Global Ethic Wk4

Based upon the 2 readings I attached (Rawls’ theory of justice

& Kantian Ethics) , you are to conduct a comparative analysis of Rawls’ Theory of Justice with Kantian Ethics. 

· How are they similar? 

· How are they different?

· Using both theories, is justice being served to all people in today’s United States

· Does injustice still abound?

· Select a specific topic, example, or issue to explain your rationale.

Please cite at least one additional source on this topic your analysis to support your interpretation of justice or injustice.

2 pages

Kantean Ethics
Onora O’Neill, “A Simplified Account”

Deontological Ethics
• Consequentialism: only consequence of actions are relevant to moral

evaluation (e.g. Utilitarianism)

• Deontological Ethics: the nature of the act itself, regardless of the
consequences, is only of relevance

• Objective (today): consider Kant’s Deontological Theory

Motivations for Deontology
• Morality without God

• Alleged problems with Consequentialism
 Not precise: difficult to predict long-term consequences of an action
 Too demanding: asks to much of us to help the world

• Deontology is an intuitive view: recall reactions to Trolley Problem

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
• Influential German philosopher in ethics

and metaphysics, epistemology

• A central figure of the Enlightenment Period

• Critique of Pure Reason –metaphysical and
epistemological work

• Metaphysics of Moral – ethical work

Onora O’Neill (1941-)
• British political philosopher and public servant

• Studied with John Rawls at Harvard University

• A Public advocate for Deontological Ethics

Formula of the End in Itself
• Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own

person or in the person of any other, never simply as a (mere) means but
… as an end in themselves.

• Each of our acts reflects one or more maxims
 The maxim of the act is the principle on which one sees oneself as acting
 A maxim expresses a person’s policy, or the particular intention or decision

• Example:
 Intention: “This year I’ll give 10 percent of my income to famine relief”
 Maxim: I want to give some of my income for famine relief.

Treating someone as a Mere Means
• There is nothing wrong in using someone as a means to an end

 E.g. using a cashier; cashier using you; This is permitted because both parties consent

• But, we should never use someone as a mere means (tool)
 To use someone as a mere means is to involve them in a scheme of action to which they

could not in principle consent.

• Example: Deception
 one person may make a promise to another with every intention of breaking it
 Since the person who is deceived doesn’t know the real maxim, he or she can’t in principle

consent to his or her part in the proposed scheme of action. The person who is deceived is
a prop or a tool-a mere means-in the false promisor’s scheme.

• Example: Coercion
 If a moneylender in a poor village threatens not to renew a vital loan unless he is given

the debtor’s land, then he uses the debtor as a mere means. He coerces the debtor, who
cannot truly consent to this “offer he can’t refuse.”

 creditor’s intention is to coerce; and the debtor cannot consent to his part in the scheme

Treating People as Ends in
Themselves
• One should also seek to foster some of others’ plans and maxims by sharing

some of their ends. To act beneficently is to seek others’ happiness, therefore
to intend to achieve some of the things that those others aim at with their
maxims.

Two Kinds of Duties
• Duties of Justice requires that we act on no maxims that use others as

mere means.

• Duties of Beneficence requires that we act on some maxims that foster
others’ ends, though it is a matter for judgment and discretion which of their
ends we foster.

Objection 1: The Inquiring Murderer
• Objection:

 Suppose a distraught screaming stranger runs through your doorway and into your
house, disappearing upstairs. A couple of minutes latter a known fugitive and
convict knocks on your door with a gun in his hand. He asks if you have seen a
person, matching the description of the stranger.

 On Kant’s view, Lying to the murderer would treat him as a mere means to another
end, the lie denies the rationality of another person, and therefore denies the
possibility of there being free rational action at all.

 But, this is morally wrong: we shouldn’t tell the murderer who is upstairs.

• Reply:
 “not lying” is not the same as “telling the truth”. Clearly, one is under no positive

obligation to assist a murderer by telling him the truth. Saying nothing is not the
same as lying. So, one may refuse to answer, or even choose to challenge the
murderer, without trying to deceive him.

 Is this an adequate response?

Objection 2: Disaster Scenarios
• Suppose you are in a situation where you are asked to kill one person to save

19. If you do not do as you are told, all 20 will be killed by someone else.

• What should you do? Kant claims that you should never kill a person, doing
so is a violation. And if you do it, you will have done something wrong!

Charity
• Kantian theory forbids us from using people as a mere means (Justice)

• But there is only a requirement for us to be beneficent some of the time and
money to help others (Beneficence)

• Questions
 How much should we give to others?
 Are there no special obligations to help those during famine?
 Is any kind of charity

equally good?

Famine Relief: Prohibitions
• O’Neill thinks that not using people as means would go a long way during

famines

1. where there is a rationing scheme, one ought not to cheat

2. transactions that are outwardly sales can be coercive when the consumer
is desperate (E.g. selling water for high prices to those in dire need)

Priority of Famine Relief
 Primary task of beneficence should be developing others’ capacity to

pursue their own ends – in particular, in parts of the world where extreme
poverty and hunger leave people unable to pursue any of their other ends

 Why? Benevolence directed at putting people in a position to pursue
whatever ends they may have has a stronger claim on us than beneficence
directed at sharing ends with those who are already in a position to pursue
varieties of ends

 it is more important to make people able to plan their own lives to a
minimal extent

 Reason to help education [development of reason faculty]

Kant / Singer Comparison
• Scope

 Kant: limited scope; does not classify every act as right or wrong
 Singer: unlimited scope; classifies every act as right or wrong

• Wealth
 Kant: Nothing hangs on how much you have


Singer: You will have to give more if you have more (say 20% of income)

• Amount
 Kant: have to give some of the time, but not generally required to give
 Singer: comparison of alternative – always have an obligation to give to others

(comparative moral importance)

• Pond Scenario:
 Singer: you should save the child
 Kant: you don’t have an obligation to save the child; you did nothing wrong by not doing

anything

Who is Worthy of Moral
Consideration
• Kant:

 Only rational creatures can offer consent
 Only rational persons are worthy of moral consideration

 How could Kant’s say that we shouldn’t harm animals or the severely handicapped?

• Bentham/Mill
 Calculate the happiness i.e. pleasure and pain of all involved
 All creatures that experience pleasure and pain are worthy of moral consideration

 Is this true?

Deontology and
Famine Relief
Onora O’Neill, “The Moral Perplexities of Famine Relief”

Epistemological Objection to Utilitarianism
• An objection to both Bentham and Mill is that it is difficult to know what

the long term consequences are going to be, and so it is difficult to make a
decision on utilitarian grounds.

