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A C A D E M I C P A P E R

Reforming policy roles in the Jordanian policy‐making process

Rami Tbaishat1 | Ali Rawabdeh1 | Khaled Qassem Hailat2 | Shaker A Aladwan1 |

Samir Al Balas1 | Mohammed Iqbal Al Ajlouny3

1 Department of Public Administration, Faculty

of

Economics and Administrative Sciences,

Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan

2 Department of Marketing, Faculty of

Economics and Administrative Sciences,
Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan

3 Department of Business Administration,

Faculty of Business, Al‐zaytoonah University
of Jordan, Irbid, Jordan

Correspondence

Rami Tbaishat, Department of Public

Administration, Faculty of Economics and

Administrative Sciences, Yarmouk University,

Irbid 21163, Jordan.

Email: rami.tbaishat@yu.edu.jo

The aim of this diagnostic analysis is to identify the weaknesses in the process of

reforming policy in Jordan. This study will first present a diagnostic analysis of the

characteristics of administrative reform in Jordan. Following this, weaknesses will be

identified with a focus on policy roles in the policy‐making process. Administrative

reform has long been an area of interest and development in Jordan since the early

1980s. Conferences were held, political and technical committees formed, and exper-

tise and resources invested. The outcomes of these programs have been below

expectations, with inadequate impact. This investigation paid attention on how

Jordan can best invest its resources to maximize efficiency in the public sector, spe-

cifically the process of reforming policy. This study concludes that the primary factor

impacting efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness is the degree of authority at

both national and organizational level. Recent efforts in Jordan to tackle these issues

could create more conflicts that threaten the Jordanian government’s stability. Other

resources have been dedicated to reviewing the rules and values that govern the rela-

tionship between state and society.

1 | INTRODUCTION

The bureaucratic ethos that emphasizes the importance

of centrally controlled rationality considers one of the

most important characteristics of the political regime

which Jordan has experienced during the last decades

(UNDP Report, 2015). In this context, economic

performance in most cases proved to be less than

adequate for either ensuring self‐sustained development

or, at a minimum, being able to meet the basic

requirements of the populace. In Jordan, the movement

away from the authoritarian past is characterized by

the efforts to maintain or improve the neoliberal

foundations of the economy while opening the political

arena to ensure the participation of a traditionally

marginalized citizenry that demands an equitable and

prompt share of the benefits of economic growth.

Despite the official political structure, it is so clear that the domination

of the executive branch over the judicial and legislative branch of

government is eminent. The extreme centralization of managerial

decision‐making surrounded by the executive branch challenges the

power of attempts at change and, more notably, to retard efforts to

tackle the problems of the government bureaucracy, like that of inef-

ficiency and corruption. Consequently, ministers and Prime ministers

continue their involvement in routine matters at the expense of stra-

tegic issues and are reluctant to send meaningful powers downward.

Researchers noticed that a significant number of senior administrators

have received their jobs through patronage rather than on merit. Their

longevity has conferred on them too much discretionary power and

rendered them ill prepared to handle the responsibilities associated

with decentralization (Amster, 2012).

The shift from government to governance, which involves the

focus of administrative practice, is moving from the bureaucratic

direct governmental form of services to third‐party government as it

has been called lately (Duflo, 2012).

Explicitly, the way we govern is shifting outside governmental

boundaries—the long‐established procedures and institutions of gov-

ernment are developing into less concerned with less centralized to,

which we administrate ourselves (Jacobsen, 2006).

The irresistible challenges in political environment recently, yet,

have created new passageway to self‐searching among practitioners

and thinkers in this field. This rethinking went alongside the subse-

quent lines: Can the old official procedure of government cope with

Received: 19 September 2018 Accepted: 13 October 2018

DOI: 10.1002/pa.1886

J Public Affairs. 2019;19:e1886.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1 of 10

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-1727

mailto:rami.tbaishat@yu.edu.jo

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886

http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa

economic, political, and social transform? Is it pressed to nationwide

improvement, which is basically the loud spoken objective of all

former and current governments? Should not the focal point be

turned from mere repair maintenance system to active and dynamic

improvement? Should not more concentration be given to the

dynamic development and innovative portion of governmental deci-

sion making‐administrations?

2 | RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study focused on a diagnosis of reforming the Jordanian policy‐

making process to recognize the difficulties and weaknesses that

accompanied it. In this comparative procedure, the study scrutinize

the individuality of rival’s explanation reform of policy‐making.

Pattern‐matching is a famous method that goes with this kind of stud-

ies, where quite a lot of situations are well known in having confident

results, and the analysis concentrated on answering the investigated

issues of how and why, which leads to this conclusion turn out in

every situation. A regular problem in policy‐making is to be aware of

the surroundings under which research and development can be

formalized in a constructive way to the community.

Hence, this analysis is valuable in elucidation and understanding

the methods and drivers of modern governmental reforms, which

has been carried out and modernized. Also, this form presents theoret-

ical frameworks for investigation of organizational of and public

administration and modernized governance.

To solve the previous matter, this study focused on the situation

under which structural government works efficiently, and how Jordan

can manage material capital and human in the direction of efficient

and effective governmental services.

