Review the entire document at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/227346 and closely read the Major Conclusions and Recommendations beginning on Page 15 through the end of the document at Page 21.
After reviewing the information found beneath each of the following sub-headings: Defining an Organizational Strategy, Building Organizational Abilities, Preventing Terrorist Incidents, Preparing for a Critical Incident, and Responding to a Critical Incident,
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(1) identify a minimum of three “bullets” (restate the sub-heading and restate the complete bullet narrative in your response) under each of the sub-headings that you would consider to be the most critical, and
(2) individually explain your specific “operational” reasoning for each of your bullet selections.
Research for P r a c t i c e
Learning From 9/1
1
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of JusticeO
C
T
.
0
9
Organizational Change in the New York City
and Arlington County, Va., Police Departments
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
8
10
Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
Eric H. Holder, Jr.
Attorney General
Laurie O. Robinson
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Kristina Rose
Acting Director, National Institute of Justice
This and other publications and products
of the National Institute of Justice can be
found at:
National Institute of Justice
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
Office of Justice Programs
Innovation • Partnerships • Safer Neighborhoods
www.ojp.usdoj.gov
Oct. 0
9
This Research for
Practice summarizes
a more detailed study
prepared by
Gwen Holden,
Gerard Murphy,
Corina Solé Brito and
Joshua Ederheimer
of the Police
Executive Research
Forum.
Learning From 9/11: Organizational Change in
the New York City and Arlington County, Va.,
Police Departments
Gwen Holden, Gerard Murphy, Corina Solé Brito
and Joshua Ederheimer
The opinions and conclusions expressed in this document are solely those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of
Justice or the National Institute of Justice.
This research was supported by grant number 2002-IJ-CX-001
3
from the
National Institute of Justice to the Police Executive Research Forum.
NCJ 22734
6
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
ABOUT THIS REPORT
On Sept. 11, 2001, local first
responders in two jurisdic
tions — New York City and
Arlington County, Va. — were
forced to deal with attacks
on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon that were
unprecedented in scope and
loss of life. Following 9/11,
the National Institute of Jus
tice awarded a grant to the
Police Executive Research
Forum (PERF) to conduct
case studies of the two law
enforcement agencies most
directly involved to learn
what they could teach about
best practices for responding
to future incidents.
What did the
researchers find?
■ Proactive intelligence gath
ering within the community
about terrorist threats and
sharing that information
within and among agen
cies are key to preventing
and responding to terrorist
attacks.
■ Counterterrorism policing is
the same as crime policing.
■ The first priority in respond
ing to a terrorist attack is to
save lives, including those
of first responders. Setting
up a secure perimeter and
avoiding over-responding to
an initial attack can prevent
loss of life in a second,
more devastating attack.
■ Both the New York City
Police Department and the
Arlington County Police
Department have greatly
expanded counterterror
ism training at all levels and
have integrated that training
into traditional police train
ing exercises.
■ Setting up a media rela
tions plan is essential to
get accurate information
out to both family mem
bers of victims and the
general public, to control
rumors and prevent the
spread of misinformation,
and to ensure that the
presence of media does
not interfere with evacua
tion and rescue efforts and
traffic control.
Who should read
this study?
Chiefs and managers of law
enforcement and other first-
responder agencies.
iiii
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
Gwen Holden, Gerard Murphy, Corina Solé Brito
and Joshua Ederheimer
Learning From 9/11: Organizational
Change in the New York City
and Arlington County, Va.,
Police Departments
About the Authors
Gwen Holden,
Gerard Murphy,
Corina Solé Brito and
Joshua Ederheimer are
with the Police Executive
Research Forum.
The attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Penta
gon on Sept. 11, 2001, were
among the most dramatic
events ever to have occurred
on U.S. soil. They were un
precedented attacks by ter
rorists against icons of Ameri
can commercial and military
power. Although federal and
state agencies have become
involved in handling such inci
dents, the main responsibility
for dealing with them falls to
local law enforcement. The
third report of the Advisory
Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for
Terrorism, issued three
months after the Sept.
11
incidents, makes this point
clearly: “All terrorist incidents
are local or at least will start
that way. Effective response
and recovery can only be
achieved with the recognition
that local responders are the
first line of defense.”1
Little exists in the way of
“best practices” to help
agencies prepare for and
manage an incident of this
importance. To help develop
such best practices, the
National Institute of Justice
(NIJ) awarded a grant to the
Police Executive Research
Forum (PERF) to conduct
case studies of the two law
enforcement agencies most
directly involved on Sept. 11
— the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) and
the Arlington County, Va.,
Police Department. PERF
staff interviewed agency
representatives and reviewed
internal documents to cre
ate the recommendations
presented here. This report
summarizes a more detailed
study prepared by PERF. The
police departments involved
may have made additional
changes since the original
fieldwork that is not reflected
in this report. This project is
not a side-by-side comparison
of the two agencies. Making
such a comparison would be
a disservice to both. First, the
agencies responded to two
different incidents in terms of
1
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
loss of life and property dam
age. Second, the two agen
cies and the jurisdictions they
serve, although similar in
some regards, are different in
many ways. Exhibit 1 shows
some of the key differences
between the jurisdictions.
New York City Police
Department Case Study
Unlike most major American
cities, New York City had
experience with terrorist inci
dents long before the attacks
of Sept. 11, 2001. On Feb.
26, 1993, a truck bomb ex
ploded in the parking garage
beneath the World Trade
Center, leaving six dead and
more than 1,000 injured. In
June 1993, the FBI arrested
eight people for plotting to
bomb the Lincoln and Holland
tunnels, major bridges, and
the United Nations headquar
ters building.
On Sept. 11, 2001, the New
York City Police Department
had about 36,000 sworn
officers and 14,000 civilian
employees, making it the
largest law enforcement
agency in the world. A total
of 2,749 people died in the
World Trade Center attacks
on Sept. 11, the largest loss
of life from a hostile attack
on U.S. soil in the nation’s
history. The New York City
Fire Department suffered
343 fatalities — the largest
loss of life of any emergency
Exhibit 1. New York City and Arlington County, Va., 2000
Arlington County New York City
total population 189,453 8,008,27
8
total housing units 90,246 3,200,91
2
total sworn officers 483 36,000
officers per 1,000 residents 2.
5
4.5
number of patrol areas
4
districts 76 precincts
sources: “Population, housing Units, area, and Density: 2000,” U.s. census Bureau website,
www.census.gov; Reaves, Brian a., and hickman, matthew J., Law Enforcement Management
and Administrative Statistics, 2000: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100
or More Officers, Washington, D.c.: U.s. Department of Justice, office of Justice Programs,
Bureau of Justice statistics, march 2004, available online at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
lemas00 ; arlington, Va., Police Department website, main Page, www.arlingtonva.us/
Departments/Police/Policemain.aspx.
2
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
response agency in history.
The Port Authority Police
Department, a specialized
law enforcement agency of
1,600 employees, suffered
3
7
fatalities — the largest
loss of life of any police
force in history. The NYPD
suffered
23
fatalities — the
second largest loss of life of
any police force in history.
All told, 72 law enforcement
officers perished on Sept. 11,
2001.2
The ever-present specter of
a future terrorist attack has
provided the backdrop for,
and given a sense of urgency
to, shaping the NYPD’s coun
terterrorism strategy. That
has been no easy job, nor is
combating terrorism likely
to decrease in importance
within the department in the
future. “It has taken constant
attention. It’s extremely dif
ficult,” Police Commissioner
Raymond W. Kelly says.
“But make no mistake: It’s
something we have to do
ourselves.”3
Introducing a new mind-
set on counterterrorism
readiness: Organizational
changes within the NYPD
Within one month of taking
office in January 2002, Com
missioner Kelly revamped the
NYPD’s Intelligence Division
(ID) and created a new coun
terterrorism presence within
the department.
The Counter Terrorism
Bureau. The NYPD’s Coun
ter Terrorism Bureau (CTB)
is managed by the Deputy
Commissioner of Counter
Terrorism. The CTB, with
205 officers, works with the
FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task
Forces. The CTB analyzes
the worldwide terrorist threat
for NYPD executives, runs
counterterrorism training ex
ercises for NYPD personnel,
does research, and develops
plans for protecting key sites
within New York City.
The Intelligence Division.
According to one Intelligence
Division official, the division
today is “very different than
what it was before” 9/11.
Before 9/11, primary respon
sibilities of the division were
protecting dignitaries and de
veloping criminal intelligence.
Today, one division official
stated, the ID is “proac
tively” engaged in efforts to
detect and prevent terrorism.
Division personnel are devot
ing 95 percent of their work
to examining possible links
to terrorism before an event
occurs.
Developing intelligence and
investigative leads. With the
FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task
“It has taken
constant
attention. It’s
extremely
difficult,”
Police
Commissioner
Raymond W.
Kelly says.
“But make no
mistake: It’s
something
we have to
do ourselves.”
3
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
Rumor
control is better
served by
sharing facts as
they become
available rather
than allowing
incorrect and
misleading
reports to fill
an information
vacuum.
Forces, personnel from the
NYPD’s Intelligence Divi
sion and Counter Terrorism
Bureau and the department’s
counterterrorism hotline
are key parts of intelligence
gathering. Field intelligence
officers are assigned to the
NYPD’s 76 precincts as well
as commands at the bor
ough, housing, transit and
school levels.4 Through Op
eration Nexus, the NYPD ac
tively encourages businesses
to notice anything unusual or
suspicious and to report such
instances to authorities.5
Controlling rumors and
misinformation. The depart
ment has also revamped how
it communicates with the
news media and the public.
Officials of the NYPD’s Public
Information Division say that
their experience on 9/11 un
derscored the importance of
getting the facts to the media
as they emerge during a criti
cal incident. Rumor control is
better served by sharing facts
as they become available
rather than allowing incorrect
and misleading reports to fill
an information vacuum.
