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Global Sourcing Decision-Making Processes: Politics, Intuition, and
Procedural Rationality
Alina Stanczyk1, Kai Foerstl2, Christian Busse3, and Constantin Blome4

1EBS Universit€at f€ur Wirtschaft und Recht
2EBS Universit€at f€ur Wirtschaft und Recht & German Graduate School of Management & Law (GGS)
3Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich
4University of Sussex

G lobal sourcing (GS) is a firmly established phenomenon in modern business practice that requires specific expertise from different organi-zational functions, such as purchasing, production, logistics, and research and development to analyze and select sourcing alternatives
effectively. In this context, global sourcing decision-making (GSDM) processes pose major challenges because two dimensions of functional
politics, namely goal misalignment and power imbalance across functions, appear to influence procedural rationality in a manner not understood
to date. Likewise, intuition also seems to play a role for the procedural rationality of GSDM processes. To elucidate the conditions under which
procedural rationality is hampered or enhanced by politics and intuition, we studied five cross-functional GSDM processes, in front of extant
strategic decision-making literature. We derive formal propositions on how functional politics and intuition influence the procedural

rationality

and present contingencies for the divergent role of intuition as well as functional politics in GDSM processes. Our research contributes to exist-
ing GS literature by providing a theoretical model of important microfoundations of how GSDM processes evolve. The findings also guide
managers on how to structure GSDM processes such that GS projects can be conducted in a more rational fashion.

Keywords: global sourcing; decision-making; functional politics; procedural rationality; intuition; case study

INTRODUCTION

Global trade and thus global sourcing (GS) are ancient phenom-
ena that have existed at least since the second century BC when
the Silk Road was established (Xie et al. 2007). Today, GS is a
firmly established phenomenon in modern business practice
because it enables firms to simultaneously achieve competitive
and comparative advantages (Kogut 1985; Arnold 1989; Kotabe
and Murray 2004). Academic literature has paid considerable
attention to GS antecedents and consequences (Birou and Fawc-
ett 1993; Alguire and Frear 1994; Min 1994; Fawcett and Scully
1998; Leonidou 1999; Petersen et al. 2000; Quintens et al.
2006a; Kotabe and Mudambi 2009). This stream of literature has
specifically focused on the benefits and applicability of low-cost
country sourcing, while less focus has been placed on the study
of the decision-making process as a whole. In this context, it is
important to distinguish between the global sourcing decision-
making (GSDM) process and GS as a specific outcome of this
decision-making process. For instance, if a U.S. firm decides to
source locally after it has considered multiple Asian and South
American sources, then the decision-making process would still
be a GSDM process given that alternative suppliers from around
the globe were considered.

GS is defined as the coordination and integration of common
activities, items, processes, designs, and technologies, across
buying centers and across organizational functions (Trent and
Monczka 2005; Van Weele 2010). The decision-making process
for a specific GS task involves gathering and analyzing diverse
information concerning the technical, logistical, operational, and
financial parameters provided by alternative suppliers. Sourcing

teams are expected to make high-quality decisions based on pre-
cise, accurate, and timely information (Driedonks et al. 2010). In
this paper, we shift the focus to procedural rationality as an ante-
cedent of good GSDM. Procedural rationality relates to the
degree to which parties involved in decision-making processes
demonstrate a desire to make the best possible decision under
the given circumstances (Simon 1978). Specifically, our study
seeks to shed some light on when and how procedural rationality
could be hampered in corporate practice.

The multidimensionality of GS decisions requires manifold
expertise from different functions, such as purchasing, produc-
tion, logistics, and research and development (R&D) for many
purchasing categories (Trent and Monczka 2003; Brodbeck et al.
2007; Van Weele 2010). Specifically, diverging functional opin-
ions concerning the common goal of the process among team
members often pose a major challenge to GSDM processes (Gel-
derman and Semeijn 2006; Moses and �Ahlstr€om 2008). Such
misalignment jeopardizes analytical scrutiny during the process
of information gathering, analyzing solutions, and final decision
making (Dean and Sharfman 1993; Smart and Dudas 2007). In
addition, unequal power distribution across the functions is said
to potentially hamper procedural rationality (Eisenhardt and
Bourgeois 1988), particularly for complex and meaningful deci-
sion tasks (Shrivastava and Grant 1985; Dean and Sharfman
1996). However, it has also been suggested that political behav-
ior does not necessarily cause irrationality in the decision-making
processes; rather, it can also serve as an internal adoption mecha-
nism in rapidly changing environments inside firms that ensures
that all aspects of the decision are well debated (Bourgeois and
Eisenhardt 1988; Elbanna 2006). Moreover, strategic decision-
making literature (Elbanna and Child 2007) and recent research
on sourcing team effectiveness (Kaufmann et al. 2014) do men-
tion intuition and politics in decision making as preconditions to
ensure procedural rationality of cross-functional decision making.
Yet, similar to the impact of politics, the extant literature does

Corresponding author:
Kai Foerstl, German Graduate School of Management & Law
(GGS), Bildungscampus 2, 74076 Heilbronn, Germany; E-mail: kai.
foerstl@ggs.de

Journal of Business Logistics, 2015, 36(2): 160–181 doi: 10.1111/jbl.12090
© Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals

not allow for unambiguous reasoning for intuition either (Shriv-
astava and Grant 1985; Papadakis et al. 1998; Elbanna 2006;
Elbanna and Child 2007). Hence, the effect of functional politics
and intuition on GSDM is unclear, which raised our interest in
exploring how these variables can impact procedural rationality
in GSDM.

In corporate practice, many cross-functional teams experience
conflicts between team members over goals, schedules, and bud-
gets. Even minimal conflicts can result in collaboration costs for
the firm such as delays in completing a project, lower quality or
limited cost savings, which can ultimately transform into real
costs for the firm (Hansen 2009). Such a lack of procedural
rationality in GSDM results in more frequent product quality
problems in offshore sourcing decisions compared to other sourc-
ing alternatives, which indicates that more rigorous and rational
analytic processes might cause companies to refrain from
sourcing from geographically distant suppliers in the first place
(Steven et al. 2014). Moreover, the recent development toward
near-shoring or re-shoring of European and U.S. firms might to
some extent have its origin in poor historic buying firm decisions
(Ellram et al. 2013), potentially caused by intuitive and politi-
cally charged GSDM processes. Yet, the interfunctional and
interpersonal dynamics occurring during the decision process in
such cross-functional GSDM teams have hitherto been mostly
neglected in empirical investigations (Quintens et al. 2006a;
Pagano 2009).

To summarize, the purpose of our research is to investigate the
influences of the two behavioral aspects of decision making,
namely politics and intuition, on procedural rationality of GSDM
processes. Due to the lack of theory at the decision process level
of analysis and because of equivocal prior findings, we relied on
an inductive multiple case study approach to seek an answer to the
following research question: How, when, and why do functional
politics and intuition affect procedural rationality in GSDM?

With our empirical study, we contribute to the extant literature
by providing detailed insights into the origins and characteristics
of functional politics and intuition in GSDM teams. A better
understanding of these barriers should help firms create decision-
making contexts that foster procedural rationality in GSDM,
thereby also contributing to choosing the best possible GS out-
comes. We specifically elaborate on the constellations under
which functional politics and intuition in GSDM have a positive
or a negative impact on procedural rationality. We also hope that
our research opens up a new line of enquiry within GS research
that acknowledges internal complexity and cross-functionality
inherent to GSDM (Ellram and Siferd 1998; Smart and Dudas
2007; Moses and �Ahlstr€om 2008). With the findings presented in

this paper we complement the extant research on how to over-
come bounded rationality in supplier selection processes (Kauf-
mann et al. 2009) and supply management (Carter et al. 2007).

The remainder of this article is structured in five sections. In
the following conceptual background section, we depict our
initial research framework based on a review of GS and corre-
sponding decision-making literature. Subsequently, we describe
our multiple case study methodology. Next, we present the
results of our analysis and develop testable propositions amend-
ing and extending our initial conceptual framework. After dis-
cussing some empirically visible configurations pertaining to the
types of functional politics and intuition, we conclude by
presenting emerging areas for further research that could be
elaborated on in this field.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

By studying the GSDM, we follow a call for more research on
how cross-functional GSDM processes can be conducted effec-
tively (Moses and �Ahlstr€om 2008; Driedonks et al. 2010). To
the best of our knowledge there are only two other publications
investigating the decision process in GS, yet they do so in a pre-
scriptive rather than empirically founded manner; these are the
decision framework of Cavusgil et al. (1993) and a study of
Moses and �Ahlstr€om (2008) on problems in cross-functional
decision making. Thus, we conclude that the GS literature lacks
empirical insights on how the GSDM process actually takes
place in corporate practice. At this point, it is important to men-
tion that initially we focused on procedural rationality as a core
interest in the GSDM process; however, throughout the research
it emerged that politics and intuition are crucial elements of the
process, without which understanding and capturing procedural
rationality can turn out to be incomplete. In our inductive inves-
tigation, we employed conceptualizations of our core constructs
from the GS and strategic decision-making literature (Figure 1).
Our empirical findings yield an understanding of how, why, and
when the concepts of politics and intuition affect the procedural
rationality of GSDM (Whetten 1989).