• Reply (Bentham/Mill):
 We have plenty of evidence to make decisions including evidence and personal

experiences from our own life, and evidence from the past.
 The cases from history can be analogous to count as evidence. Example: Should

we engage in a War in Iraq? Look at past evidence – track record of US military
engagements, track record of other countries involved in military action in Iraq,
etc.

 We don’t need absolute certainty, but evidence that suggests at least what is
probably going to happen, and for this Bentham and Mill think past evidence is
good enough to make a reasonable decision.

Overview
• Rejects Utilitarianism

• Individual has a dignity
 Not because we own ourselves
 Not because we seek pleasure
 Because we are all rational beings – capable of acting rationally on any given

occasion
 For Kant, rationality is central to an important kind of freedom

Personhood, Rationality and
Freedom
•A person has a dignity
 Not because we own ourselves nor because we seek pleasure
 Because we are all rational beings – capable of acting rationally on any given

occasion
 Kant rejects – that what is central to morality is pleasure/pain

•What are persons? Things capable of acting freely.

 Freedom = having alternatives (common-sense freedom)

 Kant: Strong View of Human Freedom
 When act to satisfy desires for pain/pleasure, we are slaves to pain/pleasure; this

is not freedom
 Velleman – sleeping in, when should be swimming

 Free = To act autonomously (freely) is to act in accordance to a law (rule) I choose

myself

Opposite of Free; Heteronomy = acting on a desire (inclination) that I haven’t chosen
myself

Freedom
 Freedom = having alternatives (common-sense freedom)

 Strong View of Human Freedom (Kant)
 When act to satisfy desires for pain/pleasure, we are slaves to pain/pleasure; This

is not freedom
 Free = To act autonomously (freely) is to act in accordance to a law (rule) I choose

myself
Opposite of Free; Heteronomy = acting on a desire (inclination) that I haven’t chosen

myself

 When we act to realize ends of our inclination, we are mere instruments for our desires, and so not
acting freely

• When we act freely i.e. when we act in accordance with a rule which we have
chosen
 We start to be authors of our actions (not of our desires)
 We do something for its own sake
 We become ends in ourselves – not as tools for something else

• Acting freely gives people dignity, makes them worthy of respect

• This is why it is wrong to use people for the sake of other peoples happiness

Absolute Value
• Utilitarianism: Absolute Value

 Only one thing has absolute

value

: pleasure
 Everything else is done for the sake of pleasure

• Kant: Only a “Good Will” has absolute Value
 Values: Talent, Intelligence, Pleasant Sensation are valuable but not of absolute

value

Moral Worth
• What gives an action its moral worth?

• What makes an action morally worthy has to do with the motives, quality of
will, or intention – the reason why an action is performed

• A good will must be done for the sake of moral law and this confers moral
worth on an action

• The only good motive is doing something for the sake of duty – done because
its right thing to do

Illustration: Shop Keeper
• A shop-keeper who charges the same prices for selling his goods to inexperienced

customers as for selling them to anyone else. This is in accord with duty.

• An added complication: But there is also a prudential and not-duty-based motive
that the shop-keeper might have for this course of conduct: when there is a buyers’
market, he may sell as cheaply to children as to others so as not to lose customers.
Thus the customer is honestly served, but his conduct or policy on pricing comes
neither from duty nor from directly wanting it, but from a selfish purpose. So, it is
wrong.

• The shop-keeper does want to treat all his customers equitably; his intention is aimed
at precisely that fact. But the shop-keeper’s intention doesn’t stop there, so to speak;
he wants to treat his customers equitably not because of what he wants for them, but
because of how he wants them to behave later, specifically, so that his person interest
is served.

• E.g. A Corporation giving to charity – it’s a good thing but the motive is
about profitability: increases reputation, which is marketable, which is in
the end about increasing profit.

Principles and Rationality
• Kant distinguishes two kinds of principles: subjective, objective
 Subjective (maxims): principle you act on, you set out for yourself
 Objective (imperatives): principles which you ought to be following i.e.

principles are the principles a rational person follow

• Kant distinguishes two kinds of rationality
 Hypothetical (conditional): if you want X, you should do Y

 E.g. if you want your car to run efficiently, always change your oil every 3000
miles

 E.g. if you want to avoid a fine then pay your parking ticket
 Categorical (unconditional): you should do Y, no matter what you

want

• Morality is based on Categorical Reasoning Only

Supreme Principle of Morality:
Categorical Imperative

• “so if the will is to be called absolutely good without qualification; what kind

of law can this be? Since I have robbed the will of any impulses that could
come to it from obeying any law, nothing remains to serve as a ·guiding·
principle of the will except conduct’s universally conforming to law as such.”

• That is, I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn’t also will
that the maxim on which I act should be a universal law.

3 Formulations of the Categorical
Imperative
• Kant presents CI in several different formulations; he says that they

condone and forbid the same moral actions, but one may be easier to apply
in specific cases.

• CI 1: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a
universal law of nature

• CI 2: Never treat others as tools, rather only

as ends in themselves

• CI 3: Acting on universal laws which make the kingdom of ends (a state
where all individuals act rationally on universal laws) possible.

1st Formulation
• ‘Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a

universal law of nature’.

• A law of nature specifies an absolute regularity.
 E.g. the law that pure water boils under normal atmospheric

conditions at 100 degrees centigrade is a law of nature: pure water
always boils under these conditions.

• Laws of nature would be laws
 (a) applying to everyone and (b) which everyone always follows.

• To imagine the maxim of my proposed action as a universal
law of nature, I imagine that everyone always does the kind of
act I propose doing when they are in the circumstances I am in

Test for CI
• 1. Formulate maxim: whenever I need money, I will get it by making a false

promise to repay it

• 2. The universal law corresponding to the maxim is: whenever anyone needs
money, he or she will get it by making a false promise to repay it

• 3. Test in one of two ways:
 1. Can I conceive that the maxim becomes a universal law?
 2. Even if I can conceive of its becoming a universal law of nature,

can I will that it become a universal law of nature?

Perfect Duties Imperfect Duties
To Self Never commit suicide Develop some of one’s talents
To Others Never make deceitful

promise
To help some others in
distress

Case: Suicide
• Is suicide permitted for a depressed person if he or she reasons as follows?

• a) To stay alive would be far less good for me than bad

• b) I love myself

• c) Because I love myself I do not want to see myself suffer.

• d) Therefore, I ought to commit suicide to end my suffering.

