them travel funds, and send them back to their vil-
lages. 85 Only in April 1388, after twenty years of raiding, did the Fourth Big
King surrender to the Ming prince of Jin. Escorted to Nanjing, Taizu par-
doned him and gave him gifts in recognition of his imperial descent. Then he
was packed off south to Yunnan. Taizu explained that it was never his plan to
attack him, as that would just strengthen his will to resist. The bandits he led
would in time get homesick for their wives and children and just drift away,
leaving the king isolated. 86 The plan worked, apparently.
In October 1370, their campaigning done for now, Taizu called Xu Da
and Li Wenzhong back to Nanjing. He sent several letters to Ayushiridara,
reminding him of Koko Temur’s defeat at Shen’er yu and suggesting that if
he submitted formally to the Ming, he could use Ming titles to enhance his
authority over the hordes. He promised retaliation if border raiding contin-
ued. 87
Ayushiridara’s writ was probably too feeble to control raiding. In a letter
to a Yuan commander probably located somewhere near the frontier, Taizu
urged him to surrender on the grounds that Ayushiridara was far away and
weak, while his own troops were few and suffering. 88 The outcome of that
isn’t stated, but in February 1371 the Yuan defenders of Dongsheng, a key
garrison town atop the big loop of the Yellow River, in the northeast corner
of the Ordos, surrendered. Three Ming battalions and twenty-eight squadrons
were created for them. They probably remained in place, as an interpreter
was sent from Nanjing to pass out seals and gifts for forty-three of their
leaders. 89 But this new order in Dongsheng was shaky. Fourteen officers and
a thousand men straggled to Datong and, in effect, asked for asylum. And
again, in November 1372, five thousand more Tatars came over. Taizu set-
tled them in interior north China, with allotments of monthly rice and fuel.
And the inhabitants of several small cities lying well beyond what would
later become the Great Wall line were, on Xu Da’s recommendation, forcibly
moved and resettled in the greater Beiping area. The count was 17,274
households and 93,878 individuals. That of course created a barren zone,
depriving the Tatars of plunder, or of using them as allies. 90
Indeed, in the summer of 1371, Xu Da conducted a major removal of the
population from the far north. In Yuan times, the steppes of Mongolia were
an integral part of the Yuan state, so the frontier between steppe and sown
was undefined, and settlements of Chinese extended many miles out into
favorable spots in the steppes. Another forced removal brought 35,800
households and 197,027 individuals down to the Beiping area. Grain was
issued to the soldiers. For the civilians, 264 farming villages (tun) were
marked off and distributed to 32,550 households. In December, 5,700 newly
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 120
surrendered Tatars at Beiping were issued cotton cloth and, of all things,
sapanwood (a medicine and dye of Southeast Asian origin). 91
* * *
In February 1372, Taizu and his top commanders set to work planning an-
other invasion of Mongolia. Koko Temur was their agreed-upon target. Xu
Da thought 100,000 men would suffice. Taizu overruled him. They’d need
150,000 in three columns: Xu Da to lead the center column, Li Wenzhong
the east, and Feng Sheng the west. Troops were issued uniforms, shoes, and
caps; monthly rations were authorized to feed their families back home. 92 A
Tatar soldier said there were many former subjects of a Yuan prince living at
a place called Kharachi Lake and that he’d be happy to gather them in and
join the northern expedition. Taizu agreed to that. 93
Several days later, the ruler issued his marching orders. Xu Da would exit
China at the Yanmen Pass in northern Shanxi. Li Wenzhong would exit
directly north via Juyong Pass. Feng Sheng would lead a diversionary thrust
from Gansu in the far west. Just before he reached Kharakhorum, Xu Da was
instructed to announce his presence openly so as to bring out Koko Temur’s
forces on the double, thus making them easier to defeat. 94
In April, Taizu mobilized twenty thousand men from the various guards
of Henan Province for Feng Sheng. Each man was given two bolts of cotton
for making tents. He raised twenty-eight thousand infantry and cavalry from
Shandong for Li’s army. He issued 160,000 battle coats to the guard troops
of Beiping, Shanxi, and Shaanxi—Li and Xu’s men, probably. By April 3,
Xu Da made his exit and defeated some enemy nearby. On April 23, some of
Xu’s detachments reached the Tula River in present-day northern Mongolia,
about seven hundred miles north of Beiping. There they skirmished with
some of Koko Temur’s horsemen. But on June 7, Koko inflicted a serious
defeat upon Xu Da, who at once beat a retreat back to the China border. 95
Taizu’s suggested tactic must have failed.
In July 1372, Feng Sheng’s army reported nothing but success after suc-
cess out west. From Lanzhou they went northwest along the Gansu Corridor,
their cavalry inflicting defeat after defeat on the Yuan forces and accepting
surrender after surrender. A detachment reached as far as Etzina, a good five
hundred miles northwest of Lanzhou, and brought that isolated desert settle-
ment to surrender. The spoils were huge: 120,000 horses, oxen, sheep, and
camels. 96
Late in July came a report of Li Wenzhong’s experiences. Li scored a
series of wins at places in the steppes, whose names were no doubt supplied
by Tatar informants. At the Luqu (Meat Strips) River, that is, the Kerulen, a
major stream east of Kharakhorum, Li left his baggage under guard and
proceeded west at double time with light cavalry and twenty days’ rations to
the Tula River, where he engaged in some bloody clashes that are fairly well
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 21
described—fighting on the Orhon River to the northwest; a decoy set by Li
that deterred the foe; then a Tatar counterthrust; Li driven back, unsure of his
whereabouts; food supply exhausted and no water until a horse uncovered a
hidden spring with its hoof. Four of Li’s commanders perished. Li headed
back to China, accompanied by 1,840 Yuan officials and soldiers with their
families. 97 Was this campaign a success? Probably not. Koko Temur, their
target, was left unmolested.
When Li and his captives arrived in Nanjing in August, Taizu appointed a
commander for them and directed that the officials’ sons be tested for em-
ployability. Their dependents were assigned to a Nanjing Guard unit. Feng
Sheng’s western expeditionary forces returned to Nanjing in November. 98
In January 1373, Taizu pondered the Mongolia situation and what his
next move should be, given the poor results of the 1372 campaign. He had an
ace in the hole: Ayushiridara’s son Maidiribala, captured by Li in 1370, was
still in Nanjing as his hostage. Taizu wrote a letter to Ayushiridara. In it, the
Ming ruler offered a potted history of recent China-Mongolia relations, then
he turned to the question of family. “The custom of your country is not to use
surnames,” the emperor lectured. “Your lineages esteem descendants by reg-
ular wives, and demean those born of concubines. . . . Your son came to my
capital three years ago. I’ve treated him very generously. So why haven’t you
sent an envoy to reclaim him?” Letters to two Chinese officials still serving
the Yuan court in exile demanded that they remind Ayushiridara of the
unbreakable bonds linking fathers and sons. 99
In February, he ordered Xu and Li to train troops and go guard the Shanxi
and Beiping frontiers. In a new resettlement policy, he sent some thousand
surrendered troops and their Tatar commanders down to garrisons in south
China’s Zhejiang Province, instead of placing them in north China as be-
fore. 100 Indeed, an unstated Ming policy, evident from the reported facts, was
to drain Mongolia of commanders and troops and captives, giving all these
people homes in China and posts in the Ming military, plus food relief,
clothing, and household goods. Many thousands who might have helped the
Yuan recover China instead joined the Ming under the rather liberal dispen-
sations that the ruler himself mandated.
But the prize captive, the heir presumptive to the Yuan throne, the child
Maidiribala, Taizu sent back to the steppes in October 1374 so that he might
rejoin his father. After five years in China, the boy was now old enough to
travel and was surely homesick. So Taizu arranged an escort led by one
Chinese and one Tatar eunuch. He addressed a provocative letter to Ayushiri-
dara. He told the Yuan ruler that he was delusional if he thought he had any
chance of reconquering China. He reminded the Yuan ruler that he’d been
forced out of China and that the eight thousand or so horsemen that he now
had were no match for the Ming. He said he’d treated Maidiribala very well
for five years, and he was now sending him back so that the family line might
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Chapter 122
continue. He said he’d heard Ayushiridara’s camp (a’uruγ) was somewhere
near Quanning (in present-day Inner Mongolia, 350 miles northeast of Bei-
jing).
Yuan disintegration continued. Their top commander, Koko Temur, died
in 1375. Ayushiridara died in 1378. News of his death prompted Taizu to
convey some thoughts to the Ministry of Rites. When the Yuan cycle ended,
he said, its last ruler complied with the will of Heaven and fled to the steppes.
Now his son has died, and we should send an embassy to express our condo-
lences and conduct a sacrifice. The ministry argued that it was too arduous a
journey, that Ayushiridara’s long absence from China would surely have led
him to forget China’s customs. A canonical funerary ritual would be out of
place. No, countered Taizu. As emperor, I take all under Heaven as family.
Ayushiridara never left our embrace. So what if he’s far away? Their cus-
toms may have changed, but their basic likes and dislikes remain. Their
officers will be pleased if we respect their ruler. No one will defy virtue and
reject our rites. So the mission was launched. 101
Taizu himself composed an elegy dedicated to the ghost of the dead ruler.
In it, he reaffirmed the Ming possession of the Mandate of Heaven. It was
Heaven that allowed your ancestors to enter our China, ride roughshod over
the realm, and gather in all the barbarians. It was the same Heaven that
mandated your collapse and let me emerge. You ruled the steppes while I
rule China. Your death aggrieves me, despite your raids on our borders. 102
Taizu’s pen was restless. He also wrote a funerary message to the soul of
the dead Ayushiridara. This can be quoted directly, as it comes from the
ruler’s own collected works, not from the Veritable Records.
Life and death, and rise and fall, aren’t accidental. They’re fates fixed by
Heaven and earth. When a great and worthy sage encounters these, he knows
it’s been ordained and he doesn’t complain . . . and in death he has no regrets.
Your ancestor [Chinggis-khan] rose from poverty and obscurity in the steppes
at a time when all under Heaven was rich, and the ruler of men held a big
territory with strong troops. But it wasn’t that man [the Song ruler] who
allowed him to use his weapons and ride roughshod over all under Heaven and
bring all the barbarians under his control. This the Mandate of Heaven did.
You and your father should have been able to relax and enjoy the blessings of
peace. But out of nowhere bandits arose in Henan and among the Chinese
warlords emerged. Your father and you lost control of it. Was this caused by
men, or by the Way of Heaven? I arose from poverty and obscurity. I had to
become a Buddhist mendicant, with only my shadow for company. How did I
ever come into command of an army big enough to overpower all under
Heaven? How could I ever have guessed that I would hold Heaven’s Mandate,
that crowds would follow me, and that I would supplant your family and rule
all the people? So you ruled the steppes, and I rule China. [But] you and your
ministers stubbornly refused to yield the Mandate of Heaven. You insisted that
you retained it, and I did not, so we could never cultivate a friendly relation-
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 23
ship. I didn’t venture to bring us closer. Now I hear you’ve passed away. I
condole with your successor, and I must mourn you. My envoy bears the
sacrificial goods; may your soul accept these. 103
This was a brilliant statement by an ex-peasant autodidact and Ming
dynasty founder about power and legitimacy and the fate of empires. He and
Chinggis-khan shared a similar career trajectory: from poverty to power not
by their own efforts, but by gliding on the wings of fate and circumstance.
The core of Taizu’s difficulty with Ayushiridara and his court was their
refusal to concede and yield Heaven’s Mandate to him. The Yuan was still
not totally disabused of the belief that, calamity notwithstanding, it and not
the Ming was the legitimate ruler of China. (Perhaps that was due to the need
to sustain morale and maintain internal control.)
How this statement was received by the Yuan court in exile isn’t known.
Nor how Ayushiridara’s successor, not Maidiribala but Toghus Temur, re-
ceived the two personal letters Taizu wrote to him:
I, the emperor, especially ask after you, the young Yuan ruler. Ever since your
father and his family fled north, people have come to say that you wander here
and there in fear and suffer from a lack of clothing and food. I can’t say if
that’s true or not. If it’s true, then unlike one who knows fate and preserves
himself, you rush to fight in one place while losing your people in another.
You lose men and horses going after unattainable lucre. That’s no way to
preserve yourself. If you don’t believe me, then remember when you were at
Kharakhorum. I sent a huge army three thousand li to fight you, and did you
win that? You should take that as a lesson and think about how to preserve
yourself. You and I are enemies. What can this letter tell you that doesn’t
sound like deceit?
Taizu had more to say. He’d earlier sent a letter along similar lines to
Ayushiridara. This one too is undated. It reads:
A statement of the Great Ming emperor to the young Yuan ruler: Those who
submit to Heaven prosper. Those who defy it perish. This is no newly con-
cocted idea; it’s always been true. There’s never been a thousand-year dynasty.
That too is a constant principle. When you, father and son, ruled China, you
had many troops and generals but they couldn’t maintain their power. The
high-ranking ones were crude and effete. The middle-ranking ones were arro-
gant and cared nothing for the people. The bottom grade submitted here and
defected there, and gouged the people to pay off their superiors. Did either of
you ever do anything about that? And now you’re as befuddled as a drunk, as
unaware as a man in a coma. Why don’t you sober up? Back before 1368 when
you left China, you couldn’t control all your armies. They [e.g., Koko Temur]
controlled you instead. Now you have fewer than twenty thousand troops,
some weak, some strong. They wander about the frontier, perhaps figuring out
some way to restore you to power, I don’t know. But you can calculate for
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 124
yourself how much power you have, compared to what you had before 1368.
There’s no comparison! You have but eight to ten thousand cavalry, and yet
you want to vie with all the men we can mobilize? I don’t know how you’re
weighing that. But I’d guess you’re rational enough to grasp what I’m saying.
You can survive out in the steppes with your lineage and perhaps come to a
good end. As I see it, your ancestors ruled all under Heaven for over a century.
Things flourished. It shouldn’t have ended, except that the norm of heavenly
principle dictated that it should. If you don’t understand that, I’ll attack you
one day, with what result, we don’t know. 104
We’re in the dark about how these letters were aired at the Yuan court.
They kept no records. But Taizu’s letters open up to us what his thinking was
like. He gives us a mix of logic, blandishments, and threats. Thousands of
Yuan leaders and followers were defecting to the Ming, but the Yuan court
remained obdurate.
Thus perhaps a high official could also be persuaded to peel away and
come over to China. Taizu sent two letters to one Tughlugh, evidently some-
one high in what remained of the Yuan government and who’d changed his
mind about defecting:
The Great Ming emperor asks after the Yuan minister Tughlugh. There have
been many cases of rise and fall in rule over the ages. When Yuan control
lapsed, bandits burst forth. Your emperor was ineffective, and his ministers for
all their power failed to suppress them. But I suppressed them. And it’s been
seven years since I supplanted the Yuan and ruled the people. China is at
peace. I’ve placed troops on the northern border and I’ve appointed generals to
keep order there. I never expected that Commander Geng would wantonly kill
and engage in corruption. That created a rift. So Little Sechen braves death and
goes north to you. This was all my fault for appointing the wrong sort of men.
You’re entirely blameless, because you wanted to defect to us. Commander
Geng has been arrested and the case against him is still ongoing. Do you and
your people know that? You can see clearly what my situation is. Long ago I
was forced by [White Lotus] sectarians to become a rebel in the wilds. I had
but a horse and a spear. I was not in command of millions, as I am now. Now
foreigners everywhere are our tributaries. I control the wealth of China. I have
a million garrison troops. My soldiers and civilians obey me gladly. Could I
have achieved all this through insincerity? You’re intelligent enough to know
that I couldn’t.
Tughlugh apparently didn’t trust what the Ming ruler had to say. Taizu
wrote him again, with stronger language and a compelling logic:
Shengbao has returned from your camp, and he says you don’t intend to bend
and comply with us. You’re going to cleave to the central way and be a good
[Yuan] minister. If that’s so, there are four reasons why you’ll soon die a
failure. First, you’re a Yuan minister; you did a lot for the dynasty, but three
years ago you and your ruler had a falling out. You didn’t stay by him. You
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 25
deserted him and went off on your own. Is that loyal behavior? Second, the
Yuan mandate has ended. The young ruler is ignorant, and who knows if he’s a
good man or not? If you’d stayed by his side, you wouldn’t have suffered such
obloquy, and now you’ll never be able to escape your exile. Third, you’re
isolated out in the steppes with fewer than ten thousand infantry and cavalry.
Your men have no food for their stomachs or warm clothes for the winter.
They’ll scatter, and you won’t survive alone. Fourth, if you impose harsh
discipline on your men while they starve and freeze, it’s likely they’ll kill you.
If I’m right, you’re in for an early death. On what stone of honor will your
name be etched? In what history book will you be featured? Your loyalty and
compliance with the Yuan court will gain you nothing. Are you a hero? Or a
deluded rogue? If you agree with me, you have no option but to come to me
wholeheartedly. Of course I’ll treat you as the meritorious man you are. 105
This is vintage Taizu. The language reflects his peasant origins. It is
forthright, and bears none of the subtle refinement one would expect in a
letter written by a man of education. The Ming emperor’s game was to try to
pry apart the Yuan leadership and cause its collapse without having to go to
war. He also tried to reach Nayir Bukha. Here is that letter:
The Great Ming emperor asks after Yuan minister Nayir Bukha. You sent a
man to Datong to say you want to camp on the flats, and that your intent is to
submit to us. But you’re afraid your earlier raids on our border people means
we can’t accept you. That’s nonsense. We all know the ruler of all under
Heaven thinks only of security for the people. Such a man will never cause
harm for the sake of personal vengeance. And you all are Yuan ministers, with
some lingering loyalty for your young ruler who wanders in the steppes, and of
course you’ve obeyed him. You rallied the border in his behalf. Don’t worry
about that. This is your time to decide. People enter our country to see the
sights, and maybe they’re sincere, and maybe they’re not. But when messages
like this one arrive, those who know the cycle of history will look up to
Heaven for the signs, and down to earth for men’s dispositions, and will make
whichever choice avoids calamity and promises success. That’s a fine thing.
And the choice is up to you. 106
All these letters date to September 1374. Tughlugh remained defiant.
Nayir Bukha seems to have made a temporary submission. According to
report, a vice commander of the Guanshan Guard whose name was Nayir
Bukha (Our Man?) rebelled and reentered the steppes. Given chase, his bag-
gage was captured, but the man himself escaped. This was in May 1376. 107
Nayir Bukha remained a major adversary of the Ming until 1390. His story
will be resumed in a bit.
Taizu’s communications with the Yuan court, meanwhile, were bearing
no fruit. He sent out envoy after envoy. No response. So in the fall of 1378,
he arranged yet another mission, this one involving the return under escort of
a high-ranking Yuan official named Oljei Bukha, together with a letter to one
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 126
Lu’er, one of a consortium of officials in charge of things in the temporary
absence of a successor to Ayushiridara (Maidiribala never got enthroned).
“This year,” complained Taizu, “I’ve thrice sent envoys to you. They haven’t
returned. I don’t know if they’re alive or dead. I was angered that my border
commanders captured Oljei Bukha just as I was sending an envoy on a
friendly mission to you. So I’m sending the captive back under eunuch escort
to your camp, and you may do with him as you like.” 108
An undated edict to this Lu’er bears translation.
The Way of Heaven is to hate self-satisfaction and prefer modesty. Its virtue is
to prefer life and abhor death. This is no newly invented statement; it’s been
true since ancient times. I say this because you all, ever since Heaven changed
its mandate eleven years ago, have led cavalry and infantry and have remained
steadfastly loyal and upright, putting up resistance on the frontiers. I’ve sent
envoys to you, but they’ve never returned. Now I’m sending another mission,
with a small gift of winter clothing for you. You can accept this. Don’t kill
anyone, but cultivate virtue for your successor-ruler. That will show you’re a
wise man. I hope you’ll accept what I say as wise words. Don’t be deluded by
unfounded talk. The Book of Documents says: “those who do good get a
hundred blessings; those who don’t, suffer as many griefs.” Reasonableness
brings good results. That’s all I have to say to you. 109
That was followed in January 1379 by a letter to Lu’er, Kharajang, Man-
zi, and Naghachu, the Yuan ruling committee as it were, reminding them that
they needed to choose a ruler. Ritual required that the ruler must be the eldest
of Ayushiridara’s sons, that is, Maidiribala, a young fellow used to China’s
ways and compliantly submissive to Taizu, even though he might not be the
ablest of Ayushiridara’s progeny. Backing a wrong choice might be fatal for
you, he warned. 110
The Ming founder persisted. In another letter to Lu’er, sent in the summer
of 1379, he said he’d heard from someone who’d come from the Tula River
(in northern Mongolia) that Lu’er was unwell. So he was sending him medi-
cine, which he should take in good faith and not suspect it of being poison. 111
Again he wrote:
For Yuan minister Lu’er: During the third month, Khan Temur Khoja came
and said you were at Changyu. Then you decamped for the northeast. But if a
commander like you can devote his life to his young ruler, that’s a fine thing.
It’s the Way of the loyal minister, cherished alike by gods and men. But I fear
you’re in danger. What if you fall into someone’s trap? What then? You won’t
be able to show your loyalty. You’ll get an unjust reputation for evil. That
would be awful. And the territory you’re defending now is within the range of
our troops. They’re not far away. If you refuse to allow an envoy through, it
will go badly for you some day. You’ll be a man without a plan. If you do let
our envoys go through, you’ll enjoy happiness forever. Otherwise, if one day
your young ruler dies or goes astray, then among you a strong man will
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 27
emerge, weaker men will follow him, and what will it do to your fine reputa-
tion if you submit to him? If you don’t submit to the strong one, he’ll attack
you, you’ll lose, and he’ll take your troops. Lives will be lost. Wives and
children will be scattered. You’ll lie dead in the steppes. I’m sure you’ll agree
it would be best if you just let our envoy go through. If you trust me, I’ll back
you up. You can rely on me later if you get into trouble. It’s time for you to
decide what to do. 112
All this letter writing failed. Taizu could not bring off the affection, trust,
and pro forma submission of the Yuan court in the steppes. It turned out that
Ayushiridara’s successor was not Taizu’s choice, Maidiribala, but Toghus
Temur. The outlook for a smooth accommodation of Mongolia under Ming
China’s wing turned from unlikely to wholly impossible. War resumed. In
April 1380, Ming forces under Mu Ying undertook a major search-and-
capture mission. Scouts reported a horde under a leader named Toghochi
camped near Etzina (now Gaxun Nur), a remote desert lake, seven hundred
miles northwest of the Shaanxi provincial capital, Xi’an. The Ming army
crossed the Yellow River and the Helan Mountains and for seven days
tramped over the “flowing sands.” Twenty miles from Toghochi’s camp,
they divided into four groups, put on gags, silently encircled the prey, and
took the enemy by surprise. Then they all marched back to China. It was, if
nothing else, a demonstration of China’s ability to probe deep into foreign
territory. 113 More such reverses for the Tatars followed over the next several
years. Perhaps it was pride that determined the Yuan position not to become
a Ming tributary. If so, they paid a steep price for their independence.
In December 1387 came word that Nayir Bukha and Yuan prime minister
Kharajang were at Kharakhorum. Lan Yu, who’d risen on his merits to
become the top Ming commander, got Taizu’s permission to mount a major
campaign against them. Taizu’s patience with diplomacy had worn out. Lan
Yu was to “sweep away the remnant Lu (raiders, a common name now for
the Tatar-Mongols) so that the court would have no more worries at the
north.” 114 In April 1388, Taizu conveyed to Lan Yu the latest intelligence,
that the Lu were in a state of disorder, military discipline had broken down,
and they were therefore vulnerable. Lan Yu must march on them at double
time and seize their camp. If they surrender, treat them kindly as you bring
them all south. 115
So Lan Yu advanced with an army of 150,000 from Daning. They
marched northeast to Qingzhou, three hundred miles from Beijing, where
they learned that the Yuan ruler was at Buyur Lake, some five hundred miles
north from where they were. So off they went. Midway, they crossed a
stretch of land devoid of grass or water. The whole campaign was about to
founder in thirst and famished animals. Then as if by a miracle they heard the
sound of water bubbling from a nearby hill. They were saved! The crowd
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 128
shouted paeans to the court and to Heaven for their blessings and aid. It was
said Taizu had earlier dreamed of just such a miraculous rescue. 116
Lan Yu marched ahead and pounced on Kharajang’s camp. He was able
to corral 15,803 households of troops and 48,150 horses and camels. These
were horrendous losses for the Yuan. A messenger with news of these
astounding victories reached Nanjing in June. Taizu raved about it to his
officials. He said foreign rule had historically been a shameful disaster for
China, but now the pacification of the steppes is a blessing for our regime
and our people. To Lan Yu, the ruler stressed the extraordinary thing he’d
done. Not even in antiquity was such a feat ever accomplished. Even the
successes of the Han and Tang were ephemeral. The Song cowered under
Liao and Jin pressure and let the sacred regalia of dynastic rule fall to barbar-
ians, whose stench suffused China, until I took to arms. Then recently the Hu
crowd (Hu meaning Tatar-Mongols) regathered, set up a royal court, and
planned to inflict violence. I’m growing old, and time is running out, and
something had to be done soon to end that. Lan Yu is the greatest commander
of steppe warfare China has ever known, having earlier captured Naghachu,
and now this. 117 (So thick was the praise; but, five years later, Lan Yu’s
execution was the highlight of Taizu’s massive and bloody purge of the
whole Ming officer corps.)
In August 1388, there arrived at Nanjing under escort the Lu ruler’s
second son, Dibaonu, together with his empress and concubines and prin-
cesses. They surrendered their gold seals and silver badges. They were given
cash, food, and housing in Nanjing. Then came word that Lan Yu had raped
one of the concubines. Taizu wasn’t pleased. The concubine committed sui-
cide. Dibaonu said some ugly things. That behavior Taizu couldn’t tolerate,
and so he deported the young man to the Ryukyu Islands. 118
Things went from bad to worse for what was left of the Yuan regime in
the steppes. Toghus Temur and his immediate entourage escaped from Lan
Yu’s raid on Buyur Nur. They tried to regroup at Kharakhorum, some seven
hundred miles directly west. They didn’t make it. At the Tula River, fifty
miles short of their goal, there was a mutiny. A heavy November snowstorm
blocked help from outside. A distant kinsman named Yesuder strangled the
hapless Toghus Temur with a bowstring. The heir apparent, Tianbaonu, was
murdered as well. A big rival of Yesuder’s defected to the Ming rather than
serve him. Taizu treated him and all other defectors very liberally. 119
The demise of the Yuan court in exile left in its wake independent war-
lords who were ready to fend for themselves by raiding China. Among them
was Nayir Bukha, whom Taizu had failed to coax into surrender sixteen
years before. Some steppe warriors Taizu admired, Koko Temur and Nagha-
chu, for example, and Nayir Bukha seems to have been a third. In 1390,
Nayir Bukha and several others were readying an assault on China. Taizu put
Fu Youde in charge of a campaign against them. Two Ming princes, newly
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 29
militarized, were ordered to join in. 120 Taizu sent messages to Nayir Bukha
and the others in February 1390. He said that in the two years since Toghus
Temur’s assassination, he’d had no news of what was going on, so he’d sent
out scouts to find out. Having learned where you all were, I’m sending you a
surrendered Yuan officer with the message that the Yuan mandate is over,
that you all lead its scattered shards, you have nowhere to turn, and life is
hard for you. Instead of submitting, you raid our border. You doubt us, but
look at Naghachu. He killed twenty thousand of our men, yet I enfeoffed him
and rewarded his officers. I didn’t consider them as enemies. My interest lies
in pacifying the borders and giving the people security. So if you lead your
people and submit, I’ll assign you a good place to live and be nomads. But if
you resist, our main army will come after you. 121
Having fired off that warning, Taizu relayed to his army on the border
information he’d received from several Tatar defectors, that Nayir Bukha and
the others had but five thousand horsemen, ten thousand family members,
and only one horse per warrior. They live as nomads, and their baggage is
heavy and cumbersome. Their crowd is of two minds. Most want to submit to
us. A minority refuses. So Taizu had grain prepositioned in two places deep
in steppe country. As soon as we find out where the enemy are, we’ll at-
tack. 122
In April, the deed was done. The prince of Yan, later the Yongle emperor,
took part, but the top commander was actually Fu Youde. The Ming forces
advanced north through heavy snow. When they located their quarry, they
sent an old friend of Nayir Bukha’s on ahead to greet him. The friends
hugged each other and cried for joy. Nayir Bukha was talked out of fleeing.
Without bloodshed, the whole crowd surrendered themselves, their horses,
camels, oxen, and sheep and everything else. It was a sensational coup for the
Ming. 123
These onetime enemy raiders were treated lavishly. Fu Youde escorted
them all south and into Ming territory. The warriors were issued battle coats.