The Public Information
Division’s media contact
list reflects efforts to reach
large and small media outlets
the public is most likely to
turn to for information in an
emergency. The division has
expanded its contact list to
200 media outlets.
Since 9/11, the Public In
formation Division also has
been holding training exer
cises to perfect its ability to
set up a media staging area
during a critical incident. One
division official explained that
media staging is critical dur
ing an emergency because
reporters at a critical incident
site can interfere with first
responders’ evacuation and
rescue efforts and traffic
control.
Training officers in
counterterrorism tactics
The work of the NYPD’s
Training Bureau today
reflects a philosophy of
training all NYPD officials
in anti-terrorism tactics and
procedures. Prevention, say
Training Bureau officials, is
all about broadening officers’
perspective on terrorism and
encouraging them to “think
abstractly and globally” about
counterterrorism measures.
Achieving these objectives,
these officials continued, be
gins with increasing officers’
awareness of the threat of
terrorism. The NYPD’s recruit
training curriculum includes
a new section on terrorism
prevention.
4
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
Response-related training
focuses on saving lives,
including those of first
responders. According to
a Training Bureau official,
NYPD officers are now
taught that setting up a
strong, secure and safe inner
perimeter is the first order
of business at the site of a
critical incident. Officers also
are taught that an incident
may be only the first in what
terrorists have planned as a
series of attacks. Thus, first
responders are cautioned not
to rush into the target site,
where they could be injured
or killed in a later attack. Nor
should they “over respond”
to an early incident that may
be intended by terrorists to
divert responders’ attention
away from a second, more
devastating attack.
Counterterrorism
operations in the field
and on patrol
The Special Operations
Division. The Special Op
erations Division (SOD) is an
important part of the NYPD’s
efforts to prevent a future
terrorist attack. A unit of
the NYPD’s Patrol Services
Bureau, the SOD has more
than 400 sworn and civilian
personnel. Its primary role is
to protect potential terrorist
targets in the city. That role,
one division official explained,
is carried out in close collabo
ration with the Intelligence
Division. Everything the SOD
does, this official continued,
is “funneled through” the
ID. “We get a list of hard and
soft targets” from the ID,
this official noted, and the
department uses directed
patrols to protect these sites
under Operation Hercules,
which has been operational
since before Sept. 11, 2001.
Strategically, the Hercules
teams’ objective is to dis
rupt terrorists’ surveillance
of New York City landmarks
or other potential targets by
“providing the appearance of
a randomized, heavily armed
police presence,” one official
explained. At each site, “we
‘show the flag,’ deploy, and
look for anything suspicious.”
The SOD works closely
with the U.S. Coast Guard
in observing and surveying
potential targets such as
bridges, tunnels, air vents that
open onto water sites, and
marinas. The SOD worked
with the city’s Department of
Health to train SOD personnel
in the use of air-monitoring
“meters” to detect possible
radioactive material. The
Department of Health runs
the city’s Biowatch. It alerts
the SOD about calls reporting
the presence of a suspected
biological substance, such as
Response-
related training
focuses on
saving lives,
including
those of first
responders.
5
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
a white powder suspected to
be anthrax.
The Operations Division. The
NYPD’s Operations Division
(OD) is the communications
link between the executive
command and the police
officer on the street. The
OD coordinates all personnel
details for the department,
including those placed with
special events and emer
gency incidents. According to
one OD official, the division
“acts as the information
hub of the NYPD” during
an emergency, running the
NYPD’s Emergency Opera
tions Center (EOC), which, in
turn, communicates infor
mation to command staff
and watch commanders.
According to an OD official,
the division’s telephone com
munications system includes
digital, cellular, satellite and
analog capabilities. The EOC
also manages and promotes
interagency cooperation
during a critical incident. The
EOC’s responsibilities during
a critical incident include:
■ Providing 24-hour-a-day
monitoring of any major
incident in the city, from
building collapses to major
crimes.
■ Tracking all officer-related
information arising from
or occurring during an
incident, including line-of
duty injuries, resignations
and suspensions as well
as misconduct by any city
employee.
■ Coordinating all personnel
placement planning for
scheduled events.
■ Coordinating all requests
for more police personnel
during scheduled and un
scheduled events, assess
ing whether requests are
necessary and reasonable,
and making the final deter
mination of how many of
ficers to place in response
to a request.
■ Coordinating moving on-
duty personnel assigned
to the eight borough task
forces.
The Disorder Control Unit.
The department created the
Disorder Control Unit (DCU)
in 1992 in the aftermath of
three days of rioting in the
Crown Heights neighborhood
of Brooklyn in August 1991.
The unit is charged with
“the mission of preventing
and suppressing civil disor
der” within New York City,
whether planned or sponta
neous. The DCU works closely
with the patrol boroughs, in
cluding conducting drills, table
top and no-notice exercises to
ensure readiness. It identifies
6
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
sites within NYPD precincts
that could be targets for civil
disorder or a terrorist attack,
and develops response plans.
The Community Affairs Unit.
The NYPD’s Community
Affairs Unit is charged with
reassuring the public in an
emergency and setting up a
mass casualty and missing
persons center at the inci
dent site. For unit officials,
9/11 was a learning experi
ence. They had to set up and
manage a mass casualty cen
ter quickly. There had been
no planning for such a center
before the Sept. 11 attack,
one unit official explained.
The Performance Analysis
Section. Since 9/11, the
Performance Analysis Sec
tion of the NYPD Personnel
Bureau’s Employee Manage
ment Division has assigned a
priority to improving its ability
to reach out to and provide
psychological counseling
services for NYPD person
nel during emergencies. A
critical part of this mission
has centered on overcoming
long-standing fears among
police agency personnel that
admitting to and seeking help
for emotional or psychologi
cal problems will have nega
tive effects for their careers.
Major conclusions
and lessons
Defining the organizational
philosophy
Incorporate a counterterror
ism philosophy throughout
the department. Police Com
missioner Raymond W. Kelly
described the department’s
post-9/11 philosophy as
“thinking about the unthink
able — what a few years ago
was the unthinkable.”6
Create a counterterrorism
role within the depart
ment. Commissioner Kelly
revamped the NYPD’s Intel
ligence Division and created
the new Counter Terrorism
Bureau.
Recognize that counter
terrorism policing is the
same as crime policing. The
department’s emphasis on
counterterrorism is premised
on the belief that terrorism
policing is the same as crime
policing. Moreover, because
terrorist groups commit tradi
tional crimes to finance their
work, good police work will
uncover terrorist groups and
their plans.
Police
Commissioner
Raymond W.
Kelly described
the department’s
post-9/11
philosophy as
“thinking about
the unthinkable
— what a
few years ago
was the
unthinkable.”
7
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
Appoint specific people to
drive the counterterrorism
philosophy. Commissioner
Kelly created the position of
counterterrorism inspector,
assigning an inspector to
each NYPD patrol borough
and major command. The in
spectors work for the deputy
commissioner for counterter
rorism and serve as the point
people on terrorism issues
for the borough chiefs and
precinct commanders.7
Educate the community.
Consistent with its internal
changes, the department has
set up a public awareness
campaign to increase the
community’s understanding
about terrorism, including its
role in noting potential terror
ist activity and reporting it to
the police.
Building organizational
capabilities
Provide up-to-date counter
terrorism information to of
ficers. The Counter Terrorism
Bureau prepares daily terror
ism “briefing packages” that
are tailored to various audi
ences within the department.
Get intelligence informa
tion to the patrol officer and
provide the patrol officer
with access to the intelli
gence information collector.
Patrol officers are in the best
position to identify suspicious
events within their assigned
areas.
Train new officers in coun
terterrorism tactics. Counter
terrorism training begins
at the recruit level. An in
novative part of that training
includes providing recruits
with a daily one- to two-page
summary that highlights
reports of terrorism-related
activity around the world.
Train the patrol force. A
new roll-call training program
is introduced every month.
Instructors spend
20
minutes
per roll-call training session
discussing such topics as
counterintelligence and infor
mation gathering.
Conduct counterterrorism
training in large groups.
NYPD training for all person
nel occurs in large groups
and includes first respond
ers from other city emer
gency response agencies and
neighboring law enforcement
agencies.
Train police managers to
lead and make good de
cisions. NYPD police ex
ecutives receive training in
standing up a command post
and mobilizing to mount an
incident response.
8
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
Preventing terrorist
incidents
Regularly assess the vulner
ability of your community’s
assets. The Counter Terrorism
Bureau conducts extensive
assessments of vulnerable
sites within the city.
Keep a proactive intelligence
role. Gathering intelligence
involves fostering a sense
of confidence in the depart
ment so the public is willing
to provide information, and
developing good confidential
informants.
Engage in strategic terrorist
threat assessment. Keep a
detailed awareness of groups
or individuals worldwide who
may be interested in target
ing the United States or your
community.
Reach out to local and
regional businesses (includ
ing businesses outside your
agency’s jurisdiction) as
intelligence sources. The
NYPD’s Nexus Program was
created as a bridge between
the department and busi
nesses within a 150-mile radi
us of the city that potentially
could be exploited by groups
or individuals in support of
terrorist activities.
Randomized presence can
be an effective deterrent.
The department’s high-
visibility Hercules Teams are
used to interrupt surveillance
of potential targets by any
terrorist cells working in the
city.
Collaborate with organiza
tions to leverage expertise.
The Special Operations Divi
sion works closely with the
U.S. Coast Guard in observ
ing and surveying potential
targets such as bridges, tun
nels, marinas, and air vents
that open onto water sites.
The SOD has also developed
a partnership with the city’s
Department of Health to train
SOD personnel in the use of
air-monitoring “meters” to
detect possible radioactive
material and to respond to
calls reporting the presence
of other potential radiological
and biological threats, such
as white powders that could
be anthrax.