Suicide: 1st Formulation
 Maxim: I want to commit suicide to improve my condition (i.e.

to help me stop suffering)

 Generalize Maxim: Suppose everyone acted on the maxims
that committing suicide to improve the condition

 Test 1: Is it conceivable that the generalized maxim become a
universal law of nature?
 Kant thinks it is contradictory to commit suicide out of

self-love. It is contradictory because self-love is the very
thing which motivates us to improve our lives, and
ending our life is not an improvement

 Because the Maxim fails thee conceivability test, we have a
perfect duty not to commit suicide out of self-love

Deceitful Promise: 1st Formulation
• Maxim: I want to borrow money and pretend that I will pay it back

• Generalize Maxim: Suppose everyone acted on the maxims that borrowing
money with no intention to pay the money back

• Test 1: Is it conceivable that the generalized maxim become a universal law
of nature?
 Kant thinks it is not possible; promises simply would not exist if no

one fulfilled their promises.

• Because the maxim fails the conceivability test (test 1), we have a perfect
duty not to make deceitful promises

Imperfect duties
• “‘Can I will that my maxim be a universal law of nature?’ In other words,

all things considered, do I really desire my maxim to become a universal law
of nature?’ or ‘Could I, in every situation, accept this maxim as law?’ “

• An imperfect duty is one which:
 1) is conceivable as a universal law
 2) a rational agent cannot will that it become a universal law of nature

Wasting Your Talents
• What if one is financially independent and is also exceptionally talented?

What then does she owe, if anything to her talent? Is it okay for her “to
indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving
her happy natural capacities?”

• Kant notes that it is possible for people – even an entire culture – to neglect
their talents in fact, to devote their lives to idle amusement. But the moral
question is, is it proper?

Wasting Your Talent
• Again we can run through the 1st Formulation

• Maxim: I will avoid exercising my own talents for idle amusement

• Generalize Maxim: Everyone avoids exercising their own talents for idle
amusement

• Test 1: Is it conceivable? Yes, it is possible that everyone avoids developing
their own talents

• Test 2: No. It is not something a rational person would will to become a
universal law
 He cannot will that we ought to neglect our talents since it is by means of our

talents that we develop and improve our lives, and this is what a rational being
aims for.

 That is, a rational being will necessarily will that his abilities be developed since
they are useful to him, and serve any number of purposes. Accordingly, he cannot
at the same time will that they be neglected without contradicting himself.

Treatment of Animals
• Only rational persons are worthy of moral consideration. So, in the

generalization step of the First Test, we generalize over rational human
beings. But, what about animals, or the severely handicapped?

• Kant said that we have a duty not to harm animals because we have a duty
to develop ourselves, and that entails being compassionate towards others

Objection 1: The Inquiring Murderer
• Suppose a distraught screaming stranger runs through your doorway and

into your house disappearing upstairs. A couple of minutes latter a known
fugitive and convict knocks on your door with a gun in his hand. He asks if
you have seen a person, matching the description of the stranger.

• Lying to the murderer would treat him as a mere means to another end, the
lie denies the rationality of another person, and therefore denies the
possibility of there being free rational action at all.

• It is important to note here that “not lying” is not the same as “telling the
truth”. Clearly, one is under no positive obligation to assist a murderer by
telling him the truth. Saying nothing is not the same as lying. So, one may
refuse to answer, or even choose to challenge the murderer, without trying
to deceive him.

• Is this an adequate response?

Objection 2: Moral Dilemmas
• Suppose you are in a situation where you are asked to kill one person to save

19. If you do not do as you are told, all 20 will be killed by someone else.

• What should you do? Kant claims that you should never kill a person, doing
so violates the Categorical imperative. And if you do it, you will have done
something wrong!

2nd Formulation of the Categorical
Imperative
• “Act in such as way that you always treat humanity … never simply as a

means but always … as an end”

• We are permitted to use persons as means as long as they consent explicitly
or implicitly

Duties of Justice
 Never use people as mere means i.e. involve them in a scheme of

action to which they could not in principle consent
◦ deception making a false promise with every intention of breaking it – using a

person as means to an end i.e. they cannot consent to the false promise, because if
they knew of the true intentions they wouldn’t accept the promise – a promise
would not be made

◦ coercion: A rich person threatens a debtor with bankruptcy unless he or she joins
in some scheme – the creditor’s intention is to coerce; and the debtor, if coerced,
cannot consent to his or her part in the creditor’s scheme

Duties of Beneficence
 Even if we don’t treat others as means to an end, we can fail to treat them

as ends in themselves

 Beneficence requires that we act on some maxims that foster another’s
ends, though it is a matter of judgment which of their ends we foster

Problems?
• Kantian theory forbids us from using people as a mere means (Justice)

• But there is only a requirement for us to be beneficent some of the time
(Beneficence)

• Two Problems:
 How much should we give to others?
 Are there no special obligations to help those during famine? Is any kind of charity

equally good?

Famine Relief: Prohibitions
 O’Neill thinks that not using people as means would go a long way during

famines
1. where there is a rationing scheme, one ought not to cheat

2. transactions that are outwardly sales can be coercive when the consumer
is desperate (E.g. selling water for high prices to those in dire need)

3. duties towards dependents (as much as possible)

Priority of Famine Relief
 Primary task of beneficence should be developing others’ capacity to
pursue their own ends – in particular, in parts of the world where extreme
poverty and hunger leave people unable to pursue any of their other ends
 Why? Benevolence directed at putting people in a position to pursue
whatever ends they may have has a stronger claim on us than beneficence
directed at sharing ends with those who are already in a position to pursue
varieties of ends
 it is more important to make people able to plan their own lives to a
minimal extent
 Reason to help education [development of reason faculty]

Objection
• How much?

• If a lot then it that seems to be too much

• If very little then it seems apathetic

•Kant: limited scope – does not specify whether every act you do is right/wrong

•Singer: unlimited scope – specified whether every action is right/wrong

•Kant: Nothing hangs on how much you have

Singer: You will have to give more if you have more (say 20% of income)

•Kant: have to give some of the time, but not generally required to give
Singer: comparison of alternative – always have an obligation to give to
others (comparative moral importance)

•Singer: Pond – you should save the child

Kant: it looks like we do not have a obligation to save the child from
drowning, though sometimes we do

Moral Worth
• First Proposition of Morality: For an action to have genuine

moral worth it must be done from duty
 For Kant, a person of moral worth does the right thing,

and does so in spite of the influence of desire and appetite
which may lead her to do the wrong thing.

 Moral worth is the most important attribute which a
person can have.

 Moral worth is more important talent, intelligent,
courage, vor they may become bad and mischievous if the
will which is to make use of them is not good.