3 | PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to analyze the career public servant roles in

the policy process and, more generally, how should government seek

to influence the policy‐making process. These questions involve a vari-

ety of difficult issues about the procedures through which government

should make its decisions as well as the content of those decisions

(Kugler & Kugler, 2009). Too often, those two issues are conflated,

with the assumption that certain actors (civil servants) will produce

certain types of policies (interventionist). Therefore, more market‐

based instruments (e.g., vouchers) that keep the bureaucrats out are

preferable.

In some ways, the questions about the public sector problems are

basically a reformation of the old questions regarding “governance.”

How should government administrations function? How should we

decide what government administrations will and can do? How should

tasks be divided among career civil servants and political executive’s

administrators? To what degree should one branch is to have the

power to check the other?

However, the economic and financial difficulties forced the gov-

ernment to initiate a reform process. This reform was more urgent

due to the financial crises in 2008 and globalization. This study’s main

purpose is to scientifically analyze policy roles to recognize its and

effectiveness and pitfalls. The expectation of this research study also

is to present to government administrators with the chance to identify

any variation that could be adjusted within an appropriate method.

4 | STUDY SIGNIFICANCE

The significance of this study depends on both hypothetical and prac-

tical forms. On the hypothetical side, investigating the policy making

process development in Jordan and identifies its consequences and

pitfalls. It is the first study of its kind based on the knowledge of the

researchers. Hence, this study was projected to develop and study

prior literatures in the policy‐making field in particular and public

administration in general.

Alternatively, this study has practical importance and its outcome

will offer to the policy and decision makers to recognize some of the

outcomes of the managerial transformation in Jordan and be attentive

of some of the pitfalls of the transformation process. Moreover, the

significance of this kind of study is to attain the anticipated purpose

of the transformation plan.

Understanding policy‐making in Jordan requires an understanding

of policy roles and the nature of its institutional arrangements. There-

fore, the importance of this study stems from its analytical framework

to review and assess the policy‐making process in the Jordanian

bureaucracy with special emphasis on policy roles played by different

participants and command and control mechanisms as evaluation

criteria.

5 | RESEARCH PROBLEM

Transform programs that have come about at the political and socio‐eco-

nomical levels in Jordan for the last decade, have focused on the

question of the legitimacy of traditionally detained visions. It concerns

the role and function of mutually the state, and those with most

important roles in the policy‐making processes (Blackden & Hallward‐

Driemeier, 2013).

Efforts to transition toward democracy have focused on either

reform of the constitution at a systematic level or roles played by or

assigned by conventional institutions with influential power such as

legislatures, executives, political parties, or external influencers.

Less consideration is given to the potential positive influencers in

the development of changes processes and improvement in the pro-

cess of policy making by the public sector.

Good governance should be able to control the incompatible goals

of economic efficiency in a rational manner. Along this, there ought to

be a force toward legality based on extensive involvement in the pro-

cess of public policy‐making and fairness in the sharing of services

offered by the government to the public (Adrian, 1994).

The difficulty here is in achieving an equilibrium between the

demands for enhancement in the operations of a neoliberal, capitalist,

free market, and the call to restore and develop conventional govern-

ment and formulate a process forms that connected with a free bene-

fit state (World Bank Ministerial Seminar, 2001).

The state has been instrumental in addressing a variety of

challenges ranging from regulations and promotion of economical

2 of 10 TBAISHAT ET AL.

and social activities to ensure equality and integrations among the

public. These have all been addressed through changes to economic

policies on a national level, in response to urbanization.

Characteristically, the state develops on an institutional level with

long‐enduring outcomes for public administration services. First, on an

organizational level, the state expands its functional scope to include

commercial, industrial, financial, economic, social security, public

health, education, and welfare activities.

Second, the disorderly development of the governmental public

sectors turns out to be an obstacle in attempting at answering the

question of how to develop from a practical viewpoint. Governmental

procedures and programs are built to respond to hesitant legality, and

considerable differentiation in capital accessibility was established

without congruence. There was minimal preparation, synchronization,

and controlling power by policy administrators.

The growth outline in the governmental public sectors is a cumu-

lative based on a combination of an incremental aggregation. No

incorporated well‐studied master plan was created before the initiat-

ing of determined improvement of public strategy and agendas.

Neither was expansion in the compass of the government function,

cost, size, nor relative influences and authorities which is based on

intellectuality planning.

In response to these issues, this analysis focuses on how the

reform model can clarify how legislators, political executives, and

career civil servants can share responsibility for policy‐making and

implementation.

6 | LITERATURE REVIEW

Within an article entitled “Globalization and public administration” by

Karamack (Kamaraack, 2001), it was noted that there are four key

driving forces behind the waves of reform to public administration

across the world, that is, democratization, the deficit in performance,

the revolution in information technology and global economic compe-

tition. The modern type of administrative state can shape society and

guide it, through regulations and control of social and economic devel-

opment. Doubts with regard to the capacity of the state to govern do

not just have a basis in concern over limited capacity in financial

terms; there are also deep‐rooted disputes over ideology and percep-

tions of what the nature of a state ought to be and what its purposes

are, and balances of opinion shift with regard to what people feel a

state ought and ought not to do. Within his argument related to strat-

egies for reform, Cheng (2005) explained that many factors in combi-

nation influence the reform of public administration such as traditions

of national administrations, political evolution as a result of decoloni-

zation, nation‐building and democratization and global trends with

regard to the reinvention of government and administrative reform.