The GSDM process

Previous academic discussion has only briefly touched on the
GSDM process, thus the most recent literature reviews on GS by
Quintens et al. (2006a) and Pagano (2009) do not elaborate on
the topic. Conversely, sourcing literature is rich in articles about
the operational aspects of GS concerning the parts of the world

Procedural
rationality

Intuition

Global sourcing
decision outcome

Established path
in GS literature

Unexplored path
in GS literature

Functional politics

Research scope

Figure 1: Initial research framework.

Global Sourcing Decision Making 161

in which different commodities can be sourced and which envi-
ronmental and organizational factors drive these GS decisions
(Davis et al. 1974; Giunipero and Monczka 1997; Kotabe and
Mudambi 2009; Maltz et al. 2011; Ellram et al. 2013). Perfor-
mance outcomes of cross-functional integration in sourcing deci-
sions have been found to positively impact firm performance
(Foerstl et al. 2013); however, the decision-making process itself
has remained largely unexplored aside from general remarks and
descriptive analyses.

Authors admit that GSDM is complex (Nydick and Hill 1992;
Smart and Dudas 2007; Moses and �Ahlstr€om 2008) and spans
across multiple functions of expertise (Cousins and Spekman
2003) as it requires recognition and analysis of sourcing alterna-
tives from different perspectives, such as cost, quality, and logis-
tical and technical feasibility (McIvor and Humphreys 2000).
The complexity is evoked by multiple criteria and steps as well
as multiple actors taking part in numerous factors affecting the
process (Min 1994; Van Weele 2010). Mature GS organizations
are considered to live up to this challenge. Therefore, sourcing
strategies are aligned between purchasing, logistics, R&D, and
operations through early purchasing involvement in the product
specification phase (Trent and Monczka 2003). Cross-functional
GSDM is related to decision effectiveness, which in turn is sug-
gested to lead to superior operational and financial performance
of the buying firm (Foerstl et al. 2013).

GS decisions can also impact the entire supply chain (Birou
and Fawcett 1993; Das and Handfield 1997) as they are consid-
ered to be strategic levers affecting quality, cost, and flexibility
of operations in manufacturing firms (Narasimhan and Carter
1990). Van Weele (2010) mentioned product characteristics as a
major variable affecting the buying process. The higher the prod-
uct complexity and commercial uncertainty, the greater the need
to aggregate the functionally segmented knowledge in a coordi-
nated cross-disciplinary team (Fisher 1970; Monczka et al. 2009)
to achieve better decision outcomes (Henke et al. 1993; Giunip-
ero and Vogt 1997). To this aim, authors recommend that the
purchasing function takes on a steering role toward cross-func-
tional integration among the participating functions in GS (Trent
and Monczka 1994, 2003; Monczka et al. 2008). Correspond-
ingly, Moses and �Ahlstr€om (2008) identified functional interde-
pendence and misaligned functional goals as frequent cause of
problems in GSDM processes. However, none of the investiga-
tions provides guidance on how firms can prevent tensions
affecting procedural rationality or how to prevent political behav-
ior or functional power abuse in cross-functional GSDM teams.

GSDM process characteristics

In our pursuit to understand the specific nature of cross-func-
tional GSDM processes throughout the data analysis, we identi-
fied procedural rationality, functional politics, and intuition as
the most prevalent characteristics of decision processes. Strategic
decision-making literature considers those concepts as the most
important ones as well (Shrivastava and Grant 1985).

Procedural rationality in GSDM
We refer to the concept of procedural rationality of Simon
(1978) as the degree to which decision-making processes demon-
strate a desire to make the best possible decision under the given
circumstances. This definition expresses an attempt to gather
information about potential alternatives and to use that informa-

tion in arriving at the final decision. In this context, procedural
rationality refers to the decision-making process as opposed to
the conceptualization of rationality, considering the decision
maker to be omniscient (Simon 1978). Thus, we define it as the
“extent to which the decision process involves the [1] collection
of information relevant to the decision, and [2] the reliance upon
the analysis of this information in [3] making a choice” (Dean
and Sharfman 1993, 1071). For cross-functional GSDM, proce-
dural rationality reflects the scrutiny that all involved depart-
ments contribute to the analysis and the decision outcome (Smart
and Dudas 2007). Empirical studies support the notion that pro-
cedural rationality is positively related to decision-making effec-
tiveness and firm success (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988). It is
hence deemed a suitable dependent variable in our study.

In sourcing, the concept of rationality has been studied from
the supplier management perspective, first identifying decision-
making biases in supply management (Carter et al. 2007) and
then providing de-biasing strategies to mitigate the related pro-
blems (Kaufmann et al. 2009). Moreover, procedural rationality
is elaborated on in the sourcing literature as an analytical
approach toward reaching final sourcing decision (Narasimhan
1983; Nydick and Hill 1992; Min 1994). Overall, sourcing lit-
erature supports the positive impact of procedural rationality on
GSDM effectiveness, so that GS decisions should be based on
analytic scrutiny (Ellram and Siferd 1998). Recent research
found evidence for a certain complementarity between rational-
ity and intuition in decision making to achieve high levels of
decision effectiveness (Kaufmann et al. 2014). Despite the
value of the mentioned studies for the framing of this paper,
existing research has not embraced the cross-functionality of
the GSDM process. With this paper, we seek to narrow this
research gap.

Functional politics in GSDM
Allen et al. (1979) defined organizational politics as “intentional
acts of influence to enhance or protect the self-interest of individ-
uals or groups” (p. 77). The political model of organizations
assumes that decision processes are arenas for parties to compete
to satisfy their needs, although their preferences are very often
not based on organizational, but on individual or subunit goals.
Hence, political behavior seems to be unavoidable (Zaleznik
1970; Dean and Sharfman 1996). This view is supported by Ei-
senhardt and Zbaracki (1992), who consider organizations as
political systems shaped by (1) conflicting interests and (2) vary-
ing power of internal parties (i.e., functions and departments).

First, organizations are formed by people with conflicting pref-
erences and goals. “These preferences arise not only from genu-
ine disagreements about technology and the quality of the
different vendors but also from differences in the managers’
positions within the firm and their perceptions of self-interest

”

(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992, 25). The political characteristic
of a strategic decision-making process contradicts the group
rational model (Eisenhardt 1997). In the political model of orga-
nization, parties are rational as individuals but not collectively
rational (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992). Individuals believe that
they will be affected by the decision outcome, which causes
them to try to influence the decision process to satisfy their per-
sonal needs (Elbanna 2006). As group members of GSDM pro-
cesses are typically employed in different functional areas and
possess different expertise, they may also have conflicting func-
tional interests and needs.

162 A. Stanczyk et al.

Second, the final decision is determined by preferences of
powerful parties. Arndt (1970) defines power as an ability to
instigate others to act according to one’s preferences. According
to Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988), power imbalances trigger
politics. In the sourcing context power is often debated with
respect to buyer–supplier relationships (i.e., power distribution
between firms in the marketplace) (Benton and Maloni 2005;
Crook and Combs 2007; Leonidou et al. 2008). However, in this
research we are interested in the relative internal power of the
involved parties vis-�a-vis each other and its effects (i.e., power
distribution within the hierarchy of the firm) as opposed to the
power a buyer has over the supplier in a specific relationship. In
the internal context, we are referring to the power of a functional
unit in the decision related to a particular sourcing task.

Political tactics that manifest in the decision procedures com-
prise among others coalition formation, negotiation, information
withholding, or information distortion (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt
1988; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992; Dean and Sharfman 1993).
Parties involved in the decision-making process can use data col-
lection and evaluation criteria as tools to manipulate decision
outcomes in their favor (Dean and Sharfman 1993). Bourgeois
and Eisenhardt (1988) ascertain that politics distorts information,
creates animosity and leads to poor performance. Nevertheless,
politics could serve as an important internal adaptation mecha-
nism in a quickly changing environment (Eisenhardt 1997). Fur-
thermore, the resulting negotiations could decrease uncertainty
and enhance acceptance among involved parties (Nutt 2004; Elb-
anna 2006). Finally, politics could ensure that all necessary
aspects of the decision are evaluated (Elbanna 2006). Boddewyn
and Brewer (1994) report that political behavior can occur due to
other resources, such as privileged information, ability to perform
a task, or a person’s time.

