In your paper (3 to 4 pages) you are asked to describe in detail how immigration and refugees have played a role in evolving terror trends in Canada.

Research from outside sources (no textbook), title and reference pages are not included in page count. Use citations and references per APA. Even “opinions” are supported by evidence and should be written in third person narrative. No news or media to be used as references or research material.

Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
in Canada and the United States

Immigration Policy and the
Terrorist Threat in Canada and
the United States
edited by Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott
FRASER
I N S T I T U T E
Fraser Institute
www.fraserinstitute.org
2008

Copyright ©2008 by the Fraser Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this
book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.
The authors have worked independently and opinions expressed by them are,
therefore, their own, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the support-
ers, trustees, or staff of the Fraser Institute. This publication in no way implies
that the Fraser Institute, its trustees, or staff are in favour of, or oppose the pas-
sage of, any bill.
Editing and production: Kristin Fryer
Design: Lindsey Thomas Martin
Cover design: Bill Ray
Front cover images: Dino O., Fotolia.com; Tomasz Trojanowski, Fotolia.com;
Izabela Habur, iStockphoto.com.
Date of issue: May 2008
Printed and bound in Canada
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Data
Immigration policy and the terrorist threat in Canada and the United States /
edited by Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott.
Papers originally presented at a conference held in Toronto, June 2007, entitled:
Immigration policy, border controls, and the terrorist threat in Canada and the
United States.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-88975-235-1
1. Canada–Emigration and immigration–Government policy. 2. United
States–Emigration and immigration–Government policy. 3. National
security–Canada. 4. National security–United States. 5. Border security–
Canada. 6. Border security–United States. 7. Terrorism–Canada.
8. Terrorism–United States. I. Moens, A. Alexander II. Collacott, Martin
III. Fraser Institute (Vancouver, BC)
JV6351.I45 2008 325.71 C2008-902525-3

www.fraserinstitute.org | Fraser Institute
Contents
About the Authors v
Acknowledgments viii
Introduction ix
Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott
Mass Immigration and the Growing Threat of Terrorism
1 Truths and Myths about Immigration 3
Daniel Stoffman
2 Immigration and Muslim Extremists in
the Post-9/11 World 21
Salim Mansur
3 Mass Immigration Defeats Homeland Security 37
Mark Krikorian
Troubled Immigration and Refugee Systems
4 Canada’s Broken Refugee Policy System 53
Stephen Gallagher
5 Security Threats in Immigration and
Refugee Policies 75
James Bissett

iv Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
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6 Security Threats on America’s Borders 95
Glynn Custred
Balancing Liberty and Security in the New Environment
7 The Need to Balance Liberty and Security 113
Jan C. Ting
8 Is Canada Losing the Balance Between Liberty and
Security? 129
David B. Harris
The Challenge of Strengthening the Canada-US Border
9 A Secure Border? The Canadian View 161
John J. Noble
10 A Smart Border? The American View 183
Christopher Rudolph
Conclusions and Recommendations
11 Making Canada’s Immigration System and
Borders More Secure 211
Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott
Publishing information 233
About the Fraser Institute and Editorial Advisory Board 234
Supporting the Fraser Institute 237

www.fraserinstitute.org | Fraser Institute
About the Authors
James Bissett
James Bissett is a former Canadian diplomat and Ambassador. He
served as the head of the Canadian Immigration Service from 1985 to
1990. He is now retired and living in Ottawa.
Martin Collacott
Martin Collacott is a Senior Fellow at the Fraser Institute, where he
studies immigration policy, the treatment of refugees, and related issues
involving terrorism. Mr. Collacott has 30 years of distinguished service
in the Department of External Affairs for Canada. His assignments
included Director General for Security Services. While in this capacity,
he was responsible for the coordination of counterterrorism policy at
the international level. He has represented Canada’s Department of
External Affairs in Indochina, Hong Kong, Lagos, and Tokyo. During
the late 1960s, he served as the Chinese-speaking member of the
Canadian negotiating team that established diplomatic relations with
the People’s Republic of China. Later in his career, Mr. Collacott was
appointed High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, Ambassador to Syria and
Lebanon, and Ambassador to Cambodia. As part of these assignments,
he had major responsibilities regarding the delivery of immigration
and refugee programs.
Glynn Custred
Glynn Custred is a professor emeritus at California State University, East
Bay. He has done ethnographic field work in South America and has
written on both the Canadian and the United States-Mexico borders.

vi Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
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vi Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
Stephen Gallagher
Dr. Stephen Gallagher is the Program Director of the Montreal branch
of the Canadian International Council. He also lectures at McGill
University. He has taught at the University of Calgary, the University
of Manitoba, and Concordia University.
David Harris
David Harris is a lawyer and is President of Democracy House, a
Canadian non-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of
democracy in a secure world. Canada’s Maclean’s magazine has called
him “one of Canada’s leading experts on terrorism.” A former Chief
of Strategic Planning of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS), Mr. Harris recently appeared as Counsel to the Canadian
Coalition for Democracies before two terrorism-related Commissions
of Inquiry: the Air India Inquiry and the Iacobucci Internal Inquiry.
Mark Krikorian
Mark Krikorian is the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration
Studies (CIS). He is also a regular contributor to the National Review.
He frequently testifies before Congress and has published articles
in the Washington Post, The New York Times, and elsewhere. He has
appeared on 60 Minutes, Nightline, The News Hour with Jim Lehrer,
CNN, National Public Radio, and on many other television and radio
programs. He received his BA from Georgetown University and his
MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
He also pursued graduate studies at Yerevan State University in then
Soviet Armenia.
Salim Mansur
Salim Mansur is a professor of political science at the University of
Western Ontario. He is also an academic member of the Center for
Security Policy, Washington, DC; Canadian Director for the Center for
Islamic Pluralism, Washington DC; Senior Fellow with the Canadian
Coalition for Democracies; and a nationally syndicated columnist with
Sun Media.

vii
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About the Authors vii
Alexander Moens
Alexander Moens is a professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser
University in Vancouver and a Senior Fellow with the Fraser Institute’s
Centre for Canadian-American Relations. He is the author of The
Foreign Policy of George W. Bush: Values, Strategy, Loyalty and Saving
the North American Security and Prosperity Partnership: The Case for
a North American Standards and Regulatory Area.
John J. Noble
John J. Noble served in Foreign Affairs for 35 years in a variety of posi-
tions in Ottawa. He also served as Ambassador to Greece, Minister
to France, and Ambassador to Switzerland and Liechtenstein. He has
written extensively about Canadian-American relations.
Christopher Rudolph
Christopher Rudolph is Assistant Professor of International Politics at
American University in Washington, DC. A specialist in international
relations with a particular focus on international migration, he is the
author of National Security and Immigration. His work has appeared
in leading academic journals, including the American Political Science
Review, International Organization, Security Studies, and International
Studies Review.
Daniel Stoffman
Daniel Stoffman is the author of Who Gets In: What’s Wrong with Can-
ada’s Immigration Program and How to Fix It, which was a runner-up
for the Donner Prize for best book on Canadian public policy and the
Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for best book on Canadian politics.
Jan C. Ting
Jan C. Ting is a professor of Law at Temple University Beasley School
of Law in Philadelphia. He is a former Assistant Commissioner of the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. In 2006, he
was the Republican Party nominee for the United States Senate in the
state of Delaware.

Fraser Institute | www.fraserinstitute.org
Acknowledgments
The editors would like to acknowledge the thorough editing and source
checking done by Michael Cust, MA candidate, who interned with the
Centre for Canadian-American Relations at the Fraser Institute.
This volume began as a series of papers presented at a conference
in Toronto in June 2007, titled, “Immigration Policy, Border Controls,
and the Terrorist Threat in Canada and the United States.” Both the
conference and the edited volume have been supported generously by
the Barbara & Bob Mitchell Fund and the Aurea Foundation.
We would like to thank the many people at the Fraser Institute who
have worked energetically on this project in all its stages. A special
thank you goes to Mark Mullins, Executive Director of the Institute,
for his unwavering support. We would also like to thank Leah Costello,
Arby Yeo, Dean Pelkey, and other members of the team in Vancouver
and Toronto for organizing a flawless conference. Finally, we appreci-
ate the hard work in the final production process done by Kristin Fryer
with the support of Kristin McCahon.

www.fraserinstitute.org | Fraser Institute
Introduction
Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott
In June 2007, the Fraser Institute held a major conference in Toronto,
Ontario, titled, “Immigration Policy, Border Controls, and the Terrorist
Threat in Canada and the United States.” As co-chairs of this con-
ference, we introduced the theme and purpose of the conference by
referring to recent events: the planned millennium bombing of the
Los Angeles Airport and the attacks of September 11, 2001. These
two events brought to light how terrorists are able to manipulate the
immigration and refugee policies of Western democracies. Subsequent
strikes and uncovered plots in Europe, Canada, and other countries
have demonstrated the need for us to re-examine the security threats
associated with immigration and refugee processing, and the threat
that may arise from migrants, new citizens, or the next generation who
do not integrate or identify with the values of their new homelands.
While immigrants can make significant contributions to their
new countries, the possibility that they may use the host country as
a place for recruitment, fund-raising, and a staging ground for ter-
rorist attacks, abroad or in the host country, poses a clear and pres-
ent danger. The long border and dense trade relationship between
Canada and the United States adds to the complexity of managing
this threat.
The purpose of the conference was to inform the public by describ-
ing the terrorist threat as it truly is. At the conference, we examined
and compared the government policies of Canada and the United

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States, as well as European countries, that are designed to deal with
this problem. Our objective was to analyze strengths and weaknesses
in these policies and to formulate recommendations that would pro-
vide a better balance between immigration and national security.
The ten chapters in this volume all arose from this conference.
We brought together a mixture of Canadian and American experts
to address the following issues: terrorist threat assessments; national
security and civil liberties; immigration, refugee, and asylum poli-
cies; border controls; and Canadian-American initiatives to produce
a smarter and more secure border. The chapters reveal that the chal-
lenges of dealing with groups or individuals who are planning terror-
ist acts, recruiting supporters, and providing financial or logistical
support to terrorist movements overseas are still very much present
in Canada and the United States. The threat has not diminished, and
the possibility that determined terrorist groups will at some point be
able to find cracks in our armour remains very real.
Most of the authors in this volume (as well as the editors) may easily
fall victim to charges of being anti-immigrant, xenophobic, or alarmist
with respect to the terrorist threat. But in fact, none of these authors
is opposed to effectively managed immigration or allowing genuine
refugees who pose no security threat to enter the country through a
well-vetted system. All believe that the vast majority of immigrants
pose no danger, but are simply seeking to improve their freedom and
prosperity. However, given the stakes raised by terrorist attacks, even a
small minority of threatening individuals should warrant major atten-
tion and policy adjustments. The security issues raised in this volume
pertain to the increasing risks posed by Canada’s largely open-ended
immigration and asylum systems. In Canada, both systems are heav-
ily influenced by special interest groups and political parties that are
vying for political support from limited but influential segments of the
electorate. The general principle of immigration and the importance of
keeping our borders as open as possible to the movement of commerce
are not being challenged. Rather, this volume seeks to demonstrate that
the current state of immigration and refugee policies leaves much to
be desired from a security perspective.

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Introduction xi
The purpose of this book is, first of all, to raise awareness among the
public and among government officials that Western policies regarding
migration, non-integration, and their relation to public safety need to
be re-examined. In Canada, trying to open up public debate is a David
and Goliath struggle as Canadian academic and non-governmental
organization (NGO) elites are nearly universal in their opposition to
a critical consideration of immigration issues.
We have organized the issues addressed in this book into four
themes. Usually there are one or two Canadian contributors per theme
and one American contributor.
Daniel Stoffman, a well-known Canadian writer and author of
Who Gets In: What’s Wrong with Canada’s Immigration Program
(2001), leads off with the first theme (“Mass Immigration and the
Growing Threat of Terrorism”) with a chapter that debunks popularly
held myths and images of large-scale immigration among Canadians.
He questions whether high levels of immigration actually offer solu-
tions to labour market shortages or to the social and fiscal challenges
faced by a society with an aging population. Stoffman also describes
how immigration patterns in recent decades have changed. He out-
lines how continuously replenished and increasingly large and less
diverse immigrant communities pose greater challenges in terms
of integration and security risks, whether sponsoring terrorism
abroad (Tamil Tigers) or cultivating home-grown terrorism (Sikh
and Islamist). He cites specific examples, such as the terrorist plot
discovered in Toronto in 2006, to explain why these trends constitute
an acute danger.
Salim Mansur, who teaches political science at the University of
Western Ontario, follows Stoffman with an exposé on how the recent
threat of jihadist terror has brought to the fore the dangerous nexus
between large-scale immigration and limited levels of integration
among some immigrant communities in Western societies, includ-
ing Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. For example,
this nexus has created fertile ground for the radicalization of young
Muslims by jihadist influence, as the latter has grown into a global
network. Liberal democratic societies, which emphasize pluralism,

xii Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
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multiculturalism, and tolerance, have much work to do in finding ways
to deal with this emerging threat.
Mark Krikorian, the Executive Director of the Center for
Immigration Studies in Washington, DC, demonstrates that intake lev-
els of all categories in the United States are so high that the immigration,
asylum, and visa systems are simply overwhelmed. Being overwhelmed
means that many of the security checks that should take place do not,
and, as a result, potentially dangerous individuals are not detected or
prevented from entering. The system overload and subsequent vul-
nerability, Krikorian asserts, has become an element in the strategy of
some jihadist groups who wish to attack the United States.
Under the next theme, “Troubled Immigration and Refugee
Systems,” Stephen Gallagher and James Bissett offer detailed accounts
of how imperfectly Canada’s refugee policy system actually works. The
most obvious flaws—the virtually endless opportunities for review and
delay and the near-impossibility, in many cases, of deporting a person
whose refugee claim has been rejected—will raise the eyebrows of
many readers who are being exposed to these issues for the first time.
Gallagher, who teaches at McGill University and Concordia University,
shows that the dysfunctional refugee system has, in effect, become a
parallel immigration channel through which most claimants are even-
tually able to become permanent residents and in which immigra-
tion eligibility has been replaced by self-selection. He also shows that,
in comparison with Great Britain, Australia, the United States, and
most other Western democracies, Canadian practices and processes
are uniquely lenient.
Bissett, a former Canadian ambassador and Executive Director
of the Immigration Service, explains how Canadian politicians are
reluctant to fix known flaws in the system for fear of losing votes from
immigrant groups. In fact, vote-seeking practices, multiculturalism,
and liberal immigration and refugee policies have become very much
intertwined. As a result, many politicians have become extremely
reluctant to designate certain groups—particularly those with deep
roots in ethnic communities—as having terrorist connections if they
risk losing electoral support by doing so. Bissett also outlines how

www.fraserinstitute.org | Fraser Institute
Introduction xiii
some of the measures taken by Canada in the wake of 9/11 to tighten
public security have begun to erode in recent years.
Glynn Custred, a professor emeritus of anthropology at the
University of California, East Bay, focuses on the porous southern bor-
der of the United States. Just as Canadian elites and governments are
reluctant to shore up their immigration and refugee systems, American
officials in the Bush administration have been dragging their feet on
closing the border to illegal migration. Similar to Krikorian, who argues
that the sheer number of entrants must be brought down before some
level of security can be re-established in the visa and migration system,
Custred believes American authorities must fix the border before any
programs to enhance the flow of commerce can be launched.
The next theme in the book, “Balancing Liberty and Security in the
New Environment,” addresses the important question raised by many
scholars and critics of governmental policies in both Canada and the
United States since 9/11 of how basic civil liberties, as well as respect
for cultural diversity and openness to newcomers, can be maintained
in the face of the new threats of terrorism. Jan C. Ting, a professor at
Temple University in Philadelphia, offers a detailed legal and political
analysis of why increased security need not permanently reverse or
undo civil liberties.
Under the same theme, David Harris sounds the alarm about the
imbalanced state of affairs in Canada. As a lawyer, Harris sees only lop-
sided concerns for civil liberties, multicultural correctness, and a com-
plete lack of threat awareness among Canadian academics and many
senior government officials. While intelligence and law enforcement
officials may be doing a good job, they are not receiving clear policy
guidance from the political leadership. Harris’ plea for a hard-nosed
recognition of the jihadist threat to our way of life is aimed at raising
public understanding and concern. In his words, “if the government
fails to restrict the enjoyment of some liberties in the face of infiltration
and growing threats, one might expect to see other liberties ultimately
going unenjoyed.”
Stoffman, Gallagher, Bissett, and Harris all point out the short-
sightedness of Canadian politicians and political parties in their failing

xiv Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
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to address the serious flaws in Canada’s refugee and asylum systems
and the lack of security in its immigration system. These authors real-
ize that, in addition to existing systems of patronage and “pork bar-
rel” politics, political parties in democratic countries are continuously
seeking new ways of securing electoral support. The issue remains,
however, of whether a government can afford to jeopardize national
security and public safety for the sake of pursuing votes at nomination
rallies and national elections.
The final section of the book, “The Challenge of Strengthening
the Canada-US Border,” looks at how these issues impact the border
between Canada and the United States. There are a number of other
border issues that are not examined in any detail in this book, includ-
ing the border’s inadequate infrastructure and insufficient manpower
to screen the massive flow of trucks that carry over $1 billion in trade
every day between our two countries. The main focus of this section is
how security, as it relates to migration issues, affects border controls
and regimes.
John Noble, a former Canadian ambassador who is now a distin-
guished senior fellow at Carleton University, describes the various
efforts to improve the border and make it “smarter” that the United
States, acting alone or in concert with Canada, has taken since 9/11.
Likewise, Christopher Rudolph examines the range of initiatives
launched in North America recently. Rudolph, a professor in the
School of International Service at American University in Washington,
DC, argues that there needs to be better cooperation between the two
countries in terms of basic intelligence sharing.
Both Noble and Rudolph explain why the European example of
open borders (the Schengen Accord) and a common perimeter policy
do not provide useful templates for North America. There are too
many differences and sensitivities on security and immigration issues
to expect much progress on the perimeter concept, beyond joint cus-
toms officers in selected ports to inspect inbound container cargo. The
American propensity to continue to add additional border enforcement
will not provide more security. By the same token, until American
authorities are satisfied that Canada will share its assessment of threats

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Introduction xv
and will act accordingly, the United States will continue to put in place
whatever measures it considers necessary on a unilateral basis.
Noble and Rudolph agree that simply increasing security and
screening at the Canada-United States border will be enormously
costly and will not improve security, per se, as the vast majority of
traffic contains no threat. Moreover, the cost to commerce would be
prohibitive. Instead, both governments and policy makers must realize
that a smarter, more cooperative, and more coordinated perimeter
effort is the key to achieving greater border security in the post-9/11
era. Progress thus far under the Smart Border Accord remains modest.
What is clear, however, is that, regardless of what challenges the United
States faces on its southern border in terms of illegal migration, Canada
and the United States need to find more harmonization in security, visa,
and asylum measures. Their aim must be to create a system of mutual
recognition and shared security criteria, which would alleviate the
need for certain border checks and thereby improve the flow without
diminishing real security.
In our final chapter, we review the main flaws and weaknesses in
Canada’s immigration and asylum systems and their impact on North
American security. We evaluate the broad themes raised in this vol-
ume and make general recommendations for reform. In closing, we
make a call for a comprehensive and independent review of Canada’s
immigration and refugee determination systems.

Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
in Canada and the United States

Chapter 1
Truths and Myths about
Immigration
Daniel Stoffman

Canada has the highest rate of immigration per capita of any industrial-
ized country (Statistics Canada, 2003: 6). The doctrine that high immi-
gration levels are essential, not only to our prosperity but also to our very
demographic survival, has become entrenched in Canada. The combina-
tion of these two factors makes it difficult, perhaps even impossible, for
Canada to control unwanted immigration. By unwanted immigration, I
mean immigrants who pose a threat to the existing population because
they are criminals or supporters of organizations that wish harm upon
the people of Canada and other Western countries.
Many options for stopping unwanted immigration have been offered.
For example, it has been widely acknowledged for more than a decade
that the Canadian refugee determination system needs a major overhaul
to make it less susceptible to abuse from fraudulent claimants, some of
whom pose security risks. A lower acceptance rate, similar to the rates of
other refugee-accepting countries, would deter some illegitimate arrivals,
as would increased detention of claimants considered unlikely to appear
at their refugee hearings and failed claimants considered unlikely to leave
the country voluntarily.

4 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
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Of course, not all immigrants who pose a threat to Canadian society
arrive as refugee claimants. Some come through the regular immigration
stream. More rigorous scrutiny of immigration applications submitted
to Canadian officials abroad would help minimize the number of immi-
grants who may pose security risks. As well, Canada’s new policy of arm-
ing border guards, which is being implemented gradually by the federal
government, has the obvious benefit of deterring violent individuals who
are trying to cross into Canada from the United States.
But none of these reforms would reduce unwanted immigration as
effectively as a simple reduction in the annual immigration intake. Because
the current immigration level is so high, it is not possible to screen every
newcomer thoroughly. Canadian officials cannot always verify that the
newcomer actually is who he or she claims to be. As a result, it is inevitable
that dangerous people will gain admission.
Generous, yet moderate, immigration levels prevailed in Canada until
the annual intake was raised and made permanent by Brian Mulroney’s
Progressive Conservative government in the late 1980s. Successive federal
governments have maintained that policy, despite the rise of international
terrorist organizations that target Western countries. As a result of this
policy, each year 260,000 immigrants enter Canada, a country with a
population that is one-tenth that of the United States. If the United States
had legal immigration on the same scale, it would be admitting 2.6 million
immigrants each year instead of one million (Camarota, 2007).
If Canada were serious about reducing its vulnerability to international
terrorism, it would return to the more moderate levels of immigration
it once had, similar to the levels that other major immigrant-receiving
countries, such as the United States and Australia, maintain. But Canadian
governments have tied their own hands by adopting beliefs about immi-
gration that prevent a return to normal levels. Moreover, successive gov-
ernments have viewed high immigration levels as a winning proposition
from an electoral point of view, even though a recent survey indicates
that 62% of Canadians want greater restrictions on immigration (Pew
Research Center, 2007). Since no Canadian political party advocates a
reduction in immigration levels, voters who feel strongly about the issue
have no option at the ballot box. Consequently, governments are free to

Truths and Myths about Immigration 5
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ignore public opinion. They seem to believe that an expansive immigra-
tion policy will please ethnic organizations whose leaders will respond
by marshalling support for a government that implements such a policy
(Stoffman, 2002: 76–93).
As a result, Canadian immigration policy, once managed in the national
interest, is now too often manipulated by politicians seeking re-election.
A recent example of this can be found in an internal report prepared by
Canada’s diplomatic mission in India, which describes the results of a deci-
sion made in 2004 to open a Canadian immigration office in Chandigarh,
the capital of the state of Punjab (O’Neil, 2007, Oct. 19). According to
Richard Kurland, the Vancouver immigration lawyer who obtained the
document, the office was opened to reward Punjabi-Canadians who
were clamouring for better immigration services. “Liberals yearned for
Indo-Canadian votes, and even though officials advised that Chandigarh
was a hotbed of false documents, Liberal politics trumped logic,” he told
CanWest News Service. “And now Canada’s immigration system gets to
pay the price for Liberal pragmatism” (O’Neil, 2007, Oct. 19).
The price, according to the report, is a flood of fraudulent immigra-
tion applications, including many from self-styled nannies with no train-
ing. “Fraud is omnipresent in Chandigarh and is found in every sort of
document,” the internal report states. “This office has identified over 160
‘nanny schools’ in the Punjab. While some … are bone fide schools, there
are a considerable number lacking facilities, equipment and students—but
having large graduating classes” (O’Neil, 2007, Oct. 19).
In 2004, Raj Chahal, who was an advisor to Jean Chrétien while Chrétien
was Prime Minister, told The Vancouver Sun that the Chandigarh office
was opened despite the objections of both Citizenship and Immigration
Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Both departments advised
that the resources could be better employed in other parts of India and
Asia. The cost of opening the Chandigarh office and then running it for
five years was reported to be $25 million (O’Neil, 2007, Oct. 19).
There are a number of false beliefs that are helping to prevent reform
of Canada’s immigration policy. The conventional wisdom in Canada is
that we are desperate for more immigrants because we have a low birth
rate and the boomer generation is getting too old to work. Unless millions

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of new immigrants move to Canada, all of us will become poorer because
a smaller work force will not be able to sustain the welfare state that sup-
ports the elderly at the current level of benefits. The reality, by contrast, is
that neither economic nor demographic justifications exist for accepting
any negative consequences resulting from the immigration program.
Major studies in Canada, the United States, and Australia have found
that, as a fraction of GDP, the economic gains from immigration are minus-
cule—certainly not large enough to justify maintaining a large immigration
program. In a major study, the Economic Council of Canada summed up
the Canadian literature as follows: “There is little or no effect of immigra-
tion on the per capita income of existing residents” (Economic Council
of Canada, 1991: 22). The disconnect between immigration and economic
prosperity has been evident throughout Canada’s history. “A historical per-
spective gives little or no support to the view that immigration is needed
for economic prosperity,” the Council stated in its report. “In the 19th
and early 20th centuries, the fastest growth in real per-capita incomes
occurred at times when net immigration was nil or negative” (1991: 19). An
Australian study on the economic effects of immigration by the Committee
for Economic Development of Australia supports this finding. It failed to
find any significant impact other than that immigration made the overall
economy larger (Economic Council of Canada, 1991: 22).
A 1997 study by the National Academy of Sciences on immigration’s
impact on the American economy concluded that the fiscal burden of
providing government services to new immigrants was greater than any
economic gains attributable to immigration (Cassidy, 1997, July 14: 42).
The modest gains that immigration does deliver, as American economist
George Borjas has demonstrated, are the result of lower labour costs
(1999: 87–104). In other words, the most significant economic impact
of immigration is the reduction in the costs of goods and services that
results from depressing wages. Whether one views this as good or bad
depends on whether one is a wage earner or a wage payer. Immigration,
Borjas explains, induces a substantial redistribution of wealth, away from
workers who compete with immigrants and toward employers and other
users of immigrant services (1999: 13). Workers lose because immigrants
drag wages down. Employers gain because immigrants drag wages down.

Truths and Myths about Immigration 7
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These wealth transfers may amount to tens of billions of dollars each year
(Borjas, 1999).
Immigration makes the economy larger because more people are pro-
ducing and consuming goods and services. But that doesn’t make the
average person any richer. It is obvious that no relationship exists between
population size and average incomes. If it did, the people in countries
such as China, India, and Indonesia would be the wealthiest in the world.
However, population growth—or the lack of it—does influence a country’s
economic development. Economist David Foot points out that, because of
differences in fertility rates, the economies of China and India will develop
quite differently in the future. Because China has below-replacement fer-
tility, it will experience worker shortages that will drive wages up. When
that happens, China will no longer be a low-cost competitor in the world.
“China is going to gradually become a rich country in per capita terms,”
argues Foot. By contrast, if Indian parents continue to have three or more
children, “there’s always going to be a pool of cheap young labour, so wages
are always going to remain low” (Foot, 2007, Oct. 8: 28).
As the work of Borjas, Foot, and others demonstrates, population
growth, whether it results from natural increase or immigration, has a
powerful impact on wages. Strangely, however, this topic is rarely dis-
cussed in Canada in relation to immigration policy. Stranger still, politi-
cians who claim to represent the interests of working people often advo-
cate increasing immigration levels, a policy that would actually increase
downward pressure on wages.
A political consensus exists in Canada that extremely high immigration
levels are necessary because the Canadian population is aging. However,
populations are aging in all industrialized countries—and most develop-
ing ones, as well—and yet no other country contemplates a per capita
immigration intake comparable to Canada’s. In fact, no evidence exists
to support the peculiar Canadian myth that population aging in com-
bination with moderate, rather than high, immigration levels will spell
economic doom.
In 2002, Marcel Mérette, an economist at the University of Ottawa,
produced a study on the economics of an aging population. He found
that investments in human capital—education and training—that

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accompanied aging in seven industrialized countries actually increased
economic growth more rapidly than would have occurred in the absence
of aging. Why? Because a better educated workforce drives technologi-
cal progress, the real engine of economic growth. Innovation blossoms
when resources grow scarce. Just as higher energy costs lead to advances
in fuel efficiency, so also does labour-saving technology accompany labour
scarcity (Mérette, 2002: 3).
Populations all over the world are aging because fertility is decreasing
while longevity is increasing. The notion that immigration is an antidote
to the aging phenomenon is simply wrong. Only an astronomical, and
entirely impractical, intake of exclusively young immigrants would signifi-
cantly decrease the average age of Canadians (Stoffman, 2002: 106). Even
if Canada were to double its already high immigrant intake, the impact on
the average age of the Canadian population would be minimal. Moreover,
China and India—the major immigrant-sending countries—are enjoying
rapid economic growth and, consequently, are providing good opportuni-
ties at home for the same young, well-trained workers that Canada hopes
to attract. Thus, in the future, it will be increasingly difficult to attract such
people as permanent immigrants.
Canadians will have to accept that Canada, like the rest of the world, is
getting older and that this phenomenon is manageable. Other countries,
such as Italy and Japan, that are older than Canada have adjusted to an
aging population and a slow growing workforce, and have managed to keep
the buses running and the hospitals functioning. This has been accom-
plished through moderate levels of immigration, the education and training
of young people, maximized labour participation rates, and increased pro-
ductivity through the use of technology. Slower labour force growth, con-
cludes Mérette, is offset by greater investment in human capital and rising
participation rates. “As a result,” he writes, “growth in the effective labour
force may not drop much with population aging” (Mérette, 2002: 12).
There are many examples of successful adaptation to labour scarcity.
European countries, which have less available low-cost labour, were a decade
ahead of Canada in automating fee collection at parking garages (Stoffman,
2002: 114-115). Another example is the production of grapes to be dried
into raisins, one of the most labour-intensive agricultural operations. In

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California, bunches of grapes are cut by hand, manually placed in a tray for
drying, manually turned, and manually collected. Australia lacks a large sup-
ply of cheap farm labour, so farmers developed a method of growing grapes
on trellises. This new system reduced the need for labour and increased
yields by 200%. This more productive method has been slow to spread to the
United States because the availability of cheap labour acts as a disincentive
to farmers to make large capital investments (Krikorian, 2004).
Perhaps the most powerful and prevalent economic argument for high
immigration levels is the notion that Canada needs a large number of
newcomers to do the jobs that Canadians will not do, such as cleaning
houses and offices, caring for children and the elderly, and driving taxis.
Yet Canadian-born people work in mines, fight fires, and collect garbage.
Why would they accept these arduous jobs and yet refuse to do others?
The answer is obvious. There is no job that Canadians will not do. However,
they expect to be paid well for it and to enjoy good working conditions.
When people say that Canada needs immigrants to do the jobs Canadians
will not do, they are really saying that Canada wants immigrants because
immigrants have no choice but to accept wages and working conditions
that no one else will accept. That is not a justifiable use of the immigra-
tion program.
An excessive immigration intake does no favour for newcomers to
Canada. The economic performance of immigrants has fallen as the num-
ber of immigrants has increased. In 1980, immigrants were 1.4 times as
likely as Canadian-born people to have low incomes. By 2000, they were
2.5 times as likely to be poor (Picot and Hou, 2003). In 2007, Statistics
Canada published a report entitled Losing Ground: the Persistent Growth
of Family Poverty in Canada’s Largest City (2007a). It revealed that the
number of families with children in Toronto living below the poverty line
increased by 9.7% to 92,930 between 2000 and 2005. During the same
period, the number of poor families in Canada as a whole shrank by 5.1%
(Toronto Star, 2007, Dec. 31). Toronto differs from the rest of Canada
in another important way—it receives 40% of all immigrants to Canada
(Statistics Canada, 2007b). In the context of the data on falling immigrant
economic performance, it is clear that the growth of poverty in Toronto
is closely linked to a mismanaged immigration program.

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A return to moderate immigration levels would improve the chances
for newcomers to become successful in the Canadian economy. It would
also bring other benefits, including more manageable growth in major
cities, higher productivity, and more rapid per capita economic growth.
A more moderate immigration level would also decrease Canada’s vulner-
ability to international terrorism by making it possible to screen newcom-
ers more carefully. The Canadian government not only lacks the resources
to do thorough checks of 260,000 people, it even lacks the resources to
check immigrants who come from terrorist-producing regions. In 2006,
Jack Hooper, the deputy director of the Canadian Security and Intelligence
Service (CSIS), told the Senate national security committee that 20,000
people had come to Canada from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region since
2001 and that, because of a lack of resources, no security checks whatso-
ever had been done on 90% of them (Gordon, 2006, May 30).
Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, travel-
ers shunned air travel. Six years later, planes were filled to capacity and
airline profits were soaring (Pae, 2007, Oct. 19). The fearfulness immedi-
ately following 9/11 may have been irrational, but there is no reason for
Canadians to be complacent merely because six years have elapsed since
the attack. Canadians have been victimized by terrorists in the past and
there is no reason to believe that they will not be attacked again. In 1985,
Sikh terrorists who were based in Canada murdered 329 people, most of
them Canadians, by planting a bomb on an Air India jet en route from
Canada to India. The attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 killed 24
Canadians. In 2002, Osama bin Laden named Canada one of al-Qaeda’s
targets. An al-Qaeda training manual published in 2004 stated, “We must
target and kill the Jews and the Christians … The grades of importance are
as follows: Americans, British, Spaniards, Australians, Canadians, Italians”
(Bell, 2006, June 3).
Canada’s immigration policies also have consequences for other
nations. Ahmed Ressam, the Algerian refugee claimant who intended to
blow up the Los Angeles airport, is often cited as an example of how
Canada’s laxity endangers the United States. When he was arrested while
trying to enter the United States in 1999, Ressam had been living in Canada
for five years, even though France had warned the Canadian government

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that he was a terrorist and even though he had not bothered to show up for
his refugee hearing. During that time, he had travelled to Afghanistan for
training and used a false identity to obtain a Canadian passport (Stoffman,
2002: 9). It would be wrong to assume that Ressam was not a threat to his
host country, as well as to the United States. During his trial, he testified
that he and an associate, Samir Ait Mohamed, had plotted to detonate a
bomb in a Montreal area with a large Jewish population, but had dropped
that plan to concentrate on the Los Angeles attack.
The most prominent case of an attack on Canadian soil that might have
occurred had police not prevented it is the alleged plot of a terrorist cell
in suburban Toronto, whose members were arrested in June 2006. Some
were Canadian-born, while others were immigrants from various parts
of the world, including Egypt, Somalia, and Afghanistan (Bell and Patrick,
2006, June 4). They had allegedly planned to use massive bombs to attack
the Toronto headquarters of CSIS and the Toronto Stock Exchange. There
was also an alleged plan to attack the Parliament buildings in Ottawa
and to behead Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Most of those who were
charged lived in parts of suburban Toronto that had significant popula-
tions of Muslims. One member of the Muslim community, Mubin Shaikh,
played an important role in the arrests of the 18 suspects by acting as an
informant to CSIS. In an interview, Shaikh explained his motives: “This
is home for me. I can’t have things blowing up in my backyard. There are
values that I live by—it’s not that they’re Islamic or they’re Western; it’s
that they’re human. That’s what it comes down to” (Le Goff, 2004: 3).
It is natural for immigrants from the same cultural and linguistic back-
grounds to settle in the same neighbourhoods. They have always done so.
In a free country, people have the right to live where they choose, to speak
whatever language they choose, and to maintain their culture. The differ-
ence between the current situation and the past is that immigration used
to come in waves—a group would come from a particular country, such as
Japan or Portugal, and then that influx would stop, either because Canada
reduced its immigration quota or because fewer Japanese or Portuguese
wanted to come.
This does not happen any more. Canada now has relentless immigra-
tion, year after year, from the same places to the same places. As a result,

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large self-contained communities are created and are constantly replen-
ished. The majority of the residents of these communities are good people
who want to build prosperous lives for their families. Most, like Mubin
Shaikh, are law-abiding citizens who abhor violence. But some are not,
and the larger a community is, the easier it is for groups that are hostile
towards Canada and the West to operate secretly within these communi-
ties and to develop support networks.
Canadians rightly pride themselves on the cultural diversity of their
major cities, but the reality is that Canadian cities are not diverse enough.
Out of 194 countries in the world, just 10 of them account for 62% of all
new immigrants. That the majority of immigrants arrive from a small
number of source countries is nothing new. During the first major immi-
gration wave between 1867 and 1914, 40% of new arrivals to Canada were
from the British Isles (Le Goff, 2004: 3). What is new today is the relent-
lessness of the immigration flow and its size. In the past, immigration lev-
els fluctuated according to the government’s estimate of the need for new
workers. Since the time of the Mulroney government, however, Canada’s
policy has been to maintain high levels of immigration, regardless of eco-
nomic conditions. Moreover, because certain family members of existing
residents can enter Canada by right, communities that are already well-
established continue to grow rapidly.
Most immigrants leave home in search of better economic opportuni-
ties, which is why most source countries are those in which large numbers
of young people compete for jobs and earn lower wages. Rich countries
with older populations are not significant sources of immigrants. Thus,
Italy and Japan no longer send many immigrants to Canada. Eventually,
because of demographic changes, the number of immigrants from cur-
rent major source countries may diminish. But in the meantime, creating
a more diverse intake would require a change of policy in Canada. If that
were successfully achieved, there might be a larger number of ethnic com-
munities, but they would also be smaller and, perhaps, more integrated
into the broader community.
The constant flow of new arrivals from the same places to the same
places is not the only hindrance to integration. Another obstacle is the
confusing rhetoric surrounding the policy of multiculturalism. Canada

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is not really a multicultural country because cultural practices that clash
with basic Canadian values are not permitted (Stoffman, 2002: 119–150).
Canada is a liberal democracy in which all persons are equal, regardless of
gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation. Yet many immigrants arrive
imbued with the cultures of countries that are not liberal democracies and
do not value or accept individual freedom. In addition, a whole range of
practices that are allowed in other countries—such as circumcising young
girls, eating dogs, and carrying handguns—are not tolerated in Canada.
Yet, because the policy of multiculturalism is so ill-defined, it is under-
standable that some immigrants are confused with respect to what they
can and cannot do (Stoffman, 2002).
Moreover, from a security perspective, the ideology of multiculturalism
may hinder law enforcement. Advocates of multiculturalism rightly insist
that people of all backgrounds must be treated with courtesy and respect.
However, there is a danger that the officials responsible for safeguarding
all Canadians will be overly sensitive with respect to linking security issues
to the immigration program. If we are afraid to confront problems caused
by undesirable immigration, how can we possibly control it?
Martin Collacott (2007, May 8), a retired Canadian diplomat who was
responsible for coordinating counterterrorism policy for the Department
of Foreign Affairs, believes the sacred cow of multiculturalism may have
been partially responsible for the success of the 1985 Air India bombing.
Official multiculturalism policy, with its privileging of tolerance
above all else, prevented our authorities from fully investigating
and thwarting the terrorists’ plot … The government’s look the
other way policy allowed Sikh militants to intimidate the Sikh com-
munity at large … Even during the Air India trial, supporters of the
accused were still able to threaten witnesses for the prosecution.
A striking case of “looking the other way” occurred when those accused
of planning to commit various acts of terrorism were arrested in Toronto.
Mike McDonell, Assistant Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, claimed that the suspects “represent the broad strata of our society.
Some are students, some are employed, some are unemployed” (Austen

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and Johnston, 2006, June 4). Based on his remarks, one would expect to
find a diverse assortment of people in that group of suspected terrorists—
men and women of all ages, from a variety of religious and cultural back-
grounds. But in fact, all of the suspects were Muslims, either immigrants
or the offspring of recent immigrants, all were male, and all but two of
them were in their teens or twenties at the time of the arrests. Several of
them attended the same mosque.
In other words, there was little relevant diversity among these suspects.
Rather than representing the “broad strata” of Canadian society, these men
fit the same narrow profile as those who successfully committed mass
murder in the subway in London, the trains in Madrid, and the World
Trade Center in New York. Yet McDonell’s attempt to pretend otherwise is
understandable. In “multicultural” Canada, racial profiling is unacceptable.
Our intelligence and security agencies, argues Collacott, “are being told to
operate with one hand tied behind their backs. They will be excoriated if
they fail to catch the terrorists and equally lambasted by activists if they
show too much zeal in pursuing their leads” (2007, May 8).
If the police are unwilling to state the obvious because they are afraid of
offending someone, then the safety of the general public is compromised.
Law enforcement officials must feel free to speak frankly about the dangers
posed by radical Islamists who think it is right to kill “infidels” anywhere,
including the more than 32 million infidels who live in Canada.
Fear of causing offence has also led the media to fail to inform Canadians
fully. The Toronto Star, Canada’s largest daily newspaper, refuses to publish
the race of suspects being sought by police for criminal acts, although it is
doubtful that the Star’s editor, if mugged on the street, would decline to
mention the skin colour of his attacker when informing the police. A pub-
lic opinion poll conducted in February 2007 provides another example of
media surrender to multiculturalist sensibilities. The poll found that more
than 80% of Canadian Muslims were satisfied with life in Canada and 73% of
them thought the terrorist attacks allegedly being plotted were completely
unjustified. The headline on the CBC web site read, “Glad to be Canadian,
Muslims Say” (Corbella, 2007, Feb. 18). It is not surprising that a majority
of Muslims thought the attacks were unjustified. But the real story, which
is surprising, was that 12% thought the attacks were justified. This means

Truths and Myths about Immigration 15
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that 12% of the Canadian Muslim population of around 750,000–900,000
thought it would be justifiable to explode massive bombs in Toronto and
Ottawa, for example, killing thousands of innocent people in the process.
By reporting the results of the poll the way they did, the Canadian media
tried to shield the public from this information, presumably so as not to
embarrass the Muslim community. This is the “see no evil, hear no evil”
approach that says, If all immigration is good immigration, then how can
there ever be unwanted immigration?
A steady stream of supporters of the Tamil Tigers, one of the world’s
most murderous terrorist organizations, have found a haven in Canada.
The Tigers, who are fighting to carve a separate Tamil state out of Sri Lanka,
are the world’s most accomplished suicide bombers. They have used that
tactic to murder a Sri Lankan president and a former Indian prime minister,
as well as several moderate Sri Lankan Tamil leaders. Hundreds of ordinary
people, who were in the wrong place at the wrong time, also died at the
hands of the Tigers—their bombing of a bank building in 1996 killed 90
people (Waldman, 2003, Jan. 14). Rohan Gunaratna, a research fellow at the
Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of
St. Andrews, told The New York Times, “Of all the suicide-capable terrorist
groups … they are the most ruthless” (Waldman, 2003, Jan. 14).
Tiger supporters came to Canada because the Immigration and
Refugee Board offered automatic refugee status to anyone who claimed
to be a Tamil from Sri Lanka. These claimants didn’t even have to prove
that they had ever been to Sri Lanka (Stoffman, 1994). After immigrating,
some of them used Canada as a place to raise funds to commit terrorist
acts in Sri Lanka (CBC News, 2005, Nov. 30). Nevertheless, federal Liberal
governments were so eager to cultivate support among the fast-growing
Tamil community that they refused to ban the Tigers as a terrorist orga-
nization, even though the United States and United Kingdom had already
done so.
When Paul Martin, who would later become prime minister, was criti-
cized for attending a dinner sponsored by a group associated with the
Tamil Tigers, he was unapologetic. Such criticism, he claimed, was “not
the Canadian way” (Collacott, 2007, May 8). This is one example of how
a dysfunctional immigration and refugee system, in combination with

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the notion that minority cultural groups must be immune from criticism,
makes it difficult for Canada to control unwanted immigration.
Only an infinitesimal percentage of the immigrants and refugees who
come to Canada wish us harm. But, as tragic events have shown, it takes
only a few to kill and maim thousands. However, Canada can reduce its
vulnerability by taking the same sensible approach towards immigra-
tion and refugee reform that would be justified even if a terrorist threat
did not exist. First, immigration levels must be reduced. All the adverse
impacts of immigration, both economic and social, stem from excessively
high numbers. The sharp increase in Canada’s intake in the 1990s has
been followed by an equally sharp increase in the rate of poverty among
new immigrants. Moreover, when a relentless stream of immigrants who
speak the same language arrives, self-contained communities are created,
integration is impeded, and social division may result. Finally, an exces-
sive immigration intake creates overly rapid growth in the major cities
that are the destinations of most newcomers. This growth benefits the
real estate industry, but not the population as a whole.
As well, fixing the refugee system would allow Canada to direct more
of its resources toward genuine refugees, while deterring fraudulent
ones. Because Canada does not share a border with a refugee-producing
country, there is no reason why large numbers of claimants should show
up at the Canadian border. They come because of what migration experts
call the “pull factor.” The ease of gaining refugee status in Canada attracts
economic migrants who may not qualify under the regular immigration
program or may have to wait for years before being accepted. Because
Canada is not close to refugee-producing areas, its role in refugee pro-
tection should be to choose from among the millions of people in refu-
gee camps who most need permanent resettlement and bring them to
Canada. In 1986, Canada won the United Nations Nansen Medal for its
work in resettling thousands of such people. Reducing the pull factor
by implementing normal international standards of refugee selection
would free up resources that could support an increased focus on such
resettlement. As a side benefit, officials could better ensure that these
refugees posed no security risks because they would be preselected by
Canada.

