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Moral Personality and Moral Identity
Assignment

OVERVIEW

You will summarize the assigned readings and devise a lesson plan in the context of higher
education. Teaching skills are essential in academia. Reading for comprehension is one thing,
and reading for the purpose of teaching is another. You will be given opportunities to read for the
purpose of teaching in the context of higher education while thinking about and devising plans
for how to deliver of the content of the readings.

INSTRUCTIONS

Details:

Read

Chapter 23-25

1. While completing the assigned readings for the Module: Week, think about which topic
to cover in your lecture for college students. State your topic and come up 3-4 objectives.
The first heading in the paper should be “Topic and Objectives.” When listing objectives,
start with “After this lecture, students will be able to…”

2. The second heading should be “Summary of the Lecture Content.” Citing the assigned
readings (with pages as necessary), summarize the content to be delivered in class. Your
summary should be at least 2 pages, double-spaced. Do not go over 3 pages. The goal is
not to discuss all of the details to be discussed in class but to summarize the lecture
content noting the most important concepts in a coherent manner (showing their
connections to the overall topic and objectives).

3. Provide a 2-page, double-spaced, lesson plan for an hour-long lecture on the chosen
topic. You can be creative here, but provide an outline of the lecture followed by concrete
in-class activity/discussion ideas.

Further instructions:

1. This assignment is for your future teaching opportunities, so think concretely about your
teaching context as a doctoral-level instructor and make it as useful for you as possible.

2. Use current APA format with appropriate citations and headings as well as a reference
page, but do not include the title and abstract.

Please see the Summary and Lesson Plan page under the Summary and Lesson Plan
Resources for a link to Bloom’s Taxonomy information to consider as your write your
objectives.

Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.

Please Use these chapters as a outline for the lesson plan each chapter need to be used

CH. 23

Wherein is the motivation to be moral? What instigates, develops, and sustains morally
appropriate behavior? This core question has been a recurring conundrum and challenge
for the field of moral development, and we seem to have come up short on a satisfactory
response. The issue has broad implications: for conceptualization of the breadth and
complexity of the moral domain, for the viability of explanatory constructs for moral
functioning, and for efforts to implement effective interventions. So the question of moral
motivation is a fundamental and pressing concern.
Explanatory notions of moral motivation that dominate the contemporary study of
moral development have not been fully adequate to the task. For example, the general
notion of self-denying prosociality and empathy (as advanced by Eisenberg, 2005, and
Hoffman, 2000, for example) implies that there is no moral value in pursuing personal
goals; indeed, self-interest must somehow be suppressed in favor of the interests of others.
Similarly, the notion of principled moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981) requires that we
universalize our judgments and abstract ourselves from our interests in a situation. And the
conceptualization of social understanding advanced by the social domain approach (Nucci,
2001; Turiel, 1998) separates moral obligations from personal and prudential interests.
The empirical problem of these approaches to moral motivation is the recurring evidence
of a relatively weak relation between such constructs and moral action (Blasi, 1980;
Krebs & Denton, 2005; Walker, 2004). The conceptual problem of these approaches, argued
by Campbell and Christopher (1996) as well, is that they require one to act from
obligation and against one’s personal inclinations, which essentially eliminates the motivation

to be moral. The fundamental flaw is their contention that morality should not be
self-regarding. These approaches reflect the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment Era
with its dualistic conception of human nature that pitted reason against passion and with
its narrow (formalist) definition of morality that excluded a broader consideration of the
self or personality (with which a eudaimonic, Aristotelian perspective might be more
compatible). The moral agent is left disembodied and enervated by these models.
Flanagan’s (1991, 2009) philosophical analysis is discerning in this regard. He advances
twin arguments: The first is that personal interests, projects, and commitments impart
aspects of moral development were the center of considerable conceptual and empirical
attention. His moral self model posits the self as the central explanatory concept of moral
development, with three constructs, in particular, being primary in understanding individuals’
organization of self-relevant information.
First, Blasi argued for the centrality of morality for one’s sense of self (moral self-identity).
In contrast to Erikson’s (1968) view, Blasi held that identity could be constructed around
issues other than occupational choice and political orientation; in particular, identity
could also be framed by moral concerns, the extent to which would help inform moral
motivation. In other words, the centrality of morality in identity can be construed as an
individual difference variable. As we shall see, it is this aspect of Blasi’s self model that has
sparked the most empirical attention.
Second, Blasi emphasized the motivational dynamism of psychological self-consistency. As
with theories in many domains of psychology, Blasi’s model holds that individuals tend toward
internal self-organization and coherence. Thus, moral agents are motivated to reduce
inconsistency among various cognitions and also between thought and action, at least
in their awareness. And, as Bandura (2002) has illustrated, often-unconscious processes
of moral disengagement (such as cognitive reconstruals and deflection of responsibility)
function corruptively to bolster this sense of moral self-consistency.
Third, Blasi’s self model includes judgments of personal responsibility; such judgments
implicate
the self in action. In other words, it is not sufficient to merely decide what is morally
good in a situation; a judgment also has to be made regarding the extent to which
what is morally good is also strictly required for the self. This judgment of personal
responsibility
extends moral self-identity to concrete action.
Blasi (1993) helpfully summarized the essence of his model as follows:
Moral understanding more reliably gives rise to moral action if it is translated into a
judgment of personal responsibility; moral responsibility is the result of integrating
morality in one’s identity or sense of self; from moral identity derives a psychological
need to make one’s actions consistent with one’s ideals. (p. 99)
Note that Blasi (2004) retained in his model a role for the motivational power of moral
knowledge and reason, and he argued that someone who knows moral norms but who
does not regard them as requiring adherence for their own sake does not really understand
morality. In this sense, Blasi gave attention to both the content of identity (i.e., specific
moral values and ideals) and to the subjective experience of identity.