Preparing for a
critical incident
Before an incident, appoint
a lead agency to avoid
conflict. Since 9/11, the
city has rewritten its emer
gency operations plan, which
identifies the authorities and
responsibilities of emergency
services agencies during criti
cal incidents.
9
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
Plan responses based on
geographical areas and
responsibility. The NYPD
keeps and annually updates
disorder control plans that
contain information about
critical and sensitive locations
within each precinct.
Prepare for outside agencies
to respond and help. The
NYPD has mutual aid agree
ments with law enforcement
agencies to provide help dur
ing critical incidents.
Ensure that all personnel
know their responsibilities.
Specialized response units
know their responsibilities
and train for them regularly.
Plan for the response of off-
duty officers. Procedures for
recalling off-duty officers are
critical during an emergency.
Control rumors and misin
formation. Public Information
Division officials say that
quelling the spread of rumors
is a priority during a critical
incident.
Meet the needs of the public
and victims. Police agen
cies, with other emergency
response agencies, must
develop plans for setting up
mass casualty centers. These
centers are the primary point
of contact for individuals
who are desperately seek
ing information about the
whereabouts and condition
of family members or friends.
“Line management” is a
critical part of establishing
order. Crowds can become
volatile, and keeping people
as comfortable as possible
and informed of the process
is essential. Food and water
must be available to people
waiting in line.
Improve mental health
outreach and services.
Employee assistance re
sources must be visible and
readily accessible to agency
personnel.
Arlington County
Police Department
Case Study
Arlington County, Va., is an
urban county of slightly less
than 26 square miles, making
it the smallest county in area
in the United States. Located
directly across the Potomac
River from Washington, D.C.,
the county has no incorpo
rated cities or towns. The
county had a residential pop
ulation of 189,453 in 2000,
according to the Census Bu
reau. The daytime population
is much larger on workdays;
the county has more than
196,000 jobs. The Pentagon
10
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
alone has a workforce of
more than 23,000 military
and civilian personnel. In ad
dition, about 25,000 people
visit Arlington’s tourist attrac
tions each day, including the
Arlington National Cemetery,
the Iwo Jima Memorial, and
the Pentagon. Ronald Reagan
National Airport has an aver
age of 50,000 passengers
daily.8
The Arlington County Police
Department (ACPD) provides
law enforcement services
to Arlington County’s resi
dential and business com
munities. On the day of the
attack, the department had
an approved strength of 362
full-time sworn officers and
85 civilian staff. However,
the department’s sworn
strength was closer to 320.
Moreover, on Sept. 11, 2001,
a significant number of the
command staff were out of
town at various conferences
and a staff retreat. The ACPD
provides 24-hour protection,
using three shifts to patrol 10
police beats within four dis
tricts that follow the natural
boundaries within Arlington
County.
The Arlington County Fire De
partment, the ACPD, and the
Pentagon’s Defense Protec
tive Service all act under an
Incident Command System
(ICS) in responding to emer
gencies. However, on Sept.
11 terrorists attacked the
Pentagon, which is no ordi
nary building. An enormous
complex, the Pentagon hous
es critical national security of
fices. Although the Pentagon
is in Arlington County, it is a
U.S. military facility under the
direct control of the Secre
tary of Defense. The Defense
Protective Service controls
access to the building.
Assessing emergency
preparedness in the
aftermath of 9/11
On July 23, 2002, Arlington
County officials released a
report that examined the
county’s response to the
9/11 attack.9 The report,
funded by the U.S. Depart
ment of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, assessed
practices employed during
the 9/11 response. The re
port highlighted strengths of
the county’s 9/11 response.
These included management
of mutual aid assets and out
side support, adherence to
the county’s Comprehensive
Emergency Management
Plan, and use of the county’s
employee assistance
program.10
11
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
. . . in the
aftermath of
the 9/11 attack,
teaching the
incident
command
philosophy at
the command
and line officer
levels alike
has become
a priority.
Improving police
preparedness
Targets for possible terror
ist attacks. Arlington County
is a “target-rich” environ
ment, ACPD officials noted,
that has numerous govern
ment agencies and installa
tions that might be potential
targets for a terrorist attack.
ACPD officials list 120 targets
based on threat assessments
carried out by ACPD district
commanders. These targets
include the Pentagon; Rea
gan National Airport; bridges
into Washington, D.C.; Wash
ington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority subway
stations; and the offices of
the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corpora
tion and the U.S. Marshals
Service.
Advancing the ICS and
emergency management
planning. ACPD officials
reported that in the aftermath
of the 9/11 attack, teach
ing the incident command
philosophy at the command
and line officer levels alike
has become a priority. The
need to bring training in ICS
“down to the officer level”
is reinforced by a central
principle of the ICS ap
proach — that “anyone who
responds may have to take
charge of an incident,” one
official noted. In addition, the
ACPD is aware of the addi
tion of ICS standards that
police agencies must meet
for accreditation purposes
(e.g., by the Commission on
Accreditation for Law En
forcement Agencies). To help
with this mission, the After-
Action Report recommended
that all command officers and
supervisors receive a pocket-
sized field guide containing
instructions for setting up
law enforcement ICS roles.11
The assistant chief who
sketched out the ACPD’s
first incident response plan
on 9/11 agrees. She said she
based her actions on 9/11 on
a card that she carries that
spells out the central steps
in developing an ICS. She re
ceived that card in an incident
command course sponsored
by the International Associa
tion of Chiefs of Police in the
early 1990s.
Training in support of ICS.
ACPD officials reported that
training for critical incidents,
“both mass and smaller at
tacks,” has increased signifi
cantly since 9/11. According
to these officials, ACPD
training now covers active-
shooter incidents, hazard
ous materials, and “general
education on domestic and
international terrorism.”
The training curriculum for
ACPD recruits now includes
12
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
terrorism topics. The number
and frequency of tabletop
exercises in ICS also have
increased, officials say. A
recent exercise involved
local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies; the
fire service; the public health
agency; airport security; and
the Virginia Hospital Center,
a major medical facility in
Arlington County.
ACPD officials used the op
portunity provided by a mock
exercise at the Pentagon
to test hospital and police
cooperation as they work out
a security plan with area hos
pitals. The ACPD chief has
told officers to respond di
rectly to the hospital “if they
hear anything on the radio”
signaling that an incident has
occurred that may require
a hospital lockdown. ”Hos
pitals are strategic assets,”
one ACPD official asserted.
A hospital lockdown requires
law enforcement officials’
help to secure the buildings,
control traffic and set up
decontamination lines for an
incident involving a biological
or chemical agent.
Upgrading communica
tions abilities. ACPD uses
the U.S. Government Emer
gency Telecommunications
Service, a Department of
Homeland Security program
designed to ensure that key
people can use the telephone
system even if it becomes
overloaded. Several ACPD
officials have priority access
to cell phones by punching
in certain codes. Since 9/11,
critical entities such as the
Virginia Hospital Center, the
county health department
and the county public school
system have bought police
radios to ensure seamless
communication in an attack
or other critical incident.
Confronting the results
of hypervigilance. ACPD
officials reported that the
heightened state of alert
that has been in effect con
stantly since 9/11 is creating
stress and frustration among
ACPD personnel. In particu
lar, one department official
noted, officials of the coun
ty’s Office of Emergency
Management (OEM) “always
are on top of our cops” to
remain hypervigilant. ACPD
officials’ comments also sug
gest that OEM officials’ hy
pervigilance post-9/11 is not
the only source of pressure
that department personnel
feel. Keeping emergency ser
vices personnel countywide
in a high-alert status tries
their patience. “Since 9/11,
we’ve had the anthrax scare,
13
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
a winter storm, the sniper
case, and a hurricane,” an
official said.
Coordinating intelligence
sharing countywide
One ACPD official said
initiatives to prevent terrorist
attacks should begin “way
back in the intel stage.”
Since 9/11, the ACPD, in fact,
has improved intelligence
coordination countywide.
ACPD officials reported that
briefings are held regularly
with representatives of the
Pentagon, the Department
of Homeland Security, and
the Metropolitan Wash
ington Council of Govern
ments (Metro COG). The
Metro COG meetings have
facilitated regional informa
tion sharing. The ACPD also
takes part in weekly regional
conference calls hosted by
the FBI. Other participants
include area police chiefs; the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives;
and representatives of the
military.12
In addition, one official
explained, the ACPD
“could do a better job with
data-sharing” within the
department to reduce conflict
around the issue of defining
the “need to know” during
sensitive operations. During
the October 2002 sniper case
that resulted in the deaths of
10 individuals in the Wash
ington, D.C., Maryland, and
northern and central Virginia
regions, some department of
ficials felt that other officials
were inappropriately keeping
information from them.13
Improving collaboration
with other responders
ACPD officials said ties with
federal agencies since the
9/11 attack have been “good
for some time,” but there is
a need to address internal
issues that inhibit the trans
fer of information between
federal and local agencies.
Experiences with the FBI, in
particular, have been exten
sive and favorable.
According to ACPD officials,
since 9/11 a mutual aid
agreement has been com
pleted with the Pentagon.
Importantly, the updated
agreement allows the ACPD
to have concurrent jurisdic
tion on Pentagon grounds
(i.e., outside the building) for
criminal and traffic concerns,
if necessary.
The ACPD has appointed
liaisons to preserve regular
contact with the Arlington
14
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
County Fire Department
and the Pentagon. In addi
tion, protocols for engaging
mutual aid partners in future
emergencies require that
responding agencies contact
the requesting agency before
sending help.
Strengthening
community ties
Communications between
the ACPD and the public
have improved since 9/11.
ACPD officials believe the
Arlington County community
“feels the hypervigilance”
that its emergency services
personnel are experiencing
post-9/11, but expects that
police and fire officials can
handle it. Volunteers have
helped develop “Arlington
Alert,” an emergency e-mail
and text messaging service.