Soon the Ministry of Works sent up to Beiping 18,473 suits of summer
clothes for 4,786 men and their families. The officers were sent on to Nan-
jing, where they surrendered their seals and in turn received gifts and ap-
pointments to Ming military positions. Among the gifts were 13,600 taels
silver, 12,600 ding (ingots) of cash, 1,010 bolts of various types of silk, and
550 suits of lightweight silk. The officers’ 707 households followed their
men to Nanjing and got gifts as well. Nayir Bukha and a colleague, Arugh
Temur, were made commanders, high-ranking officers in the Ming armed
forces. 124
Taizu took a moment to describe for his generals the Ming border situa-
tion as of May 1391. He said that not long ago, the enemy was on the
northern border, and China lay defenseless before it. So he created guard
communities (wei) and placed defenders at all the passes leading into China.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 130
As a result, the Lu have all moved far away. The whole zone beyond our
frontier is purified and at peace. There’s a regional military commission at
Daning (deep in the steppes, 150 miles northeast of Beiping) and a guard
community at Guangning (300 miles east of Beiping, overlooking Manchu-
ria). These are adequate for China’s security needs. So except for Shanhai-
guan, we can withdraw our troops from all the passes, just leaving a few men
to arrest any runaways heading north. The troops we pull back will be put to
use farming and raising horses. 125
This looked to be as close to a perfect security situation as China was ever
likely to achieve. But not quite. In the spring of 1392, Taizu repurposed all of
Nayir Bukha’s surrendered forces that were still at Beiping into a police
force on the nearby steppes, useful because they knew the topography. Tatar
forces posted in central and south China were to move up to replace them.
There were still remnant warriors lurking about, and they must be captured.
So during the spring and summer of 1392, there was launched one final thrust
into northern Mongolia, this one under a commander named Zhou Xing. The
expedition was successful, but it didn’t yield much. It picked up one hundred
empty carts in one place and abandoned baggage in another. They defeated
the foe at a place called Flower Mountain, taking five hundred captives plus
horses, livestock, a silver seal, maps, and an iron badge with a silver inscrip-
tion. All this they sent south to Nanjing. Taizu picked two of the captives to
go back north and call over a Lu commander named Ajashiri. 126
But five years later, twenty-one years after they left China, and after that
many years of catastrophic losses, the once-proud warriors of the Mongolian
steppes, battered inheritors of what little was left of the global empire of
Chinggis-khan, appeared to the aging emperor of China to be rising once
again as a serious threat to the realm. In the spring and summer of 1397, the
old dictator warned his six princely sons who were guarding the northern
frontier that some surrendered Hu that had been living in Shanxi had de-
fected back to northern Mongolia and were in a good position to tell their
bloodthirsty brethren all about the weaknesses in China’s defenses. He was
also reading portents. The portents told of a big nomad invasion soon to
come. Taizu said he was old and wearing down, and he was passing along
advice in the form of tentative plans for the next two or three years. You’re
likely to be facing one hundred thousand with only ten to twenty thousand
men. So the thing to do is to let them come in and loot. Meanwhile place
ambushes in the mountain passes. When the Hu enter, they’ll split into raid-
ing parties; they’ll get arrogant and careless and their discipline will be gone,
so they can be annihilated when they straggle back into their homeland. 127
In July 1397, a year before he died, Taizu issued his final warnings and
had his last say on the whole situation. He told the princes of Jin and Yan,
who were on an excursion some hundred miles out into the steppes, that “you
boys” (the Jin prince was thirty-nine, the Yan prince thirty-seven) need to be
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 31
very careful, as a big nomad force could very well coalesce, hide by day in
the willows and reeds, march by night, and take you by surprise. You’ll have
to retreat. How will you keep your men together? Given our horse shortage,
it’s much better for us to venture no more than twenty to thirty li (seven to
ten miles) beyond a fortified point and put out patrols, beacons, and signal
cannon. It’ll be pure luck if you don’t come to grief, as far out in the steppes
as you are.
(That was a counsel of caution. After he seized the Ming throne in 1404,
the prince of Yan (the Yongle emperor) totally ignored it. But Taizu’s words
prefigured Ming security strategy from 1449 down to the end of the dynasty.)
Then Taizu recounted for his two warrior sons highlights from his own
career, how he’d fought to reunify China and then, after 1368, gone on to
create a frontier for the dynasty. He said his plan was to keep his forces in
fighting trim and keep a watchful eye on the Hu. Invading the steppes was
not his idea at all. It was his generals (Xu Da, Li Wenzhong, Lan Yu, et al.)
who clamored to do that. All they did was reach Kharakhorum, at the cost of
totally exhausting the army physically. Taizu now accepted blame for letting
them have their way. China has had, after all, to confront the world of the
Hu-Lu (foreign raiders) since ancient times, and the history of that shows
they can’t be conquered, but they can be outsmarted and outmaneuvered.
Caution was the key. 128
That was an extraordinary statement for the old autocrat to make. It does
seem to ring sincere. As tightly as he ran everything in China; as adept as he
was at handling the whole complicated issue of China’s relations with the
Tatar-Mongols, who had been forced back into their native steppes; and as
successful as, on balance, his raids into Mongolia seem to have been in
reducing the rump Yuan regime to splinters and erasing the likelihood of
their ever restoring their rule in China, the old man’s final assessment was
that it had all been an unnecessary and wasteful enterprise, that Ming man-
power and resources would have been better spent on a solid border defense
infrastructure.
THE NORTHEAST: MANCHURIA
In the center, China met Mongolia head-on. In the northwest and northeast,
China shaded by degrees into non-China. 129 As one proceeded outward, the
prefectures and counties of civil administration first gave way to Chinese and
ethnically mixed guard communities, then to the Uighur, Hui, and Tibetan
settlements in the northwest, or the Tatar, Jurchen, and Korean communities
and states (guo) of the northeast. If in the northwest organized political
communities like Hami and Beshbalik complicated the security picture, in
Liaodong (the lands east of the Liao River, i.e., Manchuria) it was Korea and
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 132
the Yuan warlord Naghachu that in Taizu’s time were especially trouble-
some. Indeed, the two formed a short-lived anti-Ming alliance.
In May 1369, Taizu took special notice of that combination. Naghachu,
based north of Shenyang, controlled a huge region populated mainly by
nomads. When he tried to ally with Korea, Taizu urged Korea to ally with the
Ming instead. He wrote the Yuan emperor Toghon Temur, threatening an
attack on him unless he reined in Naghachu. At the same time, he wrote
Naghachu, reminding him how fifteen years earlier they’d confronted each
other during the civil wars in China and remarking that he was glad to hear
that he was doing well. He asked that Naghachu grant free transit for his
envoys trying to reach Toghon Temur. 130
Liaodong had been administered in Yuan times as a civilian province. In
March 1371, its provincial administrator, Liu Yi, sent two officials by sea to
Nanjing with maps, registers of troops, horses, grain, and cash. Taizu was
delighted. He appointed Liu Yi vice commander of the Liaodong Guard.
Liaodong was to be civilian run no longer. 131 But radical loyalty shifts like
this can create extreme anger, and in Liu Yi’s case it did. Three ex-Yuan
colleagues of his murdered him in June. (Only in 1397 did Taizu say why he
was murdered: it was because he was about to commit treason against China
and submit to Korea.) 132
Then in August 1371, trouble erupted. A delegation of civil officials
reached Nanjing from Liaodong with a gift of horses and two of Liu Yi’s
murderers. They said one of the killers had fled to Jinshan (Gold Mountain; a
large area abutting eastern Mongolia) where he joined Naghachu. They said
Naghachu was allied with four other ex-Yuan commanders in various places,
and they expected an attack. 133
Taizu wrote Naghachu about this. It was quite a letter. It contained a
compelling history lesson. Long ago, argued the emperor, Chinggis-khan and
Khubilai lived and acted in circumstances very different from the present.
China’s Song dynasty was weak. Heaven intended that the Mongols should
conquer it. Human effort could never have forced that result. The Yuan built
a big empire, only to have it collapse in the wake of China’s Red Turban
rebellions. Then Taizu himself, a mere commoner, rose and quelled all the
disorder, eliminating four rebel rulers and one king. Taizu again reminded
Naghachu that early in the course of the Ming foundation, he’d captured him.
“I treated you extremely well, better than any other prisoner. And I knew you
were the scion of a famous house, and so I let you return north. That was
seventeen years ago.” (Naghachu was a probable descendant of Mukhali, one
of Chinggis’s top generals.) Taizu asked for an exchange of envoys and a
rendering of tribute; and if Naghachu ceased raiding Ming territory, he could
preserve himself. Otherwise, there’d be consequences. 134
Around the time he sent this letter, Taizu set up a new command center,
the Dingliao chief military command, in the lowlands at Liaoyang, six hun-
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 33
dred miles northeast of Beiping and some four hundred miles southeast of
Naghachu’s base area. Six officers were assigned to run it. Its job was to
supervise all the guards in Liaodong and ensure that walls and moats were
built around each. 135
Out on Gold Mountain, Naghachu remained a threat. At some point,
Taizu contemplated removing him by force. To that end, he ordered the
Ministry of Revenue in June 1372 to arrange for private merchants to ship
rice to Yahong Bridge, a hub about fifty miles east of Beiping, to feed a
future expedition. In order to get the merchants to cooperate, the ministry
would offer payment in the form of salt vouchers, the vouchers redeemable at
the various government-run salt yards. (This was an analog to the tea-horse
exchange being developed on the Tibetan frontier.) 136
In July, Taizu sent a messenger to Qiu Cheng, assistant commissioner-in-
chief at Liaodong, with a letter laying out his view of the current state of
affairs. He wrote that there’d been fighting going on in Liaoyang for some
years and that while the troops could do some farming themselves, he had to
supplement their output with shipments of rice by sea. He’d been told that
Naghachu was recently on the prowl. Whenever the weather starts to heat up,
the enemy mount their horses and come south, and that’s what’s occurring
now. And Qiu needed to watch for the arrival of the rice shipments. 137
Then came December. Qiu apparently didn’t expect a raid out of season
and was caught unprepared. Naghachu’s raiders descended on Liaodong and
looted Liujiazhuang, ninety-five miles southwest of Shenyang, fifty miles
from the sea. They set fire to one hundred thousand piculs of stored grain and
killed five thousand Ming troops. Qiu was demoted for this. 138
In 1384, a Yuan defector with a Chinese name tried to convince Taizu to
attack Naghachu. He argued that while Naghachu was nominally under Yuan
suzerainty, the Yuan emperor (Tegus Temur) was too weak to control him.
Plus his subordinates don’t get along. One action should be enough to defeat
them all. No, thought Taizu. He said he knew Naghachu very well. He uses
his hereditary Yuan office to overawe his people, but his people are disaf-
fected, and he won’t last much longer. An attack might not be needed. If he
keeps doing wrong, he’ll destroy himself. 139
Two years later, Taizu decided an attack would be needed after all. An
undated edict directed to Naghachu shows what the emperor was thinking:
A man becomes a hero when he acts rightly in critical situations. The adage
has it that he who saves a thousand lives will surely get enfeoffed. You’re a
Yuan minister, and loyal enough, so why do you defy your people and lose
virtue as you do? When earlier I captured you on the Yangzi, I especially let
you go. This is what people were hoping I’d do. Anyone who falls into trouble
wants to escape it safely. Who wants to die in captivity? Think about that.
When you fight a weaker force, you kill all the captives you take. If you’d
reflected on your own experience of captivity, and thought about those you
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 134
took captive, you’d have created blessings for yourself and your posterity. But
last winter when you raided our Liao, we protected all the captives we took. I
never wantonly killed anyone. A short time ago the myriarch Huang Chou
carried my directive to your place. That wasn’t his idea; it was his duty. He
bore you no ill will. Yet you deliberately killed him. . . . Heaven and the gods
will avenge that. Right now our two forces stand in each other’s line of sight.
Twice you’ve beaten us. You’ve killed eight thousand of us. We won’t lay
blame for past events, but what of the future? If you’ll accept another envoy of
ours, then our enmity will dissolve. If when you get this edict you reject what I
say, you’ll have no alibi to make to me when one day you face me again as my
prisoner. Think that over. 140
Naghachu made no known reply to that. So over the winter of 1386–87,
Taizu told Feng Sheng that Naghachu’s aggressive assaults on Liaodong
required that the Ming gear up for an all-out attack on the base in Gold
Mountain. Defenses needed to be installed at Daning and other entry points.
The ruler ordered the Ministry of Revenue to issue 1,857,500 ding cash to
recruit two hundred thousand porters from north China to carry 1,230,000
piculs of grain to four different launching sites for troop rations. The rate for
the porters was six ding cash for each picul they carried. 141 One picul
weighed about 155 pounds.
In the early months of 1387, Feng Sheng assembled two hundred thou-
sand men near Beiping and began operations with light cavalry probes on
scattered enemy groups. In a February snowstorm, Lan Yu surprised some
Tatars camped at Qingzhou, three hundred miles northeast, killing the com-
mander and his son and seizing their men and horses.
Taizu sent two envoys plus a long-held Tatar prisoner named Nayilaghu,
with yet another letter for Naghachu. In this one, he told Naghachu he was
allowing that captive to reunite with his family and hoped the two envoys
might make it back safely. 142
In March, Feng Sheng set up four fortified places and made camp at one
of them, Daning. He left fifty thousand men there, then moved off toward
Gold Mountain. Taizu informed him that captives taken at Qingzhou said the
Hu had gone north. Then another intelligence report said Naghachu had left
Gold Mountain and was now near a place called Xintaizhou, 1,800 li from
Liaoyang. Having read some omens, Taizu wrote Feng that the foe was
probably not far from Gold Mountain, ripe for the taking. He said the Hu
ruler (the Yuan court) thinks we’ve achieved our aims and won’t march so
far into the wilds. 143
In July, it seems to have become clear that Taizu’s idea to send Nayilaghu
back to his people had paid off handsomely. The ex-prisoner spoke so highly
of the way the Ming had treated him that many Tatars began to consider
defecting. 144 Naghachu himself was persuaded by the huge Ming army
massed in front of him.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 35
In a piece of high drama, Naghachu surrendered in that same month. He
was directed to Lan Yu’s tent. Lan Yu poured out wine. Naghachu drank,
then poured a cup for Lan Yu. Lan took off his coat and tried to put it on
Naghachu. Naghachu didn’t like that. There followed an argument. Nagha-
chu emptied his cup on the ground and muttered something in Mongolian to
an aide, but a bilingual Ming officer overheard him to say he was going for
his horse and leaving, so Duke Chang Mao slashed his arm with a sword.
Naghachu was then hustled off to see Feng Sheng. In the end, Naghachu and
his people—forty thousand men, two hundred thousand people in all, plus
sheep, horses, camels, and baggage—made a sad column thirty miles long as
off they all trudged south to China. 145
Feng Sheng gathered up a further 44,963 carts and several thousand
horses left behind by the Tatars (Dadan) and by August returned to Nanjing.
What to do with all these surrendered people? Taizu ordered to let many stay
in Gold Mountain. Others should settle in Liaodong, and yet others should
live somewhere in the greater Beiping region and farm or herd as they liked.
Generous rewards were given the various commanders. For those staying in
north China, the ruler ordered up 176,716 bolts of cloth, 27,552 silk coats,
5,353 leather coats, and 32,240 sets of winter clothes, plus five hundred
piculs of grain for all the 44,179 Tatar leaders, soldiers, males, and females
who’d just arrived there. 146
This was a colossal victory for the Ming. An entire flank of an enfeebled
adversary was lopped off. Taizu reviewed the whole situation in a congratu-
latory message he sent to Feng Sheng. He said that since ancient times,
violence had characterized China’s relations with the “Hu.” But now, with
Heaven’s extinction of the Yuan mandate and Xu Da and Chang Yuchun’s
invasions of the steppes, the Yuan was done for, except for remnants who
raided our frontiers, until now, when you, Feng Sheng, advanced and sub-
dued one big horde of theirs without a battle. Except for your sincerity that
moved Heaven and your loyalty and righteousness that touched the hearts of
men, such a feat could never have been accomplished. But be careful, he
warned. Naghachu’s people must not be terrorized or victimized. The raiders
have only nomadic herding to subsist on. Bullying them in the slightest will
swiftly turn them against us. You must treat them well, as Xu Da and Chang
Yuchun did in their day. 147
Unfortunately, it soon became clear that something hadn’t gone right, and
Feng Sheng was not quite the paragon of virtue Taizu had made him out to
be. Taizu was shocked. He excoriated Feng and several other commanders
for wanton killing and for forcing Tatar widows in mourning for their fallen
husbands into marriage against their will. This is exactly what not to do. This
is what will turn them all against us. Feng and the others must mend their
behavior, he said. In October of the same year, 1387, Taizu learned that Feng
Sheng’s staff had been stealing horses from their defenseless captives. Again,
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 136
the ruler warned that unchecked greed of this sort threatened to ruin the
whole enterprise. 148
For his own part, as if to compensate for the misbehavior of his men,
Taizu treated Naghachu and his surrendered people with extraordinary gene-
rosity. In a proclamation to all the people streaming south, the ruler ex-
plained that he hadn’t intended to force them all into making such a long trek
with all their livestock, but his order to let them stay at Gold Mountain had
arrived too late. So for now he was going to let them stay somewhere in
northeast China, where 170,000 bolts of cloth would be handed out to them
and where their damaged carts could be repaired. 149
Meanwhile, 3,235 of Naghachu’s surrendered officers, having arrived in
Nanjing, handed over their seals and other emblems of Yuan authority.
Many, if not all, found employment somewhere in Ming military service.
Naghachu himself received robes of the very highest rank, enfeoffment as
Marquis of Haixi (with hereditary privilege), and a salary of two thousand
piculs of grain. Clothing, shoes, and cash were doled out to him and his
officers. Their riding horses, thin after their long journey, were put in govern-
ment stables to recuperate. Naghachu was sent off to take part in an expedi-
tion into Yunnan—which, like Manchuria, was a big fragment of the defunct
Yuan dynasty the Ming was determined to absorb. But he never arrived. In
August 1388, Naghachu died in a boat at Wuchang on the Yangzi, of alco-
holism and the oppressive heat. His son succeeded to the marquisate. 150
* * *
Meanwhile, the buildup of Ming dominance in Manchuria proceeded apace.
Suffice it to say that astounding and ever-rising quantities of bulk cotton,
cloth, clothing, shoes, winter coats, and rice were shipped in to support all
the new guard units being established there. 151
The Ming economy was preindustrial and labor intensive to a degree
almost impossible to imagine in the twenty-first century. How many man-
hours involving how many peasants did it take to grow seven hundred thou-
sand piculs, or about fifty-four thousand tons, of rice? How many carts,
haulers, and oxen to move all those tons to seaside granaries? And how many
coast-hugging small craft to ship all that up to the Liaodong peninsula? And
then how many men to offload and distribute all that grain to the various
scattered guard centers? And how many cotton planters and pickers and
weavers to provide all that commodity? And how many growers and weavers
of silk? Defending Ming China wasn’t purely a military matter, obviously. It
demanded mobilizing an enormous civilian workforce, month after month,
year after year, to keep supplying all the men serving on the frontiers. No
wonder Taizu insisted that the frontier troops and their families supply their
own food, at least insofar as conditions allowed.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 37
Ming strategy with respect to the Jurchen of the Liaodong hinterland
mirrored fairly closely their approach on the Tibetan frontier. It was to “call
and soothe,” and if that didn’t work, to conduct military operations. As in the
case of the Tibetan world, the Jurchen had already been under Yuan military
administration, so it was only necessary to get their commanders to switch
their loyalties. This wasn’t so easy, however. The Ming were aware that both
the northwest and the northeast had produced strong dynastic states in the
past: in the west the Di and Qiang states of the fourth century, the Tibetan
empire of the eighth and ninth centuries, and the Tangut Xixia dynasty of
982–1227; and in the east the Murong Xianbi of the fourth century, the
Khitan Liao of 927–1115, and the Jurchen Jin of 1115–1234. The Ming did
all they could to discourage the rise of any more such.
Taizu was curious about “Liaodong customs and famous lineages.” Some
unnamed Ming commander gave him a description of what it appears he
wanted to hear. He said Liaodong was far away, and people lived mainly
from hunting, secondarily from farming. They’re ignorant of the Confucian
classics, yet they adhere to the teaching of the rites. A son who buries his
father, or a wife her husband, will bow, weep, and offer drink to the deceased
for a hundred days and abstain for three years from wine, meat, hunting, and
hair combing. Neighbors will criticize any who violate that regimen. He went
on to relate a heart-rending story of an extended family of Chinese origin
whose men were killed in the wars of the late 1350s, one of whose brave
wives saved her young sons, while three other wives, one a Korean, strangled
themselves after their husbands got killed. Another wife was abducted and
killed. Five righteous women in one extended family! And then there was a
Ming soldier who died of disease; his wife née Li was a Jurchen, yet she
cried day and night over the coffin for two years, then upon his burial com-
mitted suicide and was buried with him. The informant insisted that these
stories were all true. Taizu was moved to sighs of admiration and ordered
honors for the families. 152
The fervor some inhabitants of Manchuria showed for Chinese-style fam-
ily ritual mirrored in a way the adherence of Tibetan communities to their
various Buddhist sects, which Taizu also much favored. The Liaodong love
for ritual probably helped encourage the establishment of Confucian schools
for the soldiers’ families in the guards at Liaoyang, Jinzhou, Fuzhou, Gai-
zhou, and Haizhou in the 1380s, each with a state-appointed head teacher and
four assistants. 153 Discernible through these and other stories was the re-
gime’s eagerness to ground the legitimacy of its occupation of ethnically
mixed southern Manchuria in an emotional commitment to extreme ritual
correctness focusing on women, a sort of quasi-religion that soldiers and
natives, Chinese, Koreans, and Jurchen could all share.
The Jurchen were poor. In October 1385, three low-ranking Yuan offi-
cials of Jurchen ethnicity came to the gate of the Liaodong regional military
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 138
commission in Liaoyang. They said they’d been enslaved by the Yeren,
backcountry Jurchen. They said Liaodong was like paradise, and they wanted
to come settle here. They asked that the Ming give them glass beads, bow-
strings, and pewter to buy the freedom of eight hundred families from the
Yeren. The court granted them clothes, ten bowstrings, five hundred strings
of glass beads, and five catties of tin to redeem the families. 154
The Ming didn’t like to leave the Yeren or Haixi Jurchen in a state of total
independence. An excursion of 1387 out in their direction seemed to yield
nothing. A Liaodong officer went out to Haixi to “call and soothe” those
people with gifts of clothing. That approach failed too. So in 1395, Taizu
authorized a big campaign on them. The princes of Yan and Ning and three
generals mobilized seven thousand crack cavalry from Beiping together with
troops from the Sanwan Guard (one hundred miles northeast of Liaoyang).
During the summer, these men fanned out and made war on the Yeren, who
lived several hundred miles farther northeast on the Sungari River. They
chased their leader, Xiyangha, but lost him in the rain and darkness. They
captured one officer plus 650 men and women and four hundred horses. The
Sanwan Guard, it was noted, included many Koreans and Jurchens who used
hunting as an excuse to raise trouble. Taizu made them all move west to open
military farms. The situation among the Jurchen in Manchuria remained
unstable as of Taizu’s death in 1398. 155
Korea was a big reason for that instability. It was itself disordered and
convulsed. Yuan suzerainty over Korea lapsed during the calamitous 1350s,
and the Korean throne could find no satisfactory new policy choice. Should it
retain ties to Koko Temur or Naghachu? How should it deal with all the
unknowns regarding China’s new Ming dynasty? Should it intervene in Man-
churia, cooperate with the Jurchen, and occupy territory there for the sake of
its own security? 156 It tried all three.
Ming relations with Korea were funneled through the Liaodong Guard at
Liaoyang. In July 1379, Taizu told Commanders Pan Jing and Ye Wang that
he’d received their message that a Korean had led men and women to Liao-
yang to surrender themselves. Do they understand what those Koreans are
actually up to? Korea sits in a corner of the sea. It’s their custom to prize
falsity. They’re perverse by nature. Just think. Why would anyone desert
home and homeland and move to foreign territory? It’s a ruse, surely, a false
show of weakness, masking a future mass migration and a threat to swamp
us. You must send them all back to Korea. And don’t start some small
incident which will just give them a pretext to start who knows what. 157
In the summer of 1380, Taizu told the Liaodong regional military com-
mission just what he thought of Korea. They weren’t following the rules;
they were not “serving the great.” He recalled that the last Yuan emperor had
abandoned his Korean palace ladies when he fled China, and we had eunuchs
escort them all home, and where was the Korean gratitude for that? Taizu
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 39
would treat only with a single envoy, not a team of them, because they’d
simply be along for spying purposes. 158
In winter 1381, the ruler commended Regional Military Commissioner
Pan Jing for doing a good job monitoring the Koreans and restricting their
movements. He noted that the Korean king had been assassinated (in 1374)
and that his successor was illegitimate and had been surviving only by instill-
ing fear. Historically, he said, China has wavered between threat and amity in
dealing with that country. Taizu’s recipe was to allow tribute but to hold
them to the strictest accountability. 159
But when a Korean embassy reached Liaodong in 1384 with a tribute of
two thousand horses, they said they couldn’t satisfy the stipulation for gold
because they didn’t produce any, and so they made up the deficiency with
extra horses. Taizu accepted that. But soon after this mission reached Nan-
jing, Taizu flew into a rage over their behavior. They intended to deal bribes
to the capital officials. In Liaodong, an envoy was found to be carrying a list
tailoring the size of the bribe to the bureaucratic rank of the intended recipi-
ent. Taizu excoriated the Koreans and praised Liaodong for the alert job they
were doing guarding the territory between the Yalu River and the wilds of
the north. 160
It was unclear where Korea ended and Ming-controlled Manchuria began.
Early in 1388, Taizu told the Ministry of Revenue to tell the Korean king that
in the area east, north, and west of Tieling (seventy-five miles northeast of
Liaoyang), China was to have control over all soldiers and commoners of
Jurchen, Tatar, and Korean ancestry, but that south of Tieling, in land once
held by Korea, these non-Chinese would come under Korea’s control. When-
ever the territorial issue was solved, that should reduce the likelihood of
conflict. 161 The emperor seems to have had in mind an eventual population
transfer. In May, the Korean king, beneficiary of the assassination of 1374,
whom Taizu had earlier declined to deal with, notified the Ming court that
several Manchurian towns near Korea had once been Korean and that the
Tieling area had once been Korea’s as well. The king asked Taizu to ac-
quiesce in their resumption of control over those territories. In reply, Taizu
conceded that perhaps Korea had a point. 162 But now both reason and
circumstance override that claim, argued Taizu. Those territories had come
under Yuan administration, and now they’re under our Liaodong. And we’ve
set up guards in Tieling; our troops are posted there. And the commoners are
administered by us. The ruler told the Ministry of Rites (whose portfolio
included the conduct of foreign relations) to tell the king that the proper
boundary between China and Korea was the Yalu River, that Korea was just
using Tieling as an excuse to start trouble, and that for the sake of peace the
king should back off and not press the case. 163 The Liaodong authorities
were told to confine all border markets to the Korean side of the Yalu, not
our side. 164
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 140
Meanwhile, Korea enacted a remarkable policy turnabout, details of
which Nanjing knew little. As Taizu was unwilling to cede peacefully, the
Korean court was determined to recapture Liaodong by force of arms. In the
summer of 1388, Korea invaded. Then, soon after the army crossed the Yalu,
one of its top commanders, the battle-hardened Yi Song-gye, acting on his
belief that the operation was sure to fail in the end, turned his men around,
marched on the capital, overthrew the government, and in 1392 made himself
founder of a new dynasty, the Yi, or Choson. 165
Usurpations in states tributary to China always raised difficult problems
and at times prompted military interventions. In this case, much as Taizu
deplored Korea’s behavior, he could scarcely intervene in behalf of a govern-
ment that had invaded his territory and oust a man, usurper though he was,
who’d stopped that invasion.
Yi Song-gye made the self-diminishing gestures that sadae (shida, “serv-
ing the great”) required. He sent a tribute embassy with an offering of horses.
He thanked Taizu for renaming his country—earlier Koryo, it was henceforth
to be called Choson. He asked permission to change his own name to Yi Tan.
Taizu gave his assent. 166 Did that end the hostilities?