Truths and Myths about Immigration 17
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Immigration is an important national tradition. While immigration
is not a prerequisite for economic growth, those who immigrate bring
with them new energy and new ideas. Over the past 50 years, they have
helped transform the major immigrant-receiving centres of Toronto and
Vancouver from dull provincial outposts into cosmopolitan cities brim-
ming with vitality. But because immigration is not essential to economic
growth or demographic survival, there is no justification for accepting
any negative consequences resulting from the immigration program. One
such consequence is an increase in our vulnerability to international ter-
rorism. We can never become invulnerable, but a return to the generous
but moderate immigration program that Canada abandoned in the 1990s
would make Canada a safer place.

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References
Austen, Ian, and David Johnston (2006, June 4). 17 Held in Plot to Bomb
Sites in Ontario. The New York Times. . Accessed December 7, 2007.
Bell, Stewart (2006, June 3). Never Mind Foreign Terrorists, Why is
Canada Growing its Own Extremists? National Post.
Bell, Stewart, and Kelly Patrick (2006, June 4). Alleged Canadian
Terror Plot has Worldwide Links. National Post. . Accessed
December 19, 2007.
Borjas, George (1999). Heaven’s Door. Princeton University Press.
Camarota, Steven A. (2007). 100 Million More: Projecting the Impact of
Immigration on the US Population, 2007-2060. Center for Immigration
Studies. . Accessed
December 19, 2007.
Cassidy, John (1997, July 14). The Melting-Pot Myth. The New Yorker.
CBC News (2005, November 30). Tamil Tigers Illegally Fundraising
in Toronto: Community Member. . Accessed December 7, 2007.
Collacott, Martin (2007, May 8). The Perils of Multiculturalism at
31,000 Feet. National Post. . Accessed December
7, 2007.
Corbella, Licia (2007, February 18). Disturbing Reality Buried.
Calgary Sun.

Truths and Myths about Immigration 19
www.fraserinstitute.org | Fraser Institute
Economic Council of Canada (1991). Economic and Social Impacts of
Immigration. Economic Council of Canada.
Foot, David (2007, October 8). The Human Factor. Canadian Business.
Godfrey, Tom (2007, June 21). Toronto Gains Say on Newcomers.
Toronto Sun. . Accessed June 22, 2007.
Gordon, James (2006, May 30). CSIS Admits Security Shortcoming.
National Post. . Accessed
December 19, 2007.
Krikorian, Mark (2004). Jobs Americans Won’t Do: Voodoo Economics
from the White House. Center for Immigration Studies. . Accessed December 6, 2007.
Le Goff, Philippe (2004). Immigration to Canada: What Policy for
What Purposes. Library of Parliament, Parliamentary Research Branch.
. Accessed December 6, 2007.
Mérette, Marcel (2002). The Bright Side: A Positive View on the
Economics of Aging. Choices 8, 1 (March). . Accessed December 6, 2007.
O’Neil, Peter (2007, October 19). ‘Nannies’ Exploit Visa Office to Come
to Canada. National Post. A13. . Accessed
November 22, 2007.
Pae, Peter (2007, October 19). Airlines Squeeze Fliers as Profits Soar. Los
Angeles Times.

20 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
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Pew Research Center (2007). World Publics Welcome Global Trade—
But Not Immigration. Pew Research Center. . Accessed November 23, 2007.
Picot, Garnett, and Feng Hou (2003). The Rise in Low-Income Rates
Among Immigrants in Canada. Statistics Canada, Business and Labour
Market Analysis Division. . Accessed December 6, 2007.
Statistics Canada (2003). Canada’s Ethnocultural Portrait: The
Changing Mosaic. Statistics Canada.
Statistics Canada (2007a). Losing Ground: The Persistent Growth of
Family Poverty in Canada’s Largest City. Statistics Canada.
Statistics Canada (2007b). Immigration in Canada: A Portrait of the
Foreign-Born Population. Census Year 2006. .
Stoffman, Daniel (1994). Open Door Travesty. Saturday Night
(November): 52–60.
Stoffman, Daniel (2002). Who Gets In. Macfarlane, Walter & Ross.
The Toronto Star (2007, December 31). Frances Lankin Exposed Reality
of Toronto Poverty. A6.
Waldman, Amy (2003, January 14). Masters of Suicide Bombing. The
New York Times. . Accessed March 31, 2008.

Chapter 2
Immigration and Muslim
Extremists in the Post-9/11 World
Salim Mansur
The most important means of countering Muslim extremists in the Western
world in the post-9/11 era of Islamist terrorism are intelligence-gathering,
policing, and security services. In addition, there are other means within
the wider community that can assist this frontline work. These means
include the “war of ideas” that must be waged against extremism within
the Arab-Muslim world and in Muslim communities in the West through
our media and within our education, social, and political institutions. This
chapter will focus on what I describe as an exercise in the “sociology of
immigration” as it helps to explain the origin and growth of extremism
in Muslim immigrant communities in the West. Such a discussion of this
aspect is often neglected. The nature of immigration to Canada and other
Western liberal democracies needs to be re-examined, as does the extent
to which immigration and extremism—in this chapter, Muslim extrem-
ism—are connected.
About immigration
There is general agreement in the study of immigration on the nature and
causes of migration. Civil unrest and wars, socioeconomic inequality, and

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poverty are among the main “push” factors in the movement of people
across natural or political boundaries. Market needs in terms of skilled
and unskilled labour, demographic needs in terms of sustaining or increas-
ing population levels, and the benefits of rich economies are the “pull”
factors that attract people to move from depressed zones of the world to
prosperous zones.
Canada has been well-served by immigration at various stages in its
history—for example, during the populating of the West in the early part
of the twentieth century. While questions have been raised regarding the
net economic benefit to Canada in the last 25 years, as the earnings of
immigrants have fallen well below those of Canadian-born and earlier
immigrants, Canadians in general have not taken issue with immigration
policy on economic grounds. The view of immigration as a negative-sum
phenomenon has been based, for the most part, on culture and race, rather
than economics. But since the 1960s, any merit of such arguments has
been mostly discounted in the liberal democracies of Europe and North
America in favour of economic arguments.
However, here we may recall the warnings of Enoch Powell, a British
Member of Parliament, which were most compellingly stated in his deeply
controversial speech of April 20, 1968, at a Conservative Party gather-
ing in Birmingham. Four decades later, his speech is remembered mostly
for being considered inflammatory by his peers. But the main point of
Powell’s speech was to show how unrestricted immigration was inexora-
bly and unalterably changing the nature of British society. For Powell, it
was about numbers: “bearing in mind that numbers are of the essence:
the significance and consequences of an alien element introduced into a
country or population are profoundly different according to whether that
element is 1% or 10%” (1991: 373–79). Powell’s warning went unheeded
and he was removed from the Conservative’s shadow cabinet. His politi-
cal career never recovered from the controversy created by his remarks,
even though there was much support for his views among voters. Today,
Powell’s words have a haunting presence in Britain, which was rocked by
“homegrown terror” and suicide bombings in London in July 2005. That
particular terrorist attack was perpetrated by Muslims extremists who
were born in England.

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Comparative profile of immigration in the second global century
Let us consider briefly some salient features of immigration to put the
consensus on the subject in context, and show why security concerns have
placed this consensus under siege since 9/11. In this discussion, I will rely
on the work of Jeffrey Williamson (2005) and the figures on mass migra-
tion he compiled. Williamson points out that the world is experiencing
the second “global century,” which began around 1950. In this view, the
first global century (based on years for which figures are available) began
around 1820 and ended with World War I. During the first global cen-
tury, barriers to trade and to the flows of labour and capital came down
and helped spread prosperity. Between 1914 and 1950, there was a retreat
from the gains of the first global century as a result of wars and economic
depression. In the second global century, increased and concerted efforts
have been made to repair ruptures after the first global century. The end
of the Cold War has accelerated the pace of the second global century as
globalization has become an irreversible phenomenon.
In terms of immigration, or mass migration from poor to prosperous
zones in the second global century, Williamson notes that the annual
increase of immigrants to North America and Europe was gradual until
the mid-1970s, after which it rose sharply to one million immigrants per
year in the 1990s. As Williamson writes, “the absolute numbers by then
were similar to those reached during the age of mass migration about a
century earlier, but they were smaller relative to the destination coun-
try populations that had to absorb them” (2005: 1). His figures reveal
that, contrary to popular belief, the number of immigrants entering the
United States as a percentage of the population remains well below the
peak reached in the first global century. As Williamson notes, “the annual
immigration rate fell from 11.6 immigrants per thousand in the 1900s to
0.4 immigrant per thousand in the 1940s, before rising again to four immi-
grants per thousand in the 1990s” (2005: 1).
As the proportion of foreign-born people to native population changed,
the effects of the immigration flow were felt in the host country. Between
1965 and 2000, the percentage of a host country’s total population com-
prised of foreign-born people increased from 6% to 13% in North America,

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and from 2.2% to 7.7% in Europe.1 The source-area composition of legal
immigrants to the United States during this period also shifted dramati-
cally. More than half of those who immigrated between 1951 and 1960
originated from Europe, around 40% were from the Americas (of this
number, more than 25% came from Mexico), and just over 6% were from
Asia. Between 1991 and 2000, the source-area composition showed a sharp
decline from Europe to approximately 15%, from the Americas an increase
to under 50% (Mexicans accounted for half of this number), and a dramatic
five-fold increase in immigrants from Asia to 30.7%. In the same period,
the number immigrants from Africa also rose dramatically (more than
six-fold) from 0.6% to 3.9% (Williamson, 2005: 4).
The figures for Canada provided by Statistics Canada are comparable to
those in the United States. In 1961, 85.71% of immigrants to Canada were
from Europe and 2.0% were from Asia. In 2001, 42.0% were from Europe
and 36.5% were from Asia. The huge surge of Asians arriving in North
America after 1970 can be partly explained by recognizable push factors,
such as wars and the search for economic opportunities, as in other peri-
ods of migration growth. But the surge also coincided with and benefited
from a transportation revolution that brought transcontinental wide-body
jetliners into operation. The economy of travel dramatically changed as
a result. First, the cost of traveling declined despite oil price increases in
1973-1974 and 1979, and later the steady rise in fuel prices during the last
quarter of the twentieth century. Secondly, transcontinental and trans-
oceanic travel time by airplanes took a fraction of the time spent travelling
by sea before wide-body jetliners were introduced in the 1960s.
We have not yet worked out the implications of this revolutionary
change in moving people and what it has meant for migration and the
receiving host countries. We need to take into account these implications
1 For the purpose of this migration study, North America consists of Canada and the
United States, and excludes Mexico. Europe includes the former communist countries
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Population movement has occurred
from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into Western Europe; consequently,
the percentage of foreign-born people in the western half of Europe is much larger
than that of Europe as a whole (Williamson, 2005: 2–3).

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in order to determine whether the words “immigrant” and “immigration”
carry the same meaning as they did before 1960, or whether we need
to introduce new terms such as “migrant worker.” In a global economy,
such terms may provide a better understanding of why newcomers—
in particular, those within Muslim communities in North America and
Europe—are resisting integration or assimilation into the host country’s
political culture.
Immigrant Muslim communities in Canada and the United States
The number of Muslims in Canada and in the United States as a percent-
age of the total population is still very small but is showing the most rapid
growth among religious groups in these countries. A recent Pew Research
Center on Muslim Americans estimated that the number of Muslims in
the United States, based on the Census Bureau data, is 2.35 million—about
0.8% of a total population of over 302 million (2007: 3). Two-thirds (65%)
of adult Muslims in the United States are foreign-born, and 39% have
immigrated to the States since 1990.
Similar to the United States, Canada’s census data show a relative surge
of Muslim newcomers in the 1990s. In 1991, there were 253,265 Muslim
Canadians, making up 0.9% of the total population. Ten years later, the
Muslim population had doubled. In 2001, there were 579,640 Muslim
Canadian, accounting for 2.0% of the Canadian population (Statistics
Canada, 2003: 8, 18). In 2006, there were an estimated 700,000 Muslim
Canadians, making up 2.2% of the population. The median age of Muslim
Canadians is 28 years—the youngest in the country based on religious
affiliation—which means that they have the most rapid growth potential
of all religious communities.
Immigrants or migrant workers
In the conventional or traditional sense, an immigrant is an individual who
leaves his native country—for whatever combination of push or pull fac-
tors—for an intended host country with the commitment to permanently
adopting it as his country in the fullest meaning, accepting its values,

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participating in its political culture, and giving it his unreserved loyalty.
Before World War II and for sometime until the 1950s, traveling by way of
trains or ships took many weeks and entailed considerable expense. This
contributed to the psychological aspect of the decision-making involved
in starting out as an immigrant. There are many poignant stories of these
journeys—stories of leaving behind native lands with some certainty of
never returning, and of anticipating the new lands as well the accompa-
nying challenges of settlement and assimilation. Immigration involved
cutting one’s ties in order to enter a new world. An immigrant was, for
the most part, brimming with gratitude for the opportunities open to him
that did not exist or were denied him in his native country.
In contrast, a migrant worker remains situated in two countries: his
native home and his place of his work. He does not have to make the same
choices an immigrant makes, and he is not asked to make these choices
by the host country, since his presence is acknowledged as temporary. A
migrant worker is not a new phenomenon, although globalization has
contributed to the increasing demand for and the supply of migrant work-
ers. For example, this phenomenon is apparent in the oil-rich Persian Gulf
states where the economy is sustained by migrant workers.
But what happens when the host country admits migrant workers and
allows them to stay on as immigrants? This phenomenon of migrant work-
ers becoming immigrants can be observed in the surge of migration to
Europe in recent decades, and the dissonance between the expectations
of the host country and the behaviour of newcomers. This surge occurred
as push and pull factors coincided. Over the past 30 years, the phenom-
enon of failed and near-failed states has created a dramatic increase in
push factors, resulting in a surge of migrants from states in Asia and
North Africa that have a Muslim majority population. The impact of the
revolution in transportation also occurred during this period. This revo-
lution made it possible for an individual in Asia, for example, to have his
breakfast in Karachi and look for dinner in New York City or Toronto on
the same day.
Moreover, the new arrival process an immigrant faces in the host coun-
try often does not require him to submit himself to the sort of preparation
immigrants of an earlier era did. The documents provided by the host

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country, which may include accelerated citizenship, can in some cases be
papers of convenience that allow the immigrant to reside in his adopted
country and earn income there, while still being able to be connected to
his native country with which he did not cut his umbilical ties. Most host
countries would not require him to do so.
Host country dilemma
Since the late 1960s, host countries—particularly, those in Western Europe—
have been squeezed by changes in internal political-cultural debates, and
by the arrival of newcomers who are mostly from parts of the world once
ruled as colonies by some of these countries. By questioning their country’s
colonial-imperialist past, as well as racism, fascism, and wars, the 1960s
generation in the West began chipping away at their respective national
identities. When Deconstruction2 came into vogue, deconstructing the leg-
acy of the Enlightenment in modern Europe and North America deprived
the West of its ability to face the cultural opposition from marginal groups
and developing societies. In due course, the weakening of the Western
identity left a space to be filled. Since Western liberal democratic societ-
ies became more averse to demanding that newcomers embrace any part
or the whole of their identity, such identity being subjected to critical re-
examination, these newcomers were increasingly left to their own resources
to shape their views about themselves in foreign lands.
It has been said that there is a hole at the centre of liberalism, for it does
not address the subject of group identity (Fukuyama, 2006). Classical liber-
alism was concerned with acquiring and defending individual liberty from
the clutches of collectivism—that is, politics that are organized around
the identity of tribes, nations, castes, class, church, or mosque. Classical
liberalism was also a product of Christian Europe. As Europeans chiseled
away their national identities in the post-Christian age, they were faced
2 Traced back to contemporary French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction
began to be used in literary, historical, and cultural studies in the 1960s. The American
Heritage Dictionary (2005) defines it as a philosophical movement and theory of literary
criticism that questions traditional assumptions about certainty, identity, and truth.

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with the problem of reconciling their liberalism and secularism with the
group identity of newcomers—especially the group identity of Muslims,
which is based on their religion.
The answer to the liberal problem came in the form of multicultur-
alism, an idea promoted most vigorously in Canada, despite the pro-
tests of Québec elitists who wanted the country to remain bicultural.
Multiculturalism offered the tantalizing prospect of moving the post-
Christian West into an openly pluralist society in which different cul-
tures could coexist harmoniously on the basis of equality, without having
to adopt the “melting pot” approach of the United States. This policy of
multiculturalism was an invitation to newcomers to maintain their own
respective religious-cultural values, while embracing cultural relativism—
the belief that all cultures are equal. Western liberals concurred that, given
the history of Europe and North America, the West did not possess the
moral authority to demand that immigrants reform their cultural values
in accordance with the values of the host country in order to be accepted
as equal members in Western societies.
But liberalism’s silence on group identity and group rights was not a
matter of forgetfulness; it was a recognition that when the individual and
collective collide, the freedom of the individual takes precedence. By pro-
moting multiculturalism, Western liberals began undermining liberalism,
since all groups do not embrace liberal values equally, and Muslims, in par-
ticular, remain resistant to the idea of individual rights and gender equality
(Lewis, 2004; Meddeb, 2003; UNDP, 2002). In practice, multiculturalism
has tended towards a plural “monoculturalism” that allows cultural groups
to withdraw into their own spaces (Sen, 2006). The effort of Muslims in the
West to secure host countries’ recognition of their group rights in law—the
rule of shariah (Islamic laws)—based on the premise of multiculturalism
is not surprising. Denying the demands of the Muslims while subscribing
to multiculturalism further complicates the liberal problem.
9/11 and homegrown terrorism
The recent Islamist terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington,
DC, were followed by terrorist attacks in Madrid, Amsterdam (the killing

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of Theo van Gogh), London, and elsewhere, as well as riots in France.
Since 9/11, there have also been a number of planned terrorist attacks in
the United States, Britain, and Canada that have been foiled. All of these
events have their roots in the politics and cultural-political upheavals
within the Arab-Muslim world. When four British-born Muslim suicide-
bombers attacked London on July 7, 2005, Tony Blair, Britain’s Prime
Minister, clearly expressed his view on the origin and spread of Islamism—
the converting of Islam from a faith-tradition into a political ideology with
an emphasis on jihad or holy war—in relation to the making of Muslim
fanatics who are going to war against the West. Blair noted that “its roots
are not superficial, but deep, in the Madrassas of Pakistan, in the extreme
forms of Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia, in the former training camps
of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, in the cauldron of Chechnya, in parts of the
politics of most countries in the Middle East and many in Asia; in the
extremist minority that now in every European city preach hatred of the
West and our way of life” (Blair, 2005).
How far the roots go back is beyond the scope of this chapter, but
a number of observations can be made. Large-scale Muslim migration
to Europe and North America after the 1970s and during the surge in
the 1990s has coincided with the revival of a Muslim fundamentalism
that changes into Islamist extremism, and with the retreat in the Arab-
Muslim world from its hesitant opening to modern politics based on secu-
lar nationalism.
For secular-minded Arabs, the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 brought
a humiliating end to the Pan-Arabism of Egyptian dictator, Gamal Abdel
Nasser, and this defeat spurred the revival of Islam as preached by the
Muslim Brotherhood and financed by the Saudi Wahhabists. In 1971,
Pakistan broke apart in the midst of a brutal civil war, mass killings by
the military in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and a humiliating military
defeat in its war with India. In Iran, the Shah’s regime faced increasing
opposition from anti-royalists who succeeded in driving the Shah into
exile and making it possible for fundamentalist religious forces led by
Ayatollah Khomeini to secure power. The former Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq engaged in a long-running war in the 1980s, and
many were dislocated as a result of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Political

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instability and violent attacks shook Algeria, and great bloodshed con-
tinues in the endless Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These events together
created a push factor for Muslims to migrate to the West.
The arrival of Muslims from failed and failing states, which began in
the 1970s, occurred as Europe and North America entered a new era of
economic expansion in which the West opened doors to immigration from
non-traditional areas of the developing world, including the Middle East
and North Africa. The slow demographic shift caused by declining birth
rates began in this era, as did the full-blown intellectual engagement in
deconstructing liberalism. The Muslims who arrived in the West came
into this environment and settled as immigrants, but had most of the
characteristics of migrant workers.
The new arrivals founded their own institutions for meeting their reli-
gious-cultural needs. The most important institution that was built was
the mosque, which provided day-care for children and religious education,
and became a centre for social networking. Much of this was not entirely
new for the West, which had already experienced cycles of earlier migra-
tions of ethnic and religious groups within its own cultural boundaries.
What was new about the most recent phase of migration was the new
arrivals—in particular, Muslims from the Arab-Muslim countries of Asia
and Africa—who came from outside of the West’s cultural boundaries
and were not prepared to fully accept the host country’s culture. In time,
Muslims constructed their own cultural wall between the host country and
themselves, assisted with funds from oil-rich Arab countries—especially
Saudi Arabia. This cultural wall was invisible at first, and no one in the host
country paid much attention to what was taking place behind it. It is esti-
mated that, between 1973 and 2003, about $70 billion US was distributed
by the Saudi Wahhabi establishment for Islamist missionary work, and a
portion of this money flowed into building mosques and related activities
of Muslim communities in Europe and North America (Allen, 2006: 277;
Alexiev, 2003; Ehrenfeld, 2005; Levitt, 2003).
The Muslim children of the new arrivals who came of age in the 1990s
found themselves caught between two worlds—that of their parents, to
which they could not return, and that of the West, which their parents did
not fully accept. After 9/11, the West began to awaken to the story of these

Immigration and Muslim Extremists 31
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children who were growing into adulthood (Malik, 2007). This generation
of youth has been inducted into the globalized version of an historical
Islam that harkens back to an idealized and airbrushed seventh century
of the Common Era (or the first century of the Islamic calendar), which
emphasizes the collective Muslim identity of the ummah—the community
of believers. This idealized conception is the version of Islam that dwells
exclusively and obsessively on the idea of jihad (holy war), the religious
obligation of Muslims that is preached by the Wahhabi imams or those
associated with the politics of the Muslim Brotherhood in mosques that
are funded by money solicited from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and
Libya, within the Shiite branch of Muslims with support from Khomeini’s
Iran. This brand of Islam has appealed to rootless young Muslims by pro-
viding them with a group identity that carries with it the romanticism
of belonging to an international faith-community—the ummah—which
transcends borders and ethnic markers.
This ideology (Islamism) has given that small segment of Muslims striv-
ing for political activism the ready-made cause of opposing the West as an
imperial hegemon in its relations with the Muslim world. For the Islamists
and their sympathizers, the Muslim world is a victim of the Western world,
which has exploited its resources and occupied its lands in the Middle
East (Palestine), South Asia (Kashmir), the Caucasus (Chechnya), and
Southeast Asia (islands in the Indonesian and the Philippines archipelago).
In the post-9/11 world, recruits known as “homegrown terrorists” have
come out of the ranks of the Islamists.
Islamism, as an ideology and an organizing principle for religiously-
based political parties, eventually supplanted secular-nationalist par-
ties within the Muslim world during the 1990s. In the West, Islamism
was imported into Muslim communities, and gradually acquired a pres-
ence in the media through organizations such as the Council on Islamic-
American Relations in the United States and its branch in Canada, the
Muslim Council of Britain, and similar organizations in France and else-
where in Europe. Its presence was established in educational institutions
through campus organizations such as the Muslim Student Association,
and in the wider Muslim community through organizations such as the
Islamic Society of North America. It was only a matter of time before

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these Muslim organizations would position themselves in the political
arena of host countries, claim to represent Muslim communities as vot-
ing blocs, and receive excessive attention from mainstream, established
political parties—particularly those on the left—seeking electoral support
in return.
Islamism acquired respectability in the West during the last quarter of
the twentieth century by escaping scrutiny. Muslim dissenters opposing
Islamism remain ostracized within larger Muslim communities and, ironi-
cally, are marginalized by the mainstream Western media and political
parties. Muslims who embrace liberal values and are at ease in the West
are viewed with suspicion by Islamists, and are increasingly intimidated
with threats of violence for being opponents of Islamism.
The “Rushdie affair” remains the most prominent cultural indicator
of the rise and spread of Islamism in Europe and North America and its
assault on the core values of the West. The Rushdie affair first took flight in
1988 in the Muslim communities of Britain, where people publicly burned
Salman Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses, which they condemned as
being blasphemous. In February 1989, it became an international affair
after Ayatollah Khomeini issued his infamous fatwa—a legal opinion of a
Muslim religious scholar—calling for Rushdie’s murder (Ruthven, 1990).
Conclusion
The West significantly contributed to the increasing prominence of
Islamism before 9/11 through its naivety, its ignorance, its openness to
the movement of funds from the Middle East to Muslim immigrant com-
munities, and its reluctance to publicly declare Islamism to be an ideology
that is unacceptable in liberal democracies. The West also contributed by
exhibiting a degree of willingness to accommodate the requirements of
Muslim practices and entertaining the argument for permitting the use
of shariah law.
Many in the West now face the urgent task of examining the extent to
which harm caused by the rise of Islamism and homegrown terrorism is
self-inflicted. This task will require a frank critical assessment of how mul-
ticulturalism has contributed to the erosion of the West’s own universal

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values of individual rights, gender equality, democracy, and secularism.
The Islamist war against the West is far from over, and the Islamists are
not yet prepared to offer any terms for their surrender—i.e., to cease their
waging a campaign against the West. This war has all the signs of genera-
tional conflict, similar to the Cold War between the West and the former
Soviet Union. Its Cold War experience should be valuable to the West in
its conflict with Islamism, for, not unlike Communism, Islamism is inter-
nationalist in its scope and agenda. If it confronts Islamism, the West does
not face even a remote possibility of military defeat, as was the case with
fascism and communism. But by failing to require Muslim immigrants to
adapt and abide by Western values, on the same basis as all other immi-
grants, the West does face the insidious unraveling of the values and politi-
cal culture that make a free society.

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References
Alexiev, Alex (2003). Wahhabism: State-Sponsored Extremism
World Wide. Testimony before the US Senate Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, June 26, 2003. . Accessed
January 15, 2008.
Allen, Charles (2006). God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the
Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad. Da Capo Press.
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2005).
Deconstruction. Bartleby. .
Blair, Tony (2005, July 16). Full text: Blair speech on terror. BBC
News. . Accessed
December 19, 2007.
Ehrenfeld, Rachel (2005). Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and
How to Stop It. Bonus Books.
Fukuyama, Francis (2006). Identity, Immigration, and Liberal
Democracy. Journal of Democracy 17, 2 (April): 5–20.
Levitt, Matthew (2003). Subversion from Within: Saudi Funding
of Islamic Extremist Groups in the United States [Edited version].
Testimony before the US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Technology, and Homeland Security, September 10, 2003. Edited
version dated October 2, 2003. . Accessed January 15, 2008.
Lewis, Bernard (2004). The Crisis of Islam. Random House.
Malik, Shiv (2007). My Brother the Bomber. Prospect 135 (June): 1–16.

Immigration and Muslim Extremists 35
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Meddeb, Abdelwahab (2003). The Malady of Islam. Basic Books.
Pew Research Center (2007). Muslim Americans: Middle Class and
Mostly Mainstream. . Accessed September 24, 2007.
Powell, Enoch J. (1991). Reflections of a Statesman: The Writings and
Speeches of Enoch Powell. Bellew.
Ruthven, Malise (1990). A Satanic Affair: Salman Rushdie and the Rage
of Islam. Chatoo & Windus.
Sen, Amartya (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny.
W. W. Norton and Company.
Statistics Canada (2003). 2001 Census: Analysis Series. Religions in
Canada. Statistics Canada. .
United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] (2002). Arab Human
Development Report. UN Publications.
Williamson, Jeffrey G. (2005). The Political Economy of World Mass
Migration: Comparing Two Global Centuries. The AEI Press.

Chapter 3
Mass Immigration Defeats
Homeland Security
Mark Krikorian
The security challenges posed by immigration are usually viewed as dis-
crete problems that can be addressed through better watch lists, for exam-
ple, or through additional resources for consular staff who conduct visa
interviews. But this is a mistake. Under modern conditions, mass immi-
gration itself is incompatible with security. This is true for two reasons:
first, immigration overwhelms our efforts to screen out security threats;
and, second, it creates large immigrant communities that shield and incu-
bate terrorists.
In the past, references to the “home front” were metaphorical, intended
to create among civilians at home a greater sense of solidarity with sol-
diers at the war fronts. But advances in communications, transportation,
and weapons technology mean that today—and in the indefinite future—
the home front is no longer a metaphor, but is an actual war front. As
President George W. Bush has said, “Our country is a battlefield in the
first war of the 21st century” (White House, 2003).
This new context makes immigration a central issue—perhaps the
central issue—in considerations of national security. The staff report of
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
on “terrorist travel” opens by stating, “it is perhaps obvious to state that

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terrorists cannot plan and carry out attacks in the United States if they
are unable to enter the country” (Eldridge et al., 2004). Enemy operatives
not only need to enter the United States, or whatever country they are
targeting, but also often need to remain under the radar, as it were, for
an extended period of time. This means that keeping foreign terrorists
out—and keeping them on the run or arresting them if they do get in—is
a security imperative.
The fact that the home territories of the developed world are now, as
they were in Europe during World War II, genuine theaters of war is a
consequence of “asymmetric” or “Fourth-Generation” warfare, in which
weaker countries or political forces use unconventional tactics against
stronger opponents (Krikorian, 2004). These tactics are not new, but
the success of the 9/11 attacks, and the subsequent bombings in London,
Madrid, and elsewhere, have made high-casualty attacks on civilians in
the homelands of Western nations the chief tactical goal of Islamic terror-
ists. Neither the United States nor Canada has experienced anything like
this before, having long been protected by oceans serving “in the office
of a wall,” to borrow a phrase from Shakespeare’s Richard II. But, as the
Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review observed, “geographic insularity
no longer confers security for the country” (United States Department of
Defense, 2006).
It is important to note that this threat to our territory and our civil-
ian population will not end when radical Islam is tamed or defeated. In
all future wars, the enemy will at least consider using our immigration
system as a means of attacking us, whether the enemy is North Korea,
China, Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–
Ejército del Pueblo (FARC), or any other nation or force with whom we
may go to war.
Excessive immigration overwhelms our ability to detect threats
One security problem created by excessive immigration is that it over-
whelms a country’s ability to detect and exclude malefactors. In the United
States, the lead agencies in this task are not part of the military. Instead,
they fall under the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs (which

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issues visas) and the immigration-related elements of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). When we examine the immigration histories
of prior terrorists, the need for these agencies to be effective becomes
clear. One analysis of the 48 foreign-born al-Qaeda operatives who com-
mitted crimes in the United States between 1993 and 2001 (including the
9/11 hijackers) found that they had penetrated almost every part of the
immigration system (Camarota, 2002). Of the 48, one-third were in the
United States on various temporary visas, one-third were legal residents
or naturalized citizens, one-fourth were illegal aliens, and the remainder
were former illegal aliens with pending asylum applications. Nearly half
of them had, at one point or another, violated ordinary immigration laws.
Another examination of 94 foreign-born terrorists in the United States,
who belonged to al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups, found
that about two-thirds (59) had committed immigration violations prior
to or in conjunction with taking part in terrorist activity, and some had
multiple violations (Kephart, 2005).
These statistics demonstrate that strict enforcement of regular immi-
gration laws could yield significant security benefits by keeping terrorists
out and making it harder for them to operate. Strict enforcement could
also result in the arrest of terrorists who are already here, thus disrupting
conspiracies and providing subjects for interrogation. This enforcement is
related to but separate from security-specific tools such as watch lists.
The immigration control network
The immigration control network has three layers of defense: (1) over-
seas, where visas are issued; (2) at the border, including inspection points
at air, sea, and land ports of entry, as well as the long stretches between
such entry points; and (3) in the interior of the country. Each of these
layers faces huge, unmanageable demand, which breeds pervasive fraud
and leads overwhelmed administrators to wave people through without
adequate scrutiny. In the nineteenth century, it did not matter as much
how effectively aliens were screened—after all, how much damage could a
gang of Bolsheviks or anarchists do, given the primitive communications,
transportation, and weapons technologies of the time? But today’s volume

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of immigration simply cannot be subjected to the level of scrutiny that is
needed because of the modern security environment.
Security filters overseas
The first of the three security filters is the responsibility of visa officers
working for the State Department, which has been described by one writer
as “America’s other Border Patrol” (Wenzel, 2000). This layer is particu-
larly important because the closer a foreigner is to the United States, the
greater the practical difficulty of keeping him out. Rejecting a visa appli-
cant who lives abroad is much easier than turning away a foreigner who
has already made his way to the border because the burden of proof for
turning him away increases.
However, the most difficult task is finding and removing people who
have already come into the United States. In 2005, about 800 visa officers
issued around six million visas to foreigners, an average of about 7,500
visas per officer, or roughly one visa issued every 15 minutes. Because of
the large number of permanent and temporary visas allowed by current
legislation, officers seldom have more than a few minutes to decide a case,
leading to staggering rates of failure on the part of the officer to keep ter-
rorists from entering. To wit, at least four million people who entered the
United States with “temporary” visas simply stayed as illegal aliens after
their time ran out (United States Department of State, 2006). In addition,
an unknown number of people simply lied to obtain permanent immi-
grant visas.
The claim that proper immigration scrutiny would yield security ben-
efits is not merely a supposition. Investigative reporter Joel Mowbray
acquired copies of 15 of the 19 visa applications made by the 9/11 hijack-
ers, and found that every application should have been rejected on
ordinary, non-security grounds (2002, Oct. 28). They were improperly
completed, included obviously absurd answers to questions, and the
applicants were all young, unattached men with no income—precisely
the kind of people who are likely to become illegal aliens if permitted to
enter the United States.
The State Department, like any government agency, complains that
its resources are inadequate for the job, and it is certainly correct. But

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even massive increases in personnel—beyond anything that is actually
feasible—would not ensure the proper vetting of applicants at the current
level of admissions. The staff increases that have taken place since 9/11 are
not what they seem, since many of the new officers are simply replacing
locally hired foreign staff who never should have been part of the visa
process in the first place.
The only way that the United States will ever be able to have a visa sys-
tem that is appropriate, given modern security needs, is by reducing the
number of immigrant and non-immigrant visas available. Even the State
Department recognizes the trade-off between volume and quality. One
staff report for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States noted that “quality decisions can make the process less effi-
cient, and, in the context of declining staff, posts have often been forced
to choose efficiency over quality” (Eldridge et al., 2004). The report sug-
gested that efficiency could be increased by approving a larger portion of
non-immigrant (temporary) visas without interviewing the applicant—the
exact opposite of what security demands.
Security at the border
The second layer of the immigration security filter is at the border, where
the overload is even worse than at the visa offices abroad. In 2004, about
180 million foreigners were admitted into the United States as non-immi-
grants—visitors of all kinds—and that is only an estimate because the
overwhelming majority were Mexicans and Canadians whose entry was
not recorded (Grieco, 2007; United States Customs and Border Protection,
2006; United States Department of Homeland Security, 2006). In addi-
tion, about 169 million Americans and 75 million permanent residents
(green card holders) returned from abroad (US Department of Homeland
Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2006).1 Of the 32 million entries
by foreigners that were actually recorded in 2005, about 24 million were
tourists and nearly five million were business travelers. As well, in between
1 These figures do not represent the number of individuals who crossed the border
because these numbers include people who travelled back and forth across the border
and thus were counted more than once.