Objections
 Objection: is acting in for duty contrarry to human freedom –

fulfiling desire to be moral
 Isn’t motive to be moral – to be a good person a selfish motive? There

is an inceptive, but Kant speaks of reverence for the moralitty = not
selfish gain

 Objection: is morality subjective? If everyone picks a law to
follows – does that mea n moral rlaws are subjective – no . What
guranteess that we have . Kant thinks there is only one law – the
reason that we have same law is a practical reason that we share
as human beings – we are all rational beings – and we all have to
reason regardless of any contingent ends of any particular person
– what is the content of such laws – see tests.

Principles and Rationality
• What is the basis of the Categorical Imperative? Answer:

rationality
• Different kinds of Principles: subjective, objective
• subjective (maxims): principle you act on, you set out for yourself
• objective (imperatives): principles which you ought to be following

i.e. principlses are the principles a rational person follow
 Hypothetical (conditional): if you wanted x, you should do Y [means to

an end
 imperatives of skill (problematic / technical)
 imperatives of prudence (assertorical)
 Some ends we all want: e.g. happiness, health, etc
 Examples:

 if you want your car to run efficiently, always change your oil every
3000 miles

 Categorical (unconditional): you should do Y, no matter what you
want

• Morality is based on Categorical Reasoning Only

Kantian Ethics
• Main idea 1: An action is morally permissible only if it would be

permissible for others to do the same act

• Main idea 2: It is forbidden to ‘use’ people.

• Important property of CI
 It universally applies to all rational people
 Persons capable of free choice

Supreme Principle of Morality:
Categorical Imperative

• “so if the will is to be called absolutely good without qualification;
what kind of law can this be? Since I have robbed the will of any
impulses that could come to it from obeying any law, nothing
remains to serve as a ·guiding· principle of the will except
conduct’s universally conforming to law as such.”

• That is, I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn’t
also will that the maxim on which I act should be a
universal law.

Rawls’ Theory of Justice–1

R. M. Hare

The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 91 (Apr., 1973), 144-155.

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144

CRITICAL STUDY

RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE-F

BY R. M. HARE

A Theory of Justice. By JOHN RAWLS. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P.,
1971. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. xv + 607. Price £5.00,
U.S. paperback, $3.95.)

Any philosopher who writes on justice or on any other subject in moral
philosophy is likely to propound, or to give evidence of, views on one or
more of the following topics :

(1) Philosophical me.tlwdology-i.e., what philosophy is supposed to be
doing and how it does it. RawiB expre.sses some views about this,
which have determined the whole structure of his argument, and
which therefore need careful inspection.

(2) Ethical analysi&-i.e., the meanings of the moral words or the nature
and logical properties of the moral concepts. Rawls says very little
about these, and certainly does not treat them as fundamental t.o
his enquiry (51/10)2•

(3) Moral mei,luxlology-i.e., how moral thinking ought to proceed, or
how moral arguments or reasonings have to be conduct.ed if they
are to be cogent.

(4) Normative moral questions-Le., what we ought or ought not t.o do,
what is just or unjust, and so on.

I shall leave discussion of Rawls’ views on (4) to the second, forthcoming
part of this review, this first part being devot.ed to (1), (2) and (3). I shall
argue that, through misconceptions about (1), Rawls has not paid enough
attention t.o (2), and that therefore he has lacked the equipment necessary
to handle (3) effectively; so that what he says about (4), however popular
it may prove, is urumpport.ed by any firm arguments.

(1) Rawls states quite explicitly how he thinks moral philosophy should
be done : “There is a definite if limited class of facts against which conjec-

1Although the Editor has been kind enough to allow me to spread this review over
two parts, I do not hope to explore in it all the convolutions of the book. I shall con-
centrate on what seem.a most important. I feel excused from discu.ssing Rawls’ treat-
ment of liberty by my general agreement with an article which Professor Hart is to
devote to this topic m the Chicago Law Review, and of which he has kindly shown me
a draft. Of the many other people with whom I have discu.ssed the book, and who
have kept my courage up during two readings of it, I should like especially to thank
Mr. Derek Parfit, who seem.a to me to see deeper and more clearly into these problems
than any of us. [The second part of this Critical Study is to appear in the July
nwnher of this volume.]

•References are to pages/lines of Rawls’ text.

RAWLS’ THEORY OF .JUSTICE-I 145

tured principles can be checked, namely our considered judgments in reflec-
tive equilibrium” (51/3). It is clear from the succeeding passage that Rawls
does not conceive of moral philosophy as depending primarily on the analysiB
of concepts in order to establish their logical properties and thus the rules
of valid moral argument. Rather, he thinks of a theory of justice as analogous
to a theory in empirical science. It has to square with what he calls ” facts “,
just like, for example, physiological theories. But what are these facts?
They are what people will say when they have beBn thinking carefully.
This suggestion is reminiscent of Sir David Ross.3 But sometimes (though
not comiistently) Rawls goes farther than Ross. Usually he is more cautious,
and appeals to the reflections of bien pensants generally, as Ross does (e.g.,
18/9, 19/26). But at 50/34 he says, “For the purposes of this book, the views
of the reader and the author are the only ones that count “. It does not
make much practical difference which way he puts it; for if (as will certainly
be the case) he finds a large number ofreaders who can share with him a cosy
unanimity in their considered judgments, he and they will think that they
adequately represent “people generally”, and congratulat.e themselves on
having attained: the truth. 4 This is how phrases like ‘reasonable and generally
acceptable’ (45/16) are often used by philosophers in lieu of argument.

Rawls, in short, is here advocating a kind of subjectivism, in the narrowest
and most old-fashioned sense. He is making the answer to the question
“Am I right in what I say about moral questions 1 ” depend on the answer
t.o the question” Do you, the reader, and I agree in what we say 1 “. This
must be his view, if the comiidered judgments of author and reader are to
occupy the place in his theory which is occupied in an empirical science by
the facts of observation. Yet at 516/15 he claims objectivity for his principles.

It might be thought that such a criticiBm can be made only by one who
has rejected (as Rawls has apparently accepted) the arguments of Professor
Quine and others about the analytic-synthetic distinction and the way in
which science confronts the world. But this is not so. Even Quine would
hardly say that scientific theories as a whole are to be tested by seeing what
people say when they have thought about them (it would have been a good
thing for medieval fl.at-earthers if they could be) ; but that is what Rawls
jg proposing for moral principles.