No. In the summer of 1393, Liaodong reported that Choson had secretly
sent officers to lure five hundred trans-Yalu Jurchen into their service in
preparation for a raid. Taizu flung his hands in the air. Yi Tan had just come
with tribute, and now he wants to raid our frontier? He sent the king a long
screed. He reminded the king of how he, Taizu, had defeated the regional
warlords and reunified China, pacifying all the foreign nations, turning war
into peace everywhere except Korea, where for some reason you all keep
harboring a restless enmity. You despise us, you start incidents, and you use
the sea lanes to lure our common people. When we marched on Liaodong,
you lured the people there with bribes of gold and silk. Your king was
assassinated. You killed an envoy of ours. Now you submit to our court, and
at the same time you have your border commanders lure the Jurchen. Just
what is in your mind? Taizu recapped the long history of China-Korea rela-
tions, laying full blame for every occasion of war and bloodshed upon Ko-
rea’s misbehavior. He professed an inability to understand why Yi Tan was
continuing to follow this stupid heritage. Taizu said he’d acquiesced in Yi
Tan’s seizure of power because the Korean people seemed to agree to it. But
why was Yi Tan so ignorant of the international status hierarchy that he first
sent envoys to the princes of Liao and Ning, and only after that to the court at
Nanjing? Is this how sadae should be practiced? The Ming combination of
cavalry and navy put Korea under greater threat than it had ever been before.
If need be, Taizu could destroy Korea in an instant, but he preferred peace.
As ruler of all, I regard every human being as if he were a child of my own. If
Yi Tan repatriates the Jurchens he lured away and repents, Taizu will tolerate
his autonomy because of his ability to pacify his people. 167
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 41
Meanwhile, Liaodong was told to block all Korean envoys, enhance se-
curity all along their land route to China, and have cavalry patrol the north
bank of the Yalu. Korea responded by rounding up 122 households of mili-
tary and civilian escapees from China, 388 people, plus one hundred horses
and oxen, delivering them to Liaodong. 168
War with Korea was not impossible. In April 1395, Taizu ordered a halt
to the construction of a palace for the prince of Liao at Guangning (seventy-
five miles northeast of Liaoyang). The laborers were well-trained troops,
angry at what they were being made to do and on the verge of mutiny. Many
had already absconded to the wilds and had turned to raiding. Taizu also
noted that Korea had stockpiled grain in depots from the center of their
country up to the Yalu and were in a good position to send their Jurchen out
to entice our runaway soldiers. Should Korea attack us with a big army, we
won’t be able to resist. The prince will stay in his camp quarters for now. 169
Finally, in June 1397, the prince’s palace was finished, but Taizu directed
that in case Korea invaded, the prince should retreat to Shanhaiguan. We’ll
need one hundred thousand men to beat them back, he said. 170
* * *
Zhu Yuanzhang received the posthumous name Taizu (Grand Ancestor), an
honor he surely deserved. He was truly a promethean figure, perhaps even a
totalitarian tyrant—a founder-organizer with few rivals in the history of our
planet. He tried to remold all China along the lines of a resuscitated ethical
ideal originating in the remote golden age of antiquity. He was not a warrior
primarily. He was a Son of Heaven, in control of the earth’s most powerful
state, a state that radiated benevolence and justice and served as a civilized
beacon light for the entire world. He was most of all an engineer of human
systems, and a hands-on director and keen-eyed monitor of the uses to which
the systems were put. 171
This chapter has so far focused on Taizu’s role as director. His role as
engineer deserves at least a quick look. His main achievement was his crea-
tion of the Ming weisuo, the “guards and battalions” system of self-renewing
military recruitment, a legacy that lasted until the end of the Ming. 172 The
system was made up of three tiers. The base consisted of some million
designated hereditary households, whose obligation was to ensure that at
least one male member (and his family) was always in actual service. The
next tier were the guards and battalions, military cities or towns, usually
walled, where those soldiers and their families were sent to live. The last tier
were the front lines of forts, camps, and signal towers to which the weisuo
dwellers were periodically rotated for duty. Off-duty personnel could be
mobilized for construction projects, to haul grain, or to work on farms. As
standardized in 1374, each guard was to number 5,600 men, divided into ten
battalions, each of these divided into ten companies, each company led by
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 142
two platoon commanders, and under each of them five squad leaders in
charge of ten-man squads. 173
The central hub of the northern frontier defenses was Beiping, site of the
old Yuan capital, rebuilt over the years 1404 to 1424 and renamed Beijing. 174
Beyond Beiping lay a landscape of forested mountains of no great height
with their many passes (guan) and gaps (kou), all of which had to be manned.
In 1373, Taizu was told there were 121 gaps (yaikou) spread over 2,200 li
(700 miles), each of which had to be held by a battalion, at least. In August
1376, four passes (guan) and gaps were singled out as especially important:
Gubeikou, Juyongguan, Xifengkou, and Songtingguan. These made for an
outer perimeter north and east above Beijing at a distance of thirty to one
hundred miles, interlinked by a system of mutually visible beacons. They
were manned by 6,384 troops at the outset, but by many more as the years
went by. 175
The Beiping region was a launching pad for Taizu’s Mongolian expedi-
tions, so it became a collection point for the prodigious quantities of supplies
that were shipped up from the south. 176 Reports of grain are for some reason
few. But in 1385, it came to the ruler’s attention that although the transport
office required three oxen for hauling heavy, grain-laden carts, it was very
hard going through deep snow, such that if one ox died, the cart was stuck,
and the teamsters had to raid nearby villages for a replacement. Taizu was
upset to hear this, and he ordered that each cart henceforth bring along a
spare ox for just such emergencies. 177 In 1390, Beiping reported that 488,510
piculs of grain were on hand at Xifengkou and Luanyang, so from just that
statistic one can imagine the massive quantities of grain that were shipped
up, either overland or by sea, as the Grand Canal wasn’t yet operative in
Taizu’s time. 178 It’s easy to understand from that why Taizu was eager to
ease burdens on civilians and develop military farms in the north. In 1396,
Beiping reported that seventeen guard centers had put 14,362 soldiers to
work farming and that they’d been able to contribute 103,440 piculs to the
cause. 179 That was helpful but far short of the total needed. What could have
been the total cost of defense in the greater Beiping region in Taizu’s time? It
could only have been colossal.
The final feature to note about the greater Beiping region was Taizu’s
buildup of military centers in Inner Mongolia, whose purpose could be either
defensive, as advanced outposts, or offensive, as launching sites for cam-
paigns deep into the steppes. This was done in conjunction with the ill-
advised creation of armed frontier princedoms under the command of Taizu’s
sons. After the 1393 execution of Lan Yu and the Stalinesque destruction of
the Ming officer corps (Taizu’s old comrades-in-arms, who’d won him the
empire), these princedoms assumed the main responsibility for China’s
northern defenses. Taizu’s talent for human engineering, sound earlier in his
career, failed him in his old age. Starring roles were given to his second son,
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 43
the prince of Jin, at Taiyuan; his fourth, prince of Yan, at Beiping; his
thirteenth, prince of Dai, at Datong; his fourteenth, prince of Su, at Ganzhou
then at Lanzhou; his fifteenth, prince of Liao, at Guangning; his sixteenth,
prince of Qing, at Weizhou then at Ningxia; his seventeenth, prince of Ning,
at Daning; and his nineteenth, prince of Gu, at Xuanfu. 180
The outermost line of guard settlements consisted of Dongsheng on the
northeast edge of the Ordos; Kaiping, 250 miles directly north of Beiping;
and Daning, 250 miles northeast of Beiping. Taizu enlarged these places and
developed military farms there: four farms at Kaiping in 1396, with five
battalions of troops moved up there from Shanhaiguan in 1397 specifically to
farm. He ordered Kaiping to be walled. The expense of shipping grain there
from Beiping was to be met by paying private merchant shippers in salt
vouchers. 181 In March 1397, the ruler sent up 5,210 sets of leather coats, felt
hats, and leather pants for the troops at Kaiping. 182
The biggest Ming city in the steppes was Daning. In October 1387 it was
designated a wei, or guard, manned in part by criminals and convicts from
China proper and also by 21,780 regular soldiers from other north China wei,
rotating in and replacing soldiers sent there earlier from nine Shanxi guards.
Later in the same month, Daning was raised to the status of regional military
commission, in charge of center, left, and right guards. In November, com-
moners’ households in north China were put to work manufacturing two
hundred thousand battle coats for the Daning troops. 183
In 1389, Daning got involved in frontier diplomacy when a former Yuan
official named Nekelei and his men came begging for food. Taizu told the
Ministry of Revenue to tell Nekelei to get his carts ready and come to Daning
to get it. Nekelei did so and was issued a seal appointing him commander of
the guard at Quanning, two hundred miles to the northeast. But one of Neke-
lei’s officers, a dignitary named Shiremun, refused to accept one of the
lower-ranking Ming appointments that was offered to him. What to do?
Taizu told the Ministry of Rites that Shiremun could do as he chose, as he
was in a personal dilemma, whether to win fame by sacrificing himself and
his family for the Yuan cause or submit to the Ming and preserve himself and
his family. Shiremun chose fame. His assault on Nekelei failed, he was
killed, and his men went to get fed at Daning and then were sent back to
Quanning to live on as nomads.
Daning grew and grew. Soldiers and their families must have boosted the
population well above one hundred thousand because in March 1390, 67,500
men there were issued 274,400 bolts of brocade and 102,200 catties of bulk
cotton. In October 1390, a Confucian school with one state-appointed in-
structor and two assistants was set up to educate the sons and younger broth-
ers of the military. A man who knew “Tatar script” (Dada zi) was recruited to
teach that. And in December 1392, the seven guards out there harvested
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 144
840,570 piculs from their military farms. (In 1403, nonetheless, the Yongle
emperor voluntarily abandoned Daning to the Uriyangkhad Mongols.) 184
* * *
So how best to judge this founder of a dynasty that lasted 276 years? He was
certainly not a pleasant character, but the huge and unrelenting task he set
himself gave him no time for humor or pleasure. When he was engineering
and directing things, he was compellingly rational on the whole, but as su-
preme monitor he was short tempered, suspicious, and distrustful, always
watchful for a coup, and given to murderous and bloody purges of personnel
he thought corrupt, contumacious, or treasonous. He was usually compas-
sionate toward the lowly and unfortunate, but quite often extremely harsh
and demanding when dealing with civilian elites and military officers. A
peasant orphan who never went to school, he was in his early years an avid
learner and quick absorber of the best advice the realm had to offer, and he
often used that advice to good effect in reunifying and reconstructing China.
He was a workaholic. After he abolished the prime minister’s office in 1380,
he let no one vet the huge pile of documents that came in daily, and so he
read and replied to all the reports and raw intelligence and pleas and sugges-
tions by himself. He wrote many of his own directives and edicts and letters
to foreign rulers. In the end, however, a later Ming generation made the case
that his legacy had to be radically revised in some ways, in particular with
respect to the arrangements he’d made to defend the northern frontiers. The
prince of Yan, who usurped the throne in 1402, was posthumously promoted
from successor (as Taizong) to cofounder (Chengzu) in symbolic recognition
of that.
On the whole, however, Taizu’s frontier policies were foundational, at
least in the broad sense. He had a grip on China’s long history, most likely
from access to Sima Guang’s Zizhi tongjian (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid
in Government). From it he probably learned that China was the moral center
of the universe, extending when it could a fist of authority and a hand of
patronage over peoples and states everywhere. The terms were en (grace) and
wei (power). History also suggested fundamental guidelines for frontier con-
trol—depending on the situation, between “calling and soothing” (zhaofu)
and punitive campaigns (zhengtao). A refusal to submit to calling and sooth-
ing must be met with a retributive action of some sort, else a failure to back
up China’s claim to world suzerainty would surely invite challenges every-
where. This logic guided Taizu.
As to “calling and soothing,” Taizu handled the difficulties in that ap-
proach fairly well. While he had trouble with the Yuan court in exile and
with Korea, he was always a generous host to Yuan refugees. Henry Serruys
has culled from the sources every known instance of Tatar-Mongols accom-
modated into Ming China through the rulers’ lenience and generosity. 185
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Laying the Foundations: Taizu, r. 1368–98 45
Untold thousands of them were taken as refugees into Ming military service
and deployed in guard units everywhere, usually under their own officers.
The creation of hybrid cities, like Hezhou on the edge of mDo-khams, has to
be scored a plus for Ming policy as well. The foundations Taizu laid for the
control and management of China’s northern frontiers, though modified and
strengthened by his successors, served the Ming well for two and a half
centuries.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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47
Chapter Two
Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust
Yongle, r. 1403–24
Between Taizu’s death in 1398 and the triumphant march of his fourth son,
the prince of Yan, into Nanjing in 1402, Ming China was engulfed in civil
war. 1 Central oversight on the frontiers lapsed. When the dust cleared, Yon-
gle faced defensive challenges all along the frontier, from the Tibetan regions
in the west to the Liaodong region in Manchuria. He responded with an
institutional innovation: he replaced the now disarmed princedoms with re-
gional commanders (zongbingguan) at five centers: Shaanxi-Gansu, Ningxia,
Datong, Xuanfu, and Liaodong. Beijing he designated to become the new
capital of China, in place of Nanjing. Beijing would be his own posting.
Taizu never ran things this way. His top commanders were assigned when
and where needed. None was given a steady frontier posting. Taizu would
deal individually with the leaders of the guards and battalions in their various
garrison communities. What Yongle did, soon after he took power, was to
impose a military-administrative layer with oversight over all the garrisons.
It was an early sign, and not the last, of a shift toward defense, and it is a bit
ironic that Yongle simultaneously sent offensive thrusts in every direction of
the compass. There was some continuity from Taizu’s time, in that the re-
gional administrators, almost to a man, were second-generation warriors
from Taizu’s home region of central China. Several of them inherited officer
status from fathers who’d played prominent roles in the Ming founding. In
the Yongle era, they were something of a closed regional military clique.
Yongle considered it essential to his job to keep an eye on the entirety of
the northern frontier. He constantly corresponded with the commanders
about the need to be on alert, to avoid mindless chases of raiders into the
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 248
steppes, to build and repair fortifications, and to maintain line-of-sight warn-
ing beacons.
Yongle also thought China must start rearing its own horses. Tibet, Mon-
golia, and Korea weren’t sending enough of the animals. In 1406, he ordered
Song Sheng and He Fu (regional commanders at Gansu and Ningxia) to
organize pasturage offices (yuanmasi). Each office was put in charge of six
directorates (jian), and each directorate was to control four pastures. The
pastures were graded. An A-grade pasture was to hold forty thousand horses;
a B-grade, seventy thousand; and a C-grade, four thousand. Pastures were to
assign each chief herdsman fifty herders, with each herder responsible for ten
horses. Four ranked bureaucrats were to manage each office; four more of
lesser status were to run each of the directorates. Yongle wanted Song Sheng
and He Fu to go out in person and measure out the pastures. Let the horses
range freely in spring and summer; bring them in for feeding when the grass
dies. Stock the pastures with select mares from the herds the Tatar and
Muslim caravans bring in. Scout out places with good water and grass. The
ruler wanted a detailed report from them, as the matter was vital to China’s
security. 2 Yongle soon issued similar orders to set up pasturage offices in the
Beijing area and in Liaodong. Yongle thought the Chinese of the Beijing area
didn’t know how to take care of horses, so he had Tatar officers go out and
teach them. 3 Datong regional commander Wu Gao submitted a map, which
Yongle liked, showing an extensive area to the west that would be good for
horse raising. 4 Horse matters piled high on Yongle’s desk during the early
years, but it would take us very far afield to try to sort them all through.
A different matter was thrashed out between Yongle and He Fu out in
Gansu in 1408. He Fu was having a hard time handling the Tatar (Da) troops
in Ming service, and he asked Yongle to send him a talented and capable
Tatar officer who could come out to the frontier to command them. Yongle
turned him down and hastened to explain why. He said any Tatar officer he
might send might know the terrain, but he’d be a stranger to the troops, and
the troops to him, and any action involving them would fail, as discipline
would surely break down. He Fu certainly knows that, so why, given his long
experience leading Han and Fan soldiers (“Fan” is vague, though it often
means Tibetans), would he make such a request? Perhaps he was talked into
it. And here Yongle made an extraordinary statement, firmly distancing him-
self from the lethal paranoia of his father, Taizu. I rule the realm, said
Yongle; I give and take, and I reward and punish. In so doing, I’ve never
punished anyone on the basis of unfounded rumor. You’re an old general
whom I’ve long known. I’ve trusted you, and when I disagree with you I
explain why. I’ve never held you under the slightest suspicion. You’re an old
comrade-in-arms of my father, and surely you don’t think I suspect you
because of your request for a Tatar officer. Act faithfully as always, and
don’t worry. 5
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 49
In the early 1400s, Ming China’s main concern along the frontiers was to
assimilate somehow the many fragmented remnants of the Yuan armies plus
many small ethnic groups that were unsure whether to submit to the Ming, to
sustain their independence by raiding, or to cast their lot with the Oirats or
the Yuan survivalists in Mongolia, or, in the case of the Jurchen, whether to
join with Korea. Yongle tried to make the Ming option attractive to them.
Already in 1402, he sent out envoys to inform the leaders of the Uriyang-
khad, Tatar, and Jurchen groups that he considered the realm one big family;
that our border commanders say you’re sincere in coming over to us, so you
may occupy territory along our borders peacefully, have commercial ex-
changes with us, and if you want to visit our court, then accompany my
envoys when they return. 6 Out in Ningxia, Regional Commander He Fu
proposed to give chase to a party of raiders who’d earlier submitted but then
defected. Yongle stopped him. He said foreign raiders (Yi Lu) were by
nature unreliable. We treat them sincerely. If they come submissively, we
receive them. If they rebel, just let them go. Their coming doesn’t benefit us,
so why should we care if they go? They have many allies of the same species
(tonglei); they have marriage ties to some of them, so if we attack them, it
will surely raise suspicions among those who haven’t rebelled. So it’s best
just to let them go. Rash actions are never a good idea. Just be on guard and
show strength. 7 That seemed like sound advice.
The Liaodong hinterland, inhabited by Jurchen groups called Yeren
(“wild people”), came over to the Ming in a slow, steady stream through all
of Yongle’s reign. Usually they’d receive a guard designation, with Ming
military ranks for their leaders. Altogether, some 384 guards and twenty-four
chiliarchies were created. Most of these were ephemeral, and once created,
they were seldom heard from again. 8 Some Jurchen moved into China. In
1408, Yongle told the Ministry of War that many Jurchen tribute envoys
want to stay in Nanjing, but the climate is too hot for them. So he ordered
that two walled settlements at the Kaiyuan Guard be built for them. One was
to be called “Joyful” (Kuaihuo) and the other “As-You-Please” (Zizai). They
were designated as civil subprefectures (zhou), each with a vice magistrate
and an assistant. The Jurchen had to get Ming permission to settle there with
their followers, but they could pursue any livelihood they preferred. If any
grew homesick, they were free to leave. 9 These towns were soon joined by a
third, named “Peaceful and Happy” (Anle).
These were hybrid locales, absorbing Ming forms; perhaps they were
targets of Chinese acculturation, but as foreigners they sent tribute. In 1411,
some Jianzhou battalion commanders were granted their wish to live in
“Kuaihuo city.” In 1418, a few details of the privileged existence lived by the
Tatars and Jurchen Yeren at Anle and Zizai were divulged: they were exempt
from a general ban on people exiting China’s territory to trade. In 1421,
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 250
however, soldiers from Anle and Zizai were drafted to take part in one of
Yongle’s Mongolian expeditions. 10
Simply judging from the face of it, Yongle’s purpose in favoring these
outsiders, who weren’t much of a border menace, was to wean them away
from Korea’s orbit and discourage their becoming too strong. Only in 1411
did Yongle articulate a policy. He said he had no desire to annex their
territory, but those people are greedy and a border nuisance. Right now they
submit out of fear, and we treat them generously, giving them the offices and
gifts they want. We make these small payments to avoid a big disaster. We
have no other option. 11
* * *
The most troubled sector of the Ming frontier in Yongle’s time wasn’t Liao-
dong, however. It was Gansu and Ningxia in the far west. Besides the Chi-
nese, the western Fan (Tibetans), and the Tuda (Monguors) who were already
there, a sizeable population of surrendered Tatars gradually moved in and
settled, mostly around the garrison town of Liangzhou. The ethnic mix could
be troublesome. Could non-Chinese be trusted? A lowly battalion judge at
Taozhou thought not. He wrote Yongle, cautioning him about admitting non-
Chinese into his personal imperial guard. Yongle answered him. He said
Heaven creates talent everywhere. The ruler just needs to ensure that he taps
the worthy ones, Chinese or not. That was, no doubt about it, a good attitude,
free of a priori ethnic bias, for an autocrat to display in handling disturbances
out in Gansu. The Yuan policy of privileging Mongols over Chinese was a
disaster. The judge meant well, however, and shouldn’t be indicted for what
he said. 12
In 1404, a Tatar officer named Tarni came over to the Ming with five
hundred males and females and was rewarded by the creation of the Chigil-
Menggu battalion, with himself as commander. 13 Nearby, in 1405, Yongle
created the Shazhou Guard (nowadays Dunhuang). A surrendered chief
named Kunjilai was made commander of it. 14
In 1409, some nine Tatar officers, two of them with princely titles, of-
fered to surrender, but they were still far off in Etzina, and if they lingered
there too long, they might change their minds and rebel. They’d shown signs
of uneasiness earlier about Ming intentions. Yongle told Gansu regional
commander He Fu that all distant people who come over should be assuaged.
Never hold a grudge. The people at Etzina should be left to choose whether
to enter China or stay where they were. Treat them well if they do come
over. 15
In 1410, trouble did break out at Liangzhou. Two Tatar battalion com-
manders—Hubao and Zhang Boroldai, plus a Yongchang Guard commander
named Irinjibal, led some Tuda soldiers on a rampage, killing and looting,
seizing horses and livestock, and then camping on the communications route.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 51
Yongle was off campaigning in Mongolia at the time, so it was his competent
son and stand-in, the future short-lived Hongxi emperor, who was left to
direct the suppression.
Why had things gone awry out in Liangzhou? Everything was quiet there,
when a rumor circulated that Hubao and the others were going to be uprooted
and moved to some other guard community. That sparked their rampage.
Other surrendered Tatar commanders and troops were rallied to put this
down. They caught and imprisoned fifty-four men. When the prisoners’
friends threatened to enter Liangzhou and liberate them, all fifty-four were
beheaded. News of the disturbance reached Yongle a month and a half later;
he ordered a major buildup of forces at Liangzhou and an extermination of
the Tuda and others who were still in rebellion. 16
Then another Gansu rebellion broke out, this one in Suzhou a few weeks
later. A Muslim sojourner led this one. The rebels killed the regional military
commissioner, Liu Bingqian, and seized the city, which was undefended
because most of the troops were out on patrol at the time. Immediate calls for
help went out to Chigil, Shazhou, and Hami. The troops on patrol doubled
back. Several bloody clashes took place inside the city. Troops from Chigil
arrived. Reportedly they scolded the rebels: “You’ve accepted the generosity
of the great Ming emperor, so how can you do this unrighteous act? Thanks
to Ming government, we’ve all been given tools and seed, and irrigation
channels have been dug for us; on what excuse then can anyone turn against
the Ming?” A thousand Shazhou troops soon arrived as well, and the rebels
were quelled. 17
Later that same year, it became clear that the Liangzhou revolt could have
been catastrophic. A report concluded that the Tatar officers had rebelled
because of false rumors, not because it was their original intent to do so.
Some twelve thousand individuals, wives and children included, many of
them Tuda, had fled to the wilds. They were called back on Yongle’s prom-
ise of a full pardon. 18
There were rumblings of rebellion in and around Ningxia as well. In
1412, Yongle was told that certain Tatar groups living in Ningxia were of
two minds, but he declined to take any action. He said it wasn’t his policy to
treat surrendered Tatars with suspicion but with sincerity. Had he acted rash-
ly, he said, many deaths would have been the result. He hoped that kind
treatment would soften their wolfish minds. But some did rebel, and their
bloody suppression was the unavoidable result. 19
There were small-scale outbreaks of Tuda banditry out in the Handong
Guard. They also raided three hundred households in Anding. Then they
recruited Tibetans, blocked the passes, and went out looting all over. There
was no way to stop them. An offer went out that if they turned over all that
they had looted, they’d be pardoned. That was the best option Yongle could
think of. But he did order the beheading of Chaghandai, a Tatar caught by
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 252
Ningxia regional commander Liu Sheng and sent on by him to the capital.
Chaghandai had been a squad commander in one of the Qing prince’s guard
units in Ningxia. He made himself leader of a bandit gang that preyed on
commoners until government forces suppressed him early in 1412. They
captured his horses, mules, and baggage and killed nineteen of his men. The
others scattered. 20
Restlessness among the Tuda persisted. Yongle thought both their sol-
diers and their civilians were harboring sedition. Was it because they were
short of food? If so, they should go to Lan County and get grain there. He
ordered that contingents of Ningxia cavalry be deployed to Liangzhou. Tibe-
tan troops from the Xining Guard should be brought in to handle any bandit-
ry. 21
These were the same Tuda to whom Yongle had offered amnesty two
years earlier. Now led by a certain Laodisha, they rebelled nonetheless. Xin-
ing Guard commander Li Ying, himself a Tuda, led the capture of nine
hundred males and females and the beheading of three hundred rebels at
Taolaichuan (Rabbit River). He captured sixty. The rest were chased down
during a nighttime snowfall. The leader, Laodisha, and a handful of others
escaped to the Chigil Guard. There the commander Tarni took them in. It was
midwinter, and shipping food for the troops was impossible. Plus the troops
would probably kill innocents, so Yongle called off the chase. He sent a
message to Tarni: Ever since you surrendered to us, you’ve behaved flaw-
lessly, but now you’ve done a bad thing, giving protection to the rebel bandit
Laodisha. I treated that bandit well, but he betrayed me. How can you toler-
ate him? If you arrest and send him here, you’ll be rewarded. Otherwise we’ll
campaign, and that will be bad for Chigil. 22
Early in 1413, a large party of captured Tuda and their families arrived in
the capital where execution awaited them. But Yongle took pity. They were
just naive common people. He sent all eight hundred of them into military
exile on the coast of Guangdong. But when three hundred of the exiles
reached southern Jiangxi, they somehow armed themselves with crossbows
and mutinied, raided villages, and escaped into the mountains, where they
caught malaria, ran out of food, and died. The other five hundred did reach
their destination.
Tarni, commander of the Chigil Guard, duly arrested Laodisha and sent
him off to the capital. He and others were rewarded for their compliance.
Things then calmed down considerably in Gansu and Ningxia. Or perhaps
affairs there stopped being fully reported. 23
* * *
Something resembling peace and quiet descended along all the frontiers, and
so it became feasible for the Ming to gear up for five big campaigns into the
vast steppes of Mongolia over the years 1409–24, four of them led personally
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 53
by the emperor himself. We can ask ourselves what the purpose of these
campaigns might have been. To what extent were they a continuation of
Taizu’s steppe campaigns, which he later regretted having allowed? Did they
enhance Ming security? Or were they just for show?
A few things need to be noted at the outset. For one thing, Yongle came
of age as a sort of frontiersman of privilege. When he was ten years old,
Taizu made him prince of Yan, and when he was twenty, he took up resi-
dence in Beiping. He benefited from the tutelage of Taizu’s top generals—
Xu Da, whose daughter he married, and Fu Youde. He took part in the
latter’s 1381 campaign against Nayir Bukha. In 1387 he participated in the
big operation against Naghachu and in further steppe operations in 1390 and
1396. These went well on the whole, and Yongle much enjoyed his life as a
steppe warrior.
Another matter is this: we have to tell the Mongolia story as China’s
story. The Tatars kept no archives, so their understanding of events is mute.
A final note is this: China’s warring in Mongolia was not so much a life-
or-death security matter as it was a symbolic expression of Ming pretensions
to a global moral and political hegemony. Any state or state-like entity that
declined to acknowledge respectfully China’s preeminent position as the
world’s sole superpower posed, intentionally or not, a challenge and a threat
to that dominance. In the early Ming, such behavior provoked military retali-
ation. Apparently the reason a Tatar power in the steppes might refuse to
accept even a symbolic Ming suzerainty was because the inheritors of the
throne of Chinggis-khan still clung to a Mandate of Heaven claim of its own.
Taizu feared a possible restoration of Yuan rule in China, and his campaigns
into Mongolia had in part the aim of disabusing the Mongols (Tatars) of any
such idea. That threat had surely receded by 1400, so for Yongle the cam-
paigns were less about security and more about symbolism. (From Ming
records, it seems the Tatars themselves often disagreed violently on the ques-
tion of whether submission to the Ming was appropriate.)
It was very hard for the Ming to get accurate information about what any
of the various Tatar groups and factions were up to. The camp of the descen-
dants of the Yuan emperors featured an iconic qaγan (khan) and a power
behind the throne, an officer named Arughtai, who would submit one day
and change his mind the next. 24 The Yuan group was involved in a struggle
for steppe mastery, not with China but with another Tatar-Mongol group
called the Oirats (Oyirad). The Ming knew too little of the facts of that
situation to play these rivals off against each other effectively. So Yongle
took a loftier approach and lavished rewards, titles, and emoluments on any
group that submitted. Permanent peace under the Ming aegis was the objec-
tive.