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ports of entry, mostly along the Mexican border, more than 1.1 million
foreigners were arrested by the Border Patrol while trying to sneak in.
This massive workload has led to the same response as that in the visa
offices overseas—a collective shrug by a demoralized bureaucracy and
the normalization of massive lawbreaking by both inspectors and Border
Patrol agents. At ports of entry, inspectors are simply unable to do their
jobs properly. Referring to the busiest crossing on the entire northern
border, a 2006 report noted that “US and Canadian inspectors on the
Ambassador Bridge [in Detroit] and elsewhere say they are routinely told
by supervisors to wave vehicles through checkpoints without scrutiny to
satisfy commercial interests” (Audi, 2006, Mar. 29). At airports, when the
inspectors’ computers are down, foreign visitors are admitted without
being checked against the various watch lists because it would take too
long and would lead to complaints from the airlines.
The overload is dealt with a little differently at ports of entry on the
Mexican border. There, Mexicans are issued a “Border-Crossing Card”—
colloquially known as a “laser visa”—for short local trips to shop or visit
relatives. These are modern, high-tech cards with digitized fingerprints
and the like, but they are almost never scanned because it would slow
down traffic (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2005).
The holders simply show the cards to the border inspectors as they pass
through, which results in massive fraud, both through the use of fake
cards and the use of genuine cards that belong to others. This is a major
vulnerability because half of all non-immigrant entries by foreigners into
the United States are Mexicans using a Border-Crossing Card.
The Border Patrol deals with its own massive workload by simply giv-
ing most Mexican border-jumpers what is called a “voluntary return”—i.e.,
the alien waives a hearing in exchange for not having a formal deporta-
tion on his record, which would make any subsequent penetration of the
United States a felony. In other words, border policing is much like the
old Soviet joke: “we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.” The
Border Patrol goes through the motions of law enforcement but does not
actually punish anyone.
Border failures caused by overload have already had security conse-
quences. For instance, the immigration inspector in Miami—one of the

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nation’s busiest international airports—who screened Mohammed Atta’s
return to the United States from Spain in January 2001 said “he knew that
if he took more time than 45 seconds to determine a visitor’s admissibility
or if he made too many referrals to secondary inspection, he could receive
a poor performance appraisal” (Eldridge et al., 2004: 17). Nonetheless, he
referred Atta to “secondary inspection” for further scrutiny, after which
Atta was eventually admitted, despite his lack of the proper documents
and despite his having overstayed his visa during his previous visit. Steven
Camarota (2002) notes that “the scale of illegal immigration creates a
tacit acceptance by law enforcement, policy makers, and even the INS
[Immigration and Naturalization Service] itself. For example, it was far
easier for an immigration inspector to allow Mohammed Atta back into
the country even though he overstayed his visa in January 2001 knowing
that there have been millions of overstayed visas in the past decade and
policy makers had done nothing about it.”
Security at home
The third layer of immigration control is inside the country. Similar to
the other two layers, the overload in this layer also results from a lack of
enforcement. Because there so many illegal aliens already in the United
States, the immigration enforcement bureaucracy simply goes through
the motions of doing its job, but seldom attempts to actually reduce ille-
gal immigration.
In addition to illegal immigration, this third layer of immigration con-
trol is also overloaded because of excessive legal immigration. While it
may seem that terrorists would require only physical access to the United
States—even as illegal aliens—this is not the case. As a former staff mem-
ber of the 9/11 Commission has written, “once within US borders, terror-
ists seek to stay. Doing so with the appearance of legality helps ensure
long-term operational stability” (Kephart, 2005).
Think of a foreigner’s access to the United States as a ladder. At the
bottom are those outside the United States, and at the top are immi-
grants who have become naturalized American citizens. Visas and bor-
der control are essential because they help keep malefactors from getting
into the country in the first place. But once in, terrorists seek to climb

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up the ladder—from illegal alien to short-term visitor, long-term visitor,
permanent resident, and finally American citizen—thereby gaining addi-
tional opportunities with each step. Every time a foreigner tries to take
another step up the ladder, the authorities—in this case, United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a part of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS)—have another chance to screen him for
security problems.
Unfortunately, massive overload makes proper screening impossible.
In 2005, USCIS received 6.3 million applications for 50 different kinds
of immigration benefits and adjudicated 7.5 million applications (United
States Government Accountability Office, 2006). On any given day, USCIS
processes 30,000 applications, conducts 135,000 national security back-
ground checks, and answers 82,000 telephone inquiries (United States
Department of Homeland Security, US Citizenship and Immigration
Services, 2005). The immigration bureaucracy is so utterly overwhelmed
that even DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff was forced to concede that
“parts of the system have nearly collapsed under the weight of numbers”
(Chertoff, 2005).
A particularly outrageous example of what happens if a bureaucracy
becomes overloaded occurred in 2003 when contract workers at an immi-
gration processing center in California decided to cope with the ongoing
tide of paperwork by simply shredding immigration documents in order
to wipe out a 90,000-document backlog there. After two months of shred-
ding, the backlog was cleared, and they kept shredding as new applications
came in to prevent the backlog from recurring (Broder, 2003, Jan. 31).
We can shake our heads at the irresponsibility of the people who would
do such a thing, but the real problem is systemic; it is the result of exces-
sive immigration. According to one government report,
It would be impossible for USCIS to verify all of the key information
or interview all individuals related to the millions of applications
it adjudicates each year—approximately 7.5 million applications
in fiscal year 2005—without seriously compromising its service-
related objectives. (United States Government Accountability
Office, 2006)

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Excessive immigration reinforces enclaves
The foregoing discussion examined how excessive immigration has clogged
the plumbing of a modern immigration control system. Another reason
why high immigration compromises security is that it creates and con-
stantly reinforces communities of foreigners that unwittingly but unavoid-
ably provide cover and incubation for attackers. In his address to Congress
after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush offered an apt analogy:
“Al-Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime” (Bush, 2001). This com-
parison is instructive. During the great wave of immigration around the
turn of the century, and for some time after immigration was stopped in
the 1920s, law enforcement had very little luck with penetrating the Mafia.
This was because Mafia-affiliated immigrants lived in enclaves, had limited
knowledge of English, were suspicious of government institutions, and
clung to Old World prejudices and attitudes such as omerta—the Sicilian
code of silence. But with the end of mass immigration, the assimilation of
Italian immigrants and their children accelerated, and the offspring of the
immigrants developed a sense of genuine membership and ownership in
America—what John Fonte (2003) of the Hudson Institute calls “patriotic
assimilation.” This process eliminated the enclaves in which the Mafia had
been able to develop, allowing law enforcement to become more effective
and eventually cripple the Mafia.
The relevance of this phenomenon to security concerns is clear. As the
chief intelligence officer for the DHS has said, “As previous attacks indi-
cate, overseas extremists do not operate in a vacuum and are often linked
with criminal and smuggling networks—usually connected with resident
populations from their countries of origin” (Allen, 2007).
Even worse than the role immigrant enclaves play in shielding terror-
ists is their role in recruiting and incubating new ones. One disturbing
example is that of Lackawanna, New York, where six Yemeni Americans—
five of them born in the United States to immigrant parents and raised
in an immigrant community—were arrested in 2002 for operating an al-
Qaeda terrorist sleeper cell. The six arrested men had traveled to Pakistan
in 2001, ostensibly for religious training, but actually went to an al-Qaeda
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. All of them are serving prison

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terms for providing material support to terrorism. The seventh member
of the cell—a naturalized American citizen—did not return after train-
ing in Afghanistan, was later jailed in Yemen, and escaped from prison in
2006. The ringleader of the cell, another American citizen, was killed in
Yemen by the CIA in 2002.
The community that bred this cell has been shaped largely by immigra-
tion. As the local paper reported,
This is a piece of ethnic America where the Arabic-speaking Al
Jazeera television station is beamed in from Qatar through satel-
lite dishes to Yemenite-American homes; where young children
answer “Salaam” when the cell phone rings, while older children
travel to the Middle East to meet their future husband or wife;
where soccer moms don’t seem to exist, and where girls don’t get
to play soccer—or, as some would say, football. (The Buffalo News,
2002, Sep. 23)
Between 1996 and 2005, more than 18,000 Yemenis immigrated legally to
the United States. In Lackawanna, the Arab population ballooned by 175%
during the 1990s. The median household income in the Yemeni neigh-
bourhood is currently 20% lower than the median in Lackawanna as a
whole (The Buffalo News, 2002, Sep. 18).
A report at the time of the Lackawanna arrests said it was likely that more
such groups existed among undigested immigrant communities. “Federal
officials say privately that there could be dozens of similar cells across the
country, together posing a grave danger to national security. They believe
that such cells tend to be concentrated in communities with large Arab
populations, such as Detroit” (The Buffalo News, 2002, Sep. 18).
Of course, Muslim immigrant communities are not alone in exhibiting
characteristics that may shield or even incubate criminality. For instance,
as criminologist Ko-lin Chin has written, “the isolation of the Chinese
community, the inability of American law enforcement authorities to pen-
etrate the Chinese criminal underworld, and the reluctance of Chinese
victims to come forward for help, all conspire to enable Chinese gangs
to endure” (1996: 18). The solution for Muslim immigrant communities

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is the same for these other ethnic groups. William Kleinknecht, author
of The New Ethnic Mobs, notes that “If the mass immigration of Chinese
should come to a halt, the Chinese gangster may disappear in a blaze of
assimilation after a couple of decades” (1996: 292).
Conclusion
The idea that there is a connection between immigration and terrorism
has been dismissed by many policy makers and activists. For instance,
then INS Commissioner James Ziglar piously observed shortly after 9/11,
“We’re not talking about immigration, we’re talking about evil” (United
States Department of State, 2001). Similarly, Cecilia Munoz of the National
Council of La Raza said, “There’s no relationship between immigration
and terrorism” (Bunis, 2001, Sep. 13). Referring to 9/11, Jeanne Butterfield,
executive director of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and
former head of the Marxist Palestine Solidarity Committee, echoed this
denial of reality: “I don’t think the events of last week can be attributed to
the failure of our immigration laws” (Martin, 2001, Sep. 19).
Indeed, to argue that a reduction in the level of immigration is neces-
sary for homeland security may seem opportunistic, similar to how agri-
cultural lobbyists used 9/11 to argue for farm subsidies by peddling the
idea of “food security.” After all, the only immigrants who pose a threat
to the security of the United States are Muslim extremists. But it is clear
that under modern conditions of asymmetric warfare, mass immigration
itself represents a significant security threat, both by overwhelming the
United States’ ability to filter out undesirables and by constantly refreshing
the immigrant communities that serve as havens for malefactors. While
there is no question that other security measures are also needed—such
as improved intelligence gathering overseas, greater cooperation with
foreign governments, and continued military operations—if the United
States does not reduce the levels of both permanent and temporary immi-
gration, it leaves itself open to the enemy.

48 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
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References
Allen, Charles E. (2007). Statement of Charles E. Allen, Assistant
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer,
Department of Homeland Security, before the Select Committee
on Intelligence, United States House of Representatives,
January 18, 2007.
Audi, Tamara (2006, March 29). Inspectors: Security Lags When Traffic
Jams. Detroit Free Press.
Broder, John M. (2003, January 31). Shredder Ended Work Backlog,
US Says. The New York Times. . Accessed
December 13, 2007.
The Buffalo News (2002, September 18). On Call to Aid al-Qaida from
Unlikely Places. A1.
The Buffalo News (2002, September 23). A Separate World. A1.
Bunis, Dena (2001, September 13). Amnesty May Lose Support: Backers
Fear Concerns about Border Security will Hurt Their Cause. The
Orange County Register.
Bush, George W. (2001). Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People, the White House, September 20, 2001. . Accessed
December 13, 2007.
Camarota, Steven A. (2002). The Open Door: How Militant
Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States,
1993-2001. Center for Immigration Studies Paper No. 21. . Accessed
December 13, 2007.

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www.fraserinstitute.org | Fraser Institute
Chertoff, Michael (2005). Statement of Secretary Michael Chertoff, US
Department of Homeland Security, before the United States Senate
Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC, October 18, 2005. . Accessed
December 13, 2007.
Chin, Ko-lin (1996). Chinatown Gangs. Oxford University Press.
Eldridge, Thomas R., Susan Ginsburg, Walter T. Hempel II, Janice L.
Kephart, and Kelly Moore (2004). 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States. . Accessed December 13, 2007.
Fonte, John (2003). We Need a Patriotic Assimilation Policy. Hudson
Institute. .
Grieco, Elizabeth M. (2007). Temporary Admissions of Non-immigrants
to the United States: 2005. United States Department of Homeland
Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. .
Accessed December 13, 2007.
Kephart, Janice L. (2005). Immigration and Terrorism: Moving Beyond
the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel. Center for Immigration Studies
Paper No. 24. . Accessed
December 13, 2007.
Kleinknecht, William (1996). The New Ethnic Mobs: The Changing Face
of Organized Crime in America. The Free Press.
Krikorian, Mark (2002, July 3). Eternal Vigilance: Handing Out
Green Cards is a Security Matter. National Review Online. .
Accessed December 13, 2007.
Krikorian, Mark (2004). Keeping Terror Out: Immigration Policy and
Asymmetric Warfare. The National Interest 75 (Spring): 1–9.
Martin, Gary (2001, September 19). Lawmakers Want Tighter Border.
The San Antonio Express-News. A8.
Mowbray, Joel (2002, October 28). Visas for Terrorists: They were Ill-
prepared. They were Laughable. They were Approved. National Review.
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United States Customs and Border Protection (2006). National
Workload Statistics. . Last updated May 25, 2006.
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Review Report. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).
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United States Department of Homeland Security [DHS] (2006).
FY04 Crossing Volume. Fax received by author from United States
Department of Homeland Security official, August 17, 2006.
United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector
General (2005). Implementation of the United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program at Land Border
Ports of Entry. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector
General, OIG-05-11. .
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Statistics (2006). 2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. .

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United States Department of Homeland Security, US Citizenship and
Immigration Services (2005). Fact Sheet: A Day in the Life of USCIS.
.
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Briefing on New Anti-Terrorism Immigration Policies. Last updated
October 31, 2001.
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Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance
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Office, GAO-06-259. .
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Wenzel, Nikolai (2000). America’s Other Border Patrol: The State
Department’s Consular Corps and its Role in US Immigration.
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White House (2003). President Discusses the Future of Iraq. News
release (February 26). White House, Office of the Press Secretary.
.
Accessed December 10, 2007.

Chapter 4
Canada’s Broken Refugee
Policy System
Stephen Gallagher
Compared to other countries in the developed world, Canada is soft on
illegal immigration. It is easier for an irregular migrant to secure per-
manent resident status in Canada than in any other developed country.
In Canada, the primary policy system that accomplishes the transition
from irregular migrant to resident status is the extended refugee policy
system. An irregular migrant is “a person without legal status in a tran-
sit or host country owing to illegal entry or the expiry of his/her visa”
(International Labour Organization, 2005), and the extended refugee sys-
tem is the web of entry, determination, appeal, and removal institutions
tasked with processing those who make a refugee claim in Canada. Aside
from infrequent migrant amnesties, refugee systems are the primary gate-
way through which irregular migrants gain entrance to the developed
world. Compared to other countries, the unparalleled generosity of the
Canadian extended refugee system, along with the absence of disincen-
tives to abuse, makes it undeniably attractive to status-seeking irregular
migrants, and clearly stimulates what is described in other countries as
abuse and illegal immigration.
However, in Canada, there is an absence of political and partisan
debate on the issue of abuse of the refugee system. In fact, there is an

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absence of political and partisan debate on immigration policy in general.
The reason for this lack of debate is connected to Canada’s self-image
of multiculturalism, openness, and tolerance, which is used by partisan
actors to gain electoral advantage. In this way, political actors can avoid the
migration debate and remain unwilling to implement and sustain effec-
tive migration management instruments. Meanwhile, well-funded and
well-organized advocacy and special interest groups connected to the
immigration field work tirelessly to ensure that the government lives up
to its pro-immigration rhetoric. The result is a maze of migration policies
that merely regularizes the bulk of the irregular migrant influx. This has
the political benefit of avoiding the contentious and difficult process of
deporting large numbers of illegal immigrants.
The problems with Canada’s extended refugee policy system are
well-known to the Canadian government. All of the recent Ministers of
Citizenship and Immigration have stated a desire to more effectively “bal-
ance” Canada’s international obligations towards those fleeing persecu-
tion with Canada’s interest in controlling irregular migration. To follow
through on any significant reform initiative, however, would be controver-
sial and difficult in the current context because the current government,
led by the Conservative Party, holds a minority in the House of Commons,
and is actively pursuing the support of voters who have recently become
Canadians (Ivison and Hanes, 2007, Jan. 6). In the recent past, members
of the federal Liberal Party have had success labeling the Conservative
Party and its predecessors as racist and anti-immigration because of their
criticisms of refugee policy. Given a new opportunity, these Liberals would
likely renew their attacks (Ivison, 2007, Feb. 23).
The federal government’s Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) has
been Canada’s primary response to an influx of approximately 300,000
refugee claimants received in the last decade (UNHCR-PDU, 2004:
table 2). This agreement with the United States, which is intended to
allocate to the first country entered the responsibility to hear a refugee
claim, came into force in December 2004 (Canada, 2004, Nov. 3). But
the STCA system has structural flaws and is failing to protect Canada’s
refugee claimant reception and determination processes from excessive
cost, abuse, and overload.

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In the absence of an effective entry management mechanism, such as a
functional safe third country policy, the Canadian government may wish to
consider adopting a manifestly unfounded policy or a safe country of ori-
gin policy. A manifestly unfounded policy involves asking a claimant upon
arrival whether he or she has any claim whatsoever. If not, the individual
is quickly deported. Such a system is widespread in Europe, including the
United Kingdom where it is called a “clearly unfounded policy.” A safe
country of origin policy allows for the expedited review of claimants from
countries that are not normally associated with persecution. Reforming
Canada’s refugee determination system by adopting both of these policies
would involve changes to Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB),
the administrative tribunal that reviews refugee claims. The objective of
such reform would be to make the determination process “faster, fairer,
and firmer,” in the words of the United Kingdom’s reform mantra.
However, fundamental reform of the refugee system is not likely to take
place in the near future because it would not be politically expedient. The
attitude generally held by the media, most society-based commentators,
and the advocacy community is that the main problem with the refugee
system relates to “first instance” determination—the first examination of
a refugee’s claim—inconsistencies and errors. According to them, rejected
claimants do not have an opportunity to appeal on the merits of their
claim. The rise and success of the “church sanctuary movement” provides
evidence of the difficulties the government would likely face if it pursues a
migration control agenda. To make matters more difficult, the process of
removing rejected claimants is very complex, attracts significant societal
criticism, and the government appears very willing to address individual
and group cases with special immigration deals.
Reform of the refugee system is also unlikely because the number of
refugee claims in Canada in 2004-2006 was relatively low compared to
1999-2003, as has been the case in most of the developed world. As a result,
political pressure to reform the system has lessoned, and the government
has become more willing to seek ad hoc solutions to irregular migration
problems.
In all, Canada presents a good example of the workings of “cli-
ent politics”—the benefits of Canada’s open door system are highly

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concentrated in new-Canadian communities and the immigration and
rights activist industries, while the costs are diffused broadly across the
entire political and social system (Freeman, 2003: 5). This means that a
defense of the public’s interest in having an effectively managed migration
system is, for the most part, left up to partisan actors who are constrained
by the electoral and expediency concerns noted above. To a great extent,
this explains why the existing Parliamentary, special interest, and elec-
toral situation does not provide decision makers with an environment
conducive to reform, regardless of both the cost and dysfunctionality
of the existing system and the common understanding that reform is
needed to address the incentives in the existing system that “pull” irreg-
ular migrants. Consequently, in the foreseeable future, Canada’s costly
extended refugee policy system will continue to attract significant num-
bers of irregular migrants and will be vulnerable to overload. Moreover, if
efforts to reform the immigration system in the United States fail, Canada
may see a major influx of status-seeking migrants in the near future. In
fact, there are already signs that such an influx is beginning to take shape
as large numbers of irregular migrants in the United States are report-
edly considering traveling to Canada to make a refugee claim (Davey and
Goodnough, 2007, Sep. 21).
The asylum migration issue and the politics of entry
A large part of the difficulty that the government faces with respect to
irregular migration control measures results from the fact that the media
and the general public view immigration positively, and they generally
fail to distinguish between selected immigrants or resettlement refu-
gees, and self-selected in-country refugee claimants or asylum seekers.
In fact, refugee claimants are often simply referred to as “refugees” by
the media; the term “asylum seeker” is not in popular usage. Even failed
asylum seekers, such as those who have been given church sanctuary, are
often referred to either as “refugees” (Montreal Gazette, 2004, Dec. 15)
or “rejected refugees.” Both of these terms imply that the migrant pos-
sesses a legitimate residency claim. Because of these biases, a defence of
migration management efforts is difficult. Even clear cases of abuse may

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be framed and vilified as anti-refugee, anti-immigrant, and “un-Canadian”
by advocacy groups and those who profit from gaining status for foreign-
ers in Canada.
Canada is out of step with other countries that have “high volume”
refugee determination systems because it does not fully utilize the avail-
able range of migration management instruments, such as safe country of
origin, application time limits, and “last in-first out” policies (Legomsky,
1996). These entry controls include a mix of three types of policies: (1) a
detention policy; (2) a manifestly unfounded policy; and (3) a safe third
country policy.
A willingness to detain
In Australia, illegally arriving refugee claimants are detained until their
claim is fully processed. In the United States, the law states that illegal
arrivals must be detained and removed. If they make an asylum claim,
they should be detained until the process is complete (although many if
not most refugee claimants are paroled). In Canada, an illegal entrant who
makes a refugee claim at a point of entry is usually not detained. While
there is little doubt that other countries use detention and reception cen-
ters as both a deterrent to entry and a means by which to avoid claimant
integration prior to determination, this is simply not practical in Canada
because the extended refugee process takes so long to complete. In addi-
tion, detention initiatives attract criticism, even in the national security
arena. For example, in February 2005, Canada’s Federal Court forced the
government to release Adil Charkaoui, an asylum seeker, on $50,000 bail.
Charkaoui was being held under a “security certificate,” which allows the
government to detain non-Canadian citizens who are considered to be
threats to national security. Since 2001, certificates have been issued for
only six people, and not one of them has been unwillingly deported.
A manifestly unfounded policy
Unlike other refugee-hosting countries in the developed world, Canada has
no manifestly unfounded policy. In the United States, this policy requires
those who arrive illegally and make a refugee claim to have a “credible fear”
of persecution in order to be granted a full assessment of their claim. If they

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cannot convince an asylum officer or an immigration judge that they have
a credible fear, they can be deported within a matter of days. In August
2004, this “expedited removal” policy was first applied to illegal entrants
seeking entrance to the United States at the Canadian land border. In
Canada, however, almost anyone from anywhere can make a refugee claim
for almost any reason, even if it is a transparent attempt to slow a removal
process. For example, a man who argued that if he remained in Poland he
would relapse into alcoholism could not be denied access to a full refugee
determination hearing, including a federal court review (Freeze, 2005, Sep.
23). Although Canada does not have a manifestly unfounded policy, claim-
ants face, at the very outset, a security screening to determine if they are
eligible to enter the refugee process. But if they are found to be ineligible,
that does not mean a speedy removal, or, as the Charkaoui case shows,
detention until a decision is made. It is not surprising that when the gov-
ernment sought to quickly deport a well-known holocaust-denier, Ernst
Zundel, after he was deported from the United States and made a refugee
claim on entry to Canada, they chose to use the security certificate route.
This proved unsuccessful when the process became bogged down in court.
In the end, after two years in detention, Zundel agreed to be deported (The
Globe and Mail, 2005, Mar. 2). In practice, there is simply no mechanism
in Canadian law that allows the government to quickly deport a reluctant
foreign national who has made a refugee claim.
A safe third country policy
A country may also regulate entry by establishing a safe third country
policy. Having such a policy means, for example, that if a refugee claim-
ant entered one of the 27 European Union countries from another EU
country, only the first country entered has the responsibility to hear the
claim. In the absence of such a policy, the majority of asylum seekers in
Europe would likely end up in Germany or the United Kingdom, where
jobs, family, and friends are likely to be found.
In 2001, Canada signed a safe third country agreement with the United
States, expecting that it would become operational by the end of 2002.
The agreement finally came into force in December 2004. The agreement
matters little to the United States because there are so few people passing

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through Canada to make a refugee claim in the United States. In fact, in
2005, the first year of operation, only 66 claims were made (Citizenship
and Immigration Canada, 2006: 44). In addition, relatively few of the refu-
gee claimants who pass through the United States to reach Canada would
have much chance of being recognized in the United States or in any other
country for that matter. For example, in 2004, Canada’s top two refugee
claimant source countries were Columbia and Mexico, which together
lodged more claims in Canada than in the United States (UNHCR-PGDS,
2005: table 8). Their recognition rates in Canada were 86% and 33% respec-
tively compared to 44.6% and 2.8% in the United States. That same year,
Canada’s recognition rate of claimants from China, one of Canada’s top
source countries in 2004, was roughly double the recognition rate in the
United States. These figures illustrate the need for Canada to legislate a
manifestly unfounded policy. In 2005 and 2006, this pattern persisted with
one change: Columbia fell to third place as a source country after China
(UNHCR-DS, 2007a).
Clearly, the absence of a functional safe third country policy is a fun-
damental problem with Canada’s refugee system. However, it is a problem
that will be very difficult to address because refugee lawyers and advocates
can rightly claim that no country, and certainly not the United States, is as
generous to refugee claimants in terms of reception conditions and rec-
ognition rates. For example, Amnesty International’s 2005 report claims
that the United States is not a “safe protection partner” (Ottawa Citizen,
2005, May 25).
Of course, much of this concern about the impact of the agreement is
propagandistic. As I have argued elsewhere, the current agreement with
the United States is fundamentally flawed as an instrument of migration
management and will not have much of an impact on the flow of refugee
claims, except possibly as a psychological deterrent (Gallagher, 2003). In
a recent report, the Canadian government reported that, in 2005, only 303
claims out of a total of 19,735 claims, 4,033 of which were made at the bor-
der, were declared “ineligible” to make a refugee claim in Canada because of
the agreement. In 3,254 cases, claimants at the border were able to invoke
an exception in the agreement, such as the presence of a family member
residing in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2006: 31).

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There are many reasons why a refugee claimant would want to pass
through the United States or Europe to come to Canada. The claimant
may have family or friends in Canada, which is why more than half of the
refugee claims in Canada are made inland by claimants who may have
originally obtained a legal visitor’s visa. The visa screening mechanism
makes every effort to block potential “overstayers,” but the government is
often criticized for excesses in this effort.
Another benefit of making a refugee claim in Canada is that a claimant
can apply to work in Canada while awaiting a decision. To obtain a work
permit, the claimant must not be self-supporting. The reason behind this
policy is the idea that allowing a claimant to work will reduce support
costs for the government. Nevertheless, support costs are high in any case
because refugee claimants often lack language or technical skills. For this
reason, governments often provide language training, as well as a range of
educational opportunities to claimants. Another attractive benefit of mak-
ing a claim in Canada is that, unlike the United States, refugee claimants
often have access to free legal assistance in order to prepare their cases.
Ultimately, the most important attraction of Canada, which will be
discussed further below, is that for many migrants from the developing
world, making a refugee claim is an effective conduit for securing resi-
dence status in Canada. Put simply, Canada’s existing extended refugee
policy system guarantees a few years stay in Canada and holds the promise
of a prosperous new life in a wealthy, developed country.
The Immigration and Refugee Board
The core weakness in Canada’s migration management regime is the
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). This board makes the first assess-
ment as to whether an individual is a legitimate refugee. The process of
making this decision requires an independent decision maker—an IRB
board member—to hold a formal hearing on whether a claimant should
be recognized as a United Nations’ “convention” refugee. No other coun-
try implements this type of “first instance” refugee determination pro-
cess. Close to 20 years of the author’s experience with the IRB shows
that, regardless of the presence of so many hardworking and professional

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individuals, this system produces inconsistent decisions, is administra-
tively unwieldy, overly legalistic, open to abuse, and slow. Much effort
has gone into addressing these concerns and some improvement can be
observed. However, there remains a number problems associated with
the independent first instance approach. Some of these issues could be
remedied if public officials conducted the first instance determination
process. The decision making of an IRB board member is much less likely
to be consistent than that of a public official. Unlike an IRB board mem-
ber, a public official can be rigorously trained and carefully monitored to
ensure that his decisions accurately reflect government policy. Examples
of decision making inconsistency within the current independent process
are numerous and well documented (Jimenez, 2004, July 24).
Moreover, unlike the independent decision maker, a public official can
be required to meet targets. Backlogs are a fact of life at the IRB. Although
refugee determination work is challenging and requires a high level of
diligence, the patronage appointment system has been a focus of criticism
since the creation of the IRB. The presence of such concerns suggests that
the workload requirements and remuneration likely do not match norms
found elsewhere, such as the United States, where a high turnover rate
is identified as a concern among its corps of asylum officers (Ewing and
Johnson, 2005).
Another problem with Canada’s first instance determination approach
stems from the fact that all claimants appear before a tribunal. This
approach requires a structured and formal process which leads to admin-
istrative and procedural complexity. In other countries such as Australia,
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the claimant is inter-
viewed by administrative officials. The formalities and procedural guar-
antees of a tribunal setting are reserved for appeal stages.
In addition, other countries manage first instance determination
directly to ensure that only legitimate cases of persecution are recog-
nized. This is done to avoid the development of a self-selected parallel
immigration system which may stimulate people-smuggling and abuse.
Even the most cursory review of recognition statistics shows that Canada
suffers from such a parallel system. Canada’s aggregate convention refu-
gee recognition rate is usually above 50%, which is higher than that of any

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other country in the world. In addition, when country of origin statistics
are examined, Canada’s determination record is simply extraordinary.
For example, in 2005, Canada was the only country to recognize conven-
tion refugees from Brazil, Costa Rica, Granada, Guyana, Israel, Jamaica,
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and Trinidad
and Tobago. Canada recognized more convention refugees from Cuba,
Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, and Romania than all the other countries
in the world did put together. Canada also recognized the most refugees
from Columbia, Iran, Nigeria, and Ukraine, in terms of absolute numbers
(UNHCR-DS, 2006: table 9). Such anomalous decision making has been
characteristic of the IRB since its establishment.
Ultimately, however, one problem with Canada’s current approach is
intractable. The “independent” process of first instance refugee determi-
nation through a hearing process is too slow and no reform of the IRB is
likely to change this. Moreover, the time required for an IRB determination
to occur may soon lengthen by 50%. A private member’s bill (Bill C-280),
which was passed by the House of Commons on May 30, 2007, and received
first reading in the Senate on October 17, 2007, will, if passed, implement
an IRB internal appeal mechanism—the Refugee Appeal Division. This
additional level of appeal was an element of the 2001 Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which was not implemented because of
the large number of refugee claims that were made while the legislation
was working its way through Parliament (House of Commons Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 2007b: 9–13). If Bill C-280 is
implemented, this reform will add an estimated five months to the nearly
year-long IRB decision making process (House of Commons Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 2007a: 11–13).
During this slow process of determination, provision must be made
for claimant needs. Given the prevailing political climate in Canada,
such support must be comprehensive and generous, as noted above. As
a result, asylum seekers are given an opportunity to put down deep roots
in Canada, and this makes the removal of failed claimants problematic
in a large number of cases. Canada’s solution to this problem has been to
provide numerous and relatively easy mechanisms for failed claimants to
secure Permanent Resident Status (PRS).

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Other countries in the developed world are unwilling to regularize
the granting of a residence status to “mixed” and self-selected migrants,
unless the individual in question is a legitimate refugee (Straw, 2000).
Consequently, refugee determination in these countries is structured so
as to quickly differentiate refugees from unqualified migrants. In Australia,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the initial decision
on whether a person is a legitimate refugee is made by specially trained
public officials who are carefully scrutinized by the government to ensure
that the decisions reached in an interview setting come swiftly and meet
international obligations. In the United States, the entire determination
process, including appeals, must be completed within 180 days, while in
the United Kingdom, 60% of cases are fully completed, including appeals,
in six months (United Kingdom Home Office Immigration and Nationality
Directorate, 2006: 8). In addition, the United Kingdom is aiming to reach
a 90% “grant or remove” rate in the same time frame by 2011. In other
countries, the refugee system is structured to provide for a short and stingy
period of support and residence while the first instance determination
takes place. This period is followed by aid to those who are granted asy-
lum, and, by contrast, an array of disincentives and discomforts for those
who fall short and must appeal or leave. Canada is the only country in the
world that makes the determination period both long and comfortable
for the claimant. It is also the most generous country with respect to the
outcome of the determination process.
Given all these facts, one would expect that fundamental IRB reform
would be at the top of the agenda. However, the proponents of reform
in the policy-knowledgeable government bureaucracy lack significant
support in the policy-knowledgeable public, let alone the general pub-
lic. Given the nature of the policy field described above—the patron-cli-
ent politics model coupled with partisan political expediency—it is not
surprising that there is little in the way of an organized public defence
of aggregate national interests. As a result, society-government stake-
holder meetings are dominated by rights, humanitarian, and immigration-
industry advocates who condemn—unopposed—the public official “inter-
view” model that is employed in first instance determination elsewhere.
They argue that Canada’s IRB system is a superior approach because it is

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“independent” and it retains the procedural safeguards consistent with
a “hearing model.” For example, this kind of defence was made at a 2004
roundtable of experts brought together at the University of Ottawa to dis-
cuss reforms to the refugee determination process. Government officials
who participated in the roundtable were faced with society-based partici-
pants who were of one mind on this issue. The conclusion of the discussion
on the “institutional setting of refugee determination” was that “there was
strong support for an independent, quasi-judicial process with full due
process safeguards in view of the sensitive nature of refugee status deter-
mination and the high stakes involved” (Kumin and Showler, 2004: 14).
The processes used in the United States and elsewhere were discussed
very little by the roundtable.
The politics of regularization or removal
Although the IRB is very liberal in its decision making, it does reject a
large number of claimants. However, obtaining recognition as a conven-
tion refugee is not the only way by which an irregular migrant may secure
PRS, and being rejected by the IRB does not signal quick removal or a
withdrawal of social benefits, although, some changes have been made
recently to pressure failed claimants to leave on their own. Before removal,
the law stipulates that there has to be a “risk assessment” known as a
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA). This process is undertaken by
Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officials, and, due to current
staffing and resources, this review can take a very long time. While this
process is going on, a failed claimant can make a humanitarian and com-
passionate review application to a branch of Citizenship and Immigration
Canada. The number of people appealing to this immigration category has
ballooned, and now as many as 60% of those who apply gain PRS in this
way (The Globe and Mail, 2005, Apr. 16).
Generally, the cases presented in these humanitarian reviews are the
same as those that were heard by the IRB, except “new evidence or changed
circumstance” is required. Similar to the determination process, an appeal
to the Federal Court is possible at the completion of each of these stages.
Although the focus of an appeal should be on legal errors, in practice, the

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substance of the case is presented once again. If an individual is willing to
foot the expense, this process can go on for many years.
In contrast, the United States has no equivalent “humanitarian” process
at the end of its refugee determination process. Most failed claimants sim-
ply become part of its illegal alien population, which has reached approxi-
mately 11 million people (United States Government Accountability Office,
2006: 17). This population is relatively free to earn a living and participate
in society, but there are many drawbacks to not having legal status. One
such drawback has led to a raging battle over whether illegal aliens should
be issued drivers’ licenses.
At the end of Canada’s extended refugee process, there are still some
claimants who have not gained PRS or secured some means of accessing
the regular immigration system to gain PRS. Special deals at an individual
level are possible at this time. A deal may allow failed asylum seekers to
leave Canada (officially, these claimants are “removed”), but, simultane-
ously, this allows an expedition of their immigration application (Montreal
Gazette, 2004, Aug. 6). Eventually, however, failed claimants who have
resided in Canada for many years are scheduled for removal. To the advo-
cacy community, the solution to the clogged refugee determination system
is simple enough: grant them all PRS (Goldman, 2004, July 6).
In fact, such a solution has always been attractive to the government,
given the general failings attributed to the IRB and the criticism the gov-
ernment faces each time it attempts to deport failed claimants who often
have Canadian children. Consequently, when high profile cases arise, the
government attempts to naturalize the individual or group in an ad hoc
manner. When a moratorium on removals to Algeria was lifted in 2002,
those who were affected—mostly failed asylum seekers—organized and
staged protests. The federal government responded by working out a deal
with the province of Québec to naturalize the bulk of them (Montreal
Gazette, 2004, Sep. 8). When the media began to focus on failed asy-
lum seekers who had been given sanctuary in churches, the government
offered to allow churches to select 12 people annually for “special recon-
sideration,” essentially granting them PRS. But when this proposal was
rejected by the churches, the New Democratic Party protested. The gov-
ernment reacted by creating a new offer for churches, which would give

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them the opportunity to select cases for “re-examination” by the IRB (The
Globe and Mail, 2004, Nov. 3).
Arguably, the greatest mystery surrounding Canada’s refugee system is
not the lack of reforms which would bring the system in line with interna-
tional norms; instead, it is the relatively small number of claimants, given
the fact that the system guarantees a benefit-rich legal status for at least
two years, and, if all the opportunities and side entrances are taken into
consideration, the system is obviously capable of granting PRS to large
numbers of illegal arrivals and overstayers.
The reason why there are few claimants is likely the result of three fac-
tors. First, although the people-smuggling industry recognizes the benefits
of Canada as a destination country, Canada is very difficult to reach from
the developing world (Montreal Gazette, 2005, May 2). Furthermore, since
9/11, the United States and European countries have become much more
vigilant in their screening of migrants who are passing through these areas
in order to reach Canada. In the absence of this tightened screen, it is
likely that the trend in Canadian refugee claims, which rose from 23,500
in 1997-1998 to 45,000 in 2001-2002, would have continued (Consulting
and Audit Canada, 2005). Secondly, the Canadian government has made
greater efforts to screen visitor visas granted to foreign nationals of less
developed countries, and to interdict potential claimants prior to embar-
kation (Montreal Gazette, 2004, Dec. 28).
The third reason why there are few claimants relates to the attractive-
ness of the United States and the possibility that the American government
may regularize its population of illegal immigrants. Political and electoral
forces make this possibility very controversial. Consequently, American
policies have vacillated between a softening stance, such as President
George W. Bush’s recent support for Comprehensive Immigration Reform,
and a hardening stance, such the REAL ID Act which was passed in May
2005. The migratory pressure on Canada, in terms of the arrival of a large
number of irregular migrants, is related to what the Americans decide to
do with their undocumented population. A clear example of this relation-
ship occurred in 2002, when the United States government implemented
a domestic call-in registration—National Security Entry-Exit Registration
System (NSEERS)—for foreign nationals who were living in the United

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States but were originally from countries where al-Qaeda was thought to
be active. Soon afterwards, Canada began to receive a significant stream
of Pakistani refugee claimants who had been living illegally in the United
States (Jimenez, 2003, Mar. 1).
With a safe third country policy now in place, such migrants would
be likely to seek entry to Canada by clandestine means. Mexicans, how-
ever, who are now by far Canada’s largest claimant source country, are an
exception. Unlike the United States, Canada does not require Mexicans
to obtain a visa to visit and thus they can bypass border controls. It is
easy to see the potential for a major migratory influx, considering that
Canada’s refugee recognition rate for several Latin American countries
is high, and all of these countries have large undocumented populations
in the United States. The countries with the highest undocumented pop-
ulations in the United States are Mexico, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
The United States government estimates that, in 2006, there were almost
7.5 million undocumented foreign nationals from these countries living in
the United States (Hoefer et al., 2006: 4). However, in terms of their suc-
cess with gaining access to the Canadian refugee system, in 2006, Mexico
had the lowest rate of success of the three countries (23.4%), while El
Salvador and Guatemala had success rates of 37.6% and 39.4%, respec-
tively. Columbia, which is estimated to have well over 150,000 undocu-
mented residents in the United States, had a determination success rate
of 82% (UNHCR-DS, 2007b: table 9). In addition, there are number of
countries for which Canada has a moratorium on removals. For example,
irregular Haitian migrants in the United States are able to gain status in
Canada if they can avoid the application of the safe third country policy.
This possibility is currently being publicized in the Haitian community
in the United States, and may trigger a northward migration (Davey and
Goodnough, 2007, Sep. 21).
Should a mass influx of migrants from any of these countries occur,
the IRB, which is already backlogged, will become overloaded and the
wait time for determination may lengthen greatly. Given that Canada’s
enforcement resources are already woefully inadequate, the government
may be forced to consider an amnesty. Eventually, the government will
have to consider employing migration management instruments that are

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currently in use elsewhere in the developed world, such as a manifestly
unfounded policy.
Conclusion
Canada’s national interest requires an effectively managed migration pol-
icy. Despite the importance of this policy and the clear shortcomings in the
Canadian process, there does not seem to be substantive political debate
on the subject. The reason for this is simple. Multiculturalism, openness,
and tolerance have become so central to Canadian identity that speaking
about Canada’s “interests” in terms of immigration is verboten.
To make matters worse, Canada may be the only country in the
world where its citizens cannot expect guidance on these issues from
their Parliament. In the past, the federal Liberal Party has successfully
used the issue of immigration to damage the political aspirations of the
Conservative Party and its predecessors (Wattie, 2005, May 5; Ivison, 2007,
Feb. 23). Because of electoral considerations, it is likely that the Liberals
will be careful not to lose their edge on this issue, and the Conservative
party is not likely to challenge them.
But now, more than ever, Canada must take a hard look at the issues
surrounding both immigration in general, and asylum migration in par-
ticular. Over the course of only four years, Canada receives one million
new residents. Since 1950, Canada has received nine million immigrants.
Soon, the majority of Canadians will not be able to trace their primary
roots back to Canadians of the World War II era.1
The immigration process is vast and costly. According to the Auditor
General of Canada, the government does not have anywhere near the
resources necessary to effectively screen this influx (2000: 3.5). Although
there is immobilism and avoidance in partisan circles, hardly a day goes by
without a newspaper making at least one reference to a migration policy
shortcoming.
1 The technical term for this phenomenon is “rootedness.” Over time, a high immi-
gration rate coupled with a low indigenous birth rate lowers the rootedness of the
resident population (Statistics Canada, 2003).

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Canada needs to analyze the effects of this constant, large influx of
immigrants on existing social and economic structures. In this regard,
Canada’s immigration-rich history will not provide much guidance. Today,
new Canadians are not filling empty land, nor are they all from the same
general region of the world, and, therefore, relatively easy to assimilate.
They generally move to the largest cities, transforming Toronto, for exam-
ple, into the most multicultural city in the world. Assimilation can no lon-
ger be viewed in the way it once was, now that globalization provides so
many communication and travel opportunities through which migrants
can maintain close connections with their regions of origin.
In addition to these basic immigration-related problems, there are also
humanitarian, enforcement, and security issues. Canada’s Immigration
and Refugee Board has a long history of controversy, and all recent min-
isters have tried to fix it. No other country in the world emulates Canada’s
approach to refugee policy, especially when it comes to the regularization
opportunities afforded to failed claimants.
In order to address the many problems with Canada’s refugee system,
a number of questions must be answered: what kind of system will meet
Canada’s international refugee obligations most effectively, and realisti-
cally curtail abuse? What can be done to address the concerns of the
Auditor General, whose reports consistently document weaknesses across
a range of refugee migration related policies? In terms of enforcement,
what can Canada do to ensure that its immigration laws are respected?
And finally, how can such an important and contentious discussion be
provided for, so that it engages more than just those representing special
interests and does not degenerate into a partisan slugfest?

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Populations, New Arrivals, Durable Solutions, Asylum Seekers, Stateless
Persons, and Other Persons of Concern to UNHCR. United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Population Data
Unit/PGDS Division of Operational Support [UNHCR-PDU] (2004).
Asylum Levels and Trends: Europe and non-European Industrialized
Countries, 2003. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
United States Government Accountability Office (2006). Estimating
the Undocumented Population: A “Grouped Answers” Approach to
Surveying Foreign-Born Respondents. Report to the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, Committee on the
Judiciary, US Senate. .
The Washington Times (2003, December 2). Registration of Muslims,
Arabs Halted.
Wattie, Chris (2005, May 5). Volpe Refuses to Apologize for Klan
Remark. National Post. A9.

Chapter 5
Security Threats in Immigration
and Refugee Policies
James Bissett
It seems self-evident that Canada’s immigration and refugee policies have
a direct bearing on our nation’s security concerns. But despite the horrific
Air India bombing by Sikh terrorists in 1985 that killed 329 Canadians,
despite the common knowledge that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) have been operating actively in Canada for years, and despite
numerous examples of Muslim extremists planning terrorist strikes or
using Canada as a safe haven for fund-raising and other terrorist opera-
tions, many of our political leaders seem unwilling to accept that Canada’s
immigration and refugee policies present security concerns.
Their refusal to accept this reality while determining Canada’s secu-
rity strategy has weakened our efforts to play an effective role in the war
against Islamist extremists. Moreover, this failure has led senior political
leaders and bureaucrats in the United States to look upon Canada as the
weak link in North American security concerns. They see us as an uncer-
tain and uncommitted ally. This perception persists despite evidence that
the anti-terrorist measures taken by Canada in the wake of 9/11 closely
matched those taken by the United States.
Unfortunately, these impressive first steps were neutralized by
hesitation and ambivalence on the part of Canada’s political leaders.

