The age old saying of “there’s more than one way to skin a cat” has served as a clichéd phrase to adequately illustrate and paint the canvas of the archetypal process, exemplar standard or the perfect specimen isn’t the only path to success. This expression has been applicable as life advice, in competitive sports, career choices, as well as habitual daily-life in achieving greatness, the idiom has also lent to International Relations. Cooperation at any level is considered an achievement in all respectful fields; the ability to set aside differences, identify commonality for a purpose and the overlapping determination in reaching that ambition. The success of cooperating in International Relations takes the form of nation states coming together in alliance on the basis of commonality towards an ambitious goal, furthering into nation states in regions linking arms in pursuit for a collective objective. This profound bond is the grouping of nation states in a region exuding behaviors as a collective who understand differences, identify common interests and strive towards a unified goal. The examples of regionalization would be of the European Union, the EU, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. While the two regional groupings have been known to be successful, the level of integration between the two differ quite considerably. The EU’s level of integration furthers ASEAN by many folds; the ability to integrate not only areas for free trade, but the unification of the market, currency, common passport, a customs union and a commonality in foreign policy as a region all through a common institution. The overwhelming success of the European Union dwarfs that of ASEAN where the Asian counterpart has only been able to achieve integration regionally through free trade and economic movement. The difference in level of integration begs the question of whether the EU model has the ability to befit that of ASEAN and provide guidelines and prove to be exemplar in regional integration. To begin whether the EU model is capable of providing as a structural guideline for ASEAN, we inspect the circumstances of the purpose each integration from its origins, and examine the validity of the two then systematically determine whether the EU model is capable of befitting that of ASEAN to achieve paralleling success in the East.

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The integration of the European Union is
herald as the greatest union of nation states in a region, highest achievement
in integration of a common currency, customs union, single market, common
passport and foreign policy under a common institution. The ability for the
members to share sovereignty and surrender to a collective long-term goal of a
regional cooperation above domestic interests creates a supportive environment in
channeling political will. The European Union marked the pioneer for regional integration
which exhibited a collective ideology of a ‘community approach’ rather than the
traditional balance of power mode accrediting Robert Schuman of France and Konrad
Andenauer of Germany. The collective to channel political will led to the
construction of a legally binding common institution which oversaw the integration
project. This Western model empowered the consensus approach with a pronged initiative
of solidarity and tolerance by not isolating any member regarding major
domestic issues of a banking crisis resulting in an increase in public debt.
Greece represents the first test to the European Union’s Single currency
resulting in a great increase in both public debt and deficit. The consensus
approach meant that Union were hesitant in decision-makings as well as
implementing policies until the vast majority of member states were pursued to
collectively pursue and implement such policies. The process of proposals
passed through the Working Party, then to the Permanent Representatives
Committee (Coreper) then finally a Council configuration secures that a
proposal befits the interests of the entire Union. The willingness to provide
significant financial transfer to help poorer members catch up with the
collective norm meant that stronger members in the Union saw the importance of
financial weaker nation states and placed collective will power above domestic interests
but meant a lag and a pull back on financial capabilities for further advancements.
Under the
leadership of France and Germany meant that Paris and Berlin were the driving force
behind the EU integration, and under this leadership can attribute to the
success of the integration itself in the ability for the two countries to
overlook historical differences between the two and step together for a success
of a better tomorrow. The critical element that make regionalism successful in
Europe in achieving the European Union was the ability to push aside
differences; the capability in reconciling historical pasts. With historical
reconciliation, especially between France and Germany with a turbulent
historical past of the war of 1870, the First and Second World War. The reconciliation brought the
cohesion that allowed for the development of relationship building and the
necessary political will for cooperation and ultimately integration. The
achievement through years of sustained political effort from leaders of both
countries paved way that facilitated the mend of commonality towards sculpting
a regional community. This is a reflection of the European Union’s ability and
‘community approach’ and through a common institution of the European Econmic
Community formed a Free Trade Area, instill a Customs Union that led to a
Single Market and Single Currency. The regional cooperation of economics wasn’t
the limit as foreign policy overlapped amongst the members which allowed for a
common passport. These aspects and byproducts through political will in
achieving an ambitious common goal forged an atmosphere of peace, prosperity
and security in the European environment.