Citizens can sign up to re
ceive the service.14
The county has bought a
radio station and is testing a
siren system, both for alert
ing residents. Community
emergency response teams
(CERT teams) have been set
up within the county to enlist
citizen volunteers in perform
ing “some light emergency
response duties” if first
responders cannot imme
diately get to a site. CERT
teams currently include some
120 to 140 volunteers. Team
members are not certified,
but receive training in search
and rescue, firefighting, first
aid, freeing victims from
buildings and vehicles, and
traffic control. An ACPD offi
cial said that experience with
CERT team volunteers during
Hurricane Isabel served as a
model for integrating them
into future incidents.
Major conclusions and
recommendations
Preventing terrorist incidents
Expand intelligence-sharing
efforts. Realizing that initia
tives to prevent terrorist
attacks should begin as early
as possible, the ACPD has
improved intelligence coordi
nation countywide.
Conduct threat assessments
of local assets. The ACPD
now has access to a list of
120 targets.
Engage residents in preven
tion activities. Community
policing can provide avenues
to engage residents in watch
ing their neighborhoods for
suspicious activities.
15
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
Command
officers and
supervisors
should have
pocket-sized
field guides.
Preparing for a
critical incident
Ensure the agency is adept
at incident management.
Training agency personnel to
use the Incident Command
System during a critical inci
dent requires continual work
to inculcate this idea into the
department’s culture.
Diligently prepare for out
side law enforcement agen
cies to respond and help.
Even in northern Virginia,
where agencies regularly
work together under mutual
aid agreements, differences
in the procedures and laws
that govern the nature and
extent of help can be ex
posed during the pressures
that critical incidents impose
on organizations.
Neighboring jurisdictions
must coordinate assigning
their personnel with the
host agency. On Sept. 11,
ACPD officials seemingly
were overwhelmed at the
staging area when mutual
aid officers arrived without
notice that they were on their
way.
Coordinate traffic manage
ment and evacuation proto
cols. One jurisdiction’s deci
sion to evacuate can have an
enormous influence on traffic
in neighboring jurisdictions.
Develop strong ties with
other emergency respond
ers in the jurisdiction. Police,
fire, emergency medical and
emergency management
agencies all play key roles
during a critical incident.
Develop protocols with
emergency medical services
and hospitals. Develop a plan
with local emergency medical
services and local hospitals
for transporting the injured
to area hospitals, including
provisions for hospital diver
sions because of closures or
inadequate capacity at some
facilities and excess capacity
at others.
Exercise plans regularly. De
veloping plans is not enough.
They have to be exercised,
reviewed and adjusted.
Include private security. In
clude private-sector property
managers and private secu
rity in training and exercises.
Ensure that every officer is
prepared. ACPD personnel
now have specific proce
dures and protocols to follow
when alerted to the threat of
a terrorist attack.
Provide agency managers
with policies and proce
dures. Command officers
and supervisors should have
pocket-sized field guides.
16
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
Keep enough local and
regional maps in com
mand vehicles. The ACPD
has placed maps of the area
in command supervisory
vehicles.
Provide officers with equip
ment and ensure that it
works. Since 9/11, the ACPD
has bought better equipment
for department personnel,
including personally fitted
masks.
Organize and use citizen
volunteers. Community
emergency response teams
have been set up within
the county to enlist citizen
volunteers in performing light
emergency response duties
if first responders cannot im
mediately get to a site.
Develop and exercise proto
cols for on-scene manage
ment. Improve protocols for
coordinating response units
and the incident command
post.
Review procedures for set
ting up perimeters. If an
outer perimeter is set up too
close to the incident site, a
significant portion of the on-
site incident command may
be placed at risk if there is
another attack.
On-scene personnel need to
be identified and controlled.
The influx of people at the
scene may require develop
ing an identification system
for use in controlling access
to incident sites.
Develop a system for telling
officers about assignments
and shift changes. Supervi
sors and line officers need
timely notice of assignments
and regular status updates
during a critical incident.
Check officers to prevent
fatigue. Ensure that officers
do not work more than one
12-hour shift without rest
unless necessary.
Be prepared to address both
immediate and long-term ef
fects of the incident on first
responders and their fam
ily members. Call on local
mental health or employee
programs and outside groups
such as the Red Cross, which
has specific units trained in
addressing first responders’
mental health concerns in
response to disasters.
Communicate with resi
dents. Agencies need to
work with government
leaders to develop and in
stitutionalize procedures for
warning citizens of a terrorist
attack and keeping the public
informed about post-attack
conditions.
17
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
The principles
for preventing
and responding
to traditional
crimes and
terrorism are
the same.
Be prepared to receive dona
tions and volunteers. Do
nated goods and volunteers
can overwhelm an agency.
Set up a media relations
plan. This plan should include
where to stage the media
and who will deliver briefings.
Observations and
Implications for Law
Enforcement From
New York City and
Arlington County’s
Experiences
Coordination is fundamental
to a successful response
to any critical incident (e.g.,
weather-related disasters,
terrorist attacks, significant
fires, major crime scenes).
Although the federal govern
ment has produced response
guidelines,15 many state and
local emergency response
agencies have improved
coordination themselves.
The private sector is on the
front line of homeland secu
rity efforts and is important to
identifying and finding terror
ists as well as disrupting ter
rorist networks. According to
the Department of Homeland
Security, the private sector
oversees about 85 percent
of the nation’s critical infra
structure.16 The experiences
of the New York City Police
Department and the Arlington
County Police Department
can provide perspectives that
will help law enforcement
agencies develop effective
strategies and approaches to
make our communities safer.
Though very different in size
and organizational structure,
these two agencies provide
many similar lessons learned.
Defining an organizational
strategy
■ Incorporate a counterterror
ism philosophy throughout
the department.
■ Create a counterterrorism
role within the department.
■ Embrace the notion that
anti-terrorism policing is
the same as crime policing.
The principles for prevent
ing and responding to tradi
tional crimes and terrorism
are the same.
■ Choose specific personnel
to drive the counterterror
ism philosophy.
■ Educate the public about
its role and the depart
ment’s initiatives.
■ Recognize that community
policing principles can help
law enforcement meet
18
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
the demands of homeland
security.
Building organizational
abilities
■ Provide up-to-date coun
terterrorism information to
officers.
■ Get intelligence information
to the street officer and
provide the street officer
with access to the intel
ligence information
collector.
■ Train officers in counterter
rorism tactics.
■ Conduct counterterrorism
training in large groups.
■ Train police managers
in critical incident
management.
Preventing terrorist
incidents
■ Regularly assess your
community’s vulnerable or
valuable assets that might
be targeted by terrorists.
■ Keep a proactive intelli
gence role.
■ Reach out to local and
regional businesses as
intelligence sources.
■ Use randomized presence
as a deterrent.
■ Collaborate with emergen
cy response organizations
to leverage expertise.
■ Build regional intelligence
talent.
■ Engage residents in pre
vention activities.
■ Develop information-shar
ing protocols with other
agencies. The FBI, the
Department of Homeland
Security and local law en
forcement should share in
telligence information with
other emergency service
providers, such as fire and
emergency management
officials.
Preparing for a
critical incident
■ Cities and counties
should conduct vulner
ability assessments and
gather information about
potential targets, and
then share those results
with neighboring jurisdic
tions to develop a regional
understanding of risks and
threats.
■ Learn from the best prac
tices established by other
agencies.
19
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
Institute
counterterrorism
training at
all levels of
local law
enforcement —
from line
officers to
command level
to the chief
executive level.
■ Develop strong relation
ships with other emergency
responders — fire,
emergency medical and
emergency services —
in your jurisdiction.
■ Before an incident, choose
a lead agency to avoid
conflict.
■ Plan responses based on
geographical areas and
responsibilities.
■ Develop protocols with
emergency medical ser
vices and hospitals.
■ Ensure that the agency is
adept at incident manage
ment. Local law enforce
ment and other emergency
responders must incorpo
rate the National Incident
Management System17 into
emergency response plans.
■ Prepare for outside agen
cies to respond and help,
including coordinating
assigning their personnel
with the host agency.
■ Coordinate traffic man
agement and evacuation
protocols with neighboring
law enforcement agencies.
■ Exercise plans regularly.
Conduct honest self-
assessments after exercis
es and revise policy based
on lessons learned.
■ Include private-sector prop
erty managers and private
security in training and
exercises. The partnerships
could include target hard
ening through environmen
tal design, other guidance,
and response procedures
for effective preparedness,
prevention and response
roles.
■ Institute counterterrorism
training at all levels of local
law enforcement — from
line officers to command
level to the chief executive
level. Training should ad
dress street-level indica
tors of terrorism, the link
between traditional crime
and terrorism, information
analysis, targeting and
profiling issues, privacy
concerns and other impor
tant ideas.
■ Focus training on area-
specific target hazards.
Train members from
various disciplines
simultaneously.
■ Embed counterterrorism
training in existing training.
Many agencies have
developed creative meth
ods to conduct training
exercises that can serve
as an example for others.
20
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
■ Provide officers with equip
ment and ensure that it
works.
■ Plan for the response of
your agency’s off-duty
officers.
■ Provide agency managers
with policies and proce
dures.
■ Keep an acceptable supply
of local and regional maps
in command cars.
■ Organize and use citizen
volunteers.
■ Plan for rumor control and
misinformation.
■ Improve mental health
outreach and services for
employees.
Responding to a critical
incident
■ Review procedures and
criteria for setting up pe
rimeters. Work together to
set up zones and staging
areas. Consider the pos
sibility of second strikes.
Where there is a potential
biological, radiological or
chemical hazard, there is
also a need to stem con
tamination. First respond
ers must work together
to set up an exclusion or
“hot” zone, a decontamina
tion or “warm” zone, and
a staging and support area
or “cold” zone. The staging
area should always be lo
cated upwind from the inci
dent, preserved by trained
personnel and protected by
a secure crowd-control line.
■ Create a method for easy
identification and control
of on-scene personnel.