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Furthermore, these measures did not include any review of or changes
to our immigration and refugee policies. Consequently, it may be argued
that Canada is more vulnerable to a terrorist attack today than it was in
the months following 9/11. To understand how this has come about, it is
necessary to understand the nature of Canada’s immigration and refugee
policies.
Background
Political parties have always solicited support from ethnic or religious
groups and have offered rewards of one sort or another in return for votes.
Block voting by new immigrant groups is an old phenomenon—these
groups tend to vote for the party that promises them the most benefits.
This tradition of “pork barrel” politics lives on, but the modern version has
become far more ominous than the old practice of exchanging votes for
free beer, a new road, or a turkey at Christmas. The new “spoils” system,
which has now become institutionalized, is the direct result of multicul-
turalism and a sustained high volume of new immigrants.
In the 1970s, political parties discovered that they could gain and main-
tain the allegiance of ethnic voters by formalizing the concept of multi-
culturalism. Multiculturalism became a formal policy of the government,
and multicultural institutions were created within the framework and
structure of the bureaucracy. This was a revolutionary step and it trans-
formed Canadian politics. It was no longer necessary to use party funds
to entice ethnic voters. Once in power, a party was able to expend large
sums of the taxpayers’ money in support of ethnic organizations, including
newspapers and media outlets, and ethnic or religious celebrations and
related events. All of this was done in the name of multiculturalism—and
with the expectation of block voting from ethnic groups.
After multiculturalism was implemented, all of the political parties
realized that more immigrants meant more votes, and frequently, these
votes could be manipulated. Consequently, it was in their interest to
increase and maintain a high level of immigration. Canada’s former policy
of adjusting immigration levels to accommodate the ups and downs of the
labour force was ended. It was decided that one percent of the Canadian

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population should become the annual target.1 The decision to implement
this policy had no rationale, apart from the notion that more immigrants
meant more potential voters for the party in power.
In 1977, the Citizenship Act was passed, reducing the waiting time for
citizenship eligibility from five to three years. Voting patterns show that
new immigrants often vote for the party that was in power at the time
the immigrant was admitted to the country. In return for the immigrants’
votes, the party in power will usually become a powerful advocate for
large scale immigration.
Immigration policy is no longer about the costs or benefits of immigra-
tion, or whether immigration is needed to sustain our economy. Now, it
is only about maintaining high levels of immigration, and it seems that all
political parties in Canada do their best to ensure that there is no open or
public debate about this important issue of public policy. Immigration is
seldom, if ever, discussed in Parliament, and all parties ensure that their
members who sit on the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Citizenship and Immigration are frequently those who come from strongly
ethnic ridings and who are in favour of immigration. In addition, witnesses
who are called before the Committee often represent organizations or
groups that support high immigration levels.
In Canada, it has become politically incorrect to suggest that immigra-
tion may have negative aspects. To question the wisdom of adding 250,000
newcomers each year (Singer, 2002, Dec. 6) to the already swelling popula-
tions of Canada’s three major cities—Toronto, Montréal, and Vancouver—is
to risk the accusation of being racist or xenophobic. Immigration has
been accepted, automatically, as being essential for nation building and
for strengthening two recently created pillars of the new Canadian soci-
ety: diversity and multiculturalism. For many Canadians, immigration has
1 The notion that one percent of the Canadian population should become the annual
target for immigration intake came out of the Liberal Party’s “Red Book” in 1993. The
“Red Book” stated, “we should continue to target immigration levels of approximately
one percent of the population each year, as has been the case for more than a decade.”
The fact was, however, that annual immigration intake reached one percent only once
in the four decades prior to 1993. This happened in 1967, when it was 1.1 percent.

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acquired an almost mythical status. Given the current state of popular
opinion in Canada, it is not surprising that many Canadians and poli-
ticians do not want to recognize that there may be an adverse security
dimension to immigration and refugee policies.
Tough anti–terrorist measures passed
In the weeks following the tragic events of 9/11, the Canadian government
responded immediately with a series of tough anti-terrorist measures
which gave the impression that Canada was serious in its determination
to combat the terrorist threat. Canadian troops were sent to Afghanistan
to help fight Taliban insurgents. Bill C-36, a controversial anti-terrorist
bill similar to the USA PATRIOT Act, was rushed through Parliament,
giving police and intelligence forces extraordinary powers normally used
only in a time of war.
The government created a new Department of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness closely resembling the United States Department
of Homeland Security. It possessed the similar aim of achieving bet-
ter coordination of security agencies and improved information shar-
ing. The government quickly set up a National Security Plan, a Threat
Assessment Centre, and four Integrated National Security Teams, which
were designed to identify and prevent terrorist attacks. Only two months
after 9/11, Canada signed a Smart Border Declaration with the United
States, which was aimed at making the border more secure while facilitat-
ing cross-border traffic and trade.
The rapid and vigorous response following the attacks in New York and
Washington signaled to Canadians and our allies in the war against Islamist
extremists that Canadian political leaders understood that Canada was a
potential target. This response also suggested that the government had a
strategic plan to ensure the safety and security of its citizens.
Essential measures not enacted
However, these impressive first steps soon came to an inexplicable halt.
Some of the key elements necessary to implement and give life to the

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anti-terrorist legislation were not enacted. Bill C-36 called for the prosecu-
tion of people identified as active terrorists, and provided for the “listing”
of organizations that the government identified as “terrorist.” However,
months passed before the government placed any of the most obvious
terrorist groups on the list. It was only after pressure from the media and
Jewish organizations that terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah,
the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Armed Islamic Front were finally
listed as terrorist organizations. The government offered no explana-
tion as to why the implementation of this provision of the bill had been
delayed. The fact that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
had reported that there were 50 terrorist groups operating in Canada—as
early as 1998—suggests a curious disinclination to place such groups on
the terrorist list (Duff-Brown, 2005, July 15).
One of the more obvious terrorist groups not placed on the list was a
Sikh terrorist group known as Babar Khalsa. This organization was held
responsible for the 1985 Air India bombing. The reason for this omis-
sion is easy to understand, but difficult to excuse. There are thousands of
Sikh Canadians residing in British Columbia and Ontario, and they are
known to be supporters of the federal Liberal Party. It is likely that the
Liberal Party did not wish to alienate Sikh supporters by placing one of
their organizations on the terrorist list. Eventually, in June 2003—18 years
after the Air India bombing—Babar Khalsa was designated as a terror-
ist organization, but only because it became publicly known that CSIS
had named the group as one of the 50 terrorist organizations operating
in Canada. Because of this revelation, it was impossible to keep it off the
terrorist list.
Another obvious terrorist organization that was not immediately put
on the list was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The Tamil Tigers
were acknowledged to be one of the most notorious terrorist groups in
the world and yet they were operating openly in Canada, raising millions
of dollars for the organization each year (Collacott, 2006). Again, the
notorious Tigers were not listed because the government feared it would
lose the support of the more than 250,000 Tamil Canadians residing in
Canada. The Tamil Tigers were finally designated a terrorist organization
in April 2006 (CBC News, 2006, Apr. 10).

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This reluctance to designate internationally recognized terrorist orga-
nizations for fear of losing ethnic votes reveals a frightening degree of
irresponsibility and cynicism on the part of Canadian political leaders.
On the one hand, these politicians are prepared to send Canadian troops
to risk their lives fighting Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan,
but on the other hand, they are prepared to permit terrorist organizations
to operate freely in Canada. There is something seriously wrong with this
tolerance of terrorist groups. Either our elected representatives are not
taking the terrorist threat seriously, or they are willing to trade the safety
and security of their fellow citizens in exchange for voting support from
those who may be sympathetic to the terrorist cause.
Immigration security concerns
As noted above, for the past 17 years, Canada has received approximately
250,000 immigrants each year. Many thousands of these newcomers have
come from Muslim countries whose populations are known to contain
significant numbers of Islamist radicals. For example, between 1996 and
2005, Canada accepted over 118,000 immigrants from Pakistan, 62,000
from Iran, and 25,000 from Algeria (Citizenship and Immigration Canada,
2006). It would be foolish to suggest that the majority of these immigrants
or their families represent a security threat, but it would be equally wrong
to assume that there are no potential radicals among them, who would be
willing to support or engage in terrorist activities.
The experience of other countries that receive a high volume of Muslim
immigrants has shown that some of these migrants or their children—
even those born in the new country—are susceptible to the radical Islamist
cause. The bombings in London and Madrid, the rioting of young Muslims
in France, and the murder of Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam have clearly
demonstrated that there is a connection between Islamic immigration and
security. Although, so far, Canada has been fortunate enough not to have
experienced an Islamist terrorist strike, our security service has warned
us that it may only be a question of time before an attack occurs.
In March 2004, a Canadian Muslim was charged in connection with a
planned bomb attack in England (CBC News, 2006, Oct. 24). He has been

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in custody since that time, but because of numerous appeals and a con-
stitutional challenge, his case has not yet come to trial. There have been
a number of instances of Canadian Muslims fighting for or supporting
al-Qaeda activities outside Canada. It is obvious that the terrorist threat
is real and that it involves Muslims in Canada, whether they immigrated
to Canada or were born here.
In June 2006, 18 Canadian-born Muslims were arrested and charged
with planning a series of terrorist attacks against selected targets, including
the Canadian Parliament buildings and Prime Minister Stephen Harper. It
has recently been disclosed that these suspects were part of a larger group
of almost 50 Muslims who were under investigation (Bell, 2006, June 2).
Some of the members of the group were known to have received training
overseas. Security officials have explained that only those with a reason-
able chance of being convicted were charged, and the remaining suspects
are still under investigation.
In April 2007, an Environics Poll showed that over 80% of the approxi-
mately 700,000 Muslims living in Canada “were satisfied with their lives
here” (Corbella, 2007, Feb. 18). Alarmingly, however, the poll also indi-
cated that 12% of Muslims polled thought that the terrorist plot for which
18 Canadian Muslims were arrested was justified. In other words, the
poll showed that approximately 84,000 Canadian Muslims believed that
blowing up the Parliament buildings and beheading the Canadian Prime
Minister was justified. Not surprisingly, this portion of the poll received
little publicity in the Canadian media and the issue was not raised in
Parliament.
Considering that the evidence available suggests that Canada is on
Osama bin Laden’s hit list (Bell, 2006, June 3) and that there are Muslim
terrorists operating here—including people born and raised among their
fellow Canadian citizens—it would be prudent, from a security point of
view, for Canada to review its immigration policy in relation to the admis-
sion of immigrants from Muslim countries that are known to produce
terrorists. But such a review has not happened. Immigrants from these
countries are admitted under the same criteria and selection systems as
any other immigrants. Many of those who are issued visas never meet a
Canadian visa officer. They are not asked questions about whether they

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will be comfortable living in a secular society, whether they can accept
the principle of equality for women and homosexuals, whether they will
be tolerant of other religions, and whether they will be willing to accept
the principle of free speech, even if it may be considered offensive to
Islam. These types of questions are not raised. If these migrants meet
the normal economic or sponsorship admission requirements, they are
issued visas.
The priority of immigration officers is to issue visas and to do so as
quickly as possible. Positive decisions are never challenged, but a rejec-
tion frequently ends up in Canadian courts, where the officer is required
to defend the negative decision. The emphasis on numbers and the liti-
gious nature of the immigration process make it difficult for visa officers
to refuse applicants. At one time, officers were able to use their discretion
to override the selection system if they believed an applicant possessed
negative personality traits or attitudinal problems that demonstrated it
was likely that he would not be able to become integrated satisfactorily
into Canadian society. Unfortunately, visa officers no longer have this
discretionary power.
The Netherlands and France have adopted a more realistic approach
to the security problems associated with Muslim immigrants. Both coun-
tries recognized the connection between immigration and security, and
were concerned that multiculturalism was not working with many of their
Muslim newcomers. The Netherlands has changed course from its for-
merly tolerant approach to the Muslim population. Citizenship classes for
Imams in charge of Mosques are now mandatory (Pereira, 2002, Nov. 28).
Before being accepted for entry, Muslim immigrants are tested about their
knowledge and familiarity with Dutch society and values (Fox News, 2006,
Mar. 16). As well, the Prime Minister has proposed a law that would out-
law the wearing of the burka in some public places. Moreover, they have
instituted a “zero tolerance” policy towards those who preach violence
and hatred.
In 2007, Brice Hortefeux, the head of France’s Ministry of Immigration
and National Identity, announced a policy of controlling the inflow of
immigrants and protecting French values and cohesion. He reiterated
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end of 2007, and expanding the system through which illegal immigrants
are paid to return home voluntarily (Gangley, 2007).
However, the realization that millions of Muslims in France have not
been willing to integrate into French society may have come too late. Now
that Muslims account for an estimated 10% of France’s population (United
States Department of State, 2008), there are more Muslim voters added
to the electoral roll each election. Since 2005, three million new voters
have been qualified to vote in France, and at least-one third of these vot-
ers are Muslims (Trifkovic, 2007). Only 1% of Muslim voters voted for
Sarkozy in the recent election, while 90% cast ballots for his left-wing
competitors who are not nearly as forceful on immigration and security
issues (Trifkovic, 2007).
Nevertheless, too late or not, France and some other European coun-
tries have now accepted that immigration is a legitimate topic for public
debate for mainline political parties. They have accepted the reality that, in
a very short amount of time, high volumes of immigrants of a different cul-
ture, who hold strongly to a different value system, can not only change the
demographic landscape of a host country, but can also present a threat to
many of its traditional beliefs and principles. This is the challenge of large-
scale Muslim migration into Western societies. The challenge becomes
more complicated when even a tiny proportion of the Muslim population
is sympathetic to the mission of al-Qaeda and other extremist groups
because this creates a security problem of major proportions.
Canada’s asylum system
Countries that have experienced a terrorist attack have been forced to
acknowledge that immigration has a bearing on security. In Canada, that
realization has not occurred. Nothing illustrates this more than our refusal
to reform our refugee asylum system. Few Canadians know the differ-
ence between a “refugee” and an “asylum seeker” and, as a result, there is
a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding regarding refugee issues.
Frequently, the media will describe someone who is seeking asylum in
Canada as a refugee. By doing so, they elicit, whether deliberately or not,
sympathy and compassion for the individual concerned.

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An asylum seeker is a person who claims to have been persecuted in
his own country and asks a host country for protection. A refugee is a
person who has been accepted by an authorized body—in Canada, the
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB)—as meeting the definition of a
refugee set forth by the United Nations Refugee Convention. A refugee is
given the protection from persecution that is needed and a guarantee that
he will not be sent back to the country to which he fears to return. Most
refugees can be found in refugee camps in developing countries. They
are cared for and protected by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). In the past, Canada has selected many thou-
sands of refugees for permanent resettlement: Hungarians, Czechs and
Slovaks, Poles, Ugandan Asians, Vietnamese, Chileans, and others. In
1986, Canada was awarded the prestigious Nansen Medal by the United
Nations for its contribution to helping to resolve global refugee problems.
Canada is the only country that has received this honour (Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, 2007).
But since that time, Canada has not been able to accept large numbers
of genuine refugees or to contribute significantly to world refugee prob-
lems because of the large number of asylum seekers entering the country
and claiming to have been persecuted. The numbers are large—more than
600,000 asylum seekers have entered in the past 20 years (Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, 2006). And Canada continues to receive many asy-
lum seekers each year—28,300 in 2007 alone (BBC News, 2008, Mar. 18).
Though anyone can claim to be a refugee, not all claims are genuine.
Thousands of asylum seekers who claim to have been persecuted are
refused refugee status because their claims are found to be unfounded
or fraudulent. Many deliberately claim to be persecuted in order to avoid
having to meet normal immigration requirements. Seeking asylum is
the primary method of gaining entry into Western countries by those
who have little chance of legal admission. Those coming to Canada are
no exception.
Canada’s asylum system is recognized as the most generous in the
world. The IRB’s acceptance rate is quite high by international standards.
In 2004, citizens of 152 different countries applied for asylum in Canada,
including citizens from the United States, Costa Rica, Brazil, Portugal,

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Pakistan, India, Hungary, Mexico, Turkey, Barbados, Germany, Sweden,
Switzerland, France, Spain, and the Netherlands. Many of those who seek
asylum in Canada come from terrorist producing countries such as Iran,
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria, and Morocco.
Because most people who come to Canada require visas, with the
exception of those coming from the United States and Western Europe,
many asylum seekers arrive in Canada without documents or with fraud-
ulent documents. Asylum seekers who are unable or unwilling to apply
for a visa at a Canadian Embassy pay to be smuggled into the country by
international criminal gangs who sell them documents that enable them
to board aircraft destined for Canada. Afterwards, these documents are
usually picked up by a member of the gang who is aboard the aircraft to
be recycled and resold later.
Upon their arrival in Canada, these smuggled individuals claim asylum.
After being fingerprinted and photographed, they are released and asked
to show up at a refugee hearing which may be scheduled months after
their arrival. Few asylum seekers are detained, even if very little is known
about their background. None of them are initially screened for health,
criminality, or security. There is no system for keeping track of them and
they are free to travel anywhere in Canada. Many asylum seekers do not
attend their refugee hearing. Those who do appear and are found not to
be genuine refugees are asked to leave, but many do not go home. In 2003,
the Auditor General found that a “large gap” of 36,000 existed between
the number of removal orders issued and the number of departures con-
firmed (Jimenez, 2005, Apr. 16). Today, insiders estimate that that figure
is likely to be close to 50,000 or more. Yet our government does little to
address this problem.
In December 2004, a Safe Third Country Agreement was put into
place as part of the Smart Border Declaration signed by Canada and the
United States. The agreement prevents certain categories of people in the
United States from applying for asylum in Canada at the land border. The
agreement also prevents people in Canada from applying at the border for
asylum in the United States (Canada, 2004). Those entering either country
by sea or air are still able to submit asylum claims, but this discrepancy
has never been explained.

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But after signing the agreement, Canadian officials feared that it would
prevent individuals in the United States who had been charged or con-
victed of an offense that might result in the death penalty from finding
refuge in Canada. To ensure that such individuals could find refuge in
Canada, the government—quietly and without publicity—passed a law in
December 2004 which exempted those individuals from the terms of the
agreement (Canada, 2004). Consequently, any person in the United States
who has been charged or convicted of a capital offense and applies for
asylum at the border must be permitted entry by our officers. Essentially,
such a policy “lays out the welcome mat” for murderers. This policy also
indicates that our government is not taking the terrorist threat seriously.
Almost all of the known or alleged terrorists who have been appre-
hended in Canada have entered as asylum seekers. Ahmed Ressam, the
Algerian who tried, unsuccessfully, to blow up the Los Angeles airport,
entered Canada in this fashion. Six of the eight alleged terrorists who were
held in custody under security certificates until recently entered the coun-
try as asylum seekers. Since Canada cannot prevent the entry of anyone
who claims asylum, and is obliged to give anyone who is physically in the
country Charter of Rights protection (Singh v. Minister of Employment
and Immigration), it is, in effect, impossible to keep undesirables out.
Moreover, once these people enter the country, it is almost impossible to
remove them.
Since Canada is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, it cannot deport anyone to a country where they may be mistreated
or tortured. Most suspected or known terrorists come from countries
that are known to mistreat prisoners and, consequently, Canada cannot
deport them. Among the members of the United Nations committee that
is responsible for overseeing the Torture Convention are Egypt, Morocco,
Russia, China, and Senegal. Canada would be unlikely to deport anyone
to any of these are countries. Thus, Canada now finds itself in a position
where it cannot keep terrorists from getting into the country, and it can-
not remove them once they get in.
Other countries that are signatories to the United Nations Convention
Against Torture have taken a proactive approach to this problem. For
example, Britain will deport failed asylum seekers to countries known to

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practice torture after it has signed an agreement with the country con-
cerned that permits British consular officers to have access to prisons
where persons deported from Britain are held. Consular officers ensure
that the individuals are not being mistreated or tortured. Germany fol-
lows a similar practice. This would appear to be a suitable compromise,
but it requires forceful political direction which, sadly, has been lacking
in Canada’s approach to the war on terror.
Canada’s wide open asylum system was made even more generous only
two months after the tragic events of 9/11 when the government passed
the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The asylum provisions
of the new legislation made it easier for people to apply for asylum and
even more difficult to remove those who do not qualify as refugees. A
small group of former diplomats and retired senior public servants tried
to persuade the Senate to send the bill back to the House of Commons,
but these attempts were summarily dismissed.
The motivation of our political leaders to maintain a dysfunctional
and dangerous asylum system cannot be a desire to act in a humane and
compassionate manner towards potential refugees because the current
system does not effectively aid genuine refugees. The asylum system pre-
vents Canada from donating any substantial funding to help the UNHCR
aid millions of genuine refugees who live in sordid and unhealthy camps
around the world. At all levels of government, there are enormous finan-
cial costs associated with the current asylum system. These costs prevent
our government from providing the UNHCR with anything other than a
token annual contribution.
The government continues to support the present system, not to aid
those in need, but to placate and meet the vociferous demands of special
interest groups. In Canada, there is a powerful refugee lobby, consist-
ing of immigration lawyers, consultants, religious denominations, aca-
demics, activists, and subsidized non-governmental organizations that
are entrusted with caring for and looking after the thousands of asylum
seekers who enter Canada each month.
The asylum system is a multi-million dollar industry. The groups that
profit from it are highly organized and influential. In fact, the immi-
gration department and some Members of Parliament consider them

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“stakeholders” rather than lobbyists, and they are treated accordingly.
These groups also receive favourable media coverage of their attempts to
help asylum seekers.
No other country allows universal access to their asylum system.
European Union countries will not accept refugee claims from people who
come from countries that are signatories to the United Nations Refugee
Convention, are democratic, and follow the rule of law. They also screen
out obvious, unfounded claims, and detain claimants who enter with false
documents until they have verified the claimant’s identity and that the
claimant does not present a security threat. There is nothing to prevent
the government of Canada from adopting a similar policy except the risk
that such a policy would alienate special interest groups.
Canada’s asylum system is a threat to North American security. It
undermines every other measure that has been taken by Canada and the
United States to strengthen and bolster our respective defences against
a terrorist strike by al-Qaeda or other Islamist radicals. Canada’s is no
longer able to control its borders, and this inability presents a threat to
our southern neighbour. When a nation gives up its right to decide who
may or may not enter its territory, and compounds this folly by forfeiting
its right to remove dangerous criminals and terrorists, it has effectively
abandoned its sovereignty. In an age of terrorist attacks, there is no excuse
for such a dereliction of duty and a loss of common sense.
Conclusion
There is a strong argument to be made that Canada and the United States
should form a common security shield against the threat of a terrorist
attack. While both sides should strengthen their common border, it is
folly to believe that a stronger border will stop determined terrorists from
striking either country. The terrorist attacks in Madrid, London, and the
United States were carried out by native-born Muslims or by Muslims
who had entered the country legally. Today, radical Islamism can be found
among Muslim communities in every Western country.
A fortified border and a tough border crossing policy between Canada
and the United States is the wrong way to combat terrorism. Such actions

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may be expedient for political leaders, by serving as evidence that some-
thing tangible is being done, but this will not prevent terrorists from enter-
ing the United States or Canada. Few terrorists have criminal records
and suicide bombers are seldom on the watch lists of our security forces.
Consequently, it is easy for them to enter Canada or the United States as
legal visitors, students, or temporary workers.
Furthermore, there are enormous costs associated with a fortified bor-
der. These costs are not just the cost of electronic surveillance, drone air-
craft, “smart cards,” and hundreds of additional border guards. The real
costs are the obstacles a fortified border creates, which prevent the swift
and easy flow of tourists and commercial trade. As well, a more serious
long-term cost may be the deterioration of the “good neighbour policy”
that has been the hallmark of Canada-United States relations. When we
consider that almost all border traffic between Canada and the United
States is clean and does not present any real threat, it is clear that the
benefits of a fortified border do not outweigh the costs.
A much more effective approach to the terrorist threat for Canada
and the United States would be to enter into an agreement to establish
a common security shield for the protection of both countries. Such an
idea has been proposed before. In October 2000, the former United States
Ambassador to Canada, Gordon Giffen, made such a proposal, arguing
that it was a sensible and logical move to coordinate and improve the effi-
cacy of the security of both countries. This concept has also been endorsed
by the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, which represents 150 of
Canada’s leading corporations.
A common security perimeter would not entail dismantling the Canada-
United States border. Instead, it would make border crossing between
the two countries easier. The possible structure of such a perimeter can
already be found in the Smart Border Declaration, which was signed by
both countries in December 2001. That declaration provides for a number
of common security measures including: the removal of people who were
ordered deported from either country; the designation of terrorist groups;
the sharing of intelligence and advanced travel information; freezing the
assets of organizations suspected of financing terrorist groups; and, joint
training of personnel from both countries. The United States already has

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its customs officers located in Canada to conduct pre-screening of United
States-bound passengers and inspection of sea going containers.
A common security border already exists in Europe where a number of
European Union countries in the Schengen Accord have effectively done
away with internal borders, allowing free movement of people between
member states. This was done by creating an external perimeter that pro-
vides immigration control for all member countries. This has allowed
them to devote more funding to internal security and to anti-terrorist
operations in their own countries.
From an operational point of view, expanding the Smart Border
Declaration into an effective security perimeter would not require very
much. Canada and the United States would need to have a common pol-
icy for designating countries visa-free for visitors and other temporary
entrants. Common guidelines regarding the types of questions to ask visa
applicants would be necessary, as would a common agreement on reasons
to refuse admission. Canada would have to reform its current asylum
system by denying access to people who come from countries considered
“safe” by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Canada
would also have to enforce a policy of detaining people who arrive without
documents until their identities are verified and they are believed not to be
dangerous. Canada would also have to improve its capacity to apprehend
and remove people who are in the country illegally. Though it would be
possible to meet these requirements and establish such a perimeter, both
Canada and the United States lack the political will to seriously consider
the idea. In the meantime, both countries will have to deal with the ter-
rorist threat in their own fashion.
Since 9/11, Canada has dismantled two of the most effective anti-ter-
rorist clauses of Bill C-36, which related to preventative arrest and investi-
gative hearings, and the courts have neutralized the one remaining useful
instrument for detaining and removing foreign terrorists: the immigration
security certificate. The anti-terrorist measures that are still in place are
constantly being attacked by lawyers, the courts, civil rights activists, and
privacy advocates.
Canada’s security forces have not been given the financial and person-
nel resources needed to conduct adequate counterterrorist activities. The

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British security agency MI5 estimates it takes 50 intelligence operatives to
trail one suspect (Nelson, 2007, May 2). Moreover, following the Maher
Arrar affair,2 the reputation and status of the police and CSIS have been
badly tarnished. If Canada suffers a terrorist attack, these organizations
will be blamed rather than their political heads.
None of Canada’s political parties are willing to admit that our immi-
gration and refugee policies are in any way a security concern. However,
in Canada, there is little attempt to screen prospective immigrants from
terrorist producing countries. Our asylum system presents a clear and
present danger to both Canada and the United States, but it is not likely to
change. Canadian citizenship is easy for anyone to obtain and little effort
is made to stress that citizenship entails obligations and duties as well as
benefits. We fail to keep criminals and terrorists out of Canada, and when
they do get in, we cannot remove them.
Considering the state of Canada’s policies, it would appear that the
prospect of dealing with the threat of Muslim terrorism in Canada is
pretty grim. Perhaps Canada will be lucky and will not experience a cata-
strophic event. If so, our political leaders should not take credit for this
good fortune.
2 In 2002, Maher Arar, a Syrian-born immigrant who came to Canada in 1987 and
became a Canadian citizen, was detained by US officials who claimed that he had links
to al-Qaeda. They deported him to Syria, even though he was carrying a Canadian
passport. When Arar returned to Canada a year later, he claimed he had been tortured
while in Syria. After a long investigation, in 2007, the Canadian government issued an
apology to Arar and offered him a multi-million dollar settlement.

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References
Anti-terrorism Act, R.S.C. 2001. c. 41.
BBC News (2008, March 18). Iraqi Asylum Seeker Numbers Jump.
.
Bell, Stewart (2006, June 2). 17 Part of Bigger Plot: Officer. National Post.
Bell, Stewart (2006, June 3). Never Mind Foreign Terrorists, Why is
Canada Growing its Own Extremists? National Post.
Canada (2004). Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Regulations. Canada Gazette 138, 22. . Accessed December 18, 2007.
CBC News (2006, April 10). Canada Adds Tamil Tigers to
List of Terrorist Groups. .
CBC News (2006, October 24). In Depth: Canadian Security.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2006). Facts and Figures 2005:
Immigration Overview – Permanent and Temporary Residents. .
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007). Citizenship: A Canadian
Story. .
Accessed December 18, 2007.
Collacott, Martin (2006). Canada’s Inadequate Response to Terrorism:
The Need for Policy Reform. Fraser Institute Digital Publication. Fraser
Institute. .

Security Threats in Immigration and Refugee Policies 93
www.fraserinstitute.org | Fraser Institute
Corbella, Licia (2007, February 18). Disturbing Reality Buried.
Calgary Sun.
Dube, Rebecca Cook (2006, May 3). Canada Pinches Tamil Tigers’
Pocketbooks. Christian Science Monitor. .
Duff-Brown, Beth (2005, July 15). Officials Believe 50 Terror Groups
Reside in Canada. USA Today. . Updated July 26, 2005.
Fox News (2006, March 16). Dutch Immigrants Must Watch Racy Film.
.
Gangley, Elaine (2007, June 4). France Sets Quotas for Immigrant
Arrests. American Renaissance. . Accessed December 18, 2007.
Jimenez, Marina (2005, April 16). Broken Gates: Canada’s Welcome Mat
Frayed and Unravelling. The Globe and Mail. .
Nelson, Fraser (2007, May 2). MI5 is Much Enhanced Since Crevice: But
It Still Can’t Make Guarantees. The Spectator. .
Pereira, Clarisse (2002, November 28). Imams on Dutch Culture Course.
BBC News. .
Singer, Colin (2002, December 6). The Facts about Immigration.
National Post. .
Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.

94 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
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Trifkovic, Srdja (2007, June 5). A French Lesson for George W. Bush.
Chronicles. . Accessed
December 18, 2007.
United States Department of State (2008). Background Note: France.
.

Chapter 6
Security Threats on America’s
Borders
Glynn Custred
There are probably no two countries in the world that are as much alike as
the United States and Canada. Each is proud of its legal system derived from
Anglo-Saxon law and, with the exception of Québec, both share a common
language and a common cultural heritage. Canadians and Americans are
“children of a common mother,” as the Peace Arch on the border at Blaine,
Washington, proclaims. Indeed, immigration and settlement patterns
explain this commonality. The core of English-speaking Canada emigrated
from the newly independent United States after the American Revolution
and, during the settlement of western North America, the populations of
the two countries crossed their mutual border, mingling along the way in
response to changing opportunities (Hanson, 1940).
The great transatlantic migration from Europe in the nineteenth cen-
tury brought the same kinds of immigrants to both the United States and
Canada. The Second Great Migration, which is now in full-swing, is bring-
ing similar kinds of people from other continents into both countries. This
new wave of immigration is creating immigrant populations on both sides
of the border who are similar in composition and dynamics.
Canada and the United States also have interdependent economies.
Trade is one of the most important relationships between the two countries.

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An enormous volume of trade passes across the border each way every
day. Trade contributes to the prosperity of Canada to a great extent, and
to the prosperity of the United States to a lesser extent.
Despite increasing economic interdependence and the commonality of
language, cultural heritage, and population, the border that separates the
two countries, “the continental divide” as Seymour Martin Lipset (1990)
has described it, is a significant element, not only in their relationship
with one another, but also in their separate identities. Historian Benedict
Anderson (1991) has described modern nation states as “imagined com-
munities” because nations are collectively imagined by their members as
communities. In other words, nations are thought of by their members as
definable cohesive entities, imagined as sovereign and limited by the spe-
cial rights and privileges of citizenship that mark the distinction with other
polities and by borders that define the territorial limits of sovereign states.
They are imagined thusly, despite the necessary heterogeneity of their large
populations. From this definition, we can infer that borders are important
to the definition and the constitution of the modern nation and state.
In this broad sense, the Canada-United States border is like all others.
It differs from other borders, however, because of the unique history of
the two countries and because of the different roles the border plays in
how Americans and Canadians imagine their distinctive identities. Roger
Gibbins writes that the border has “a mythic significance, at least in Canada,”
both due to its great length and because of its reputation as the longest unde-
fended border in the world. Two factors account for the symbolic impor-
tance of the border in Canada: the overshadowing presence of its powerful
neighbour to the south, and the fact that four-fifths of the Canadian popu-
lation lives within 150 kilometres of the international boundary, making
Canada a “borderland society” where the border “penetrates the Canadian
consciousness, national identity, economy and polity to a degree unknown
and unimaginable in the United States” (1997: 316–317).
American vulnerability on the northern border
Since 9/11, the border has assumed a more prominent place in American
consciousness, not as a defining element in its collective identity, but

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rather as a zone of vulnerability along its entire northern rim. The danger
comes not from a hostile country to the north, but from an immigration
policy that makes it easier for aliens hostile to the United States to enter
Canada, disappear within the country, and connect with networks sub-
merged in its large immigrant communities. Indeed, lax immigration laws
in Canada concern both American and Canadian authorities.
This situation is graphically illustrated by the case of Ahmed Ressam,
the “millennium bomber,” who was caught trying to enter the United
States from Canada with material for a bomb that was designed to blow
up the Los Angeles International airport during the millennium celebra-
tion. Ressam entered Canada with no documents at all. Though he was not
given refugee status, Ressam did not appear at a scheduled government
hearing on his case. He was arrested several times but was never expelled
from Canada, and was eventually caught by an alert United States cus-
toms agent while coming into the United States from Canada at the Port
Angeles crossing in Washington. The customs agent suspected Ressam
possessed drugs, but found materials for bombs instead.
The Ressam case illustrates what Canadian experts have described as
parallel systems of immigration: one with formal regulations and pro-
cedures, and the other—the one that Ressam and thousands of others
take advantage of every day, which operates as an end-run around the
formal system, creating in Canada an entryway for foreigners, some of
whom are hostile to both the United States and Canada—which oper-
ates outside the boundaries of security. As a result, the border has taken
on a greater significance in the United States as Americans contemplate
national security.
The incoherence of American homeland security
The problem with American border security, however, does not lie solely
with Canada, despite the clear and present danger indicated by a number
of incidents before 9/11. The American government’s incoherent policies
reflect a mix of inattention, incompetence, and the tug-of-war between
the security needs of the nation and powerful economic and ideological
interests.

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The case of the millennium bomber illustrates the problem of
incompetence under the Clinton administration. The National Security
Advisor at that time, Sandy Berger, ordered Richard Clarke, then Chief
of Counterterrorism, to prepare an “after action” report on the incident.
The report is classified and has been described as “highly secret.” However,
speaking to journalists on the condition of anonymity, one federal official
who has seen the report said that it was actually “a scathing indictment”
of the administration’s anti-terrorism policies (Gerstein, 2006, Dec. 21).
There must be some truth to this statement because after 9/11, when secu-
rity policies were under close scrutiny, Berger was caught stealing multiple
copies of the document from the National Archives with the intent of
destroying them. Berger avoided prison with a plea bargain that gave him
probation, community service, and a $50,000 fine (York, 2004, July 21).
American laxity regarding its borders has existed since long before the
Clinton administration. In 2005, Mark Reed, a former Immigration and
Naturalization Service commissioner with authority over both the Mexican
and Canadian borders, told a joint meeting of the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Citizenship, and the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary about a high level meeting he attended 20 years prior. In
attendance were representatives from federal law enforcement, as well as
the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State. They had met to decide
how the agencies would coordinate their efforts on the war on drugs that
the president had just declared.
One topic was the urgency of sealing the Mexican border so as to stop
drug smuggling into the United States. Members of the Department of
Defense (DOD) said that they were capable of detecting and interdicting
any intrusion across the border. They were unable, however, to distin-
guish between groups of migrants and drug smugglers until the individu-
als detected had been interdicted. At that point, said Reed, “the dialogue
became difficult. When DOD refused to entertain the idea that they
should only detain drug smugglers upon interdiction, the meeting was
abruptly terminated. The safety valve that illegal immigration provided
toward the stability of Mexico seemed to be a more compelling national
security priority than drug smuggling” (Reed, 2005).

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Reed told the committee that almost 10 years later, the Border Patrol
launched a highly visible project, Operation Gatekeeper, “to stop an inva-
sion of thousands of illegal border-crossers from Mexico” who were com-
ing across the border every night between the ports of entry just south of
San Diego (Reed, 2005). Gatekeeper was part of a larger border strategy
known as the Southwest Border Initiative, designed to gain control of the
border one sector at a time, “marching,” as Reed put it, from the Pacific to
the Gulf of Mexico until the entire border was secured. The initiative also
included plans to concentrate resources on corridors of human and drug
smuggling and on aggressive work site enforcement in order to attack the
“magnet” that draws illegal immigrants into the country. “It seemed to be
a very measured, balanced approach to border enforcement”, he told the
committees, “and still does” because entries were actually deterred. The
project, however, turned out to be a piecemeal effort. “Resources to attack
the corridors never materialized and work site enforcement resources
actually dwindled.” Eventually the “marching strategy” was abandoned
(Reed, 2005).
Purposely porous borders
Under the administration of George W. Bush, the situation became even
worse. Border control and interior enforcement came to a halt. The pur-
suit of fleeing aliens was prohibited, check points along corridors leading
from the border into the interior were greatly curtailed and thus made
ineffective, and agents were assigned to fixed positions. Line agents and
supervisors have said that illegal entrants simply go around these fixed
positions.
The 9/11 Commission highlighted the role that illegal immigration plays
in the threat to American security, and recommended, among other things,
that additional manpower be devoted to the Border Patrol (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The
Bush administration, however, immediately began a campaign to remove
any measures that would have an impact on the immigration status quo.
In 2005, when Congress authorized the hiring of 2,000 new Border Patrol
agents as recommended by the commission, the Bush administration

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only allocated enough money for 210 agents—not even enough to cover
attrition. When asked about this funding reduction, current Homeland
Security Chief Tom Ridge called the money “fools gold.” In fact, for the
2006 fiscal year, the budget for the Border Patrol was only $80 million, an
indication that the function the Patrol serves has fallen out of favour with
the present administration.
In 2006, Congress authorized a 700 mile-long fence along the Mexican
border. However, by the end of the year, only 150 miles had been built
(Nuñez-Neto and Garcia, 2007). Even along the most modernized section
of the border in San Diego County, which before Operation Gatekeeper
was a place of massive illegal entry, there is still a gap, known as Smuggler’s
Gulch, through which illegal migration still flows. Congress made provi-
sions in the 2006 legislation to secure this gap. However, it remains open
(Nuñez-Neto and Garcia, 2007).
In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Reed observed,
“the DOD stated that they could provide the technology and resources to
detect any intrusion along the Mexican border.” But, he added, “almost
two decades later the Border Patrol still cannot ‘see’ most of the border.”
He told the committee that “detection is a fundamental enabler of any
border security strategy. Acquisition of that ability cannot languish any
longer” (Reed, 2005).
In 2007, the Border Patrol was still lacking adequate detection capa-
bilities, even though an effective system has been developed for that pur-
pose. The system, produced by the Raytheon Corporation, is known as
Project Athena and is similar to the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD), which routinely monitors a large number of targets
for North American air defense. The system consists of a secure wireless
network, integrated ground-air surveillance, and enhanced communica-
tions and computer data processing. Although Project Athena is able to
detect low flying aircraft and terrestrial movement, its ability to detect
maritime targets is especially effective. The advantage of the system is
that it focuses on enforcement rather than arbitrary patrolling and track-
ing, thus making border control far more efficacious. The system was field
tested by multiple enforcement agencies in Operation Gulfview along
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between the United States and Mexico. That test showed that the system
is effective and ready for deployment (Raytheon, 2006).
The Department of Homeland Security, however, has indicated that it
has no intention of deploying the system. In the meantime, the vehicles
and communication equipment used by the Border Patrol are inadequate.
Moreover, the bulletproof vests and armaments issued to agents are no
match for the mercenaries hired by the smugglers to guard their illicit
trade (Carter, 2006, June 7).
In the absence of better surveillance or a physical barrier, putting troops
along the border offers the best enhancement through which to curb mass
migration and the crime that it causes. Under pressure, the Bush admin-
istration did assign soldiers to the border, but this move appeared to be
more of a public relations tactic than a real effort to secure the border,
as the troops have not been allowed to perform effectively. For example,
in 2006, when a unit was confronted by heavily armed intruders from
Mexico, the American soldiers were told to fall back. Most of them were
veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, where their orders had been much dif-
ferent. This situation did not go over well with the troops (Associated
Press, 2007, May 1).
Going north after dark
As thousands of migrants pass uncontrolled across the border each year,
the situation is becoming chaotic. For example, in the winter of 2007, an
organization (of which the author is a member) called Friends of the Border
Patrol took a visiting congressman, Ted Poe, a Republican from Texas, on
a tour of the border in San Diego County. Just after sunset, while standing
on a hilltop above Smuggler’s Gulch, we heard gunfire on the other side of
the border. We did not know the cause, but the former United States Army
Corps of Engineers officer who had built the infrastructure that we were
inspecting—and who was guiding us on our trip—quietly told us that it
was time to leave. Indeed, such precautions must be taken in many other
places along that often perilous border—sometimes even before dark.
The sheer mass of migrants flowing across the border is disruptive to
small borderland communities and rural dwellers, and brings the danger

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of criminals, individuals, and organizations who enter unrestricted with
this flow. In this regard, Congressman Poe said, in a speech in the House
of Representatives in 2007, that small communities on the border “live
in fear of their lives because our borders are open”—a fact that seems to
carry little weight with the United States government (Poe, 2007).
The situation is even worse in Mexico. Organized drug cartels, together
with weak institutions and a long tradition of corruption, have neutralized
the sovereignty of the Mexico state in certain areas such that the govern-
ment in those areas can be regarded as equivalent to a failed state. For
example, in areas where some military units act as mercenaries for the
drug cartels, the government cannot exercise control over its own military.
These mercenary units enter the United States at will and sometimes fire
at outgunned American authorities (KFOX, 2006, Mar. 21).
The United States government is well aware of these incidents. In fact,
the Border Patrol in the Tucson area—one of the most traveled corridors of
illegal entry—has issued a wallet-sized plastic card to its agents that states,
“REMEMBER, Mexican Military are trained to escape, evade, and counter-
ambush if it will affect their escape.” The card also gives directions regard-
ing how agents should react if Mexican army units are encountered on the
American side of the border, advising agents to stay out of their way, as a
last resort (Carter, 2005, Dec. 19). In an internal document that was leaked
to journalists, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) noted that
200 such incursions had occurred between 1996 and 2006, and included
a map showing the points of entry (Carter, 2006, Jan. 15; Inland Valley
Daily Bulletin, 2006, Jan. 20). The United States government, however, has
downplayed these incidents repeatedly. The Sheriff of Hudspeth County
has called attention to this problem (West, 2006), as has Congressman
Poe. In a speech on the House floor in September 2007, Poe argued, “Our
federal government has the duty to keep the Mexican military out of our
Nation,” adding that “it has no business being here for any purpose.” Yet
the government refuses to do anything about it (Poe, 2007).
The volume of illegal entry, as well as the fact that the ability of the
Border Patrol to do its job has been hindered, has resulted in a rising level
of attacks on agents, some involving shots fired across the border and
some involving assaults by armed intruders into the United States. For

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example, in 2005, two agents were ambushed on the American side of the
border near Nogales, Arizona. Both agents were wounded and had to be
evacuated by helicopter (Seper, 2005, July 6).
In Mexico, the problem is even worse. Mexican police who obstruct
drug trafficking, or have accepted a bribe from the wrong side of a struggle
between the cartels, are assassinated. This problem is not restricted to bor-
der cities, but is found in the interior as well. In several instances, officers
have been found decapitated, their heads left in one place and their bodies
in another. This brutal act serves as a warning to authorities to keep out
of the traffickers’ business.
This problem is particularly well illustrated by a spectacular series of
events that took place in Nuevo Laredo, a borderland community, on June
8, 2005. On this day, Alejandro Dominquez was murdered only hours after
taking office as the city’s police chief. Federal police were dispatched to
the city after the assassination. When they arrived, a gunfight broke out
between the federal police and the local police, causing several casualties.
Troops from the Mexican army were dispatched to the city in an effort to
get control. The entire 750 man local police force was suspended until drug
tests and background checks could be completed. Two hundred policemen
resigned or were fired. One suspended policeman committed suicide, and
41 others were flown to Mexico City for further investigation (Associated
Press, 2005, Oct. 6). To make matters worse, Dominquez’s successor, Omar
Pimentel was also attacked on his first day in office in a drive-by shoot-
ing. Pimentel escaped with his life, but one of his bodyguards was killed
(Associated Press, 2005, Oct. 6). As of August 2005, it was estimated that
Nuevo Laredo was experiencing three execution-style murders per week,
totaling 109 to date for that year (Thompson, 2005, Dec. 4).
The international bridge between Nuevo Laredo and Laredo, usually
one of the busiest corridors between Mexico and the United States, was
nearly empty on the Monday following the shoot-out in Nuevo Laredo. On
the following Friday, the head of the city council’s public security commit-
tee and a police commander were ambushed and murdered only blocks
from city hall. A policeman and an unidentified passerby were wounded in
the incident. A total of 170 deaths resulting from drug-related violence in
Nuevo Laredo were reported in 2005 (Jordan and Sullivan, 2005, June 16).