The sourcing literature does not specifically integrate politics
in the internal decision-making process, yet authors provide evi-
dence for friction between functions in cross-functional coopera-
tion (Gelderman and Semeijn 2006; Van Weele 2010). In
particular, the arena of GSDM is potentially affected by political
behavior and power influences of decision team members due to
the multidimensionality of the performance outcomes and the
trade-offs between dimensions (Smart and Dudas 2007; Van We-
ele 2010). Moses and �Ahlstr€om (2008) described functional
information interdependence, the lack of a holistic view by the
individual contributors, unstructured process design, ad hoc deci-
sion making, and misaligned functional strategies as hurdles to
attaining procedural rationality in GSDM. Especially misaligned
functional goals and functional interdependence are well reflected
in the concept of functional politics. To this date, we are una-
ware of GS literature that empirically explores whether such
political distortions affect procedural rationality in GSDM.

Intuition in GSDM
Intuition in strategic decision-making literature has mainly been
investigated by management theorists and psychologists, while
empirical management research on the topic is lacking (Elbanna
et al. 2013). Elbanna (2006) concludes that intuition is difficult
to characterize because many researchers define it differently,
and hence there is no unity in the description. We rely on the
definition of Elbanna et al. (2013), who state that intuition is a
“mental process based on gut feeling as opposed to explicit, sys-
tematic analysis, which yield an intuitive insight or judgement
that is used as a basis for decision making” (p. 150). Researchers

generally perceive intuition as an information-processing act that
differs from cognitive processes (Dayan and Elbanna 2011) as it
is associated with relying on hunch (Miller and Ireland 2005) or
gut feeling (Hayashi 2001). Most decision-making literature
assumes that rational processes result in better outcomes than
intuitive ones (Elbanna 2006). However, intuitive processes help
to speed up decision processes and are useful in solving less
complex problems (Dayan and Elbanna 2011). Moreover, Miller
and Ireland (2005) assert that intuition is often an effective
approach in decision making in today’s business environment, as
decision makers usually do not have timely, accurate, and com-
plete information to make strategic decisions.

In the sourcing literature, research on the topic is scarce and
limited to some noteworthy exceptions such as Kaufmann et al.
(2014) who provide empirical evidence that some intuitive evalu-
ations of sourcing alternatives still lead to decision-making effec-
tiveness. At the same time, it is suggested that the higher the
number of rational team members, the better the sourcing deci-
sion. In the context of cross-functional GSDM processes, intui-
tion has not yet been investigated, especially not in relation to
functional politics at the decision process level.

METHODOLOGY

Research design

We opted for the multiple case study method because of the
exploratory nature of our research. In a nascent stage of research,
case studies provide a strong means for exploration and theory
development purposes (Quintens et al. 2006a,b; Dubois and Ara-
ujo 2007). The use of case studies is a recent method of choice
for studying complex phenomena and generating managerially
relevant knowledge (Amabile et al. 2001; Boyer and Swink
2008; Dul and Hak 2008; Gibbert et al. 2008; Narasimhan
2014). Because our interest relates to the rather complex and
cross-functional GSDM at the process level of analysis, the case
study method provides a good methodological fit with our
research objectives (Dubois and Araujo 2007). It allows us to
compare and contrast decision processes and practices in individ-
ual firms to build theory on GSDM (Eisenhardt 1989; Strauss
and Corbin 1998). Moreover, case study research allows us to
interact with informants, thus enabling us to ask clarifying ques-
tions or to react spontaneously to emerging new themes (Pratt
2009). The measures to ensure construct, internal and external
validity, as well as reliability throughout our research process are
summarized in Table 1 (Gibbert et al. 2008; Yin 2009). To facil-
itate accumulation of empirical evidence across studies, we
adopted construct conceptualizations from the extant literature
and employed them throughout all stages of our research.

Empirical context

Our intention was to study GSDM processes in a context where
the phenomena that we are most interested in, such as multi-
functionality of GSDM as well as functional politics and intui-
tion would be most strongly visible. This led to multiple
requirements for the empirical context, which we derived from
prior decision-making literature (Papadakis et al. 1998; Elbanna
and Child 2007). First, we decided to investigate GSDM pro-
cesses in mechanical engineering firms as they produce rather

Global Sourcing Decision Making 163

complex products for which the firms source many technically
demanding categories. We can thus ensure that decision-making
criteria beyond price play an important role, which in turn
means that the purchasing function can be expected to incorpo-
rate functional expertise other than its own. Second, we opted
for studying GSDM in large organizations with revenues
exceeding EUR $1 billion. This decision serves to ensure a cer-
tain level of specialization and division of labor. Large firms are
also relatively more complex in terms of geographic dispersion
of sales, production, and procurement operations than small
firms are. Third, we decided to exclude all firms with a domestic
orientation, concentrating instead on companies advanced in GS
operations (Trent and Monczka 2003; Monczka et al. 2008).
Fourth, we limited our sample to firms headquartered in Ger-
many and Austria, as these countries are major industrialized
economies with comparable legal systems (Hausmaninger 2011)
and are culturally close (Hofstede 1983). There were also other
practical reasons for selecting German-speaking countries, such
as language, data access, response time, and the possibility of
conducting personal interviews. Thus, we can study GSDM pro-
cesses in an ideal empirical context. Our choices also ensure that
none of the aforementioned sampling criteria can act as a con-
founder.

Case selection and data collection

We followed a purposeful case selection approach that employed
a structured process to maximize the richness of information and
to minimize the number of cases necessary for comprehensive

insights (Perry 1998; Yin 2009). Given our research framework
and our decisions related to the empirical context, we chose mul-
tiple cases that were ex ante literal replications of each other
because we could not judge any theoretically important concepts
from the outside. We started primary data collection in Septem-
ber 2011 and finished in October 2012. We achieved theoretical
saturation (Eisenhardt 1989; Strauss and Corbin 1998; Glaser
and Strauss 2009) after completion of five cases that provide us
with rich and high-contrast information. Throughout the data
collection process, we modified the interview guide (which is
attached in an Appendix) whenever additional interesting facets
were identified, and we ensured that they were included in subse-
quent interviews across all case firms. Once no more new themes
and patterns emerged from additional interviews, saturation was
assumed to have been reached (Yin 2009). This assumption is
supported by the fact that we conducted an additional two case
studies that did not yield any further insights into GSDM pro-
cesses. Table 2 presents case descriptions and information on
interviewed informants.

In each case study firm, we interviewed key informants from
multiple organizational units. In total, our database comprises
19 interviews with managers involved in GSDM projects, repre-
senting the purchasing, logistics, R&D, quality, strategy, or
controlling function. Semistructured interviews lasted 1 to 3 hrs
and were mostly conducted by the same two authors. Each
interview was recorded, transcribed and sent back to each inter-
viewee to rule out any misunderstandings or misinterpretations.
Whenever necessary, the authors revised the transcription. Over-
all, the interviews resulted in 350 pages of transcripts.

Table 1: Validity and reliability measures pursued throughout the research process

Reliability/validity
criteria

Research phase

Research design Case selection Data gathering Data analysis

Construct validity Building interview
questions based
on concepts grounded
in previous
literature

n.a. Multiple sources of information:
questionnaires, multiple
semistructured interviews,
secondary data from databases
and reports

Triangulation of
data collected
from
independent
sources

Internal validity Foundation of our
investigation based
on decision-making literature
(e.g., Dean and
Sharfman 1993)
Definition of main concepts

Purposeful sampling
criteria:
(1) headquarter location,
(2) firm
internationalization, (3)
firm size, (4) industry

Multiple respondents
Participants of GSDM process
interviewed

Pattern matching
Comparison of
theme and axial
codes (Table 3)
Prior aggregation
to abstract
general codes
(Table 4)

External validity Comparative multiple
case studies

Predefined case selection
criteria

Gathering data at the project level n.a.

Reliability Development of a case
study protocol
and verification of
content through
informants (full
transcription)
Development of
case database

Selection criteria well
documented
in case study protocol

Development and utilization of
case study database
All interviews transcribed by
interviewers
Verification of interview
protocol through interviewees

Researchers
independently
coded data
Documentation
and discussion
of coding
discrepancies to
reach inter-rater
agreement

164 A. Stanczyk et al.

To substantiate emerging data patterns further, we triangulated
interview data with archival data in the form of publicly avail-
able documents (e.g., annual reports, articles, and catalogs) and
internal firm documents (e.g., internal reports, procedures, and
handbooks) (Eisenhardt 1989; Voss et al. 2002). The resulting
triangulation contributed to construct validity and enabled inves-
tigation of the phenomena from diverse perspectives, leading to a
stronger substantiation of constructs and propositions (Meredith
1998; Gibbert et al. 2008).