Angranof and Yildis (2006) articulated a dichotomy between

administration and politics; they sought answers to issues stemming

from politics being related to policies and expressions of the will of

the state, whereas administration is concerned with how such policies

are to be executed. Political decisions over public policy are made by

political leaders, and then it is simply a case of career officials figuring

out what is the most effective and efficient manner in which those

policies are to be implemented. It is conceptually appealing to cleanly

split between labor for administration and labor for politics; however,

in realty, there is a complete disconnect. The perspective of gover-

nance offers another kind of solution to the issue. As Wachhaus

(2012) noted, governing structure patterns are experiencing change

in what is considered a shift from government to forms of governance.

Such a shift involves the movement of managerial practices focus

beyond government boundaries of bureaucratic states and the provi-

sion of services directly from government to what is called “third

party” kinds of government. Expressed another way, the manner in

which people govern is going beyond the boundaries of government

and is less involved with traditional institutions and mechanisms.

The reforms that have been disseminated and inspired by the

‘new public management’ new reforms have been implemented

within many countries and, as Schick (2002) argued, there has been

an increase in the horizontal specialization witnessed in the function-

ing of administrations, which has often been coupled with more clear

separation between administrative and political function. The aim has

been to have sharper structural task separation in relation to policy

advice, control, and regulation. Another way of looking at the shift is

to consider that reform rhetoric and theories in relation to normative

practice thus give the suggestion that actors in administration, such

as agencies operating at arm’s length, ought to focus upon the

implementation of policy instead of being involved with processes of

decision‐making around policy.

Talbot (2004), meanwhile, pointed out that “Next Steps” has the

aim of a more precise description of the respective roles of civil

servants and ministers, with the former being responsible for making

policy intentions happen with the autonomy to do so, and the latter

being responsible for the setting of policy in the first instance.

Reformers within the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have

frequently argued that specialization of functions of public services

into agencies would lead to better forms of management and better

delivery of services. Also, the distancing of public services into agen-

cies was thought likely to lead to more professional forms of manage-

ment with greater levels of transparency through the bringing of

services closer to citizens and through making, and allowing, managers

to manage (Kettl, 1996). It was emphasized within an appraisal of gov-

ernment reform (“Inside the Reinvention Machine”) that a need still

exists for centralized coordination and control; although policy may

lead to devolved activity, as long as there is an involvement of public

funds, government still remains responsible for how such funding is

used. A need to ensure that there is value for money leads to encour-

agement for early detection and policy conflict resolution and the

elimination of duplication. There is, therefore, a call for further

informal procedures and suitable communication between them, in

addition to change in behavior and attitudes on both parts. It was

claimed by Lawson (2006) that there is a need for good governance

to rest upon the ability of a system to manage conflicting goals related

to rationality and efficiency in economic terms along with goals for

legitimacy based upon wide participation in the processes of public

policy‐making along with equity in access to, and distribution of, public

services. Stolk and Wergrich (2008) have indicated that reforms search

continuously for improved linkages that can reconcile the goals of

budget and policy and serve to ensure that they have a mutually

TBAISHAT ET AL. 3 of 10

reinforcing nature. One development with promise is that with regard

to evolving roles within budget ministries. There is a move away from

traditional roles with budget ministers being perceived as “naysayers”

to a culture wherein expertise is developed for identification of

efficiency and cost‐cutting measures; as such, they are better placed

to offer ministries advice in relation to how administrative costs can

be cut without there being a need to reduce programs.

7 | FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

Politically, Jordan is a constitutional system that differentiates the

powers of each of the three branches of government. The Jordanian

governmental system is parliamentary with an inherited monarchy.

The Mulgi government is the 84th since the founding of the Jordanian

State some 95 years ago, giving the government an average life span

of 11 months (www.gov.jo/byFormationdate).

Over the years, the centralization aspect has reinforced and per-

petuated a status quo judged as inappropriate by researchers and

practitioners. The king appoints the Council of Ministers, which is

responsible for the daily operations of the domestic government, the

president, and the members of the Senate. He approves and promul-

gates laws. The king has the power to declare war and sign peace

treaties, although treaties must be signed by the National Assembly

(Jordan Constitution, article 35).

Policy‐making cannot adequately be studied apart from the

environment or context in which it operates. Therefore, it is necessary

to review and focus on the important actors in the policy‐making

process.

7.1 | The Palace and the Cabinet

In the absence of democracy, decisions have been those of the king,

often in conjunction with several key advisers. On issues of foreign

policy and military, the king, the Prime Minister, and the Chief of the

Royal Court are the decisions‐making circle. The cabinet, as a body,

is not involved, although its members may be consulted for their reac-

tions or comments.

Brand also argued that in foreign policy, the major goal was to

secure aid for the budget and to finance the military. In the case of

the budget, the king’s highest concern has been paying the salaries

of the army and the security apparatus, whose members have tradi-

tionally been largely recruited from the kingdom’s tribes and who have

long been regarded as the bedrock of support for the monarchy.