In order not to be unfair to Rawls, it must be granted that any enquirer,
in ethics as in any other subject, and whether he be a descriptivist or a
prescriptivist, is looking for an answer to his questions which he can accept.
I have myself implied this in my Freedom and Reason, page 73 and else-
where. The element of subjectivism enters only when a philosopher claims
that he can ” check” his theory agaimit his and other people’s views, so

“Cf. The Right and the Good, pp. 40 ff.
•see 104/3•14 for a “considered judgment” with which many of ill! now would

agree, but whic:h differs from the views of most writers of other periods than the present,
and is not argued for.

!46 lt. M. HARE

that a disagreement between the theory and the views tells against the
theory. To speak like this (as Rawls does constantly throughout the book)
is to make the lruth of the theory depend on agreement with people’s opinions.
I have myself been so often falsely accused of this sort of subjectivism that
it is depressing to find a self-styled objectivist falling as deeply into it as
Rawls does-depressing, because it makes one feel that this essentially
simple distinction will never be understood : the distinction between the
view that thinking something can make it so {which is in general false) and
the view that if we are to say something sincerely, we must be able to accept
it (which is a tautology).

Intuitionism is nearly always a form of disguised subjectivism. Rawls
does not call himself an intuitionist ; but he certainly iB one in the usual
sense. He says, “There is no reason t.o suppose that we can avoid all appeals
to intuition, of whatever kind, or that we should try t.o. The practical aim
is to reach a reasonably reliable agreement in judgment in order to provide
a common conception of justice” (44/34, cf. 124/38). It is clear that he is
here referring mainly to moral intuitions ; perhaps if he appealed only to
linguistic intuitions it would be all right. He reserves the name ‘intuition•
iBt’ for those (including no doubt Ross) who advocate a plurality of moral
principles, each established by intuition, and not related to one another in
an ordered structure, but only weighed relatively to each other (also by
intuition) when they conflict. The right name for this kind of intuitionism
would be’ pluralistic intuitionism ‘. Rawls’ theory is more systematic than
this, but no more firmly grounded. There can also be another, non-pluralistic
kind of intuitionist-one who intuits the validity of a single principle or
ordered system of them, or of a single method, and erects his entire structure
of moral thought on this. Sidgwick might come into this category-though
if he were living today, it is unlikely that he would find it necessary t.o rely
on moral intuition.

‘ Monistic intuitionism ‘ would be a good description of this kind of
view. It might apply to Rawls, did it not suggest falBely that he relies only
on one great big intuition, and only at one point in his argument. Un-
fortunately he relies on scores of them. From 18/9 to 20/9 I have counted
in two pages thirty expressions implying a reliance on intuitions : such
expressions as ‘ I assume that there is a broad measure of agreement that ‘ ;
‘ commonly shared presumptions ‘ ; ‘ acceptable principles ‘ ; ‘ it seems
reasonable to suppose ‘ ; ‘ is arrived at in a natural way ‘ ; ‘ match our
considered convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable way ‘ ;
‘ which we can affirm on reflection ‘ ; ‘ we are confident ‘ ; ‘ we think ‘ ; and
so on. If, as I have done, the reader will underline the places in the book
where crucial moves in the argument depend on such appeals, he may find
himself recalling Plato’s remark : ” If a man starts from something he
knows not, and the end and middle of his argument are tangled together
out of what he knows not, how can such a mere consensus ever turn into

RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE-I 147

knowledge 1 ” (Rep. 533 c). Since the theoretical structure is tailored at
every point to fit Rawls’ intuitions, it is hardly surprising that its normative
consequences fit them too-if they did not, he would alter the theory (19/26
ff., cf. 141/23) ; and the fact that Rawls is a fairly typical man of his times
and society, and will therefore have many adherents, does not make this a
good way of doing philosophy.

Rawls’ answer to this objection (581/9) is that any justification of
principles must proceed from some consensus. It is true that any justifi-
cation which consists of a “linear inference ” 5 must so proceed; but Rawls’
justification is not of this type. Why should it not end in conserums as a
result of argument 1 There may have to be a prior consensus on matters
of fact, including facts about the interests of the parties (though these
themselves may conflict) ; and on matters of logic, established by analysis.
But not on substantial moral questions, as Rawls seems to require. A re-
view is not the place for an exposition of my own views of how moral argu-
ment can succeed in reaching normative conclusions with only facts, singfflr
prescriptions and logic to go on; all that I wish to say here is that the matter
will never be clarified unless these ingredients are kept meticulously distinct,
and the logic carefully attended to (see further footnote 6).

(2) I shall mention only in passing Rawls’ views about the meanings of
the moral words or the natures, analyses and logical properties of the moral
concepts. It would be wrong to take up space on something which Rawls
evidently thinks of little importance for his argument. He wishes to “leave
questions of meaning and definition aside and to get on with the task of
developing a substantive theory of justice ” (579/17). There is in fact a
vast hole in his 600- page book which should be occupied by a thorough
account of the meanings of these words, which is the only thing that can
establish the logical rules that govern moral argument. If we do not have
such an account, we shall never be able to distinguish between what we
have to avoid saying if we are not to contradict ourselves or commit other
logical errors, and what we have to avoid saying if we are to agree with
Rawls and his coterie. 6 So far as he does say anything about the meanings
of the moral words, it is mostly derivative from recent descriptivist views,
my arguments against which it would be tedious to rehearse. I found this
reliance surprising, in view of the fact that what he says about justice, at
any rate, clearly commits him to some form of prescriptivism : the principles
of justice determine how we are to behave, not how we are to de.scribe certain
kinds of behaviour (61/7, 145/12, 14, 33, 149/16, 351/15). My quarrels with
Rawls’ main theory do not depend at all on the fact that I am a prescriptivist.

•See my F,.,WU,m and R=on, pp. 87 f.
•See the paper ” The Argument from Received Opinion ” in my Essays on PhUO-

sophical, Metlwd, which might have been written with Rawls’ book m mind, although
in fa.ct at that time I had not had the opportunity of reading it. For my latest shot
at the project of giving such an account, see the paper “Wrongness and Harm” in
my Essays on the Mo~al Concepts.

148 lt. M. HARE

There are significant passages in which Rawls compares moral philosophy
with mathematics (51/23) and linguistics (47/5, 49/8). The analogy with
these sciences is vitiated by the fact that they do not yield substantial
conclusions, aa moral philosophy is supposed, on Rawls’ view, to do, and
in some sense clearly should. It is quite all right to te.