■ Develop a system for tell
ing officers about develop
ments and assignments.
■ Check officers to prevent
excessive fatigue.
■ Be prepared to address
both immediate and long-
term effects of the incident
on first responders and
their family members.
■ Communicate with resi
dents about the incident
and agency responses.
■ Be prepared to receive
donations and volunteers.
■ Set up a media relations
plan.
Notes
1. Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of
Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commis
sion), Third Annual Report to the
21
R e s e a R c h f o R P R a c t i c e / o c t . 0 9
President and the Congress of the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terror
ism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction, December 15, 2001,
p. 7. Available online at www.rand.
org/nsrd/terrpanel.
2. This NYPD case study relies on
the following sources: DeBlasio,
Paul, Terrance Regan, Margaret Zink
er, F. Brian Day, Michelle Crowder,
Kathleen Bagdons, Robert Brodesky,
and Dan Morin, “Effects of Cata
strophic Events on Transportation
System Management and Opera
tions: New York City — September
11, 2001,” draft report submitted
to the U.S. Department of Trans
portation, ITS Joint Program Office,
2002; McKinsey & Co., Improving
NYPD Emergency Preparedness
and Response, New York: McKin
sey & Co., 2002; McKinsey & Co.,
Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness,
New York: McKinsey & Co., 2002;
National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report, New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 2004 (here
inafter 9/11 Commission Report);
Thompson, Paul, and the Center for
Cooperative Research, The Terror
Timeline, New York: Regan Books,
2004.
3. Horowitz, Craig, “The NYPD’s
War on Terror,” New York Magazine,
Feb. 3, 2003. Available online at
www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/
news/features/n_8286/.
4. Although New York City is divided
into five administrative units — the
boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn,
the Bronx, Queens and Staten Island
— the NYPD subdivides Manhattan,
Brooklyn and Queens into north and
south, creating a total of eight patrol
boroughs.
5. For more information about
Operation Nexus, see the NYPD’s
Crime Prevention web page, www.
nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/crime_
prevention/counterterrorism.shtml.
6. Rashbaum, William K. and Judith
Miller, “New York Police Training for
Catastrophic Terrorism,” New York
Times, N.Y. Region, Feb. 15, 2004.
Available online at www.nytimes.
com/2004/02/15/nyregion/15THRE.
html.
7. In the NYPD, the rank of inspector
is the military equivalent of colonel.
8. This ACPD case study relies on
the following sources: Carter, Mark
R., Mark P. Howard, Nicholas Ow
ens, David Register, Jason Kennedy,
Kelley Pecheux, and Aaron Newton,
“Effects of Catastrophic Events on
Transportation System Manage
ment and Operations: The Pentagon
and the National Capital Region —
September 11, 2001,” draft report
submitted to the U.S. Department
of Transportation, ITS Joint Program
Office, Vienna, Va.: Science Applica
tions International Corporation, 2002;
National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States,
9/11 Commission Report (see note
2); Thompson and the Center for
Cooperative Research, The Terror
Timeline (see note 2); Titan Systems
Corporation, Arlington County: After-
Action Report on the Response to
the September 11 Terrorist Attack
on the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.:
Titan Systems Corporation, 2002
(hereinafter Arlington County After-
Action Report).
9. “Arlington County Creating Emer
gency Preparedness Blueprint from
9/11 After-Action Report Recom
mendations and First-hand Experi
ence,” Press Release, Arlington
22
L e a R n i n g f R o m 9 / 1 1
County Public Affairs Division (July
23, 2002), available online at www.
arlingtonva.us/NewsReleases/
Scripts/ViewDetail.asp?Index=843.
10. Ibid.
11. Titan Systems Corporation,
Arlington County After-Action Report
(see note 8), p. C-19.
12. These weekly calls started after
9/11. In October 2002, during the
Beltway Sniper experience, the calls
became a daily occurrence.
13. For a complete report on law
enforcement actions related to the
Beltway Sniper case, see Murphy,
Gerard R., and Chuck Wexler, Man
aging a Multijurisdictional Case: Iden
tifying the Lessons Learned From
the Sniper Investigation, Washing
ton, D.C.: Police Executive Research
Forum, 2004.
14. For more information on this
service see the following website:
www.arlingtonalert.com/index.
php?CCheck=1.
15. For example, under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-5
(HSPD-5), the National Incident Man
agement System (NIMS) “provides
a consistent framework for incident
management at all jurisdictional
levels regardless of the cause, size
or complexity of the incident.” The
National Response Framework uses
NIMS and “establishes a comprehen
sive, national, all-hazards approach
to domestic incident response.” For
more information, see U.S. Depart
ment of Homeland Security, National
Response Framework (NRF) — Fact
Sheet, n.d., available online at www.
fema.gov/emergency/nrf/aboutNRF.
htm.
16. See U.S. Department of Home
land Security, “Critical Infrastructure
Sector Partnership” web page.
Available online at www.dhs.gov/
xprevprot/partnerships/
editorial_0206.shtm.
17. See note 15 above.
Additional references
Jones, Radford W., Margaret A.
Kowalk, and Patricia P. Miller. “Criti
cal Incident Protocol — A Public and
Private Partnership.” East Lansing,
Mich.: Michigan State University,
School of Criminal Justice, 2000.
National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States.
Staff Statement No. 13: “Emergency
Preparedness and Response”
(n.d.). Available online at www.
9-11commission.gov/staff_
statements/staff_statement_13 .
Safe Cities Project. Timothy P.
Connors and Georgia Pellegrini,
eds. Hard Won Lessons: Policing Ter
rorism in the United States. New York:
The Center for Policing Terrorism at
the Manhattan Institute, and Newark,
N.J.: The Police Institute at Rutgers
University, July 2005. Available online
at www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/
scr_03 .
Tierney, Kathleen J. “Strength of a
City: A Disaster Research Perspec
tive on the World Trade Center
Attack,” Social Science Research
Council: Essays, July 18, 2002.
Available online at www.ssrc.org/
sept11/essays/tierney.htm.
23
The National Institute of Justice is the
research, development, and evaluation
agency of the U.S. Department of Justice.
NIJ’s mission is to advance scientific research,
development, and evaluation to enhance the
administration of justice and public safety.
The National Institute of Justice is a component of
the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes
the Bureau of Justice Assistance; the Bureau of
Justice Statistics; the Community Capacity
Development Office; the Office for Victims of
Crime; the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention; and the Office of Sex
Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending,
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6*
CRM 365
SAINT LEO UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SERVICES
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CRM 365 Local Response to Terrorism
3 CREDITS
Spring I 2020
Instructor:
Dr. Delmar P. Wright
Office:
Fort Lee Center
Phone:
(O) 804-861-9634
Fax:
804-861-1816
email:
D2L Classlist email Browser
Class Meets: Mondays – 5 PM to 7:30 PM Eastern
Office Hours: Mondays 11:00 AM to 5 PM Eastern
Course Prerequisite: none
Catalog Description
This course provides a comprehensive overview of the need to plan for the possibility of a terrorist event on the local level. A terrorist event could take place that restricts or retards the state and federal government’s response to a local community. The course will give the student the tools needed to prepare a local agency for immediate response to an event in his or her community. The course will give an introduction to the National Incident Management System and will provide the student with the information necessary to ensure local government compliance with federal law.
Text(s)
Walsh, D. W., et al. (2012). National Incident Management System: Principles and Practice. (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett. ISBN-13: 978-0-7637-8187-3. ISBN-10: 0-7637-8187-8
American Psychological Association. (2020). Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (7th ed.). Washington, DC
Commercial software program templates are available for purchase to assist in the correct formatting for use of APA. One example is found at http://www.perrla.com/
Saint Leo University Core Value:
Community
. Saint Leo University develops hospitable Christian learning communities everywhere we serve. We foster a spirit of belonging, unity, and interdependence based on mutual trust and respect to create socially responsible environments that challenge all of us to listen, to learn, to change, and to serve.
Course Goals/Objectives
As a result of this course, students will
1. Describe the role of the Saint Leo University core value of Community in designing a local response to terrorism.
2. Relate lessons learned from past incidents and exercises to the needs of local jurisdictions.
3. Recognize the importance of planning for a terrorist attack
4. Obtain the knowledge to prepare a response and containment plan in the event of a terrorist attack.
5. Evaluate existing local plans for response and containment of a terrorist attack.
6. Plan and conduct a training exercise involving a local response to a hypothetical terrorist attack.
7. Obtain the necessary knowledge to prepare a local agency for compliance with the National Incident Management System requirements.
8. Articulate the responsibilities and authority of local government in a terrorist situation.
9. Develop expertise necessary to prepare a local agency for compliance with the National Incident Management System requirements.
Topics
· Assessing the terrorist threat
· Developing the situation and assumptions about a terrorist threat
· Direction and control for terrorist incidents
· Communicating during terrorist incidents
· Disseminating warnings during terrorist incidents
· Emergency public information
· Taking protective action during a terrorist incident
· Planning for mass care following a terrorist incident
· Planning health and medical needs in a terrorist incident
· Managing resources in a terrorist incident
· Roles and responsibilities in a terrorist incident
Course Policies
Students with Disabilities:
Appropriate academic accommodations and services are coordinated through the Office of Disability Services, which is located in Kirk Hall Room 121. Students with documented disabilities who may need academic accommodation(s) should email their requests to
adaoffice@saintleo.edu
or call x8464.
For more information, please review the Policy and Procedure Manual on the Disability Services web page at
http://www.saintleo.edu/SaintLeo/Templates/Inner.aspx?pid=391
Academic Honor Code
The Academic Honor Code is published in its entirety in the Saint Leo University Catalog. The first paragraph is quoted below:
As members of an academic community that places a high value on truth and the pursuit of knowledge, Saint Leo University students are expected to be honest in every phase of their academic life and present as their own work only that which is genuinely theirs. Unless otherwise specified by the professor, students must complete homework assignments by themselves (or if on a team assignment, with only their team members). If they receive outside assistance of any kind, they are expected to cite the source and indicate the extent of the assistance. Each student has the responsibility to maintain the highest standards of academic integrity and to refrain from cheating, plagiarism, or any other forms of academic dishonesty.