Coding procedures

Once all data were collected, we started open coding procedures
to structure the information provided (Strauss and Corbin 1998).
In this process, we reflected upon informants’ statements to
derive first-order codes and provisional codes (Pratt 2009). After
the individual firm profiles were obtained from within-case cod-
ing, we conducted cross-case analysis and relied on tabular dis-
plays to detect commonalities and differences across firms
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Yin 2009). Two authors dis-
cussed their coding results to ensure consistency. Coding was
only considered complete when full agreement was reached. Rea-
sons for the adjusted coding were documented in the case data-
base. This process caused a forced inter-rater reliability of 100%
(Pagell et al. 2010).

We coded procedural rationality according to the three deci-
sion-making steps: (1) information search, (2) analysis, and (3)
solution development, whereas politics was coded into its two
dimensions of goal misalignment and power imbalance. Intuition

in turn was coded according to the following dimensions (1) reli-
ance on gut feeling, (2) judgment, and (3) past professional experi-
ence, ultimately resulting in the differentiation between creative
and justified intuition. The coding scheme of first-order codes
emerged over time and resulted in the dimensions detailed in
Table 3 (Ellram 1996; Pratt 2009). Through cross-case analysis,
we were able to identify relationships between the first-order code
variables, and firms were compared regarding their properties in
the identified dimensions (Voss et al. 2002). These identified rela-
tionships were then elaborated on in light of findings in relevant
literature to derive second-order codes and enfold theory (Pratt
2009). Second-order codes were depicted in Table 4. Cross-case
analysis enabled us to identify commonalities and differences in
GSDM patterns along the coding scheme that emerged from our
initial conceptualization and definition of terms (Eisenhardt and
Graebner 2007; Yin 2009). In the subsequent section, we elaborate
on our findings in detail and summarize them as research proposi-
tions.

CASE ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITION DEVELOPMENT

Based on the analysis of each case and on cross-case analyses,
we detected specific relationships between the concepts of
interest. These relationships also direct decision-makers’ strate-
gies to manage the impact of functional politics and intuition
on the procedural rationality in cross-functional GSDM, which
will be delineated in the conclusion as managerial implica-
tions.

Table 2: Case demographics

Cases Alpha Beta Gamma Delta

Epsilon

Home Country Germany Germany Austria Germany Germany
Number
of employees

~45,000 ~10,000 ~5,000 ~10,000 ~15,000

Motives for
global sourcing

Comparative
cost advantage

Access to
technology

Finding the best
quality-price
combination

Comparative
advantage
Economies
of scale

Cost reduction
Access to
technology

Informants job titles Vice President
Corporate
Category
Management
Head of Strategic
Procurement
Quality Manager

Head of Production
Logistics
Head of Trade
Goods Procurement
Procurement
Manager
R&D Managers

Head of Strategic
Procurement
Procurement Manager
CRM Manager
BU Manager

Vice President
Strategy
Business Unit
Director
Project Director
Procurement
Controlling
Manager

Head of Procurement
Procurement
Team Leader
Quality Manager
Head of Logistics

Functions
involved in study

Purchasing
Quality Mgmt.
Production

Purchasing
Production Logistics
R&D

Purchasing
Product Management
Country BU
Management

Business Strategy
Purchasing
Controlling

Purchasing
Quality Mgmt.
Production
Logistics

Global presence
of operations

Connected global
operations

Connected
Manufacturing and
R&D in Germany

Four production sites
located in Europe
and the U.S.

Eight production
sites across
Europe and Asia

15 plants worldwide
Centralized R&D
in U.S. & Germany

Description of
analyzed sourcing
task (project)

Electronic circuit
system for motion
control system

Lithium-ion batteries
for crafts

Air handling unit
for the test
system unit for
combustion engines

Finished machined
cylinder for
industrial engines

Cooling element for
industrial
gear-motors

Global Sourcing Decision Making 165

Functional politics and procedural rationality

Our findings suggest that politics and procedural rationality are
relevant characteristics of GSDM processes. The cross-functional
character of GSDM bears the risk of political behavior of deci-
sion contributors due to their potential conflicts of interest (stem-
ming from misaligned functional goals) and a power imbalance
between participating functions (e.g., caused by their respective
organizational standing). The resulting political tactics of actors
are deployed in the decision-making process and frequently
affect the procedural rationality of GSDM. The five cases show
ample variation of goal misalignment and power imbalance in
their respective decision-making processes. Our investigation
suggests that three types of political behavior (none, assertive,
and negotiating) occur along the two dimensions of goal mis-
alignment (high and low) and power imbalance (high and low)
between participating functions. The strength of occurrence of
each of the two dimensions determines the intensity and type of
political behavior to which the GSDM process is exposed. We
begin by considering the intensity of politics and thereafter turn
to its type, lastly analyzing its effect (positive and negative) on
procedural rationality.

For DELTA, its vice president of strategy concluded that their
“common goal fosters cooperation among the involved parties.”
They regard the total cost of ownership analysis (Ellram and
Siferd, 1998) as the ideal rational backing for GS decisions. In
this case, goals are aligned and politics does not occur. Con-
trarily, at ALPHA and BETA, goals are strongly misaligned.
ALPHA’s purchasing manager reports that “it is very often about
the trade-off between costs and technical capabilities of suppliers
that cause political actions that can be resolved throughout the
decision-making process.” At GAMMA and EPSILON, we could
observe high goal misalignment, which also caused political
behavior. The observed political tactics include, but are not lim-
ited to, geographically limited tendering to suppliers from low-
cost countries by purchasing [EPSILON], the adjustment of the
technical specification to ensure that the preferred supplier of
R&D or the production function has advantages in the concept
evaluation [GAMMA], and the exaggeration of logistical require-
ments associated with securing a continuous supply and lean
management principles by the logistics function [EPSILON]. To
summarize, at ALPHA, BETA, GAMMA, and EPSILON politics
occurred as a result of high goal misalignment, whereas DELTA
is the case where no political tactics were detected throughout
the GSDM process. Based on these observations, we formulate
our first proposition:

Proposition 1a: Low levels of goal misalignment between
functions in GSDM processes do not lead to functional
politics, whereas high levels of goal misalignment do
create functional politics.

Our empirical findings suggest that functional politics occurs
with different intensity, depending on the combination of goal
misalignment and power imbalance. At DELTA the constellation
of low goal misalignment and low power imbalance did not
evoke functional politics. The combination of high goal misalign-
ment and low power imbalance was represented by the cases of
ALPHA and BETA, which resulted in medium intensity politics.
The high intensity of politics stemming from a combination
of high goal misalignment and high power imbalance was

observable at GAMMA and EPSILON (see Figure 2). The two
dimensions were coded based on individual expressions of team
members and the consistency of statements across GSDM team
members. The fourth configuration of low goal misalignment and
high power imbalance was not empirically observed. We assume
that any political tactics in this unobserved case would be point-
less because all involved functions already pursue aligned goals
in their segmented tasks. Hence, the exploitation of the power
imbalance through the most powerful function would not lead to
any additional goal achievement. Thus, we suspect that in this
constellation no politics would become apparent.

DELTA was the only case where no politics was visible, as
goals are aligned between the functions, and none of the
involved parties possesses extraordinary power to be used
throughout the GSDM process. The controlling manager at
DELTA stated that the overarching project goal is “to have each
team member [purchasing, logistics and R&D] contribute to total
cost and technical analysis.” The trade-off between technical ade-
quacy and price is assessed based on the formal directive to
present decision alternatives as opposed to subordinate metrics.

At ALPHA and BETA the misaligned goals lead to debates
between participating functions about the relevance of perfor-
mance dimensions and the allocation of weights to the respective
indicators (e.g., cost vs. logistical capabilities or technical capa-
bilities vs. labor cost). Yet, informants in both case companies
admit that power is balanced between the parties. The quality
manager stresses: “it is highly important for us to have a team
decision (. . .). Therefore, the issue of power plays no role for
us.” The vice president of corporate category management elabo-
rates that “for the sourcing decision process there are four (deci-
sion) criteria: quality, logistics, price and technology (. . .). Of
course, the weighting of indicators needs to be agreed cross-
functionally.” The quality manager adds that “we are able to
openly discuss controversial preferences and find mutually
agreed solutions.” At BETA, the head of production logistics
admits that politics evolves only around conflicting goals. “There
are no alliances formed among team members (. . .) and all func-
tions are equally integrated.” The development engineer at BETA
adds “we need to find a compromise, that all of us can live
with.” At BETA, the enabler for reaching an agreement despite
misaligned goals is equally distributed power among GSDM
team members. Misaligned goals are mitigated by balanced
power leading to a medium intensity of politics in the GSDM
process.