In 1403, Yongle got off a letter introducing himself to the khan, Guilichi.
He reminded Guilichi that whoever possesses the realm must have Heaven’s
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Chapter 254
Mandate, which cycles between rise and fall, success and failure, loyalty and
disaffection. Wisdom and strength avail nothing. As between reality and
illusion, reality has the controlling hand. When the Song lost its mandate,
Khubilai took over, and he and his progeny ruled China with the mandate for
nearly a century. Then they lost it. There was rebellion, and the Yuan col-
lapsed. Heaven then mandated my father to suppress the disorder, rule Chi-
nese and non-Chinese alike, set up governing institutions, and revive the
ancient rites and music. I succeeded him, and I sent an envoy to tell you that.
As emperor, I take the realm to be a family. You, the khan, are far off in the
steppes, yet you must know how the mandate rises and falls. We should send
friendly envoys back and forth. But I hear you’re covetous and start inci-
dents. That’s bad, as such behavior defies the Mandate of Heaven. You, the
khan, surely know that those who conform to Heaven flourish, while those
who defy it perish. So I’m sending another envoy with this letter and gifts for
you: two outfits of patterned silk, and one each for sixteen or so of your
subordinates, among them Arughtai. (Arughtai was listed fourth.) How the
khan reacted to this letter isn’t known. 25
A few months later, one of the Ming envoys sent to Guilichi stole a horse,
escaped from arrest out somewhere in parts west, and reported that the khan
and Arughtai had recently inflicted a terrible defeat upon the Oirat chieftain
Mahmud. Yongle got the report, and guessed that the China border might be
Guilichi’s next victim. He ordered a general alert. 26
Then in August 1404, Yongle passed on to Gansu regional commander
Song Sheng some news he’d just heard: the Uriyangkhad (eastern Tatars) had
come and said that Arughtai and two other chiefs were at odds with each
other and that this spring the Oirats had beaten Guilichi, whose horde had
moved north. Yongle said this could well be disinformation designed to
make our border defenders complacent. If the raiders come near you, said
Yongle, have all the military villages brew a poisoned wine to kill them off.
Try this out. Or maybe you have a better stratagem. Meantime, he put Xuan-
fu and Kaiping on alert. 27 Such was the poor quality of information coming
from the steppes.
Early in 1405, a subordinate of Arughtai’s defected to the Ming and said
that Guilichi was pondering his contacts with the Ming court, the oasis city of
Hami, and the Uriyangkhads and might be developing some sort of broad-
based threat and had sent men to come south and reconnoiter. Yongle
thought this was just a predictable instance of Lu fabrication. We just need to
be on guard. So he put the border commanders everywhere on alert. 28
A few months later, a Tatar defector gave information about Guilichi’s
whereabouts. Yongle seems to have thought this report genuine. There were
reports of campfires in the steppes north of Shanxi. These could be Guilichi’s
men reconnoitering. He ordered cavalry patrols out to see what was going on.
If they come and raid Kaiping, set ambushes. 29
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 55
Early in 1406, Yongle told Song Sheng out in Gansu that he’d heard
Guilichi and his top commanders Arughtai and Yesuntei had led their men
southeast, then turned north, then south again. This pattern of action sug-
gested they had looting in mind. So train your men, ordered the emperor, and
strengthen all the city walls and moats. 30
In the spring of 1406, Yongle sent another letter to the Tatar (Dadan)
khan Guilichi. It was at once artful and threatening. Yongle said his hope was
that people everywhere should find their proper niches. Foreign states have
submitted to us and they enjoy peace. I’ve sent several missions to you, the
khan, so that we might establish an amicable relationship, like members of
one family. But you are unreceptive. You detain my envoys, loot my border,
and spurn my words. Ever since Ayushiridara fled China in 1368, you’ve had
seven different rulers, and did any of them increase your land and people in
the slightest? Your crowd, outfitted with armor, bows, and swords, is in
constant motion east and west. The older men die before their time, and the
young have no secure habitat. For years it has been like this, and whose fault
is that? Surely you, the khan, know you must respect Heaven’s Mandate,
assuage your people, and release my envoys and all the border people you’ve
abducted. We need a friendly relationship. You need to rest your crowd and
enjoy the blessings of peace. If you continue your stubborn resistance to us, I
won’t sit still. Our troops are strong, and you won’t be able to survive a long
expedition if we send one. May the khan think about that. (Yongle sent along
more outfits of patterned silk.) 31
One can only speculate as to the reason or reasons for Guilichi’s hostility
to the Ming, but if Yongle was accurate in his characterization of Guilichi’s
behavior, the core of the dispute lay in the symbolism of the Mandate of
Heaven and Guilichi’s refusal, as a Chinggis-khan descendant, to concede
any legitimacy to the Ming claim to it. That was a pretty serious challenge.
Maybe Yongle could peel off a key supporter of Guilichi’s. A few weeks
after sending the above letter, Yongle sent a message to Arughtai. Envoys
had told him that Arughtai was intelligent, that he knew where the Mandate
of Heaven lay, and that both he and his mother were sincere in their current
leaning toward China. If Arughtai were to respond in a positive way, Yongle
promised to assign him a secure habitat and accord him a hereditary royal
title. Now was the time to decide: security and good fortune, or danger and
disaster? Yongle bolstered his message with two outfits of gold-weave pat-
terned silk. 32
That fall, Yongle had to assess some doubtful intelligence about the foe.
A low-level Ming officer returning from Uriyangkhad territory reported that
one of Guilichi’s commanders, Yesuntei, had been murdered; that another,
Mar Haza, had defected to the Oirats; and that Arughtai was camping in the
Hailar River area. Yongle was suspicious. Likely the officer had been bribed
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 256
to state this to make us relax our guard. And so he ordered a full frontier alert
at Gansu, Ningxia, Kaiping, Xinghe, and Datong. 33
In June 1407, Yongle sent an embassy out to the Oirats. Defectors had
said Guilichi was deposed by his horde, who preferred another Chinggisid
claimant to the Yuan throne, Bunyashiri. Yongle hoped to establish friendly
relations with the Oirats. He sent along gold-weave patterned silk outfits in
token of that. 34
Apparently the news coming out of the Inner Asian steppes was confused,
or the reports reflected an actual state of confusion. It appears Guilichi, if
indeed dethroned, was still active. Yongle had it from Uriyangkhad sources
that the horde of one Prince Oljeitu, having joined forces with the Turkish
oasis city of Beshbalik, went on a looting expedition against the hordes to the
northeast, which panicked the Uriyangkhad, who now begged the Ming for
help. Yongle carefully weighed this news. Oljeitu, he said, was a Yuan scion
and as prominent a figure as Bunyashiri. The story of a linkup with Beshbalik
rang false. It was likely that the frightening news the Uriyangkhad received
was a lie purposely concocted by Guilichi. He counseled the three Uriyangk-
had guards to be on the watch and ignore all such rumors.
Arughtai, however, was still sweet. In January 1408, he sent an envoy
with a request for medicine. Yongle was happy to tell the Imperial Academy
of Medicine to supply him. 35
Then some rumblings from out in the vast sweeps of Inner Asia hinted at
a major upheaval brewing among the Tatars, which was not good news for
China. Ming envoys returning from parts west reported that Bunyashiri had
fled Samarkand and had arrived at Beshbalik, where the Lu welcomed him.
Ming border commanders said that if the Lu do put up Bunyashiri as khan,
they’ll first raid our frontier, then head out to Mongolia. They suggested that
the Ming cavalry should launch a preemptive attack on them. Yongle thought
that if the Lu did set up Bunyashiri, they wouldn’t be in a position to be
aggressive. So he sent eunuch Wang An to Beshbalik to reconnoiter and
ordered Regional Commander He Fu to send men to Hami to buy horses and
see what Bunyashiri was up to. The missions to Beshbalik and Hami needed
to be coordinated and escorted by government troops. 36
It was time for Yongle to write Bunyashiri, The letter was the usual mix
of lures and threats. It went out on April 4, 1408. Yongle said he’d been told
that Bunyashiri had escaped Samarkand and was living in Beshbalik and that
Guilichi had invited him to come to Mongolia. He said he’d also heard that
Guilichi and his commander Yesuntei were very close kin to each other, and
it was not likely that Yesuntei would abandon him for someone more distant-
ly related. Even though some of Guilichi’s men have submitted to you, his
power is still formidable, so the rest won’t rebel. You and Guilichi cannot
coexist. And the Yuan cycle is over. Seven khans have ruled in Mongolia in
the forty years since 1368. None came to a good end. If you do go to
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 57
Mongolia, you’ll have a hard time there. So you must decide whether or not
to go. Everyone knows China’s practice is to honor the descendants of de-
funct ruling families with titles of honor, generous emoluments, and permis-
sion to continue the ancestral rites. Surely you know that our Taizu made
such an offer to Toghus Temur. You Yuan descendants need to think about
all of this. If you submit to us, you’ll get an enfeoffment and license to
nomadize near our frontier. If instead your inferiors mislead you into making
a bid for the empty fame of Yuan enthronement, disaster awaits you. Yongle,
as usual, sent a gift of two outfits of gold-weave patterned silk and four bolts
of colored silk. 37
Bunyashiri paid no heed. Three months later, Wang An reported that
Bunyashiri left Beshbalik, bypassed Hami, and headed for Mongolia. Eight-
een Tatars, adherents of his at Hami, had been captured while reconnoitering
for him. Yongle ordered the Hami king to turn the captives over to He Fu for
debriefing. The Oirats, meanwhile, asked Yongle for official Ming seals and
patents. Yongle was happy to comply. 38 Three Oirat leaders got royal titles:
Shunning king Mahmud, Xianyi king Taiping, and Anle king Batu Bolod. 39
Then in January 1409, a clamor for offensive action arose from among the
Ming commanders out in Gansu and Ningxia. Several of them were ethnic
Tatars and Tuda eager to recompense the Ming court’s generous treatment
and itching to give visceral evidence of their loyalty and valor. Yongle
endorsed their appeal. It was noted at the time that Guilichi had been assassi-
nated, that Bunyashiri had been welcomed in to replace him as khan, and that
dissenters had fled the scene. A few months later, captive Tatars confirmed
the assassination and Bunyashiri’s enthronement. So in April 1409, Yongle
sent the new ruler a letter. It was very conciliatory. He said we need to
exchange friendly envoys and lay the foundation for a permanent peace. In
token of his sincerity, Yongle was sending back twenty-two captives, men
who all have parents, wives, and children whom they surely miss. And he
made a present of more silks, including some for Arughtai. In case Bunyashi-
ri reciprocated with a return mission, Yongle instructed Gansu regional com-
mander He Fu and Marquis Wu Gao at Datong to make sure the envoys
weren’t arrested by mistake, as that might ruin everything. 40
Then some scouts returning “from among the Lu” had some disturbing
news to relate. Bunyashiri had killed one of Yongle’s friendly envoys. They
also said Bunyashiri and Arughtai, beaten in a clash with the Oirats, were
now on the Kerulen River, where they were planning an assault on the
Uriyangkhad and then a raid on the Ming frontier. Yongle was outraged. I
treated Bunyashiri with complete sincerity, he said, and what does he do? He
kills my envoy and plans to come raid! He’s a rebel and he must be extermi-
nated. 41
* * *
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 258
That was the casus belli. The Ming had been handed the gift of the moral
high ground. It now had a good reason to gear up for war on Bunyashiri.
Yongle explained to his border commanders that while the Hu cycle is over
and done with, their thievish rat-and-dog natures live on, which is why we
must have stout walls, deep ditches, sleepless watches, assiduous patrols, and
all necessary repairs made and the troops in fighting trim. On August 13,
1409, he put Qiu Fu in charge of a grand expedition into Mongolia. The
emperor’s instructions to the expedition highlighted Bunyashiri’s defiance of
the Way of Heaven and his killing of our envoy. Yongle counseled caution.
Beyond Kaiping, he said, you may see no enemy, but you must nevertheless
keep the ranks in order. When you do meet the foe, devise appropriate
stratagems on the spot. Don’t mindlessly fall for the enemy’s lures. Don’t be
pigheaded. You are all experienced commanders. And the ruler sent them off
with gifts of silk and fine horses. At the same time, Yongle sent a message to
Bunyashiri warning him of what was coming: a punitive expedition to find
out why you killed the envoy and rejected the ruler’s amicable gestures. Next
year, threatened Yongle, I’ll lead a campaign against you myself if I have
to. 42
Qiu Fu was not a good choice to serve as the supreme commander. Like
most of the officer caste, he was a native of Taizu’s home region of north
central China. He had risen through the ranks in Yongle’s personal service.
He proved to be an effective risk-taking battler for Yongle during the civil
war of 1399–1402, and that made him a special favorite. Yongle made him a
duke. But Qiu Fu’s impetuousness drowned out his reasoning powers. He
and an advanced detachment reached the Kerulen River in northern Mongo-
lia, six hundred miles north of Beijing, in mid-September 1409. Early skir-
mishes seemed to go well. A captured officer said Bunyashiri had fled some
ten miles north. Against the urgent advice of his top leaders, Qiu Fu decided
not to wait for the rest of the expedition to arrive but to go after Bunyashiri at
once. He threatened to execute for insubordination anyone unwilling to take
part in the chase. Feigning weakness, the Tatars lured Qiu into a fatal trap.
On September 21, Bunyashiri’s men suddenly created a thick circle around
Qiu’s isolated detachment and proceeded to kill Qiu as well as four of his top
commanders, including those who’d earlier argued against such a foolhardy
pursuit. 43
This was a shattering reverse. It had serious repercussions on the whole
question of the viability of the Ming as a global superpower. It must be said
that Yongle handled the bad news well. He blamed himself for choosing Qiu
Fu as leader, but he condemned Qiu posthumously for his rash behavior and
exiled his family to Hainan Island. The other commanders, victims of Qiu’s
folly, got posthumous honors. The rest of the expedition, one hundred thou-
sand cavalry, and the families of the fallen were to be assuaged. He warned
He Fu and Chen Mou at Gansu and Ningxia that news of the fiasco was
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 59
likely to turn the minds of all newly surrendered Tatars away from us, and Lu
raids on the frontiers were now extremely likely. Yongle explained to the
heir apparent that Qiu Fu’s avoidable failure had so humiliated China that we
must now organize another campaign and destroy the foe, else the Lu power,
enhanced as it now is, will become an unending frontier menace. A spring
offensive led by Yongle himself would now be launched, so the heir apparent
would have to manage the realm while his father was away. In a message to
the Oirats, Yongle acknowledged Qiu Fu’s failure, warning that Bunyashiri
was now in possession of Ming armor and battle flags and might well imper-
sonate Ming forces in an attack. And he announced his own upcoming spring
offensive. 44
By late fall 1409, Yongle’s plans were well advanced. He told his com-
manders that the latest news indicated that Bunyashiri was arrogantly assum-
ing we’d never attempt another such campaign, and that he could now have
either of two aims in mind—either to winter in the southeast near our frontier
or to move west for an attack on the Oirats. So we can’t wait for the grass to
turn green. We’ll have to move out very early in the spring, when the Lu
horses are weak for want of grass, but we can solve that problem by feeding
our horses beans. This horse-provisioning plan called for building silos or
blockhouses at ten-day intervals north of Xuanfu, where we can preposition a
total of two hundred thousand piculs hauled by thirty thousand carts. 45
A formal public announcement was issued March 9, 1410. It proclaimed
how everywhere even the most distant foreign entities had submitted, with
the sole exception of the northern Lu, whose evil remnants in the steppes
have killed our envoy and spurned our virtuous generosity. Their minds are
wolfish, greedy, violent, thuggish, and cruel. They hope for a revival, but
they enjoy neither Heaven’s favor nor the approval of their people. I’m
leading a campaign on them to put our might on display and carry out
Heaven’s suppression. There are five reasons why our victory is certain. We
outnumber them; we don’t defy Heaven as they do; we stand for order, not
chaos; we’re not as hard pressed as they are; and our compassion trumps
their hatred. We’ll sweep the steppes clear of them. We’ll assuage their
people and bring peace to their lands. Then the commoners who did all the
hauling can go home, and all our troops can rest. I so notify all in the realm. 46
The ruler then made a speech to his army. It’s unknown how many might
have heard him clearly; perhaps eunuchs relayed his remarks to those beyond
earshot. It was a good speech. Some of you men, he said, followed Taizu and
pacified the realm, and some of you followed me in the civil war (“putting
down the internal trouble”). Some of you inherited your positions from your
grandfathers and fathers; others of you obeyed Heaven and came to us to
surrender. You older men are still functional, and the younger are in good
shape. All the foreign countries have submitted to us, except for these rem-
nant Lu, who in their arrogance defy us and raid our frontiers. You all must
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 260
cooperate and drive them off so that Taizu’s great enterprise and your own
descendants will enjoy a myriad years of security. We will surely win. The
great Chinese fighters of the past are still remembered to this day, and you
can be like them. The speech was followed by drinks and food. 47
The campaign was on. On April 13, Yongle, on horseback surely, scaled a
prominence called Lingxiao feng (Reach-the-Clouds Ridge). There he chat-
ted with his academicians as he gazed out over the landscape. He said that
when the Yuan was at its height, many common people made their homes out
here. Now it’s desolate, nothing but wind and dust and sand and grass. That
shows how low the Yuan power has plummeted. Yet they still resist! Why?
The academicians preferred to avoid answering that. Yongle bristled. I want
your advice, he said. Since when have I ever been a dictator?
According to diarist Jin Youzi, Yongle remarked that men who’d never
come north of the border could scarcely imagine such an endless vista as that
spread before them. And then they all came down the ridge. The ruler
pointed out two paths made apparently by horses, but he identified one as
made by gazelles and the other by wild horses. They made camp below the
ridge. No water was at hand. Ready-to-cook parched grain couldn’t be
cooked. Elite diners made do with bean porridge, goose and gazelle meat,
and melons and vegetables in soy sauce. Most of the troops went hungry.
Was Heaven watching? Overnight a foot of snow fell, and next morning
cooking could finally be done. 48
The expedition reached the Kerulen River in northeastern Mongolia on
June 3. This in Chinese was the Meat-Strip River, now renamed by the
expedition as the Water-the-Horses River. Jin Youzi found the current swift,
the water full of fish, the banks covered by elm and willow, the islets in the
river full of reeds and foot-high grass. 49 On June 10, at long last, they made
contact with the foe. A raider (Lu), captured and questioned, said Bunyashiri
had no intention of fighting Yongle and had hoped to join Arughtai and flee
west to the Oirats, but Arughtai had refused and went east instead. Factions
fell to fighting each other. Bunyashiri could be found in the area of the
Ugurja River (probably the Ulja, a small stream parallel to the Onan and
Kerulen). 50 He was ready to flee west to the Oirats. Normally skeptical of
such revelations, Yongle took this to be accurate, and he organized a chase.
On June 14, he and some horsemen reached the Ugurja, but Bunyashiri
wasn’t there. So he renamed the river the “Clear Dust River” (Qingchenhe)
and returned double-time to camp. The next day, the pursuers caught up with
Bunyashiri on the Onan River. There was a skirmish. Yongle climbed a hill
to supervise operations. The Ming fighters let out a yell. Bunyashiri and
seven of his cavalry escaped across the river. Yongle, mindful of what hap-
pened to Qiu Fu, let him go after a token chase. 51
The damage, moral and material, that the Ming expedition inflicted on
Bunyashiri’s Tatars was considerable. There were large roundups of defense-
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 61
less nomads and their livestock. Yongle’s orders were to soothe and feed
them. A hundred or so of Bunyashiri’s people, male and female, fell captive
to the Ming on the Onan. Yongle said he would punish evil leaders only,
those bandits who put those innocent children (chizi) of mine in trouble. He
released the innocent ones, saw that they were fed, and returned their horses
and sheep to them. Troops were forbidden to harass them. More fighters
came in to surrender voluntarily. Yongle sent them away. They all have
parents, wives, and children, he said, and surely they’d prefer not to be
detained by us. 52
So that was the end of the campaign. Was it a success? What did it show
about Ming strategy in Mongolia, home to those who posed the most serious
threat to Ming pretensions to world mastery and to China’s frontier security?
Calling Tatar-Mongol nomads his “innocent babes” was as good a claim to
universal suzerainty as any.
Yongle certainly acclaimed the campaign a success. He explained why to
his academicians while they were beginning their return to China. The Veri-
table Records have him say, “I had no choice but to undertake this campaign
for the sake of the dynasty and the common people. I hoped for a decisive
win. The big evildoers have fled, but their crowd is beaten and scattered.
Now it’s time to turn the army around, rest the troops, and ease up on the
commoners [suppliers and haulers of grain], ready the defenses, give atten-
tion to the military farms, and secure the borders so that the Lu are foiled.”
He further described his success in a detailed letter to his heir apparent. In it,
he laid full blame on the irrationality (qixing) of the evil Tatar leaders,
impervious to his every gesture of kindness and friendship. Bunyashiri him-
self escaped with but seven cavalry, but we destroyed his forces and fumigat-
ed a myriad li of stench. So I inform you of our all-encompassing success. 53
Still, there was violence on the homeward march. Various Tatar groups
were by now aware of Yongle’s presence. Surprise! On July 10, Arughtai
sent messengers to Yongle’s tent with an offer to surrender to the Ming.
Yongle was skeptical. This could be a ruse. But he sent notice to Arughtai
that if he did indeed submit, he could expect the highest of hereditary honors
and would be allowed to continue to lead his crowd. Yongle’s own envoys
accompanied the messengers back to Arughtai’s camp. According to them,
Arughtai was himself agreeable, but his top men opposed him and demanded
war. Yongle’s men also pressed for a fight. So there took place a big cavalry
clash involving several thousand on either side. Jin Youzi heard gunfire.
Arughtai got the worst of it and fled with his family, while what was left of
his crowd scattered. The weather was very hot and the Ming troops were
thirsty, so Yongle disengaged. 54
On July 15, Yongle became aware that Lu horsemen were tracking his
departing army, so he arranged an ambush. After the main army marched off,
he hid a detachment of several hundred cavalry in a willow grove at a bend in
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 262
the river, probably the Kerulen. He had ten infantry stuff grass in sacks on
their backs and march in plain sight. The Lu thought the sacks contained
valuables and fell for the deception. The infantry then fired their guns, the
signal for the cavalry ambush to spring into action. The Lu scattered in
helpless panic, their horses slipping and floundering in the mud. Many died.
Some captives turned out to be Uriyangkhads who’d earlier submitted to the
Ming and later deserted and joined Arughtai. Yongle scolded them for their
perfidy and had all their leaders executed. 55
For all of Yongle’s ignoring of ethnic distinctions, there did exist a persis-
tent if subdued chafing among the various peoples that constituted the fight-
ing forces on either side of the great steppe campaigns. Tatar, Tuda, and
Jurchen units under their own leaders made up some considerable if un-
known portion of Yongle’s Ming army. Jin Youzi noted in his diary of June
30 the friendly help of one Pei Yash Temur, commander of the Dongning
Guard, an ethnic Jurchen, who along with a hundred of his men had been
asked to take part in the campaign. Pei had his men build a raft so that Jin and
his colleagues, who were stranded, could cross the rain-swollen Kerulen, and
he also provided them with fresh-caught fish. Jin thought Pei’s righteousness
and selflessness put him in a category of his own, “a myriad times better than
anyone else.” He went on to remark that most Tatar officers and nobles on
the Ming side would self-segregate, laugh and talk together, vaunt their
superiority, and look on the rest of us as though they didn’t know who we
were. Commander Pei was not at all like that. 56
On August 17, Yongle entered Beijing. The campaign had lasted almost
exactly five months. Jin’s daily log is full mainly of his own personal experi-
ences and has very little to say about the larger military and strategic issues,
but three striking features of his log bear mention. The first is that while we
are used to thinking of Mongolia as semiarid, in 1410 it was very wet. Spring
snowstorms and heavy squalls of rain were constantly met with. Rivers in
flood stage, camps deluged, deep mud on the trail, and horses stumbling in
the mud made the campaign unusually hazardous and exhausting. The sec-
ond is Jin’s portrait of Yongle as a competent and compassionate supreme
commander who much enjoyed the outdoor life—an obsequious portrait, no
doubt, but not necessarily a false one. The third is copious evidence that the
campaign was not just a military exercise. It was also a learned traveling
seminar in steppe topography and ecology. Wild plants, edible ones especial-
ly, were carefully described. Steppe fauna, such as marmots, gazelles, geese,
and the like, were observed too, as were various minerals, salt ponds and
deposits, and stones of various colors. Every prominent hill, every stream,
every campsite was given a Chinese name, and any suitable rock face was in
danger of being engraved with a short Chinese poem. Yongle was intently
interested in all of this and himself composed a poem or two, such as “Moon
and sun are bright / As eternal as Heaven and earth / This engraving on the
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 63
dark rock / Will last just as long.” 57 It was a bit like dogs going about a
strange landscape marking trees. The Ming didn’t claim outright annexation
of the steppes in a military or bureaucratic sense, but Yongle and his accom-
panying academicians definitely formed an esthetic bond with the steppes,
everywhere renaming places with Chinese names, and in that attenuated
sense annexing Mongolia into the overpowering literary domain of China.
* * *
For all the triumphalism about Yongle’s 1410 campaign, the steppe situation
remained fluid, as Oirat and ex-Yuan factions went for each other’s throats,
with the Ming in no position to intercede and dictate peace. Indeed, the
initiative lay with the Lu contenders, who submitted to Ming suzerainty only
when they saw some use for China’s support in the continuing struggle
among themselves for steppe dominance.
The first such supplicant was Arughtai. In January 1411, half a year after
Yongle defeated him, Arughtai sent an envoy to Beijing acknowledging the
end of Yuan rule and expressing a wish to lead his people and submit to the
Ming. The envoy also denigrated the Oirats, with whom the Ming were
friendly. He said the Oirats weren’t sincere in their loyalty to the Ming
because they didn’t hand over the chuanguo bao, a talismanic seal that leg-
end said one Chinese dynasty hands over to its successor whenever the
Mandate of Heaven changes. Yongle disbelieved the authenticity of such a
seal. The real seal of legitimacy, he said, consisted of virtue, not some bau-
ble. Why, if the Yuan had possessed it, did the Yuan collapse? It should have
ruled forever. Yongle sent a return mission with a gift of colored silk for
Arughtai and a message that he understood his onetime adversary’s state of
mind but that his own policy was to ensure that everyone under Heaven
found his proper place and that all who submitted were soothed and rewarded
without discrimination. 58
There was another mission exchange in July 1411. Yongle sent Arughtai
twenty outfits of colored silk, plus eight more for his mother. In December,
the emperor sent Arughtai a gold-weave outfit, along with Arughtai’s elder
brother and younger sister, whom the Ming had captured in the Buyur Lake
battle of 1388. They were to be reunited at long last with their natal family in
a Ming gesture of goodwill. 59
The Oirats, meanwhile, made a clumsy attempt in June 1412 to retain
Yongle’s favor. King Mahmud (his title Ming-conferred) said he’d killed
Bunyashiri, who’d fled west in 1410, and got his magic seal, the chuanguo
bao, which he would like to deliver to Yongle; but Arughtai wanted it too, so
Mahmud was asking for Ming military aid and Ming weaponry to use against
Arughtai, and also for rewards for his meritorious officers. Yongle was unim-
pressed. He said these Lu were showing arrogance, but there was no point in
arguing with foxes and rats. He ordered the Ministry of Rites to provide a
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 264
banquet for Mahmud’s envoys. He prepared a message for the Oirat trium-
virs, contents not disclosed. 60
Then it seemed Yongle’s embrace of Arughtai hit some sort of snag. In
February 1413, Yongle told Arughtai that while he appreciated the horse
tribute, the Tatar leader’s mind seemed to harbor some doubts. Why? Was he
somehow thinking of the disastrous Qiu Fu expedition of 1409? Everyone
has his suzerain, and what did I ever do to you? (Yongle probably had reason
not to mention his 1410 battle with Arughtai.) The emperor insisted on his
total sincerity. He promised to treat Arughtai much more generously than the
Han and Tang rulers had ever treated the famous steppe warriors who’d
come over to them in ages past. Meanwhile he sent Arughtai twenty-five
bolts of gold-weave patterned silk and twelve more for his mother, plus thirty
bolts of colored silk gauze. 61
This was as close to an abject pleading as a proud Ming ruler was ever
likely to enunciate. Yongle was at his wits’ end. Arughtai was coy. And it
was Arughtai, not Yongle, who sat in the driver’s seat with the ultimate
decision-making power in hand. Meanwhile, Yongle’s relationship with the
Oirats was continuing to deteriorate. Mahmud’s communiqué of February
1413 sounded demanding and disrespectful, and he was preventing the return
of a Ming envoy. Yongle sent him a return message listing his offenses but
offering continued friendly relations in return for an apology. If he refused,
he could expect a punitive Ming campaign against him. 62 That was not an
idle threat.
