150-200  words answer this question:

Reading article is attached below. 

What are your key takeaway points from the Burnette, Pollack, and Forsyth article?  Identify and explain at least two key takeaways. 

JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES, Volume 4, Number 4, 2011
©2011 University of Phoenix

View this article online at wileyonlinelibrary.com • DOI:10.1002/jls.20190 29

Groupthink, as traditionally conceived, is a failure in group decision making that occurs in highly co-

hesive groups. In the current case study, we propose an alternative potential form of groupthink in

which the group’s cohesiveness results from the shared pursuit of a collective goal rather than from

strong interpersonal bonds between members. Our model, recognizing the multifaceted nature of

cohesion, assumes that a group whose members are united in pursuit of a valued collective goal

while guided by a directive leader may experience breakdowns in the decision process. Specifically,

drawing on reviews of personal accounts, media descriptions, online interviews, and past empirical

papers, we propose that the May 1996 Mount Everest disaster can be understood in part from a

groupthink perspective. Applications for the proposed model are discussed, along with implications

for leaders seeking to improve organizational decision-making practices.

L E A D E R S H I P I N E X T R E M E

C O N T E X T S : A G R O U P T H I N K

A N A L Y S I S O F T H E M A Y 1 9 9 6

M O U N T E V E R E S T D I S A S T E R

JENI L. BURNETTE, JEFFREY M. POLLACK, AND DONELSON R. FORSYTH

On May 10, 1996, two teams of climbers set off from
their camp high on Mount Everest in an attempt to
reach the summit. New Zealander Rob Hall, recognized
as one of the world’s most reputable Everest expedition
guides, was the leader of the Adventure Consultants
Guided Expedition. The other team, Mountain Mad-
ness Guided Expedition, was led by esteemed and re-
spected American guide Scott Fischer. Although
members of both teams reached the summit, they met

with disaster. Many of the climbers lost their way in a
storm and five of them—including Hall and Fischer—
perished. Death is not uncommon for climbers on Ever-
est. However, when a disaster of this magnitude occurs,
involving well-designed teams guided by skilled and ex-
periences leaders, we must ask, “Why?”

Experts, in both mountaineering and in human be-
havior, have attributed the May 1996 Everest tragedy
to a host of factors, including changes in the climbing

30 JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 4 • Number 4 • DOI:10.1002/jls

unity of the mountaineering expeditions was not based
on friendship, esprit de corps, or camaraderie but on
members’ commitment to their quest. We suggest
groupthink can also occur in groups of this type,
brought together to reach a common goal. In this
groupthink model, task cohesion takes the place of in-
terpersonal cohesion as the necessary precondition for
decisional dysfunction when coupled with directive
leadership and a provocative context.

Keeping with the tradition of groupthink theory de-
velopment, we use a case study analysis to identify the
qualities of groups that make them prone to suffer from
groupthink. Thus we first describe the events surround-
ing the tragedy of the attempted ascent of the summit of
Mount Everest in 1996, drawing on archival materials
that present a description of the events, including the
synthesis of first-person accounts written by Krakauer
(1997), Boukreev (with De Walt, 1997), Gammelgaard
(1996), and Weathers (Weathers & Michaud, 2001).
In light of Elmes and Frame’s (2008) argument that re-
countings of the May 1996 episode are filled with myth,
we also considered the viewpoints of less-prominent
team members. After describing the context of the dis-
aster, we examine the two expeditions to determine if
they meet the conditions of the proposed groupthink
theoretical model. We review scholarly work and histor-
ical perspectives regarding the multidimensional nature
of cohesion before elaborating on the contribution of
directive leadership style and provocative contexts. We
conclude with implications for leaders operating under
extreme contexts and applications for organizational de-
cision-making practices more generally.

The Everest Disaster of May 1996
A number of expeditions attempted to reach the sum-
mit of Mount Everest in the summer of 1996, but two
of these teams seemed destined for success. Rob Hall,
leader of Adventure Consultants Guided Expedition,
had reached the summit of Mount Everest four times
and in the process had led thirty-nine climbers safely to
the top. Scott Fischer, who had summited Everest once
before, was the head guide on the Mountain Madness
Guided Expedition and had a reputation as an impec-
cable climber and talented guide (Dowling, 1996). Both
of these groups were commercial expeditions led by

culture, narcissistic personality characteristics, and over-
crowding. Sir Edmund Hillary, one of the first climbers
to reach the summit of Everest, blamed commercializa-
tion and the “erosion of mountaineering values” (quoted
in Dowling, 1996, p. 41). Medical experts noted the
advanced age of some of the climbers; research shows
that Everest favors the young, particularly on the de-
scent (Huey, Salisbury, Wang, & Mao, 2007). Psychol-
ogists Elmes and Berry (1999) used a blend of
psychodynamics and structural theory to argue that narcis-
sism and regressive dynamics led to the disaster. Mangione
and Nelson (2003) suggested that scapegoating may
have undermined the groups’ effectiveness. In his anal-
ysis of the tragedy, Kayes (2004, 2006) stressed ineffec-
tive team learning with precursors such as narrowly
defined purpose and ill-defined problems. Roberto
(2002) argued that system complexity, team structure,
and cognitive limitations offer a holistic approach for
understanding high-stakes decision making such as the
Everest disaster. In a recent analysis, Elmes and Frame
(2008) suggested that a more critical perspective on the
Everest 1996 events is needed.