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These incidents are not isolated. On July 28, 2005, a middle-class
neighbourhood two miles south of the border was rocked by automatic
rifle fire, bazookas, and grenades. For 30 minutes, the battle raged with
sounds of explosions echoing through the city. Residents later told report-
ers that they heard nothing. The police did not immediately provide a
version of what happened. Eye witnesses, who asked to remain anony-
mous, said that armed men wearing what appeared to be the uniform of
the Mexican Federal Agency of Investigation descended upon a house in
the district when the firing began. Afterwards, 300 well-armed troops
from the Mexican army used tanks to cordon off the devastated area for
inspection (Associated Press, 2005, Oct. 6). The United States Embassy
in Mexico issued an announcement describing the battle as an “alarming
incident” in which “unusually advanced weaponry” was used (Associated
Press, 2005, Oct. 6).
Before and since those events, gunfire has erupted in the borderlands
of Mexico and people have been killed. One of the most recent reported
incidents took place in May 2007, in the town of Cananea, which is 20
miles south of the Arizona border. The incident occurred after police
and soldiers confronted a band of “Zetas”—former Mexican army elite
troops who now work as mercenaries for the cartels. A total of 23 died
as a result of the incident, five of whom were policemen (McCombs,
2007, May 20; Nevarez, 2007, May 17). In March 2008, the police chief of
another Mexican border town, Palomas, showed up at the port of entry at
Columbus, New Mexico, seeking asylum, saying that his two deputies had
left him and that he feared for his life and needed protection (Associated
Press, 2008, Mar. 21). At a recent conference of Mexican and American law
enforcement agents, one official with the Sonora State Attorney General’s
office said that the drug war situation is “a constant battle, because the
monster is so very powerful” (Associated Press, 2007, June 6).
The connection between terrorism and drug trafficking
Terrorists seek power vacuums in which to operate and chaotic situations
in order to move about. The United States-Mexico border provides such
conditions. It shouldn’t seem unimaginable that terrorists with lots of

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money and drug cartels that have no scruples may eventually cooperate
with one another. In fact, this state of affairs is confirmed by documents
from the Department of Defense and the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) that were leaked to journalists. The DEA documents, dated 2005,
report that terrorist cells inside the United States are cooperating with
drug smuggling cartels in order to fund terrorist activities abroad. The
document also reports that Islamic radicals who speak Spanish, Arabic,
and Hebrew fluently are camouflaging themselves as Hispanics. The
report even contains photographs of such individuals “who appear to be
Hispanics” but are “in fact, all Spanish-speaking Arabic drug traffickers
supporting Middle Eastern terrorism from their base of operations” in
the Southwest. The report notes that some of these individuals have ties
to the radical Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, a Department of Defense
document dated 2006 reports that al-Qaeda has attempted and is plan-
ning to use the United States-Mexico border as an entry point into the
United States (Carter 2007, Aug. 8; 2007, Aug. 9).
Asa Hutchinson, who began his three-year term as director of the DEA
one month before the 9/11 attacks, emphasizes the link between traffick-
ing and terrorist activity. Hutchinson notes that extremists everywhere
around the world are “benefiting from drug trafficking,” and—in refer-
ence to the Mexican border—that “it should be no surprise to anyone
that terrorists should exploit our weakness” (Carter, 2007, Aug. 14). In
2001, he told federal authorities that terrorists would exploit weaknesses
in the system if the United States did not create and maintain a foolproof
immigration system and enhance security on the border.
Mark Juergensmeyer, director of the Ortalen Center for Global and
International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, notes
that links between terrorist organizations are well established around
the world. Speaking specifically about the 2005 DEA documents, he said
that the information reported there reveals a new evolution in terror-
ist tactics that poses serious security concerns. “In some ways,” he said,
“that’s even more frightening to think that drug trafficking organizations
in Mexico may adopt some jihadist’s ideology. If it’s an ideology being
adopted by a drug culture then that makes the situation very dangerous”
(Carter, 2007, Aug. 8).

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Mike McConnell, a retired Vice Admiral, director of the National
Security Agency from 1992 to 1996, and current director of National
Intelligence, serves as the principal advisor to President George W. Bush
on matters of national security. Regarding the possibility of terrorists
using the southwest border as a means of entry into the United States,
McConnell has said, “There are some [terrorists]. And would they use it
as a path given that it was available to them? In time they will.” He cited
the easing of visa restrictions in Latin America, which has facilitated the
movement of people within the Western Hemisphere, as a contributing
factor. A passport from a Middle Eastern country will allow an individ-
ual to enter one of the South or Central American countries. McConnell
noted that “there are a significant number of Iraqis that came across [the
southwest border] last year” (Roberts, 2007, Aug. 23).
In a speech before the North Texas Crime Commission in September
2007, Texas Homeland Security Director Steve McGraw echoed those
concerns, reporting that individuals who have connections to Hamas,
Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda have been arrested on the Texas-Mexico border.
“A porous border,” he said, “without question is a national security threat”
(Carlton, 2007, Sep. 12). When the Associated Press queried federal offi-
cials regarding the threat described by McGraw, the possibility of this
threat was downplayed by the officials (Carlton, 2007, Sep. 12).
Secure trade, corruption, and visions of a New North America
Despite the military effort against terrorist organizations currently under-
way in the Middle East in the name of national security, the Bush adminis-
tration still refuses to face the security consequences of its de facto partial
open border policy with Mexico. One can only speculate as to why, but it
seems that there are a number of factors contributing to the government’s
unwillingness to acknowledge these security concerns. A major factor is
the constant tug-of-war between commercial interests and security—a
struggle that commerce seems to be winning.
Certain ideologies also contribute. The no-borders libertarianism of,
for example, The Wall Street Journal, supports open markets at any cost.
There is also a new transnational vision of North America that has been

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articulated among an elite group of business leaders, government offi-
cials, and intellectuals. This vision follows the example of the European
Union, and was often articulated by former Mexican President Vicente
Fox. Such plans have been presented in a report titled Building a North
American Community, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations,
along with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Consejo
Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales (Pastor et al., 2005). The architect
of the plan was American university professor Robert Pastor who has
testified in support of the plan before the United States Congress and the
Canadian Parliament.
Progress towards the creation of an European Union-like single market
for North America has gone beyond the initial stages and is now under
consideration for practical application by work groups made up of offi-
cials and bureaucrats from all three countries. This initiative is known as
the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), and was
launched by President George Bush, President Vicente Fox, and Prime
Minister Paul Martin at a meeting held in Waco, Texas, in March 2005
(United States Department of State, 2005).
An ideological commitment to furthering North American economic
integration—what may be called a “New North America”—constitutes
the context in which markets and commerce trump national sovereignty
and security. The problem is not with commerce and security. We have
both all the time. In fact, we need security in order to have productive
commerce. The problem is the way in which the elite in the United States
are mismanaging the kinds of changes that are now under way. Because of
this, commerce is being favoured over security in a way that is detrimental
to almost everyone concerned.
Another factor contributing to the government’s unwillingness to
acknowledge border-related security concerns is corruption. More com-
merce and closer relationships between countries do not mean that nega-
tive features from one country will necessarily flow to another. However,
it is naïve to think that a New North America will result in a one way
diffusion of positive public behaviour from the United States to Mexico.
With the reduction in border enforcement and the amount of money
involved in the illegal drug trade, the kind of corruption that has plagued

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Mexico since colonial times is spilling over the border and seeping into
the United States.
This trend is developing as a result of what is, in essence, a partial open
border policy with Mexico, as well as a failure on the part of the American
elite to recognize that there are great differences between the United States-
Canada border and the United States-Mexico border. The European Union
is not a good model for North America because, unlike anywhere else in
the world, the United States-Mexico border is the only place where a com-
mon land border separates the first and the third worlds. This fact should
be recognized and dealt with when considering border policy.
Under these conditions, a North American defense perimeter to guard
against the international terrorist threat is either disingenuous or wishful
thinking. To the north, the Canadian elite are too committed to a politi-
cally correct immigration policy in which security plays a minor part. To
the south, Mexico cannot even defend itself against powerful and danger-
ous domestic enemies that threaten the Mexican state. The only prudent
move that the United States can make under such conditions is to rein-
force its own borders.

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References
Anderson, Benedict (1991). Imagined Communities. Verso.
Associated Press (2005, October 6). Mexican Border Struggles with
Lawlessness.
Associated Press (2007, May 1). Gunmen Attack National
Guard Border Patrol Site in Arizona. Fox News. . Accessed
December 20, 2007.
Associated Press (2007, June 6). Mexican US Law Agents Worried about
Drug Cartel Violence. KTAR. .
Accessed December 20, 2007.
Associated Press (2008, March 21). Mexican Police Chief Requests
Asylum.
Carlton, Jeff (2007, September 12). Security Chief Says Terrorists Have
Been Arrested on Texas Border. Associated Press.
Carter, Sara (2005, December 19). Border Patrol Fears Run-Ins
with Mexican Military. Inland Valley Daily Bulletin. .
Accessed December 20, 2007.
Carter, Sara (2006, January 15). Mexican Soldiers Defy Border. Inland
Valley Daily Bulletin.
Carter, Sara (2006, June 7). Smuggling, Drug-Running, Violence Define
Mexican Border: Testimony. Inland Valley Daily Bulletin. .

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Carter, Sara (2007, August 8). Hearings Urged on DEA Report.
Washington Times. . Accessed December 20, 2007.
Carter, Sara (2007, August 9). Hearings Sought on Islamic, Mexican
Ties. Washington Times.
Carter, Sara (2007, August 14). Drug Cartel-Terrorist Ties Known in
2001. Washington Times. . Accessed
December 20, 2007.
Gerstein, Josh (2006, December 21). How an Ex-Aide to President
Clinton Stashed Classified Documents. New York Sun. . Accessed December 20, 2007.
Gibbins, Roger (1997). The Meaning and Significance of the American-
Canadian Border. In Paul Ganster, Alan Sweedler, James Scott, and
Wolf-Deiter Eberwein (eds.), Borders and Border Regions of Europe and
North America. San Diego State University Press.
Hanson, Marcus (1940). The Mingling of the Canadian and American
Peoples. Yale University Press.
Inland Valley Daily Bulletin (2006, January 20). Congress Must Probe
Reports of Border Incursions. . Accessed December 20, 2007.
Jordan, Mary, and Kevin Sullivan (2005, June 16). Border Police Chief
Only Latest Casualty in Mexic0 Drug War. Washington Post. . Accessed December 20, 2007.
KFOX (2006, March 21). Hudspeth County Incursion Latest. .

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Lipset, Seymour Martin (1990). Continental Divide: The Values and
Institutions of the United States and Canada. Routledge.
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Arizona Daily Star.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(2004). The 9/11 Commission Report. W.W. Norton & Company.
Nevarez, Oman (2007, May 17). Body Found Invokes Attacks by Cartels.
Associated Press.
Nuñez-Neto, Blas, and Michael John Garcia (2007). Border Security:
The San Diego Fence. Congressional Research Service, The Library
of Congress. . Accessed
December 20, 2007.
Pastor, Robert, John P. Manley, Pedro Aspe, William F. Weld, Thomas
P. d’Aquino, and Andreas Rozental (2005). Building a North American
Community. Council on Foreign Relations Press. . Accessed December 20, 2007.
Poe, Ted (2007). The Texas/Mexico Border. Speech delivered in United
States House of Representatives, September 7, 2007. . Accessed
October 1, 2007.
Raytheon (2006). Project Athena Multi-Domain Awareness System.
. Accessed
October 1, 2007.
Reed, Mark (2005). The Need for Comprehensive Immigration Reform
and Strengthening Our National Security. Testimony before the
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of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, United
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Seper, Jerry (2005, July 6). Injured Border Agents Likely Were
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Streets of Nuevo Laredo into a War Zone. The New York Times. .
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York, Byron (2004, July 21). Sandy Berger’s Heavy Lifting. National
Review. .
December 20, 2007.

Chapter 7
The Need to Balance Liberty
and Security
Jan C. Ting
Since the terrible attacks of September 11, 2001, democratic governments
in North America and Europe have tried to respond to the threat of Islamic
terrorism by adopting new security procedures intended to prevent a rep-
etition of that day’s events. In doing so, these governments have been
admonished—sometimes, through the words of Benjamin Franklin—to
find the right balance between liberty and security. But how exactly do we
do that? What methods and measures can or should we employ to evalu-
ate our new security procedures?
One way to balance liberty and security is to subject the new secu-
rity procedures to political and judicial scrutiny. In the United States, for
example, there has been a protracted debate over the USA PATRIOT Act,
which was enacted overwhelmingly by both Houses of Congress in the
wake of the terrorist attacks and signed into law by President George W.
Bush on October 26, 2001.1 This Act was a catchall for many new initia-
1 The Congressional vote in favour of the Act was 356 to 66 in the House of
Representatives, and 98 to 1 in the Senate.

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tives, most of which were non-controversial,2 but a few of which drew
public attention and controversy.
The Act authorized the sharing of foreign intelligence information
among federal enforcement, intelligence, and national defense agencies
(2001: s. 203; Ting, 2002). It expanded surveillance authority involving for-
eign powers or agents, and authorized roaming wiretap warrants specific
to a target, rather than a device or carrier (USA PATRIOT Act, s. 206). It
also authorized government inspection of business records (s. 215). As well,
it extended to the internet the government’s existing authority to record
incoming and outgoing addressing and routing information (ss. 216–17).
In response to objections and controversy over these provisions,
Congress added a “sunset clause” by which these parts of the Act would
automatically expire in four years unless reauthorized by Congress (USA
PATRIOT Act, s. 224). This provision ensured that the entire Act would be
subject to review by the Congress. After extensive debate, during which
the “sunset” deadline was extended by one year, reauthorizing legislation
was enacted by Congress and signed by President Bush on March 9, 2006.
This legislation made permanent 14 of 16 expiring parts of the 2001 Act
(Yeh and Doyle, 2006). New four-year sunset extensions were enacted for
two of the expiring provisions: section 206, which authorizes surveillance
of foreign powers or agents, and section 215, which authorizes inspection
of business records (Yeh and Doyle, 2006).
Does the overwhelming bipartisan support3 for reauthorizing this leg-
islation, as well as judicial oversight,4 resolve the liberty versus security
2 The USA PATRIOT Act increased funding for counterterrorism activities, particu-
larly for increased border protection. It also condemned discrimination against Arab
and Muslim Americans, extended expiring immigration benefits for 9/11 victims, and
provided direct assistance for victims and their families (ss. 101–103, 402–427, and
611–624). The Act also included new initiatives to prevent and disrupt the financing
of terrorist organizations, strengthen criminal laws against terrorism, and improve
intelligence gathering (ss. 301–377, 801–817, and 901–908).
3 The final vote on reauthorization was 251 to 174 in the House of Representatives,
and 89 to 10 in the Senate (Congresspedia, 2007).
4 Legal challenges to some provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act have not been sus-
tained by United States courts. For examples, see American Civil Liberties Union v.

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debate, or are there other factors to be considered? This chapter will con-
sider some other factors. But before considering these factors, I will exam-
ine another example of extensive Congressional and judicial oversight with
respect to balancing liberty and security—namely, the subject of military
tribunals and the detention of enemy combatants.
Balancing liberty and security: military tribunals and the
detention of enemy combatants
Yasir Hamdi was a United States citizen who was captured in Afghanistan
as an enemy combatant, fighting on behalf of hostile forces there. In the
2004 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision, the United States Supreme Court found
that the Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force authorized
the detention of such enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities
without criminal trial. But the Supreme Court also held that a United
States citizen-detainee, such as Hamdi, who was seeking to challenge clas-
sification as an enemy combatant, was entitled to notice of the basis for
classification and a fair opportunity to rebut before a neutral decision
maker, which could be a military tribunal.
The United States government’s attempts to conform to the Hamdi
ruling by instituting Combatant Status Review Tribunals for alien enemy
combatants detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were alternately approved
and rejected by the courts in the United States.5 To clarify the law and end
litigation, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which
provided in part that, except as provided therein,
no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider—
United States Department of Justice, and Doe v. Ashcroft, which struck the non-dis-
closure provision of the national security letter subpoena power. On review, the US
Court of Review for the Second Circuit vacated the ruling because changes made in
the 2006 reauthorization made the issue moot (see Bush v. Gonzales).
5 Compare Khalid v. Bush with In Re Guantanamo Detainee Cases.

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(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf
of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba; or
(2) any other action against the United States or its agents relating
to any aspect of the detention by the Department of Defense of an
alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (Jurist, 2005: s. 1005)
The case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld provides another example of
Congressional and judicial oversight. Hamdan was a Yemeni national
taken into custody by United States forces in Afghanistan in 2002. Upon
his transfer to Guantanamo Bay and classification as an enemy combat-
ant, the United States military prepared to try Hamdan for conspiracy
“to commit …. offenses triable by military commission.” A federal district
court granted habeas corpus and stayed the military commission proceed-
ings. The District of Columbia Circuit Court reversed this decision. In
its 2006 opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed the District
of Columbia Circuit Court’s decision and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court. With respect to the Hamdan case, the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the Detainee Treatment Act as applying only prospec-
tively and not to pending cases. Putting that statute aside, it found that
Congress had, by a different statute, authorized courts to exercise juris-
diction over military proceedings, that the military commission at issue
was not authorized by Congress, and that the commission violated the
Uniform Code of Military Justice enacted by Congress, and the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
In response to this holding, Congress enacted the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, which reinforced and broadened the language of the Detainee
Treatment Act, denying courts jurisdiction over habeas claims of detained
alien enemy combatants, and specifying its applicability “to all cases, with-
out exception, pending on or after the date of enactment” (s. 7.b).
On February 20, 2007, the United States Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia, in the Boumediene v. Bush case, dismissed the petitions
for habeas corpus of alien enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, ruling that the Military Commissions Act removed jurisdic-
tion from the courts, except as specified in the Detainee Treatment Act.

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On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to
hear an appeal from the lower court holding in Boumediene. On June 27,
2007, the Supreme Court reversed itself and granted certiorari6 to hear
an appeal from the lower court holding in Boumediene. We await with
interest the pending Supreme Court ruling on whether and to what extent
laws enacted by Congress and signed by the President can limit the access
of alien enemy combatants detained outside the United States to United
States courts.
The so-called “Terrorist Surveillance Program” provides another example
of the three branches of the United States government grappling with the
balance between liberty and security. Under this program, communications
to and from the United States were intercepted by the National Security
Agency without judicial warrant or oversight (Eggen, 2007, Jan. 18). The
American Civil Liberties Union and others expressed concern that the
communications of people in the United States may be intercepted under
this program without judicial oversight. In response, the Executive Branch
agreed to continue the program only with warrants and the oversight of
the federal judges who serve in the special court created under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (Eggen, 2007, Jan. 18; Gonzales, 2007), while
continuing to assert authority whenever it is necessary to act unilaterally
under the United States Constitution (Risen, 2007, May 2).
Balancing liberty and security: five factors to consider
It would certainly seem that the three branches of the United States gov-
ernment are actively engaged in trying to find the right balance between
liberty and security. But does the close involvement of Congress and
the courts provide the necessary checks and balances against executive
power? Can we conclude that, because all three branches of government
are directly involved, the national security initiatives of the government
appropriately consider both liberty and security interests?
6 Certiorari is a writ (order) of a higher court to a lower court to send all the docu-
ments in a case to it so that the higher court can review the lower court’s decision
(Hill and Hill, 2008).

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Even if that were true, we still might want some basis from which to
evaluate the justifications for new security initiatives proposed or otherwise
not yet subjected to Congressional oversight or to judicial challenge and
scrutiny. Thus, in addition to legal and constitutional sufficiency, I would
like to suggest five additional factors which could be considered while seek-
ing the appropriate balance between liberty and security. In a democratic
society, it may be sufficient to rely on the legal and political process to find
the right balance between liberty and security, whether during a time of
peace or war. But specific factors can also be considered. As a starting point
for discussion, I suggest that the following factors be included:
■ Historical precedent. We should examine what was done in the past
and determine whether it was justifiable.
■ Revocability of the initiative. We should consider whether security
initiatives can be changed or withdrawn when the threat recedes
or when mistakes are recognized.
■ Location. We should recognize that initiatives may be justified in
some contexts, but not in others.
■ The nature of the threat. We must understand, and neither trivialize
nor exaggerate, the nature of the external and internal threat.
■ The likelihood of success. We must be forthright about what works in
terms of applying our moral and ethical sensibilities to the struggle
to defend our nation and preserve liberty.
Historical precedent
In the first place, we will consider historical precedent. In the case of some
national security initiatives, the historical precedent is fairly clear. For
example, American history is replete with examples of the use of military
tribunals during wartime, and the Supreme Court stated in 1952 that,
Since our nation’s earliest days, such [military] commissions have
been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many urgent
governmental responsibilities related to war. They have been called
our common-law war courts. They have taken many forms and
borne many names. Neither their procedure nor their jurisdiction

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has been prescribed by statute. It has been adapted in each instance
to the need that called it forth. (Madsen v. Kinsella)
In other cases where security initiatives depend on technological
advances, historical precedents, if any, are weaker and of less certain mean-
ing. Consider, for example, the government’s expanded use of national
security letters, as authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act, to acquire com-
munication, banking, and credit data which might be surveyed for reveal-
ing patterns (cf. Gellman, 2005; Leahy, 2007). This practice cannot be
measured against historical precedent because no such precedent exists.
Sometimes historical precedent is cited as an example of the wrong
balance between liberty and security. The “internment” of Japanese-
Americans during World War II, for example, is cited as a warning against
the use of race, ethnicity, appearance, or similar factors as part of secu-
rity screening. But should governments be limited in the current war on
Islamic terrorism by such a negative historical precedent?
At minimum, the use of historical precedent should require some
understanding of the precedential facts. For example, the three United
States Supreme Court rulings related to the “internment” do not use that
term. In the first case, Hirabayashi v. United States, the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld a military curfew order applying only to persons
of Japanese ancestry within a designated war zone. The Supreme Court,
while noting that “distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,” nonetheless concluded,
“we decide only that the curfew order as applied, and at the time it was
applied, was within the boundaries of the war power.”
In the second and most famous ruling, Korematsu v. United States,
the United States Supreme Court, by a six to three vote, upheld the mili-
tary order excluding persons of Japanese ancestry from a designated war
zone. The Supreme Court stated that “nothing short of apprehension by
the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the
public safety can constitutionally justify either [curfew or exclusion],” but
concluded that, in wartime, “the power to protect must be commensurate
with the threatened danger.”

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In the Korematsu decision, the Supreme Court distinguished exclu-
sion from the issue of detention, which was at issue in the third and least
known case, Ex Parte Endo, which was decided the same day as Korematsu.
Mitsuye Endo was a United States citizen of Japanese ancestry who was
excluded from her original place of residence by the order upheld in
Korematsu. Residing temporarily in a relocation camp operated by the
United States government, she sought release from the camp, but, without
compliance with regulations requiring either confirmation of employment,
adequate financial resources, or living arrangements, she was denied
release. After citing facts that showed that the relocation camps were
an afterthought of the evacuation order, the Supreme Court concluded
that “whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have to detain
other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are
concededly loyal to its leave procedure,” and unanimously ordered Endo’s
unconditional release (cf. Malkin, 2004).
The Supreme Court’s allowance of the use of ethnic ancestry in national
security measures was limited to the facts of the military emergency fol-
lowing the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and did not include invol-
untary detention of United States citizens whose loyalty was unquestioned.
Post-war declassification of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic communi-
cations has also been cited as previously undisclosed justification for the
military curfew and exclusion orders (Lowman, 2000).
Revocability of the initiative
A second and related factor we may consider while contemplating new
national security measures is whether such measures are revocable, or will
have a lasting impact on the liberty of a democratic society. Returning to
our previous example, the question we may ask is, Have wartime measures
such as the emergency curfew and evacuation of Japanese-Americans in
fact resulted in less civil liberties after the war and today? Considering the
current situation in the United States, we may ask, Is it likely that national
security measures invoked since 9/11, such as military tribunals, detention
of enemy combatants, surveillance, and information gathering regarding
terrorist suspects, will impact civil liberties after the current war is over
and the terrorist threat recedes?

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Suspending civil liberties will not necessarily have a long-term impact.
President Abraham Lincoln defended his suspension of the writ and right
of habeas corpus during the United States Civil War, saying that he could
no more believe that the necessary curtailment of civil liberties in wartime
would establish precedents fatal to liberty in peacetime “than I am able to
believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during
temporary illness, as to persist in feeding upon them through the remain-
der of his healthful life” (quoted in McPherson, 1988: 599).
It is sometimes argued that the current war on Islamic terrorism
is different because of its already long and still indefinite duration. In
response, it may be argued that it is not clear why duration should make
any difference, that every war is of indefinite duration until the prospect
of imminent victory or defeat appears on the horizon, and that defeat in
the current war will mean a much greater loss of civil liberties than is
contemplated in the discussion of current national security measures. It
should be noted that whether the United States is actually at war, even
without a formal declaration, and is, therefore, properly exercising war
powers, is well-settled. The Supreme Court, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, cited
the Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force adopted after
9/11 as authority for the detention of lawful and unlawful enemy combatants,
which by “universal agreement and practice” are “important incident[s] of
war.” Earlier Supreme Court cases—such as The Amy Warwick (The Prize
Cases) and Bas v. Tingy—held that other undeclared conflicts, including
the United States Civil War, were legally wars, despite being undeclared.
Location
A third factor for consideration while weighing national security against
civil liberties is location. For example, stopping and questioning drivers of
a certain ethnicity on the New Jersey Turnpike with the hope of identify-
ing a threat to national security should not be permitted because of the
imposition on civil liberty and the low prospect for a positive “hit,” not-
withstanding the recent immigrant plots uncovered against Fort Dix and
the Kennedy International Airport. However, performing the same action
at a border port of entry creates a different and more defensible scenario.
On the turnpike, ordinary citizens who are commuting or running errands

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would be adversely impacted. But at the border, different considerations
and expectations apply. Additional questioning by United States immigra-
tion inspectors on the basis of ethnicity, if officially authorized, would be
legal and constitutional. Similarly, at an airport, subjecting boarding pas-
sengers to closer inspection because of ethnicity, if officially authorized,
should not be rejected automatically as a violation of civil liberties. Even
excluding immigrant passengers from flying at all because of religious
provocations, as United States Airways did recently at Minneapolis airport
(Von Sternberg and Miller, 2006, Nov. 21), can be an appropriate balancing
of enormous public security risks against the liberty of individuals.
The nature of the threat
A fourth factor that could be taken into consideration while trying to
balance liberty and national security is the nature and seriousness of the
threat. According to the Pew Research Center survey of Muslim Americans
released May 22, 2007, 47% of Muslim Americans think of themselves as
Muslim first, rather than American. Eight percent of Muslim Americans
think suicide bombing can often or sometimes be justified, and another
9% declined to answer this question. In addition, 5% have a favourable
view of al-Qaeda, and 27% declined to answer. Finally, 28% do not believe
Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks, and another 32% declined to answer
(Pew Research Center, 2007: 3, 5).
Higher percentages were reported for Muslim Americans aged 18 to 29
years. Of this group, 60% think of themselves as Muslim first, rather than
American, and another 5% declined to answer this question. Of this group,
15% think suicide bombing is often or sometimes justified, and another
5% declined to answer. Moreover, 7% have a favourable view of al-Qaeda,
while 19% refused to answer (Pew Research Center, 2007: 6).
The likelihood of success
A fifth factor to consider while weighing civil liberties against national
security concerns is the likelihood that national security initiatives will
succeed. I will offer just one observation regarding this factor, and although
my observation is related to torture, it is by no means an endorsement of
torture, which I condemn, as does the United States government.

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My observation is that most Americans believe that torture works,
and this is not necessarily because they have been watching television
dramas such as 24, a show about a fictional counterterrorist unit. Rather,
the torture imposed upon American airmen who were captured by the
Vietnamese during the Vietnam War suggests than anyone, even our best
and most courageous warriors, can be forced to make involuntary disclo-
sures by determined torturers.
United States Navy Captain (later Admiral) Jim Stockdale was the
senior officer among the prisoners of war held in North Vietnam. In his
memoir, he reports that American prisoners subjected to interrogation
under torture were unable to limit their answers to name, rank, and serial
number. Rather than leaving his troops feeling that they had betrayed their
country, he issued new orders to his fellow prisoners to “communicate,
level with your American neighbors on just what-all you compromised,
what information you had to give up in the torture room,” and that “you
were required to take torture, forcing the Vietnamese to impose significant
pain on you before acceding to these specific demands” (Stockdale et al.,
1990: 252). For his leadership in the most difficult circumstances imagin-
able, Stockdale received the highest decoration in the United States: the
Medal of Honor (Stockdale et al., 1990: 451–52).
The American belief that torture works is also reflected in Professor
Alan Dershowitz’s much-discussed proposal that warrants be required
for torture when necessary, to prevent the “slippery slope” phenomenon
which may make torture unnecessarily common (2002, Jan. 22: A19; cf.
Dershowitz, 2006). His work suggests that our natural condemnation
and rejection of torture in nearly every circumstance should be informed
by the reality that it can be made to work, and the recognition that
someday the alternative to torture could be the loss of innocent lives.
In a democratic society, it may be sufficient to rely on the legal and
political process to find the right balance between liberty and security,
whether during a time of peace or war. But specific factors can also
be considered. And as a starting point for discussion, I suggest that
these factors include historical precedent, revocability of the initiative,
relativity or location, the nature of the threat, and the likelihood of
success.

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References
Congresspedia (2007). USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005. Congresspedia. . Last updated June 7, 2007. Accessed
December 11, 2007.
Dershowitz, Alan M. (2002, January 22). Want to Torture? Get a
Warrant. San Francisco Chronicle: A19. . Accessed
December 12, 2007.
Dershowitz, Alan M. (2006, October 17). Warming Up to Torture.
Los Angeles Times. . Accessed
December 12, 2007.
Eggen, Dan (2007, January 18). Court Will Oversee Wiretap Program.
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December 12, 2007.
Gellman, Barton (2005, November 6). The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny.
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December 12, 2007.
Gonzales, Alberto R., United States Attorney General (2007). Letter to
the Honorable Patrick Leahy and the Honorable Arlen Specter. . Accessed December 12, 2007.
Hill, Gerald, and Kathleen Hill (2008). Certiorari. The People’s Law
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Jurist (2005). Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 [White House]. . Accessed December 11, 2007.
Leahy, Patrick, United States Senator for Vermont (2007). Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
H.R. 3162: Section by Section Analysis. Office of Senator Patrick
Leahy. . Accessed
December 12, 2007.
Lowman, David D. (2000). MAGIC—The Untold Story of US Intelligence
and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents from the West Coast During
WWII. Athena Press.
Malkin, Michelle (2004). In Defense of Internment. Regnery Publishing.
McPherson, James M. (1988). Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford
University Press.
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Mostly Mainstream. . Accessed December 12, 2007.
Risen, James (2007, May 2). Administration Pulls Back on
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December 12, 2007.
Stockdale, Jim, and Sybil Stockdale (1990). In Love and War. Revised
edition. Naval Institute Press.
Ting, Jan C. (2002). Unobjectionable But Insufficient—Federal
Initiatives in Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks.
Connecticut Law Review 34, 1145 (Summer).

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Von Sternberg, Bob, and Pamela Miller (2006, November 21). Uproar
Follows Imams’ Detention. Minneapolis Star Tribune. . Accessed December 12, 2007.
Yeh, Brian T., and Charles Doyle (2006). USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005: A Legal Analysis. Congressional
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American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Department of Justice,
321 F.Supp.2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004).
Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dell) 37 (1800).
Boumediene v. Bush 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U. S. (2007)
Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. (2007).
Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp.2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004).

The Need to Balance Liberty and Security 127
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Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
The Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
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Stat. 224 (2001).
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Available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/PL-109-366 .
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

Chapter 8
Is Canada Losing the Balance
Between Liberty and Security?
David B. Harris
Balancing liberty and national security is a task that involves resolving
competing tensions, weighing evidence regarding risk, and making real-
istic and informed public policy choices and decisions. Conventional
wisdom dictates that rights and freedoms would be limited as security
restrictions increase. Although this is true in many respects, balancing
liberty and national security involves much more than this. If we fail to
appreciate the larger picture, then we also fail to understand the issue of
proportion. Understanding proportion, in turn, requires an understanding
of the threats and risks that determine how liberty and national security
should be balanced.
As we try to determine how rights and restrictions should be bal-
anced, it is important to begin by recognizing how vulnerable the Western
world—as a community and a civilization—has made itself by ignoring
or underestimating threats. The challenge with which we are presented
when faced with complex, unpalatable, and anxiety-inducing phenomena
has been partly captured by Anna Freud. She, like her father, wrote about
denial, a defence mechanism (Juan, 2006, Sep. 29). There is much in the
age of mass casualty terrorism that invites denial. An aid to short-term
mental function, denial may help explain why, despite mounting evidence,

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our intellectual elite and others choose to observe our current crisis the
way they do.1 As anthropologist Dr. Stephen Juan has written, “denial is the
path of psychological and moral least resistance” (Juan, 2006, Sep. 29).
Canada’s academic and intellectual elite illustrate the difficulty of deal-
ing with these painful issues. In Canada, gifted and well-meaning leaders,
especially in certain arts and social science fields, have been far removed
from the realities of terrorism and national security. Prior to 9/11, they had
little interest in these areas. Those who warned the elite of what was to
come faced an absence of interest, outright denial, and, not infrequently,
hostility.
This reaction was, in many ways, natural. Most of us have trouble pic-
turing life at the wrong end of a knife or gun, let alone an A-bomb. Having
known mainly creature comforts for the past two generations, few people
in Canada wanted their pre-9/11 reverie to end. Even ostensible specialists
seem to have found the new reality difficult to grasp. Former American
security official Larry C. Johnson, for example, asserted conclusively in
The New York Times that international terrorism was of marginal signifi-
cance, and that fears of terrorism were greatly exaggerated. According to
Johnson, the American homeland faced no measurable threat:
The greatest risk is clear: if you are drilling for oil in Colombia—or
in nations like Ecuador, Nigeria or Indonesia—you should take
appropriate precautions; otherwise Americans have little to fear.
(Johnson, 2001, July 10)
Johnson’s article was rendered unwise, if not self-immolating, how-
ever, by the fact that it appeared a scant two months before the 9/11
catastrophe.2
1 The author recognizes that rationalization and other psychological elements and
mechanisms contribute to people’s assessment of and reaction to terrorist threats.
2 Johnson’s faulty methodology was at the heart of his inability to anticipate anything
in the nature of 9/11. Relying on straight-line extrapolations of past experience into an
uncertain future, Johnson could not foresee attacks whose combined magnitude and
locale were unprecedented and, thus, unavailable in the historical record. The post-9/11

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Canada’s elite
Having taken little professional interest during the lengthy build up of the
terrorist threat, some of Canada’s most distinguished, influential academ-
ics—most notoriously, those in human rights studies, legal studies, and law
schools—suddenly threw themselves into post-9/11 philosophizing about
national security. With little noticeable understanding of risk assessment
and conditions, and with the most tentative and highly skeptical grasp of
the threat, they launched into criticizing security organizations, declared
themselves experts on intelligence law and practice, and scribbled out
counterterrorism policy prescriptions with abandon. They even became
members of government security committees and other official bodies.
Often thorough and frequently exhaustive in their criticism of security
measures and initiatives, many of these academics unearthed manifold
weaknesses in “the system,” but did not recognize their own, most devas-
tating frailty. Their criticism skipped over any serious assessment of the
nature, scope, and extent of the threats that security law and policy were
to be constructed to deal with. Thus, many of the academic prescriptions
were made without any serious appraisal of the size or shape of the thing
for which the prescription was being written.
An example of this academic approach can be found in September
11: Consequences for Canada, a book by Canadian legal academic and
University of Toronto law professor Kent Roach. This book covers many
issues, often very thoughtfully. To be sure, Roach’s examination of post-9/11
approaches to security makes a certain appeal to the Canadian impulse
that favours self-congratulation, and reminds us how realistic, sensi-
tive, and generous we tend to be, compared to so many of our benighted
American cousins. Roach helpfully discloses that his participation in a
United States panel discussion on American and Canadian responses to
9/11 “affirmed my faith that the Canadian response to September 11, while
persistence of this weakness is illustrated in the unimaginative past-bound analytics of
Fear’s Empire by Benjamin Barber. Consistent with Johnson’s approach, Barber finds
little to worry about with respect to mass casualty and mass destruction terrorism, for
the historical record is not replete with examples of such attacks (2003: 26–29).