At GAMMA and EPSILON, the political behavior caused by
goal misalignment was further intensified by the attempts of one
powerful function (production engineering at GAMMA and pur-
chasing at EPSILON) to manipulate the GSDM process to attain
their individual functional priorities regardless of the other team
members’ goal attainment (Table 3). For example, at EPSILON,
the conflicting interests between purchasing and logistics
revealed imbalanced power between functions, which in turn
triggered high intensity politics. The logistics manager com-
plained that the purchasing function diminished the weight of the
logistics department by assuming equal inventory levels and
working capital requirements across all decision alternatives
regardless of the location of the supplier. The purchasing man-
ager deliberately neglected this effect stating that “their [the
Logistics department’s] view does not fit with the purchasing
reality.” GAMMA also represents high intensity of politics trig-
gered by the technical function. The responsible business unit

166 A. Stanczyk et al.

T
ab

le
3:

C
ro
ss
-c
as
e
m
ea
su
re
m

en
t

of

ce
nt
ra
l
co
ns
tr
uc
ts

F
un
ct
io
na
l
po
li
ti
cs

P
ro
ce
du
ra
l
ra
ti
on
al
it
y

In
tu
it
io
n

A
lp
ha

�

G
oa
l
m
is
al
ig
nm

en
t:

○
D
if
fe
re
nt

fu
nc
ti
on

al

in
te
re
st
s

be
tw
ee
n

(P
),
(L
),

an
d

(Q

)
in

te
rm

s
of

pr
ic
e-
qu

al
it
y-
av
ai
la
bi
li
ty

tr
ad
e-
of
f

○
“
T
he

go
al
s

ar
e

of

co
ur
se

th
ei
r

(d
ep
ar
tm

en
ts

in
vo
lv
ed

)
fu
nc
ti
on
al

vi
ew

po
in
ts
,
bu
t
th
an
ks

to

ou
r

cr
os
s-
fu
nc
ti
on
al

pr
oc
ed
ur
e
w
e

ha
ve

ne
ut
ra
l

ev
al
ua
ti
on

s
as

th
e

fo
un
da
ti
on

of

de
ci
si
on

m
ak
in
g.

W
e
tr
y
to

ke
ep

em
ot
io
ns

ou
t
of

th
e
pi
ct
ur
e
w
e
ge
t

fr
om

su
pp
li
er

s
an
d
le
t
th
e
da
ta

sp
ea
k”

�
P
ow

er
im

ba
la
nc
e:

○
B
al
an
ce
d

po
w
er

be
tw
ee
n

de
pa
rt
m
en
ts

○
“
S
om

et
im

es

pu

rc
ha
si
ng

tr
ie
s
to

pu
t

pr
es
su
re

on
th
e

ot
he
r

pa
rt
ie
s
an
d
to

pu
sh

in
th
e
di
re
ct
io
n
of

ch
ea
pe
r

su
pp
li
er
s,
es
pe
ci
al
ly

if
th
e
su
pp
li
er

pr
ov
id
es

se
em

in
gl
y

co
m
pa
ra
bl
e

K
P
Is

in
th
e
ot
he
r
di
m
en
si
on
s.

H
ow

ev
er
,
th
is
is
no
t
ap
pr
ec
ia
te
d

by
to
p
m
an
ag
em

en
t”

�
In
fo
rm

at
io
n

se
ar
ch

:

gl
ob
al

su
pp
li
er

se
ar
ch
,

pr
ef
er
en
ce

fo
r

ha
vi
ng

a
“
br
oa
d

ap
pr
oa
ch

to
w
ar
d
su
pp
li
er

se
ar
ch

an
d
op
en
-m

in
de
d

ap
pr
oa
ch

to
w
ar
d
ev
al
ua
ti
on

”

�
A
na
ly
si
s:

○
U
se

of

an
al
ys
is

:
su
pp
li
er

qu
al
ifi
ca
ti
on

to
ol

en
ab
le
s
cr
os
s-
fu
nc
ti
on
al

co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s

an
d
ev
al
ua
ti
on
s
in

te
rm
s
of

qu
al
it
y,

lo
gi
st
ic

co
st

an
d
re
li
ab
il
it
y,

pr
ic
e
an
d
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l

ca
pa
bi
li
ti
es

○
U
se

of

G
S

to
ol

(f
or

co
nt
in
uo
us

im
pr
ov
em

en
t

of

so
ur
ci
ng

co
nd
it
io
ns
):
K
P
I
gu
id
el
in
e
ab
ou
t

ho
w

m
uc
h

su
pp
ly

ri
sk

is
in
vo
lv
ed

an
d

ab
ou
t
su
pp
li
er
s
fi
t
w
it
h
th
e
cu
rr
en
t
su
pp
li
er

po
rt
fo
li
o

○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(P
):

fu
lfi
ll
m
en
t

of

ta
rg
et

co
st
s;
co
nd
uc
ti
ng

su
pp
li
er
-f
ac
to
r
ev
al
ua
ti
on

○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(T
):
en
su
ri
ng

fu
lfi
ll
m
en
t

of
te
ch
ni
ca
l
re
qu
ir
em

en
ts
an
d
in
no
va
ti
ve
ne
ss

of
th
e
su
pp
li
er
,

ra
ti
ng

ba
se

d
on

m
ix
ed

m
et
ho
ds

○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(L
):
en
su
ri
ng

se
cu
ri
ty

of
su
pp
ly

,

de
li

ve
ry

ca
pa
ci
ty

○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(Q
):
su
pp
li
er

si
te

au
di
ts
an
d

no
nc
os
t

pe
rf
or
m
an
ce

ev
al
ua
ti
on
,
su
pp
li
er

au
di
ts
jo
in
tl
y
co
nd
uc
te
d
by

th
e
pu
rc
ha
si
ng

an
d
th
e

qu
al
it
y

de
pa
rt
m
en
t
(i
nt
er
vi
ew

,
pr
oc
es
se
s,
pr
od
uc
ti
on
)

○
H
ig
h

tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy

of
de
pa
rt
m
en
ta
l
in
pu
ts
;

al
l

an
al
ys
es

ar
e
tr
ac
ea
bl
e
by

al
l
pa
rt
ie
s
as

ev
er
y

in
pu
t
is
w
el
l
co
di
fi
ed

�
S
ol
ut
io
n
de
ve
lo
pm

en
t:
so
lu
ti
on

de
ve
lo
pe
d

co
m
m
on

ly

by
th
e
so
ur
ci
ng

co
m
m
it
te
e,

ev
er
y
pa
rt
y
ha
s
on
e
vo
te
,
“
It
is
im

po
rt
an
t

th
at

th
e
de
ci
si
on

is
m
ad
e
jo
in
tl
y.
”
In

ca
se

of
st
al
em

at
e,

pu
rc
ha
si
ng

m
ak
es

de
ci
si
on

�
R
el
ia
nc
e
on

ju
st
ifi
ed

in
tu
it
io
n:

○
T
he

ov
er
al
l
su
pp
li
er
-f
ac
to
r
ev
al
ua
ti
on

al
so

in
co
rp
or
at
es

so
ft
fa
ct
s,

w

hi
ch

ar
e
co
di
fi
ed

an
d

co
m
pl
em

en
ta
ry

to
th
e

ba
si
c
ev
al
ua
ti
on

○
“
O
nl
y
w
he
n
su
pp
li
er

ev
al
ua
ti
on

is
cl
ea
rl
y

do
cu
m
en
te
d,

kn
ow

le
dg
e
ab
ou
t
th
e
su
pp
ly

ba
se

is
es
ta
bl
is
he
d
an
d

ex
pe
ri
en
ce

ev
ol
ve
s”

○
T
o
a
la
rg
e
de
gr
ee
,
ex
pe
ri
en
ce

is
co
di
fi
ed

in
hi
st
or
ic

da
ta
;
“
ex
pe
ri
en
ce

re
fl
ec
ts
th
e
kn
ow

le
dg
e
bu
il
t,
”

pe
rs
on
al

im

pr
es
si
on

is
no
t
im

po
rt
an
t

○
R
el
yi
ng

o

n
pe
rs
on
al

ex
pe
ri
en
ce

in
m
ak

in
g

a
de
ci
si
on

is
po
ss
ib
le

w
he
n
al
l

ha
rd

cr
it
er
ia

ar
e
fu
lfi
ll
ed

to
th
e

sa
m
e
ex
te
nt

by
m
ul
ti
pl
e
su
pp
li
er
s

○
“
O
ur

pr
oc
es
se
s
le
av
e
no

ro
om

fo
r

in
tu
it
io
n
or

gu
t

fe
el
in
g,

ex
pe
ri
en
ce

ca
n
be

us
ed

if
it
is
co
di
fi
ed

an
d
tr
ac
ea
bl
e”

C
on
ti
nu
ed
.