Extending groupthink theory, the current work ex-
amines the May 1996 disaster and offers an explana-
tion for the incident by drawing on one of the venerable
theories of group decision making. Groupthink, as Janis
(1972, 1982) explained, is a distorted style of thinking
that renders group members incapable of making sound
decisions. After examining a series of famously bad de-
cisions, Janis identified three key antecedents of group-
think: high interpersonal cohesion, a provocative
context (e.g., situational pressures, isolation from other
groups), and strong leaders who stated their preferences
clearly (i.e., directive leadership style).

For Janis, the critical condition for groupthink was a
sense of strong solidarity, friendship, and respect within
the group. The Everest climbing teams were not cohe-
sive, at least in this interpersonal sense. As one mem-
ber wrote, we “were a team in name only” (Krakauer,
1997, p. 163). The Everest groups were, however, ex-
tremely cohesive in a different sense of the word: they
were united in a shared commitment to their task. Al-
though interpersonal cohesion is often indexed by the
strength of group members’ bonds to one another and
to the group, task cohesion depends on members’ shared
drive to accomplish their goals (Guzzo, 1995). The

JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 4 • Number 4 • DOI:10.1002/jls 31

professional high-altitude climbers who guided the
clients. Hall’s team consisted of 15 members and profes-
sional guides Mike Groom and Andy Harris, and local
guides, known as sherpas, who play an integral role on
expeditions. Fischer’s team consisted of 12 members,
guides Neal Beidleman and Anatoli Boukreev, and sher-
pas. After nearly six weeks on the mountain acclimatiz-
ing and preparing, the expeditions set out for the
summit in the early morning of May 10, 1996, from
Camp IV, which was established at 26,100 feet.

The climb to the summit is a choreographed under-
taking. Midnight departures are common on Everest
since they improve the chances of an early summit and
a safe return to Camp IV before late afternoon storms
arrive and darkness falls. Expeditions also typically es-
tablish and adhere to deadlines for reaching the sum-
mit. This turn-around time is established since
descending in the dark or in poor weather adds unnec-
essary risk to the most difficult part of the climb: the
descent, where “fatigue and inattention” are most
prevalent (Graydon & Hanson, 1997, p. 83). Addi-
tionally, the turn-around time is especially important
on Everest because most climbers use supplemental
oxygen at higher altitudes. When teams set off from
Camp IV, they carry enough oxygen canisters so that at
a conservative flow rate they have 16–17 hours for the
summit push and return. Thus, by 4:00 or 5:00 p.m.
climbers run out of oxygen, making hypothermia,
frostbite, high-altitude cerebral edema (HACE), and
high-altitude pulmonary edema (HAPE) more likely
(Krakauer, 1997). Teams adhere to a set turn-around
time to minimize excessive risk of lack of oxygen,
storms, and descending in the dark. On Everest, a noon
turnaround is cautious, and a 2:00 p.m. time is consid-
ered risky.

During the May 10, 1996, attempt to reach the sum-
mit, time started to become more of a factor as climbers
waited to ascend the “Balcony” section of the climb,
which requires fixed ropes—climbing lines that are an-
chored to the mountain and used as an extra safety pre-
caution in especially steep or exposed areas. Numerous
climbers all attempting the summit on the same day
made the more technical parts of the climb slower,
and climbers began to worry about the fast-
approaching designated turn-around time. By 2:00 p.m.
only Neal Beidleman, Andy Harris, Anatoli Boukreev,

Jon Krakauer, Klev Schoening, and Martin Adams had
summited. The remaining expedition members should
have turned around at that time. Climbers in both
teams, however, continued to the summit until about
3:30 in the afternoon. This decision to ignore the turn-
around time, combined with a (relatively common) late
afternoon storm that brought snow, winds, and colder
temperatures, resulted in clients running out of supple-
mental oxygen during the descent. Three groups
of clients and guides became stranded and lost sight of
their camp. Beidleman, who had started to lead a phys-
ically deteriorating group of clients that included
Pittman, Gammelgaard, Fox, and Madsen toward safety,
had trouble finding the camp during the descent. As
the conditions continued to worsen, the group was un-
able to continue. Hall and a client, Doug Hansen, were
stranded just below the summit, and Fischer and one
of the sherpas, Lopsang Jangbu, were in trouble at about
27,200 feet.