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far from perfect, was in many ways more civil, productive, and inclusive
than the American approach” (Roach, 2003: 262).
But Roach notes that Canada’s superiority is not without serious blem-
ishes. September 11 strains to condemn as overblown and exaggerated vari-
ous aspects of Canadian security law, management, and attitude. As with
many other similar books, the book’s fatal flaw is that it does not make
a serious attempt to evaluate the nature and scope of the terrorist threat
against which the balance of any liberty-national security solution can be
measured. The result of such an omission is something akin to studying
physics without mathematics.
It appears that this approach to security may prevail among the deni-
zens of many law schools and other faculties in Canada. After 9/11, the
University of Toronto rushed into the fray, hosting a conference involving
a large number of “security skeptic” academics, and produced an unbal-
anced book that, for a time, seemed to be a staple of human rights and
national security university teaching (Daniels et al., 2001). Others were at
least realistic enough to experience the shock of realizing that large-scale
terrorism wasn’t a myth after all.
In a temporary awakening from denial, some of Canada’s intellectuals
and opinion makers began to assert that the September 11 attackers “got
through” because of a “failure of imagination.” However useful this was as a
phrase, it was, unfortunately, given the wrong spin. The failure was exclu-
sively that of the national and local security authorities and their machin-
ery, we were told, not a failure of national communities finally to realize
the truth—that twenty-first century technology was being harnessed by
religious ideologues in support of an upgraded seventh century world war
that had been declared on the liberal-pluralist West many years before.
Fortunately, a few academic voices still struggle to challenge the
academic orthodoxy with realistic appraisal. It has become the task of
researchers such as Dr. Salim Mansur, a Sunni Muslim Canadian and
professor of political science—who has twice had fatwas (religious edicts)
issued against him, calling for his death—to compensate for some of the
intellectual elite’s shortcomings. Mansur recognizes 9/11 as merely another
event in a series of thrusts in Islamo-fascism’s long-standing and escalat-
ing, ideology-driven war against liberal democracy. “On September 11,

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2001,” he wrote, “Americans awoke to a war in progress” (Mansur, 2007,
Sep. 8). Mansur has written extensively, warning Westerners about the
virtually unprecedented nature and scale of the violence and subversion
faced by liberal societies such as Canada.
As people such as Mansur have pointed out, the absence of an inclina-
tion to understand and quantify the threat means the menace will continue
to be underplayed and our attitudes and preparedness will lag dangerously
behind the reality of the situation. Thus, the want of reality-based thinking
will worsen our plight. It will continue to invite into the vacuum of good
sense a host of appealing, if lopsidedly facile, formulae, such as the bald
assertion that “the terrorists will have won if we restrict our freedoms.”
Ironists who are aware of the hard reality of terrorism and its prospects
should find much to consider in the near-bravado with which some of the
elite pronounce such unhelpful, absolutist formulae. As Shapiro (2006)
has pointed out, in an admittedly harsh retort, such arguments are “pure
sophistry”:
If our enemies affect our freedoms, they affect our freedoms. We
may not like our freedoms being affected. Nonetheless, that has
no impact on whether the “terrorists have won” …. If the terror-
ists achieve global sharia, then they will have won. If they erect a
mosque on the ruins of the World Trade Center, then they will have
won. They will not stop until they achieve their goals. We must not
stop until we have shattered their dreams forever.
Yet, as a whole, the message from Canada’s elite has tended to be that
threats are certainly exaggerated and possibly nonexistent. Where politi-
cal correctness rules, it is difficult to open meaningful discussion about
the problem and its solution, particularly if the discussion covers sensitive
areas such as immigration.
Assessing threats
Certainly, classic terrorist strategy seeks to trigger a hostile governmental
overreaction, but overemphasis on possible reaction has at times led to

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extravagant claims that terrorists will have “won” if citizens give up any
freedoms in the course of the struggle. Such claims ignore the fact that
modern martyrdom-bent religious terrorists will be satisfied with butch-
ering every single nonbeliever. From their illiberal perspective, achieving
this end is a more than acceptable form of “winning.” The evidence of
radical jihadists’ passion for self-destruction and mass casualties makes
the “liberty-though-the-heavens-may-fall” view look like the kind of thing
George Orwell had in mind when he wrote, with endearing unfairness,
that only “the intelligentsia [could] believe things like that: no ordinary
man could be such a fool” (Orwell, 1945).
Let us look at a more concrete example of the importance of grasping
the threat and risk of terrorism. Afterwards, let us determine the appro-
priateness of the balance between rights and restrictions. This exercise
should enable analysts to reframe the issue properly, and ultimately ask
the abiding question: what is liberty without national security?
Canada’s leading terrorist threat has repeatedly been identified as
Islamic extremism (see, for example, Commission of Inquiry into the
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 2005, 6315,
l. 21–25). This threat may be operationalized in any number of forms:
chemical, biological, and so on. To simplify our discussion, let us focus
on nuclear considerations, which are becoming insistent and point to our
stake in understanding the dangers of terrorism before leaping into resolu-
tions affecting the liberty and national security balance. Though there are
various Islamic terror groups and state sponsors, this chapter will focus
only on Iran as an example. However, the threat picture that is described
in this chapter can, in certain dimensions, be multiplied several times over
if one takes into account other countries, terrorist groups, and elements.
A précis of this particular threat must begin with Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s September 2005 address to the United
Nations General Assembly. In recorded conversations after the event, Mr.
Ahmadinejad noted that, throughout his speech, his head was orbited by
a green halo, and his divinely-inspired words paralyzed attending diplo-
mats (Melman and Javedanfar, 2007: 41–42). For guidance, Ahmadinejad
corresponds with a number of sources, including a deceased imam in a
well, whom he is confident can be brought back to life as the Mahdi, the

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Twelfth Imam, bringing with him an age of paradise. According to Mr.
Ahmadinejad and his key associates, mankind is in the happy position
of being able, through its own intervention, to accelerate this momen-
tous development. All that is required is Armageddon (Melman and
Javedanfar, 2007: 41–57). This violent eschatology encourages dyspeptic
feelings abroad where many find it difficult to digest the regime’s theol-
ogy, which is routinely expressed in repeated Iranian threats to destroy
selected countries and civilizations. In the meantime, discomfort deepens
with the knowledge that Ahmadinejad is running crash nuclear weapons
programs. Although Ahmadinejad claims Iran’s nuclear program is peace-
ful, the United States and key European nations believe the program is
a cover for an Iranian attempt to produce nuclear weapons. President
Ahmadinejad is joined in his convictions by Iran’s constitutional leader,
the Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, and by those whom the two leaders
have inserted into influential government decision making positions—
including military and security.3
In light of these facts, it seems that, for all practical purposes, Iran’s
national command authority is essentially of the same mind as the men
who crashed 767s into the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September
11, 2001. Iran’s leaders have associates among us. The country’s aggressive
foreign intelligence service has a documented record of assassinations and
bombings throughout the world. In North America, their sleeper agents
are called “submarines.”
Also disturbing is that fact that the rabid, Iranian-controlled terrorist
organization, Hezbollah, lives among us, too,4 and has committed some of
3 Although reportedly variable in quality, the relationship between Supreme Guide
and Ahmadinejad seems considerably more constructive than the Guide’s dealings
with former President Muhammad Khatami (for example, see Melman and Javedanfar,
2007: 36–40, 65, 149). As Yossi Melman and Meir Jafarzadeh report, based on a 2000
media assessment, “Contrary to some media reports, Ahmadinejad is fully devoted
to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei” (2007: 20).
4 Hezbollah’s Canadian presence has been well documented in court proceedings
and the press. Levitt, for example, notes that they have a “Canadian network … under
the direct command of Hajj Hassan Hilu Lakis, Hezbollah’s chief military procurement
officer who is also known to procure material for Iran” (2003).

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its worldwide acts of bloodshed in close cooperation with Iran’s VEVAK
(Vezarat-e Etelaat va Amniat-e Keshvar) intelligence service, among other
groups.5 During the Israel-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006, dem-
onstrations in Toronto, Montreal, and other Canadian cities showed that
Hezbollah supporters and operatives were prepared to brazenly adver-
tise themselves, despite Parliament’s having banned the organization in
Canada.
In the face of martyrdom-fixated Iranian leaders, some would argue
that the deterrence doctrine6—which guaranteed 40 years of Cold War
nuclear peace—would be meaningless. “Meaningless” doesn’t quite cap-
ture the situation, because, consistent with the 9/11 attackers’ sensibility,
the promise of paradise would actually be a positive incentive to trigger a
nuclear cataclysm. Only in a secular, Westernized context could this logic
seem controversial at a time when Mr. Ahmadinejad promises the “wip-
ing out” of the United States, the West, Israel, and so forth. If Iran obtains
nuclear weapons, the only questions remaining will be narrow ones: when?
Where? And how often?
In light of this situation, it is possible that Hezbollah suicide squads
could be used to smuggle multiple weapons into the cities of the “Great
Satan”—the United States—or into Canada and other Western nations.
Indeed, the prodigious number of actual and prospective Canadian al-
Qaeda sympathizers may be sufficient to allow this to happen. Rough
estimates based on an Environics poll suggest that there are thousands of
these sympathizers (Corbella, 2007, Feb. 18). The polling data suggest that
between 49,000 and 119,000 Canadian Muslims could justify an alleged
5 A classic example of cooperation between the two groups was the Mikonos oper-
ation, a successful Iranian intelligence-Hezbollah plot to assassinate dissidents in
Germany. For general background on this and comparable foreign intelligence issues,
see Federation of American Scientists (2007).
6 In strategic security relations, deterrence theory posits that adversary countries or
blocs will avoid—or be “deterred” from—commencing hostilities with a country or bloc
that has the capacity and will to respond with sufficiently damaging military means.

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2006 Islamic terrorist plot to attack public buildings in Toronto, blow up
Parliament, and behead the Prime Minister.7
The nuclear element
Let us consider the impact of nuclear weapons. One estimate suggests that
a somewhat limited 150 kiloton nuclear ground burst in Manhattan would
kill 800,000, and injure 900,000 (Atomic Archive, 2006; Glaser, 2006).
Nothing suggests that Canadian municipalities would fare much better.
Moreover, virtually no hospital, water, or energy facilities would survive
in the region. Radiation and blast-effect would be catastrophic. A detona-
tion above fifty kilometres in altitude would produce an electromagnetic
pulse effect (EMP) likely to fry electrical and electronic equipment over a
substantial area—perhaps nationwide, if exploded at above 400 kilome-
tres8—paralyzing any surviving rescue vehicles, generators, communica-
7 These numbers are based on interpretations of an Environics poll of Canadian
Muslims that was published February 13, 2007, by CBC Television. As columnist
Licia Corbella reported, “Fully 12% of Muslim Canadians polled by Environics said
the alleged terrorist plot—that included kidnapping and beheading the prime minister
and blowing up Parliament and the CBC—was justified” (2007, Feb. 18). Based on the
poll and a wish to be “really non-alarmist,” Corbella reduced the estimate using the
margin of error (4.4%) and conservatively “translated” the 12% to signify that between
49,000 and 84,000 of Canada’s 700,000 Muslims would feel that an attack on Canada
would be justified (Corbella, 2007, Feb. 18). A more statistically-proficient economist
consulted by me reported that the 4.4% error margin is, in statistical terms, a “two-
tailed error”—meaning that the statistical range should be between the mean plus
4.4% and the mean minus 4.4%. Thus, the true range of Muslim Canadians willing to
justify terrorism against their country is between 49,000 to 119,000, with a mean of
84,000. As Corbella pointed out, however, denial springs eternal: “Predictably, the
CBC managed to find a talking head—in this case York University sociology profes-
sor Haideh Moghissi—who dismissed this disturbing revelation. ‘It’s really negligible
that 12% feel that the attacks would be justified,’ said Moghissi. ‘I don’t think it even
warrants attention’” (Corbella, 2007, Feb. 18).
8 This is an approximation assuming a one-megaton yield, and is based on the tes-
timony of Dr. George W. Ullrich (1997), Deputy Director, Defense Special Weapons

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tions equipment, and other life-saving apparatus. And what if this were
to happen during a stifling summer or freezing winter?
This type of analysis is often portrayed by academics and others as irre-
sponsible and alarmist,9 yet it relies on facts and common knowledge (see
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007; Barnaby, 1997). Its message
is bleak, but realistic, and its warning is clear: if we consider this kind of
nuclear holocaust as a mere fraction of the overall threat that civilization
faces, without the blinders of denial, we can see that survival is depen-
dant on assessing the threat correctly before rushing in to determine the
balance between liberty and security. How we respond in terms of our
Agency, US Department of Defense, before a US Congressional subcommittee, on
July 16, 1997.
9 An example of such a tendency is found in a work by McGill University economics
professor, R.T. Naylor. Jeffrey Breinholt, US Justice Department counterterrorist pros-
ecutor, tersely summarized the worldview captured in Naylor’s book, Satanic Purses:
according to Naylor, “Al Qa’ida is a ‘synaptic leap in some US prosecutor’s brain,’ and …
there is no such thing as a terrorist organization” (Breinholt, 2007). These sentiments
are similar to those expressed in Benjamin R. Barber’s Fear’s Empire, in which Barber
appears to claim that the fear of mass-casualty terrorism is at least as great a threat
as terrorism itself. He argues that “[t]errorists otherwise bereft of power have bored
into the American imagination,” and that “it is not terrorism but fear that is the enemy”
(2003: 15, 32). On the other hand, The New York Times reports that distinguished stra-
tegic thinker and Harvard University professor, Graham Allison, “offers a standing bet
at 51-to-49 odds that, barring radical new anti-proliferation steps, a terrorist nuclear
strike will occur somewhere in the world in the next 10 years” (Kristof, 2004, Aug. 11).
In April 2008, Dr. Cham E. Dallas, Director of the University of Georgia’s Institute for
Health Management and Mass Destruction Defense, told the US Senate Committee on
Homeland Security that a nuclear attack was “inevitable,” adding, “it’s wistful to think
that it won’t happen by 20 years” (Emerling, 2008, Apr. 16). Assessing the prospect
of nuclear terrorism, former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives,
Newt Gingrich, declared that “we are not very many mistakes away from a second
Holocaust … Our enemies would like to get those [nuclear] weapons as soon as they
can, and they promise to use them as soon as they can” (Gingrich, 2007). As for the risk
of a radiological “dirty” bomb terrorist attack, International Atomic Energy Agency
chief Mohamed El Baradei has said, “Sometimes I think it’s a miracle that it hasn’t
happened yet” (Bednarz and Follath, 2007, Sep. 3).

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national security policy will define our long-term ability to enjoy liberty
of any kind.
In light of these kinds of risks and consequences, we can begin to
examine how our immigration-related national security policies threaten
both our liberty and security.
Immigration and security
Despite the existence of the terrorist threat, the extent of which is only
hinted at in the example of Iran, Canada welcomes more immigrants per
capita than almost any other nation: 260,000 each year. Canada is also
among the world’s greatest per capita recipients of refugee claimants,
accepting about 22,910 people in 2006 (United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, 2007), compared to 500 in 1977 (Bissett, 1998).
An extremely powerful lobby of politicians, immigration lawyers, gov-
ernment-funded settlement organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and others claim various justifications for these high levels:
aging population, growing economy, and so on. Principled social and eco-
nomic thinkers who are not beholden to the immigration industry—such
as Daniel Stoffman, Martin Collacott (2006), and many others—risk being
called racist, anti-immigrant, or “Islamophobic,”10 for saying that this is
simply unjustified (Dhillon, 2003, Aug. 16). Canada’s immigration and
refugee system has become largely a vote-importing mechanism designed
to play on identity politics. It gives no consideration to the kinds and scale
of terrorist threats, subversion, and disruption that such massive popula-
tion movements can facilitate, even at the best of times.
10 Many critics agree that the term “Islamophobia” is being used to censor debate
on immigration. Dr. Sam C. Holliday (2007) of the Armiger Cromwell Center refers to
Islamophobia as “a term invented to shut down legitimate and vital debate about the
threat of the Third Jihad,” his term for the present worldwide radical Islamist offensive
and associated subversion. Kenan Malik (2005, Feb. 10) observes that “[t]he charge
of ‘Islamophobia’ is all too often used not to highlight racism but to silence critics of
Islam, or even Muslims fighting for reform of their communities.”

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140 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
Those of us who are concerned with terrorism, liberty, stability, and
public safety recognize that, in today’s world, sheer numbers can consti-
tute a clear and present danger and threaten our liberty. Consider that
some of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Services’ (CSIS) 2,500
personnel and perhaps a few thousand other government employees
are involved in screening approximately 250,000 newcomers every year
(Singer, 2002, Dec. 6). Many of these people are coming from, for example,
Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—countries that are, to varying degrees,
virtual enemy states.
Iran’s leadership, for example, remains devoted to the memory of
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian revolution that took
place in the late 1970s, whose photo appears in Tehran government
offices today. Listing “11 things which are impure” Khomeini included
urine, excrement, the sweat of the excrement-eating camel, dogs, pigs,
and non-Muslim men and women (Khomeini, 1980: 48; quoted in Harris,
2007, June 4: A11). In 1989, Khomeini issued a fatwa (a religious edict) call-
ing for the assassination of writer Salman Rushdie because of his alleged
blasphemy against Muhammed in his novel, The Satanic Verses.
As for Pakistan, the radicalism of some of the country’s influential
elements was illustrated when Rushdie, who was knighted in 2007 by
Queen Elizabeth. Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq, Pakistan’s religious affairs
minister, recently said that Rushdie’s knighthood could justify suicide
bombing: “If someone exploded a bomb on his body, he would be right
to do so unless the British government apologizes and withdraws the ‘sir’
title” (Pennington, 2007, June 18). National Assembly opposition leader
Maulana Fazlur Rehman told protestors that by knighting a “blasphemer,”
the British government had “hurt the religious sentiments of Muslims
throughout the world” (Daily Times, 2007, June 23). Rehman also attacked
the late Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) chairwoman, Benazir Bhutto, for
opposing suicide attacks on blasphemers (Daily Times, 2007, June 23).
Other Pakistani leaders are also hostile to non-Muslims, and to
peaceful coexistence. Muhammed Taqi Usmani, a retired sharia judge of
Pakistan’s Supreme Court and a reported “moderate-leaning” Deobandi
Muslim scholar, has expressed the view that “Muslims should live peace-
fully in countries … where they have the freedom to practise Islam, only

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until they gain enough power to engage in battle” (Norfolk, 2007, Sep. 8).
This view is consistent with that of some Pakistani extremists who, accord-
ing to Arnaud de Borchgrave (2002, Aug. 21), promised that “in the next 10
years, Americans will wake up to the existence of an Islamic army in their
midst—an army of jihadis who will force America to abandon imperialism
and listen to the voice of Allah.”
Despite these threats, Canada’s policy with respect to Pakistani immi-
grants remains lax. Only 10% of Pakistani immigrants are screened by
CSIS. Moreover, based on United Nations figures, Martin Collacott (2006)
concludes that “[a]ltogether in 2003, Canada granted refugee status to
more than twice as many Pakistanis as did all other countries in the world
combined.”
Saudi Arabia has also shown hostility towards Canada. This largely
Islamic country, which is home to a variant of sharia law that condones
the stoning of women and the killing of homosexuals, injects money and
its values into various Canadian Islamic and non-Islamic institutions in a
process that has been subjected to increasingly critical scrutiny (Kaplan,
2004, Apr. 5). When Sheikh Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sudayyis, Saudi Arabia’s
highest ranking government-appointed cleric, has spoken to outreach-
hungry churchgoers and naïve social justice advocates, he has talked
about interfaith peace and dialogue (Stalinsky, 2004). But at home in
Saudi mosques, he reportedly “refers to Jews as ‘the scum of the Earth,’
and … exhorts his followers against the Christian ‘worshippers of the cross’
and the ‘idol-worshipping Hindus.’”11 When the Islamic Society of North
America, a supposedly mainstream Islamic group, reportedly invited him
to officiate at their conference in Canada, authorities were ready to bar
his entry (B’Nai Brith Canada, 2004; United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 2006).12
In light of the seriousness of the threats noted above, Canada must
reconsider its current immigration policies. The number and sources of
11 This quote has been attributed to Canadian Member of Parliament Jason Kenney
(Stalinsky, 2004).
12 For more information on the strange background to—and fallout from—this invi-
tation, see Sharrif (2004, July 1).

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immigrants to Canada are undermining the foundational requirements
of our liberal-pluralist society: integration, stability, and public safety. The
number and concentration of extremists increases, while the possibility of
diluting such tendencies decreases. When immigrants arrive in Canada
after being taught in the madrassas and mosques of certain countries
that Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Jews, and moderate Muslims are sub-
human, one cannot expect a change in their thought patterns once they
settle in Canada. A change is even more unlikely if they set up their own
schools. With this development, an increase in the number of recruits
to extremism becomes possible, and the probability of the realization of
ghastly scenarios, similar to those already mentioned, increases.
Once again, it would seem reasonable to speculate that the bulk—
quite possibly, the vast majority—of people entering Canada will con-
tribute positively to the country. However, it would seem naïve to assume
that none of the many newcomers would possess the training, condition-
ing, and values imparted in some of the world’s illiberal and anti-liberal
jurisdictions.
Meanwhile, none of this even begins to address the developing risk
that chain migration involving radicalism may reinforce the growth of a
dangerous political demographic in Canada. It is far from clear that politi-
cians and other vote- and lobby-conscious authorities would be willing to
challenge the demands of zealous blocs. In this regard, the recent open-
ness of several public universities to radical demands for taxpayer-sup-
ported prayer rooms, footbaths, and even separate, gender apartheid-style
female swimming hours, could be regarded as a compromising of basic,
religiously-neutral standards in the face of fundamentalist pressure.13 This
unwillingness to “grasp the nettle” is also demonstrated by politicos and
officials who are considering providing, in the tradition of Saudi-style gen-
der separation, women-only government screeners to check beneath face-
veils at polling stations. At recent Canadian House of Commons committee
hearings on “burqua voting,” moderate Muslims seemed startled to hear a
Member of Parliament, who had recently observed Morocco’s elections,
13 See Carrigg (2007, Aug. 14). See also CRARR (2006) for some insight into the role
that human rights’ commissions may play in related matters.

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commending that country’s gender-separated approach to the screening
of veiled women as a model for Canada to consider emulating.14
Simply put, rational polities do not bring in large numbers of newcom-
ers from such potentially “Western-hostile” source regions while a war is
going on. But they might if their influential intellectual elite were bereft
of a proper sense of the risks involved, and therefore, of the appropriate
balance. If polities bring in large numbers of such immigrants during war-
time, they must expect to see their freedoms curtailed as their government
anticipates larger communities of hostile residents in their midst—and the
infiltration of government, security, and emergency services.
This latter prospect is far from being a paranoid delusion. In The
Management of Savagery, senior al-Qaeda strategic thinker Abu Bakr
Naji (2006) calls for,
infiltrating the adversaries and their fellow travelers and establish-
ing a strong security apparatus that is more supportive of the secu-
rity of the [revolutionary Islamic] movement now, and later the
[resultant Islamic] state. (We) should infiltrate the police forces, the
armies, the different political parties, the newspapers, the Islamic
groups, the petroleum companies (as an employee or as an engi-
neer), private security companies, sensitive civil institutions, etc.
Naji notes that this “actually began several decades ago,” but adds, “we
need to increase it in light of recent developments.”
Indeed, it appears that a good start has been made on Naji’s plan.
The 9/11 Commission hearings were one forum in which American offi-
cials recounted enemy efforts to install operatives into various govern-
ment and para-governmental positions, including those of FBI translator
and defence contractor (Washington Post, 2004, June 16). From Britain
(Leapman, 2007, Apr. 29; see pg. 143) to Spain (Jordán and Wesley, 2007)
to India (India Times News Network, 2006, July 21), and beyond, there
14 As one of those testifying at the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on
Procedure and House Affairs hearing on September 13, 2007, the author was witness
to the dismayed reactions of those described.

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is growing evidence of actual and attempted radical fundamentalist and
terrorist penetration of Western countries’ machinery of government and
national infrastructure.
In sum, if the government fails to restrict the enjoyment of some lib-
erties in the face of infiltration and growing threats, one might expect to
see other liberties ultimately going unenjoyed—perhaps even the right to
life and security of the person, which is guaranteed under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.15 These are among the liberties that
bombings and intimidation tend to remove.
This is a lesson in how a failure to take national security sufficiently
seriously, and to translate this seriousness into immigration policy will
15 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
A Security Breach in the House of Lords
In the House of Lords in November 2005, Baroness Cox expressed concern about
interference with the Lords’ microphone system during her discourse on extremist
Islam. She reported the advice of an independent specialist she had sought who
“pointed out that such jamming is easy to achieve and that it demonstrates the
ability to penetrate the security of Parliament, shows contempt for democracy,
was a specific threat to me, and a general threat to anyone who dares to speak
critically about Islamists” (United Kingdom House of Lords, 2005).
In her speech, Cox pointed to an article printed in the Sunday Times on July
30, 2000, which reported that,
A Sudanese businessman who has been linked by the American CIA to the
world’s most wanted terrorist is the leading shareholder in a company that
provides security systems to the House of Parliament … [This person’s]
pharmaceutical factory in Sudan was flattened by American cruise mis-
siles after it was linked to Osama bin Laden … [The businessman] owns
25 per cent of IES, a company specialising in high-technology surveillance
and security management.
The article claimed that IES had provided such equipment to New Scotland
Yard, British Airways, Texaco, and other blue chip firms (United Kingdom House
of Lords, 2005).

Is Canada Losing the Balance between Liberty and Security? 145
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lead, at best, to an unrealistic balance between liberty and security, and
restricted freedoms. In an era of proliferating weapons and materials of
mass destruction, the risk of social, economic, and political chaos and
infrastructural collapse is not to be disregarded. In fact, chaos can create
the worst form of unconstitutionality,16 for, in a chaotic situation, there is
no judiciary, no government, no rule of law, no liberty—and perhaps, for
increasing numbers—no life. However, well before this point were to be
reached, more subtle restrictions on freedom would be felt.
The radical traditions of sharia, as known in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
parts of Pakistan, are already pressed upon us in the form of “Islamic
civil law,” frequently in the teeth of objections from Canadian Arabs and
Muslims who may have escaped the horrors of certain sharia jurisdic-
tions. Hard-line immigré-based groups such as the Canadian Council
on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) and the Canadian Islamic
Congress (CIC) are the leading advocates of adopting sharia law. These
groups have caused alienation within the Muslim community with their
improbable “studies” (see pg. 146) that allege Canadian Muslims are being
victimized everywhere, and their calls for further “accommodation” of the
fundamentalist view.
Challenging CAIR-CAN statistics, Fraser Institute CANSTAT Project
Director Neil Seeman (2002, Sep. 14) concluded that “however much some
in the media tried to imagine a ‘backlash’ against Muslim Canadians, the
truth is there never really was one.” In fact, Statistics Canada reports that
the number-one target of hate crimes in 2001 and 2002 after 9/11 was
not Muslims but Jews. Twenty-five percent of 1,000 hate crimes reported
by 12 big-city police forces in Canada were committed against Jews. By
comparison, Muslims (11%) were targeted in roughly the same numbers
as South Asians (10%) and gays and lesbians (9%) (The Globe and Mail,
2005, July 14).
In the United States, FBI statistics have led the Investor’s Business Daily
to declare that “Muslim groups are crying wolf about exploding anti-Mus-
lim abuses” (2007, Dec. 3):
16 On this subject, it is worth recalling the Canadian Supreme Court’s warning to
this effect in Reference re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.

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A Closer Look at a CAIR-CAN survey
The credibility of one of CAIR-CAN’s surveys on the treatment and perceptions of
Canadian Muslims came into question when a representative of CAIR-CAN testi-
fied before the Maher Arar Commission regarding its curious statistical “survey,”
conducted in June 2005 and titled Presumption of Guilt.
Testifying about the survey, CAIR-CAN’s Chair, Sheema Khan, faced only def-
erential questions from Commission staff. However, Simon Fothergill, Counsel for
the Attorney General of Canada, exposed doubts about the survey’s reliability
and credibility (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in
Relation to Maher Arar, 2005: 6290ff ). It turned out that the anonymous, question-
naire-based study had made response-forms available on the internet, making
it possible for foreigners who had never even set foot in Canada to attest to the
imaginary anti-Muslim abuse they had suffered in the country. Copies had also
been emailed to those on the CAIR-CAN member list, raising issues of bias, given
CAIR-CAN’s idée fixe about “anti-Islamic” behaviour.
Fothergill pointed out that over half the respondents were connected to
CAIR-CAN (6323, l. 3–6), and a “good proportion” were from those interested in
Muslim and/or Arab advocacy or issues (6323, l. 17–22). In the end, the survey’s
credibility—and its implicit claims regarding anti-Islamic tides—were dashed as
Khan proved unable to clarify fundamental aspects of the study, including the
number of forms that were distributed: “I can’t really say”; the number of hard
copies that were distributed at centers and mosques: “I don’t have the number on
me right now”; and whether the ethnic make-up of respondents was statistically-
representative of Muslim Canada: “I would have to look at the Census to speak to
that” (6321, l. 16–21; 6322, l. 1–2; and, 6322, l. 25–6324, l. 1–2).
In 2006, a whopping 66% of religiously motivated attacks were on
Jews, while just 11% targeted Muslims, even though the Jewish and
Muslim populations are similar in size. Catholics and Protestants,
who together account for 9% of victims, are subject to almost
as much abuse as Muslims in the US (see also Salman, 2006,
Aug. 31).
As mentioned, it is unclear why anyone would propagate unreliable
information that might trigger upheavals, but this is part of the chal-
lenge Canada now faces (for a critical, annotated bibliography of the

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claims of anti-Muslim bias, see Appendix C to Canadian Coalition for
Democracies, 2008).
Charter values as a defensive measure
Free speech rights have also been under pressure from hardliners. Despite
constitutional guarantees, a number of Canadian and American research-
ers, media outlets, and commentators have been sued for libel by the
Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) and
its troubling American parent organization, the Council on American-
Islamic Relations (CAIR).17
In general, these lawsuits were brought against media outlets and com-
mentators who asked questions about the history, links, agendas, and
leading personalities of CAIR and CAIR-CAN. Aware of the free speech
issues raised by these suits, several defendants in these lawsuits made
a principled stand and drove the plaintiffs—who then faced disclosure
risks—to ask for the dismissal of their own suits, and, it seems, to leave
the libel suit business entirely.
Unfortunately, those who struggled in defence of Canada’s consti-
tutional rights had to do so without any help from the intellectual and
humanitarian organizations normally considered to be advocates for
17 The US government has CAIR on its “List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or
Joint Venturers,” under Section III (“individuals/entities who are and/or were mem-
bers of the US Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee and/or its organizations”)
(see United States of America v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development as
incorporated into the Government’s Trial Brief by reference at Trial Brief, Section IV
B.2). CAIR derives from the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), and, according to
the US government, the IAP, “as well as its members, representatives and supporters
were participants in the same joint venture or conspiracy—the conspiracy to support
Hamas.” Like CAIR, certain other organizations with a Canadian presence were iden-
tified in the “List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or Joint Venturers,” including
the Islamic Society of North America (under Section VII: “individuals/entities who
are and/or were members of the US Muslim Brotherhood”), and the Jerusalem Fund
(IRFAN) (under Section VIII: “individuals/entities that are and/or were part of the
Global HAMAS financing mechanism”).

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human rights. Well-known organizations in Canada such as Amnesty
International, PEN, Reporters Without Borders, and the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association (CCLA) did not come to anyone’s aid, while, at the
same time, many of these rights’ groups pontificated about post-9/11 free-
doms on platforms shared with CAIR-CAN and similar groups. Indeed,
during these lawsuits, the CCLA stunned some observers by electing to
its own board one of CAIR-CAN’s leading plaintiffs, a development that,
in the freedom of expression context, invited metaphors about foxes and
henhouses. None of the free speech lawsuit victims dared approach the
CCLA for assistance after this occurred.
Even presenters at the Fraser Institute’s immigration conference in
June 2007, the conference from which this chapter derives, were obliged
to fight for free speech. Apparently uncomfortable with the prospect
of a mainstream conference regarding immigration, security, and radi-
calism, the Canadian Islamic Congress and Canadian Arab Federation
jointly—and implausibly—called upon the police to put the conference
under surveillance. Though a number “free speech” organizations stayed
selectively silent on this issue, journalists such as Calgary Sun Editor Licia
Corbella (2004, Oct. 31; 2007, June 15) stepped into the gap and exposed
the disturbing origins and implications of the attempts to shut down the
Institute’s learned and responsible exercise of the Charter-guaranteed
right to free expression.
However, by the end of 2007, the prospects of those wishing to
silence speech and warnings about radical Islam had improved. Media
developments had led to fears that “silencers” could avoid the costs and
disclosure-risks of the courtroom simply by appealing to one of Canada’s
human rights commissions—at the taxpayers’ expense (Levant, 2007).
In 2007, the Alberta Human Rights Commission moved forward with a
Canadian imam’s complaint against the Western Standard for reprinting
controversial cartoons of Mohammed. In one fell swoop, expenses were
forced on a media outlet, a deterrent effect was imposed on publishers,
and—particularly in this case—Canadians had to contend with the
possibility that government quasi-judicial “human rights’” bodies might
be used indirectly to enforce sharia law bans on portrayals of the Islamic
Prophet.

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Ezra Levant, who was the publisher of the Western Standard at the time,
has highlighted the attractiveness of appealing to a human rights board,
rather than filing a civil law suit, for those wanting to control speech:
After the National Post ran my column, the CIC served us with
notice under the defamation laws. Of course, they had no case—
we had the defences of truth, fair comment, etc.—so the CIC had
to settle for a letter to the editor almost a year later.
But the CIC learned their lesson: there’s no point suing in defama-
tion law, where the CIC would have to pay for their own lawyers,
and our lawyers if we won, and where silly things like the rule of
law apply. Better to go to the human rights commissions where the
taxpayer pays for the prosecution, traditional rules of evidence and
procedure don’t apply, and free speech is not protected. It still has
all of the down-sides for the defendant—the hassle, the cost, and
a lower bar for a “conviction”—but none of the cost for the com-
plainants. (Levant, 2007)18
At the end of the year, alarms were growing louder as federal and pro-
vincial human rights’ commissions were simultaneously served with a
formal complaint, supported by the Canadian Islamic Congress, against
Maclean’s magazine. Maclean’s had published an excerpt from interna-
tionally-syndicated journalist Mark Steyn’s best seller, America Alone,
and this had been deemed unacceptable by those making the complaint
(Levant, 2007). Levant suggests that the Canadian Islamic Congress’
record in their libel law contretemps with him led that organization to
18 By early 2008, the complainant, Imam Soharwardy, was facing growing pressure
from the media and the public, and, in a strange turnaround, was having to fend off
formal complaints from certain members of his own mosque. This public relations’
debacle was said to have led to his withdrawal of his “human rights’” complaint in
February 2008. Levant contended that he would pursue Mr. Soharwardy for the costs
involved in the commission exercise (see Levant, 2008, and Corbella, 2008, Feb. 16).

150 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
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recognize the value of human rights’ commissions to its campaign against
Maclean’s magazine.
Conclusion
Without an appropriate, proportionate understanding of the threat, our
national community will continue to downplay the challenge of radicalism
and terrorism, and to pursue a course of freewheeling laxity in immigra-
tion, refugee, and other social and security matters. The unrealistic belief
that Canadians enjoy an unconstrained luxury of public policy choice—
that virtually nothing can justify inconveniencing our freedoms—will
paradoxically bring nearer and make more imposing the restrictions that
our freedoms will eventually face. A naïve public policy—such as relatively
open borders during wartime—means that we will see more “no-fly” lists,
more agitation and instability, more crises, and more constraints.
Under current conditions, vast intakes of immigrants from a world
at war—part of which is at war with us—is a recipe for non-assimilation,
provocation, violence, genuine alienation, domestic chaos, panic, and
reactive, if unavoidable, state inhibitions on civil liberties. Once we are
very far down the road to chaos, reassuring government statements and
human rights organizations’ resolutions will have no more relevance than
burnt-out courtrooms and judges in hiding. If we reach a state of panic
and reaction, the essence of liberty will be undone.
“Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women,” Learned Hand, the great
American judge, once said. “[W]hen it dies there, no constitution, no law,
no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much
to help it” (Hand, 1960, quoted in Mehta, 2007: 82). With this in mind, we
must govern ourselves accordingly while there is still time.

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Peace until Strong Enough to Wage Jihad.’ The Times. . Accessed
September 8, 2007.
Orwell, George (1945). Notes on Nationalism. Charles’ George Orwell
Links. Originally published in Polemic (October, 1945). . Accessed
September 8, 2007.
Pennington, Matthew (2007, June 18). Pakistan Condemns Rushdie Honor.
Washington Post. . Accessed June 21, 2007.
Reference re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
Roach, Kent (2003). September 11: Consequences for Canada. McGill-
Queen’s University Press.
Rushdie, Salman (2006). Secular Values, Human Rights and Islamism.
Presentation to Center of Inquiry, New York, October 11, 2006. .
Salman, Omran (2006, August 31). Misguided Muslim groups.
Philadelphia Daily News. .htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp>.
Accessed September 1, 2006.
Seeman, Neil (2002, September 14). Are We All Islamophobes? Not
Really. Free Republic. . Accessed April 3, 2004.

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Sharrif, Ali (2004, July 1). No-show Sheikh Rattles Jewish-Muslim
Relations. NOW Magazine. . Accessed January 2, 2008.
Singer, Colin (2002, December 6). The Facts about Immigration.
National Post. .
Accessed April 18, 2008.
Stalinsky, Steven (2004). Incitement to Jihad on Saudi Government-
Controlled TV. The Middle East Media Research Institute Special
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Accessed January 2, 2005.
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to US Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure. Testimony before
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. Accessed 17 April 2008.
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Washington Post (2004, June 16). Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearings
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Chapter 9
A Secure Border?
The Canadian View
John J. Noble

In a previous examination of the issues involved in a common security
perimeter, I came out in favour of expanding the common security perim-
eter we have had since the 1950s—North American Aerospace Defence
Command (NORAD)—to deal with the security challenges of the twenty-
first century (Noble, 2005). Those challenges now include a sharper focus
on who is allowed to cross national borders and who we let into Canada
and the United States, both from across our common border and from
outside North America. There have been and always will be segments of
Canadian and American society that regard any sharing of sovereignty
as bad thing, by definition, notwithstanding the end result. In this chap-
ter, I review major developments in the past three years which affect the
prospects for a common security perimeter and common security criteria
for immigration and refugees. In the end, I conclude that while the pros-
pects for more cooperation are good, the chances of a common security
perimeter and common security criteria for immigration and refugees
are not good on either side of the forty-ninth parallel. First, I will dis-
cuss several recent developments regarding the flow of people across our
mutual border.

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162 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
The Security and Prosperity Partnership
In late November 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin and President George
W. Bush agreed to a bilateral Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP)
during the latter’s visit to Ottawa. This Partnership built on the Smart
Border Declaration and 30-point Plan of Action which were established in
December 2001. This bilateral SPP agreement was trilateralized in March
2005 during a meeting between President Bush, President Vicente Fox of
Mexico, and Prime Minister Martin at Waco, Texas (White House, 2005b).
A key element of the SPP is that it is trilateral in concept, but it allows any
two countries to move forward on an issue, creating a path for the third
to join later. Prime Minister Stephen Harper became part of the discus-
sion at a leaders’ meeting in Cancun in March 2006, and then hosted the
SPP Trilateral Summit in Montebello in August 2007 (Office of the Prime
Minister, 2007b). One of the five key priorities identified by the leaders at
the Cancun meeting was the creation of “smart, secure Borders,” with the
objective of completing the following activities within 24 months:
■ Collaborate to establish risk-based screening standards for goods
and people, which rely on technology, information sharing, and
biometrics;
■ Develop and implement compatible electronic processes for supply
chain security that use advanced electronic cargo information to ana-
lyze risk and ensure quick and efficient processing at the border;
■ Develop standards and options for secure documents, to facilitate
cross-border travel;
■ Exchange additional law enforcement liaison officers to assist in
criminal and security investigations; and,
■ Develop coordinated business resumption plans at border cross-
ings, to ensure legitimate trade continues (Office of the Prime
Minister, 2006).
On February 23, 2007, ministers from the three countries met in
Ottawa where they issued a final communiqué which established a senior
level coordinating body to prioritize and oversee emergency management

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activities, including emergency response, critical infrastructure protec-
tion, border resumption in the event of an emergency, and border inci-
dent management (Ministers Responsible for the Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America, 2007).
The SPP will enhance and strengthen our ongoing security efforts, such
as the Smart Border Accord, the Border Partnership Action Plan, and the
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Initiative. As a White House (2005a) news
release states,
The SPP builds upon, but is separate from, our long-standing trade
and economic relationships, and it energizes other aspects of our
cooperative relations, such as the protection of our environment,
our food supply, and our public health. The issues of immigration
and trade disputes will be dealt with outside the SPP through exist-
ing treaties and congressional action.
The SPP and its related programs are the platform on which more coopera-
tion and greater confidence between Canada and the United States in the
flow of people across our mutual border is being built. The SPP may also
be the platform on which certain aspects of a common security perimeter
can be built, but a formal common security perimeter is clearly outside
the scope of the Partnership.
The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
The United States Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, which requires the development and implementa-
tion of a passport, other document, or combination of documents for all
travel into the United States by American citizens and by other catego-
ries of individuals for whom documentation requirements had previously
been waived (e.g., all Canadian citizens). The Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative (WHTI) of April 2005 is the proposed plan to implement this
mandate (Abelson and Wood, 2007).
The WHTI has nothing whatsoever to do with illegal migration and is
not expected to stem it in any way. In my view, a plan that is supposed to

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enhance the security of the United States, but does not deal with an annual
illegal migration of some 500,000 people from Mexico seems to have a
very big hole in it and makes a mockery of the whole process. When it
comes to illegal migration from Mexico, the United States is faced with a
difficult predicament: on the one hand, there is a strong security concern,
and on the other, there is a strong demand for the labour provided by ille-
gal migration. Canada faces a similar dilemma with respect to legal migra-
tion (Tibbetts, 2007, June 18; The Economist, 2007, May 31a; The Economist,
2007, May 31b). Both countries are confronted with the question of where
to draw the line between meeting annual targets for migrants and refugees
and maintaining national security. Not all of the illegal migrants enter-
ing the United States across the Rio Grande are Mexicans, and American
security officials becoming increasingly worried about this. At least in
Canada the authorities have an idea of who is entering the country.
There has been much talk about the possible development of an alter-
nate secure ID document, such as a secure driver’s license with biometric
identifiers, and a United States smart pass card for traveling to Canada,
which would be much cheaper than a full passport. To date, the Canadian
government has focused almost exclusively on the development of a more
secure driver’s license as a satisfactory alternate ID that meets the criteria
of the WHTI. Such as license would allow for a number of security options.
For example, the duration of licenses issued to visitors with time-limited
visas would not exceed the period of the visa (Vaughan, 2005).
In August 2007, the government of Canada asked the American
administration to declare that it would accept enhanced driver’s licenses
as a passport substitute, and has asked for more time to introduce those
licenses gradually, as existing licenses expire. However, an editorial in The
Globe and Mail (2007, Sep. 4) suggested that this was unrealistic, and
urged the government to expand its campaign to encourage Canadians
to obtain passports. In addition, the editorial argued that the govern-
ment should heavily advertise the NEXUS card, a high-security identity
card available to Canadian and United States residents which expedites
crossings at the land borders for low-risk, pre-approved travellers. The
government should abandon its advocacy of the enhanced driver’s license
alternative, which would simply create more bureaucracy as provinces

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scrambled to give their licensing officials more security training, while
dealing with privacy concerns.
In June 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced
a further delay in the full implementation of the WHTI, which meant that
the deadline after which citizens of both countries who want to enter
or re-enter the United States would be required to have a passport had
been postponed from January 31, 2008, to a yet to be determined date
(DHS, 2007). A DHS news release noted that “on January 31, 2008, United
States and Canadian citizens will need to present either a WHTI-compliant
document or a government-issued photo ID, such as a driver’s license, plus
proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate” (DHS, 2007).
The DHS announcement was due to a number of factors, the most
important of which was pressure from border state legislators at the fed-
eral and state level who are concerned about the potential negative impact
the passport requirement may have on the economy. The fact that passport
offices on both sides of the border have been swamped with applications,
causing considerable delays, is another factor. One unspoken factor is the
clear desire of both countries to try to come up with a low-cost alterna-
tive to the passport that is still secure. While the WHTI is a unilateral
American initiative, its implementation has various cross-border implica-
tions which have required, and will continue to require, extensive coop-
eration. The WHTI may yet result in some new form of secure ID which
will be less than a full passport, such as the NEXUS card.
The Safe Third Country Agreement
Another recent development affecting the flow of people across our mutual
border was the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States of America for Co-operation in the
Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries
(known as the Safe Third Country Agreement). The Agreement reinforces
refugee protection by establishing rules for the sharing of the responsibil-
ity between Canada and the United States to hear refugee claims made by
persons at ports of entry (POEs) on the shared land border. Its objectives,
as articulated in the Smart Border Action Plan, are to enhance the orderly

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handling of refugee claims, strengthen public confidence in the integrity
of our asylum systems, and help reduce abuse of refugee programs.
The agreement applies only to land crossings of the Canada-United
States borders, and not to arrivals by air or sea. In November 2006, a
one year binational review of the implementation of the Agreement was
completed (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2006). This review was
conducted in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and drew on input from non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) in both countries, as mandated under section 8.3 of the
Agreement. Overall, both governments’ assessment of the implementa-
tion of the Agreement was positive. The Agreement also received the
UNHCR’s stamp of approval. The UNHCR’s overall assessment was that
“the Agreement has generally been implemented by the Parties according
to its terms and, with regard to those terms, international refugee law”
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2006).
Over several years prior the Agreement, the number of refugee
claims made in Canada declined steadily. In the 50 countries covered in
a UNHCR report, there were 15% fewer applications for refugee status
in 2005 (336,100) than there were in 2004 (394,600) (Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, 2006).
In 2005, there was a 3% decrease in the number of refugee claims made
at airports and a 6% decrease in the number of claims made at inland
offices across the country, and a 55% decrease in the number of claims
made at the land border. This led to an overall decrease of 23% in the
number of refugee claims made in 2005, compared to the number made
in 2004 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2006).
In recent years, refugee claims made at the Canada-United States land
border have comprised a significant portion of the total refugee claims
received each year. On average, between 2002 and 2004, approximately
32% of the annual number of refugee claims were made at the land bor-
der. In 2005, this proportion fell to approximately 20%. In 2005, Canada
received 4,033 refugee claims at the Canada-United States land border,
3,254 of which qualified for one of the exceptions to the Agreement. As a
result, those people were able to pursue their claims for refugee protec-
tion in Canada. That acceptance rate (80.5%) is higher than the general

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Canadian average mentioned below (Citizenship and Immigration
Canada, 2006).
The Safe Third Country Agreement has reduced the number of
unfounded refugee claimants coming to Canada across the land border,
without becoming an impediment for genuine refugee claimants. Once
word spreads about this agreement, perhaps the numbers of claimants
will increase in future years.
The United States’ experience with the Safe Third Country
Agreement
Between 2000 and 2004, when the Agreement was not in place, an average
of 58 asylum claimants arrived at one of the Canada-United States land
border crossings each year. Of the 66 claimants during the first year of the
Agreement, 62 were subject to the Agreement. The other four claimants
were Canadian citizens, who are not subject to the Agreement. There were
39 cases in which United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) determined that the applicant was subject to the Agreement. In
38 of the cases in which USCIS determined that an asylum seeker was sub-
ject to the Agreement, Asylum Officers found that an exception applied in
23 cases (60%). In 16 cases, there was a determination that an exception
to the Agreement did not apply. In the 23 cases in which the applicant
established an exception, all 23 were determined to have a family-based
exception (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2006).
Reform of the refugee system in Canada
The Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) states that
reform of Canada’s refugee determination system is being explored so as
to identify ways of streamlining the system to ensure protection is deliv-
ered efficiently to those in need. To support administrative reform of the
system, additional funding was allocated to reduce the backlog in the
refugee system. These new administrative measures continue to yield posi-
tive results in the form of an enhanced ability to manage access to the in-
Canada refugee determination process and a reduction in the Immigration

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and Refugee Board (IRB) inventory by more than half since 2002 (from
51,600 in 2002 to 22,000 in 2005). In this context, CIC increased admis-
sions from 15,901 in 2004 to 19,935 in 2005. CIC has also worked with
other organizations—including the Department of Justice, the IRB, and
the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)—to develop substantive
proposals that will advance the refugee reform agenda (Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, 2006).
However, a June 2007 article in the Ottawa Citizen reported that the
“refugee backlog grows despite a flurry of appointments to IRB—Canada’s
backlog of refugee claims is growing by almost 1,000 cases a month as
the Harper government continues to dawdle on filling vacancies at the
Immigration and Refugee Board” (Bryden, 2007, June 16). The article
pointed out that the backlog of claims has climbed to about 8,000, accord-
ing to IRB records. Board spokesman Charles Hawkins said the number
of pending cases is rising by about 900 a month, with each claim taking
an average of 12.5 months to process. Furthermore, the Citizen reported
that “when Prime Minister Stephen Harper took power 16 months ago,
there were only five vacancies on the board, which at that time had 119
members …. [and] the backlog of claims had been effectively reduced to
zero for the first time in a decade.”
In August 2007, Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson wrote
about Canada’s refugee system. He noted that,
between January of 2005 and June of 2007, Mexico was the top
source country for refugees to Canada. There were 6,745 Mexicans
in the Canadian queue as of the end of June, more than Haitians,
Chinese, Colombians and Sri Lankans combined. Yes, a majority of
claimants are rejected, but given Canada’s limited deportation suc-
cess, even the unsuccessful ones can go underground and stay. Or,
with a good lawyer, appeal to the minister. Or, as a last resort, a news
outlet may provide a sympathetic front-page story. Because anybody
who puts a toe on Canadian soil and claims to be a refugee has the
right to Charter protection and the whole panoply of the refugee-
determination system, the country is essentially helpless to do things
more efficiently—and to assist genuine, certified refugees.