The Prime Minister has generally handled the “how” questions

related to the economy and bureaucracy. The role of the Prime Minis-

ter was also described as key, but his input varies depending upon the

political or economic conditions at any given time (Brand, 1994).

Beyond these two figures—the king and the Prime Minister—the

economic decision‐making group differs from the foreign policy group.

The king has certain advisers and confidants both within and outside

government whose friendship and proximity give them access and,

hence, the opportunity to lobby for certain policies. The king is

described as an arbiter by nature, preferring not to interfere in policy

details. However, if a complaint is voiced frequently enough either

by officials or by nonofficial confidants, he will likely come to view it

as a general problem. He may then draw the cabinet’s attention to it

and, if it is not solved, may replace the relevant minister. However,

for domestic economic matters to have an influence on upper level

decision‐making, they must be of real consequence—large loans, the

devaluation of the dinar, and the like (Kernaghan, 2010).

7.2 | The Economic Security Committee

One key factor that affected the development of the economy and the

process of economic decision‐making in the kingdom was the pres-

ence of a martial law regime during most of the 1957–1990 periods.

Symptomatic of the conditions that existed under martial law were

the establishment, development, and activities of what was called

the Economic Security Committee (ESC; Alfanik, 2016). This body

was originally founded in 1967 to address the economic problems cre-

ated by the occupation of the West Bank in 1967. With martial law

already in place giving the state sweeping powers, adding such a com-

mittee seemed like a natural step. Composed of the Minister of

Finance, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Minister of Transport,

and the Governor of the Central Bank, and standing in effect above or

outside the law, the committee initially served to help solve problems

faced especially by the government and some of the public companies

and institutions (UNDP, 2015).

Gradually, however, the committee’s “mandate” broadened. It

began to act as a kind of extraordinary legislative council. The commit-

tee was permitted to make decisions that overturned existing laws;

even those that had been passed after the occupation and that had

taken the post‐June 1967 reality into account. In this way, the com-

mittee came to be used to bypass existing laws when it was problem-

atic or inconvenient from the point of view of the decision‐makers or

their confidants (Brand, 1994). For example, if the Prime Minister

requested something to be done quickly or something done that was

officially against the law, he could refer it to the committee. The

committee also made decisions about liquidating companies, borrow-

ing to the ceiling of the Central Bank, and then legalizing more

borrowing, allowing the Central Bank to deposit with other banks to

support the currency, issuing more currency than had been allowed,

expelling people from commercial organization, and consenting to

someone who would or else have been banned, to be part of the

board of directors of a corporation. In the days of escalating political

repression in 1988, its decisions also dissolved the boards of a number

of public shareholding companies including those of the major daily

newspapers.

Many of the rulings the committee made are open to criticism, not

only on legal grounds but also on economic and financial ones. Some

of its decisions were intended to benefit a particular person, company,

or bank, to enable them to undertake an activity that was against the

law or to avoid procedures dictated by the law (Alfanik, 2016). More-

over, only a few of the ESC’s decisions were ever published in the

Official Gazette, the newspaper in which all legislation is supposed

to appear. Most were confidential, and for specific purposes, they

were usually not general edicts.

4 of 10 TBAISHAT ET AL.

http://www.gov.jo/byFormationdate

Comprising only a handful of cabinet members who were chosen

by the Prime Minister in consultation with the king, the ESC appears

to have been the institutionalized form of an inner circle for economic

policy. Their power derived from both the cabinet positions they held

and their closeness to the king and the Prime Minister at the time, to

which they owed their appointment.

7.3 | The role of the ministers

The type of regime that produces and perpetuates an institution such

as the ESC is clearly one that is uninterested in or incapable of

decentralizing decision‐making. And, indeed, even for what would

appear to be relatively minor matters, economic decision‐making is

highly centralized in the kingdom. Most decisions—whether important

or relatively minor—are made at the cabinet level or even above, not

even at the level of individual ministers.

Part of the reason for the lack of ministerial involvement is that

ministerial appointments in Jordan generally owe to considerations

of domestic political balancing along ethnic and regional lines. All cab-

inet members must meet certain unofficial but well‐known formulae.

As a result, most ministers are appointed because of ethnicity, tribal/

family background, or regional considerations, not because of exper-

tise in the field of their appointment, although there are certainly

numerous notable exceptions. In such a system, where a minister’s

background in his or her field has generally been only a secondary

consideration, a minister’s power derives from a number of sources.

The first is the degree of support he or she enjoys from the Prime

Minister. They therefore have no automatic political base in the

Parliament or outside, as would be the case in a normal parliamentary

system. Beyond his or her ties with the decision‐making group, a min-

ister’s power is often determined by such factors as the degree to

which he or she has developed ties in the bureaucracy (both within

his or her own ministry and elsewhere) and his or her own energy

and involvement. Another source of power lies in the ministry itself.

For example, the Ministry of Finance is potentially very powerful,

because it includes the customs bureau, the income and sales tax

department, the budget, and the land and surveys bureau—all the

departments responsible for domestic revenue.

At least part of the problem with ensuring implementation below

the cabinet level is that many individual ministers prefer not to take

responsibility, opting to leave certain issues to the cabinet. If that is

the case at the level of minister, one can imagine what happens

(or does not happen) at lower levels. As is the case for bureaucrats

everywhere, there is no incentive (and in this case, also no authority)

to make decisions without prior approval from above, even on

very minor matters. If the relevant minister does not take an

interest in solving a problem, no action will be taken. In general, then,

because of the lack of authority to make decisions, there is little or no

follow‐up.