Global Sourcing Decision Making 167

T
ab
le
3:

(C
on
ti
nu
ed
)

F
un
ct
io
na
l
po
li
ti
cs
P
ro
ce
du
ra
l
ra
ti
on
al
it
y
In
tu
it
io
n

B
et
a

�
G
oa
l
m
is
al
ig
nm

en
t:
○
D
if
fe
re
nt
fu
nc
ti
on
al
in
te
re
st
s

be
tw
ee
n

(P
)

an
d
(D

)
○

P
ri
or
it
ie
s
of

(P
):
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy

in
co
st
s,

ac
ce
ss

to
th
e

be
st

te
ch
no
lo
gy
,
kn
ow

in
g
gl
ob
al
su
pp
ly
ba
se

fo
r
re
le
va
nt

pr
od
uc
ts
an
d
se
rv
ic
es

w
it
h
re
ga
rd

to

pr
ic
e,

lo
gi
st
ic
,
qu
al
it
y,

se
cu
ri
ty
of
su
pp
ly

○
P
ri
or
it
ie
s
fo
r
(D

):
be
st

qu
al
it
y
fo
r
be
st
pr
ic
e

�
P
ow
er
im
ba
la
nc
e:

○
E
qu
al

po
w
er

di
st
ri
bu
ti
on

be
tw
ee
n

al
l
in
vo
lv
ed

de
pa
rt
m
en
ts

○
C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n
an
d
m
od
er
at
io
n
of

th
e

pr
oc
es
s
by

(P
)

○
(D

)
an
d
(P
)
pe
rc
ei
ve

ea
ch

ot
he
r

as
ex
pe
rt
s
in

th
ei
r
re
sp
ec
ti
ve

do
m
ai
ns

an
d
th
er
ef
or
e
ac
kn
ow

le
dg
e
th
e
de
ci
si
on

se
gm

en
ta
ti
on

an
d
th
e
co
m
pl
em

en
ta
ry

to
th
e
de
ci
si
on
-m

ak
in
g
pr
oc
es
s;
ve
ry

co
ns
en
su
s
dr
iv
en

�
In
fo
rm

at
io
n

se
ar
ch
:

(P
)
ex
te
ns
iv
e
se
ar
ch

fo
r
su
pp
li
er

s
gl
ob
al
ly

(fi
rs
t
w
av
e
15
0

po
te
nt
ia
l
su
pp
li
er
s,
re
du
ce
d
to

50
af
te
r

in
it
ia
l
fi
lt
er
in
g)

�
A
na
ly
si
s:

○
S
tr
ic
t

us
e

of

an
al
ys
is
by

ev
er
y

pa
rt
ic
ip
at
in
g
fu
nc
ti
on

○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(P
):

an
al
ys
is
of

th
e
ca
se

ba
se
d
on

to
ta
l
co
st
;
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l
an
d

lo
gi
st
ic
s
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce

(p
ro
ce
ss
es
),
pr
od
uc
t

qu
al
it
y,
pr
ic
e,
se
cu
ri
ty
of
su
pp
ly
○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(D
):
de
te
rm

in
in
g
su
pp
li
er

ca
pa
bi
li
ti
es
ba
se
d
on

th
e
te
ch
ni
ca
l

pe
rf
or
m
an
ce

be
ca
us
e

“
ou
r
ev
al
ua
ti
on

ne
ed
s
to

be
as

ob
je
ct
iv
e
as

po
ss
ib
le
”

○
H
ig
h
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy

of
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar

fu
nc
ti
on
al

an
al
ys
es
,
fu
nc
ti
on
s
in
fo
rm

ea
ch

ot
he
r
ab
ou
t

su
ba
na
ly
si
s
re
su
lt
s
an
d
di
sc
us
s
al
l
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
ie
s

�
S
ol
ut
io
n
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t:
so
lu
ti
on
de
ve
lo
pe
d

co
m
m
on
ly

,
fi
na
l
de
ci
si
on

ac
hi
ev
ed

by
vo
ti
ng
,
bo
th

de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
ha
ve

th
e
sa
m
e

nu
m

be
r

of

vo
te
s,
in

ca
se
of
st
al
em

at
e

ne
go
ti
at
io
ns

ta
ke

pl
ac
e
w
it
ho
ut

in
te
rv
en
ti
on

fr
om

th
e
to
p

�
R
el
ia
nc
e
on
ju
st
ifi
ed
in
tu
it
io
n:

○
(P
)
U
sa
ge

of
in
tu
it
io
n
“
w

he
re

th
in
gs

ca
nn
ot

be
m
ea
su
re
d,
”
fo
r
ex
am

pl
e,

us
in
g

gu
t

fe
el
in
g

w
he
n

de
ci
di
ng

ho
w

in
-d
ep
th

a
su
pp
li
er

sh
ou
ld

be
sc
re
en
ed
;
no

pu
re

re
li
an
ce

on
in
tu
it
io
n,

gu
t
fe
el
in
g

is
su
pp
or
te
d
w
it
h
ev
id
en
ce

○
(D

)
“
W
e
do

no
t
re
ly

on
te
ch
ni
ca
l
gu
t
fe
el
in
g
ev
en

in
co
m
pl
ex

si
tu
at
io
ns
.
W
e

al
w
ay
s

co
di
fy

ou
r
de
ci
si
on

m
ak
in
g
dr
iv
er
s”

C
on
ti
nu
ed
.

168 A. Stanczyk et al.

T
ab
le
3:
(C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
F
un
ct
io
na
l
po
li
ti
cs
P
ro
ce
du
ra
l
ra
ti
on
al
it
y
In
tu
it
io
n

G
am

m
a
�

G
oa
l
m
is
al
ig
nm
en
t:

○
F
un
ct
io
na
l
go
al
s
no
t
al
ig
ne
d

am
on
g
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts

○
“
B
as
ic
al
ly
,
in

th
e
en
d

th
ey

w
an
t
to

ha
ve

th
e
be
st

te
ch
ni
ca
l
so
lu
ti
on

an
d
th
ey

do
no
t
ca
re

ab
ou
t
th
e
co
st
s.
O
f

co
ur
se
,

th
e
pr
oj
ec
t

m
an
ag
er

un
de
rs
ta
nd
s

th
in
gs

di
ff
er
en
tl
y
an
d
th
e
pu
rc
ha
si
ng

fu
nc
ti
on

ha
s
a
co
m
pl
et
el
y
di
ff
er
en
t

un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g”

○
P
ri
or
it
ie
s
of

(P
):
ac
hi
ev
in
g
be
st
pr
ic
e

○
P
ri
or
it
ie
s
of
(T
):
en
su
ri
ng
be
st
te
ch
ni
ca
l
so
lu
ti
on
�
P
ow
er
im
ba
la
nc
e:

○
U
ne
qu
al

po
w
er

di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
,
lo
ca
l

bu
si
ne
ss

un
it
m
an
ag
er

co
or
di
na
te
s,

(P
)
ha
s
a
su
pp
or
ti
ng

ro
le

an
d
(T
)

is
th
e
m
os
t
po
w
er
fu
l

○
(T
)
is
es
pe
ci
al
ly

po
w
er
fu
l
in

th
is
pr
oj
ec
t

du
e
to

hi
gh

co
m
pl
ex
ity

of
th
e
co
m
po
ne
nt
s.

“
If
an

en
gi
ne
er

w
as

no
t
ha
pp
y
w
ith

th
e

su
pp
lie
r
de
ci
si
on
,a
nd

he
is
st
ill

in
vo
lv
ed

in
th
e
pr
oj
ec
t,
it
is

ea
sy

fo
r

hi
m

to
sh
ow

th
at
th
e
de
ci
si
on

w
as

w
ro
ng
.