With an ambitious idea seen through to the very end can prove to solidify and validate the EU model of integration especially in its historical record of responding to crisis. The validity of cooperation is tested in the face of turmoil and with such response by the European Union model, this integration has proved time and time again that in crisis it has responded astoundingly, as well establish mechanisms that eliminate repeating failures. Crisis that brought leveraged adversity namely the failed plan for a European Community in 1954 led to the creation of the European Economic Community, the EEC, the empty chair crisis of 1965 led to the de facto acceptance of the Qualified Majority Voting reflecting the consensus approach, QMV, and its eventual acceptance resulting in the 1986 Single European Act. A currency crisis of the 1980s birthed to the European Monetary System and ultimately the Euro, and finally the demise of communism in Europe led to the establishment of a common foreign and security policy paving way for the widest enlargement EU members into the Union’s integration.
In
retrospect, there were many requirements that had to be met for numerous nation
states to come together in unison linked by interests. Requirements that places
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to the test in its own integration. The process of the European integration may
have had the head start and set an example to other regions for the strive for
regionalism but the European Union isn’t without flaws, flaws that once
examined may unveil why the Western model is ill suited for ASEAN. The European
Union has been the most developed model of regional integration, although
historically through common institutions and the sharing of sovereignty for
problem solving, recent crises haven’t been handled well. Shaken by an economic
and financial crisis, and the lack of a timely and coherent response to the
Eurozone crisis called into question the integrity of the union and increased
doubts of the integration process altogether. The financial crisis revealed
structural and institutional fault lines which led to a decline of the Western
orientated world power into one that gave rise to Asia and its market power.
Mechanisms in place that aimed to reverse or buffer the effects of the economic
and financial crisis were economic adjustments or austerity measures but came
off as threatening towards domestic affairs. The adjustments allowed for the
fragility of political cohesion and stability; the Lisbon Treaty, also known as
the Reform Treaty, that replaced the European Constitution. One of major
changes of the Lisbon Treaty will be the new president of the European council with
two and half year term which will replace the current presidency rotating
between member states every six months. Although the Lisbon Treaty sought a
reform that would restructure leadership, it paved way for a failure that would
undermine the integrity of the shared collective that the European union herald
greatly. The obstacle that the Lisbon Treaty faced was that Ireland placed the
Lisbon Treaty on referendum, and the Irish public did not accept the Treaty and
rejected its ratification. With this wave of doubt in the ratification, the Czech
Senate voted for the Lisbon but lacked the signatory approval of the Czech
president, without such proved his Euro-Skeptic attitudes towards it sand
fueled a demonstration of the Czech public who shared disapproval of this
Treaty. With this apparent failure convinced the interests to stray away from
any further institutional changes, “More Europe, no more.” This example
explores that a regional restricting that a shared collective no longer spreads
the region evenly, the region’s interest has slowly diminished and national
interests have overtaken decisions made in this Union. Evident of this change of heart is Germany’s shift in
perception, as one of the strongest advocate and champ of integration, Germany
leaned towards the skeptic camp as well as issuing public doubts of the
Eurozone.