And Arughtai was ready for war on the Oirats. In June 1413, he told
Yongle that Mahmud had killed his ruler Bunyashiri, seized the chuanguo
bao, and on his own authority put up the Chinggisid Daliba as his sovereign.
Arughtai urged a punitive expedition. He offered to put his own men in the
vanguard. Anti-Oirat war fever built up among China’s civil and military
officials, too. Yongle chimed in. Those Oirats are wolves, he declared. If by
this fall they don’t apologize, we’ll mount a spring campaign against them. 63
Yongle and Arughtai were ready now for a deeper tie. On July 28, 1413,
Arughtai agreed to accept Ming suzerainty and receive enfeoffment as Hen-
ing king (Hening, “harmonious and peaceful,” was also a Chinese name for
Kharakhorum). There were also titles for his mother and wife, gold seals,
caps, robes, a gold helmet, saddle horses, twenty bolts of gold-weave pat-
terned silk, and two bolts of embroidered velvet. Yongle told Arughtai that
he viewed him as a remnant Yuan minister who was bowing to the Way of
Heaven like a sailboat blown by the wind. Arughtai was given leave to rule
his troops and people and possess his lands forever. In November, Arughtai
sent a mission of thanks. 64
The Ming began mobilization. A call-up of troops from Gansu all the way
across to Liaodong was begun. In late November, Marquis Guo Liang from
his base at Kaiping reported that he’d caught an Oirat spy and learned from
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 65
him that Mahmud’s men had invaded the Kerulen River area and were about
to attack Arughtai as well as the Chinese frontier. Arughtai reported much
the same news. The Oirats had crossed the Kerulen and were aiming at him
and at Kaiping, Xinghe, and Datong as well. On December 29, Yongle issued
a formal declaration of war to his commanders. He said “the remnant Oirat
Lu” killed their ruler (i.e., Bunyashiri), they detained and killed our envoy,
and they’re raiding our border. They defy Heaven and mankind and must be
chastised. We’ll win. Be resolute. Just obey orders and keep discipline. 65
We simply don’t know the reasons for the Oirat hostility. One can only
speculate. But if the Oirat game was to rule the whole steppe world, as their
election of a Chinggis-khan descendant as nominal overlord would suggest,
then hostility to the Ming made some sense. If the Oirats were determined to
be pro-Ming at the same time that Arughtai was also pro-Ming, then what?
Yongle would be in a position to intervene and dictate terms, and that would
end the Oirat bid for mastery. For his part, Yongle didn’t openly seek to
master the steppes or play balance-of-power politics. His aim was to estab-
lish amicable relations with all the hordes out there, meaning the symbolic
submission of each of them to Ming hegemony, which demanded punish-
ment for any determined defiance. He was more than willing to forgive and
forget if an Oirat apology were forthcoming. None was.
The three Oirat leaders had accepted Ming hegemony some years before.
Arughtai deferred committing himself in like manner until the Oirats reached
his front yard and he felt himself in danger. The Ming rewards were consid-
erable—not just for him and his mother, but for large numbers of his men:
2,962 of them given Ming military appointments, and 129 more shortly after-
ward. 66
With mobilization completed, a half million infantry and cavalry departed
Beijing on April 6, 1414. Their target: the three Oirat leaders, Mahmud,
Taiping, and Batu Bolod, and their iconic sovereign Daliba. They took the
same route north to the Kerulen that they’d taken in 1410, only this time the
weather was much drier. This time there were no ecology seminars either.
Instead, Yongle conducted a leadership classroom on the side for the benefit
of his thirteen-year-old grandson, heir apparent to his father who was again
running things back in Beijing in Yongle’s absence, and would one day,
Yongle was confident, become emperor himself. He was the ruler’s favorite.
He would tell everyone how bright and brave the boy was. He was showing
him how to lead an army and how hard a campaign was on the troops in the
ranks. He had the academicians keep tutoring the boy in the classics and
histories meanwhile, which is probably why Jin Youzi’s log of this campaign
is so terse. 67
Out in the steppes on May 13, Yongle and his grandson rode side by side.
The ruler pointed out the landscape and the marching army. “Do you know
why I’m doing this?” asked the ruler rhetorically. “Surely not because you
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 266
want their land or their herds,” replied the future Xuande emperor. “But these
Lu have bestial natures. Though you extend to them the beneficence of
Heaven and earth, they don’t show gratitude. They submit for a while, then
rebel. Unless exterminated, they become unmanageable. The ancient rulers
Yao and King Wen had to do this. They drove the Lu far away so they didn’t
dare come near the frontiers, so that our people and their families could enjoy
generations of peace and security.” That was pure boilerplate. Yongle
thought it was exactly the right answer. 68
On May 19, Yongle had another lesson for his grandson. He said that in
China’s past, rulers grew up deep in the palace, spoiled by privilege, idle, and
so ignorant of history that they had no compassion for the hardships of the
common people and no grasp of the demands of administration, and so they
brought on catastrophe. One day you’ll inherit the throne. You need to study
hard, you need to know everything about the realm’s affairs, and you need to
experience hardship. Then you’ll be able to handle crises. You’ll be able to
measure up to the ancestors and benefit the people. That was good advice.
The boy pleased his grandfather by showing some physical prowess. On
April 16, he shot and skewered with an arrow a rabbit that the horses had
flushed from the grass. Soldiers nearby whooped for joy at the kill. Nothing
wasted, a eunuch took the dead rabbit to the camp kitchen. 69
The army reached the Kerulen on June 10. The logistics were well han-
dled. Grain was at hand in protected silos. The eunuch-run palace armory
sent up two hundred firearms, helmets, sets of horse armor, and a thousand
sets of regular armor at double speed. A long and elaborate schedule for
awarding battle merits was prepared ahead of any clash. There was time out
along the way to tend to sick soldiers. Yongle had the Imperial Academy of
Medicine treat them. Those who failed to recover were sent back to Wanquan
on the frontier to recuperate. The ruler reminded Marquis Liu Sheng that the
soldiers are our hands and feet, and commanders who don’t win their affec-
tion won’t get their full effort in a crisis. 70
Where was the foe? They were very hard to locate. On May 22, Yongle
told Liu Jiang, leader of the vanguard, that if the scouts should see raiders
heading east, they’d be Oirats, and if westbound, they’d be Arughtai’s fight-
ers. In either case, capture a few of them, because the Lu nature is fickle, and
we always have to be alert for perfidy. 71
On June 9, Commander Zhu Rong sighted several thousand Lu bandits
heading east. Yongle concluded they must be Oirats, and he picked out a
direct route from the Kerulen to the Tula River that had good water and
grass. Cut them off if indeed they are eastbound. Yongle would stay with the
main army on the Kerulen. Commander Liu Jiang reported Lu tracks going
east. Yongle said they’d be encumbered by baggage and could be easily
defeated and assigned him a thousand more cavalry. Yongle told the whole
army that they were to behead all leaders and die-hard fighters, but they were
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 67
forbidden to steal, rape their women, mistreat their children and elders, or kill
any who surrender. Violators could expect execution for disobeying these
orders. 72
The first clash with the Oirats came on June 19. It was inconclusive, but
Yongle ordered all camps to be aware that there were Chinese speakers
among the Lu who might raid us by night. The next day a captured spy said
Mahmud and Taiping’s forces were one hundred li (some thirty miles) away.
Yongle was glad to hear they were as close as that. The next day, June 21,
Commander Liu Jiang rushed a report that he’d spotted the enemy, and
Yongle then led a unit at double time to meet them. His grandson and a guard
of five hundred iron cavalry came along too. 73
The big showdown with the Oirats came on June 23. The Oirat triumvirs
and Daliba saw that the Ming were in good order and got out of harm’s way.
Yongle surveyed the scene from a hilltop. He had several iron cavalry pro-
voke them. The Oirats responded with a charge. Ming gunfire killed several
hundred. Yongle and three marquises led a countercharge, and before the day
was over, there were several thousand dead Oirats. A chase of the survivors
went as far as the Tula River, but Mahmud and Taiping escaped, and as it
grew dark, the Ming disengaged. 74 Later, Yongle explained to his grandson
that the escaped Oirats hadn’t gone far, and we may need to fight them again
tomorrow. The boy disagreed. He replied that he’d seen for himself the Oirat
loss of morale, that they were a beaten bunch, that they wouldn’t be resting
easy, and that they were in no position to bother us further. They needn’t be
chased to the bitter end. It was time now for the Ming forces to regroup.
Yongle stood corrected. Indeed, the campaign was over, and the army began
its homeward trek on June 25. 75
And where was Arughtai in all this? Apparently his forces took no part.
He sent an envoy to Yongle’s camp on the Kerulen on July 5 to announce
that he was sick and unable to visit. Yongle gave him some campaign left-
overs: 5,100 piculs of rice, 100 donkeys, and 100 sheep. 76
On the march home, Yongle issued an edict to the realm. It trumpeted
another Ming victory. He explained how, when he first took the throne, he
found the Oirats, evil raiders though they may have been, in a dire situation,
beaten down in the steppes, and so he assuaged them with kingly titles, and
for some years China got some respite from their raids. Eventually, however,
they regrouped, grew arrogant and defiant, killed their ruler, seized our en-
voy, and raided our borders, greedy as wolves. I had no choice but to lead the
Ming army against them. They were overconfident, so we beat them at Sari
ke’er and chased them to the Tula. They broke like sticks. We killed a
thousand of them, and the survivors fled. We withdrew to the Kerulen;
Arughtai’s crowd came to us, and we assuaged them and had them return to
their horde. We wielded Heaven’s might, swept all the stench from that
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 268
faraway region, and cherished those who came over and surrendered to us.
The borders are now pacified, and our people are secure. 77
A curious feature of Yongle’s steppe campaigns, as well as those con-
ducted in Taizu’s time, was that somehow the top enemy leaders always
escaped after their forces suffered a major defeat. The usual excuse was that
to chase them risked entrapment, as happened with Qiu Fu in 1409, or that
there was simply no pressing need to capture them. One possible but unspok-
en explanation for this policy of avoiding a hot pursuit was that there was no
protocol for handling foreign potentates who were seized against their will. If
they did capture Mahmud or any of the other Oirat chiefs, what would they
have done with them? For voluntary surrenders, there were, of course, elab-
orate protocols.
* * *
As the returning Ming army neared the China frontier, Yongle issued a
warning to all commanders and their troops that the campaign had been
conducted for the sake of the common people, whose land they were about to
enter, where the harsh climate made life very hard, so any wrecking of fields
and crops, or any theft of livestock by Ming soldiers, would be resolutely
prosecuted. 78
The question of whether or not this second steppe campaign was a suc-
cess, enhancing Ming stature and security, gradually began to tilt toward the
negative. Arughtai asked for and received 158 more appointments for his
men, along with three thousand piculs of rice. Yongle warned Regional
Commander Chen Mou out in Ningxia that Mahmud was gearing up for a
raid, as his people were in dire straits. And Arughtai was becoming a bit of a
problem. In February 1415, barely four months after Yongle had satisfied his
earlier request, Arughtai sent 390 men on a mission to Beijing with a presen-
tation of horses and a request for 275 more military offices for his men. That,
as well as gifts of cash, cloth, and silk gauze, they got. 79
But a major recalibration of Ming relations with the steppe world was in
the offing. On February 14, 1415, an Oirat embassy reached Beijing from the
three Oirat kings. (Their khan, Daliba, seems to have died during the 1414
battle with the Ming, alluded to in Ming sources indirectly as the killing of “a
noted king,” not by his name.) They presented fifty horses and finally made
their long-awaited apology. The kings claimed they’d been misled by belli-
cose subordinates, that the Ming had to come and fight, for which dereliction
they now acknowledged the deepest guilt and shame. They asked for a par-
don so that they might renew themselves and return to the good graces of the
imperial court. “The crafty Lu dare make fine words,” Yongle is said to have
remarked upon reading a translation of their statement. His advisers chimed
in and agreed that the foreigners (Yi-Di) were animals with whom it was
pointless to argue, but because the celestial virtue was all inclusive, their
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 69
tribute might be accepted. Yongle assented to that and put up the embassy in
the official hostel. Arughtai’s envoys continued to receive lavish treatment
meanwhile. 80
So the Ming now had both steppe adversaries under its wing, but what did
that mean for the actual situation in steppe country? There, things took on a
menacing look. A spy’s report had come in from Liaodong, on the basis of
which Yongle warned the commanders at Kaiping that Arughtai had recruit-
ed troops from among the Uriyangkhad and that Oirat forces were lingering
nearby as well. A day-and-night alert was necessary. 81
Another campaign might be needed. Yongle began laying the ground-
work for one. It came up for discussion in December 1415 that the just-
completed steppe campaign had exposed some troubling deficiencies. Minis-
ter of War Fang Bin complained that some commanders weren’t conscien-
tious; that when we mobilized, some able-bodied men feigned illness and
escaped duty; that some officers were timid; and that too many weapons
were of poor quality. Yongle agreed and ordered censors to check into these
things and issue indictments. He ordered all regional commanders to train
their forces and bring them to Beijing for review. He wanted Jurchen recruits
too, as many as could be mustered; the Liaodong commanders were to bring
them to Beijing in the spring to train. On Duanwu, the Dragon Boat Festival
day in spring, Yongle went out to the east park to view kick-ball games and
archery contests, followed by cash prizes and a banquet. 82
In December 1419, as the slow process of recruiting, mobilizing, and
training a new generation of troops ground on, Yongle made a formal address
to his commanders. He wanted them to know what was on his mind. He was
worried. History showed, he said, that military posture determines the rise
and fall of dynasties. The Song in its rise brought peace to the realm through
its military power, but it could not in the long run stave off the “ugly Lu,”
and the realm split. Under Khubilai, the Yuan was strong militarily, but his
successors were derelict, warlords arose, and the dynasty fell. Our Taizu
founded the great enterprise of the Ming on military power, and my fear now
is that we may be falling into military decline, just as the Song and Yuan did.
The fates of all of you are tied to the guojia (the family-state). But you’ve let
things slide. The ranks are depleted. Soldiers abscond. You don’t care about
casualties. You have corrupt connections to civil officials. Vacancies lie
unfilled for years. How will we ever meet a crisis? You care nothing for the
soldiers below, and you’re not loyal to the state above. If you don’t reform,
indictments await. Assuage the men, replenish the ranks, and ready the weap-
ons. 83
Mobilization orders picked up speed during the year 1421, as it had
become increasingly clear that the Ming could not sustain a policy of equal
treatment of both Arughtai and the Oirats at the same time. Relations with the
Oirats grew friendlier, while those with Arughtai soured. For instance, an
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 270
Oirat mission of 1418 bore a tribute of horses plus statements of fealty from
kings Taiping and Batu Bolod and a request from Mahmud’s son Toghon
that he be allowed to succeed his dead father. The request was granted. An
Oirat mission of June 1419 said they’d successfully beaten off an attack by
bandits while they were on the way to Beijing; their words won Yongle’s
respect and admiration. In February 1421, relations with Arughtai, smooth
enough up to that point, hit a snag, the first sign of a turn for the worse. This
came about as Arughtai’s tribute envoys decided to raid a merchant caravan
on the China border. Yongle was understandably angered. He sent an envoy
with an order to Arughtai to punish the malefactors. “From this,” note the
Veritable Records, “the Lu grew arrogant, and their tribute missions [eventu-
ally] ceased.” 84
A couple of months later, Yongle sent a eunuch on mission to the Oirats
with gifts of silk and an edict to the effect that the crimes of border raiding
committed by their horde (buluo) in years past were all forgiven and that
their people should not fear arrest or attack if they came near our frontiers.
And as Oirat relations warmed, those with Arughtai cooled further. In No-
vember 1419, the Beijing police reported rowdy behavior by some of Arugh-
tai’s envoys in the city market. They arrested one of the offenders. Yongle
ordered that the offender be sent in shackles back to the Hening king Arugh-
tai for punishment. He warned Arughtai to tell his envoys that they must
obey Ming law when they were in China. 85
Weren’t these run-ins too minor to affect China’s place in the world?
Apparently not. They were being read as early warning signs of something
bad developing. News came in from the Oirats that Arughtai had fought and
defeated their Xianyi king Taiping. Yongle criticized Arughtai as a “wily
Lu” and scolded Taiping for ignoring his warning to be on guard. But he also
consoled Taiping with gifts of colored silk. The Ming dislike of Arughtai was
becoming ever clearer. Nonetheless, in February 1420 there arrived from
Arughtai and a certain Esen Tugel a tribute of nine hundred horses. Yongle
reciprocated with payment for the horses and gifts of cash and patterned
silk. 86 What was this all about, and who was this Esen Tugel? His story will
emerge later on, but at this juncture he was a wangzi, or khan, a scion of the
house of Chinggis-khan. Arughtai had taken him in as a token of legitimacy.
Evidently Yongle thought him a very important figure, which is probably
why Arughtai’s mission was accepted. The inner politics of the steppe world
are poorly documented, but from later developments, it seems Esen Tugel
was much more favorably inclined toward the Ming than was Arughtai. So,
was a rebalancing of China’s relations with the steppe world about to take
place? No.
By July 1421, scouts’ reports had it that Arughtai was menacing the
frontier. Yongle began a general mobilization preparatory to another inva-
sion of the steppes. Then in late August he canceled it. He’d heard that
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 71
Arughtai had moved his forces north and away from the frontier. 87 Yongle
ordered a reassembly of forces at Beijing early the next year. 88
Then in December 1421, at a high-level strategy meeting in Beijing,
Yongle was confronted with a consensus opinion that due to a grain shortage,
no steppe campaign was going to be possible. Was that really true? Or was it
just an excuse to mask a reluctance to go to war at all? Unusual for him, the
emperor flew into a rage. He arrested and shackled a long-serving and faith-
ful minister of revenue, Xia Yuanji, as well as Minister of Justice Wu Zhong.
Minister of War Fang Bin, for many years very close to Yongle, committed
suicide. The suicide upset Yongle. It was an inexplicable act of defiance, and
he forbade posthumous honors for him. The ministers’ protest against an-
other campaign failed utterly. 89
Yongle ordered local officials across north and central China to manufac-
ture grain carts and deliver them to Beijing by early the following year, 1422.
Apparently that got done. On March 14, 1422, at another high-level meeting,
it was decided how grain supply for the upcoming steppe campaign was
going to be managed. There would be two main bodies of haulers. Twenty-
five officers would conduct the lead component of 340,000 donkeys. Twen-
ty-six men would have charge of the rear component of 117,573 carts pulled
by 235,146 civilian commoners as part of their service obligation. (That was
two men per cart.) They were to backpack or haul a total of 370,000 piculs of
grain. A thousand cavalry and five thousand infantry would be assigned to
guard the convoys. 90
There came a devastating raid by Arughtai on Xinghe, a Ming battalion
center in the steppes north of Xuanfu. The place was destroyed and never
rebuilt. That was the trigger for war. Yongle explained to the court on April
9, 1422, his rationale for this fourth invasion of Mongolia, the third led by
him personally. He said that after having been beaten by the Oirat Mahmud,
Arughtai brought his wife, family, and followers southeast in the direction of
our border, sent us horses and camels in tribute, and declared his submission
to us. But the Lu nature is crafty and false hearted. That wasn’t his true
intent. He only submitted because he was in trouble. We, however, had no
choice but to extend to him the benevolence of Heaven and earth. We ac-
cepted their tribute, treated their envoys courteously, enfeoffed Arughtai as
king of Hening, gave titles to his mother and wife, gave them all gold and
silk, and let them live in the northern steppes. For a time our relations were
smooth. He even sent his son to court. But now his herds have expanded, his
wealth has grown, and his malignant and rebellious mind has resurfaced. His
envoys looted us on their return. He treated our envoys rudely. I warned him
about this, but he paid no heed. And now he’s raided Xinghe. So I’ve decided
to lead a campaign. 91 No objections were raised.
So the campaign began. Arughtai’s men fled Xinghe by night, having
heard that the Ming forces were on the march. Some commanders urged an
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 272
immediate pursuit. Yongle turned them down. “The Lu just want to satisfy
their wolfish greed,” he is recorded as having said. “They got what they
wanted, and they’ve gone. A chase would just tire out our men. We’ll wait
until the grass gets green and the horses are fat. Then we’ll go via Kaiping
and Yingchang, surprise them in their lair, and smash them. It won’t be too
late.” By April 17, 1422, Yongle settled in at Xuanfu. 92
At Xuanfu, there were many details to take care of. The ruler gave special
attention this time to medical care for the soldiers. “Soldiers are the claws
and teeth of the state,” he said. “They’re going out on campaign, and I’m
mindful day and night of their hardships, whether they’re getting enough
food, whether they’re adequately clothed. And on a long campaign they get
sick from storms, cold, heat, hunger, and overwork. Doctors must be on call
in each camp to dispense medicine, not just file reports.” The Imperial Acad-
emy of Medicine got busy. 93
The emperor’s first steppe campaign was an occasion for a seminar in
landscape appreciation. His second found him intent upon showing his
grandson how to command a huge combat army. This time his focus was on
preparedness. The march was also going to be a sort of shakedown cruise.
Yongle explained that many troops weren’t veterans but new men from all
over, and it was urgent that their state of training be reviewed while the
march was underway. He also had them go hunting on May 29, as the
campaign reached a spot north of Xuanfu. “I don’t like hunting,” he re-
marked, “but it’s a chance for the men to race horses, wield weapons, and
show a martial spirit. It’s good for their morale.” 94
Yongle sent word ahead to Marquis Guo Liang, in command at Kaiping,
that if the Lu came, he was to bring everyone from outlying settlements into
the fort and hold fast. Let no one leave, and wait for the main army’s arrival.
On May 31, the ruler held a major review. He remarked to his command-
ers that military formations on the march were just like bodies of water
flowing over a landscape. The placement of the enemy determines the flow.
Just as water has no permanent shape, neither does a body of troops have a
constant posture. We have to adjust to any changes made by the foe. Right
now we’re making sure the ranks know how to turn this way or that on
command so that when they actually meet the enemy they’ll respond as
ordered.
There was archery practice the next day, probably involving shooting at a
target while at a gallop. One squad leader hit the target three times in three
tries. Yongle issued the prize: an ox, a sheep, one hundred ingots of cash, and
two silver cups. Big rewards inspire the men, he said. So apparently did
singing. The emperor composed three songs about suppressing the Lu and
had the soldiers sing these so as to infuse them with a fighting spirit.
Then Yongle made his top commanders all compete in mounted archery
while he looked on. Only three of them could consistently hit the target. One
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 73
missed all his shots, so the ruler demoted him. Another failed to show on
excuse of illness and was demoted too. Yongle said all commanders must be
brave and smart as well as expert marksmen. Bravery means agility and
forcefulness in the face of the enemy. Having deep and comprehensive plans
is what intelligence is all about. To be brave but stupid isn’t good enough.
You must all of you persevere. And troops need to be in good order. No
carousing. If a crisis emerges, direct them calmly. No panicky reactions. The
enemy may leave behind people, horses, camels, oxen, and sheep. But watch
out: it could be bait. On June 5, there was another big review. Yongle said it
was vital to do this. 95
The army marched on and stopped to form a twenty-li circle. Fuel gather-
ing was forbidden beyond the perimeter. Yongle and his top officials pitched
camp in the middle. Inside were infantry, then cavalry, then the gunners
furthest out. Inner and outer command posts were set up at left and right.
Yongle lectured the officers not to forget that good plans trump bravery. The
men must be taught to obey commands, but they must also be cared for. You
gain their cooperation by acting like fathers or elder brothers. Have them
encourage each other to press on, like oarsmen rowing a boat into a head-
wind. On June 10, he sent five thousand mounted scouts under Zhu Rong
ahead of the main army, with orders to rush a report whenever they spotted
the foe. No combat until the main forces arrive. At another meeting with his
commanders, Yongle told them he always thought deeply about any order
before he issued it and that they should do the same; and if they think what
I’ve ordered is wrong, they should voice the better idea they believe they
have. The Veritable Records note that on this trip it was Yongle’s habit to
rise daily at five drums (3–5 a.m.) to review troops or formulate plans. Every
night he called in the academicians to his tent to discuss the Confucian
classics and the histories, and the commanders to discuss the military classics
(bingfa). He often forgot to eat or sleep. 96
On June 10, the army reached Kaiping. Yongle had the Ministry of Reve-
nue send up twelve thousand piculs of grain and the palace armory five
thousand catties of gunpowder. An advance party of five hundred cavalry
was to proceed to Yingchang to find out what the Lu were up to. Word came
on June 26 that the Lu had attacked Wanquan, a frontier fort some three
hundred miles south of where the expedition was. The commanders urged
that a detachment go down there and fight them. “No,” said Yongle. That’s
just a feint to distract us. There’s not many of them, and they fear our march
north. Yongle was right; four days later, word came that the foe had with-
drawn from Wanquan.
Toward Yingchang, the terrain flattened, which meant our advance must
be in strict order, with the gunners and cavalry up front. No intermixing of
units. Another advance unit of three hundred cavalry with two horses per
man and twenty days’ grain was ordered to advance by night and hide by day
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 274
and find out what the Lu were up to. Again, Zhu Rong led it. A backup party
of one thousand were to follow and assist if necessary.
On July 22, one or more Tatars captured by Zhu Rong reached Yongle’s
camp, where they were at once debriefed. Their story was that on hearing of
the campaign, many of Arughtai’s men panicked and fled, and when Arugh-
tai and his family heard Yongle was leading the army personally, they too
took fright and fled, abandoning all their horses and livestock on the banks of
Lake Kölen (Dalai Nor, six hundred miles directly north of Beijing). Their
report that Arughtai’s mother and wife scolded him for opposing the Ming
may have been an ingratiating fib. Yongle was cautious. He said their story
might be a show of weakness meant to deceive us. But soon other captives
confirmed the story of Arughtai’s nighttime flight. Yongle sent soldiers to
round up all the abandoned animals. He burned the abandoned luggage. Then
he held a general meeting of civil officials and military officers and told them
the campaign was over. He explained that there would be no pursuit of
Arughtai. The Lu are a border threat, so driving them off is enough. Our men
have come a very long way and they need rest. 97
Then at a later meeting he targeted the Uriyangkhad, those Tatars domi-
ciled on the Mongolia-Manchuria border that the Ming normally relied on
and mollified for strategic reasons. But they’d recently swung their weight in
favor of Arughtai, who’s now limping away in defeat, leaving the Uriyang-
khad “bandits” still out there. We must cut them down on the return march,
ordered Yongle. The commanders were eager to do just that. Yongle picked
twenty thousand infantry and cavalry. They were divided into five groups.
Speed was essential.
Calling them “bandits” was surely a deliberate choice of terminology. It
absolved the formally recognized three Uriyangkhad guards (Duoyan, Tai-
ning, and Fuyu) of blame for deserting the Ming and joining with Arughtai. It
was, officially, freebooting bandits who joined purely on their own, not
under the direction of the commanders of the Three Guards. Yongle appar-
ently saw no need to scare and alienate them. Off they went to exterminate
the bandits.
Yongle led the cavalry vanguard. Behind him came the main army. The
Uriyangkhad territory lay three hundred miles southeast of Lake Kölen,
along the headwaters of several rivers that flow down into the Manchurian
lowlands. To make a long story short, the result was a massacre. The Ming
cavalry and gunners maneuvered through swamp and forest and shot, hacked,
and blasted the bandits in bloody retribution for their alliance with Arughtai.
All their people, horses, and livestock fell to the Ming. Many of the people
were later released. Their baggage and weapons were gathered and de-
stroyed. The “gang” leader, Borke, was chased down and caught. When it
was all over, Yongle told his commanders that he had to do this. The com-
manders, who by now knew the approved script, replied that it was Heaven’s
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 75
way to bless the good and destroy the evil, and that the ruler did this at
Heaven’s behest to protect the common people. It was not a case of overkill.
Remnant “bandits” were pursued. One hundred thousand Uriyangkhad live-
stock were divided up among the men, presumably to be slaughtered and
cooked. 98
The army resumed its homeward march. On September 2, as he neared
the China frontier, Yongle issued another triumphal edict to the realm. This
time he underlined his own role as a battlefield leader. He said he had no
choice but to label the crimes and apply the chastisement. The crimes? Heav-
en and earth encompass all; there is nothing outside their embrace. The
emperor extends the same kind of benevolence to all. I labor day and night
for the sake of the living beings of the realm. The “ugly Lu” Arughtai lurked
like a rat in the northern steppes, and when the Oirats troubled him such that
he couldn’t protect his wife and children, he led his crowd and submitted to
us. I understood his need. I cosseted him, granted him a title, and let him live
peacefully in his own land. But his Lu mind harbored deceit, presumption,
and arrogance. He defied Heaven, grace, virtue, and the mandate. He killed
our envoy and raided our border. So I acted to protect the common people,
and I personally led the army and attacked him.