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Helpless to deal with claimants when they land, the government has
been forced to impose visas on all visitors from some friendly democratic
countries, such as Costa Rica, Chile, and some countries in Eastern Europe.
Mexico may be next. Today, Colombia (where Mr. Harper just made an
official visit), India, the United States, and Israel are among the top 10
source countries for refugees. A majority of claimants from those coun-
tries, except Colombia, eventually are rejected, but they use up money
and time, and send awful signals to other countries. We ought to have an
annual list of countries from which Canada will not accept refugees, no
matter the circumstances. Such a list could be compiled from a variety of
public sources. But, of course, our laws would not allow it.
Election of the Conservative Party in January 2006
The election platform of the Conservative Party during their last cam-
paign included a seven-page section entitled “Stand Up for Security,”
which included a section on “Securing our Borders” (Conservative Party
of Canada, 2006: 26). The platform also included a section entitled,
“Ensuring Effective Deportation Laws” (2006: 27). The platform contained
a promise to hold “a comprehensive, independent judicial inquiry into the
investigation of the Air India bombing of June 23, 1985,” which, prior to the
9/11 attacks, was the largest single terrorist attack. That inquiry has been
established and to date has heard considerable testimony and evidence
which suggests the bombing could have been prevented.
Following its election, the Conservative government declared the
Tamil Tigers a terrorist organization, resulting in favourable comments
from Nicholas Burns, the United States Undersecretary of State. Burns
made it clear that the State Department was tremendously excited to
have an engaged, active new government as interlocutor. The govern-
ment’s early actions against Hamas, as well as its designation of Sri Lanka’s
Tamil Tigers as a terrorist group, were “indications of a very self-confident
foreign policy and of a government not afraid to make very tough deci-
sions,” Burns said. “So we are very impressed. We are very impressed by
the self-confidence and by the clarity of thinking in Canadian foreign
policy” (Wells, 2006).

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Need for further reforms to Canada’s refugee system
The Canadian refugee system needs to be reformed for reasons other
than issues of terrorism. Our concerns about possible terrorists slipping
in as refugee claimants should not be the primary force driving this issue.
But even if many Canadians are not concerned about terrorist threats
to Canada, they should be concerned about the negative effects of a
border closure in the aftermath of a terrorist attack with a Canadian
connection. They should also be concerned about and want to rectify a
two-tier system that many people use to try to circumvent the normal
immigration process by claiming refugee status (Noble, 2003: 21). For
example, the number of refugee claimants from Mexico continues to be
very high, as noted above.
An Ipsos-Reid poll published by the National Post on June 18, 2007,
concluded that “Canadians are split on refugee risks.” Nearly one-half of
those surveyed (48%) said immigration officials should be more worried
about “accidentally letting someone stay in Canada when they are not
a legitimate refugee.” On the flip side, 43% said officials should be more
concerned about “forcing someone to return to their country when in
fact they really deserve to be considered a refugee.” Nine percent said
they did not know which prospect they find more worrisome (Tibbetts,
2007, June 18).
The same article noted that a separate Ipsos survey conducted among
1,002 Canadians between June 12–14 also found that over the past 20 years,
Canadians have changed their attitudes regarding refugees. When asked
whether Canada should be doing more than other similar countries, 41%
said Canada should do more than other countries do to protect refugees,
1% said Canada should do less, and 48% said it should be about the same. In
a 1987 survey, only one-quarter of Canadians said Canada should be doing
more to protect refugees. However, in 1987, almost half said that Canada
should be doing about the same as other countries, a figure that has held
steady for two decades. The recent poll found that British Columbia resi-
dents were most likely (51%) to think Canada should be doing more than
other Western countries. Québecers were the least likely (only 24%) to say
Canada should be more active (Tibbetts, 2007, June 18).

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Differences between the Canadian and American systems
There is no reason why Canada cannot continue to maintain its own poli-
cies on annual levels of immigration and its own regulations determin-
ing the selection of skilled immigrants, sponsored relatives, etc. Canada
and the United States would only need to adopt common standards if
they were to agree to combine their economies in a common market that
included free movement of labour across their common border. If so, the
reasons would be economic rather than security. Sovereignty concerns
and jealousies in both Canada and the United States regarding the ques-
tion of common standards for the selection and numbers of immigrants
are not likely to abate.
In terms of law enforcement, prosecutions, and detention, the two
countries differ in a substantial way. The United States uses detention
much more aggressively than Canada does. Until recently, this indi-
cated primarily a willingness to spend more money—much more money.
However, since 9/11, the United States has also backed away from legal
protections that still hold sway in Canada. In the United States, there is
also a greater willingness to prosecute, a greater ability to convict, and
harsher penalties imposed by the courts on smugglers and traffickers than
is the case in Canada.
But does this mean that the American system is better than the
Canadian system in terms of entry control and removals? In light of the
number of asylum seekers from abroad coming to Canada via the United
States, it seems that many people have not had difficulty getting past
American entry controls. If Canada did not have to deal with the 10,000
to 15,000 additional refugee claimants per year who come from the United
States, it would have considerably more resources to apply to enforcement,
detention, and removals. That is why the Safe Third Country Agreement
mentioned above was so important to Canada. It was supposed to relieve
some of Canada’s present burden, and force the United States to take
some responsibility for the present flow of refugee claimants into Canada
(Noble, 2005: 510–11).
A 2002 study entitled, US and Canadian Immigration Policies: Marching
Together to Different Tunes, itemized problems with Canada’s refugee

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determination system and American criticisms. It suggested that entry
as a visitor would offer a terrorist the path of least resistance. The paper
notes that “the modus operandi of the 9/11 terrorists suggest that they
understood that the weakest link in North American border security lay in
the admission and monitoring of tourists, international students, business
people, and other temporary entrants, because there are no exit controls
and no way of knowing whether those who were admitted temporarily ever
leave” (Rekai, 2002: 15).
Schengen and the idea of a shared border for North America
A security perimeter, similar to the Schengen Treaty which covers most but
not all European Union countries,1 which would abolish the land border
between Canada and the United States is not an option at this time for a
number of reasons. First, Canada and the United States are not committed
to the type of political and economic union that has developed in Europe.
The Americans would worry that abolishing the border would make the
United States more vulnerable to security threats. In addition to shar-
ing those concerns, Canadians would worry about two things: the large
number of illegal undocumented immigrants in the United States and the
potential flow of guns into Canada. I must agree with James Laxer, long-
standing nationalist and member of the New Democratic Party “Waffle
Group,” who wrote that an open border with the United States “would raise
serious security concerns for Canada including importing the American
gun culture into Canada, something most Canadians strongly oppose”
(Laxer, 2003: 262, 318–19).
As Daniel Stoffman has written, there are two main problems with the
idea of a security perimeter: “i) the Canadian immigration and refugee sys-
tems are in such disarray that American security would be compromised if
border controls were removed; and ii) Canadian security would be at risk
1 The Treaty established the first provisions for a harmonized visa policy among sig-
natory EU countries and established new policies to ensure the cooperation necessary
to eliminate internal border checks for nationals of Schengen party states (Newland
and Papademetriou, 1998-1999).

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if Canada stopped checking people entering from the south” (2002: 48).
Stoffman also wrote that “the major reason Canada should fear the United
States is that the States is home to the greatest collection of unidentified
illegal immigrants anywhere in the world” (2002: 66). Sidney Weintraub
(2003) of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has also writ-
ten about the problems associated with a security perimeter:
the notion of perimeter screening to speed up the movement of
goods and residents of the two countries is logical on the surface,
but there are inherent problems that must be considered. Without
any border screening, the two countries would need identical immi-
gration laws to permit the free movement of people from one coun-
try to the other and a common tariff and other trade restrictions so
that the transhipment [sic] of goods from one country to the other
would not matter. These steps smack of sharing sovereignty rather
than “mutual respect for sovereignty.”
Moreover, in 2004, Christopher Rudolph concluded that “the unequal dis-
tribution of power among NAFTA states, disparate interests, and ideational
factors make the establishment of a comprehensive harmonized regime
governing migration and border policy in North America highly unlikely”
(Rudolph, 2005: 457). Quoting Peter Andreas, Rudolph also noted that “to
‘Schengenize’ North Americas borders … would require a level of formal
institutionalization and policy harmonization that is difficult to imagine in
the present context” (Andreas, 2003: 12, quoted in Rudolph, 2005).
When considering the possibility of a security perimeter, it is also use-
ful to recall the assessment made by Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott
(2004) that North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) politics
in the United States are far more sensitive to Mexico than to Canada.
As such, a bilateral Canada-United States deal is less likely to garner the
necessary support in Congress than a trilateral deal. Hufbauer and Schott
suggested that,
non-NAFTA visitors who threaten security can be better excluded
if a few principal measures are adopted … we believe that Ottawa,

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Washington, and Mexico City can forge common visa standards for
most non-NAFTA visitors and immigrants. The NAFTA partners
should agree on visa-waiver country lists, length of stay, and watch
lists for potentially troublesome visitors. Officials in each country
should have electronic access to the immigration records of its
partners. These suggestions seem obvious. However, US security
agencies, such as the FBI, CIA, Customs, and Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (ATF), have yet to agree on a common watch list for
potentially troublesome visitors to the United States, so it will take
political energy to forge a common North American approach.
Furthermore, Hufbauer and Schott argue that NAFTA partners should
create a special force to handle all third country immigration controls at
the individual’s first airport of entry into the NAFTA area. Common docu-
ment and biometric identification standards should be applied (2004: 14).
However, this kind of immigration control ignores the ongoing realities
of illegal migration from Mexico into the United States and the unwill-
ingness of both Canadian and American authorities to trust Mexican
border officials.
Options for North American physical security
Previously, I have suggested various potential options for ensuring the
security of North America (Noble, 2005: 520). The threat of a protection-
ist “Fortress America” mentality appears to have receded in the light of
cooperation along the two American borders since 9/11. However, this
assessment may be considered overly optimistic in light of a report tabled
by North American business leaders at the Montebello Summit, which
expressed concerns about the “need to make borders within North America
as safe and transparent as possible” (North American Competitiveness
Council, 2007). It is unknown what would happen in the event of another
9/11 type of attack on the United States, particularly if any of the terrorists
gained access to the United States through Canada or Mexico. At a mini-
mum, there would be the type of short-term interruptions which char-
acterized the American response to 9/11. A Fortress America mentality

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would rely on existing borders as the best place to maintain controls. It
could entail increased delays in the flow of people and goods from north
and south of the United States, and thereby threaten the economic secu-
rity of two large trading partners of the United States and a large amount
of American investment in those countries.
Creating a Fortress America would be very expensive and would put
the emphasis of control in the wrong area. Control should be maintained
at the perimeter points of access to North America, which are not across
the two land borders, but at airports and ports. I fear that the United
States Congress has decided to spend a lot of money on controlling the
two borders, for example, by building a physical fence along the southern
border and an electronic fence along the northern border (or at least from
the head of Lake Superior to the Pacific coast). As Michael Byers notes,
“attempting to secure a frontier that is nearly nine thousand kilometres
long is a fool’s errand that will cost the American taxpayer dearly …. Fences
might make for good neighbours, but barriers are not good for making or
keeping friends” (Byers, 2007: 214).
The United States has recognized that it needs to expand the perim-
eters of its security at least to the edges of North America and, in many
cases, beyond. Passengers destined for the United States and Canada from
overseas countries must go through pre-clearance checks before they are
allowed to board the aircraft. Canada and the United States are cooper-
ating in this effort in various European airports and elsewhere. As well,
container traffic bound for North America is being pre-cleared in ports
outside the continent. Cooperation in this area was highlighted in the
joint communiqué which came out of the Montebello SPP summit in late
August 2007 (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007a).
Perimeter concepts for North America are not new and are best
exemplified in the long standing Canada-United States defence part-
nership. Similar activities took place on the civilian side prior to 9/11
and have since become codified in the Smart Border Declaration and
Action Plan. Various ideas have been put forward for concentric circles
of perimeter security and some of these have been incorporated into the
Smart Border plans, on which work is continuing alongside the Security
and Prosperity Partnership.

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The concept of a security perimeter could be limited strictly to a mili-
tary or defence one in the face of traditional threats. But the new threats
to North American security do not come from state actors, but non-state
actors, and the most appropriate means of defence against these threats
lies outside the traditional military pattern. Instead, it involves intelligence
sharing, police cooperation, and tighter administration of refugee and asy-
lum policies and visitor visas. Here, the past experiences of Canada and
the United Sates, and Mexico and the United States are widely divergent.
Defence cooperation between Canada and the United States has a long
and ongoing history. However, cooperation between the United States
and Mexico would be a new and very controversial matter.
Proposals for increased labour mobility within North America are
being held hostage to the new security climate. The Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and NAFTA introduced Trade NAFTA
(TN) visas for certain categories of skilled professionals, with major dif-
ferences in application between those issued by the United States for
Mexicans and for Canadians.2 Full scale labour mobility between Mexico
and the United States is seen as a major threat to the United States and an
economic drag. Whether or not it might be possible to envisage a widen-
ing of the categories for NAFTA, widening TN visas is another matter. In
any event, full labour mobility inside the European Union did not come
until after it had gone from a customs union to a common market and
an economic union. Such a union would appear to be a pre-cursor to any
Schengen type of agreement which governs admission from outside the
borders of the European Union and has effectively abolished controls on
the internal borders. Proposals to abolish all controls on the Canada-
United States or Mexico-United States borders would run into strong
opposition on both sides of the two borders for reasons mentioned in
this chapter.
2 Until September 30, 2003, there was a yearly ceiling of 5,500 TN visas for Mexicans
and no ceiling for Canadians. The ceiling on Mexican TN visas no longer exists.
Mexicans have to apply for their TN visas at United States Consulates in Mexico.
Canadians apply for their TN visas at the port of entry into the United States.

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Conclusions
New initiatives with respect to the flow of people across our mutual border
and for a common security perimeter are unlikely to find support from
either the Canadian or the American government unless some fundamen-
tal decisions are made with respect to the nature of our future economic
integration. Such a prospect is not in the cards at the present time, how-
ever much it might be in both countries’ interests.
The two governments have committed themselves to the Security and
Prosperity Partnership, which has as one of its key objectives a smart,
secure border. However, the SPP has made it clear that no treaties are
being negotiated under its mandate and that, in most respects, immi-
gration is outside its purview, notwithstanding the relevance of border
controls on some parts of immigration and refugee issues. The Safe Third
Country Agreement appears to be working better than some thought, and
with less impact than others feared. But it is not a panacea. Similar agree-
ments are needed with other countries, especially those in the European
Union. Alternatively, the Canadian government could just announce that
it will return any refugee claimant arriving from a safe European Union
country. All that is required to do this is a strong dose of political will
from the federal government. The refugee system would also work better
if the United States would agree to include refugee claimants arriving by
air and sea in the Safe Third Country Agreement, rather than limiting its
application to the land border.
Attempts to develop common security criteria for immigration and
refugees could prove extremely problematic for a variety of reasons,
including the sovereignty and criminal issues mentioned in this chapter.
However, continued work and cooperation in this field will increase the
confidence of the other party that the policies and their administration
are being carried out in a manner which meets the common objective for
smart, secure borders. Thus, more can be done without a formal common
security perimeter and without common selection criteria for immigrants
and refugees.

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Borders: The Impact of the WHTI on North America. Foundation
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Andreas, Peter (2003). A Tale of Two Borders: The US-Mexico and US-
Canada Lines after 9-11. Working Paper No. 77. Centre for Comparative
Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego.
Bryden, Joan (2007, June 16). Refugee Backlog Grows Despite
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Chapter 10
A Smart Border?
The American View
Christopher Rudolph
Globalization has served to make immigration and border control an
increasingly important priority for the state, affecting nearly all facets of
security—geopolitical, economic, and societal (Rudolph, 2003a; 2006a;
2006b). Since September 11, 2001, the issue of immigration and border con-
trol has gained even more salience, as it now must be considered to consti-
tute the front lines of homeland security (Camarota, 2002; Kephart, 2005).
In Europe and North America—regions that attract the largest volume of
migrants—states face a daunting challenge: to craft policy that will enable
them to support the national interest along several security dimensions
that often have contrasting policy preferences.
In terms of policy design, the European Union has been the most inno-
vative in its attempts to deal with the issue of managing immigration and
controlling borders (Papademetriou, 1996; Newland and Papademetriou,
1998; Meyers, 2002). In particular, the European approach of integrated
border management sets it apart from most other states around the world,
whose policies have traditionally been unilateral in orientation. Indeed, in
North America, unilateral policies have dominated as policy makers have
generally positioned the issue of immigration and border control as cen-
tral to conceptions of sovereignty (Shanks, 2001; Rudolph, 2005b; 2006a).

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184 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
Among the more significant elements of the European Union’s integrated
approach was the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985. Included
in the Schengen Agreement were provisions to establish the Schengen
Information System (SIS), which would provide authorities with needed
information regarding who should and should not be admitted into the
Schengen zone. Although not originally signed by all European Union
member states, the Schengen Agreement and its provisions were later
included in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), which provided much of the
political architecture employed in the European Union’s process of regional
integration. The European Union has also sought to utilize a multilateral
approach to dealing with asylum claims. In 1997, most European Union
member states signed the Dublin Convention in order to codify harmo-
nized rules and procedures for asylum processing that were aimed to
curtail the growing practice of “asylum shopping” (Koslowski, 2000).
This chapter briefly outlines the current developments and challenges
in United States-Canada cooperation, focusing on the Smart Borders
Agreement. It discusses the obstacles facing the quest for “smart borders”
in an age of globalization and international terrorism, especially the chal-
lenge of intelligence sharing. Finally, it demonstrates that few of the condi-
tions that led to Europe’s Schengen regime are present within the current
North American region.
North American integration and border management1
In contrast to Europe, integration and regional cooperation in North
America was not initiated under extreme circumstances. Instead of a
comprehensive “grand design,” such as the one articulated in the Treaty
of Rome, North American integration has been more measured and incre-
mental. Recognition of regional—if not global—interdependence concern-
ing international migration has pressed policy makers to shift political dis-
course from one solely rooted in a domestic perspective to one that moves
beyond national borders. This does not necessarily mean that policy mak-
ers see management issues from a regional interest; rather, they see that
1 Portions of this section were published as Rudolph (2005a).

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regional cooperation is necessary in order to achieve national interests.
As United States Attorney General John Ashcroft (2003) explained to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, “close working relationships with interna-
tional allies” would allow the United States to “leverage our anti-terrorism
efforts throughout the world.”
Bilateral cooperation between the United States and Canada has a
long tradition, and has been described as “the most extensive bilateral
relationship in the world” (Johnson and Fitzgerald, 2003). In 2003, Tom
Ridge, who was the United States Secretary of Homeland Security at
the time, explained the desire for intergovernmental cooperation as an
issue of common interests. He stated, “By working together we can better
reach our common goals of ensuring the security and prosperity of our
citizens” (Canadian Embassy in Washington, 2003). Yet when we exam-
ine the parameters of the existing bilateral measures taken concerning
migration and border control, it appears that “common interests” have
not generated movement toward a formal regime (Stein, 1983). Rather,
the extension of egoistic self-interest (i.e., “leveraging” domestic efforts)
has been the driving force behind the increased cooperation, especially
since 9/11.
In the United States, cooperation with Canada is seen as increasingly
important for United States security. First, there is concern about the
possibility of terrorist activity and infiltration from the North. Suspicions
rose with the apprehension of Ahmed Ressam, the “millennium bomber,”
in December 1999, and these were later bolstered by a 2003 report which
suggested that some 50 terrorist groups were present and active in Canada
at that time (CBS News, 2003, Sep. 7; Berry et al., 2003). Moreover, there
is a wide spread belief that Canadian immigration and border policies are
somewhat lax, especially those concerning refugees and asylum seekers
(Gallagher, 2003). The 9/11 attacks increased the salience of counterterror-
ism as a policy imperative in Canada (from the standpoint of self-interest),
but expressed interests continue to focus on building a more open bor-
der. An inability to increase security along the border and allay American
concerns would no doubt put this goal in jeopardy. The tremendous back
ups at key points along the border in the days following 9/11 made this
perfectly clear.

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The Smart Border Declaration
With mutual interest in increased cooperation, Canada and the United
States signed the Smart Border Declaration on December 12, 2001. The
declaration was accompanied by an action plan based on four pillars: the
secure flow of people; the secure flow of goods; secure infrastructure;
and, information sharing and coordination in the enforcement of these
objectives (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2001). What
becomes evident quickly—even with only a cursory examination of the
language used within the document—is that the Smart Border Declaration
advances integration of border management more in terms of coordina-
tion, rather than collaboration.
Although programs such as NEXUS, FAST, and Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams (IBET) have been touted as evidence of a more inte-
grated approach, the level of “smart border” integration remains relatively
shallow, with little effort made to formally link or harmonize policy in
ways that would constrain independent decision making on things such as
admissions criteria. Convergence in the domain of visa issuance has been
informal—a “spontaneous regime,” as Oran Young (1983) would say. As a
result, the United States and Canada now share common visa policies with
175 countries, though they still differ with 18 other countries (Migration
News, 2005). Negotiated collaboration has been more limited, and has
focused on the issue of refugee and asylum processing.
Although harmonization of asylum policy is listed as part of the action
plan of the Smart Border Declaration, a closer look at the issue warrants
pessimism regarding the possibility of highly-integrated collaboration. In
terms of current policy, several dimensions of the Canadian system make it
disproportionately open relative to other advanced industrial states. These
include high rates of approvals, a generous social welfare system, infre-
quent prosecutions, and lax deportation procedures. In 2002, the refugee
recognition rate (for in-country determinations) in Canada was nearly
double the American rate, while the per capita acceptance rate of refugees
between 2000 and 2002 (in-country Convention refugee recognitions)
was four times the American rate (United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, 2003). In addition, authorities detain few refugees and asy-
lum seekers while their claims are pending adjudication, even though

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Canadian law permits the detention of applicants who may represent a
possible security threat or flight risk.2 In fact, generally only 5% of refu-
gees entering Canada are detained; the remaining 95% are released until
their immigration hearing is held (CBS News, 2003, Sep. 7; Bissett, 2002).
Moreover, in Canada, there are few barriers to claimants working and
accessing social entitlement programs while their claims are pending.
In contrast, the United States’ Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996 added to existing restric-
tions on applicants’ access to social welfare while their case is being adju-
dicated by requiring that employment authorization not be given for a
period of at least six months. Because “first instance” determination of
asylum status must be processed within 180 days according to American
law, employment opportunities are reserved only for those who warrant
an affirmative determination of their case. Moreover, in addition to detain-
ing claimants pending a review of their case, the United States also has
an “expedited removal” system in place which facilitates detention and
removal of apprehended individuals who do not have proper immigra-
tion or travel documents. As well, out-of-status foreigners who are in the
country for more than one year are barred from applying for asylum and
are subject to deportation if apprehended (Migration News, 2003).
In contrast to its American usage, it has been argued that the use of the
term “expedited” in Canada has meant “[to] speed positive claims toward
recognition” (Gallagher, 2003: 14). In Canada, a failure to detain applicants
pending what is often a lengthy judicial review process is coupled with a de
facto policy of failing to deport those who either fail to appear at their hear-
ing or are denied refugee status. As James Bissett writes, “not only does
Canada permit anyone who arrives to make an asylum claim, but many of
those eventually denied refugee status are never removed from the country.
Only about 9,000 people are removed from Canada each year, and of these,
approximately two-third[s] are failed asylum seekers” (2002: 5).
2 Peter Rekai notes that there are several factors leading to this failure to detain
potential “high risk” applicants, including a lack of the intelligence necessary to iden-
tify “high risk” applicants, a lack of adequate detention facilities, and humanitarian
considerations (Rekai, 2002: 13).

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Canada’s refugee and asylum policies have resulted in trends that are
disconcerting to some security-minded American policy makers. Certainly,
Canada’s stance vis-à-vis asylum and refugees makes it a first choice for
those seeking protection, as well as those seeking admission after failing to
obtain it through other channels (Gallagher, 2003: 9). Unfortunately, this
also creates conditions conducive for the infiltration of foreign terrorists.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has confirmed the pres-
ence of some 50 active terrorist organizations operating in Canada, includ-
ing the Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda (CBS News,
2003, Sep. 7). In addition, a number of known terrorists, including Hani
Al-Sayegh, Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, Nabil Al-Murabh, and Ahmed Ressam,
have gained access to Canada by seeking political asylum upon entry. From
an American point of view, this represents a potential threat to United
States security, as terrorists can exploit Canadian policy and then use their
Canadian base as a potential staging ground for terrorist attacks.
In the European Union, policy makers have sought to increase secu-
rity through integration and policy harmonization, including “fast track”
processing to dismiss “patently unfounded” asylum claims and applying
“safe third country” principles in asylum processing to reduce the practice
of asylum shopping. Applying this strategy in North America has proven
to be politically challenging, even though a strong bilateral relationship
exists between Canada and the United States. Canadian concerns with
respect to protecting the human rights of bona fide refugees and asylum
seekers fleeing persecution have made Canada wary of applying strict
limitations on safe third country entrants. After a series of failed attempts
since 1987 to apply safe third country protocols to asylum processing, new
legislation was passed after 9/11. However, this has yet to change Canada’s
concerns regarding the practice of safe third country principles in asylum
processing. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), passed in
November 2001, actually increased restrictions on applying the safe third
country principle in the processing of asylum claims. A report released
in December 2003 points out that “Article 102(2)(a) of the IRPA requires
the government to ‘consider’ whether a ‘responsibility-sharing’ agreement
exists between Canada and the transit country before a refugee claim
can be considered ‘ineligible’ for determination in Canada” (Gallagher,

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2003: 15). In contrast to American legislation passed after 9/11, which
stresses security interests—e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry/Exit Reform Act—the title of the 2001 legisla-
tion touts Canada’s commitment to refugee protection, with no refer-
ence to security. Moreover, policy makers have made their discomfort
regarding policy harmonization quite clear. In October 2001, the current
Immigration Minister, Elinor Caplan, suggested that Canadian-American
discussions concerning the development of a security perimeter should
focus on information sharing rather than harmonization: “Let there not
be any misunderstanding. Canadian laws will be made right here in the
Canadian Parliament” (quoted in Adelman, 2002).
A Safe Third Country Agreement
There appears to be less of an incentive for the United States to enter a
bilateral third country agreement with Canada, since the flow of asylum
seekers generally moves toward Canada from the United States. Indeed,
one United States State Department official suggested that the Safe Third
Country Agreement is something that “Canada wants and that we are
willing to agree to as a trade-off for other important counterterrorism
measures” (United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on
Immigration, 2002; Gallagher, 2003: 15). Reluctance towards deeper inte-
gration and harmonization in this area is also evidenced in practice. For
example, the United States’ treatment of the Maher Arar case suggests a
wariness with Canada’s commitment to the war on terrorism and may also
hint at a reluctance to turn over individuals who appear on American anti-
terrorist watch lists. A report by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies suggests that “by refusing to send [Arar] to Canada, the US gov-
ernment appears to have believed Canada would let Arar walk free, or at
a minimum fail to gain any information from him” (Belelieu, 2003: 7).
The political inertia involved may explain the lag in implementing the
Safe Third Country Agreement. The agreement was signed on December
5, 2002, but was not implemented until December 29, 2004. Under the
terms of the agreement, refugees claimants are required to submit their
claim in the first country they enter—either the United States or Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2004). In addition to being limited

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in scope (including only Canada and the United States), the agreement
had other limitations. For example, an exception to the agreement exists
for refugee claimants attempting to enter Canada from the United States
if they have family in Canada or if they are an unaccompanied minor. In
addition, the agreement applies only to land border crossings. It does not
include claims processed at airports or in the country’s interior.
The Safe Third Country Agreement is a significant development in
border management and it definitely suggests that increased collabora-
tion between the United States and Canada is possible. However, there are
many obstacles facing the creation of a more expansive North American
security perimeter regime. For Canadians, immigration and border policy
preferences are based on a number of goals: maximizing the economic
gains from migration; upholding Canada’s liberal humanitarian tradition
by offering protection for refugees and for those who are fleeing per-
secution and require asylum; facilitating the social integration of new
immigrants; and, maintaining border control as a component of homeland
security. In Canada, liberal, open policies have strong domestic lobbies
that have been instrumental in shaping both immigration and asylum
policies. Moreover, the human rights and immigration law lobbies have
successfully institutionalized protections for migrants within the judiciary
(as well as the Immigration and Refugee Board) that constrain policy mak-
ers from enacting restrictive policies. Indeed, defense of the Canadian
liberal identity is also evidenced in Canada’s preference for the term “zone
of confidence” rather than “security perimeter” when discussing bilateral
cooperation (Andreas, 2003: 12). Moreover, further integration is also
constrained by the notion that Canada’s approach to immigration reflects
its distinctiveness and sovereignty and thus should be protected. Member
of Parliament John Manley has expressed this defense of Canadian sover-
eignty explicitly: “Working closely with the United States does not mean
turning over to them the key to Canadian sovereignty” (quoted in Wells,
2003, Oct. 5: A6; Barry, 2003: 11).
The Americans also have an economic interest in having relatively lib-
eral border policies. On this point, there is commonality between American
and Canadian interests. However, the emphasis that the Bush administra-
tion has placed on security and the “War on Terror” has established that

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economic interests cannot be promoted at the expense of security. It is
here that Canadian and American interests diverge. The Americans see
coordination as a necessary means by which to increase security. From the
United States’ standpoint, maximizing the capacity to screen entrants is
not only a homeland security imperative, but also a prerequisite for main-
taining a relatively open stance regarding migration—both permanent
and temporary. Coordination and collaboration would seem to advance
this aim. However, similar to their Canadian counterparts, United States
policy makers are also keenly defensive of their sovereignty in terms of
migration policy, making policy integration politically difficult.
The Smart Border plan articulates several areas in which increased
coordination could be cultivated, but few regarding policy harmonization
or integration. In other words, the plan places few constraints on inde-
pendent policy decision making. As Howard Adelman notes, “immigra-
tion and refugee policy has not been harmonized between Canada and
the United States,” and there are no indications that these policies will be
(2002: 24). The fact that the driving force behind such a regime is one that
is related more to a common aversion (terrorist alien infiltration) than a
common interest (preference for a single common outcome), and that
the regime is influenced by ideas regarding the goals and structures of
such a regime causes deeper integration to remain politically challenging
(Stein, 1983). The process of deepening integration in a way that is similar
to the European Union is likely to be incremental, rather than the product
of a comprehensive shift in grand strategy. In other words, policy mak-
ers will likely be “muddling through” the process in a piecemeal fashion,
rather than reinventing the North American space.
Smart Borders and the challenges of intelligence sharing
If the existing Smart Borders agreements do represent the initial stages
in the creation of a more expansive regional migration control regime in
North America, what is necessary to make such a regime effective? To
answer this question, we must first consider what the term “smart borders”
means in the most basic sense: the ability to identify and filter potential
threats while maintaining liberal flows to promote economic interests.

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Whereas much of the existing cooperation of the Smart Borders regime
has focused on the screening process (including cooperative border polic-
ing), effective screening requires us to be able to recognize and differenti-
ate friend from foe. A 2004 report released by the Congressional Research
Service points out that “[American] watch lists were only as good as the
information contained in them, and the agencies responsible for produc-
ing these lookout records [to be used in the screening process] … were
dependent upon the information they received from the Intelligence
Community and federal law enforcement” (Krouse, 2004: 6). A report
released by the American Immigration Law Foundation concurred with
this assessment (Stock and Johnson, 2003: 1):
If we are to succeed in reducing our vulnerability to terrorist attacks,
we must focus our attention and resources on the gaps in intelligence
gathering and information sharing that allowed the 19 terrorists respon-
sible for 9/11 to enter the United States. National security is most effec-
tively enhanced by improving the mechanisms by which we identify
actual terrorists, not by merely implementing harsher immigration laws
or blindly treating all foreigners as potential terrorists. This means that
intelligence—especially that which concerns international terrorists and
their supporters—and information management are the necessary foun-
dations that must be built (Meyers, 2003; Salter, 2006).
The 9/11 attacks highlighted the challenges facing intelligence communi-
ties with regard to the global war on terrorism. Chief among these, perhaps,
is the growing consensus regarding the need to share information in order
to better identify potential threats. As the 9/11 Commission report states,
the US government cannot meet its own obligations to the
American people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a major
Figure 1: Basic elements of the smart borders regime
Identify threats Screen Admit/Detain

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effort to collaborate with other governments. We should do more
to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies, and raise US
and global border security standards for travel and border cross-
ing over the medium and long term through extensive cooperation.
(United States National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, 2004: 390)
Canadian intelligence experts concur. Reid Morden, former Director of
CSIS, has said, “If the overriding threat is terrorism, and terrorism tran-
scends boundaries, then the ability of Canada’s security and intelligence
community to function effectively with its foreign partners has never
been more important” (2003: 7). Morden also noted that “in this new
world, nothing is more important than our overall relationship with the
United States.”
What makes this facet of an integrated border management regime so
complicated is that the need for better intelligence creates interests for a
regime within a regime. Pooling raw anti-terrorism data requires a high
degree of cooperation in scale and scope, both within states (interagency
sharing) and among them (interstate). The United States-Canada Smart
Borders Action Plan specifically calls for a more integrated use of intel-
ligence and includes provisions to establish Integrated National Security
Enforcement Teams on a case-by-case basis. Though this is indeed a begin-
ning for increased intelligence integration, at least on a bilateral basis, it
does not come close to meeting the levels of integration and cooperation
recommended by security experts (Markle Foundation Task Force, 2003).
Because one can never know what piece of intelligence is vital for analysts
to “connect the dots” in order to identify potential threats and keep ter-
rorists from entering the country, it stands to reason that a wider net is
necessary to maximize the potential uses of existing intelligence. The dif-
ficulties associated with creating such a multilateral intelligence-sharing
regime are tactical, political, and procedural.
One key obstacle is the belief that expanding access to intelligence
would necessarily incur a potentially significant cost in terms of system
security. In other words, as more links are included in the chain of intelli-
gence, the risk that such intelligence may be compromised increases. With

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respect to possible types of intelligence sharing arrangements, a United
States congressional aide once said, “We don’t want it to be in Interpol,
because too many countries sit there and too much information can leak”
(quoted in Farah and Eggen, 2003, Dec. 21: A25).
In the American intelligence community, risk involved in sharing infor-
mation was minimized by including trusted partners in the loop. During
the Cold War, for example, American and British intelligence services
established a “special relationship,” one that also extends to Canada and
Australia. A former senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official3 sug-
gested that, in practice, information sharing was the product of recip-
rocal ties and an established trust between corresponding agency rep-
resentatives in each country—a practice that, he suggested, continues
today. This seems to suggest that an intelligence sharing regime would be
asymmetrical. Indeed, Peter Hoekstra, former Chairman of the United
States House Intelligence Committee, described intelligence sharing as
a system of “tiered relationships,” based largely on the existing bilateral
political relationship between the two countries involved, as well as the
historical practice of sharing between agencies (personal communication,
November 1, 2005). Indeed, the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand probably share more information with each other than
with other allies, as they are bound together by intelligence sharing agree-
ments dating back to 1948 (Grant, 2000: 3).
While the historical legacy of close ties between Canada and the
United States bodes well for increased bilateral cooperation and sharing,
this does not necessarily mean that such practices would extend sym-
metrically throughout North America or with countries in other regions
throughout the world. Even among close allies, some have suggested that
the United States prefers a one-way approach to information sharing. As
one European source explained, “It is a matter, in part, of culture. They
believe strongly in the need-to-know operational function, and they usu-
ally believe we don’t need to know” (quoted in Farah and Eggen, 2003,
Dec. 21: A25; see also United States National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, 2004: 417). An Indian intelligence analyst
3 The author personally interviewed this source, who wished to remain anonymous.

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concurred: “Cooperation in counterterrorism has improved considerably
since [9/11], but the US still calls the shots. It wants the agencies of other
countries to share with it whatever it asks for, but gives them in return
only what it thinks they should know” (Raman, 2003, Feb. 21). Moreover,
Gregory Treverton, a senior policy analyst at RAND, points out that old
intelligence relationships may not be the most advantageous when gather-
ing information regarding terrorists and their organizations: “Even if the
United States improved its HUMINT [Human Intelligence] dramatically,
other nations and groups—including some that are not friends—would
have more success against hard terrorist targets” (2003: 5). A Center for
Defense Information Terrorism Project report seems to concur, suggesting
that “if the United States is to penetrate international terrorist networks, it
will need access to resources outside the purview of Western intelligence
sources” (Donovan, 2001).
Since 9/11, the CIA has established a network of secret Counterterrorist
Intelligence Centers (CTIC) in more than two dozen countries to foster
cooperation between American and foreign intelligence officers (Priest,
2005, Nov. 18: A1). The extent of the existing cooperation is classified, but
when we consider long-standing agency practices, it is likely that such
sharing and cooperation is of a very limited nature. Indeed, although the
deputy director of operations at the CIA told a Congressional committee
that virtually every capture or termination of suspected terrorists since
9/11 was the result of a coordinated effort with foreign agencies, the CIA
served as the primary intelligence source and foreign agents were largely
responsible for apprehension (Priest, 2005, Nov. 18: A1).
Still, some analysts remain optimistic about the United States’ coop-
eration with other nations. As Michael Herman writes,
The move to more cooperation has not always been consistent. US
policies vary between cultivating international support and going it
alone. Nevertheless the increase in inter-governmental intelligence
collaboration since 9/11, sometimes between unlikely allies, has
been striking in what, despite foreign liaisons, had formerly been
instinctively regarded as an essentially separate, reclusive national
activity, deeply rooted in secrecy and national interests: waging a

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zero-sum information contest between states, some far removed
from the main fabric of international relationships, a matter for
special people in special compartments. By contrast, intelligence
cooperation is now regularly in the news, almost as often as the
older elements of international relationships. (2003: 11)
The very nature of intelligence as it pertains to counterterrorism also pres-
ents formidable challenges to the effective pooling of information that is
necessary to identify viable threats. It requires that long-standing opposi-
tions within the intelligence community be integrated.
In addition to the opposition between foreign and domestic intel-
ligence gathering, there is also the issue of the divide between “intelli-
gence” and law enforcement information. Reid Morden, former Director
of CSIS, once said, “The essence of the problem rests with the difference
between the objectives of intelligence, especially security intelligence,
and law enforcement. Simply put, security intelligence equals preven-
tion and law enforcement equals prosecution” (2003: 11). In the United
States, the separation of foreign and domestic information gathering
was seen as necessary to protect civil liberties—in other words, to avoid
a “big brother” scenario as was prevalent in the Cold War Soviet bloc.
When the CIA was created in 1946, the current President, Harry Truman,
worried that such an agency might evolve into a “Gestapo-like organiza-
tion,” and thus he sought to ensure that the agency would not engage in
law enforcement or domestic activity (Treverton, 2003: 4). Indeed, this
concern was so acute that, in the 1970s, policy makers established a legal
“wall” between foreign and domestic intelligence through the provisions
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Similar structural
divisions were created in the Canadian intelligence bureaucracy, which
was divided into foreign intelligence, security intelligence, military intel-
ligence, and criminal intelligence functions (Morden, 2003). When we
consider the history of the intelligence bureaucracy, it becomes clear
that resistance to crossing jurisdictional lines and sharing information—
even within a country, much less between countries—was created by
design and that this culture evolved as standard operating procedure
(Zegart, 1999).