The case of mathematics is more controversial. Rawls seems to imply
that if we had a ” moral system ” analogous to the systems of logic and
mathematics, then we could use such a system to elucidate the meanings
of moral judgments, instead of the other way about, as I have suggested.
There is no objection, so far as I can see, to such a claim in mathematics
and logic, provided that we realize that the concepts used in the formal
systems may be different from (perhaps more useful for certain purposes
than) our natural ones. Such a procedure is all right in logic and mathe-
matics, since the construction of artificial models can off.en illuminate the
logic and the meaning of our ordinary speech ; but whichever way the
illumination goes (why not both ways ?) it can work only if the system in
question is purely formal. If what Rawls calls “the substantive content of
the moral conceptions” (52/7) is part of the system, then what will be re-
vealed by it are not the meanings of moral judgments but the moral opinions
of those who adhere to the syst.em. And when he proposes (111/6) to replace
our concept of right by the concept of being in accordance with the principles
that would be acknowledged in the original position, he is in effect seeking
to foist on us not a new meaning for a word, but a substantial set of moral
views ; for he thinks that he has tailored the original position so as to yield
principles which fit his own considered judgments.

(3) Rawls’ moral methodology takes the form of a picture or parable-
and one which is even more difficult than most to interpret with any confi-
dence. We are to imagine a set of people gathered together (hypothetically,
not actually), to agree upon a set of” principles of justice” to govern their
conduct.’ The “principles of justice ” are those principles to which these

•It is tempting to say” their subsequent conduct”; but the tenses in Rawls’ aC

RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE-I 149

“people in the original position” (POPs) would agree for the conduct of
all of them a.i “people in ordinary life” (POLs}, if, when making the agree-
ment, they were subject t-0 certain conditions.

It is obviously these conditions which determine the substance of the
theory (indeed they are its substance, the rest being mere dramatization,
useful for expository purposes, but also potentially misleading). Rawls’
theory belongs to a class of theories which we may call ” hypothetical choice
theories “-i.e., theories which say that the right answer to some question
is the answer that a person or set of people would choose if subject to certain
conditions. The best-known example of such a theory is the” ideal observer”
theory of ethics, about which Rawls says something, and which we shall
find instructive to compare with his own. The important thing to notice
about all such theories is that wlwi, this hypothetical person would choose,
if it is determinate at all (which many such theories fail to make it) has to
be determined by the conditions to which he is subject. If the conditions,
once ma.de explicit, do not deductively determine the choice, then the choice
remains indeterminate, except in so far as it is covertly conditioned by the
prejudices or intuitions of the philosopher whose theory it is. Thus intuition
can enter at two points {and in Rawls’ case enters at both; cf. 121/7-15).
It enters in the choice of the conditions to which the chooser is to be sub-
ject ; and it enters to determine what he will choose in cases where the
conditions, as ma.de explicit, do not determine this {see Part II, forthcoming).

The more important of the conditions to which Rawls’ POPs are subje

(1) They know certain facts about the world and the society in which
POLs live, but have others concealed from them by a “veil of
ignorance “. It is obviously going to be crucial which facts they are
allowed to know, and which they are not.

(2) They are motivated in certain ways, especially in being selfish or
mutually disinterest.ed, and also in lacking envy and in being un-
willing to use the principle of insufficient reason. They are also
“rational” {i.e., take the most effective means to given ends (14/5) ).

(3) They are subject to “the formal constraints of the concept of

and ‘ initial situation ‘ (20/ 18), seem to indicate that this conclave is temporally prior
to the time at which these same people a.re to enter the world as we know it, become
“people in ordinary life” (POLs) and carry out their contract. But on the other hand
Rawls seems to speak commonly in the pr-esent tense (e.g., 520/27 ff.), as if they were
somehow simultaneously POPs and POLs. Not surprisingly thLS, and other obscurities,
make it often difficult, and sometimes (to me at any rate} impossible, to determine
whether some particular remark is intended to refer to POPs or POLs. “Who, for
example, are” they” in 206/5? And m 127/25, is it the POLs who a.re being said to
be mutually disinter-ested, as the passage seems to imply, and as is suggested by the
r-eforence to •• circumstances of justice” on 128/5 (which seems usually, though not
on 130/1-5, to mean circumstances of POLs, not POPs)? But if so, how are 129/14-18
or 148/2 ff. consistent [ Again, do POLs lack envy, or only POPs? (see 151/22-24,
143-4, §§ 80-81.) A review as long as Rawls’ book itself could be spent on such questions
of interpretation; I was intending to set a few more of these exercises for the reader,
but have not had time t;.o compile them.

150 R. M. HARE

right “. Rawls explicitly says that he does not “claim that these
conditions follow from the concept of right, much less from the
meaning of morality” (130/16). Instead, he as usual says that it
“seems reasonable” to impose them (130/14). He does not tell us
what he would say to somebody to whom they did not ” seem
reasonable “.

(4) There are also certain important procedural stipulations, such as
that the POPs should all agree unanimously in their choice of
principles. Later in the book, the procedure is very much elabor-
ated, and takes the form of a series of stages in which the ” veil of
ignorance” is progressively lifted; but I shall ignore this complica-
tion here.

In comparing Rawls’ theory with other theories, it is most important to
notice the roles played by these groups of conditions. If I may be allowed
to mention my own theory, I would myself place almost the whole emphasis
on (3), and would at the same time aim to establish the ” constraints” on
the basis of a Study of the logical properties of the moral words. This still
seems to me the most rigorous and secure procedure, because it enables us
to say that if this is how we are using the words (if this is what we mean by
them), then we shall be debarred from saying so-and-so on pain of self-
contradiction; and this gives moral arguments a cutting edge which in
Rawls they lack. In a similar way, Achille.a should have answered the
Tortoise by saying, ” If you mean by ‘if’ what we all mean, you have to
accept modus ponens ; for this is the rule that give.a its meaning to ‘ if’ “.
It is of course in dispute how much we can do by this method ; but I think,
and have tried elsewhere to show, that we can do much more than Rawls
allows.

The “ideal observer” theory (in a typical form) differs from Rawls’
theory in the following respects. Under (1), it allows the principle-chooser
to know everything ; there is no ” veil of ignorance “. On the other hand,
under (2), he is differently motivated; instead of being concerned with his
own interest only, he is impartially benevolent. Now it is possible to show
that on a certain simple and natural ” rational contractor ” theory of the
Rawls type (though not, it is fairly safe to say, on Rawls’ own version of
this type of theory) these two changes exactly cancel one another, so that
the normative consequences of the “ideal observer” and ” rational con-
tractor ” theories would be identical. To see this, let us remember that the
main object of these conditions is to secure impartiality. This is secured in
the case of the rational contractor theory by not allowing the POPs to
know what are to be their individual roles as POLs in the society in which
the contract has to be observed ; they therefore cannot choose the principles
to suit their own selfish interests, although they are selfishly motivated. It
is secured in the case of the ideal observer theory by express stipulation;

RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE-I 151

he is required to be impartially benevolent. It looks, therefore, as if these
versions of the two theories are, as I have said elsewhere,s practically
equivalent.