In addition to the issue of authority and responsibility is the

problem of the lack of a guiding program or policy. In more general

terms, however, one reason for the lack of a coherent policy is that

there have not been political parties steering the government. The

appointment of the Prime Minister has always been the king’s

prerogative, not a response to election results, even since the political

liberalization of 1989.

Although some studies agreed that ministerial changes are disrup-

tive, given the lack of a program, it is not necessarily the case that a

change in minister will mean a complete change in the ministry

(Kernaghan, 2010). After all, the other mid‐level and lower level

bureaucrats remain in place. Instead, the change of ministers will often

mean that projects in which the former minister was involved may

simply be set aside as the new minister begins to establish his own pri-

orities (Brand, 1994).

7.4 | The Parliament

Legislative authority resides with the King and Parliament that is a

bicameral national assembly consisting of the upper house (the Sen-

ate) and the lower house (the Chamber of Deputies). The constitution

provides that the Senate, indulging the Speaker, shall consist of not

more than one‐half of the number of members of the Chamber of

Deputies (Senate 65 members, Chamber of Deputies 130 members).

The King chooses all senators that meet the requirements approved

in the constitution. A senator must be 40 years old and belong to

one of the following classes: present or former prime ministers, per-

sons who have previously held the office of Ambassador, Speaker of

Chamber of Deputies, retired military officers of the rank of Lt.

General and above, president and judges of the Court of Causation

and of the Civil and Sharia Courts of Appeal, former deputies who

were elected at least twice as deputies, and other similar personalities

who enjoy the confidence of the king in view of the services rendered

by them to the nation and country. Senators serve 4‐year terms,

renewable every 4 years (AL Taamneh, 2016).

The Chamber of Deputies consists of 130 members elected by

secret ballot in a general and direct election. The term of office is

4 years. A deputy must be 30 years old. Unlike senators, who must

meet specific qualifications, the Chamber of Deputies does not have

specific requirements except potential deputies must have Jordanian

citizenship, no current declaration of legal bankruptcy, and not subject

to any indictable charge.

The public perception is that the Parliament, especially the Cham-

ber of Deputies, is very weak and a rubberstamp for the executive

branch (AL Taamneh, 2016). The majority of its members must rely

on the executive branch to keep their constituencies happy, which is

accomplished primarily through nepotism and political patronage.

There are no restrictions on political campaign financing, and conse-

quently, getting elected to Parliament depends in part on tribal affilia-

tions and wealth. The members of both houses have immunity from

prosecution, which can only be lifted by a majority of votes in Parlia-

ment. The Prime Minister and his ministers are jointly accountable to

Parliament regarding public policy, and each minister is accountable

to Parliament regarding the work of his ministry.

Another structural weakness is Parliament; in practice, it does not

initiate legislation. Although Article 95 of the Constitution states that

any 10 Deputies (MP’s) may propose any law, in reality, the Prime

Minister submits proposals for laws, which Parliament can accept,

amend, or reject. In all cases, the proposed laws have to be submitted

TBAISHAT ET AL. 5 of 10

to the Senate, and they do not become laws unless approved by both

houses and signed by the King.

7.5 | The judiciary

Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions,

they are subject to no authority other than that of the law. The judicial

system is divided into two categories: civil and religious courts.

According to the constitution, the civil court has jurisdiction over all

personnel in all affairs, criminal and civil, including cases brought by

or against the government. Religious courts are divided into (a) the

Sharia court, jurisdiction in issues of personal status of Muslims, cases

concerning blood money where the two parties are Muslims; and (b)

the Tribunals of Religious Communities are those for the non‐Muslims

communities that are recognized by the

government.

The courts have a very limited role to play in policy‐making to

affect the nature and content of public policy through exercise of

the powers of judicial review and statutory interpretation in cases

brought before them.

In practice, the courts do not play an active role in deciding issues

of administrative accountability or responsiveness. The exercise of this

limited power, however, is further constrained by practical consider-

ations. To avoid being either politicized or caught in the middle of a

fight between branches of government, courts tend to define prob-

lems as political in nature and hence beyond their jurisdiction—the

basic rationale used for not questioning decisions made by the

government.

7.6 | The bureaucracy

The domination of the executive branch over legislative and judicial

branches of government is evident. The extreme centralism of deci-

sion‐making inside the executive branch resists endeavors at

change and, more considerably, hinders attempts to tackle problems

of the government bureaucracy like inefficiency and corruption

(Pearce, 2011).

The executive branch is vested with an impressive array of formal

powers that places the Prime Minister at the center of the political

arena. He is called upon to carry out a number of roles that give him

the opportunity to expand his ability to persuade and influence other

significant actors in the political process.

The cabinet and its bureaucracy are the most important actors in

the policy‐making process in spite of the fact that the legislative

authority resides with the king and the Parliament (Kpundeh, 1999).