Blasi (2005) provided further theoretical elaboration of his model with a somewhat
more characterological twist in specifying various virtues that are critical for the functioning
of a moral self-identity. For example, willpower (the capacity for self-control and
self-regulation) helps to facilitate moral concerns by putting them into action. But note
that willpower is morally neutral in that it can just as well serve nefarious as worthy
ends. A second virtue that Blasi posits is integrity of identity, which entails concern for
the unity of the self and ensures that behaviors are consistent with one’s moral identity.
Again, this virtue is morally neutral because its moral significance depends on the particular
values and commitments that one’s identity may entail. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, Blasi contends that moral desires form the essence of moral character, a term

CH.24

Morality, in its essence, requires agents whose needs and desires are embedded in social
relationships, social institutions, and social groups. Without agents reflectively pursuing goals
while aware that others are similarly motivated, there can be machines in motion but no
morality (Flanagan, 1991). Relationships, communities, and cultures, therefore, make up
the moral space in which life is lived because social life provides the meanings necessary
for moral decisions (Taylor, 1989). In this chapter, we focus on the intersections of identity,
community, and development, and weave together research that illuminates the development
of each. In previous works, we have explored identity, development, and morality
(e.g., Hart, 2005). However, in this chapter we add a focus on moral identity development
in the context of community. While there are many conceptions of community, our focus
is sociological with an emphasis on common expectations, values, and beliefs that people
share and that influence their identity and selfhood (Smith, 2001).

Moral Philosophy and Community

Over the last 50 years, moral and political philosophies have explored the importance of
community as it has been conceived in various ways for understanding ethical life. Much
of this work can be understood as both a reaction and complement to a liberal philosophy
positing universal principles of justice. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1992) is arguably the
twentieth century’s most important exemplar of an exploration of moral universals. In this
work, Rawls described how rational individuals, mindful of their own needs and desires
and aware that others have broadly similar constitutions, could engage in reflective discussion
to identify just social practices.

While Rawls’s argument was and continues to be enormously influential, many scholars
have suggested that Rawls’s conclusions are undermined by a failure to appreciate the extent
to which different communities of individuals fundamentally differ both in their constitutions
of self and in their moral outlooks. Some of these critical scholars can be labeled

as communitarian (e.g., MacIntyre, 1984; Taylor, 1989). Communitarians share the beliefs
that: (a) social life varies substantially from one social group to another, and (b) social and
cultural practices thoroughly infuse the self (Bell, 2009). Consequently, communitarians
would argue that honest, moral deliberation among individuals from different communities
may not converge toward agreement on what constitutes just moral practices because
those involved in the discussion may have substantially and irreconcilably different notions
of what needs and desires of self must be elevated and protected in moral life.
Moral communities have sets of shared norms that guide members’ behavior (Haidt,
2007). Haidt argues, from an evolutionary perspective, that these shared norms allow
communities to survive and prosper or, to use his words, “bind and build” (p. 1000). Individual
conduct is shaped by these norms as a result of people forming their identities vis-à-vis
the collective (Appiah, 2005). In the case of moral norms, ethical obligations to act are
internal to the self as a member of the collective. Collective-based identities can influence
one’s interpretation and crafting of his or her sense of self, the life projects one pursues,
and the meaning of one’s actions. The consequence is that communities can shape moral
life by outlining moral responsibilities that are integrated into identities.
Community norms change over time. Appiah (2010) chronicles how historical changes
in community norms, particularly those that affect one’s sense of honor, lead to moral
transformations within societies. Honor, Appiah argues, arises from aligning one’s behavior
and identity with the moral norms and standards of one’s community. By meeting
these standards, one garners respect from others and gains pride in oneself. Failure to meet
these standards contrastingly elicits contempt from others and produces shame toward
oneself. We return to these ideas later in the chapter.
As reflected in recent trends in moral philosophy, we believe a deeper focus on the connection
between communities and moral development is warranted. Yet the psychological
literature on moral identity development has underemphasized the role that community
has on the emergence of moral identity (see Hardy & Carlo, 2011). This is somewhat surprising
given the historic centrality of community in identity development. In Erikson’s