We must next ask how much the POPs have to be ignorant of, in order
to secure impartiality. It must be noticed that much of the work is already
done by the” formal constraint” that the principles have to be” general “. 9

Rawls himself says that the formal constraints rule out egoism (136/13) ; it
might therefore be asked what there is left for the ” veil of ignorance ” to
do, since to abandon egoism (and for the same formal reasons the pursuit of
the interests of any other particular person or set of them) is e.o ipso to
become impartial. I do not think that this objection sticks ; for a POP, if
he had full knowledge of his own role as a POL, might adopt principles which
were formally” general “or universal but were rigged to suit his own interest.
Rawls, however, thinks (wrongly10J that such rigged principles can be ruled
out on the formal ground of lack of ” generality “, and so is open to the
objection ad hominem. That is to say, he has left nothing for the veil of
ignorance to do as regards impartiality.

Be that as it may, however, we need to be clear how thick a veil of
ignorance is required to achieve impartiality. To be frugal : all that the
POPs need to be ignorant of are their roles as individuals in the world of
POLs. That is to say, it would be possible to secure impartiality while
allowing the POPs to know the entire history of the world-not only the
general conditions governing it, but the actual course of history, and indeed
the alternative courses of history which would be the result of different
actions by individuals in it, and in particular to know that there would be in
the world individuals a, b, … n who would be affected in specific ways by
these actions-provided that each of the POPs did not know which individual
he was (i.e., whether he was a or b, etc.). Impartiality would be secured
even by this very economical veil, because if a POP does not know whether
he is a orb, he has, however selfish, no motive for choosing his principles so
as to suit the interests of a rather than those of b when these interests are
in conflict.

A superficial reading of Rawls’ rather ambiguous language at 137/4,
12/12 and Hl8/20 might lead one to suppose that this “economical veil”
is what he has in mind. But this cannot be right, in view of 200/17 and other
passages. We need to ask, therefore, why Rawls is not content with it, if
it suffices to secure impartiality. The answer might just be that he is un-

‘” Rules of War and Moral Reasoning”, Philosophy and Public. Affairs l, 1971/2,
p. l66.

iRawls’ word ; I have commented on his Ulle, and given reaBollil for preferring the
word’ universal’, which Ju,, uses for something else, in my paper” Principles”, P.A.S.
73 (1972/3), p. 2.

‘”I have hinted why in “Principles” (op. cit.), p. 4. For my own answer to the
“rigging” difficulty, see my Freedom and Reason, p. 107.

152 R. M. HARE

clear as between two things: (1) the POPs’ not knowing which of them is
going to be a and which b ; (2) their knowing this, but not knowing how a
and b are going to fare. Much of his language could bear either interpretation.
And 141/25 seems to imply that Rawls thinks that the “economical veil”
would allow the POPs to use threats against each other based on the power
which as individual POLs they would have; but this is obviously not so if
they do not know whi,ch individuals they are going to be, however many
particular facts about individuals they may know.

Nevertheless, sooner than accuse Rawls of a mere muddle, let us look
for other explanations. One is, that he wants, not merely to secure impar-
tiality, but to avoid an interpretation which would have normative conse-
quences which he is committed to abjuring. With the ” economical veil “,
the rational contract.or theory is practically equivalent in its normative
consequences to the ideal observer theory and to my own theory (see above
and below), and these normative consequences are of a utilitarian sort.
Therefore Rawls may have reasoned that, since an “economical veil”
would make him into a utilitarian, he had better buy a more expensive one.
We can, indeed, easily sympathize with the predicament of one who, having
been working f0r the best part of his career on the construction of ” a viable
alternative to the utilitarian tradition ” (150/12), discovered that the type
of theory he had embraced, in its simplest and most natural form, led
direct t.o a kind of utilitarianism. It must in fairness be said, however, that
Rawls does not regard this motive as disreputable ; for he is not against
tailoring his theory to suit the conclusions he wants to reach (see above,
and 141/23, where he says, “We want to define the original position so
that we get the desired solution”). I shall be examining in the second part
of this review the question of whether Rawls’ thicker veil does help him t.o
avoid utilitarianism ; it is fairly clear from §28 that he thinb it does.

A further motive for the thicker veil is a desire for simplicity both in
the reasoning and in the principles resulting from it (140/31 ; 142/8 ; but
cf. 141/22). By letting the POPs know only the general facts about the world
in which the POLs live, and also by other devices (e.g., 95/14, 96/6, 98/28),
Rawls effectively prevents them from going into much detail about the
facts. This means that his principles can and must be simple ; but at the
same time it raises the question of whether they can be adequate to the
complexities of the actual world. Rawls is, in fact, faced with a dilemma.
If he sticks to the ” economical veil “, then there will be no difficulty of
principle in doing justice even in highly specific and unusual cases in the
a,::tual world; but this will involve very complex calculations, in advance,
on the part of his POPs. On the other hand, if, in order to avoid these com-
plex calculations, he limits the POPs’ knowledge to “general ” facts about
the world, he is in danger of having his POPs choose principles which may,
in particular cases, result in flagrant injustice, because the facts of these
cases are peculiar.

RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE-I 153

This is merely the analogue, in Rawls’ system, of the dilemma which
afflicts utilitarians, and which I have tried to solve in two articles already
referred to.11 The solution lies in distinguishing between two levels of moral
thinking, in one of which (for use ” in a cool hour “) we are allowed to go
into all the details, and in the other of which (for normal use under con-
ditions of ignorance of the future, stress and temptation, and in moral
education and self-education) we stick to firm and simple principles which
are most likely in general to lead to right action-they are not, however,
to be confused with “rules of thumb”, a term whose undiscriminating use
has misled many. The first kind of thinking (let us call it “level-2 “) is
used in order to select the principles to be adhered to in the second kind
(” level-I “), choosing those principles which are best for situations likely
to be actually encountered. If this kind of solution were applied to Rawls’
system, he would allow his POPs to know everything but their individual
roles as POLs (the “economical veil “) ; but since their task would be to
choose the best level-1 principles for the thinking of POLs, they could still,
since these principles have to be simple and observed only in general, attend
only to the general facts about the POL society and the general run of
cases. The contract would then not be a contra-Ot to act universally in
certain ways, but rather a contract to employ certain firm principles in the
moral education of POLs themselves and their children, and to uphold such
principles as the norm in their society. For unusual cases, and for those in
which the principles conflicted, the POLs would be allowed (in Aristotelian
fashion} 12 to do a bit of POP-thinking for themselves.