The cabinet and its authority to exercise legislative leadership is clearly

established by both the constitution and legislation and accepted as a

practical and political necessity (AL Taamneh, 2016). As a result, Par-

liament expects the Prime Minister to present proposed legislation

program. In practice, Parliament does not initiate legislation’s.

Although Article 95 of the constitution states that any 10 Deputies

(PM’s) may propose any law, in reality, the Prime Minister submits pro-

posals for laws, which Parliament can accept, amend, or reject.

7.7 | The private sector

Two institutions with potential clout and interest in the economic

policy arena, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have been in

existence throughout much of the kingdom’s history. The Chamber

of Commerce is in fact a federation of local chambers of commerce.

The federation was founded in December 1955, as the representative

of the private sector in all economic, commercial, and service fields

(Amman Chamber of Commerce, 2015). The Amman Chamber of

Industry established itself as a separate entity in 1962 (Amman Cham-

ber of Commerce, 2015). Its members are public, private, and mixed

sector companies. The chamber serves as a forum for formulating

and expressing the views of the industrial sector in the kingdom.

The annual report of the chamber of commerce provides some

insights into the influence that the institutionalized private sector

has had on policy‐making. The summaries of meetings held with the

ministers to discuss issues related to the role of the private sector,

and development seems to be the best indicator for formal access

by the chambers to the government. Rather than simply waiting to

read the text of new law in the official gazette, industrialists began

to initiate projects and make suggestions regarding tariff, interest rate,

and rate of taxes to the government (Amman Chamber of Commerce,

2015). In general, however, it seems clear that formal meetings were

few and effective input is quite limited. In short, it would be inaccurate

to conclude that, in practice, the private sector plays an important role

in the policy‐making process in Jordan.

8 | ASSESSMENT OF FINDINGS

The Jordanian policy‐making process and the roles played by the dif-

ferent parties explain the Jordanian political culture, characterized by

bureaucratic elitism and political–administrative centralism that tend

to legitimize the moral authority of the ruling elites.

The finding reveals that the cabinet and its bureaucracy are the

most important actors in the policy‐making process in spite of the fact

that the legislative authority resides with the king and the parliament.

The political alliances between elected representative and bureau-

cracy can be seen as a way in which the bureaucracy can generate

power necessary for successful action. An exchange of bureaucratic

services for political support is the norm of cooperation between

legislators and bureaucracy in Jordan. Parliamentarians, who seek

reelection every 4 years, certainly need the support of the bureau-

cracy. Political representative who oppose the government legislations

in a given policy feel that his own objection will be meaningless

because of the size of the group of which he is a member. These

alliances play an essential role in the success or failure of a given

legislation.

On the other hand, the effectiveness of government substantially

depends upon executive leadership and action in both formation and

execution of policy. The authority of the Prime Minister to exercise

legislative leadership is clearly recognized by both legislation and the

constitution and acknowledged as a practical and political necessity.

The crumbling of power in parliament stems from lack of

strong party leadership, renders and committee system, which

6 of 10 TBAISHAT ET AL.

incompetent of building a inclusive legislative program. As a result,

parliament has come to expect the Prime Minister to present to it a

program of proposed legislation. The parliament does not, however,

do whatever the Prime Minister recommends. More than 90% of the

Prime Minister Policy proposals were adopted by the parliament dur-

ing the period 2010–2015 (World Bank Report, 2015). Although the

Prime Minister is the head of the executive branch, he does not act

alone on policy matters. The bureaucracy compromises several staff

agencies’ advice and assists the Prime Minister in handling his respon-

sibilities, including development and implementation of policy. For

example, the Budget Department assists the Prime Minister in prepar-

ing the annual budget, supervising expenditures, and managing the

executive branch (Jreisat, 1998). On the other hand, in foreign and

military policies, the palace has the authority to decide and almost

operate in freedom. Foreign and military policies in Jordan are largely

the product of the King’s leadership and action.

The most important institution in this respect is the palace. The

King is the only figure in the kingdom that represents a national

constituency.

In Jordan, the capacity of legislatures to engage effectively in

policy‐making has been very limited because they lack the required

professional personnel to serve the individual members of the Parlia-

ment. The absence of the professional staff helps to make parliament

members more dependent on others—the executive, administrative

agencies, and interest

groups—for information.

Because there are few policy issues, a larger proportion of them

can reach the cabinet level, and the executive plays a larger role in

forming public policies about most issues; because power is more

highly concentrated, the political executive is free to establish policies

on many more issues without worrying as much about having to build

coalitions.

The courts have a very limited role to play in policy‐making to

affect the nature and content of public policy through the exercise

of powers of judicial review and statutory interpretation in cases

brought before them. The exercise of this very limited power, how-

ever, is further constrained by practical considerations. To avoid being

either politicized or caught in the middle of a fight between branches

of government, courts tend to define problems as political in nature

and hence beyond their jurisdiction.

In short, as in many developing countries, the policy‐making struc-

ture is rather simple and executive policy‐making prevails. In such

countries, too, interest groups have little influence on policy‐making

because of their limited independence from political institutions.

A number of reasons lie behind the apparent lack of influence by

the private sector (World Bank Report, 2016). First of all is the state

perception of the private sector. Public sector employees tend to view

private businessmen as selfish and unconcerned with the national

interest. Second and not surprisingly, the private sector, although

small, is not unified in its interests. Another more general problem is

that the government has in effect over the years trained Jordanians

not to challenge it, but to depend on it for a whole range of services.