CH. 25 The Personal and the Moral

This chapter will focus upon the development of concepts about social actions that
individualsconsider to be personal matters of choice and privacy that fall outside of
considerations of right and wrong (Nucci, 1981, 1996; Nucci & Turiel, 2000; Smetana, 2006).
By definition, the personal is positioned in a dialectical relationship with the norms and
conventions of society, and moral considerations of interpersonal welfare and individual
rights. The contribution of the personal to moral growth stems from those interactions
(Nucci & Turiel, 2007) and from the role the personal plays in constructing moral concepts
about rights as freedoms (Helwig, 2006; Helwig, Ruck, & Peterson-Badali, this

volume; Nucci, 1996, 2000). This chapter will explore those interrelationships following
a discussion of research findings on the emergence of the personal in early childhood, its
function in psychological development, and its cultural generality.

Foundations and Theory

As described in other chapters in this volume, social cognitive domain theory proposes
that social cognition is structured within basic conceptual frameworks that account for
qualitatively differing components of our social interactions (Smetana, Jambon, & Ball,
this volume; Turiel, 1983, this volume). The basic domains that have been defined to date
are: moral (concepts about fairness, harm, welfare, and rights); societal (concepts about social
organization, social systems, and social conventions); and psychological (concepts about
persons, self, identity, and internal states). Reasoning about personal issues is structured
by conceptions of the role that decisions over personal and private matters have for the
construction of what is socially individual or unique about the decision maker (Nucci,
1996), and related understandings of the function that control over those decisions has
for the establishment of agency and autonomy (Helwig, 2006). Within social cognitive
domain theory concepts about personal issues are considered to be part of the psychological
domain of conceptions about personhood, self, and identity (Nucci, 1996; Smetana et al,
this volume; Turiel, 1983). Studies with children and adolescents have determined that the
content of personal diaries, phone calls, and letters (and who should have access to them);
aspects of personal appearance; form of play or recreation during free time; and control over
one’s own body (such as food preferences) are examples of issues that are treated as personal
(Nucci,1981, 1996; Smetana, 2002). Individuals justify their selection of issues as personal on
the grounds that they are matters that primarily impact the actor, and that control over those
decisions and activities is important to their sense of autonomy and individuality (Helwig,
2006; Nucci, 1996). These justifications point toward an internally consistent framework
for reasoning about personal matters that is quite distinct from the ways in which individuals
conceptualize the societal and interpersonal functions and purposes of social
conventions and evaluations of moral actions.

Prototypical situations involving personal judgments, such as choosing what color shirt
to wear, will primarily involve personal reasoning. A basic premise of social cognitive
domain theory, however, is that many social situations are multifaceted and may engage
concepts across domains (Smetana et al., this volume; Turiel, 1983). This is the case with
judgments about the personal in contexts that also elicit reasoning about morality or
social conventions. For example, a judgment about what color shirt to wear ceases to be
solely a personal matter in social contexts where dress is prescribed by local conventions
such as a school or work setting, or in the military (Nucci, 2000; Smetana & Bitz, 1996).
Smetana’s (2011) extensive research with adolescents and parents has illustrated how differing
perspectives on the personal rather than prudential or conventional nature of social
events, such as dress, serves as a source of adolescent–parent conflict. As will be discussed
below, the intersection between what is personal and conventional varies considerably

across cultures, although the basic claim to a personal zone of privacy and choice appears
to be a cultural universal. One’s personal decisions also may intersect with morality. First, as will
be discussed further below, claims to a personal zone inform the construction of moral concepts
of rights as freedoms (see Helwig et al., this volume; Nucci, 1996). Second, one’s personal
decisions can have moral implications that extend beyond the immediate personal action or
choice.

For example, the decision to drink coffee rather than tea is a personal matter. Drinking
coffee is an action that primarily impacts the self, does not constitute an issue of harm or
welfare, and is not in conflict with Western social conventions. From the perspective of
the individual, one’s preference for coffee is an action that is emblematic of personal autonomy.
However, deciding whether to buy coffee from one vendor rather than another
may have moral ramifications stemming from the farming practices employed to grow
the coffee beans, and whether the growers and vendors compensate their workers fairly.
An individual attending to these implications would engage both their personal decision
making (preferring coffee to tea) and moral concepts centering on concerns for fair and
safe labor practices in selecting a brand of coffee that was both personally satisfactory
and morally right. In so doing, the individual would be engaged in what social domain
theorists characterize as domain coordination (see Smetana et al., this volume). As will be
discussed in greater detail below, one aspect of moral development is the increased capacity
to coordinate moral considerations with personal goals and interests in multifaceted
social situations.