PROTECTION OF THE ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT:
Cell phones, headphones, or earphones are not to be used at any time in the classroom other than during official breaks declared by the professor. The professor will deduct a minimum of 2 points from your final course grade for each violation.
Disruption of academic process is the act or words of a student in a classroom or teaching environment which in the reasonable estimation of a faculty member: (a) directs attention away from the academic matters at hand, such as noisy distractions, persistent, disrespectful or abusive interruptions of lecture, exam or academic discussions, or (b) presents a danger to the health, safety or well-being of the faculty member or students. Education is a cooperative endeavor – one that takes place within a context of basic interpersonal respect. We must therefore make the classroom environment conducive to the purpose for which we are here. Disruption, intentional and unintentional, is an obstacle to that aim. We can all aid in creating the proper environment, in small ways (such as turning off beepers and cell phones, and neither chatting nor sleeping in class), and in more fundamental ways. So, when we speak in class, we can disagree without attacking each other verbally, we wait to be recognized before speaking, and no one speaks in a manner or of off-
topic
content that disrupts the class. Any violation of this policy may result in disciplinary action. Please refer to the Student Handbook for further details.
Attendance Policy
An educational program centered on classroom instruction is predicated on the concept of class attendance at scheduled class sessions. Should a student be required to miss a class, it is the student’s responsibility to promptly notify the instructor. The instructor is required to keep attendance records in compliance with various federal regulations. Student absences can have a deleterious effect on the student’s grade or the continuing eligibility for financial assistance. At the end of the term there will be a 2.0 point overall term grade reduction for each absence and a term letter grade reduction for each absence in excess of two excused or unexcused absences during an eight week term. If a federal holiday, e.g., Memorial Day, causes a single class not to be held and there are only seven scheduled class meetings, there will be a letter grade reduction for each absence in excess of one excused or unexcused absence. Students are expected to attend all classes held during the term. The instructor is not responsible for providing class materials or notes missed due to individual absences or late class arrivals.
Written Assignments and the APA Format:
The Department of Criminal Justice recognizes the value of excellence in writing for students in Criminal Justice. In part, each professor is expected to provide guidance on improving a student’s writing skills. Students are required to use only the current APA (American Psychological Association) format to write and develop a scholarly paper for submission in the Social Sciences. APA has been adopted by the Department as its writing standard for all academic written assignments. No other writing style is acceptable.
APA is the American Psychological Association, and the style is one of many in the academic world used to regulate the language, citations, procedure and formatting of manuscripts and other examples of writing in the social sciences. Please be consistent throughout each written paper. For on-line and distance learning courses, refer to APA Guide under Resources on the Course Menu for APA specifics.
For on-ground traditional courses, refer to the APA Manual for Publication, 7th edition for guidance. Moreover, an on-line reference for APA; inclusive of a sample cover page, abstract page, reference page, and research paper, can be accessed at the following website:
For each scholarly paper and individual assignment(s), the work will be assessed using an individual grading rubric for each assignment. This tool and process helps the students identify and Professor measure the key points necessary to successfully complete written or group assignments. Wikipedia is not an appropriate source for any scholarly writing and should not be used for any assignments in this course.
Turnitin.Com
All written papers (research and reaction) are submitted in
Turnitin.com
via the course “assignment” dropbox and therefore there is no requirement for a turnitin.com Class Identification # or Password or separate submission.
This is a writing intensive course. Turnitin.com is a plagiarism identification service that can also assist students with term paper reference methodology. The Turnitin.com tool compares your writing against all published sources and also checks against a wide range of work
It is highly recommended that all students access Turnitin.com and read about the service prior to use. The analysis provided by turnitin.com lets the professor see the use of information contained in a submitted item.
Turnitin provides for a wide range of outcomes in its analysis. For the most part, when an analysis links large amounts of un-cited or improperly referenced information, this is problematic. This tool makes it easy to assess whether the student created a paper by using information they found in various resources and completed a “cut and paste” job to develop the paper. This is not an acceptable method to develop and write scholarly papers and may result in an academic standards violation for plagiarism.
Assignments
Submit all assignments by the date and time due. Late papers will be considered for emergent reasons only, and may be graded at the end of the term. All work must be completed individually and personally unless specifically noted as a group assignment. Submit each week’s assignments in the designated areas for that week only unless explicitly advised by the professor to do otherwise.
Discussion Board Participation (Review the Grading Rubric)
Students are required to participate in online Discussion Board postings of no less than 250 words each Thursday of the Module/Week due and no later than 11:59 PM Eastern. You must also respond to the initial Discussion Board postings of at least two classmates each Module/Week due no later than Sunday at 11:59 PM Eastern, or a minimum of 2.5 points will be deducted from your overall score for the Discussion Board posting for that Module/Week.
Your Discussion Board submissions must be posted on the Discussion Board for review by the entire class. Do not post your input as attachments. Do not use emoticons or inappropriate lower case letters in your posts. Do not cut and paste from the internet. Late Discussion Board submissions have no value and will not be accepted under any circumstances. Your posts must be scholarly and professional and void of the use of wording that may be considered “patently offensive” by any member of the class.
Reaction Papers (Review the Grading Rubric)
In addition to Discussion Board postings, you must submit APA style and formatted Reaction Papers of no less than 800 words (12 pitch), excluding the wording in the Cover page, Abstract page, and Reference page. The papers are due no later than Sunday at 11:55 PM Eastern during Modules/Weeks 2, 3, 4, and 5. Your Reaction Papers must be in full APA style and format including the cover page, abstract page, in-text citations, properly placed page numbers, running heads, and a reference page identifying all sources. Your Reaction Papers must address a minimum of one full chapter of the assigned textbook readings for the Module.
No more than 25 % of each written assignment in this course may be attributed to referenced sources. Your papers must be 75% original thought. Again, your cited work and quotations must not exceed 25%. Failure to properly use in-text citations or required quotation formatting will be considered evidence of potential Academic Honor Code violations. The submission of writings from prior courses, classes, schools, colleges, or universities to fulfill assignment requirements in this class will be referred as a potential Academic Code Violation.
It is strongly suggested you follow the following logical flow in presenting your reaction paper: critical overview of the entire reading, significant facts or information disclosed, and a conclusion based upon inductive or deductive reasoning flowing from the assigned reading. A Reaction Paper is designed to develop and sharpen your critical thinking, cognitive skills, and problem-solving abilities, as well as your writing skills. Your objective in writing this assignment is to clearly articulate your assessment of the information presented by the author(s) and to formulate and clarify your position on or reaction to the writings.
Avoid “I will . . .” and “My paper will . . .” and “This paper will . . .” constructions in your writings. In other words, the use of “I” and “My” and “We” in your written work must be avoided.
Research Paper (Review the Grading Rubric): A major component of this class is a minimum 2250-word term APA research paper excluding the words in the Cover page, Abstract page, and Reference page. It represents a substantial effort on your part to research and write an in-depth paper. No more than 25 % of the written assignment in this course may be attributed to referenced sources. Your paper must be 75% original thought. Again, your cited work and quotations must not exceed 25%. You must use and cite a minimum of five primary sources with no more than two being internet sources in the text and on the Reference page. Dictionaries and encyclopedias are not appropriate or considered adequate as referenced sources. Turnitin.com reports provide the instructor with the word count in addition to the percentage of wording attributable to other sources. Do not cut and paste from other sources. Your failure to cite sources by using in-text citations and failure to use APA quotation formatting where necessary will result in referrals as potential Academic Code Violations. Papers may not be submitted from previous courses or classes to fulfill this course requirement and will be referred as a potential Academic Code Violation.
You must select a research topic from the following listing and use your research to relate the topic to local response to terrorism while
integrating the Saint Leo Core Value of Community:
Local Law Enforcement Involvement in Joint Terrorism Task Forces
Local Law Enforcement Involvement in Fusion Centers
El Paso Intelligence Center Capabilities and Local Response to Terrorism
The Intricacies of Local Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Agreements
Local Law Enforcement Continuity of Operations Plans
Response and Incident Command System in Mass Shooting Situations
The Incident Command System and the 9/11 Pentagon Attack
The Incident Command System and the World Trade Center 9/11 Attacks
The Incident Command System and the Boston Marathon Bombing
Local L.E. Cultivation and Development of Informants for Terrorism Investigations
Local Police Community Outreach and Counterterrorism
Local Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (e.g., NYPD, LAPD, etc)
Local Law Enforcement Planning and Preparation for Terrorist Attacks
“Homeland-Policing Model” and Local Law Enforcement
Protection of Critical Infrastructures in Local Jurisdictions
Grading (Be sure to review the Grading Rubrics below)
Reaction Papers (4) 60
Written Discussions (8)
80
Mid-Term Exam 80
Final Exam
80
Research Paper
100
Total
400
Grading Scale
A
94-100%
Exceptional
A-
90-93%
Superior
B+
87-89%
Excellent
B
84-86%
Very Good
B-
80-83%
Good
C+
77-79%
Above Average
C
74-76%
Average
C-
70-73%
Below Average
D+
67-69%
Marginal
D
60-66%
Poor
F
< 60%
Failure
Grading Rubric: Following is the grading rubric to be used in evaluating the research paper.
Rating:
Exceptional corresponds to an A (93-100%). Performance is outstanding; significantly above the usual expectations.
Proficient corresponds to a grade of B to A- (83-92%). Skills and standards are at the level of expectation.
Basic corresponds to a C to B- (73-80%). Skills and standards are acceptable but improvements are needed to meet expectations well.
Novice corresponds to a D (65 – 72%). Performance is weak; the skills or standards are not sufficiently demonstrated at this time.