However, part of the explanation for private sector inactivity must be

attributed to the years of martial law (1957–1990) and political

repression. In a situation in which complaints were often (mis)read,

whether deliberately or not, as potential assault upon the security of

the state, few people had the courage or the power to speak out. Such

an atmosphere is hardly conducive to open an effective expression of

discontent, preferences, or challenging initiatives. Finally, this problem

is perhaps most significant for the argument of this study; the size

of the private sector’s contribution to the economy, as well as its

dependence upon the state for a good deal of its activity, has not

given it much bargaining power vis‐a‐vis the state (World Bank

Report, 2017). If one looks at the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fig-

ures, one finds that the real productive sectors of the economy‐phos-

phate, potash, fertilizers, and so on are public sector companies. The

bureaucracy contributes another major chunk of GDP.

The media and its role in policy‐making are very limited also due

to the following reasons. Sixty percent of the newspapers are govern-

ment owned. Most of the broadcasts media–radio and television are

owned by the government and controlled by the Information Ministry.

Radio and television documentaries are pro‐government, highlighting

its achievements. Although some address issues such as poverty,

unemployment, education, and health, none have focused on corrup-

tion and mismanagement. The government‐owned newspapers are

managed as public share‐holding companies. Major stockholders are

current or former government officials. This arrangement has politi-

cized the press. Dominant stockholders oftentimes use the media to

promote their interests and criticize their rivals. Private newspapers

that have published stories about governmental abuses and misman-

agement have become targets of arrest and prosecution. Government

papers glamorize high‐level government officials, especially those in

the cabinet and criticize their detractors. In general, the media’s role

in raising public awareness has been minimal in this society.

9 | EXPLANATION

Jordan politics and administration manifest the historical stamp of

Jordanian political culture, characterized by bureaucratic elitism and

political–administrative centralism to a substantive authoritarian

political psychology that tends to legitimize the moral authority of

the upper strata.

Traditionally, public policy in Jordan is totally viewed as the favor-

ites and values of the governing personnel elite (Allam, 2017). The

nonparticipatory Jordanian masses have long been psychologically

oriented toward powerful leadership by the elite and a centralized

hierarchical bureaucracy. Thus, a highly centralized administration

typifies the recurrent institutional essence of Jordanian political tradi-

tions. Despite the trauma of Westernization in recent centuries, the

core values of Jordanian political culture have not been substantially

altered by the cross‐cultural fertilization. Western patterns of liberal

pluralistic ideals have had some cultural impact upon the Jordanian

elite. However, as yet, the elite political culture remains highly

authoritarian and still oriented toward exclusive decision‐making by

a centralized government.

Since the independence of Jordan in 1946, the Western pluralist

form has had a comprehensive impact on the organization of the offi-

cial institutional structure of the government of Jordan (Al sabaileh,

2018). Further than the official structures of Jordanian government,

however, the impact has been at a minimum, and centralization of

TBAISHAT ET AL. 7 of 10

bureaucratic rather than democratic pluralism persists in the public

policy‐making. We may ascribe this to the lack of sociocultural precon-

di

tions of pluralism.

The strict political tradition of Jordanian government does not

cultivate such pluralistic prerequisite as follows:

1. Viable groups and/or individuals competition,

2. Opportunity creation for individuals and organizations to achieve

contribution in the process of decision‐making,

3. Using organized mediation between public and government,

4. Using practical approaches of masses in participating in political

decisions‐making such as elections and other media of effect

and access, and

5. Democratic harmony based on the free system.

Drifting to strict government in Jordan therefore should be viewed

partially as historical–cultural determinism and in part as the absence

of the pluralistic prerequisites.

The elite‐mass class division of Jordanian public lean to stand with

a political system that maintained by domination and regulation and

not by pluralist interest group balancing. The high level of political

centralism or authority enforces elitist policy upon the different strata

of the masses. Some other determined ideological limitations as a

result of the Arab‐Israel conflict besides inhibit pluralistic prospects

for political and socioeconomic development:

1. Less political freedom for individuals,

2. Less power of the judiciary and legislature over executive

bureaucracy,

3. More restrictions of political parties’ role and function, and

4. Military expansion role in politics.

The governing elite based upon the political passivity of the

Jordanian masses may facilitate effective bureaucratic intervention

in the economic and social areas but impedes the creation of

autonomous centers of decision‐making authority in the develop-

mental process—the democratic/political area. Recent Jordanian

politics and administration manifest bureaucratic centralism, which

give little encouragement to the positive projection of democratic

development.

Jordan’s recent move toward political democratization is expected

to mature with its emphasis on socioeconomic development, a new

popular consciousness, greater national self‐confidence, and a new

generation of democratic leadership, if it is subjected to the precondi-

tions of pluralism.

Jordanians also face the challenge of “civilizing” their politics and

government, calling upon their talent to lead an increasingly complex

economy and society. Jordan has already made a historic commitment

to greater democratization. Consequently, there appears to be a gen-

eral consensus along with Jordanians of diverse political persuasions

that government institution and administrative practices up to now

have been inadequate to convene Jordan’s complicated current and

potential demands. A drastic administrative reform will be a vital part

of democratization of politics. Jordan now has the opportunity to

match its socioeconomic progress with much better administrative

apparatus, and by doing so, it will have laid the groundwork not only

for enduring democratic progress but also for enduring economic

prosperity.