Hall, Harris, Yasuko Namba, Hansen, and Fischer all
died that evening. The clients in the group guided by
Beidleman could have died, as well, had it not been for
the skill of Beidleman, Boukreev, and the sherpas.
Beidleman, during a break in the weather, used the stars
to identify the direction of Camp IV. The clients
who could walk on their own (Schoening and
Gammelgaard) set out with Beidleman, Groom, and the
two sherpas to get help and managed to reach the safety
of Camp IV. By 4:30 a.m.—nearly dawn—Boukreev
had managed to rescue Pittman, Fox, and Madsen.
However, Weathers and Namba were left for dead.
Weathers miraculously managed to stumble back to
Camp IV despite severe frostbite and hypothermia. Of
the six climbers on Hall’s team to reach the summit,
only Mike Groom, a guide, Krakauer, and Weathers
made it down alive.

Although such a disaster is without a doubt a com-
plex issue with multiple contributors, we propose that
the climbers proceeded, under the direction of the
leader, to continue beyond the turn-around time, and
this decision was triggered by groupthink.

Groupthink Analysis
Not all groups that fail suffer from groupthink. Corpo-
rate boards make faulty decisions not because of a

32 JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 4 • Number 4 • DOI:10.1002/jls

Building on previous research offering alternatives to
interpersonal cohesion as a key antecedent, we too argue
for another potential contributor. Namely, in the cur-
rent analysis we use the events of the May 1996 Everest
disaster to propose that task cohesion can replace inter-
personal cohesion as a catalyst for concurrence seeking.
Additionally, we focus on the role of directive leader-
ship as a key component. We answer three fundamen-
tal questions suggested by Janis, before concluding that
the decision on Mount Everest was due, at least in part,
to groupthink. First, was the outcome the result of the
collaborative actions of individuals? Second, did
the group make not just a mistake but instead a blun-
der that could have been avoided? Third, were the an-
tecedent conditions (i.e., cohesion, directive leadership,
and provocative situational context) and groupthink
symptoms (e.g., concurrence seeking) present? In an-
swering the question regarding antecedent conditions,
we review scholarly work on the history of cohesion as
a multifaceted construct and emphasize the critical im-
pact of the leader. Initially, however, we focus on our
reasoning for suggesting the group as the decision maker
and the faulty nature of the decision.

THE GROUP AS DECISION MAKER

Groupthink, by definition, is a group-level process. In-
dividuals can make bad decisions, and they do so with
remarkable regularity, but only a group experiences
groupthink. However, because groups make decisions
in a variety of ways, the question “Was this a group de-
cision?” is not easily answered. In some of the cases Janis
(1972) analyzed, the leader of the group made final de-
cisions for the group, but he did so with input from his
advisors. The leader took responsibility for the outcome,
but his advisors shared in the decision process (Abbasi &
Hollman, 1991; Raven, 1998). Similarly, on Mount
Everest the head guide structures the expedition and is
responsible for the outcome, but the other guides and
expedition members take part in the process. The shared
nature of the group decision is indicated, indirectly, by
the degree of guilt expressed regarding disregard for the
turn-around time. For example, one guide, Beidleman,
remarked “now I kick myself for it,” where it refers to
the decision to continue climbing (Krakauer, 1997).
We suggest that regarding the turn-around time this
was a group decision, albeit one made primarily by the

“deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and
moral judgment” (Janis, 1972, p. 9) but because their
members lack requisite skills and experiences (LeBlanc &
Gillies, 2005). As Kowert (2002) explains, errors by
U.S. President Ronald Reagan and his advisors, such as
their handling of the budget crisis and the Iran-Contra
situation, resulted from Reagan’s decision-making style
and the advisors’ inability to reach agreement. In many
cases, business failures, such as the Millennium Dome
in London and cost overruns at Denver International
Airport, can be blamed on basic foibles of human deci-
sion makers, such as the tendency to overestimate one’s
capabilities, and the strong desire to recoup sunk costs
(Nutt, 2002).