Rawls does not adopt this solution, although he shows some awareness
of the distinction between level-I and level-2 thinking on 28/Hl. Ross’s
different but related distinction between ” prim.a faci.l!. duties ” and ” duties
all things considered” is referred to and indeed used on 340/15. On the
whole Rawls’ principles are treated as unbreakable ones for universal obser-
vance (e.g., 115/36) ; but they are supposed to have the simplicity which in
fact only level-I principles can, or need, have (132/17). Other passages
which might be relevant to this question are 157 /32, 159/16 ff., 161/l 7, 304/13,
337/11, 340/28, 341/14, 454/6; but I have been unable to divine exactly
what Rawls’ view is.

He has tried to get over the difficulty of conflicts between principles
and unusual cases in two ways. The first is by means of a rigid ” lexical ”
ordering of his principles (which could be guaranteed in unusual cases to
yield absurd results); the second is by his” four-stage sequence” (195 ff.),
whereby the “veil of ignorance” is progressively lifted, and at each “lift”
the knowledge of extra facts is absorbed and the principles expanded to
deal with them. The sequence ends with the complete disappearance of
the veil. Since Rawls can say this, he cannot have any objection on grounds

U” Prinmples” (op. cit.), pp. 7 ff.; Philosophy and Public Ajfafrs 1 (1971/2), p. 166.
“Eth. Nk. ll37 b 24 ff. (cf. Rawls 19/9, 138/20).

154 R. M. lIARE

of practicability to unrestricted knowle.dge from the start, and his reasons
for forbidding it must be theoretical ones.

The four-stage sequence would only work if at each later stage the
principles inherited from the stage before determined, in the light of the
new information, what further principles were to be adopted. At least this
is so, if the method is required to be rigorous; Rawls can perhaps escape
this requirement by using intuitions all down the line. But if the principles
chosen in the original position do determine, in conjunction with each new
batch of facts, all the additional principles that are to be adopted at each
stage, then the moral law is likely to turn out to be an ass. Some victim
of the application of one of these lower-order principles may be found com-
plaining that if the POPs had only known about him and his situation,
likes and dislikes, then they would have complicated their principles a little
to allow them to do justice to him (perhaps he does not give a fig for the
“priority of liberty” ; or perhaps his preferences do not coincide with the
POPs’ ranking of the “primary goods”). If it were rigidly applied, Rawls’
system would be like a constitution having a legislature in which reading
of the newspapers was forbidden, and law-courts without any judicial dis-
cretion. But of course he does not apply it rigidly.

I will conclude this part of the review by showing why the ideal observer
theory, the rational contractor theory and my own theory must, on certain
interpretations of each of them, yield the same results. As pointed out
above, the ” economical veil ” version of the rational contractor theory
secures impartiality between the individuals in society. The ideal observer
theory includes impartiality as an express stipulation. My own theory
secures impartiality by a combination of the requirement that moral judg-
ments be universalizable and the requirement to prescribe for hypothetical
reversed-role situations as if they were actual (I am not sure whether the
second is an independent condition or not). So, as regards impartiality,
the theories are on all fours. Next, some degree of benevolence is required
by all three theories; the ideal observer is expressly required to be impartially
benevolent ; my universal prescriber, since he has to treat everybody as one
and nobody as more than one, and since one of the persons included in
“everybody” is himself, to whom he is benevolent, has to be positively and
equally benevolent to everybody; the rational contractor, although he is
selfish, does not know which individual POL it is whose interests he should
favour (since he does not know which is himself) and so his selfish or partial
benevolence has the same results as impartial benevolence. For the same
kind of reason the ideal observer and the universal prescriber, though they
have additional knowledge (viz., knowledge of their own individual roles, if
any, in the situations for which they are prescribing) are prevented by the
previous requirements from using it for selfish ends.

Rawls himself says that the ideal observer theory leads to utilitarianism

RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE~I 155

(185/24) ; and~at least if it takes a certain form, if it involves what Rawls
calls ‘ sympathetic identification ‘ with all affected parties~this seems plaus-
ible. In stating this form of the theory, he echoes some phrases of my own,13
and later treats my theory and the ideal observer theory as equivalent.14
So, then, the rational contractor theory, in the version I have been discussing
(which is not Rawls’) should also lead to utilitarianism. Rawls is aware of
this possibility (121/33). He even seems to imply on 149/3 that kis own
theory is practically equivalent to the ideal observer theory; but this is not
his usual view. I shall leave to the second part of this review the difficult
task of deciding whether Rawls, by the departures he makes from this
simple version of the rational contractor theory, succeeds in establishing a
non-utilitarian conclusion.

Of the three theories that I have just shown t.o be practically equivalent,
it is largely a matter of taste which one adopts. Philosophers will differ in
the use they like to make of dramatizations of their theories, and in the
particular scenarios chosen. Such dramatizations do not help the argument,
though they may help to expound it; Rawls himself seems to agree (138/31).
For myself, I think such devices useful (though they can also mislead), and
I had much greater hopes of Rawls’ enterprise than have in fact been realized.
For, knowing that the simplest and most natural version of the rational
contractor theory was practically equivalent to my own position, I was
optimistic enough to hope that Rawls’ elaborate exploration of the normative
consequences of such a theory might illuminate those of my own, and thus
enable me (in the most favourable outcome) simply to plug in t.o his results.
Such good luck, however, seldom befalls philosophers; and in fact Rawls’
constant appeal t.o intuition inst.ead of argument, and his tailoring of his
theory to suit his anti-utilitarian preconceptions, have deprived it of the
value which it could have had as a tracing of the normative consequences
of views about the logic of the moral concepts.

It is interesting that in his peroration (587) Rawls as good as drops into
an ideal-observer way of speaking. I myself should be happy to use any of
these images (including C. I. Lewis’s ” all lives serialim” picture15). But the
work needs t.o be done on the logic of the argument, which has to be shown
to be valid by the procedures of philosophical logic, involving the analysis
of concepts, natural, or if need be artificial. Without this, a ” theory of
justice ” is nothing but a suggestive picture.

Corpus Christi ColU!.ge, Oxford

13186/30, 34 ; Freedom and R~ason, p. 123.
USee Freed-Om and Reason, p. 94 n.
“AnaJysis of Ktwwledge and Valuation, p. 547; Rawls 189/12; cf. my Freedom and

Reason, p. 199, where through ignorance I failed to acknowledge Lewi.s’s UJle of this
picture.

© R. M. HARE, l973