In this scenario, hackers launch cyber attacks that affect several parts of the nation’s financial infrastructure over the course of several weeks. Specifically, sensitive credit card processing facilities are hacked and numbers are released to the Internet, causing 120 million cards to be cancelled; automated teller machines (ATMs) fail nearly simultaneously across the nation; major companies report payroll checks are not being received by workers; and several large pension and mutual fund companies have computer malfunctions so severe that they are unable to operate for more than a week. Identify the countermeasures that need to be implemented to prevent these cyber attacks from occurring in the future.
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Start a discussion thread and discuss what type(s) of countermeasures need to be implemented to prevent the cyber attack described above from occurring in the future. Be specific in recommending countermeasures for this scenario.
You must do this following:
1) Create a new thread. As indicated above, discuss what type(s) of countermeasures need to be implemented to prevent the cyber attack described above from occurring in the future. Be specific in recommending countermeasures for this scenario.
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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc.
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Chapter
7
Discretion
Cyber Attacks
Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.
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• Proprietary information will be exposed if discovered
by hackers
• National infrastructure protection initiatives most
prevent leaks
– Best approach: Avoid vulnerabilities in the first place
– More practically: Include a customized program focused
mainly on the most critical information
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Introduction
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• A trusted computing base (TCB) is the totality of
hardware, software, processes, and individuals
considered essential to system security
• A national infrastructure security protection program
will include
– Mandatory controls
– Discretionary policy
• A smaller, less complext TCB is easier to protect
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Trusted Computing Base
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Fig. 7.1 – Size comparison issues in a
trusted computing base
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• Managing discretion is critical; questions about the
following should be asked when information is being
considered for
disclosure
– Assistance
– Fixes
– Limits
– Legality
– Damage
– Need
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Trusted Computing Base
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• Security through obscurity is often maligned and
misunderstood by security experts
– Long-term hiding of vulnerabilities
– Long-term suppression of information
• Security through obscurity is not recommended for
long-term protection, but it is an excellent
complementary control
– E.g., there’s no need to publish a system’s architecture
– E.g., revealing a flaw before it’s fixed can lead to rushed
work and an unnecessary complication of the situation
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Security Through Obscurity
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Fig. 7.2 – Knowledge lifecycle for
security through obscurity
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Fig. 7.3 – Vulnerability disclosure
lifecycle
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• Information sharing may be inadvertent, secretive, or
willful
• Government most aggressive promoting information
sharing
• Government requests information from industry for
the following reasons
– Government assistance to industry
– Government situational awareness
– Politics
• Government and industry have conflicting
motivations
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Information Sharing
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Fig. 7.4 – Inverse value of information
sharing for government and industry
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• Adversaries regularly scout ahead and plan before an
attack
• Reconnaissance planning levels
– Level #1: Broad, wide-reaching collection from a variety of
sources
– Level #2: Targeted collection, often involving automation
– Level #3: Directly accessing the target
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Information Reconnaissance
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Fig. 7.5 – Three stages of
reconnaissance for cyber security
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• At each stage of reconnaissance, security engineers
can introduce information obscurity
• The specific types of information that should be
obscured are
– Attributes
– Protections
– Vulnerabilities
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Information Reconnaissance
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• Layering methods of obscurity and discretion adds
depth to defensive security program
• Even with layered obscurity, asset information can
find a way out
– Public speaking
– Approved external site
– Search for leakage
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Obscurity Layers
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Fig. 7.6 – Obscurity layers to protect
asset information
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• Governments have been successful at protecting
information by compartmentalizing information and
individuals
– Information is classified
– Groups of individuals are granted clearance
• Compartmentalization defines boundaries, which
helps guides decisions
• Private companies can benefit from this model
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Organizational Compartments
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Fig. 7.7 – Using clearances and
classifications to control information
disclosure
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Fig. 7.8 – Example commercial mapping
of clearances and classifications
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• To implement a national discretion program will
require
– TCB definition
– Reduced emphasis on information sharing
– Coexistence with hacking community
– Obscurity layered model
– Commercial information protection models
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National Discretion Program