In the current analysis, we propose that groupthink
remains a viable explanation for some of the fiascos and
blunders that continue to plague groups (Baron, 2005;
Moorhead, Neck, & West, 1998). Namely, we suggest
that Hall’s and Fischer’s teams did not make faulty
judgments due to lack of necessary skill, nor did they
consciously make a risky choice. Rather, we propose
that the groups succumbed to groupthink, a style of
thinking that rendered them unable to consider all
necessary components and consequences. Groupthink
occurs apart from the usual sources of human error,
as groups fall prey to concurrence-seeking tendencies
(Whyte, 1998). Although Janis’s original model ar-
gued that the key cause of consensus seeking resulted
from interpersonal cohesion, more recent analyses in-
dicate that additional variables may help explain the
tendency to seek agreement (Street & Anthony, 1997).
For example, a groupcentrism model suggests that
groups tend to rush to make judgments on the basis of in-
sufficient information (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, &
De Grada, 2006). In a re-analysis of many of Janis’s
original case-studies, Whyte (1998) suggested that
groupthink-style decision making stems primarily from
collective efficacy rather than interpersonal cohesion.
A self-regulatory model of groupthink argues that goals
and feedback on goal pursuits are relevant antecedents
(Flippen, 1999). Baron (2005), after reviewing much
of the existing research on Janis’s theory, agreed with
Janis that members of groups often strive for consen-
sus, but his ubiquity model of groupthink suggested
that a threat to shared social identity was the driving
force.

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leaders. The shared commitment to reaching the sum-
mit, the closed nature of the leadership, the extreme cir-
cumstances, and ultimately the subsequent consensus
seeking influenced the leaders’ decision to push on well
beyond a safe turn-around time.

MISTAKE OR AVOIDABLE BLUNDER?

Classifying the Everest disaster as a case of groupthink
requires answering a second key question: “Was the de-
cision to continue objectively faulty?” An Everest climb
is a dangerous undertaking, even under the best of con-
ditions with the most skilled and well-led climbers. Of
the expeditions climbing Everest between 1980 and
2002, a total of 91 climbers and 38 porters (sherpas)
died. During the spring season of 1996, the fatality rate
reached 7.5% for the expeditions who climbed the
South Col route (the common route and the one
climbed by Hall’s and Fischer’s teams). Approximately
one in 10 expeditions suffered the death of more than
one team member. Everest is considered one of the most
dangerous climbs in the world, second only to the
mountain called K2 in difficulty (Huey et al., 2007).
However, of the climbers attempting the summit
Hall’s team suffered a death rate of closer to 30%, and
Fischer’s team would have had a similar fatality rate if
not for the skill of the guides in rescuing a number of
stranded clients.

Defective decision making turned this hazardous
summit attempt into a fatal one. The decision to climb
far past the designated turn-around deadline provides
a bright-line indicator of error. A feature story published
six weeks prior to the expedition stressed Fischer’s phi-
losophy about turn-around times: “Every climber has a
set of personal guidelines that he or she follows, Little
Stay Alive Rules. One of Fischer’s is the Two O’Clock
Rule. If you are not on top by two, it is time to turn
around. Darkness is not your friend.” As Krakauer
writes, “Certainly time had as much to do with the
tragedy as the weather, and ignoring the clock can’t be
passed off as an act of God. Predetermined turn-around
times were egregiously ignored” (1997, p. 273).

Climbing experts agree that the groups should not
have pushed on beyond the turn-around time. Hillary,
after hearing the details of the failed expeditions, con-
cluded that tragedy was not an “accident,” for it was
caused by the slow ascent to the summit (quoted in

Dowling, 1996). Ed Viesturs, an expert on high-
altitude climbing, was present on the mountain in
1996. He watched in disbelief as the teams pushed for
the summit, thinking, “Guys, you left at midnight. It’s
two o’clock! It’s going to be three or four before you get
to the summit.” As he watched the climbers continue
upward he wondered, “Dudes, what are you doing?
Wake up! Guys, turn around, turn around” (Viesturs,
1996, p. 1). However, Fischer’s and Hall’s expeditions
failed to adhere to the strict two o’clock rule—a mis-
take that turned deadly.

GROUPTHINK ANTECEDENTS AND
SYMPTOMS

Although the decision to continue climbing was a faulty
one, unless the groups exhibited the key antecedents
and symptoms the teams could not have experienced
groupthink, at least as originally defined by Janis
(1972). The third component of arguing for a group-
think analysis of a particular case is to illustrate that the
key antecedent conditions and symptoms of groupthink
were present. In the current study, we consider the mul-
tidimensional nature of group cohesion (Dion, 2000)
before elaborating on the critical role of the leaders, and
provocative context in contributing to the consensus
seeking and ultimately the poor decision to ignore the
turn-around time.