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The events of 9/11 provided a stark lesson regarding the costs of bureau-
cratic “stove-piping” within the intelligence bureaucracy, prompting pol-
icy makers to seek to make the institutional changes necessary to con-
front the new reality in a better way. In Canada, the Anti-terrorism Act
sought to diminish due process protections to forward counterterrorism
measures. In addition, the Act afforded the Solicitor General heightened
powers to act on the advice of CSIS to define activities and organizations
as “terrorist.” Yet, such measures did little to alter the bureaucratic struc-
ture or the processes within and among it. As Reid Morden notes, “the
Canadian intelligence community post 9/11 is structurally much the same
as before, except buttressed with added powers and resources. Except for
the creation of an ad hoc cabinet committee having overall responsibility
for security matters, and chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, little has
changed” (2003: 9).
In the United States, a more ambitious agenda was attempted by
policy makers. The process of intelligence reform in the United States
began much like that in Canada—with new provisions that attempted to
provide additional leverage to the existing intelligence and law enforce-
ment community. First and foremost, the USA PATRIOT Act (2001) pro-
vided a legal mechanism by which the existing “wall” between domestic
and foreign intelligence could be broached. In 2003, the current United
States Attorney General, John Ashcroft, declared that “perhaps the most
effective provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are those that altered the
outdated statutory restrictions so that intelligence and law enforce-
ment agencies have greater freedom to coordinate their efforts and to
share information gathered about terrorists” (2003; see also Goss, 2005).
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)
was more expansive. It sought to address criticisms that 9/11 was at
least in part the product of a failure of intelligence. Among its most
significant provisions was the creation of a new Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) to oversee the process of increasing coordination
and cooperation among the nation’s intelligence agencies. Policy mak-
ers and analysts also suggested that additional Congressional oversight
was needed to promote an environment more conducive to cooperation
(Markle Foundation Task Force, 2003). The culture of “ownership” of

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intelligence information at the agency level needed to change. To date,
however, critics argue that much remains to be done along these lines.
John Brennan, former interim director of the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), said,
Sadly, the [IRTPA], which mandated many of the changes now
underway, lacks a clear vision. A hurried and flawed piece of legis-
lation, the act used ambiguous language to describe the authority
of the czar [DNI] and other members of the intelligence community.
The act also raised unrealistic expectations—for example, about
sharing electronic databases. The legislation calls for the creation
within two years of a terrorism information-sharing ‘environment’
that can be used by federal, state, local, and even Native American
tribal officials. But it does nothing to make sure agencies develop
information systems that meet not just their own needs, but those
of their partners. (2005, Nov. 20: B5)
Jerry Berman, President of the Center for Democracy and Technology,
offered much the same perspective, noting that “the sharing of terrorist-
related information between relevant agencies at different levels of gov-
ernment has only been marginally improved in the last year, and remains
haphazard” (2004: 3). Moreover, in December 2005, intelligence experts
pointed out that “currently, no formal process exists for state, local, tribal,
and private sector entities to task federal agencies with specific intelli-
gence requirements” (LLIS, 2005: 1). Instead of federal oversight, for the
most part these agencies have adopted their own informal and formal
structures to share intelligence.
Clearly, there remain formidable structural challenges to information
sharing and intelligence pooling at both the agency level and between
states. William Nolte, Deputy Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Analysis and Production, argues that “the end of the Cold War and
the major changes which followed in both the operational and techni-
cal environments for intelligence did not produce sufficient momentum
to overcome the institutional inertia that favored the status quo in the
nature and structure of American intelligence” (2004: 1). Nolte also notes

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that “neither the significant budgetary austerity of the 1990s nor the
attacks of 11 September 2001 produced enough shock to prompt major
changes” (2004: 1).
Current President of the Markle Foundation Zoë Baird (2005), testi-
fying before the United States House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, echoed this sentiment, but also pressed lawmakers to con-
tinue efforts to create reform: “While there has been some progress, we
still have a long way to go [in terms of implementing the Executive and
Congressionally mandated Information Sharing Environment] …. Without
effective information sharing, information collection remains stove-piped
and the importance of information held by different agencies or at differ-
ent levels of government cannot be understood.”
Conclusion
In March 2005, the leaders of the North American Free Trade Agreement
countries adopted the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America, in order to form a regional strategy to confront shared chal-
lenges, including border management (Independent Task Force, 2005).
The question is whether such a regional approach to border management
will work in North America. The European Union’s extensive experi-
ence with regional approaches to policy serves as an appealing example
of what is possible. However, when one recognizes the important dif-
ferences that exist between Europe and North America, as well as the
European Union’s more recent challenges with expansion, two things
become clear: first, the challenge is formidable—strategically, logistically,
and politically; and second, the process of increasing the regionalization
of border management will likely be an incremental one, rather than a
giant leap forward.
As the evidence presented here shows, the creation of a regime of truly
“smart borders” requires a fundamental reorganization of existing struc-
tures and procedures. The fact that this necessitates fundamental changes,
both in border management and intelligence, makes this task all the more
daunting. Moreover, when one considers the institutional inertia that is
particularly acute in the intelligence community, one begins to see the

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magnitude of what a deeper integration of North America entails. The
evidence presented here does not necessarily suggest that further inte-
gration is impossible. On the contrary, the need for both openness and
security on our borders would seem to demonstrate that the creation of
a cooperative regime is a necessity. What this chapter does reveal, how-
ever, is exactly how complicated the process will be as we move toward
such a regime.

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Chapter 11
Making Canada’s Immigration
System and Borders More Secure
Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott
In this volume, our contributors have examined the relationship between
terrorist threats—particularly those from Islamist extremists—and
Western countries, and the extent to which such threats have been made
more real because of the nature of current immigration, asylum, and bor-
der control policies. The foregoing does not mean that all such threats
are the direct result of inadequate selection or screening of immigrants,
asylum seekers, and visa applicants. However, there is sufficient evidence
of interconnections between threats and current policies, as described in
the preceding chapters, that these policies need to be carefully examined
and revised where appropriate.
Security implications of current Canadian immigration policies
A number of major themes that emerged in this book addressed the rela-
tionship between immigration and security. According to Mark Krikorian,
mass immigration is essentially incompatible with security in the present
era because it overwhelms our efforts (both American and Canadian) to
screen out security threats, and it creates large immigrant communities
that serve as the sea, as Mao might have said, “within which the terrorists

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212 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
swim as fish.” In Krikorian’s view, bringing security standards up to what
is required because of current threats would require a huge increase in
the resources devoted to screening immigrants. Krikorian argues that it
would make more sense to reduce immigration levels substantially so as
to bring them in line with the resources available for screening. Daniel
Stoffman comes to a similar conclusion.
James Bissett notes that a large number of newcomers to Canada are
from Muslim countries whose populations contain significant numbers of
Islamist radicals. For example, he points out that between 1996 and 2005,
Canada accepted over 118,000 immigrants from Pakistan, 62,000 from
Iran, and 25,000 from Algeria, relatively few of whom received adequate
security screening.
Stoffman also expresses concern over the large numbers of newcomers
and the difficulty of screening them properly. He notes that, in the past,
large-scale immigration came in waves. The periods in between these
waves allowed newcomers and, in particular, their children to become
integrated into Canadian society. However, immigration levels are relent-
lessly high (the highest per capita in the world), year after year, bringing
immigrants from the same places to the same places. As a result, large,
self-contained communities are developed and are constantly replenished,
thereby reducing the need and opportunities for these immigrants to inte-
grate into mainstream society.
Stoffman also points out that, while Canadians rightly pride them-
selves on the cultural diversity of their major cities, the reality is that
Canadian cities are not diverse enough. Out of 194 countries in the world,
just 10 of them account for 62% of current immigration to Canada. If the
immigration intake were more diverse, the ethnic communities in Canada
might be more numerous, but they would also be smaller and, perhaps,
more integrated into the broader community.
In this respect, a Statistics Canada report issued in 2004 (Hou and
Picot, 2004) revealed that, between 1981 and 2001, a significant change
occurred in the number of visible minority neighbourhoods in Canada.
The report indicated that the number of such neighbourhoods increased
from six in 1981 to 254 in 2001. It also noted that such residential con-
centrations of minority groups may result in social isolation and reduce

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the incentives for those in such communities to learn the language of
the host country or gain work experience and educational qualifications.
Moreover, the report revealed that neighbourhoods with large concen-
trations of visible minorities tended to have a poor economic status and
low income rates.
We completely agree with Stoffman when he points out that the major-
ity of residents of immigrant communities are good people who want to
build prosperous lives for their families as Canadian citizens. But some
of them are not, and the larger an immigrant community is, the easier it
is for groups that are hostile to Canada and the West to operate secretly
within them and to develop support networks. In this regard, Krikorian
adds that such enclaves not only shield terrorists, but they also facili-
tate the recruitment and incubation of new ones. Krikorian, along with
Stoffman, asserts that continuous mass immigration seriously slows down
the integration of newcomers.
With respect to criminal activity, he notes that during the great wave
of immigration around the beginning of the twentieth century, and for
some time after immigration was stopped in the 1920s, law enforcement
had very little luck with penetrating the Mafia. This was because many
immigrants lived in enclaves, had limited knowledge of English, were
suspicious of government institutions, and clung to Old World preju-
dices and attitudes such as “omerta” (the Sicilian code of silence). When
mass immigration ended, the assimilation of Italian immigrants and their
children accelerated, and the offspring of these immigrants developed a
sense of genuine membership and ownership in America. This is what
John Fonte of the Hudson Institute calls “patriotic assimilation.” This
process drained the water within which the Mafia had been able to swim,
allowing law enforcement to do its job more effectively and to eventually
cripple the Mafia.
Krikorian notes that Muslim immigrant communities are not alone in
exhibiting characteristics that may shield or even incubate criminality. For
instance, as criminologist Ko-lin Chin has written, “the isolation of the
Chinese community, the inability of American law enforcement authori-
ties to penetrate the Chinese criminal underworld, and the reluctance of
Chinese victims to come forward for help all conspire to enable Chinese

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gangs to endure.” On this subject, Krikorian refers to William Kleinknecht,
author of The New Ethnic Mobs, who notes that “if the mass immigration
of Chinese should come to a halt, the Chinese gangster may disappear
in a blaze of assimilation after a couple of decades.” This solution to the
problems associated with Chinese isolation can be applied to other ethnic
groups as well.
In Krikorian’s view, the same solution applies to immigrant-related
terrorist activity. As long as immigrant communities are continuously but-
tressed with newcomers, the problems that some of them bring with them
from their homeland, such as crime and terrorism, are likely to persist for
much longer than they would otherwise. In this regard, Krikorian refers
to the very rapid expansion of Muslim communities in the United States
through immigration, and the effect that this could have on the creation
of fertile soil for the recruitment of terrorists and sympathizers. He cites
a disturbing example from Lackawanna, New York, where six Yemeni
Americans—five of whom were born in the United States to immigrant
parents and were raised in an immigrant community—were arrested in
2002 for operating an al-Qaeda terrorist sleeper cell. He points out that,
between 1996 and 2005, more than 18,000 Yemenis immigrated legally to
the United States. In Lackawanna alone, the Arab population ballooned by
175% during the 1990s. Yet the median household income in the Yemeni
neighbourhood is 20% lower than in Lackawanna as a whole.
A rapid increase in the Muslim population is also taking place in
Canada, mainly due to immigration rather than natural growth on the
part of those who are already here. According to Statistics Canada, in
1981 the Muslim population was 98,165. By 2006, the population had
increased to 783,700 and, based on mid-range projections, will reach
1,421,400 by 2017 (Statistics Canada, 2005). Thus, the Muslim population
in Canada has grown six-fold in a period of 25 years, and over 36 years is
projected to reach more than 14 times its 1981 size. As an illustration of
the significance of this increase, the Muslim community will change from
being one-third the size of the Jewish community, for example, to being
four times the size. A further comparison of these two religious groups
shows that in 2001, 69% of Jews in Canada were born in this country,
while only 21% of Muslims were born here (Statistics Canada, 2001). The

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implications of these trends for Canadian foreign and domestic policies
could be very important.
The continuing severity of the terrorist threat
Many of the chapters in this book clearly demonstrate that the ongoing
terrorist threat to Canada remains serious. Christopher Rudolph notes
that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has confirmed the
presence of some 50 active terrorist organizations operating in Canada.
From an American point of view, this represents a potential threat to
United States security as terrorists could exploit Canada’s lax immigration
policy and then use their Canadian base as a potential staging ground for
terrorist attacks.
In addition to the threat that terrorists in Canada may pose to the
United States, they may also plan to attack targets in this country. Stoffman
points to the example of Ahmed Ressam, who was captured while trying
to enter the United States for the purpose of bombing the Los Angeles
Airport, admitted at his trial that he and an associate had also considered
detonating a bomb in a Montreal area with a large Jewish population. As
well, Stoffman notes that an al-Qaeda training manual published in 2004
states, “We must target and kill the Jews and the Christians …. The grades
of importance are as follows: Americans, British, Spaniards, Australians,
Canadians, Italians” (Bell, 2004, Mar. 31).
Even without considering the threat of attacks by terrorists from over-
seas, as was the case in the 9/11 attacks, neither Canadians nor Americans
can be complacent about possible threats from within their countries.
Jan C. Ting points out that, according to a poll released in May 2007, 47%
of Muslim Americans think of themselves as Muslim first, rather than
American, 8% think suicide bombing can often or sometimes be justified,
and 5% have a favourable view of al-Qaeda. Among Muslim Americans
between 18 and 29 years of age, 60% think of themselves as Muslim first,
rather than American, 15% think suicide bombing is often or sometimes
justified, and 7% have a favourable view of al-Qaeda.
The situation in Canada is not any more encouraging. Following the
arrest of 18 Muslims in Ontario who allegedly were planning to carry

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out mass killings in the Toronto area, it was revealed that the RCMP had
quietly broken up at least a dozen other terrorist groups in the previous
two years (Sallot and Laghi, 2006, June 7). David B. Harris and Stoffman
both point out that, in a poll released in February 2007, 12% of Canadian
Muslims surveyed (almost 100,000 Muslims) believed that the plot was
justified. A 2008 report regarding a Muslim university student from the
Toronto area who called for the killing of Canadian troops in Afghanistan,
as well as Jews, demonstrates a continuing cause for concern about such
issues (Bell, 2008, Jan. 30).
While most of the focus in this volume has been on threats from
Islamist extremists because they are the most likely to target Canadians
and Americans, they are by no means the only terrorists within our bor-
ders. Sikh separatists were responsible for the Air India bombings in
1985—the largest single act of terrorism launched from Canadian soil.
Since then, they have desisted from attempting large-scale operations in
Canada. James Bissett and Stoffman both note the ongoing activities of
Sikh and Tamil terrorist supporters in Canada, and express concern over
the failure of our authorities to put a stop to their operations or to suc-
cessfully prosecute those who have been apprehended. In recent months,
there have been indications that extremists in both of these communities
have become increasingly open in their efforts to build ties with political
parties and to trade electoral support for more lenient treatment of their
terrorist-related activities. For example, these activities include reported
attempts at the Liberal Party leadership convention in December 2006 to
offer delegate support to leadership candidates in exchange for a promise
to remove the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam from the list of designated
terrorist groups in Canada. Meanwhile, Muslim delegates at the conven-
tion were advised by the Canadian Arab Federation not to support lead-
ership candidate Bob Rae because his wife was a senior official with the
Canadian Jewish Congress (Fatah, 2006, Dec. 6).
In spring 2007, a number of federal and provincial politicians attended
a parade in Surrey, a suburb of Vancouver, where Talwinder Singh Parmar,
the suspected mastermind of the Air India bombing, was held up as a “mar-
tyr” to the cause of an independent Sikh homeland (Brown, 2007, Nov. 22).
Later that year, a three-day memorial service was held to commemorate

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Parmar as a martyr at a Sikh temple in Surrey (Bolan, 2007, Oct. 31). In
November, a number of federal Liberal Members of Parliament attended
a memorial service held in Toronto for a senior leader of the Tamil Tiger
terrorist group (Leong, 2007, Nov. 6).
Renewed doubts over whether Canada is able to deal effectively with
terrorists and suspected terrorists on its own soil have also been raised
in connection with the difficulty Canada had applying what appeared to
be tough anti-terrorism legislation after 9/11. In recent months, oppo-
sition parties in Parliament have successfully prevented the extension
of two important provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act, while, as Bissett
notes, judicial decisions have placed in jeopardy the one remaining use-
ful instrument for detaining and removing foreign terrorists: the immi-
gration security certificate. Moreover, Canadian authorities have yet to
lay a charge under legislation that was passed to curb terrorist fund-
raising, even though the agency that tracks such activities has reported
transactions of $200 million annually under the category of suspected
terrorist activity financing and other threats to the security of Canada
(FINTRAC, 2007).
Despite the partial dismantling of the anti-terrorism law, the govern-
ment has persisted in its efforts, begun in 2004, to bring to trial Mohammed
Momin Khawaja, the first case under the remaining provisions. However,
Khawaja’s lawyers have been sufficiently successful at raising various legal
and constitutional objections so that in January 2008 the presiding judge
opined that the case may be nearly impossible to bring to trial. In the
meantime, five of his alleged co-conspirators in the United Kingdom bomb
plot in which he is accused of participating, were tried, convicted, and
sentenced by a British court months ago (MacLeod, 2008, Jan. 25).
Assessing the economic and demographic benefits of immigration
against the security risks
While issues concerning the benefits and costs of immigration in general
were not addressed in any detail in this volume (but will be at a conference
in Montreal in June 2008 which is being organized by the Fraser Institute),
a few words have to be said about whether the security risks entailed by

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Canada’s current large-scale immigration policies must be accepted sim-
ply because of the major gains we realize through immigration. Stoffman,
in particular, challenges the assumptions on which such claims are based.
He points out that neither economic nor demographic justifications exist
for accepting any negative consequences resulting from the Canadian
immigration program. Stoffman points to major studies by the Economic
Council of Canada and the US National Academy of Sciences which have
found that, as a fraction of gross domestic product, the economic gains
from immigration are minuscule. He also rejects claims that Canada will
benefit economically from having a larger population, or that immigration
can have a significant effect on mitigating the challenges associated with
Canada’s aging population.
Another issue that needs to be examined in relation to the benefits of
large-scale immigration is whether it is necessary to fill labour shortages.
The Economic Council of Canada report cited above, along with other
more recent studies, concluded that immigration is not an effective way
to fill gaps in the labour force and that cases where immigration had been
successfully used to fill such gaps were rare.
One of Canada’s most eminent experts on the economic and demo-
graphic impacts of immigration, Professor (Emeritus) Alan G. Green of
Queen’s University, points out that, in addition to the absence of any gen-
eral economic gains from immigration, as well as the fact that immigra-
tion will not solve problems related to an aging population or to regional
inequality, immigration is not the best way to address labour shortages.
According to Green, Canada has the educational facilities to meet our
domestic needs for skilled workers in all but extreme circumstances
(Green, 2003). Whether Canada makes full use of this capacity and, if not,
why does it not do so are questions that require further examination.
Security implications of the Canadian refugee system
In addition to security issues raised in relation to Canada’s large-scale
immigration intake, many of the chapters in the volume cited Canada’s
refugee determination system as a source of major problems. In particular,
Stephen Gallagher, Bissett, and Stoffman examine, in considerable detail,

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the shortcomings of the system, including the extent to which it has been
used by terrorists and their supporters. Harris also expresses concern over
the system’s laxity from a security point of view, while Noble identifies
areas in which improvements are needed. Rudolph notes that, from an
American perspective, Canada’s refugee and asylum policies have resulted
in trends that are disconcerting to some security-minded American policy
makers, while Glynn Custred makes reference to the ease with which the
“millennium bomber,” Ahmed Ressam, had been able to make use of the
Canadian refugee system.
In addition to the various points made in each chapter, it should be
noted that the very large numbers of refugee claimants (or “asylum seek-
ers,” as they are called in most countries) that Canada has accepted—four
times the per capita average of other countries—and its generous rates of
approval—three times the average of other countries—have contributed
substantially to the formation of large communities of ethnic minorities,
many members of which are below the poverty line (Collacott, 2006).
Moreover, a number of developments since these chapters were writ-
ten have cast serious doubts regarding Canada’s ability to deal with the
shortcomings of the system. A significant case in point is the Safe Third
Country Agreement (STCA) between Canada and the United States,
under which asylum seekers in the United States must make their claims
in that country, rather than coming to Canada to do so. Similar restric-
tions under the STCA apply to those in Canada. A number of the chapters
in this volume voiced support for the STCA in principle, but argued that
it needs to be strengthened by eliminating some of the exceptions under
which, as Gallagher points out, the vast majority of asylum seekers in the
United States who have come to the Canadian border since the agreement
went into effect have been able to qualify. However, instead of closing
the loopholes, a Canadian Federal Court judge, following representations
from refugee advocacy groups, recently ruled that the entire STCA was
invalid, essentially because no other country provided the same level of
protection for refugee claimants as Canada did. The government, however,
was not about to give up on the STCA and obtained a Court of Appeal
decision in January 2008, allowing the agreement to remain in effect until
a full review could be carried out.

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Another recent development of concern in the area of refugee policy
is the current initiative put forth by opposition parties in Parliament to
create a body that would provide a further opportunity for appeal (the
Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board) for failed
refugee claimants who are seeking to avoid removal from the country. The
current Conservative government, as well as its Liberal predecessors, has
resisted pressure to create this additional level, given the already exist-
ing range of appeals and reviews which some failed claimants have been
able to use to stay in Canada for years and even decades. If the opposition
parties successfully establish this new level of appeal, they will make an
already highly dysfunctional system even worse.
Obstacles to policy reform
While outlining the shortcomings of Canadian immigration and secu-
rity policies from a security point of view, a number of chapters also
examined the factors that make reforms difficult. Harris notes that “an
extremely powerful lobby of politicians, immigration lawyers, govern-
ment funded settlement organizations, NGOs and others” plays a role in
impeding reform. Reform is also slowed by an absence of political debate
regarding the abuse of the refugee system, as well as immigration policy
in general. Gallagher points out that well-funded and well-organized
advocacy and special interest groups connected to the immigration file
work tirelessly to ensure that the government lives up to all of its pro-
immigration rhetoric.
One of the chief obstacles to reform, according to Bissett, is the extent
to which political parties solicit support from ethnic or religious groups
and offer rewards in return for votes: “Block voting by new immigrant
groups is an old phenomenon—these groups tend to vote for the party
that promises them the most benefits.” As Bissett writes, the government
ended its former policy of adjusting the number of immigrants based on
the ups and downs of the labour force, and decided that Canada should
aim for an annual intake equivalent to 1% of the country’s population. No
convincing explanation was provided for establishing such levels, lead-
ing Bissett to suspect that the real reason behind this decision was the

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assumption that larger numbers of newcomers would mean more poten-
tial voters for the party in power.
In 1977, the Citizenship Act was passed, reducing the waiting time for
citizenship eligibility from five to three years. Voting patterns show that
new immigrants often vote for the party in power at the time the immi-
grant was admitted to the country. Bissett notes that, in return for the
immigrants’ votes, the party in power usually becomes a powerful advo-
cate for large scale immigration.
Stoffman points to the influence that ethno-politics can have, not only
on immigration, but on security issues as well. A steady stream of sup-
porters of the Tamil Tigers, one of the world’s most murderous terrorist
organizations, have found a haven in Canada, largely because we accept a
far higher percentage of asylum seekers claiming to be Sri Lankan Tamils
than any other country in the world. Yet, as Stoffman argues, federal
Liberal governments were so eager to cultivate support among the fast-
growing Tamil community that they refused to ban the Tigers as a terror-
ist organization, even though the United States and the United Kingdom
had already done so. When Paul Martin, who would later become Prime
Minister, was criticized for attending a dinner sponsored by a group asso-
ciated with the Tamil Tigers, he was unapologetic. Such criticism was “un-
Canadian,” Martin was reported as saying. In Stoffman’s view, this is how
a dysfunctional immigration and refugee system, in combination with the
notion that minority cultural groups are immune from criticism, makes
it all but impossible to control unwanted immigration.
Other actors with a vested interest in opening Canada’s borders even
wider and with little interest in impeding such a process by introducing
more effective security measures include the immigration lawyers and
immigrant settlement organizations mentioned by Harris. Many of them
are government-supported organizations that lobby for diversity, human
rights, and related causes.
In addition to vested interest groups lobbying for increased immigra-
tion, several of the chapters identify additional factors that impede reforms
to our immigration and refugee policies. One of the most important of
these is Canada’s multiculturalism policy. Bissett argues that this policy
is often used by political parties to shore up electoral support among

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immigrant groups. He points out that, in the 1970s, political parties dis-
covered that they could gain and maintain the allegiance of ethnic voters
by formalizing the concept of multiculturalism. Thus, it was no longer
necessary to use party funds to entice ethnic voters. Once in power, a
party was able to expend large sums of the taxpayers’ money in support
of ethnic organizations, including newspapers and media outlets, and
ethnic or religious celebrations and related events. All of this was done in
the name of multiculturalism—and with the expectation of block voting
from ethnic groups.
Mansur examines how Western countries have made themselves vul-
nerable to penetration and exploitation by extremist groups through the
adoption of multiculturalism policies. He argues that these groups have
made use of opportunities to claim that they are being treated unfairly and,
therefore, should receive concessions in compensation. This assessment has
been born out by recent initiatives on the part of Islamic organizations to
use Canadian human rights tribunals to shut down media coverage of issues
that they consider unsympathetic to their cause (Steyn, 2008, Jan. 14).
In a similar vein, Harris documents how organizations such as the
Council for American Islamic Relations of Canada (CAIR-CAN), whose
parent organization in the United States has been associated with Islamist
extremist activities, have been able to promote the notion that Muslims
have been victimized by Canadian efforts to strengthen counterterrorism
measures. Such groups have made a careful study of Canadian law, includ-
ing human rights provisions, and make maximum use of this knowledge
to advance their agendas.
Balancing freedom and security
A question that is frequently raised when new security measures are pro-
posed is whether they will infringe unduly on the rights and freedoms of
individuals. Ting examines in detail various factors that must be consid-
ered when one tries to answer this question. While citing the declaration of
the US Supreme Court that “distinctions between citizens solely because
of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,” he notes that, in

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certain circumstances, even the Court recognizes that security measures
that focus on certain groups are justified. However, such measures should
be restricted to situations where they are particularly warranted because
of serious security risks. Ting argues that, for example, stopping and ques-
tioning drivers of a certain ethnicity on the New Jersey Turnpike with the
hope of identifying a threat to national security ought not to be permitted.
However, subjecting passengers boarding an airplane to closer inspection
because of their ethnicity, if officially authorized, ought not to be rejected
automatically as a violation of civil liberties. Ting challenges the claim
that any compromises in relation to civil liberties carry a serious risk of
being the beginning of a slide down a slippery slope towards the erosion
of basic freedoms in general. In this regard, he points to the example of
the restrictions placed on people of Japanese origin in the United States
during World War II, and the fact that these restrictions were completely
removed when the war was over.
Harris looks at the debate on these issues in Canada. He argues that
most academics and lawyers who have taken a position on the subject
have been ardent supporters of the primacy of human rights and have
limited knowledge of the nature of the terrorist threat or the challenges
associated with effectively dealing with it. In effect, they take the position
that if there are any compromises in relation to civil liberties, then the
terrorists will have “won.”
Securing our borders
A number of chapters focused on the importance of border security and
the possibility of establishing a common security perimeter around North
America, or at least around Canada and the United States. Such a perim-
eter would enhance security and facilitate the movement of people and
goods across our common borders.
Considering the issue from an American perspective, Custred raises
concerns in relation to the potential threats to American security that may
come from the Canadian side of the border. He notes that this danger does
not come from a hostile country to the north, but rather from immigration
and refugee policies that make it easier for aliens who are hostile to the

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United States to enter Canada, disappear into the general population, and
connect with networks submerged in its large immigrant communities.
Custred’s strongest criticism, however, is reserved for the situation
along the southern border of the United States. Noting the mass influx of
illegal migrants, the level of lawlessness and violence (particularly on the
Mexican side), and the large-scale smuggling of narcotics into the United
States, Custred is highly critical of the Mexican authorities for allowing it
to happen and of Washington for its lack of resolve in terms of controlling
the situation. Given this lack of border security, Custred remains skeptical
of North American attempts to facilitate trade and border flows.
Bissett, on the other hand, is in favour of the establishment of a com-
mon security perimeter by the United States and Canada, given the ben-
efits to our country. He doubts that the increasingly robust measures being
taken by the Americans to strengthen their side of the border will prevent
determined terrorists from crossing it. However, he recognizes that to
establish a common perimeter, our two countries would have to harmo-
nize policies in a number of areas. For example, Canada and the United
States would need to create a common list of countries for which visas are
waived, and establish common policies regarding the detention of people
arriving without travel documents, the acceptance of asylum claims, and
the removal of foreign criminals and terrorists.
Bissett is not optimistic, however, that Canadian political parties would
be prepared to make the changes to our immigration and refugee policies
that would be necessary for any harmonization to take place and for the
Americans to be interested in a common security perimeter. Similarly,
Noble is not overly sanguine about the prospect of establishing a common
security perimeter, even though it might be in both countries’ interests to
do so. Before a common perimeter could be established, Canada and the
United States would first need to make some fundamental decisions with
respect to the nature of our future economic integration, and a number of
areas, including our porous refugee system, would need to be dealt with
before the Americans would be interested in such a perimeter. As well,
Noble does not think that the relatively unfettered movement of people
and goods between our two countries would be entirely a blessing for
Canada if, for example, it allowed greater freedom for more illegal firearms

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or more of the illegal immigrants presently flooding into the United States
to enter our territory.
Noble also reviews the two countries’ progress in terms of their
increased cooperation to date in such areas as the implementation of the
Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan and the Safe Third Country
Agreement (with respect to asylum seekers). In doing so, he questions the
value of some of the United States’ attempts to strengthen security along
our common border, particularly when the United States is clearly doing
such an inadequate job of controlling its border with Mexico.
In Noble’s view, Canadian interests would be best served by continu-
ing to work with the Americans to find ways to make our border both
smarter and more secure, while at the same time correcting some of our
policies and programs. For example, one area that needs improvement is
our refugee determination system, which is highly dysfunctional from a
Canadian perspective. Such policies and programs undermine the United
States’ confidence in our ability and resolve to exercise effective control
over our borders.
Rudolph also examines, in considerable detail, our prospects for greater
progress in terms of Canadian and American efforts to create a “smart bor-
ders” regime. He argues that such a regime would require a fundamental
reorganization of existing structures and procedures. Similar to some of
the other authors, he has concerns about the Canadian refugee system and
expresses doubts regarding the extent to which harmonization could be
achieved with the United States in the area of asylum policy as envisioned
under the 30-point smart border plan.
As well, Rudolph identifies features of the Canadian system that make
it disproportionately open in comparison to those of other advanced
industrial states. These features include high rates of approvals, a gener-
ous social welfare system, infrequent prosecutions, and lax deportation
procedures. He notes that strong domestic lobbies in Canada have been
instrumental in shaping both immigration and asylum policies, as human
rights and immigration law lobbies have successfully institutionalized
protections for migrants within the judiciary (as well as the Immigration
and Refugee Board) that constrain policy makers from enacting restric-
tive policies.

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To realize further progress in terms of border security coopera-
tion, Rudolph argues that improvements in intelligence sharing must
be made. What makes this facet of an integrated border management
regime so complicated, according to Rudolph, is that the need for bet-
ter intelligence creates interests for a regime within a regime. Pooling
raw anti-terrorism data requires a high degree of cooperation in scale
and scope, both within states (interagency sharing) and among them
(interstate). In the United States, major initiatives were taken to ensure
better integration among intelligence gathering agencies to eliminate the
kind of coordination failures that may have prevented the events of 9/11.
However, there is still much to be done in this area. In Canada, steps
have been taken to achieve greater integration in the handling of intelli-
gence, and the intelligence community has been given additional powers
and resources. Yet, according to Rudolph, little has been accomplished
in terms of altering the bureaucratic structure and its processes, within
or among members of the intelligence community. These impediments
notwithstanding, Rudolph believes that the need for both openness and
security on our borders would seem to demonstrate that the creation of
a cooperative regime is a necessity. He advises, however, that we should
not underestimate just how complicated the process will be as we move
toward such a regime.
Conclusion
In the preceding chapters, each contributor outlined their concerns with
respect to the shortcomings in Canadian immigration and refugee policy
system as they relate to security issues and, in particular, the threat of ter-
rorism. The authors point out that these problems not only involve risks to
the security of Canadians, but they also undermine American confidence
in the ability and resolve of Canada to exercise adequate control over
who is allowed to enter and remain in its territory. As such, the United
States will likely continue to impose tighter controls over the movement
of people and goods across its common border with Canada. This could
have serious implications for the Canadian economy since it is heavily
dependent on trade with the United States.

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One of the major problems with Canadian immigration policy identi-
fied by the authors is the unrelentingly high level of intake that is resulting
in an increase in both the number and size of separate immigrant com-
munities. The formation of such communities tends to slow down the
integration of newcomers and provides an environment in which extrem-
ists can operate relatively unnoticed and have increased opportunities to
recruit supporters. Questions were raised as to why Canada maintains
such high immigration levels, since they do not result in economic ben-
efits of any significance and are not the most effective means of meeting
most labour shortages. While Canada does have an aging population, it is
clear that immigration will do little to mitigate the challenges associated
with this phenomenon.
The authors who pursued this issue concluded that the most impor-
tant factor contributing to the continuation of high immigrant intake lev-
els was the influence of organizations and individuals who have a vested
interest in seeing it continue. Prominent among them are political parties,
which count on newcomers who arrive while they are in office to provide
them with electoral support once they become eligible to vote. Other
players include immigration lawyers, immigrant settlement organizations,
and others such as groups that lobby for diversity or human rights, for
example. While some chapters concluded that, at least in Canada’s case,
human rights and civil liberties had often been given undue priority over
security concerns, it was also clearly accepted that the former were of fun-
damental importance and that a reasonable balance had to be established
between liberty and security.
Related to Canada’s high intake levels is the issue of the lack of
resources available for the adequate security screening of individuals who
are accepted as immigrants. To ensure reasonable standards of security,
the resources available for screening must be increased or the number of
immigrants admitted must be decreased.
Canada’s refugee determination system was also cited as a source of
major concern from a security point of view because it has been used as
a means for terrorists and their supporters to enter Canada and to delay
their removal from the country. American contributors noted that the
weaknesses of the system are among the major reasons why the United

228 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
Fraser Institute | www.fraserinstitute.org
States continues to have serious concerns about Canada’s ability to deal
with security issues. With respect to Canada’s refugee system, the authors
identified the need to ensure that the system does not continue to be
clogged with large numbers of asylum seekers who would be rejected or
prohibited from applying for protection in other countries. To a great
extent, this could be achieved through the application of “safe third coun-
try” and “safe country of origin” rules, as other countries have done.
Action also needs to be taken in other areas of our refugee system. For
example, there is a need for more frequent use of detention in the case of
claimants whose identity is in doubt and who may pose a security threat
to Canada, as well as claimants whose applications have been rejected and
who have been ordered removed but frequently fail to show up for their
departure unless kept in custody. Another area that requires correction is
the appeal process. Currently, refused claimants have the ability to delay
their removal almost indefinitely through various appeals and reviews.
While not specifically proposed in any of the chapters, one of the obvi-
ous conclusions to be drawn from this volume is that a thorough and
comprehensive review of both immigration and refugee policy is long
overdue in Canada. Such a review must determine what the objectives
of Canada’s immigration policy should be, and must look critically at the
extent to which current programs are achieving these objectives and the
extent to which immigration policy and national security policy can pur-
sue complementary objectives. Moreover, the review should not be done
by any of Canada’s political parties, which have a strong tendency to treat
immigration policy as means of shoring up electoral support, or by orga-
nizations that will advocate policies that serve their own interests. While
all interested groups should have an opportunity to present their views, it
is important that an independent review be organized in such a way that
the interests of Canadians in general are paramount.
A final topic discussed by the contributors was the importance of
continued cooperation between Canada and the United States. Both
countries should look for ways in which they can harmonize standards
and procedures, in order to ensure that the measures in place along our
common border provide an adequate level of security while facilitating
the movement of goods and people. Such harmonization could include

Making Canada’s Immigration System and Borders More Secure 229
www.fraserinstitute.org | Fraser Institute
the establishment of common lists of visa-exempt countries, as well as
common security screening standards and procedures for visa applicants.
The contributors recommended that the two countries work towards a
better integration of the work of intelligence gathering agencies from
each country.
With a comprehensive and fundamental review of Canadian immi-
gration and refugee policy that takes into account the various issues and
recommendations made in the chapters in this volume, Canadians could
ensure that the programs in these areas achieve their stated objectives,
while contributing to, rather than detracting from, the security, economic,
and humanitarian interests of Canadians at large.

230 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
Fraser Institute | www.fraserinstitute.org
References
Bell, Stewart (2004, March 31). Al-Qaeda Urges Attacks on Canadians.
National Post.
Bell, Stewart (2008, January 30). Killing Canadians ‘Best Way’: Student.
National Post.
Bolan, Kim (2007, October 31). Air India Blast Mastermind Called
‘Martyr’ at Sikh Service. Vancouver Sun.
Brown, Jim (2007, November 22). ‘The Reign of Terror is Still There’:
Liberal MP Describes Beatings, Death Threats Faced by Opponents of
Sikh Extremism. Toronto Star.
Collacott, Martin (2006). Canada’s Inadequate Response to Terrorism:
The Need for Policy Reform. Fraser Institute Digital Publication. Fraser
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Convention. The Globe and Mail.
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[FINTRAC] (2007). FINTRAC Annual Report 2007. . Accessed February 1, 2008.
Green, Alan G. (2003). What is the Role of Immigration in Canada’s
Future? Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century. McGill-
Queen’s University Press.

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Hou, Feng, and Garnett Picot (2004). Visible Minority Neighbourhoods
in Toronto, Montréal, and Vancouver. Canadian Social Trends (Spring):
8–13. .
Leong, Melissa (2007, November 6). Liberal MPs Attend Vigil for Slain
Tamil Tiger. National Post.
MacLeod, Ian (2008, January 25). Terror Trial Delay Angers Judge.
Ottawa Citizen.
Sallot, Jeff, and Brian Laghi (2006, June 7). RCMP Foiled Dozen Plots in
Past Two Years. The Globe and Mail.
Statistics Canada (2001). 2001 Census of Canada. Catalogue No.
97F0022XIE2001004. Statistics Canada.
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Groups, Canada, Provinces and Regions. Catalogue No. 91-541-XIE.
Statistics Canada. .
Steyn, Mark (2008, January 14). Here is What Offends This Writer.
Maclean’s. 76–77.

Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat 233
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234 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
About the Fraser Institute
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Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat 235
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236 Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat
Professor Armen Alchian
Professor Terry Anderson
Professor Robert Barro
Professor Michael Bliss
Professor James M. Buchanan+
Professor Jean-Pierre Centi
Professor Thomas J. Courchene**
Professor John Chant
Professor Bev Dahlby
Professor Erwin Diewert
Professor Stephen Easton
Professor J.C. Herbert Emery
Professor Jack L. Granatstein
Professor Herbert G. Grubel
Professor Friedrich A. Hayek* +
Professor James Gwartney
Professor H.G. Johnson*
Professor Ronald W. Jones
Dr. Jerry Jordan
Professor David Laidler**
Professor Richard G. Lipsey**
Professor Ross McKitrick
Professor Michael Parkin
Professor F.G. Pennance*
Professor Friedrich Schneider
Professor L. B. Smith
Professor George Stigler* +
Mr Vito Tanzi
Sir Alan Walters
Professor Edwin G. West*
* deceased; ** withdrawn; + Nobel Laureate
Editorial Advisory Board

Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat 237
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Contents
About the Authors
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter 1: Truths and Myths about
Immigration
Chapter 2: Immigration and Muslim Extremists in the Post-9/11 World
Chapter 3: Mass Immigration Defeats
Homeland Security
Chapter 4: Canada’s Broken Refugee
Policy System
Chapter 5: Security Threats in Immigration and Refugee Policies
Chapter 6: Security Threats on America’sBorders
Chapter 7: The Need to Balance Liberty and Security
Chapter 8: Is Canada Losing the Balance Between Liberty and Security?
Chapter 9: A Secure Border? The Canadian View
Chapter 10: A Smart Border? The American View
Chapter 11: Making Canada’s Immigration System and Borders More Secure
Publishing information
About the Fraser Institute
Editorial Advisory Board
Supporting the Fraser Institute