Yongle went on to recount the smashing of Arughtai and his allies, the
Uriyangkhad bandits. At dawn on September 23, Yongle reentered Beijing;
personally reported his victory to the shrines dedicated to Heaven, earth, and
the ancestors; and received the court’s congratulations at the Fengtian Gate. 99
* * *
But Arughtai’s career wasn’t over, not by any means. He was resilient. In
August 1423 came news that he was gearing up for another raid on the China
border. Yongle called a meeting of his top command. He told them that when
those bandits attacked Xinghe last year, I personally led the army and
pounded their nest. They fled, and we got all their horses, livestock, and
baggage; and then we marched east and smashed the bandit Uriyangkhad
gang, and we seized their people and livestock and put them in dire straits.
Now, however, they think that because of our victory we won’t come out and
campaign again, so they dare act brazenly. Earlier we surprised them, and
now we’ll do so again.
This was becoming routine. Everyone knew his role as once again the
order of procession was put together. The emperor left Beijing on August 29,
ignoring the usual spring departure date. Two days later a large review was
held at Tumu—the post station that will be the site of the infamous 1449
disaster. The review went well, and Yongle was pleased, even though he got
soaked in the rain. Reports came in that the Lu had gathered just beyond the
border farther west and had designs on Datong and Ningxia. Again, Yongle
would not divert the campaign; it was up to the local defenders to bring all
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 276
scattered soldiers and common people into the forts for protection and stay
on the alert. 100
On September 5, there was another big review at Xuanfu. Lingering
storm clouds dissipated, and the parade of flags, banners, arms, and armor
glistened in the sun. At the banquet afterward, Yongle said the army looked
superb; if the generals are smart, the troops brave, and everyone cooperates,
the victory will be ours. At Wanquan on September 16, Yongle insisted to his
generals that he was not a militarist, not a war hawk. The entire aim of his
campaigns was simply to drive away the bandits and protect the common
people. We have the moral edge, Heaven’s aid, and three hundred thousand
men, and if you all strive loyally, we’ll prevail over the remnant bandits. 101
Yongle busied himself giving advice and instructions as the expedition
proceeded. He reminded Chen Mou as commander of the van that he had to
make his own tactical decisions and not refer everything back to the ruler. He
told his commanders to train as they go and to remember to place the gunners
in front of any cavalry charge.
Important news came in on September 19. From among the Lu, two men
bearing titles of Yuan vintage came and surrendered themselves and their
wives and children. They said that over the summer the Oirat king Toghon
defeated Arughtai, seized nearly all of his people and livestock, and forced
his remaining fighters to scatter away leaderless. They said Arughtai would
flee as soon as he heard of Yongle’s campaign. Yongle had to caution his
commanders that while they might now anticipate a weakened foe in Arugh-
tai, the Lu penchant for deception must be borne in mind, and border de-
fenses everywhere must be solidified. 102
On November 9 came stunning news. Vanguard commander Chen Mou
had gotten as far as the Kerulen River chasing Arughtai when a powerful
Tatar-Mongol grandee named Esen Tugel came and surrendered himself, his
wife and children, and his personal followers. His statement, translated, read,
“I, Esen Tugel, am in straits in the northern steppes, ceaselessly on the run
day and night. I saw Arughtai nearly get killed several times. He’s in danger.
I see that you embody Heaven’s mind; you’ve won the allegiance of every
country; how can I reject your benevolence? I lead my family and come over,
and dare to bask in your glory.”
Yongle was at the Tiancheng Guard, in between Datong and Xuanfu,
when he got this news. It appeared to be genuine. At once he sent Chen Mou
the message that Esen Tugel must be treated with kindness and respect.
Allow no taking of livestock from his followers. And give him this message:
“You’re wise, you know the Mandate of Heaven, and you’ve come over. If
you’re sincere with me, I’ll be sincere with you, and as ruler and subject
we’ll enjoy peace together. I’ve ordered Chen Mou to treat you well and
escort you here.”
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 77
Esen Tugel was no ordinary Tatar. He was a wangzi, a khan, a descendant
of Chinggis-khan, and obviously the legitimizing front man behind whom, or
with whom, Arughtai tried to rule Mongolia after he shed the Ming title
Hening king. No mere icon was Esen Tugel; he was a feared leader in his
own right. And now he’s surrendered to the Ming! Taizu had always been
deeply respectful of capable and high-born aristocrats from the steppes
whenever they voluntarily came and surrendered, witness his treatment of
Naghachu and Nayir Bukha. Almost instinctively, Yongle did the same; long
ago as prince of Yan he’d participated in the reception of both.
So with that the campaign ended. On November 24, Chen Mou reached
Tiancheng and delivered his honored guest. Esen Tugel was nervous on
meeting Yongle. Yongle reassured him. Esen Tugel said he’d long wanted to
come submit, but Arughtai prevented that. Yongle arranged a banquet. Yon-
gle gave him a title, “Loyal and Brave King,” and a new name: from now on
he was Jin Zhong, the two elements meaning “gold” and “loyal.” His wife
Yechi was honored, as well as his nephew Badai, who was made a military
commissioner-in-chief. His followers all got caps, belts, and gold-weave
garments. At the banquet, Jin Zhong sat right in front of Yongle, ahead of all
the other Ming commanders. Yongle fed him special delicacies and, when
the banquet was over, gave him the gold cups that the banqueters had used.
The next day he wrote the heir apparent, informing him of all this. 103
November 30 found Yongle on horseback, with Jin Zhong just behind, as
they departed the guards citadel at Wanquan, heading for Beijing. Yongle
quizzed him about Lu affairs. An interpreter was at hand, surely. Jin Zhong
said that many among the Lu would like to come over, but the evil leader
prevents that, so they can’t break free.
On December 6, the southbound imperial entourage transited Juyong-
guan, the famous pass thirty miles north of Beijing. The day was bright and
clear. Yongle wore his imperial gold-threaded dragon robe as he rode his
caparisoned mount, and as the procession slowly edged forward, metal drums
sounded and banners waved for several miles. A huge crowd of onlookers—
soldiers, civilians, children, elders, and foreign envoys—knelt along the left
side of the road. Rolling shouts of wansui! rose when Yongle came into
view, his trophy Jin Zhong right behind.
Yongle and his party reached Beijing on December 9. Military ranks were
dished out to eighty of Jin Zhong’s followers. The next day, a big consign-
ment of seals, robes, belts, gold-weave patterned silk garments, gold and
silver taels, cash, hemp clothing, bolts of silk gauze, saddle horses, oxen,
sheep, and rice went to Jin Zhong, plus housing, furnishings, dishes, fuel, and
fodder and a yearly salary of one thousand piculs. His wife, nephew, and
followers all got their share as well. The lowliest recipients, twenty-five men,
each got fifteen taels silver, three hundred ingots cash, one gold-weave pat-
terned silk garment, three hemp garments, and fifteen bolts of cotton cloth,
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 278
plus saddle horses, oxen, sheep, housing, dishware, fuel, and fodder. To
describe all this as lavish would be a bit of an understatement. 104
* * *
Bad news followed almost at once. On February 7, 1422, reports arrived
from Datong and Kaiping that the Lu bandit Arughtai’s men had raided both
places. Ever since he came over, Jin Zhong had been urging Yongle to mount
another campaign against Arughtai, but the emperor was reluctant. Now he
changed his mind. He called a big meeting of his high military and civil
officials, all of whom clamored for action. So once again Yongle set in
motion a mobilization of forces. These came from the regional military com-
missions of five different north China provinces.
On May 2, the expedition departed Beijing. While en route to Kaiping,
one of Jin Zhong’s men captured a Lu scout, who said that last fall Arughtai
had fled north in the face of the Ming armies, but a big winter snow, many
feet deep, killed off his livestock and caused his people to scatter. He’d since
gone farther away and had sent the scout to see if a Ming campaign were
really coming. This was another cold and wet campaign. When the forces
reached Kaiping late and soaked to the skin, Yongle made sure the com-
manders took as much care of them as they would for their own children. 105
For once, Yongle had one target in mind, and that was the one man,
Arughtai. Just driving him away would no longer do. Why? Because he’d
killed one overlord, Guilichi; betrayed another, Yongle; and was abandoned
by a third, Esen Tugel, and had therefore forfeited all claim to respect and
consequently was nothing more than a common bandit. Yongle released
some captives and had them make an eloquent appeal to all the Tatars out in
the steppes, many of whom were probably contemplating defecting to the
Ming. Yongle reminded them how kindly he’d treated Arughtai when he was
in deep trouble. Then he turned on me for no reason, raided our frontier, and
harmed our people. He forced me to campaign. Had I heeded my command-
ers and conducted an all-out war, you all would have perished like snow-
flakes on a hot stove. But I espoused Heaven’s benevolence and forbore. I
just lopped off some branches, destroyed his belongings, and drove him off
into the wilds, hoping he’d change his ways. But he didn’t. Now he’s men-
aced our border people yet again. So this expedition is after that one man,
Arughtai, and no one else. We’re not after any of his men. If you submit
sincerely, we’ll reward you and give you offices and let you live peacefully
wherever you like. It’s up to you to decide. Yongle restated this same policy
to his commanders. Chinese and non-Chinese are all my children, he said.
We’re pursuing one villain, Arughtai. All Tatars who don’t fight us need to
be treated well and released. 106
There was a stopover in heavy rain 250 miles north of Beijing at what
used to be the Yuan-era town of Yingchang. Banquets were held. A eunuch
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Defensive Buildup, Offensive Thrust: Yongle, r. 1403–24 79
chorus sang uplifting lyrics composed by Taizu long ago. Scouts found no
sure trace of Arughtai. The campaign was eager for action, Jin Zhong espe-
cially. Scouts reached a place where Arughtai was supposed to be but found
no sign of anyone or anything. He must have left some time ago. The scouts
fanned out and searched everywhere. Finally, on July 16, Yongle decided to
abort the mission. Men and horses were getting tired, he said. It gets cold
early in Lu country, and it’s a long way back to China. Finding Arughtai is
like trying to find a pebble in the ocean. I can’t overstrain the army. So they
formed two main groups and began the trek south to Kaiping. Yongle had a
final inscription carved into a rock face: “So posterity will know I cam-
paigned here.” 107
On August 8, at another stopover, Yongle leaned on a table in his tent-
palace as academicians Jin Youzi and Yang Rong sat or stood by. He seems
to have sensed that something was wrong with his health. He asked and was
told by a eunuch that the expected arrival time in Beijing was the middle of
next month (around September 7). Yongle nodded and said to the academi-
cians that when we get back, I’ll hand over all military duties to the heir
apparent, who by now has long experience in government, and I’ll spend my
last years in retirement. The academicians didn’t protest as they might have
been expected to do. Instead they lauded the heir apparent. Yongle was
pleased. In his edict to the realm, the ruler recapitulated why the mission had
been launched and why it had been necessary to abort it.
On August 10, he didn’t feel well. On August 11, at a place not far
northwest of Kaiping, he died. He was sixty-four, by Western reckoning. For
security reasons, his death was kept secret until the expedition returned safe-
ly to Beijing. 108
* * *
So, were these Mongolian campaigns of Yongle’s worthwhile? Did they
enhance China’s stature in the world and its border security? Their whole
purpose, according to Yongle, was to allow the common people, the min, of
China’s frontier regions to live in peace, free of the danger of raids on their
lives and property. It’s possible that in the short run, they did that. The raids
of the Oirats and Arughtai on the frontier were few, and each was answered
by a colossal retaliatory Ming campaign. It surely appears as though China
inflicted much worse damage on the Lu than the Lu did on China. The
campaigns were probably too costly in resources and manpower to continue
routinely once Yongle departed the scene. And no successor, not even his
grandson, the Xuande emperor, was a genuine generalissimo like he was.
One important consequence of the Mongolian campaigns of Taizu and
Yongle, though never stated as their purpose, was the draining of Mongolia
of some unknown number, surely many thousands, of fighters and their fami-
lies and followers by way of encouraging their voluntary defection and reset-
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 280
tlement, usually under their own officers, in military guard cities all over
China. Serruys has detailed this phenomenon at great length for Taizu’s
reign. 109 China’s willingness to absorb aliens such as these, rather than trying
to keep them out at all costs, was surely of some benefit to the security of the
guojia.
The Tatar side of the story is difficult to probe. From what the Ming
sources say, there was a fierce rivalry going on between the Oirat Tatars and
the Tatars of the defunct Yuan dynasty over which of them would dominate
the steppes. To the west of both lived the Tuda or Monguors, a Mongolian
people living in military cities in Gansu, many of whose commanders led
troops in Ming behalf. On the eastern edge of the steppes lived the Uriyang-
khad Tatars, their three guard communities wavering between allegiance to
China and cooperation with Arughtai. In all of this, the Ming, for all its
pretensions as the global great power, was unable to impose its dominance,
because it could not, and never tried to, establish a permanent steppe pres-
ence, only an intermittent one. Whether the formidable Ming armies entered
the steppes at all was mainly up to the steppe powers to decide. The Ming
just reacted. The initiative was the enemy’s. Did either steppe competitor
want Ming backing? Arughtai did, but only after the Oirats put him in serious
trouble in 1411. The Oirats likewise, only after Ming forces, allied with
Arughtai, beat them soundly in 1414.
Some key parts of the puzzle are nebulous for lack of documentation.
Whether or not to accept Ming suzerainty was a question that we know was
hotly contested in steppe leadership circles, but we know little of the details.
Nor do we know what prompted the Oirats and Arughtai to detain and kill
envoys from the Ming court and initiate raids on the Ming frontiers. And
where do frontier raids fit into the picture? Why raid when raiding, like
envoy-killing, just provoked Ming retaliation? One can only speculate.
The raids were for plunder only. The raiders never tried to seize and
occupy Ming territory. They never voiced a higher purpose, such as using
raids to force a change in Ming policy. Perhaps in the absence of a regular
system of frontier markets, raiding was the only way to supplement the
pastoral economy with needed goods. Perhaps raiding was, like hunting, an
enjoyable pastime for the young men, keeping them busy and loyal to their
leaders. Perhaps some of the raiding was anarchic freebooting, beyond the
control of the top leaders. Ming sources regularly call the raiders not by any
other name than “Lu” (meaning raiders) or “bandits,” unconnected to consti-
tuted steppe authority. The Ming sources repeatedly blame raiding on the
insatiable greed of the beastly Lu soul.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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81
Chapter Three
A Zenith of Peace?
Xuande, r. 1426–35
The frontier was unpredictable. Quiet might erupt into violence at any time.
Violence might subside without any clear reason for doing so. The volatility
of human passions may help explain it. For much of Taizu’s reign (1368–98)
and for the first seven years of Yongle’s, up to 1409 or so, from Songpan all
the way around to Liaodong, the frontier was a zone of considerable turbu-
lence. Then it quieted down unaccountably, so much so that Yongle could
focus his attention on his campaigns into Mongolia. Under his immediate
successors—his son, the Hongxi emperor (r. 1425), and his grandson, the
Xuande emperor—Beijing’s attention was drawn again to troubles along the
frontiers. Hongxi and Xuande were both competent administrators.
Although Xuande kept insisting that China was enjoying an age of peace,
he was by no means complacent. He kept a wary eye on everything going on,
well aware that inefficiency, idleness, corruption, shortages, mismanage-
ment, and unforeseen challenges could easily erode the realm’s defensive
barriers and cause untold disasters. His job was to meet these troubles calmly
and not overreact, handling bad news rationally and constructively. His desk
was crowded with paperwork.
There were routine maintenance, repair, and upgrading tasks he had to
authorize. Walls tended to crumble. New installations, like signal towers and
forts (chengpu) especially, had to fill the many gaps the latest raids had
exposed. Soldiers had to be shifted from guard duty to construction labor and
back; they had to be fed, housed, clothed, and provided with armor, weapons,
and cavalry horses. They had to be recruited and trained. Food supply was a
major headache, as the frontiers were not well suited for agricultural produc-
tion. How to organize grain hauling; secure the donkeys, carts, and teamsters,
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 382
often civilians; and ensure that the loads arrived intact after a hundred or
more miles of difficult and dangerous terrain leading from the interior to the
outermost limits of the realm? Men and animals had to be replaced as they
aged, sickened, and died. Modes of procurement and payment had to be
devised and constantly readjusted as circumstances changed. All these kinds
of things required Xuande’s daily attention as matters came up from com-
manders in the field or from the Ministry of War asking for his decision.
Xuande was sufficiently competent to initiate his own edicts and commands
as well. As a ruler, Xuande was outgoing, communicative, and quite friendly
and trusting with the two dozen or so high military officers and civil officials
in Beijing and out in the field with whom he regularly worked. He issued a
well-articulated scolding and levied fines when he found that officers in the
field had been derelict in their duties.
How Xuande handled the eruptions of violence along the frontiers is
central to the story of the evolution of the Ming defense system over the long
term. But where did the frontier end? It’s clear that the eastern part of the
northern frontier ended in Liaodong (Manchuria), where it oversaw a vast
hinterland populated by Jurchen and Jurchen “wild people” (Yeren, Udiha),
loosely corralled under Ming auspices as guards, mostly situated along the
many rivers and streams of upper Manchuria. Where the other end of the
northern frontier lay seems to be a matter of choice. The Gansu Corridor is
one possibility, a place where the Ming command center at Ganzhou faced a
complex mixture of groups and ethnicities and had to protect the embassies
traveling to and from the Middle East. Or did it end at Xining in today’s
Qinghai Province, whose hinterland extended out as far as the Himalayas,
and the wider Tibetan world with which the Ming consistently sought friend-
ly ties? Or must one end it at Songpan, on the western edge of Ming China, in
the foothills of the Tibetan Massif, roughly 150 miles northwest of Chengdu
in Sichuan Province? Songpan sat in an ethnic and religious transition zone,
the religions being Tibetan Buddhism and pre-Buddhist Bön, and the eth-
nic—to use the Ming shorthand terminology—where the “Fan” (Tibetan or
Qiang or Minyag) met the “Man” and “Bo” (non-Chinese peoples of the
southwest frontiers). Songpan was reachable by Tatar raids from the north,
and in Xuande’s time it was a cockpit of violence in its own right. We will
reluctantly have to omit it for reasons of space. It deserves a detailed study of
its own.
* * *
Xuande had serious problems with the ambassadors’ highway to the greater
Middle East. An ability to protect the highway of course tested the credibility
of China’s pretensions to global hegemony. The Ming could not countenance
raids on its embassies going west, or attacks on embassies from such distant
but friendly courts as those in Himalayan Tibet, Samarkand, Herat, Shiraz, or
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 83
Isfahan. The raids occurred at some remove from China proper, where Ming
rule faded out and reliance had to be placed on non-Chinese commanders and
their armies.
Heading west, China proper ended at Suzhou and Jiayuguan at the end of
the Gansu Corridor. As the corridor widens and becomes what is now the
open expanses of Xinjiang, there were set up in early Ming times a series of
satellite guards out as far as the city of Hami (Qomul), roughly four hundred
miles to the northwest.
Bad news arrived in October 1424, just after the Hongxi emperor had
come to the throne. Fei Huan, regional commander in Gansu, reported that a
thousand or more bandits from the Anding, Quxian, Chigil, and Miluo
Guards had attacked a Ming embassy. There were casualties. The bandits
made off with horses, donkeys, oxen, and silks intended as gifts for poten-
tates in far Tibet and Nepal. The scene of the crime was somewhere in the
vicinity of Xining. Hongxi instructed Fei to notify the authorities at Chigil
and to tell Regional Military Commissioner Li Ying at Xining and Com-
mander Kang Shou at Bili (nowadays Guide County, south of Xining) to
rally Handong, Quxian, and Anding with a view to identifying who these
bandits were, along with their ethnic community (cu) or horde (buluo), and
make arrests if possible, or at least report the facts. 1
The answer came back in September 1425, under Hongxi’s son and suc-
cessor, Xuande. Li Ying, himself a Tibetan, led his Xining Guard troops plus
militia from twelve Tibetan communities to Handong, southeast of Shazhou
(nowadays Dunhuang), where he was told that the raiders were from Anding
and Quxian. So Li Ying advanced on those places. The Anding bandits
scattered west toward the Kunlun Mountains, where Li killed 480 of them,
capturing 700 and rounding up 140,000 head of livestock. The Quxian ban-
dits got wind of this and fled too far off for Li to chase them. Li thought the
king at Anding should come in person to Beijing and apologize.
Xuande noted that Anding was ethnically Uighur and that the Ming had
created a guard there and appointed native officers to gather and pacify the
people. We treated them generously, he said. But when foreigners (Yi-Di)
see profit, they forget righteousness. They brought this calamity on them-
selves. We had to suppress them, but if now they sincerely apologize, I’ll
treat them liberally. 2
This was how Xuande would manage provocations along the frontiers. He
appeared to believe that a great power needn’t overreact, that it was great
because it could afford to show lenience and generosity when offenders
apologized for their misbehavior, and perhaps also made restitution for the
plunder they’d taken.
The suppression of the Anding outlaws had aftereffects. It wasn’t a sim-
ple matter.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 384
Commissioner Liu Zhao at Xining reported later that same month that Li
Ying had identified the two leaders of the raid, one from Anding, the other
from Quxian, both still at large; he also asked Xuande’s permission to send
back to Handong militiamen from that Tibetan community who’d taken part
in Li Ying’s campaign and were now living in Xining, afraid to return for
fear of Quxian bandit leader Sanjis’s revenge. Xuande told Li to let the
Handong refugees stay where they were.
Li Ying came in person to Beijing in October and described the situation.
Xuande told him there was no need for a long campaign in pursuit of Sanjis.
Li presented Xuande with fifteen captive Anding boys, plus the horses and
camels the bandits had abandoned. (The captured oxen and sheep had been
given to the local troops earlier.) Xuande pitied the boys, who now had no
families, so he placed them in the care of one of the guards at Beijing. The
camels and horses were sent to the Directorate of the Imperial Horses. Pro-
motions, salary boosts, and lavish gifts went out to the victorious command-
ers and their men. 3
In December, an emissary from Handong stated that 1,500 common peo-
ple there had fallen into arrears providing tribute horses for Beijing and had
fled to the neighboring Chigil Guard in order to avoid the penalty. Now in the
wake of Li Ying’s victory, they wanted to return, but they were afraid to.
Xuande reacted with his usual magnanimity. He said to the minister of war
that the fugitives were violent as a people, but they could be mollified. He
ordered Regional Commander Fei Huan to accompany the Handong author-
ities and bring them back under amnesty, their horse debts canceled. 4
In November 1426, a joint embassy with tribute horses arrived from
Anding and one of the Handong Buddhist communities. They said Li Ying’s
campaign had caused panic, sending 2,400 tents and 17,300 men and women
into flight, but officers from the Xining Guard had them return, so they were
now well enough recovered to present the horses. Generous rewards went out
to the officers and to the leaders of the fugitive communities. 5
There was still trouble in the area, however. It may have been related to
Li Ying’s campaign. Kang Shou, assistant regional military commissioner at
the Bili Guard, said Fan bandits looted one of the Tibetan communities (cu).
Xuande ordered Assistant Commissioner-in-Chief Shi Zhao at Xining to join
Li Ying in suppressing them. Shi Zhao had stated that the bandits were a very
big gang from Xining, Hezhou, and Bili. Xuande cautioned Shi and the
others not to overdo it and provoke a general uprising of Fan. 6
There were other molestations of tributary convoys. Tatar outlaws from
Shazhou killed and wounded Ili-balik envoys and made off with a hundred
horses. Then they descended on a mission from Samarkand and stole bag-
gage, horses, and donkeys. This bad news was relayed up to Xuande. In late
January 1427, he ordered Fei Huan to go after them. He did so, but he died
not long afterward. 7
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 85
In December 1427, the vice military commissioner at Xining reported that
he’d called back forty-two thousand tents of Quxian fugitives, who’d fled in
fear they’d be blamed for Sanjis’s crimes. The assistant commander who led
the group sent tribute of camels and horses to Beijing. Xuande accepted their
apology. 8
In January 1431, Shi Zhao updated Xuande on the Quxian situation. He
said the main leader of the marauders, Sanjis, was still at large, but he’d
captured his lieutenant, Dada Bukha, along with three hundred men and
women and 320,000 horses and livestock. The emperor was pleased. In
March, Shi himself delivered Dada Bukha in shackles to Beijing. Xuande
had Dada Bukha put in the prison of the Embroidered-Uniform Guards. His
fate is not known. 9
Shi Zhao brought three further complications to Xuande’s attention. Offi-
cers and common people from the Aduan Guard—which was a Tatar (Da-
dan) and Uighur group inhabiting a large territory west of Handong and
south of Shazhou—were still living among the Quxian outlaws, afraid to
return because they’d taken part in the attack on the embassy. Xuande au-
thorized Shi to send people to “soothe and instruct” them and call them
back. 10 Shi described a similar situation regarding a subgroup from Quxian
whose people had also joined Sanjis and had since fled into the territory of
the Bili Guard, where they sat on the envoys’ highway to and from Tibet and
might conceivably start trouble. Xuande said they were just a remnant horde
in desperate circumstances, not worth bothering about. Send someone to
forgive their crimes and have them all go home. Third, Shi said that before
Assistant Commander Sengge at Anding had joined Handong in the cam-
paign on Quxian, the Banna community (cu) in Handong had led a major
looting of Anding families, including Sengge’s, and they still held all the
animals they’d stolen. Shi said he had visited Banna and learned they were a
semi-independent group, and he asked Xuande to authorize a recovery of all
the plundered animals they were holding. Xuande complied. He told the
Banna chiefs that if they returned all the livestock and the families they’d
abducted to Anding, he’d pardon their crime, and if they didn’t, he’d sup-
press them. 11
The people of these small, autonomous polities on and beyond the bounds
of China proper never give us their own story. Everything we know of them
comes through a Chinese filter. And the Ming officials, to whose testimony
we’re beholden, weren’t anthropologists. Their concern was national secur-
ity, and they used a bureaucratic shorthand whenever they discussed these
non-Chinese groups. The Banna story gives but a hint of the real-world
complexities. What was it that made them a separate group? What language
did they speak? Anding was probably mostly Uighur in ethnic composition
and Buddhist in religion, but what of the Banna? Were there other such
subgroups in Anding? It’s a mystery. It’s a safe bet, however, that the Ming
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 386
border commanders knew much more about these non-Chinese guards than
they conveyed in their memorials to the throne.
In the late spring of 1431 came the news Beijing had long been waiting
for. The Quxian Guard vice commander Sanjis, almost seven years after
leading the notorious raid on the Ming embassy to Tibet, sent his younger
brother, Vice Battalion Commander Jiandu, and three others with tribute
horses and an apology in hopes the gesture would atone for his crime. It did.
It was noted that Sanjis was in effect the founder of the Quxian Guard,
having come to Beijing back in the Yongle era, receiving the necessary
authorization, and having been treated very generously. Xuande remarked to
the minister of war that small emoluments were enough to bring “distant Yi”
to heel and that we should let them go and not quibble with them. Sanjis was
forgiven, hostages were returned, and gifts of silk cloth were given out to his
embassy. 12
That was not quite the end of it all. A complaint came up from a battalion
commander of the Ganzhou Right Guard that he and his men had been out on
reconnaissance when the merit awards were given out for the Quxian cam-
paign, and so they were wrongly omitted from the list. And some small men
got rewards they didn’t deserve. Those left out were very upset. Xuande
knew rewards had to be done right; he ordered the regional commander to
verify the claim. 13
In January 1432, the Gansu regional commander Liu Guang relayed a
plea from Kunjilai, commander at Shazhou, that he needed famine relief, and
he asked permission to wall the town because he feared Fan raids from
Handong. Xuande wasn’t moved in the least. “Kunjilai lives in Shazhou and
raises herds for subsistence,” he said. “And if he’s been kind to his neigh-
bors, why should he fear an attack? Why instead does he put a burden on
China?” Xuande told Liu to tell Kunjilai that due to a poor harvest, we can’t
spare him any relief grain; and as for the wall, he should wait for a good
harvest year and then raise the matter again. 14
Rewards continued to be an issue. In February 1432, Assistant Commis-
sioner-in-Chief Shi Zhao went to bat for one Goto Bukha, vice commander at
Anding. Arguing that he’d been an effective guide during the campaign on
Quxian, that he’d taken captives, and that he’d called on the foe to surrender,
but since he’d only cut off one head, his merits had been discounted. The
minister of war didn’t think he deserved anything, but Xuande disagreed.