Cohesion. The first and most critical catalyst of group-
think is cohesion. Early work on cohesion suggested it
was a culmination of factors, such as attraction to the
members, prestige of the group, and collective pursuit of
goals (Festinger, 1950). However, subsequent empiri-
cal analyses, including Janis’s case studies, typically op-
erationalized cohesion in terms of interpersonal
attraction (Lott & Lott, 1965). During the 1950s
through the early 1970s, the dominant perspective was
that cohesion was a one-dimensional construct that had
similar impacts on relevant outcomes despite potential
subcomponents. After Cartwright (1968) and Hackman
(1976) raised concerns about this unitary definition, stud-
ies began to offer evidence for multidimensionality
(e.g., Carless & De Paola, 2000; Cota, Evans, Dion,
Kilik, & Longman, 1995). This history is important for
our paper. Although Janis may not have directly artic-
ulated that interpersonal attraction was the only source

34 JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 4 • Number 4 • DOI:10.1002/jls

less experienced than the leader. On Everest commercial
expeditions, the leadership style of the head guides is
often more directive. As Krakauer (1997) noted, “For
safety’s sake, a responsible guide . . . simply can’t afford
to let each client make important decisions independ-
ently” (p. 168). Rather, the leader guides the group. This
philosophy is functional in theory and perhaps necessi-
tated by the situation, but such a directive leadership
style makes groups significantly more prone to group-
think (Kramer, 1998).

The nature of directive leadership raises the issue of
what constitutes a group decision. For example, is it
that the leader obtains a vote, getting input from each
and every member? In past groupthink analyses, this
has not typically been the case. For example, the United
States clearly did not vote to fail to carefully monitor
Japanese warship movements in the Pacific prior to Pearl
Harbor, yet this is a classic groupthink example. Is a
group meeting required for a group decision? Again, for
many of the famous groupthink groups, such as the Wa-
tergate burglars, the members did not “meet” or directly
discuss their series of choices to cover up the incident.
In the current case-study analyses, we are not suggesting
that at some point during the climb a leader directly
stated to all members, “I’ve decided the expeditions
should continue on beyond the turn-around time; does
everyone agree?” The style employed on summit day
makes such a direct collective decision impossible, as
does the nature of directive leadership. We argue that
such an explicit announcement of a group choice is not
required for something to be a group decision. Rather,
we propose that the climbers proceeded to the summit
beyond the turn-around time under the direction of the
leader, and this was precipitated by groupthink consen-
sus seeking.

On Everest, neither the second guides nor the clients
voiced their concerns about the groups’ decision to con-
tinue the push toward the summit well beyond a safe
turn-around time. Krakauer noted that Beidleman
(a guide on Fischer’s team) acknowledged, after the ex-
pedition, that “I tried not to be too pushy. As a conse-
quence, I did not always speak up when maybe I should
have” (Krakauer, 1997, p. 260). Experienced and capa-
ble guides such as Beidleman censured themselves in
large part due to the directive leadership and in part
due, to the desire to reach the team goal of the summit.

of cohesion necessary for groupthink, Janis’s case stud-
ies focused primarily on the interpersonal nature of co-
hesion, as did subsequent empirical investigations of
groupthink.

Our model, in contrast, draws on studies of perfor-
mance groups that suggest cohesion is often based on
commitment to a task, rather than to the group and its
members. Studies of a variety of task-oriented groups,
such as teams, military squads, and expeditions, find
that when asked to describe their team’s cohesiveness
members stress the quality of their group’s ability to per-
form as a unit (Guzzo, 1995). Similarly, the expeditions
on Everest exhibited high task cohesion as team mem-
bers shared a common goal. Each member trained for
months or years; endured extreme ailments such as
painful coughing spurts, frigid temperatures, months
away from family and friends; and paid as much
as $65,000 to be part of the expedition. To succeed,
each person needed to focus, put personal issues aside,
and function as part of a unified group committed to
reaching the summit. Emerson (1966) noted in his eval-
uation of Everest and goal striving that, in considera-
tion of the heavy toll and long commitment required
for high-altitude expeditions, group goal-oriented mo-
tivation had to be very powerful to overcome such a
harsh setting. These groups come together with the sole
purpose of reaching the summit. Unlike club-style ex-
peditions among friends, commercial expeditions are
groups that come together with the sole purpose of
reaching the summit. These groups therefore typically
lack interpersonal cohesion and loyalty to one another;
rather, the groups on Everest share commitment to the
collective goal of reaching the summit (Kayes, 2006).
This extreme task cohesion can result in what moun-
taineers often call “summit fever.” We suggest not only
that the deterioration in group performance is due to
an excessive desire to achieve the desired goals but also
that this commitment, combined with directive leader-
ship and other antecedents of groupthink, contributes
to consensus seeking.

Directive Leadership. Directive leadership entails telling
followers what needs to be done and giving appropriate
guidance along the way (House & Mitchell, 1974).
Directive leadership is most often used when the task
is unstructured and complex and when the follower is

JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 4 • Number 4 • DOI:10.1002/jls 35

Janis argued that when leadership is overly directive,
group processes form the basis for and sustain consen-
sus behaviors that can lead to groupthink. It was not
that Beidleman or the clients lacked the experience to
offer valuable feedback. Rather, groupthink triggered
self-censorship, with the result that qualified guides
failed to express concerns. Unintended as it may have
been, a norm was created in which potential concerns
about safety came second to protecting the goal of
reaching the summit of Everest, which is stressed by the
paying clients. We suggest that this norm developed out
of the directive leadership style coupled with high task
cohesion.