The growing urgency rising from the problems of the European Union is that rapid integration without commensurate strengthening of political and economic institutions. The emerging gaps can allow for lessons to be learned by other regional groupings in terms of institutional capacity and necessary coordination in integration. The challenges that follows of the EU integration can be accredited to fiscal coordination, amidst a worsening of economic outlook the reform adjustments to cleanse the financial system with austerity measures led to fragility of economies of EU member states like Greece, Spain, Portugal and renewed speculation in the financial market.  The second challenge that the European Union faces is a long-standing identity crisis, the Eurozone with 16 members, European Union members allotting at 27 issues a high number heterogeneity.  The attachment of European capital to national sovereignty and its reluctance to give power to Brussels for decision making lends to a decrease in the willingness to share sovereignty. On a recent note, at the Copenhagen climate change conference in December 2009, the EU inability to collectively voice at the conference revealed the Union’s weakness as an international actor. The conclusion of the conference ended with the EU agreeing to a deal that leaders of the region agreed that “no deal would have been a better deal”, endorsing a deal with no legal bindings, and an informal setting of promises to curb emissions speaks volumes on EU being unable to assert itself at the most critical juncture on the world stage and stains the legacy of its integration and its ability to conform to differences and shared sovereignty in the region. If the deal wasn’t endorsed, it would have rallied a collective of voices who share the sentiment that such a deal would make no changes to the environment. The European Union in many of its successes poses numerous present-day challenges that undermine the achievements of this regional integration, its inability to respond to difficulties of a financial crisis and the burdening increase of doubt spreading throughout the region on the crumble of an aligned collective interest.
The Asian counterpart to the European Union is
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, also known as ASEAN. When foreign
ministers from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore
came together to sign the Bangkok Declaration on August 8th, 1976 it
established this newly founded association, in hopes to manage and contain
intra-regional conflicts. The Association grew to ten members with the
additional Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The goal extended to
maintaining peace, and bringing stability in a community marred by war to
ensure that each member is free to pursue domestic development in their
respective nations. The success of ASEAN was the ability to house a community
of nations whom were independent and sovereign with different historical pasts,
multitudes in diversity of languages and beliefs and rarely any overlap of
culture to peacefully co-exist. Aspects of diversifying historical pasts, and intra-regional
conflicts didn’t hinder the forging of the association, the ten Southeast Asian
nations were able to overcome suspicions of one another and set aside latent
hostilities.
ASEAN in its inception established a means of
non-intervention and non-binding agreement, the inability to impose disciplines
on any of its members. The approach to the ASEAN model is under the foundation
of consultation and consensus which allows for a decision based on the majority
before implementation. In attesting the ASEAN model, the process and approach
to solving issues relies on the ‘ASEAN Way’ that reflects and respects cultural
norms in Southeast Asia,
“A working process or style that is informal and personal. Policymakers constantly utilize compromise consensus, and consultation in the informal decision-making process. Quiet diplomacy allows ASEAN leaders to communicate without bringing the discussions into the public view.” (Masilamni and Peterson)
ASEAN did indeed progress but without flaws
and missteps of their own, this Asian collective failed to resemble the
progress of the EU with historical pasts unreconciled and still damaging
relationships between Southeast Asian members. For example, the dispute of the
Preah Vihear Temple located in Cambodia standing as a World Heritage site, struggled
to resolve with Thailand. The historical site stands on Cambodian sovereignty
but was under Thai occupation until Cambodia’s independence in 1954. The UN has
granted that Thailand remove military personnel as the site rightfully belongs
to Cambodia, this territorial dispute has sparks major clashes between the
border of the neighboring Southeast Asian countries. One settled by the United
Nations through the International Court of Justice but stands as contention
between Cambodia and Thailand. Reconciliation hasn’t been an agenda between the
two over a 900-year-old Hindu temple.