There was a precedent in Han history, he said. He praised Goto Bukha and
promoted him to full commander at Anding. 15
Shi Zhao endorsed another overlooked case relating to the Quxian cam-
paign. This one centered on a certain vice commander at Aduan named (in
Chinese transcription) Zhenjihan. His father had been an assistant command-
er at Aduan and had been forced to join Sanjis in his raid on the Ming
embassy. He fled in the face of the retaliatory army and lost his seal. The
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 87
Ming commanders knew he’d been coerced and sent someone to grant him
amnesty. Then at some point he died. His son Zhenjihan then led his people
back to their original homes at a place called (in Chinese transcription)
Tiergu. Here things got a bit complicated. Zhenjihan himself came with
tribute to Beijing in February 1432 and explained that Tiergu was a month’s
journey from the “old city” of Aduan, in Muslim (Huihui) territory, making it
hard for him to send tribute, apparently because he had to go by way of the
“old city.” So he asked to be allowed his own land at Tiergu. It appears as
though Aduan consisted of a settled population of Muslims in the “old city”
and a population of non-Muslims tending herds in the general vicinity.
Xuande accommodated him. He appointed him vice commander, issued him
a new seal, and made him a manager at the Aduan Guard, apparently denying
him full independence at Tiergu. 16
But for all the difficulties and complications, the northwestern frontier in
the Xuande era was on the whole peaceful. Early in 1432, Xuande sent out a
eunuch-led mission to Herat and other cities of the Western Regions with the
announcement that security threats to the ambassadors’ highway had been
eliminated and the road was now open, with promises from Hami, Shazhou,
and Chigil to provide military escorts. In his message, Xuande said the Ming
welcome mat was out, and he emphasized how important tributary relation-
ships were to the peace of the world. 17
So surely that marked the end of the Quxian troubles. But it didn’t. There
were loose ends still. Li Ying (since made an earl) put in a word for a Tibetan
Buddhist monk who’d taken a meritorious part in the Quxian campaign.
Xuande was pleased to reward him with silver, paper cash, colored silk, and a
promotion in the church hierarchy. 18
Nor was all well on the ambassadors’ highway. Already in May 1432,
Herat envoys, having finally made it to Beijing, complained that at Shazhou
a high-ranking officer from the Chigil Guard had robbed them and killed
some members of the delegation. The Ministry of War said that a Chigil
officer had no business being in Shazhou and that his going there in order to
rob was an unforgivable crime. Xuande gave his by now expected reply.
These are all non-Chinese involved here, and their claims must be verified. If
the officer (Geguzhe, in Chinese transcription) really did that, chase him
back but pardon his crime. Tell Kunjilai, the leading officer at Shazhou, not
to let them in again if indeed Geguzhe and his men were robbers. Drive them
back to their own domain with a warning. 19
In August 1432, the new commander at Quxian, Nanahan, gave notice
that when the troops from Anding came to suppress Sanjis, they abducted his
own two daughters and his four brothers, plus Commander Sangge, the fami-
ly of the lama registrar, and five hundred other people. Sanjis has been
pardoned and is living peacefully, but my abducted family members have
never returned. A battalion commander of ours fled to Fan territory, and he
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Chapter 388
hasn’t returned either. Xuande was solicitous for the missing people. “War
always harms the innocent,” he said. “Had [Nanahan] not spoken up, I’d
have known nothing about this.” He sent an order to the king at Anding and
his officers that they must launch a search for these captives and send them
back at once. And he told Nanahan to send his own people to Fan territory to
hunt for the missing battalion commander. 20
Security for Ming envoys traveling to and from Tibet was a vexing prob-
lem. The Handong Guard, populated largely by Tibetan ethnics, had been set
up explicitly to provide this protection, yet it was a Fan bandit from Handong
who had descended upon a Ming mission to Tibet. “The guards at Xining and
Handong were created by the Ming, and we put officers in charge of them,”
remarked Xuande, “but these types have a wild nature that doesn’t conform
[to our expectations]. When they see profit, they jump to seize it. That can’t
be tolerated.” He ordered Regional Commander Liu Guang to probe the
crime thoroughly and make arrests. “Don’t let our national dignity [guoti]
suffer humiliation,” he said. 21
There was more highway trouble in 1434. At Shazhou, Kunjilai com-
plained that he’d been raided for people and livestock by Tatars and Tibetans
from the Handong Guard. They block the roads. We can’t live in peace. He
asked permission to move his people to “the old city of Chaghan.” Like a
kindly schoolmaster, Xuande talked him out of it. “You’ve been loyal to us a
long time, and we have treated you generously,” he is reported as saying.
“You’ve been in Shazhou thirty years, your population has grown, and your
farming and herding prosper, thanks to our court. Years ago, Hami com-
plained that your people raided their territory, so you brought your present
distress on yourself. Moving elsewhere will do you no good.” He ordered the
Tatars and Fan at Handong to return all the people and livestock they’d taken
from Shazhou. 22
But soon there was another eruption. A memorial came up from Liu
Guang, regional commander at Gansu, that he’d gotten the Fan bandit Zhar-
jia of the cu of Nancuo in Handong to confess that he’d killed and wounded
Ming envoys and that he had indeed taken the imperial diplomatic letter plus
the gift silks the caravan was taking to parts west. What had happened was
that earlier on, when this outrage was reported, Xuande ordered Liu Guang
and Commissioner-in-Chief Liu Zhao to go suppress the raiders. The two
commanders calculated that Zharjia was likely to flee, and if we go on a long
chase and don’t get him, our prestige among the outsiders (Yi) will plummet.
So they sent an officer named Qi Xian with a hundred light cavalry and a
native guide from a different Handong cu to go find the bandits. It took them
a month to locate Zharjia out in the mountains and negotiate a surrender.
Zharjia explained that his hatred had been directed at Anding and that his
raid on the caravan had been a mistake. He returned the stolen letter along
with the other goods and offered to atone by sending a horse tribute mission
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 89
to Beijing. When told about all this, Xuande decided not to prosecute, despite
Zharjia’s obvious lie. He was in distress; he gave up, and that was enough. 23
There was a small matter of a slave trade involving Chinese children.
Xuande reminded Liu Guang that foreign envoys from Samarkand or else-
where were forbidden to take adults or children out of China for sale. 24
So the serene picture of peace on earth that Xuande was fond of trumpet-
ing is hard to credit except in the broadest sense that out in the northwest the
difficulties weren’t beyond the capacity of the Ming state to manage in one
way or another. Given all the violence at Songpan and the constant security
breakdowns along the roads to Tibet and the Middle East, it seems beyond
question that even during a time of relative peace, from 1409 or so to 1449
and the Tumu debacle, frontier defense was an exhausting thing to maintain.
* * *
What of the steppes of Mongolia? The Xuande era, 1425–35, found the
steppes suffering internecine war and economic hardship, probably climate
induced. 25 Recall that the Tatars were in three main groups: Oirats to the
northwest, ex-Yuan Chinggisids in the center, and Uriyangkhad to the north-
east. Rumors abounded of raids; Ming defenses directly to the north were
constantly being reconfigured and enhanced, taking advantage of the relative
quiet, as Xuande said; and as Xuande urged over and over, not for a moment
could vigilance relax. Defending officers had to be on the alert at all times,
day and night.
Xuande sat at the summit of a highly centralized political-military ma-
chine, interested in and making all kinds of decisions about the smallest
details of frontier defense, and nowhere was this more evident than in his
involvement in those parts of the frontier nearest Beijing, directly to the
north, mainly at Datong and Xuanfu, where China looked out upon the vast
steppes of Mongolia.
One of Xuande’s earliest transactions with the steppe world went well.
Fifty-four Oirats came down with their families in 1425 and offered to sur-
render to the Ming. Accompanying them was the widow of khan Bunyashiri,
whom the Oirats had killed twelve years earlier. Xuande followed the prece-
dents set by Taizu and Yongle in cases like these, which was to welcome all
refugees from the steppes and provide them at government expense with silk,
paper cash, silver, saddle horses, housing, furnishings, oxen, sheep (and pas-
ture), and a monthly issue of fuel and rice. Salaried military appointments
were made. Ming treatment of onetime Yuan royalty was always especially
respectful and generous, so the widow and her mother were given a fine
mansion in the capital and a generous five piculs of rice monthly. 26
It was also Ming policy, never articulated as such, to militarize the fron-
tier, moving the civilian population into the interior, and also to lighten
expenses by abandoning the guards and battalions that were felt to be too far
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 390
off in the steppes and thus too hard to supply and defend—Dongsheng,
Xinghe, and even the flourishing city of Daning. In 1426, Regional Com-
mander Xue Lu, a onetime common soldier from north China who’d won his
spurs in the wars that brought Yongle to the throne, argued in a memorial
(probably written by a secretary, as many military officers were illiterate)
that it had become too hard to maintain Kaiping as a principal outpost. 27
Kaiping was the old Yuan summer capital of Shangdu, destroyed by Red
Turban rebels in 1358. Xue thought the Kaiping Guard should be moved to
Dushi, about seventy-five miles southwest. Xuande wasn’t sure it was a good
idea to do that. He ordered the Ministry of War to give the matter some
thought. 28 In the end, the Kaiping Guard headquarters were moved even
farther south to Xuanfu, leaving only a small contingent at Kaiping itself.
In order perhaps to deter corruption in the supply chain, the emperor
himself was often petitioned to allow the issuance of military gear. Thus late
in October 1426, Lü Xin, vice commander at Yongning, an inner defense
citadel fifty miles north of Beijing, complained that he had to supervise
troops at forty-seven gaps high up in the mountains, where it grows very
cold, and the troops need fur coats and fox hats. Xuande said he knew about
the bitter cold, and he ordered the Ministry of Works to rush a delivery of
leather coats up to Yongning. 29 A few weeks later, Tang Ming, regional
military commissioner at Kaiping, said the soldiers there and at Shanhaiguan
were all in rags and asked for help. Xuande replied that he knew border
troops had to be cared for, and so he authorized the issue of shoes and padded
coats and trousers. Tang followed with a plea that the men’s helmets, body
armor, bows, swords, metal drums, and banners were all in bad shape and
should be replaced. Xuande explained to the Ministry of Works that Tatars
could easily see what things were like at Kaiping, and shiny new equipment
was vital both to troop morale as well as to making an impression of strength
to the adversary. He ordered that this and all other such requests must be
met. 30
It would tax the reader’s patience to continue in this vein. Let’s just say
that supplying the frontiers with adequate gear, grain, horses, gunpowder,
weapons, and manpower was not something automatic that could easily be
done by the book. In later years, the rulers in Beijing farmed out these tasks
to lower levels. But early in Ming, supply constantly required the endorse-
ment of the highest authorities. Xuande often had to remind everyone that
frontier soldiers were China’s fence against invasion and ruin, that their
service was a bitter hardship, and that we must all be grateful to them and
support them for the crucial job they do.
Kaiping, defended by a thousand men who rotated in and out twice a year
while their families stayed back in Dushi (north of Xuanfu), suffered a Tatar
raid in August 1427. Kaiping was walled by now, so the raiders got nothing
and withdrew. Marquis Xue Lu and Wu Cheng, his vice commander, interro-
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 91
gated three of the raiders, who said their main crowd was at a place called
“Four Arrows” (Dörben Niruu), a hundred miles off. Ignoring long-standing
Ming policy against deep chases into the steppes, Xue Lu led a cavalry unit
in pursuit. Hiding by day and riding by night, they reached the Tatar camp
after three days and in a surprise raid killed dozens and captured twelve men,
including their two chief leaders. Then they headed back to China, with 64
males and females, 817 horses, and 4,000 oxen and sheep in tow. It looked
like a big win and a prestige builder for China, but Ming propaganda made
little of it. 31
But then Xuande himself got into an aggressive mood. In October 1427,
he announced to his commanders at Datong on the Shanxi border that recent-
ly people had come down from among the Lu and reported that the Tatar
bandits were gathered like a swarm of bees on the Kerulen River, getting
ready for what looked like an invasion of China. There were also reports of
campfires northwest of Datong, perhaps a decoy; we’re not sure what it
portends. Xuande demanded full-scale preparedness and promised that he
would personally lead a campaign to exterminate the enemy. 32 Nothing came
of it; perhaps it was a false alarm.
In February 1428, word came that the Uriyangkhad were grazing their
animals along the Luan River, which flows from around Kaiping southeast to
the sea. They were too close for comfort. Commanders asked for permission
to attack them. Xuande ordered restraint. If they raid us, yes, fight them, but
they haven’t done that. He sent the Uriyangkhad a message: “You’ve given
your hearts to the court, you’ve given tribute, you come and go pursuing your
livelihood; and we’re like one family. That’s been the case for a long time.
Now I hear your people are near the Luan River. You pasture your horses on
both its banks. Our border generals’ suspicions have been raised, and they’re
on guard. I must urge you to restrain your people and don’t let them encroach
in the slightest. Send tribute as usual. Then your parents, wives, and children
will be safe, and you’ll enjoy the blessings of peace.” 33 Events would show
that his words made little impact on the Uriyangkhad.
Then, almost out of the blue, Xuande organized a grand march and parade
northward, with himself in personal command. “This is no mere hunting
trip,” he said to Duke Zhang Fu. “Our country (guojia) is at peace, but we
can’t forget our military and our people’s fear of Lu raids. If we defend
rightly, the Lu can do nothing. For the people’s sake, I’m using a hunting trip
to review the border situation.” The ruler noted that the tour would take less
than a month, but the weather was getting colder, and the marchers would
need to be warmly dressed. He ordered the Ministry of Revenue to supply a
month’s travel grain and three pints (dou) of dry wheat per soldier as well,
plus shoes, socks, and padded coats. Officers at posts along the route were
advised not to press people for gifts or make them repair the roads. Just make
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 392
the roads passable. I just put up a temporary bridge over the Luan River, so
the marchers can cross.
Xuande next addressed an assembly of commanders. He said they must
keep the marchers in order so that they looked to be well drilled. Make sure
they look good, with clothes and body armor fresh and bright and their
weapons sharp.
The parade departed Beijing on October 6. At the first stop, he told the
assembled commanders that the purpose of the tour was to upgrade protec-
tion for the common people, about whose safety he worried day and night.
He saw that there’d been floods and no harvest. He felt badly for the people
whose fields had been washed out. He threatened to kill any soldier who stole
anything.
At Jizhou, sixty miles east of Beijing, reached on October 9, there’d been
no floods. The ruler gazed at the flatlands, the hills, the streams, and the
harvested fields. He told an assembly of local elders they’d been fortunate,
and he advised them to teach their juniors the Confucian virtues of decorum,
righteousness, modesty, and a sense of shame.
The next day a messenger rushed up with an emergency report. Defenders
at Xifengkou, a major transit point between China and the steppes, said ten
thousand Uriyangkhad bandits had penetrated China and were on a looting
rampage. Xuande, not normally a war hawk, reacted in outrage. He called his
commanders together and said the raiders dared to do this because our de-
fenses are poor, but they’ll flee in panic when they discover I’m out here. He
decided to rush ahead of the slow-moving parade, himself leading three
thousand cavalry so as to make a surprise attack. Someone thought three
thousand too few. Xuande assured him that if skilled and obedient, three
thousand were more than enough. So at Zunhua he selected the three thou-
sand, assigned each man two horses, and issued the men ten days’ rations.
Deadly skirmishes followed. On October 14, the emperor and his horse-
men exited Xifengkou. At a place called Kuan River, some twenty-five miles
out into the steppes, in Uriyangkhad territory, which they reached at dawn,
Xuande divided his iron-armored cavalry into two wings and charged the foe.
Arrows fell like rain on the Uriyangkhad. The ruler himself took bow and
arrow and shot three of the enemy. Then the gunners killed half the enemy’s
horses. The foe was routed. Xuande led a chase. Some of the foe saw the
emperor’s yellow dragon battle flag and bowed in surrender. All were tied
up. Their people, horses, oxen, camels, sheep, and baggage all became Ming
possessions. The leaders were beheaded. Xuande ordered the hills and val-
leys searched for their main camp. 34
Accompanying Xuande’s expedition was the Zhongyong king Jin Zhong,
a Chinggis-khan descendant, formerly known as Esen Tugel. He and his
nephew volunteered to lead a unit in pursuit of the remnant Uriyangkhad. An
adviser whispered to Xuande not to allow that, because he and his nephew
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 93
might just run away. Here, then, was a chance for Xuande to demonstrate the
imperial Ming virtue of ethnic impartiality. He said the two could stay or go
as they liked. I won’t tie them up. If they do go, we won’t miss them. “Well,
then,” suggested the adviser, “maybe let one go and keep the other as a
hostage.” “No,” answered Xuande, “I treat them with sincerity. Keeping one
as a hostage will raise suspicions. We’ve fed and tamed them, so like dogs or
horses they’ll be gratefully dependent.” And indeed, Jin Zhong came back a
few days later with dozens of captives, a hundred horses, and several hun-
dred head of livestock. Xuande was delighted and ordered eunuchs to feed
him meat snacks from the imperial kitchen. He shared wine with him and
gave him the gold cups they’d drunk from. The nephew, Badai, got the same
treatment when he showed up a bit later with Uriyangkhad captives and
livestock.
The lesson in all this? Xuande preached to his entourage: “Rulers must
treat others with sincerity, and not with suspicion,” he said. “Men won’t give
their full effort if all they think about is self-protection and avoiding trouble.
If I’d listened to the advice I got, I’d have forfeited those two men’s trust.”
Someone raised the counterargument that foreigners (“outside Yi”) can’t be
trusted. Xuande replied that sometimes they can be trusted. He cited an
example from Han history. 35
In 1422, Yongle had fought these same Uriyangkhad, who at the time
were allies of Arughtai, and he inflicted a horrendous defeat upon them. And
now, in 1428, they once again suffered slaughter and capture. It’s probably a
reflection of an unstated but deliberate policy that the Three Guards (Fuyu,
Taining, and Duoyan), which in theory were responsible for controlling the
Uriyangkhad, were never mentioned in connection with the battles of 1422
and 1428. Though fickle, the guards were potentially useful as pro-Ming
tributaries and allies, and the Ming apparently did not want to see them
discredited and dismantled. The Ming victories were chastisement enough.
So the tour was over, and the units began the trek back to Beijing. On
October 18, Xuande reviewed the affair in a general edict, pulling out all the
organ stops in a crescendo of familiar grandiloquence. A paraphrase will do.
In revering Heaven and assuaging the common people, he said, there is no
difference between Chinese and foreign, between near and far. We pull
weeds for the sake of the crops, and kill snakes because they do harm. We
love the good and hate evil. In my tour of the frontier, my aim was to inspire
the troops and strengthen the defenses, but unexpectedly we came across
several myriad Hu bandits conducting a raid, so I personally led three thou-
sand cavalry and we smashed them, cutting off a myriad heads, capturing a
hundred leaders, and we seized all their people, weapons, horses, livestock,
and baggage. We removed the stench and pacified the border, and this day
I’ve withdrawn our forces.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 394
Note that he named neither the Uriyangkhad nor the Three Guards specif-
ically. The hundred miles of road from Xifengkou back to Beijing was
crowded with local people, soldiers, males, and females, watching the parade
of incoming captives, animals, and baggage that stretched for miles with
scarcely a break. Everyone leapt and danced for joy, kowtowed, and shouted
wansui! when they saw the emperor come by. Preceded and followed by yet
more commanders and their captives and livestock, everyone said this was
the greatest outcome ever of war in the steppes. 36 It surely rivaled any of
Yongle’s triumphant returns.
* * *
What were the aftereffects of the campaign for Ming-Uriyangkhad relations?
Xuande told Marquis Xue Lu, regional commander at Jizhou, who’d taken
part, that he could expect revenge raids and must be on guard day and night
all along the frontier. Later, Xue Lu failed to stop a raid on a village in his
jurisdiction, and Xuande had to remind him to be more alert. The raiders,
unnamed but surely Uriyangkhad, had carried away people, horses, and
oxen. 37
In March 1429, Jurchen neighbors of the Uriyangkhad, doing them a
friendly service as intercessors, told the Ming court that their guard officers
were living in fear for their safety. Xuande sought to calm them. “It’s the
Way of Heaven to bless good and chastise evil,” he explained, “which the
ruler of mankind effectuates with his rewards and punishments. There’s
nothing personal about it. When the Uriyangkhad are guilty, the court cam-
paigns against them. Would we deliberately harm the innocent? The guards
should rest easy, obey the law, and enjoy peace and happiness. Why fear?”
He sent the Jurchen off with gifts and a message. 38
So on April 4, the leader (toumu) of the Duoyan Guard, Oljei Temur,
came to Beijing with a tribute of horses. Xuande “appreciated his sincerity”
and forgave all his past transgressions. He appointed Oljei Temur vice com-
missioner and released his family members, who’d been captured back in
October. “Henceforth you must discipline your people,” counseled Xuande.
“Don’t raid, else you make the imperial army come out again. Enjoy eternal
peace. If you transgress again, Heaven and mankind will destroy you.” 39
In Ming global hegemony as exercised by Xuande, apologies from vil-
lainous foreigners were always welcome. No grudges, no personal sense of
unavenged victimhood, lingered in Ming ruling circles.
In March 1430, Xuande reemphasized this policy. An embassy from the
Fuyu Guard said that both Taining and Duoyan had raided the China frontier,
but we, the Fuyu, wanted no part of that and stayed away. Though you
understand that, we still fear guilt by association. Fuyu asked permission to
attack the two if they failed to reform. Xuande agreed. Did the Fuyu really
attack? It’s not clear. But the emperor’s patience was nearly unlimited.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 95
Sometimes patience is rewarded. In July 1432, Xuande sent envoys to all
three guards, praising their good behavior and sending them all gifts of gold-
weave and colored silk. 40
In March 1431, he officially informed the leaders big and small of the
Three Guards of the Uriyangkhad that even though raids had continued, their
crimes were forgiven. “You got the court’s titles and rewards, but you
couldn’t control your inferiors, who kept raiding our border,” he stated. “Our
border commanders wanted to march on you, but I didn’t allow that, as I was
afraid of harming the innocent. . . . I’ll let you punish the guilty. Send back
everything that you looted. Send us tribute horses in atonement. Reform your
ways, else when the imperial army comes, your parents, wives, and children
will all get killed, and even the insects, grass, and trees will suffer.” 41 So
Xuande’s policy here was to ascribe Uriyangkhad assaults on Ming territory
not to a hostile and deliberate decision to make war on China, but to incom-
petent management inside the Three Guards’ command hierarchies. In the
context of time and place, that was a rational path to take.
Finally, in September 1432, report came from Liaodong that the Three
Guards had made war on Arughtai and that Arughtai had beaten them and
had proceeded to seize their baggage, oxen, horses, and field crops as well as
their families. Refugees fled east to Jurchen territory. Other Uriyangkhad
stayed put. Some of the refugees said that those who stayed behind had
readied their defenses. This was confusing. Xuande gave the news little
credit. He just told Wu Kai, the regional military commissioner at Liaodong,
to be alert for raids. In December, word came that Arughtai was again on the
march east to attack the Uriyangkhad. Xuande said it was normal for barbar-
ians (Yi-Di) to fight each other and that either or both might hit our frontiers,
and so he ordered a general alert. Some chiefs from both sides defected to
China in March 1433, and Xuande accorded them the usual generous treat-
ment. 42
It seems safe to say that Uriyangkhad strategy lacked coherence. They
were allies of Arughtai when Yongle smashed them in 1422. Then they were
enemies of the Ming when Xuande beat them in 1428. Now, four years after
that, they turned against Arughtai and suffered yet more thrashing. Future
events will show that the Three Guards’ loyalties will continue to waver,
being mostly pro-Ming, but sometimes not. Better from the Ming point of
view to have them as fair-weather friends rather than as permanent enemies.
* * *
Mongolia bulked largest in Ming strategic concerns. It was close to Beijing,
and it was where the Mongol conquerors had once come from. The latter-day
Tatars of Mongolia, descendants of Chinggis-khan and the commanders as-
sociated with him, leaders like Arughtai, took such a pounding at the hands
of Yongle that Arughtai had to downshift from a proud foe of the Ming to a
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 396
humbled tributary, no longer an appointee of the Chinggisid khan’s, but a
recipient of the title “king of Hening” from the Ming. In western Mongolia,
the Oirats were also Ming tributaries, and it can be argued that this was just
how the Ming ideally wanted things arranged in the steppes. As between the
Tatars and the Oirats, Xuande favored neither side but sought peaceful rela-
tions with both, and of that policy the result was a decade of relative calm
and quiet along the China-Mongolia frontier.
In order to see how diplomacy and defense intertwined under Xuande, we
need to follow (as usual) the Ming Veritable Records (shilu) and watch
developments as they unfold.
Early on, an issue arose about just where the Ming northern defense line
should be placed. There was a tendency in the Xuande era to pull back:
witness the retreat from Vietnam and the cancellation of the Zheng He voy-
ages to Southeast Asia and beyond. Remote steppe outposts were eliminated
as well. In the summer of 1426, a common soldier of the Shuozhou Guard in
northern Shanxi Province, probably an educated convict, put up a statement
that the branch military commission at Datong used to have ten frontier
guards under it, but they were pulled back from the far edge of the realm to
the interior during the reign of the Jianwen emperor, 1398–1402, and this
withdrawal gave the Lu too close an edge on China. He urged restoring those
abandoned sites. This suggestion from a lowly soldier reached Xuande him-
self. He ordered all the top military and civil officials to discuss it. Xuande
thought that now, when things were quiet, was a good time to build up
frontier defenses. But he was afraid the soldiers and their families who were
living in relative safety might not like being put back in harm’s way. A move
was later made, however, to reposition four of these guards back north. 43
These and other withdrawals of remote citadels meant that instead of
investing in expensive and vulnerable defenses, security could be obtained
by mounting offensive strikes. That was how Yongle had proceeded, and
now, during the reign of his grandson, a transition had begun, to downplay
offense and focus more on defense. Defenders needed less training than
assault forces, for one thing.
That meant moving guards that had been relocated in the south back north
to where they had once been. That was not easy to do. Xuande wanted two
such moved back to the Xuanfu area. But to suddenly uproot twenty to thirty
thousand troops and their families would unsettle them unduly. We must at
least prepare camp housing for them, best done in the fall when the alternat-
ing replacement units are moving in and out. What this meant was that
Yongle’s strategy was to place the permanent guards in the interior, where
the soldiers’ families lived, with half the soldiers rotating twice each year to
man the outer frontier defenses. Xuande’s idea was to move the families to
the frontier and make further rotations unnecessary, in effect doubling the
frontier military presence. But Xuande did the opposite in the case of Kai-
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 97
ping, due to the great difficulty of supplying so many people two hundred
miles northeast of Xuanfu. He ordered the families moved to Yunzhou fort,
seventy miles northeast of Xuanfu, with half the men to be on duty at Kai-
ping at any one time. 44
Marquis Xue Lu had a different idea. There were indeed too many people
at Kaiping, such that it was hard to get monthly supplies to them. So a walled
settlement ought to be built at Felt Hat Mountain in Dushi (north of Xuanfu);
then move the Kaiping Guard there, have the families farm and supply them-
selves, divide the troops into two thousand-man groups, and have them carry
their own rations out to Kaiping for their six-month tours of duty. That firms
the defense and eliminates shipping costs. He had more suggestions to make,
too. He said Marquis Zhang Heng had over twenty thousand defenders and
fighters at Datong, and at Xuanfu, Tan Guang had ten thousand. But the two
places are four hundred li (130 miles) apart, too far to be able to come to each
other’s aid. So mobile units should patrol the intervening territory. He also
pointed out that while the gaps through the cliffs at Xiyanghe and Ximalin
were furnished with smoke beacons, they were too remote to send fire signals
by night. Both should have three relay beacons for signaling for help. These
should be supplied with signal cannon too, with soldiers on permanent
round-the-clock watch. All the beacons are in need of repair. Zheng and
Tao’s troops should do the work. Xuande ordered high-level discussions of
all this. 45
Cold weather was coming on. In view of the likelihood of the Lu coming
south to raid, the emperor ordered a general alert. He reminded everyone that
security at the gaps and passes wasn’t just to keep raiders out. It was also
their job to keep inferior and shiftless people from exiting China to cause
trouble out in the steppes. Violators were to be shackled and sent to Beijing
for prosecution. 46
Forty marauders entered somewhere between Shanhaiguan and Jizhou in
August 1426. A Ming patrol beat them off, killed many, and took their
horses. A pleased Xuande said to the minister of war that the Lu like to hide
like rats; but if our defenses are ready, we can beat them when they come,
and when they flee, we forbear trying to win merit by chasing them. Our
policy is simply to protect our territory and give our people security. 47 Here,
as often, the ruler declined to hold the elites deep in the steppes accountable
for small-scale Lu raids on the Ming border.