Provocative Situational Context. Cohesive groups cope
well with routine problems, but the advantages of cohe-
sion may be lost not only if a leader is overly directive
but also if groups face a stressful environment (Driskell,
Salas, & Johnston, 1999). The imminence of death, the
intense amount of time and money invested in reaching
the top, and the uncontrollable objective dangers (e.g.,
avalanches, icefalls, crevasses, poor weather) make stress
an inevitable part of mountaineering expeditions. These
stressors are constantly present in mountaineering, but
in May 1996 the addition of journalists, an IMAX film
crew, and two expeditions competing for the same clien-
tele created additional anxieties. When Beck Weathers (a
client on Hall’s team) was interviewed by ABC News
about having a reporter on his expedition team, he
replied, “It added a lot of stress. I was always a little con-
cerned about the idea. . . . you know, this guy’s going to
come back and write a story that’s going to be read by a
couple of million people” (Krakauer, 1997, p. 174).

Another component of a provocative situational con-
text is the role of recent failures. This antecedent condi-
tion could be seen on Hall’s team, the one that endured
the majority of casualties. The year before, while guid-
ing on Everest, Hall had turned all his clients around
just below the summit because the team had failed to
reach the top before the turn-around time. Hansen, a
client on Hall’s team, had failed on the past expedition
to make the summit, and this year Hall was determined
to help him reach the top. A year later, on the 1996 ex-
pedition, Hansen made it to the summit with the sup-
port of Hall, but not until 4:00 p.m. However, this time
turned out to be too late for a safe descent.

In summary, our analysis of the events of the May
1996 Everest tragedy illustrates the presence of the key
groupthink antecedents, including high task cohesion,
directive leadership, and a provocative context. Thus
far, we sought to elaborate on Janis’s original model by
highlighting the multifaceted nature of group cohesion
and the critical role of the leader. However, it is neces-
sary not only to illustrate the antecedents but also to
elaborate on the symptoms of groupthink. Janis (1982)
noted that cohesiveness, leadership, and decisional stress
may cause a group to experience groupthink, whereas
the factors of overestimation of the group, closed-
mindedness, and pressure toward uniformity are symp-
toms suggesting a group has fallen prey to groupthink
(Henningsen, Henningsen, Eden, & Cruz, 2006). We
now assess the events of May 1996 and examine which
symptoms of groupthink were present.

Groupthink Symptoms: Overestimation of the Group.
Janis argued that overestimation of the group increases
because of feeling “close” to the group members. In the
current analysis, overestimation of the group’s ability is
also a groupthink symptom, though one based on an
exaggerated commitment to the group goal. The clients’
commitment grew as they watched their talented head
guides lead them safely to high camp, through difficult
logistical challenges and complex route finding. The
clients and guides developed an illusion of invulnera-
bility and thus failed to focus on another extremely dan-
gerous aspect of the climb: late afternoon storms high
on the mountain. The characteristics of optimism, the
leader’s assurance of success, and the belief that some-
thing never done before can be accomplished are
strongly reminiscent of groupthink.

Pressure Toward Uniformity. In the traditional group-
think model, uniformity characterizes groups experi-
encing groupthink because members do not wish to
offend one another and risk undermining the group’s
bond. In the present framework, uniformity is high be-
cause all the members shared the same goal. Each ex-
pedition wanted to ensure a chance at the summit, and
dissenting information would have hindered that goal.
For example, Lene Gammelgaard on Fischer’s team re-
marked, “Can’t help but admire Scott’s decision. This kind
of gambling must be what’s gotten him to the summit so

36 JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 4 • Number 4 • DOI:10.1002/jls

expeditions viewed one another with some degree of dis-
trust, given that they were competitors seeking the same
goal. The teams also tended to stereotype some of the
other groups present on the mountain that season,
among them the Taiwanese and South African expedi-
tions. This stereotyping of outgroups is characteristic of
typical groupthink-based decision making in which in-
group members are viewed as “morally” right whereas
outgroups are viewed as enemies or morally wrong.
Krakauer (1996) described how Hall reacted after Ian
Woodall, the South African expedition leader, declared
that the South Africans would go for the summit when-
ever it suited them. Hall exclaimed, “I don’t want to
be anywhere near the upper mountain when those pun-
ters are up there” (Krakauer, 1997, p. 142).