W
ith

th
ei
r
in
fl
ue
nc
e
on

th
e
te
ch
ni
ca
l

sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns

of
th
e
co
m
po
ne
nt
,i
t
is

ea
sy

fo
r
th
em

to
m
an
ip
ul
at
e
th
e
de
ci
si
on
”

�
In
fo
rm

at
io
n
se
ar
ch
:
su
pp
li
er

se
ar
ch

fo
cu
se
s

on
es
ta
bl
is
he
d
E
ur
op
ea
n
su
pp
ly

ba
se
;
no

at
te
m
pt
s
of

a
m
or
e
gl
ob
al

ap
pr
oa
ch
�
A
na
ly
si
s:

○
L
im

it
ed

re
li
an
ce

on

an
al
yt
ic
al

m
et
ho
ds

○
(P
+
T
):
co
nd
uc
t
an
al
ys
is
ba
se
d
on

co
m
m
on

se
ns
e,

“
ev
er
yo
ne

kn
ow

s
w
ha
t
to

do
”

○
L
oc
al
ly

de
ve
lo
pe
d
E
xc
el

fi
le

us
ed
:
“
w
e
do

no
t
ha
ve

st
an
da
rd
iz
ed

an
al
ys
is
to
ol
s”

to
pr
es
en
t
an
al
yz
ed

an
d
co
ll
ec
te
d
in
fo
rm

at
io
n
○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(T
):
de
fi
ne
s
th
e
sc
op
e,

pr
ov
id
es

te
ch
ni
ca
l
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
an
d
di
sc
us
se
s

th
e
te
ch
ni
ca
l
de
ta
il
s
w
it
h
su
pp
li
er
s

○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(P
):
ev
al
ua
te
s
su
pp
li
er
s

ac
co
rd
in
g
to

co
st
,
ri
sk
,
de
li
ve
ry

ti
m
e,

an
d

w
ar
ra
nt
y
co
nd
it
io
ns

○
L
ow

tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy

of
ce
rt
ai
n
de
pa
rt
m
en
t

an
al
ys
es

an
d
in
fo
rm

at
io
n
in
pu
t,
(P
)
is
aw

ar
e
th
at

(T
)
ca
n
pr
ov
id
e
re
co
m
m
en
da
ti
on
s
th
at

ar
e
qu
es
ti
on
ab
le

an
d
w
it
h
un
tr
ac
ea
bl
e

re
as
on
in
g
du
e
to

th
e
hi
gh

co
m
pl
ex
it
y
of

th
e
pr
od
uc
t

�
S
ol
ut
io
n
de
ve
lo
pm

en
t:
co
ns
en
su
s
is
st
ri
ve
d

fo
r,

so
m
et
im

es
ev
en

at
th
e
ex
pe
ns
e
of

te
ch
ni
ca
l
qu
al
it
y
or

pr
ic
e;

th
e
pr
oj
ec
t
m
an
ag
er

re
-e
va
lu
at
es

th
e
re
su
lt
un
ti
l

al
l
pa
rt
ie
s
ag
re
e

�
R
el
ia
nc
e
on

cr
ea
ti
ve

in
tu
it
io
n:

○
“
H
ar
d

fa
ct
s

m
ak
e
up

2/
3
of

a
de
ci
si
on
,
in
tu
it
io
n
1/
3”

○
A
na
ly
se
s
ar
e
dr
iv
en

by
“
co
m
m
on

se
ns
e”

○
S
up
pl
ie
r
se
le
ct
io
n
is
ba
se
d
on

in
di
vi
du
al
s
ex
pe
rt
is
e

an
d
ex
pe
ri
en
ce

w
it
h
su
pp
li
er
s;
to

so
m
e
ex
te
nt
,

su
pp
li
er

ca
pa
bi
li
ty

ju
dg
m
en
ts
ar
e
ba
se
d
on

pe
rs
on
al

fe
el
in
g

an
d
pe
rs
on
al

ex
pe
ri
en
ce

○
“
P
er
so
na
l
ex
pe
ri
en
ce

an
d
pe
rs
on
al

fe
el
in
gs

ar
e

pa
rt
of

th
is
pr
oc
es
s,
bu
t
it
is
ha
rd

to
pu
t
it
in
to

m
et
ri
cs
.
It
is
ha
rd

to
ra
te

pe
rs
on
al
fe
el
in
g

to
w
ar
d
a
su
pp
li
er
”

○
“
If
w
e
do

no
t
ha
ve

tr
us
t
in

a
su
pp
li
er
’s

qu
al
it
y

an
d
it
s
pr
om

is
es
,
w
e
do

no
t
si
gn

”
C
on
ti
nu
ed
.

Global Sourcing Decision Making 169

T
ab
le
3:
(C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
F
un
ct
io
na
l
po
li
ti
cs
P
ro
ce
du
ra
l
ra
ti
on
al
it
y
In
tu
it
io
n

D
el
ta

�
G
oa
l
m
is
al
ig
nm
en
t:

○
F
un
ct
io
na
l
go
al
s
ar
e
w
el
l
al
ig
ne
d,

“
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
ar
e
m
ot
iv
at
ed

by
K
P
Is

to
w
or
k
in

th
e
sa
m
e
di
re
ct
io
n”
;
“
S
tr
ic
tl
y

pu
rc
ha
si
ng

de
ci
de
s
w
he
re

w
e
so
ur
ce

ba
se
d
on

in
pu
t
fr
om

lo
gi
st
ic
s”

○
P
ri
or
it
ie
s
of

(P
):
en
su
ri
ng

th
at
ta
rg
et

co
st
s

ar
e
ac
hi
ev
ed

○
P
ri
or
it
ie
s
of

(L
):
w
or
ki
ng

ca
pi
ta
l
K
P
Is
,

K
an
ba
n
ti
m
e
go
al
s,
in
tr
od
uc
in
g
su
pp
li
er
s

to
th
e

sy
st
em

an
d
se
tt
in
g
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce

ta
rg
et
s
fo
r
th
em

�
P
ow
er
im
ba
la
nc
e:

○
B
al
an
ce
d
po
w
er

am
on
g
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts

○
(P
)
is
in

th
e
le
ad

an
d
ha
s
th
e

co
or
di
na
ti
ng

ro
le
,
bu
t
do
es

no
t
ab
us
e
it
s

po
w
er
;
“
w
e
on
ly

m
ov
e
fo
rw

ar
d
in

th
e

pr
oc
es
s
if
ev
er
yo
ne

is
co
nt
en
t”

�
In
fo
rm

at
io
n
se
ar
ch
:
gl
ob
al

su
pp
li
er
se
ar
ch
:

70
%

of
R
F
Q
s
go

th
ro
ug
h
th
e

en
ti
re

ne
tw
or
k
of

gl
ob
al
pu
rc
ha
si
ng

un
it
s
(g
lo
ba
l
qu
ot
at
io
n
co
ll
ec
ti
on
)

�
A
na
ly
si
s:
○
U
se

of
an
al
ys
is
:
(P
+
L
)
le
ve
ra
gi
ng

th
e
S
A
P

da
ta
ba
se

an
d
ac
ce
ss

de
ci
si
on

su
pp
or
t

sy
st
em

s,
w
he
re

su
pp
li
er

ev
al
ua
ti
on
s
ar
e

pr
ov
id
ed

an
d
ra
te
d
ac
co
rd
in
g
to

qu
al
it
y,
pr
ic
e,

fl
ex
ib
il
it
y,

de
li
ve
ry
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
○
U
se

of
pu
rc
ha
si
ng

an
al
yt
ic
al

to
ol
s
su
ch

as
be
nc
hm

ar
ki
ng
,
li
fe

cy
cl
e
co
st
an
al
ys
is
;

T
C
O

is
m
ai
n
cr
it
er
io
n
on

w
hi
ch
G
S
de
ci
si
on

is
gr
ou
nd
ed

○
H
ig
h
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy

of
th
e
de
pa
rt
m
en
ta
l

an
al
ys
es
,
in
fo
rm

at
io
n
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
y

is
ve
ry

hi
gh

an
d
co
ll
ab
or
at
in
g

de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
ar
e
aw

ar
e
w
hi
ch

an
al
ys
es

an
d
K
P
Is

th
ei
r
pa
rt
ne
rs

us
e
�
S
ol
ut
io
n
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t:
so
lu
ti
on
de
ve
lo
pe
d
co
m
m
on
ly

by
al
l
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
in
g
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
,

w
hi
ch

in
se
qu
en
ti
al

or
de
r
pr
ov
id
e
th
ei
r
in
pu
t

�
R
el
ia
nc
e
on
ju
st
ifi
ed
in
tu
it
io
n:

○
Ju
dg
m
en
t
ca
nn
ot

be
ac
co
m
m
od
at
ed

in
th
e
su
pp
li
er

ra
ti
ng
sy
st
em

○
O
nl
y
fa
ct
s
ar
e
co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed

in
a
st
ru
ct
ur
ed

w
ay
,

so
m
et
im

es
so
ft
fa
ct
s,
su
ch

as
a
pe
rs
on
al

im
pr
es
si
on

ab
ou
t
a
su
pp
li
er
’s

tr
us
tw
or
th
in
es
s
an
d
re
li
ab
il
it
y

○
“
In

te
rm
s
of

so
ft
fa
ct
s,
th
e
bu
ye
r
ha
s
to

de
sc
ri
be

ve
ry

cl
ea
rl
y
w
ha
t
hi
s
im

pr
es
si
on

is
,
bu
t
it
sh
ou
ld

no
t
be

a
gu
t
fe
el
in
g.