One day early in his reign, Xuande expatiated on China’s experiences
with its northern tormentors back in the twelfth century. That was when, as
history had it, the Northern Song court made a Faustian bargain with the
Jurchen in hopes of regaining the sixteen northernmost prefectures long lost
to the Khitan Liao. This led to the collapse of the Northern Song and the
Jurchen occupation of all of north China. The consensus opinion was that the
alliance had been a horrible mistake. Xuande disagreed. No, he said, it
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 398
wasn’t a bad idea at all. The problem was more deeply rooted. It was political
corruption that was to blame. 48
Xuande’s relations with the centers of power in Mongolia were satisfacto-
ry, as far as China was concerned. Xuande’s dealings with Arughtai were
much more frequent than those with the Oirats, however. In December 1428,
he was exceptionally generous to Arughtai’s departing embassy, praising
Arughtai himself for his sincere “leaning toward civilization.” 49 From a foul
enemy in Yongle’s time, Arughtai somehow metamorphosed into a chas-
tened friend in Xuande’s.
Xuande’s real enemy on the frontier, as suggested by his reading of
Northern Song history, was complacency, corruption, and disobedience
among his own personnel. He warned about this in circulars to his officers.
He had the kedao (supervising secretaries and censors) tour the frontier at
intervals and report any and all malfeasances. In August 1429, a regional
inspector turned in a severe indictment of Fang Min, commander of the
Kaiping Guard. He showed cowardice in defending Chicheng, a fort about
fifty miles northeast of Xuanfu. He neglected troop training. He moved his
family south, out of harm’s way. His troops were too demoralized to do
anything but sit and watch the raiders plunder Chicheng of people and live-
stock. He should be executed. Xuande, however, refrained from doing that.
Instead, he sent Fang a copy of the charges and scolded him. Protect the
people and livestock, he demanded, so the Lu will find nothing worth raid-
ing. Set up ambushes to intercept them when they leave. You selfishly just
want to protect yourself and your family, and you let the Lu pillage freely. If
you keep acting like this, I’ll see to your execution. 50
During that same month, a eunuch in charge of firearms, leading another
eunuch and his government troops, quartered himself in a peasant’s home
near Longmen, a fort about ten miles east of Chicheng. The Lu, observant
about such things, saw that one of the eunuchs and the Longmen battalion
commander had gotten drunk. They killed both and made off with oxen and
horses. Whose fault was that? Xuande upbraided Tan Guang, regional com-
mander at Xuanfu. That eunuch was acting on his own, and you should never
have allowed that. But in light of your meritorious record, I’ll forgive you for
now. The ruler reminded all the border commanders that they were respon-
sible for controlling all eunuchs, who were not empowered to act on their
own. 51
And Tan Guang got another scolding. This time, a Ming commander,
acting on his own, had put the soldiers manning a smoke beacon to personal
service and led them out into the steppes to hunt deer, leaving the border
undefended. So the Lu came in and abducted people and livestock. Xuande
ordered the commander shackled and brought to Beijing for prosecution. He
chided Tan for lax supervision. 52
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 99
The absence of a major crisis led to relaxed attitudes and growing malfea-
sance as efforts were concentrated on building up the defenses. Thus, while a
large labor draft of soldiers was put to work building twenty-six smoke
beacons at Piantouguan on the Shanxi border, and more were assigned to
rebuild walls in the Jizhou area that had been eroded during rainstorms, a
regional military commissioner of high rank and responsibility was indicted
for shaking down merchant convoys coming and going through Shanhai-
guan. What a shame! Xuande said. He’s so old; he should have known better.
And a commander at the Xuanfu Front Guard had his men exit the frontier to
cut timber for his own benefit. Raiders killed them and took their horses.
That, said Xuande, must be prosecuted according to military law. 53
In November 1429, Tan Guang reported a Lu raid at Xuanfu that a batta-
lion commander had failed to stop. Tan himself led a chase and recovered the
abducted people and livestock, together with the marauders’ weapons. He
recommended that the failed commander be indicted. Xuande scolded Tan
for his lax oversight. You got back the loot, he said, but you didn’t kill a
single looter, so you deserve no reward. The guilty officer he ordered to be
docked two months’ salary, and death would be the penalty if he failed
again. 54
Tan could do nothing right, it seemed. He reported that on the night of
December 14, 1429, a hundred Lu attacked a post station at Diao’e, a fort
about ten miles northeast of Xuanfu. They killed and wounded our soldiers
and stole our livestock. Troops from the Huailai Guard, about thirty miles
southeast of Xuanfu, helped drive the Lu away; but Tan charged Fang Min at
the Kaiping Guard (relocated to Dushi) with failure to show up, for which he
should be prosecuted. No, thought Xuande. It all took place at night. Maybe
they weren’t ready. I’ll forgive it this time, but not the next. For this and
other failures, Tan asked to be punished. Xuande relented but threatened him
again. And now he rejected his proposal to punish Fang Min! Xuande’s barks
were worse than his bites, certainly. 55
There were in fact Lu raids all along the Shanxi-Datong-Xuanfu frontier
during the winter of 1429–30. A supervising secretary of the Office of Scruti-
ny for War sent up a lengthy statement of the conditions he’d seen along that
frontier. It wasn’t all Tan Guang’s fault that the Lu were making so many
incursions. The gaps and passes leading down from steppe country into the
Ming interior were manned by troops inadequately clothed for the winter;
each gap and pass had roughly a hundred defenders, but they were seriously
short of usable weapons; the soldiers hate their duty, and many go off into the
steppes to hunt and never come back; grain often fell short because it had to
be shipped in over very long distances; and on and on. Xuande said he’d seen
the soldiers’ hardships for himself and he’d never forgotten it. He ordered the
Ministries of Revenue, War, and Works to remedy these deficiencies at once.
At three places on the frontier, there were sick troops and no medicine for
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 3100
them. Xuande ordered the Imperial Academy of Medicine to rotate two phy-
sicians to make half-year visits to the patients. 56
Not all the news was bad. In March 1430, Marquis Xue Lu announced
that Ming troops had marched to a place called Phoenix Ridge, where they
met and killed a hundred marauders and came away with forty-six male and
female captives (Chinese, probably), plus a thousand horses and livestock.
The rewards list included an astounding number of soldiers—11,262 of them,
who got 418,230 ingots of cash, 585 bolts of silk gauze, and 12,748 bolts of
cotton cloth. 57 Victory didn’t come cheap.
The problem of long-distance grain hauling was addressed by the Minis-
try of War in a memorial of May 1430. The Kaiping Guard, relocated to
Dushi, 150 miles north of Beijing, consumed forty thousand piculs of grain
yearly. It was too much for civilians to haul as part of their service obliga-
tions. So we should build eleven evenly spaced forts, settle a thousand men at
each, and have them haul the carts; it will take them a day and a half to move
grain from one fort to the next and three days to move two thousand piculs,
so all forty thousand can be shipped over a period of sixty days. Granaries
will provide casings, and the government the cloth bags. And there were
more details, regarding donkeys and escort guards. Xuande gave the plan his
approval. 58
Taking advantage of the lull in major warfare, Xuande pressed ahead with
building up the border defenses. Tan Guang checked and found thirty-nine
gaps where raiders could enter. He suggested building forts with at least a
hundred men at each. Xuande approved. The Wanquan regional military
commission was organized and located at Xuanfu in July 1430, as sixteen
Xuanfu guards and their battalions were too many and too scattered to man-
age effectively from Beijing. A registry, judicial office, police chief, and jail
warden were soon added. 59
Intelligence capabilities were given a major boost in January 1435. Fron-
tier watchtowers and reports from refugees did not provide an adequate pic-
ture of what was going on among the Tatars miles out in the steppes. So there
began to be developed what might be styled special forces, operatives who
could undertake deep reconnaissance missions. These were called yebushou,
or scouts “not kept in at night.” This was hard and dangerous work. The
scouts had to bear exposure to the elements, rain and snow, hiding by day
and probing by night. One couldn’t ask young soldiers to do this kind of
work. It was too demanding. Volunteers were needed. Cao Jian, assistant
regional commander at Datong, said six pints (dou) of monthly salary grain
wasn’t attracting anyone. He asked that it be made one picul (shi). Xuande
agreed. Scouts had to be paid more than ordinary soldiers, he said. 60
* * *
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 101
With all this new construction, troop redeployments, and supply reorganiza-
tion in progress, Xuande announced that he was going to visit the frontier
personally again to see how things were going. He left Beijing on October
25, 1430. The soldiers were warned not to enter people’s homes and demand
things. Xuande and his entourage transited Juyongguan on October 27, where
they took part in a hunt. (Unlike Yongle, Xuande was fond of hunting.) He
sent an upbeat message to his mother, the empress dowager, that everything
was looking great. The weather was clear and warm, but it gets cold at night.
He ordered up extra clothes and shoes for the soldiers.
At Nihe (Mud River) in Xuanfu, he had an amiable talk with Tan Guang
and gave him some generous gifts. Then he announced he was going to make
a five-day trip to Ximalin, along with the troops and a small entourage.
Ximalin was a fort on the very outermost edge of Ming China, some twenty
miles northwest of Xuanfu. There he inspected the walls of the fort. He
reviewed the troops and horses, all wearing armor and bearing flags. It all
looked superb. Xuande was pleased. The next day he went on a hunt. Then he
discussed political philosophy with his entourage. “What are the best expe-
dients the ruler has for ruling the world?” he asked. Clarifying virtue and
punishing crime was the stock reply. “Yes,” said the ruler, “but we have to be
right about what it is we like and hate.” On November 6, he was back at Mud
River, and the next day he led a big battue hunt. “It’s not for the animals,” he
said. “It’s to deter the Lu from raiding when they see I’m returning to Bei-
jing.” He arrived back in the capital on November 10. It was a whirlwind
tour, taking only sixteen days. 61
* * *
An uptick in Lu raids and other activity along the frontiers was connected not
to hostility toward the Ming, but to fallout from the fighting between the two
steppe powers. People coming over to China from among the Lu said that the
Oirats, now under the leadership of Toghon, defeated Arughtai, whose men
scattered, many of them regrouping on the China frontier. Xuande thought
some of them might want to defect to us, likewise the Chinese they’d ab-
ducted; if so, they should be fed and escorted to Beijing. But some may raid,
so we must keep up our guard. 62
Indeed, defectors straggled in, in groups big and small. In June 1431,
forty-nine Lu with 258 family members, having arrived in Beijing, were
sorted into five grades by the Ministry of War and assigned military ranks
accordingly. All got caps, belts, gold-weave garments, colored silk, silver,
cash, silk gauze, and saddle horses, plus housing and furnishings. 63 Encour-
aging such defections was a Ming policy of long standing, but it would
eventually cease.
Tatar defectors reported that Arughtai, hard pressed by the Oirats, had
moved south with his family. Some at the Ming court urged an attack on him.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 3102
Xuande refused. That would not be a benevolent response to a long loyal
tributary. They’re in deep trouble, but we can’t exhaust our own resources in
an effort to help him. So Xuande sent him a token gift of helmets, armor, and
fine clothing. In July 1431, Zhang Heng, regional commander at Datong,
reported that two thousand of Arughtai’s forces were camped near Lake
Jining, not far to the north. What to do? Xuande said that if they don’t raid
us, let them alone. If they want to surrender to us, verify that, and let them
choose what they want to do—come down to Beijing, stay on the frontier and
hunt, or go back north. Don’t send spies; that will just provoke their vio-
lence. 64
More Tatar defectors came and said that Arughtai, having been defeated
by the Oirats, had heard rumors of a Ming campaign against him and was
living in fear of that possibility. Xuande told an envoy of Arughtai’s that it
would be neither benevolent nor righteous to attack an adversary in peril. He
sent Arughtai a reassuring letter to the effect that no ruler of all under Heaven
would desire to profit from someone else’s distress, that Arughtai had shown
nothing but compliance as our tributary, and that he could therefore rest in
security on our border. 65 This was the kind of diplomacy a power still confi-
dent of its global supremacy could conduct.
In November 1431, Xuande warned Zhang Heng at Datong that remnant
Lu were scattered in distress and were under no one’s command and now, in
the cold weather, they may raid us. A report from Kaiping had just come in
that five hundred Lu approached the frontier but, hearing cannon fire, went
north again. Xuande said we don’t know who these raiders are. We’d best be
on guard. Bring all the people and their animals into the forts so that if the
raiders come they’ll get nothing. 66
In keeping with his policy of treating Arughtai and the Oirats equally,
Xuande began tilting toward Arughtai after his defeat by the Oirats in order
to redress the imbalance. In February 1432, he warned Gansu regional com-
mander Liu Guang that the Oirat Shunning king Toghon was faithful in
sending us tribute, but the Lu nature is deceitful and he could well be using
the embassies for espionage purposes. We have to be on guard for that. And
Xuande began paying close attention to troop placements in the far north-
west, where the Oirats might threaten. 67
By September 1433, Ming-Oirat relations were in trouble. Some Ming
court officials wanted to detain Toghon’s envoy in light of the fact that he
was detaining three Ming envoys. Xuande said that wouldn’t be polite and
that the Oirats insisted they weren’t being detained but had stopped some-
where on the road, and so he accorded Toghon’s mission generous treatment.
He sent Toghon a message: Our nation (guojia) treats distant peoples very
generously, and you, the king, have shown sincerity to our court, and your
envoys emphasize your goodwill, but three of our envoys have gone to your
place and none have returned. Were they all blocked on the road? We haven’t
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 103
sent more envoys to report. We’re waiting for the roads to clear and the
return of the envoys. Then we’ll let you know. 68
There were other nomads besides Oirats off to the northwest. A Lu defec-
tor reported that one Jiubu, supposedly a commander of Arughtai’s, was
readying a raid. Xuande ordered an alert, and in October 1433, Jiubu raided
Liangzhou and Yongchang in Gansu. This was a thousand miles away from
the Liaodong frontier, where Arughtai was thought to be lingering. Gansu
regional commander Liu Guang chased Jiubu off and seized his camels and
horses. Xuande was pleased at the news, but he predicted these Lu would
soon strike again out of frustration. He put all of Gansu, Ningxia, and Datong
on alert. Meanwhile, Liu Guang raided Jiubu’s camp. His men beheaded
eighty Tatars, including Jiubu and his sons. He sent thirty captives off to
Beijing, where Xuande ordered them placed in the prison of the Embroi-
dered-Uniform Guards. A long list of deserving soldiers got their rewards. 69
In late January 1434, as an embassy of Arughtai’s was on the verge of
departure from Beijing, some court officials suggested that since Jiubu had
been Arughtai’s officer, so Arughtai’s envoys should be detained and an
expedition sent against Arughtai “to inquire into his crime.” Xuande
wouldn’t do that. He said seizing envoys is not how we treat distant people.
Arughtai’s commanders are scattered in disorder; they no longer cleave to
him, and he has no way of controlling what his people do far away in Gansu.
Xuande sent the envoys off with a message for the beleaguered Tatar chief-
tain:
I could have campaigned against you, but I didn’t, for fear of harming inno-
cents. You’ve been loyal, and we’ve treated you well. Recently the raid on
Liangzhou didn’t do us much harm, and the evildoers have been killed, as
Heaven imposes disaster on those who go to excess. My officials wanted to
detain your envoys, but my understanding is that either the raiders disobeyed
you, or they were so far off you didn’t know, or if you did know, you weren’t
able to restrain them. So I denied the officers’ plea. You must restore disci-
pline and keep up our good relations. I send you apparel and cash. 70
Mongolia was in distress for environmental reasons as well as war. In
February 1434, Datong said a hundred Lu with their families were nomadiz-
ing nearby. Their horses are in bad condition, and they’re divided about what
they should do. Should they be chased and captured? No, said Xuande; these
aren’t bandits. Don’t attack them; call them over. Datong regional command-
er Zhang Heng said that the northern Lu are in straits; they admire our
transforming virtue and have been coming over one after the other. They
come naked or in rags, as do the male and female Chinese escaping captivity
and slavery. We’ve had the local officials issue them clothes and send them
ahead to Beijing. But recently their numbers have so increased that we can’t
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 3104
help them. Xuande ordered the miscellaneous manufactures service at Da-
tong to give out any clothing, pants, and shoes they had in store. 71
In May 1434, Datong assistant regional commander Cao Jian stated that
Assistant Regional Military Commissioner Xu Bin had sent out scouts with
placards to “call and instruct” remnant Lu in the steppes to the northwest.
The scouts never returned. Xu Bin led forces to the abandoned guard site at
Dongsheng, atop the big loop of the Yellow River, but the Lu fled, and Xu
didn’t dare give chase for fear of violating his call-and-instruct orders. This
looked like a normal and straightforward report. But Xuande, not usually a
suspicious type, immediately spotted its dishonesty. He scolded Cao for it.
“You know very well,” he thundered, “that you were ordered to treat the Lu
families kindly if they responded, and to let them go if they declined. You
were never ordered to go out into steppe country after them. But you dis-
obeyed. You had Xu Bin leave China for half a month, nominally to put up
placards, but actually to conduct battue hunts. You lost men to the Lu. You
covered things up. You’re guilty, but I’ll keep you on the job. You’re to
blame if the troops never return.” 72
In September 1434 came news of the death of Arughtai, reportedly killed
at the hands of the Oirats. Xuande reacted as though he’d lost an old friend.
Arughtai’s followers all broke and scattered, many of them heading south.
Xuande had the Ministry of War put placards outside the frontier promising
good placement for all who wished to surrender. The ruler pitied their desti-
tution. Some of them will hide like rats, but our border defense is tight,
thankfully. He alerted commanders as far out as Gansu to accept any steppe
refugees and to watch out for Oirat king Toghon, smug after killing Arughtai;
he may come and reconnoiter our frontiers. An Oirat embassy confirmed
Arughtai’s killing. Surrendered Lu said a khan named Atai was with his
people in the steppes near Liangzhou in Gansu. Xuande said Atai seemed to
have nowhere else to go. He ordered his forces there to be ready for raids. 73
All this meant that the Ming policy of treating Oirats and Arughtai’s
people both as friendly steppe adversaries and keeping the peace that way, a
policy which seemed to work, could no longer be sustained. A vital compo-
nent of it had collapsed, leaving the Oirats in a good position to dominate the
steppes altogether. And how would that impact Ming security in the years
ahead? Not favorably.
* * *
Xuande announced his third tour of the northern frontier in October 1434.
This tour retraced the itinerary of 1430. Two days were spent hunting game.
At Huailai on October 16, the ruler called Grand Secretary Yang Shiqi to his
tent and asked him his impressions of what he’d seen on the road thus far.
Yang replied that there were many more residents than there had been in
1430. Xuande said he’d noticed this too, and he wondered how well they
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 105
were living. Yang said he’d asked at a house along the way and was told
they’d had a very big harvest. That news pleased Xuande. He then asked if
the troops had harassed anyone. Yang said he hadn’t heard of any such cases,
but close monitoring of the men was always necessary. Xuande showed some
poems he’d just written while on horseback, and he ordered Yang and the
others to take up their pens and write and enjoy some wine and snacks. On
October 25, they reached the end of the line at Ximalin. Xuande visited the
fort and reviewed the troops. It looked good, and the defenses were tighter
than in 1430.
Two days later, the ruler held a policy discussion session with his com-
manders. They told him the Lu were often to be found less than thirty miles
from there conducting battue hunts. We could go attack them at such a time.
Xuande (as expected) said no; as long as they’re not threatening the border,
leave them be. The commanders said the Lu have the hearts of wolves, and
we can’t guarantee that they won’t become a threat. Xuande replied that he’d
done this tour to check up on the defenses, not to corral the Lu. I’ve sent
messengers to soothe them. A surprise attack on them would make me un-
trustworthy. You all are being loyal to the dynasty (guo), but I must preserve
the imperial good faith. Xuande had permitted them to nomadize and hunt
that close to the frontier, and Grand Secretary Yang Rong assured him he’d
be guilty of enticement if he then launched a raid upon them. By November
3, the ruler was back in Beijing. 74
The Tatars were in bad shape, no doubt. A son of Arughtai’s, beaten and
bereft, pleaded to be allowed to surrender. Xuande pitied him and treated him
kindly. A former commander of Arughtai’s named Bata led his family and a
crowd of eighty-nine to surrender. Like most Tatar refugees, he wanted mili-
tary appointments and permission to live in Beijing. They were all given the
usual generous treatment. 75 Gansu regional commander Liu Guang updated
Xuande on the Tatar situation based on what captured Lu had told him. He
said that during March and April 1434, Oirat prince Toghto Bukha killed
Arughtai’s wife, sons, and followers and seized his animals. Arughtai and
thirteen thousand of his people moved off, but Toghon attacked and killed
him and sent his followers into flight. Arughtai’s designated successor Atai
went off with barely a hundred people. A party under one Oljei Temur
attacked the Lu, who then chased him, cut off a dozen heads, and captured
him and twenty males and females and sent them all in shackles to Beijing.
Xuande replied to Liu Guang that the Lu are desperate; of course they’ll raid.
Don’t let this small win make you complacent. Stay on alert day and night. 76
Liu Guang soon reported a Lu raid by one Dorjibal on Liangzhou, where
a chase ended in killing four, capturing four, and corralling forty horses and
camels. Xuande expressed displeasure at this news. A censor on tour cast
doubt on the veracity of Liu’s report. Even if it’s true, said Xuande, you
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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Chapter 3106
failed to foil a Lu raid. You didn’t stay alert as I asked you to do. The
marauders got in, and your failure was egregious. You must do better. 77
The victorious Oirats, meanwhile, stayed in Xuande’s good graces. Their
tributary relations continued uninterrupted. As an Oirat embassy was about
to return, Xuande had a message for Toghon: You continue your predeces-
sors’ horse tribute missions, so your sincerity is proven. We’ve been told
how you killed a hereditary antagonist in Arughtai. You say you have a jade
seal [of Yuan vintage], and you want to give it to us. But we don’t need that
to validate the dynastic transition, so keep it. Xuande sent along a gift of fifty
hemp and silk garments. 78
Liu Guang’s report of more trouble arrived in mid-January 1435. He said
three northern Lu had shown up in Ganzhou as envoys and that Dorjibal and
his crowd of three thousand were camped in the steppes three miles (ten li)
from Liangzhou; they were out of food and wanted to surrender; and they
wanted to retrieve Dorjibal’s lost nephew. Liu thought this was all a lie and
ordered a general alert. He asked what should be done about Dorjibal. The
minister of war agreed with Liu that Dorjibal wasn’t sincere and tossed the
ball back to Liu. (The Veritable Records note editorially that Dorjibal was
once a follower of Arughtai’s; that he’d received the high Yuan military title
of commissioner-in-chief; and that after Arughtai’s death at the hands of the
Oirats, he’d fled with nowhere to go and raided Liangzhou, where the Ming
captured his nephew. Xuande had pitied the nephew and spared him. Now
Dorjibal was probing us to disarm our defenses and see what the court’s
reaction might be.) It was decided that since Dorjibal had the option of
“letting his rats steal,” it would be best to try to mollify him. Liu Guang was
instructed to escort Dorjibal’s envoys back and tell him that if he would
return all the people and livestock he’d taken from Liangzhou, he’d get his
nephew back. 79
And there things stood when Xuande died on January 31, 1435, after a
short illness of some sort. He was thirty-five years old.
* * *
As for Liaodong, the northeast wing of China’s long frontier, it mirrored the
northwest in some respects. Han Chinese guard cities gave way, the farther
out you went, to non-Chinese guard cities or centers. Below the level of
guards, the Ming dealt with a plethora of ethnic communities led in the
northwest by lamas; and in the northeast, extreme fracturing characterized
hundreds of different communities called guards, inhabited by Jurchen of
various sorts and Jurchen Yeren (or Udiha), which were dealt with individu-
ally by the Ming. Both sent frequent tribute missions to Beijing, just as
though they were so many tiny foreign countries. The Ming regime, without
saying so, seems to have preferred this to dealing with large consolidated
entities. When the Manchurian guards did consolidate in the mid-seventeenth
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
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A Zenith of Peace? Xuande, r. 1426–35 107
century, the power that was generated became the Qing dynasty, which, as
we all know, went on to conquer all of China and more.
In Xuande’s time, Liaodong was fairly quiet. A regional commander by
the name of Wu Kai managed the area from 1425 until he died in 1439—a
long-term posting characteristic of China in the early Ming years. The in-
tense hostility between Taizu and Korea, as each advanced conflicting claims
to Manchurian territory, dissipated; Korea backed off, and tributary relations
between Yongle and Xuande with Korea were smooth.
But how does one explain the subsequent Ming drive to dominate all
Manchuria out as far as the Amur River? Was it mindless expansionism?
Curiosity? A sense of global supremacy? A desire for trade? Yongle sent out
probes to nearly every state in the eastern hemisphere. The Jurchen eunuch
Isiha, acting in Ming service, led some half dozen missions out to the far
edge of Manchuria over the years 1411–32. He set up a Buddhist temple and
the Nurgan regional military commission at a site very near present-day
Komsomol’sk na Amure (Nikolaevsk), some two hundred miles from where
the Amur empties into the Sea of Okhotsk—1,000 miles northeast of Liao-
yang and 1,400 miles from Beijing. This activity being eunuch led meant it
was a palace operation, bypassing discussion by the high officials and avoid-
ing any public declaration of purpose.
However, two multilingual inscriptions, dated 1413 and 1432, celebrate
the building and later the rebuilding of the Buddhist temple Yongningsi and
throw some light on what Yongle and Xuande had in mind.
The first attests to the grandeur of Heaven, earth, and the sagely virtue of
the ruler, who brings joy to those near and overawes those who are distant,
and whose bountiful beneficence extends to everyone. The text reads,
In the fifty years since the Ming finding, foreign peoples streaming in from
everywhere have come to offer tribute. But the state (guo) of Nurgan lies at an
immense distance. People called Jiliemi and Yeren live intermixed. They’d
heard of us but couldn’t reach us. And they don’t grow grain or cotton, and
raise dogs only. Some [hunt with falcons? The text is broken]. Others fish.
They eat flesh and wear skins. They’re good archers. I, the ruler, understood
they were peaceful but desperately poor. So I sent eunuch Isiha at the head of a
thousand troops and twenty-five big boats and set up the commission. The
people all rejoiced, recalling how well they’d fared centuries ago under the
Liao and Jin. We distributed offices, seals, and clothing, and set up guards and
battalions to bring the people under control. On the route from Haixi to Nur-
gan, the expedition gave out men’s and women’s clothing plus utensils and
grain, set out banquets, and made everyone happy. No one rejected us. The
ruler paid gold and silver for a site to build a Buddhist temple as a means to
soften the people, so they know they should revere and obey [text broken]. The
people rejoiced at the blessings this temple will bring them. No more disease,
famine, or cold.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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Chapter 3108
A listing of all the names of some fifty-four officers involved followed.
The names of the artisans were listed as well: three calligraphers, the engrav-
er, three chief carpenters, two sculptors, two or more artisans in lacquer, the
brick and tile maker, and two plasterers. (More are listed, but the inscription
is too weathered to read.)
The later expedition, with two thousand troops in fifty boats, led by Isiha
and six other palace eunuchs, reached Nurgan in 1433. They found the Yong-
ningsi in ruins and the statue of the Bodhisattva Guanyin smashed to bits.
Blame was laid on the Jiliemi people, who now trembled in fear of Ming
retaliation. Instead, acting on Xuande’s policy of leniency, Isiha not only
granted them a pardon but laid out a banquet and doled out gifts of cloth. The
temple was rebuilt, a new statue of Guanyin was installed, and a new stela
was put up, this time adding a text in Tibetan as well as Chinese, Mongolian,
and Jurchen. Again, all the people rejoiced. All the officials’ names were
listed, as well as those of two artists, a carpenter, two stonemasons, the
plasterer, and one or more ironsmiths. Again the inscription dwelled on Ming
altruism and beneficence and the joyous submission of the natives. Nothing
was said of security. But Nurgan was not a cockpit of violence, as Songpan
was for example. Except for the chance survival of the stelae, we’d know
nothing of any of this. 80
* * *
After Xuande died, an era that began in 1368 gradually faded away. It was an
era suffused with a deep belief that China was the world’s one superpower
and absolute moral center. After Xuande, no ruler ventured to articulate that
belief as those three did. And no ruler after Xuande could make a credible
claim to an ability to lead people and armies out in the field, beyond the walls
of the palace. The whole Ming approach to the steppe world and the issue of
national security underwent a shift. Ming China spoke less and less by letter
directly to the steppe rulers. It took in fewer and fewer steppe refugees. It
gradually ceased entertaining huge embassies in Beijing. It sent fewer envoys
to the rulers in their encampments in the steppes. The rhetoric of benevo-
lence, compassion, and fair dealing, words saying that the world was one
family under an emperor acting in Heaven’s behalf—all of that fades from
the record. Slowly, what came to replace that worldview was something
closer to a Han Chinese nationalism, a posture of fortress China pitting itself
against the world.
Dardess, John W.. More Than the Great Wall : The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368–1644, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsc/detail.action?docID=5965185.
Created from ucsc on 2021-03-26 15:42:19.
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