Discussion
In summary, using reviews of personal accounts, media
descriptions, online interviews, and past empirical pa-
pers describing the May 1996 Everest disaster, we of-
fered evidence for an adapted framework through which
the groupthink phenomenon can be examined. These
events on Everest, viewed in the context of groupthink,
form a coherent pattern illustrating the applicability of
task cohesion and directive leadership in explaining how
groups can respond to a stressful and extreme environ-
ment. As opposed to the original groupthink model pro-
posed by Janis, which focused on interpersonal cohesion,
we proposed that task cohesion can contribute to an un-
derstanding of how such a skilled group of climbers with
prominent leaders decided to ignore the turn-around
time. We sought to use this provocative case analysis
as a means of introducing our scholarly analysis of
groupthink driven by high task cohesion and directive
leadership. We recognize that groupthink is only one
explanation in a multifaceted process. The weather pat-
terns, communication and lack thereof with other ex-
peditions, high altitude, and other less controllable
factors are also present on mountaineering expeditions.

Our goal in this Everest case study analysis was not to
lay blame on the expedition leaders. Rather, we sought
to use this analysis to illustrate our theoretical proposi-
tion, namely, that task cohesion may serve as a catalyst
of groupthink decision making when coupled with di-
rective leadership and a provocative context. Replace-
ment of interpersonal cohesion with task cohesion as a

many times. I would have chosen a wider margin of
safety and waited below for more stable conditions. But
I want to summit and have no scruples. Apparently no-
body else does either” (Gammelgaard, 1996, p. 160).
Boukreev, one of the guides, admitted later that he
chose to go along with the group, even though he had
misgivings: “I tried not to be argumentative, choosing
instead to downplay my intuitions” (Boukreev &
DeWalt, 1997, p. 140). The illusion of unanimity stems
in part from the silence of self-censorship and occurs
when members share the illusory belief that they are
unanimous in their judgments. Clients and guides self-
censored information that could have been critical to
the groups’ safety because of a vehement commitment
to reach the summit and a desire not to impede prog-
ress. These two expeditions failed to establish an envi-
ronment where diversity of opinion and involvement
of all team members was encouraged. Group members
viewed dissenting opinions as potentially detrimental
to accomplishing the ultimate goal. However, express-
ing disagreement might have prevented a risky decision,
one that turned fatal (see Hobman, Bordia, & Gallois,
2003, for a discussion of beneficial task conflict and
value dissimilarity in groups).

Closed-Mindedness of the Group. Collective rational-
ization and ingroup-outgroup biases were also evident.
Both teams rationalized their choices by referring to the
basic goal: to reach the summit. They became so com-
mitted to their goal that they rationalized pushing on
well beyond a safe turn-around time. In fact, Hall was so
committed to reaching the summit that, prior to the May
1996 expedition, he practically guaranteed Hansen a
chance to reach the top of Everest; Hall even offered him
a discount on the guiding fee to return since Hansen
came very close to reaching the summit the previous year
(Krakauer, 1997). Although this may be a common prac-
tice in keeping client satisfaction high in order to pro-
mote referrals, Hall felt an added stress to help Hansen
reach the goal of the summit.

Stereotypes of outgroups, another groupthink symp-
tom reflective of closed-mindedness, are most promi-
nent in political decisions regarding attacking or
invading another nation. Among mountaineering groups
on Everest, decisions mostly concerned intragroup pro-
cesses. However, outgroups were still present. The two

JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 4 • Number 4 • DOI:10.1002/jls 37

driving force in the current analysis parallels research in
which limited support has been offered for the role of
interpersonal cohesion in groupthink laboratory studies
(for reviews, see Aldag & Fuller, 1993; Park, 1990,
2000; see also Esser, 1998; Neck & Moorhead, 1995).
For example, Flowers (1977), Fodor and Smith (1982),
and Callaway and Esser (1984) all found no detrimen-
tal effects of interpersonal cohesion on group decision
making. Indeed, some empirical studies have demon-
strated that high interpersonal cohesion leads members
to exhibit less self-censorship (Leana, 1985).

If experimental studies lack support for the importance
of interpersonal cohesion, why do many case analyses
(e.g., Cuban Missile Crisis, Challenger Space Shuttle Dis-
aster, Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster, Gulf War II) fur-
nish evidence that interpersonal cohesion plays a role in
faulty decision making (Moorhead, Ference, & Neck,
1991)? In laboratory tests, the role of cohesion could
be difficult to discern, owing to the lack of other neces-
sary conditions of groupthink. It is challenging in the
lab, with ad hoc groups, to create the status differenti-
ation, time pressure, and stressful circumstances that
surround real-world decision-making situations.

Additionally, we suggest that researchers must distin-
guish between excessive task cohesion and interpersonal
cohesion in examining groupthink decision making. As
Bernthal and Insko (1993) noted, “A logical step in the
groupthink research is to launch an effort to compare
social-emotional and task-oriented cohesive groups in
the groupthink model” (p. 68). Furthermore, in our
analysis of the Everest case, we argue that a key com-
ponent of the groupthink model that must be incorpo-
rated into investigations is the role of directive
leadership. Leaders who encourage open discussion can
harness task cohesion for increased performance rather
than stifling dialogue through directive styles.