Although
there are territorial disputes, and misalignment in political institutions, ASEAN
is by far the most advanced of cooperatives amongst the efforts to regional
groupings, taking the EU not by emulation but by examples. The ability for
ASEAN to adapt progress of the integration model of the EU into ASEAN
applicable means plays homage to the ‘ASEAN way’ of doing things that are
sometimes unorthodox and against the grain. An example of using the EU as an
exemplar inspiration and not by example is regularly sending delegates to
Brussels to seek ideas from the EU experience. In this admiration of
inspiration of the ASEAN of the progress of the EU, displays elements that
differ from the Asian Association to that of the European Union and how the
Western model isn’t necessary applicable to befit the Asian. ASEAN establishes
a strictly inter-governmental body, with no interest in or indication of
relinquishing means to share sovereignty between the nation members, and
additionally, for ASEAN to emulate the EU model would require the ASEAN members
to prerequisite a certain set of requirements to progress into integration
based the EU model. Requirements that predetermine that integration breeds
mutual political will and shared beliefs in the success of the long-term goal
of the high level of integration is historical reconciliation for ASEAN members.
Reconciliation did not take place as the nations differed on many aspects for
example…
Without such reconciliation, the necessary
political will and shared belief towards a long-standing goal of integration on
the merits of shared sovereignty diminished which led to the operations and
leader of ASEAN to be one of inter-governmental rather than through a common
institution. Although ASEAN has made innumerable declarations to emulate the
European Union integration model, their words of rhetoric reflected in their
actions as unmatched with their words.
The present ASEAN development process poses a challenge to the traditional Anglo-Saxon capitalist models as it contested the reformed rules-based system of global governance. The pressure that the EU and the EU places on ASEAN members regarding labor, social environment, and human rights if seen through as a success in pressure assimilation, actually presents itself as a disadvantaging stage in the development of the Asian model if implemented as the model itself is far beyond Western pressures to curb issues. The ideology of ASEAN itself embodied the ‘ASEAN Way’, a means of consultation and consensus, similar to that of the EU model but in the Eastern agenda, practiced non-interference with non-binding agreements to accompany decisions made and policies to follow. The problem with an open-ended agreement meant no enforcement to curb behaviors and the inability to impose disciplines, essentially heavy-hearted words with empty actions to fulfill promises.
ASEAN’s point of enlargement on taking new members in 1997 introduced members of Myanmar and Laos with the expectation to solve and contain regional problems with Myanmar at the time housed a closed economy with a military regime as leadership, economic crisis and cross-border pollution. The trifecta of expectations created the illusion of integration with the confidence between members but instead exhibited loose inter-governmental cooperation. Myanmar’s triple threat posed a threat to an initiating cooperative of its region members but ASEAN overlooked this threat and extended the membership regardless.
“The incorporation of countries like Myanmar
with its military regime and closed economy represented a new extreme in
ASEAN’s diversity. This in itself would have tested the Association’s claim to
deeper integration as ASEAN has not found a way to reconcile its breadth with
its attempts to achieve a greater depth of integration” (Henderson 1999, 74-76).
The ‘ASEAN Way’ became a means to avoid
rather than solve issues and conflict, the complementing of informal operations
and non-binding agreements imposed no tangible means of success and
integration. The ASEAN Way in this examination doesn’t pose as a threat to the
integration of its members but rather examined through a behavioral lens of
informality in actions that isn’t present in the European Union attributes, the
lack of formal operations and behaviors may ill-fit the EU model.
The inceptions of the European Union
juxtaposed with the later formation of ASEAN provides a historical overview on
the ability in identifying commonalities and interests for the two groups of
nations coming together as a collective. In their respective collectives, ASEAN
and the EU share numerous elements that prove their successful integration, but
having the EU being the ‘superior’ model lends the thought of the possibility
to befit the Western model with the Eastern. With the two models explained and
deciphered, we resume the suitability in befitting the EU model within the
fixtures of the ASEAN structure. The two are known and documented as both eliciting
economic integration and community building to both foster and maintain
security as well as further economic development. The best description of
ASEAN’s use of the existing EU model without imposition from the Union to befit
guidelines would be “admiration, not emulation”, this pronounces volumes on the
actions ASEAN have already undertaken from both the successes and failures of
the European Union. The admiration and not emulation can be attributed to
skepticisms especially with Brexit and the consequences of the post-event in
addition to EU-style regional integration increases doubt on the validity of
not the EU model but its emulated nature on ASEAN’s. ASEAN’s inability and
latent behavior to reconcile historical past illustrates the initial step of
ASEAN’s incapability in emulating the EU model. ASEAN has never been more
unanimous on the need for greater integration, but the capacity to make the
necessary domestic political and economic adjustments to implement the reforms
that are necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of integration in uneven
amongst the different ASEAN member states. The late former secretariat to
ASEAN, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, elaborated that the EU served as an inspiration for
ASEAN but never a model. An inspiration to guide ASEAN rather than an imposed
steer of how-to suggests a road heading to demise.