10 | RECOMMENDATIONS

It is clear that the bureaucracy does have significant, if not necessarily

dominant, policy roles in the Jordanian government. The problem then

is how to structure government in ways that recognize the reality, and

even the desirability, of the enhanced policy roles for civil servants

while at the same time preserving the requirements of democratic

accountability.

This is a difficult balance for the designers of government institu-

tions to achieve, especially given the historical legacy of thinking

about Jordan politics and administration characterized by political–

administrative centralism and public demands for enhanced account-

ability. The politicization role of the bureaucracy, if not the members

of the civil service themselves, may make the delicate balance of

policy competencies mentioned above all more difficult to achieve.

However, in a national context like Jordan, the following are recom-

mended to enhance the policy‐making process in an attempt to create

balance between the bureaucracy and some important participants

like legislatures, interest groups, and the media in policy roles and

initiation.

First, the civil service should be acquiescent and respond almost

entirely to the policy directives given to them by their nominal political

masters. This can be achieved by enhancing the legislature’s role in

policy‐making by engaging them directly in the central political tasks

of law making and policy formation in the political system.

In the era of democracy and free‐market policies, Jordanians are

expecting from their legislatures to do more than accept, amend, or

reject the proposed legislation. They are expecting them to initiate

legislation’s especially on matters that affect directly the life of the

people such as taxation, civil right, social welfare, and economic regu-

lation. The capacity of the legislatures to engage effectively in policy‐

making can be enhanced by the following:

1. Personal staff: These people serve individual members of the

parliament; some of them professionals to handle policy responsi-

bilities; and others to handle routine office duties.

2. Committee and subcommittee staff: The professional members of

committee staffs enhance the legislature capacity to have consid-

erable influence on legislation, drafting bills, and developing polit-

ical support.

3. Institutional staff: Agencies that can serve the Parliament with

research studies, policy evaluations, and budgetary data. In addi-

tion to the Audit Bureau, we can add Parliament Research Service

and Parliament Budget Office.

All of this staff assistance helps to make parliament less dependent

upon others—the executive, administrative agencies, and interest

groups—for information.

8 of 10 TBAISHAT ET AL.

Second is enhancing the role of the private sector in policy‐making.

Well‐organized groups have an important impact on public policy‐

making. Interest groups may perform an interest‐articulation function;

that is, they express demands and present alternatives for policy action.

They may also supply legislatures with much information, often techni-

cal, about the nature and possible consequences of policy proposals. In

doing so, they contribute to the rationality of policy‐making. Interest

groups, such as those representing organized labor, business, and

agriculture, are a major source of demands for public policy action in

Jordan. Civil society organization is another example, if it is free to orga-

nize and act, and is an essential partner in developing and strengthening

policy proposals.

Last is strengthening the role of media and publicity. Jordan

has no tradition of using publicity as a mechanism for keeping bureau-

cracy under control. On the contrary, secrecy has been a distinctive

characteristic of the way government operates on a daily basis. The

communication media—newspapers, newsmagazines, radio, and televi-

sion—can participate in policy‐making as suppliers and transmitters of

information and, whether deliberately or otherwise, shapers of atti-

tudes. For many Jordanian people, the late afternoon news on the

television is the main information source of on public affairs. Compli-

ance about bias in reporting of public affairs and media coverage are

familiar for Jordanian people, as are accusations that governmental

officials are controlling or manipulating the news. Attempts must be

made to introduce reforms aimed at expanding the scope of civilian

control over bureaucracy. In general, the democratic ideal of ensuring

an informed citizenry would require changes in this area of concern.

ORCID

Rami Tbaishat http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-1727

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Dr. Rami Tbaishat is an experienced assistant professor of

Public Administration with a demonstrated history of working in

government reform.

Dr. Ali Rawabdeh is an experienced associate professor of Public

Health Administration with a demonstrated history of working in

public health services.

Dr. Khaled Qassem Hailat is an experienced Assistant Professor

of Marketing with a demonstrated history of working in the

education management industry.

Dr. Shaker A Aladwan is an experienced Assistant Professor of

Public Administration with a demonstrated history of working in

the excellence Models.

TBAISHAT ET AL. 9 of 10

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-1727

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00275.x

https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.4.1051

https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.4.1051

https://doi.org/10.1086/592839

https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5610

https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5610

https://doi.org/10.1787/budget-v2-art2-en

https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852308098470

Dr. Samir Al Balas is an experienced Assistant Professor of Public

Health Administration with a demonstrated history of working in
public health services.

Dr. Mohammed Iqbal Al Ajlouny is an experienced Associate

Professor of business administration demonstrated history of

working in human resources management and development.

How to cite this article: Tbaishat R, Rawabdeh A, Hailat KQ,

A Aladwan S, Al Balas S, Al Ajlouny MI. Reforming policy roles

in the Jordanian policy‐making process. J Public Affairs.

2019;19:e1886. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886

10 of 10 TBAISHAT ET AL.

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886

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