LIMITATIONS

The selection of a single case study design naturally
brings forth limitations. One of the main concerns of
case study research is the potential lack of generalizabil-
ity. Thus the setting, the groups, and the exact details of
the spring 1996 climbing season on Mount Everest can
only be seen as a pilot context of group decision-
making processes. On the other hand, this also repre-
sents a key goal of conducting a case study analysis. We

hoped that by understanding this particular case we
might eventually also learn something that could be ap-
plied to other groups and situations.

Another potential limitation of case study analysis is
the lack of experimental control and the post hoc the-
orizing. For example, it is less clear in our analysis which
of the antecedents is the leading cause of defective
decision making. However, case studies retain more of
the “noise” of real life, and in studying groupthink this
allows all the antecedents and symptoms to be more
readily studied. For example, a provocative situation
and directive leadership, although readily available for
study in case analyses, can be difficult to introduce to ad
hoc groups in lab settings. Future research could build
on the current analysis and test the assumptions using
more traditional, laboratory-based, a priori hypothesis
testing to offer support for the proposed model.

Despite limitations, case studies are fruitful grounds
for conceptual and theoretical development. To our
knowledge, we are the first to propose a framework that
replaces interpersonal cohesion with task cohesion to
examine groups who come together with the sole pur-
pose of reaching a shared goal other than securing a con-
sensual decision. The case study analysis builds the
foundation from which future research can examine
the role of task cohesion, leadership, and extreme envi-
ronments within the groupthink framework. For exam-
ple, avenues exist for future laboratory and case study
research to examine how the interplay between task and
interpersonal cohesion can help to reduce poor decision
making on mountaineering expeditions and in extreme
contexts in general. Early work by Bernthal and Insko
(1993) started to explore this question, but more work
is needed that incorporates leadership theory. For exam-
ple, on a larger scale researchers could experimentally
manipulate task versus interpersonal cohesion, directive
versus open leadership, norms versus no procedures for
decision making, or constraints versus unlimited time
to establish what combination of conditions most com-
monly leads to risky decisions. This research could in
turn help leaders make more informed decisions.

APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The model proposed in the current paper can increase the
applicability of groupthink to real-world decisions made by
groups in pursuit of a common goal. Considering the

38 JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 4 • Number 4 • DOI:10.1002/jls

form of groupthink. Additionally, these groups will be
prone to use directive leadership styles to try to achieve
efficiency and clear delineation of roles. As illustrated
in the current analysis, this combination can result in
risky decision making.

What, then, can leaders do to reduce faulty decision
making? Recognizing when groupthink antecedents are
present, leaders could consider adopting leadership styles
that foster more input and membership participation.
For example, recent research highlights shared leader-
ship as an efficient and effective method of facilitating
group processes. Shared leadership, an emergent group
dynamic in which leadership is intentionally distributed
across all team members and not solely held by one des-
ignated person, fosters a climate in which members share
information openly and benefit from the reciprocal in-
fluence of peers (Carson, Tesluk, & Marrone, 2007). As
research related to the benefits of shared leadership con-
tinues to emerge, a shift in leadership toward a more in-
clusive style may help alleviate the pitfalls of high task
cohesion in the context of groupthink.

Summary
In the current paper, we argued that the shared pursuit
of a common goal coupled with directive leadership and
a provocative situation can lead groups composed of
well-functioning team members and skilled leaders to
take excessive risks. Although additional empirical re-
search is still needed to investigate a task-cohesion-
focused groupthink framework, the present research of-
fers initial evidence of its applicability and can enhance
our understanding of group decision making. Leaders
who are aware of the potentially deleterious effects of
overly high task cohesion may foster vigilant decision
making and a more optimal decision-making process
(e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977; McCall, Trombetta, &
Nattrass, 2002). However, prior to putting workplace
implementations into practice, more systematic empir-
ical research is needed. We hope our case study analysis
of the Everest disaster fosters such future explorations.

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Jeni L. Burnette is an assistant professor in the Department
of Psychology at the University of Richmond. She received her
Ph.D., in social psychology, from Virginia Commonwealth
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richmond.edu.

Jeffrey M. Pollack is an assistant professor of management
in the Robins School of Business at the University of Rich-
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University. He can be reached at jpollack@richmond.edu.

Donelson R. Forsyth is a professor in the Jepson School of
Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond where he
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What are your key takeaway points from the Burnette, Pollack, and Forsyth article?  Identify and explain at least two key takeaways.

Definition just in case you need another word.

Groupthink: A way of group deliberation that minimizes conflict and emphasizes the need for unanimity.