Models
in their generality suggest emulation but downplays learning, without learning
it inhibits growth, change and innovation, emulation doesn’t produce lessons
learned and nor does it generate dynamic innovators but rather passive mimics.
ASEAN can adopt many aspects and successes of the European Union but merely as
an inspiring element and not a full-fledged guide as the two entities differ in
mannerisms, operations and behaviors in their procedures that hinder such
transfer of mimicking. The ASEAN Way of operations is the mannerisms that
prohibits such transfer of guidelines and procedural operations housed by the
European Union, the Qualified Majority Vote suggests a similarity in the
consensus approach but the backroom conferences secluded from the public by
ASEAN members suggests differently.
Emulation creates subjective benchmarks which allows for no feasible alternatives to the dominant model, in the case ASEAN and EU, the imposition of EU onto ASEAN breeds a form of Eurocentrism. The imposition by the EU regardless of validity of model strikes a force by the West onto Asia which romances dominance, although the European Union exhibits soft power with inclinations on intrinsic values, there are other means of assertion rather than projected imposition. The imposed force from the West, although in good intent to improve and expand markets in the East, presents itself as a dominant force by the West to ‘handle’ the East. This imposition and emulation of the EU model would have viewed as the West to overtake the East, and with the current rise of China, Asian nation states wish not to look beyond the Pacific for inspiration let alone a steer from elsewhere.
The necessities that ASEAN must take in order
to inspiringly succeed like the European Union and not simply emulate it would
be to learn from the Union’s failures and adapting it to ASEAN in a manner than
preserves inter-governmental operations as well promote unifying political will
in attaining a long-term goal of sustained integration. An investment that
ASEAN can consider follow in the footsteps of the Union would be placing
national government’s interests of achieving long term goal of regional
integration by all member states above domestic priorities. The push for
integration should be one that synchronizes the public as well as the
government that It is in their vital national interest to integrate. These
elements ‘borrow’ the attributes that the European Union succeeds on and adapts
it to the ASEAN model, this inspiration proves key points for ASEAN to improve
in its own integration but suggests that the EU model needs improvement in
order to be applied. The learning of the crisis in Europe that threatens the
European Union fuels the need for ASEAN to take inspiration from the EU model
rather than at total replicating.
The merits of the European Union serve as
inspiration for ASEAN integration and not as a total guideline for the
Southeast Asian collective, the missteps and struggles of the EU model provides
learning points for ASEAN to improve and implement, the successes of overcome
historical differences between regional members provides reflection that
differences in Southeast Asia are still prominent. The EU model holistically
ill-fits the ASEAN model by the diversifying approach by the two collectives, the
evolved formality of operations by each differ considerably and the approach to
crisis cements that each deal with struggles in differently. The European Union
still stands as the most successful regional collective to integrate upon a
common goal, this Union presents itself as an exemplary model of both trials
and tribulations of nations integrating, one that ASEAN views admirably and inspired.
Success takes many forms and there is no single paved way to achieve it, the
European Union represents one road to success and its success speaks volumes
that outweigh their struggles that on the world stage provides lessons for
inspired regions to integrate. As for the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, it is adamant that ASEAN will make its own Way in achieving a high
level of integration one that doesn’t mimic the EU model but mirrors in its
success.
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