0 This criterion is missing or not in evidence.
|
Criteria
|
Rating
|
|
0
|
Novice
|
Basic
|
Proficient
|
Exceptional
|
|
The paper extensively develops the topical issue and clearly demonstrates an understanding of the Saint Leo University Core Value of Community as it relates to addressing Local Response to Terrorism
|
|
|
|
|
0-20
|
|
|
|
|
1 – 5
|
|
|
|
|
6 – 10
|
11 -15
|
|
|
|
16 – 20
|
|
Show depth and understanding of the subject, with appropriate issue analysis
|
0-20
1 – 5
6 – 10
|
|
|
11 – 15
|
16 -20
|
|
Clearly identifies focus and critically analyzes and discusses the topic
|
0-20
1 – 5
6 – 10
11 – 15
16 – 20
|
Meets acceptable college level standards with respect to form, substance, grammar and spelling, and APA style and format, i.e., separate cover/title page, separate Abstract page, in-text citations, headings and sub-headings, separate References page; all with an appropriate running head and properly placed page numbers
|
0-20
1 – 5
6 – 10
11 – 15
16 – 20
|
Perspectives presented in a clear concise manner
|
0-20
1 – 5
6 – 10
11 – 15
16 – 20
Grading Rubric: Following is the grading rubric to be used in evaluating the reaction papers.
|
|
Category
|
Problems
|
0-2
|
Some Weaknesses 3-5
|
Acceptable 6-9
|
Well Done 10-15
|
|
Coherence:
Do sentences in paragraphs relate to one another in a logical way? Are relationships between paragraphs easily discernible? Is a minimum of one assigned chapter addressed in the body?
|
Main idea in most paragraphs cannot be identified; paragraphs have little or no discernible relationship to one another
|
Many paragraphs lack internal consistency; many transitions are weak or used inappropriately
|
A few paragraphs lack internal consistency; a few weak or unclear transitions
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Paragraphs are internally consistent (i.e., one idea/theme runs through paragraph); transitions between paragraphs allow reader to easily follow thread of argument
|
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Clarity/Conciseness:
Are sentences structurally correct, succinct, and easy to understand and void of misspellings and grammatical errors?
|
More than 10 percent of sentences are awkward, incorrectly constructed, or wordy
|
Six to ten percent of sentences are awkward, incorrectly constructed, or wordy
|
Five percent or less of sentences are awkward, incorrectly constructed, or wordy
|
Sentences flow smoothly, are structurally correct, and convey the intended meaning; no wordiness
|
|
Formatting:
Are formatting elements used appropriately to strengthen the document?
|
Formatting elements are confusing or inconsistent; lack of any formatting
|
Formatting elements often do not support main points; elements are not always used consistently
|
Formatting elements do not always support main points; elements are used consistently throughout the document
|
Formatting elements organize and highlight ideas as needed; formatting elements are used consistently throughout the document
|
|
Use of APA Style and Format
|
|
|
|
Fully APA Style and Formatted
|
Fully APA Style and Formatted
Fully APA Style and Formatted
Fully APA Style and Formatted
Grading Rubric: Following is the grading rubric to be used in evaluating the discussion board submissions.
Category
0-2
3-4
|
5-7
|
8-10
|
|
Promptness and
Initiative
|
Does not respond to
issues; restricted
participation
|
Late initial post and weak or no response to fellow
student postings
|
Timely initial post and failure to respond to fellow student postings or weak responses
|
Timely initial post and rigorous responses to fellow
student postings
|
|
Delivery of Post
|
Utilizes poor spelling
and grammar in most
posts; posts appear
“hasty”
|
Errors in spelling and grammar evidenced in
several postings
|
Few grammatical or spelling
errors are noted in posts
|
Uses grammatically correct posts with rare misspellings
|
|
Relevance of
Post
|
Posts input which is
not related to the
discussion content;
Makes short or
irrelevant remarks
|
Posts off
topic; posts are short
in length and offer no
further insight into the
topic
|
Posts input
related to discussion
content; prompts further
discussion of topic
|
Posts input related specifically to discussion issue;
Uses APA in-text citation(s) connected to listed source reference(s) in the body of initial postings for each Module
|
|
Expression
Within the Post
|
Does not express
opinions or ideas
clearly; no connection
to issue
|
Unclear connection to issue
evidenced in minimal
expression of opinions or
Ideas
|
Opinions and ideas are stated
clearly with occasional lack of connection to issue
|
Expresses opinions and ideas in a clear and concise manner with obvious connection to issue
|
|
Contribution to
the Learning
Community
|
Does not make effort to
participate in learning
community as it
develops; seems
indifferent
|
Occasionally makes meaningful reflection on
group’s efforts; marginal
effort to become involved
with group
|
Attempts to direct the
discussion and to present
relevant viewpoints for
consideration by group;
interacts freely
|
Aware of needs of community; frequently attempts to motivate the group discussion; presents thoughtful and insightful approaches to issue
|
Bibliography
Cannon Memorial Library On-site Resources
Library Services
Librarians are available during reference hours to answer questions concerning research strategies, database searching, locating specific materials, and interlibrary loan (ILL). Contact Elana Karshmer (
elana.karshmer@saintleo.edu
) to arrange on-site library/research instruction for your class.
Cannon Memorial Library—MC2128
352-588-8258 (Main #)
33701 State Road 52
352-588-8259 (fax)
Saint Leo, FL 33574-6665
352-588-8477 (Reference Desk)
352-588-8476 (Circulation)
Cannon Memorial Library
The library also provides an 800 number and an email address for general reference services: 1-800-359-5945 or
reference.desk@saintleo.edu
.
Reference Hours
Monday – Thursday
9am-10pm
Friday
9am-6pm
Saturday
10am-6pm
Sunday
10pm-6pm
Online Catalog, “LeoCat” (All books & media)
Click on
Library Catalog (LeoCat)
on the Cannon Memorial Library website (
http://www.saintleo.edu/library
). Simple search choices are: title, author, keyword, subject, or journal title. Use advanced searching to set limits or expand your search choices. To borrow books from Cannon Memorial and have them shipped to you, use the
Interlibrary Loan and Document Delivery
link, complete the online request form, and submit it.
Saint Leo Library Online Resources
”
http://www.saintleo.edu/library
Saint Leo provides its own array of online databases and resources supporting online courses as well as Continuing Education classes. The following databases are available to Saint Leo students and faculty. Use the
Online Library Resources
link on the Library webpage and select
Databases
. You’ll be taken to the ID Validation screen (if you’re not already in the portal) where you enter your email address and email password to gain access. Once you’re logged in you can go back and reselect any of our databases without ever having to log in again.
CQ Researcher
(In-depth topical analysis by Congressional Quarterly)
EBSCO
(Comprehensive all-subject database, includes Business Source
Premier, Academic Source Premier, ERIC, ATLA)
LexisNexis
(Comprehensive all-subject resource, includes newspapers)
Literature Resource Center
(Comprehensive source for literary topics, includes Twayne Authors)
Newsbank: America’s Newspapers (625 U.S. newspapers)
ProQuest
(Comprehensive all-subject database, includes ABI/Inform Global and Theses and Dissertations)
PsycINFO
(APA abstracts and indexing for psychology subjects)
Westlaw
(Comprehensive legal resource)
Wilson
(Includes Education, Science, Humanities, & Business indexes)
Local Area Library Resources
Almost all public library systems offer free borrowing privileges to local community members, as well as free access to their online databases, including access from your home. The key is obtaining a library card. Check with your local library to find out how to get a borrower’s card.
Additionally, through a reciprocal agreement, university campus students have borrowing privileges at the University of South Florida. Be sure to bring a current Saint Leo student ID card and proof of current enrollment with you, if you want to borrow USF library books.
Course Outline
Students are expected to read all chapters assigned prior to each class meeting
Week 1
Module 1
Outcomes:
After completing this module the student will be able to:
· Assess the Terrorist Threat
Module 1 Assignments
Due No Later Than
Introduce yourself on the Class Introductions Discussion Board
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Read through entire Syllabus
Read and review textbook Chapters 1&2
Post discussion board response
11:59 PM Thursday EST/EDT
Post responses to at least two classmates
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Identify a research paper topic from the listing in the Course Syllabus
Track your module progress
Week 2
Module 2
Outcomes:
After completing this module the student will be able to:
· Develop the Situation and Assumptions About a Terrorist Threat
· Determine Direction and Control for Terrorist Incidents
Module 2 Assignments
Due No Later Than
Read through the entire module
Read and review Chapters 3&4
Post discussion board response
11:59 PM Thursday EST/EDT
Post responses to at least two classmates
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Submit your selected Research Paper topic to Dr. Wright via the Classlist email function
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Complete and submit the Reaction Paper based on the assigned text readings
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Track your module progress
Week 3
Module 3
Outcomes:
After completing this module the student will be able to:
· Describe Communicating During Terrorist Incidents
· Describe Disseminating Warnings during Terrorist Incidents
Module 3 Assignments
Due No Later Than
Read through the entire module
Read and review Chapters 5-6
Post discussion board response
11:59 PM Thursday EST/EDT
Post responses to at least two classmates
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Complete and submit the Reaction Paper based on the assigned text readings
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Track your module progress
Week 4
Module 4
Outcomes:
After completing this module the student will be able to:
· Describe Emergency Public Information
· Describe Protective Action During a Terrorist Incident
Module 4 Assignments
Due No Later Than
Read through the entire module
Read and review Chapters 7-8
Post discussion board response
11:59 PM Thursday EST/EDT
Complete and submit the Reaction Paper based on the assigned text readings
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Track your module progress
Week 5
Module 5
Outcomes:
After completing this module the student will be able to:
· Plan for Mass Care Following a Terrorist Incident
Module 5 Assignments
Due No Later Than
Read through the entire module
Read and review Chapter 9
Post discussion board response
11:59 PM Thursday EST/EDT
Post responses to at least two classmates
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Complete Mid-Term Examination
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Complete and submit the Reaction Paper based on the assigned text readings
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Track your module progress
Week 6
Module 6
Outcomes:
After completing this module the student will be able to:
· Discuss Planning Health and Medical Needs in a Terrorist Incident
· Manage Resources in a Terrorist Incident
Module 6 Assignments
Due No Later Than
Read through the entire module
Read and review Chapters 10-11
Post discussion board response
Post responses to at least two classmates
11:59 PM Thursday EST/EDT
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Track your module progress
In orde
Week 7
Module 7
Outcomes:
After completing this module the student will be able to:
· Know Roles and Responsibilities in a Terrorist Incident
Module 7 Assignments
Due No Later Than
Read through the entire module
Read and review Chapters 12
Submit your APA Research Paper
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Post discussion board response
Post responses to at least two classmates
11:59 PM Thursday EST/EDT
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Study for the Final Exam to be taken in Module 8
Track your module progress
Week 8
Module 8
Outcomes:
After completing this module the student will be able to:
· Understand Other Factors to Consider
Module 8 Assignments
Due No Later Than
Read and review textbook Chapter 13
Post discussion board response
Post responses to at least two classmates
Complete Final Examination
11:59 PM Thursday EST/EDT
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
11:59 PM Sunday EST/EDT
Revised Spring 2020
Saint Leo University
Gary Cothran
· Preventing terrorist incidents
Protecting the American people from terrorist threats is the reason why the Department of Homeland Security was created and remains the nation’s highest priority. Terrorist tactics continue to evolve, and we must keep pace with what is going on in the world today.
Terrorists seek sophisticated means of attack, including chemical, biological, radio logical, nuclear and explosive weapons, and cyber-attacks. Threats may come from abroad or can be even homegrown. You can help reduce the chance of a terrorist attack by keeping an eye out for suspicious situations, such as an unattended suitcase or someone with a conspicuous level of interest in the security of a building. Always be vigilant in public areas and always know your surroundings. Be extra cautious in places with large numbers of people, especially in the metro and train stations, festivals, concert venues, and shopping centers. Always check the location of the emergency exits in every building you enter. Know your escape route. Never leave your belongings unattended. Always report suspicious situations to the proper authorities.
· Defining an Organizational Strategy
An organizational strategy is the sum of the actions a company intends to take to achieve long-term goals. Together, these actions make up a company’s strategic plan. Strategic plans take at least a year to complete, requiring involvement from all company levels. You want to make sure that you have designated person to drive the strategy. Always educate your personnel make sure that they know their role in case of an attack. By creating an organizational strategy, you’re establishing the priorities and setting the direction for your business. It defines your view of success and also prioritizes the types of activities that will make that view a reality.
· Responding to a critical incident
The key to developing an effective incident response plan is the understanding that it’s not a matter of “if” an incident occurs, it’s a matter of when. Employees should be trained on how to respond to workplace incidents so that they know what to do when the inevitable occurs. Proper training and incident response planning is very important on how to survive. An incident response plan is a set of written instructions that outline a method for responding to and limiting the damage from workplace incidents. Every company should have a written incident response plan and it should be accessible to all employees, either online or posted in a public area of the workplace. Incident response plans should be specific to different incident types. A Critical Incident Response (CIR) intervention can provide psychological support to people who have been directly or indirectly affected by the event. The intervention is designed to normalize responses and where possible prevent abnormal reactions such as Acute Stress Disorder and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. PeopleSense psychologists believe in supporting individuals to return to normal functioning as soon as practical after an incident.
Asja Merritt
.Defining an organizational strategy
Educated the community about its role and the departments initiatives.
. community policing principles can help law enforcement
.create a counterterrorism role within the department.
These three strategies seemed to be the best in this category because readiness is always the key to success when It comes to being prepared. These three bullets don’t only ensure that the department is ready in case something occurs but also the community.
Building Organizational abilities
.keep officers up to date with the information they receive
.Train officers
.conduct training in large groups
These three bullets ensure that officers not only have the information that they need but the training as well to always be in a ready status incase an attack occurs.
Preventing Terrorist Incidents
.regularly assess your community
Reach out to local businesses
Collaborate with other emergency response teams
This is training for everyone that could be involved if an attack was to occur having open communication with everyone can lead to a better readiness status.
Preparing for a Critical Incident,
Learn from other agencies
Develop strong relationship with other emergency response teams
Choose a lead agency
These points ensure that there is decency and order in the way we handle an attack in case one occurs. Training with other agencies ensures that the terrorist training we receive is the same across the counties and not just for one area.
Responding to a Critical Incident,
.create a method for easy identification
Create a system to keep officers updated
Check officers to prevent fatigue
These points not only ensure that the community is being taken care of but also the officers that are assigned to take care of this task at hand. Their health and awareness should be our number one priority so making sure they are rested and updated on the latest information is a must.
Gary Cothran
·
Preventing
terrorist
incidents
Protecting
the
American
people
from
terrorist
threats
is
the
reason
why
the
Department
of
Homeland
Security
was
created
and
remains
the
nation’s
highest
priority.
Terrorist
tactics
continue
to
evolve,
and
we
must
keep
pace
with
what
is
going
on
in
the
world
today.
Terrorists
seek
sophisticated
means
of
attack,
including
chemical,
biological,
radio
logical,
nuclear
and
explosive
weapons,
and
cyber
–
attacks.
Threats
may
come
from
abroad
or
can
be
even
homegrown.
You
can
help
reduce
the
chance
of
a
terrorist
attack
by
keeping
an
eye
out
for
suspicious
situations,
such
as
an
unattended
suitcase
or
someone
with
a
conspicuous
level
of
interest
in
the
security
of
a
building.
Always
be
vigilant
in
pu
blic
areas
and
always
know
your
surroundings.
Be
extra
cautious
in
places
with
large
numbers
of
people,
especially
in
the
metro
and
train
stations,
festivals,
concert
venues,
and
shopping
centers.
Always
check
the
location
of
the
emergency
exits
in
every
building
you
enter.
Know
your
escape
route.
Never
leave
your
belongings
unattended.
Always
report
suspicious
situations
to
the
proper
authorities.
·
Defining
an
Organizational
Strategy
An
organizational
strategy
is
the
sum
of
the
actions
a
company
intends
to
take
to
achieve
long
–
term
goals.
Together,
these
actions
make
up
a
company’s
strategic
plan.
Strategic
plans
take
at
least
a
year
to
complete,
requiring
involvement
from
all
company
levels.
You
want
to
make
s
ure
that
you
have
designated
person
to
drive
the
strategy.
Always
educate
your
personnel
make
sure
that
they
know
their
role
in
case
of
an
attack.
By
creating
an
organizational
strategy,
you’re
establishing
the
priorities
and
setting
the
direction
for
your
business.
It
defines
your
view
of
success
and
also
prioritizes
the
types
of
activities
that
will
make
that
view
a
reality.
·
Responding
to
a
critical
incident
The
key
to
developing
an
effective
incident
response
plan
is
the
understanding
that
it’s
not
a
matter
of
“if”
an
incident
occurs,
it’s
a
matter
of
when.
Employees
should
be
trained
on
how
to
respond
to
workplace
incidents
so
that
they
know
what
to
do
when
the
inevitable
occurs.
Proper
training
and
incident
response
planning
is
very
important
on
ho
w
to
survive.
An
incident
response
plan
is
a
set
of
written
instructions
that
outline
a
method
for
responding
to
and
limiting
the
damage
from
workplace
incidents.
Every
company
should
have
a
written
incident
response
plan
and
it
should
be
accessible
to
al
l
employees,
either
online
or
posted
in
a
public
area
of
the
workplace.
Incident
response
plans
should
be
specific
to
different
incident
types.
A
Critical
Incident
Response
(CIR)
intervention
can
provide
psychological
support
to
people
who
have
been
direct
ly
Gary Cothran
Preventing terrorist incidents
Protecting the American people from terrorist threats is the reason why the
Department of Homeland Security was created and remains the nation’s highest
priority. Terrorist tactics continue to evolve, and we must keep pace with what is
going on in the world today. Terrorists seek sophisticated means of attack,
including chemical, biological, radio logical, nuclear and explosive weapons,
and cyber-attacks. Threats may come from abroad or can be even homegrown.
You can help reduce the chance of a terrorist attack by keeping an eye out for
suspicious situations, such as an unattended suitcase or someone with a
conspicuous level of interest in the security of a building. Always be vigilant in
public areas and always know your surroundings. Be extra cautious in places
with large numbers of people, especially in the metro and train stations, festivals,
concert venues, and shopping centers. Always check the location of the
emergency exits in every building you enter. Know your escape route. Never
leave your belongings unattended. Always report suspicious situations to the
proper authorities.
Defining an Organizational Strategy
An
organizational strategy is the sum of the actions a company intends to take to achieve long-term
goals. Together, these actions make up a company’s strategic plan. Strategic plans take at least a year
to complete, requiring involvement from all company levels. You want to make sure that you have
designated person to drive the strategy. Always educate your personnel make sure that they know their
role in case of an attack. By creating an organizational strategy, you’re establishing the priorities and
setting the direction for your business. It defines your view of success and also prioritizes the types of
activities that will make that view a reality.
Responding to a critical incident
The key to developing an effective incident response plan is the understanding
that it’s not a matter of “if” an incident occurs, it’s a matter of when. Employees
should be trained on how to respond to workplace incidents so that they know
what to do when the inevitable occurs. Proper training and incident response
planning is very important on how to survive. An incident response plan is a set
of written instructions that outline a method for responding to and limiting the
damage from workplace incidents. Every company should have a written
incident response plan and it should be accessible to all employees, either online
or posted in a public area of the workplace. Incident response plans should be
specific to different incident types. A Critical Incident Response (CIR)
intervention can provide psychological support to people who have been directly