S
ti
ll
,
it
af
fe
ct
s
th
e
de
ci
si
on

by
ap
pr
ox
im

at
el
y
10
%
.”

T
hi
s
is
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly

th
e
ca
se

if
m
ul
ti
pl
e
su
pp
li
er
s
sh
ow

co
m
pa
ra
bl
e

pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
,
ba
se
d
on

th
e
an
al
ys
is
of

ha
rd
fa
ct
s
C
on
ti
nu
ed
.

170 A. Stanczyk et al.

T
ab
le
3:
(C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
F
un
ct
io
na
l
po
li
ti
cs
P
ro
ce
du
ra
l
ra
ti
on
al
it
y
In
tu
it
io
n

E
ps
il
on

�
G
oa
l
m
is
al
ig
nm
en
t:

○
C
on
fl
ic
ti
ng

go
al
s
of

de
pa
rt
m
en
ts

pa
rt
ic
ip
at
in
g
in

G
D
S
M

○
P
ri
or
it
ie
s
of

(P
):
hi
gh
es
t
ra
ti
on
al
iz
at
io
n

po
te
nt
ia
l
in

ac
hi
ev
in
g
sa
vi
ng
s
by

in
cr
ea
si
ng

G
S
vo
lu
m
e:

lo
w
er
in
g
co
st
s,

“
it
’s

al
l
ab
ou
t
m
on
ey
”

○
P
ri
or
it
ie
s
of

(L
):
ac
hi
ev
in
g
ad
va
nt
ag
es

th
ro
ug
h
sh
or
te
r
de
li
ve
ry

ti
m
es

an
d
lo
w

in
ve
nt
or
y
le
ve
ls

○
P
ri
or
it
ie
s
of

(Q
):
as
su
ri
ng

su
pp
li
er
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y,

de
pe
nd
ab
il
it
y,

an
d
pr
od
uc
t

qu
al
it
y
�
P
ow
er
im
ba
la
nc
e:

○
U
ne
qu
al
ly

di
st
ri
bu
te
d
po
w
er

○
(P
)
is
a
do
m
in
at
in
g
fu
nc
ti
on

an
d
ho
ld
s

th
e
co
or
di
na
ti
ng

ro
le

(r
es
po
ns
ib
le

fo
r

co
m
pi
li
ng

da
ta
);
“
L
og
is
ti
cs

w
as

co
nf
ro
nt
ed

w
it
h
sa
vi
ng
s
an
d
th
is
is

ho
w

th
e
di
sc
us
si
on

w
it
h
th
em

fi
ni
sh
ed
.

T
he
y
ha
ve

th
ei
r
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s
bu
t
th
ey

do
no
t
fi
t
ou
r
pu
rc
ha
si
ng

re
al
it
y”

“
P
ur
ch
as
in
g
is
in

th
e
le
ad
he
re
be
ca
us
e

w
e
ha
ve

th
e
re
sp
on
si
bi
li
ty

th
at

ev
er
yt
hi
ng

fu
nc
ti
on
s
w
el
l,
th
at
’s

w
hy

w
e
m
ak
e
th
e
de
ci
si
on

”
�
In
fo
rm

at
io
n
se
ar
ch
:
li
m
it
ed

in
te
rm

s
of

ge
og
ra
ph
y
su
pp
li
er

se
ar
ch
�
A
na
ly
si
s:

○
A
na
ly
ti
cs

ar
e
pr
ac
ti
ce
d
by

ev
er
y
de
ci
si
on

te
am

m
em

be
r
○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(P
):
su
pp
li
er

ev
al
ua
ti
on

w
it
h
E
xc
el
-b
as
ed

to
ol

fo
r
co
ll
ec
ti
on

an
d
an
al
ys
is
of

qu
ot
at
io
ns
;
au
di
ti
ng

pr
og
ra
m
—

qu
es
ti
on
na
ir
es

fo
r
su
pp
li
er

pr
eq
ua
li
fi
ca
ti
on
s
an
d
ev
al
ua
ti
ng
;

no
nc
od
ifi
ed

an
d
no
ns
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d
so
ft

fa
ct
s
pl
ay

a
la
rg
e
ro
le

in
th
e
ev
al
ua
ti
on

○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(Q
):
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
on

of
su
pp
li
er
s
ac
co
rd
in
g
to

a
w
ei
gh
te
d
sc
or
e

of
qu
al
it
y,

fl
ex
ib
il
it
y
an
d
m
ee
ti
ng

of
te
ch
ni
ca
l
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
○
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of

(L
):
an
al
ys
is
of

co
st
s

an
d
sa
vi
ng
s
w
it
h
in
cu
rr
ed

ho
ld
in
g
co
st
s

in
a
vo
lu
m
e
tr
ad
e-
of
f
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n
as
se
ss
es

in
ve
nt
or
y
sp
ac
e
an
d
po
ss
ib
le

fa
ct
or
y

ad
ju
st
m
en
ts
re
su
lt
in
g
fr
om

so
ur
ci
ng

de
ci
si
on
s.
A
na
ly
si
s
of

pa
rt
s
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s

an
d
th
ei
r
in
fl
ow

an
d
co
ns
um

pt
io
n
pa
tt
er
n

○
(M

ut
ua
l)
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy

of
th
e
in
fo
rm

at
io
n

an
d
an
al
ys
is
co
nd
uc
te
d
by

th
e
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts

is
ra
th
er

lo
w
,
al
th
ou
gh

(P
)
co
ll
ec
ts
an
d

ch
an
ne
ls
al
l
in
fo
rm

at
io
n,

it
is
ap
pa
re
nt
ly

no
t
cl
ea
r
an
d
no
t
tr
an
sp
ar
en
t
fo
r
th
em

ho
w

an
d
w
hy

(L
)
co
m
es

to
it
s

re
co
m
m
en
da
ti
on
s
(w

hi
ch

co
nfl

ic
t
w
it
h

(P
)
de
pa
rt
m
en
ta
l
go
al
s)
;
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on

of
(Q

)
is
un
co
m
pl
ic
at
ed
,
it
en
su
re
s
qu
al
it
y

de
li
ve
re
d
by

th
e
su
pp
li
er
,
is
on
e-
di
m
en
si
on
al

an
d
th
er
ef
or
e
is
ea
si
ly

co
m
pr
eh
en
si
bl
e;

an
al
ys
is
of

(P
)
is
al
so

no
t
cl
ea
r
fo
r
(L
)

as
(L
)
is
aw

ar
e
on
ly

of
on
e
as
pe
ct

of
pu
rc
ha
si
ng

an
al
ys
is
—

th
e
pr
ic
e

�
S
ol
ut
io
n
de
ve
lo
pm

en
t:
pu
rc
ha
si
ng

pr
ep
ar
es

th
e
so
lu
ti
on
,
in
pu
ts
fr
om

ot
he
r
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts

ar
e
se
le
ct
iv
el
y
us
ed

�
R
el
ia
nc
e
on
cr
ea
ti
ve
in
tu
it
io
n:

○
(P
)
us
in
g
sh
or
tc
ut
s:
ex
cl
ud
es

po
te
nt
ia
l
so
ur
ci
ng

di
re
ct
io
ns
,
fo
ll
ow

s
tr
en
ds

w
he
n
se
le
ct
in
g
so
ur
ci
ng

co
un

tr
y:

“
I
ca
nn
ot

sa
y
w
hy

C
hi
na
,
w
e
fo
ll
ow

ed
th
e
tr
en
d,
”
m
ak
es

qu
ic
k
de
ci
si
on
s
w
it
ho
ut

a
go
od

ov
er
vi
ew

of
th
e
si
tu
at
io
n,

re
li
es

on
ow

n
pe
rs
on
al

an
d
ot
he
r
co
m
pa
ni
es
’
pa
st
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
s

○
In

th
e
en
d
th
e
su
pp
li
er
s
w
er
e
ch
os
en

ba
se
d
on
gu
t

fe
el
in
g
“
us
in
g
no
se

an
d
he
ar
t”

○
(Q

)
gu
t
fe
el
in
g
ab
ou
t
th
e
tr
us
t
in

su
pp
li
er
,
w
he
n

co
ns
id
er
in
g
sw

it
ch
in
g
to

L
C
C

su
pp
li
er

“
it
is

w
is
er

to
st
ay

w
it
h
cu
rr
en
t
(l
oc
al
,
pr
ov
en
)
on
e

be
ca
us
e
w
e
al
re
ad
y
kn
ow

hi
m
”

○
(L
)
no

in
tu
it
io
n
or

gu
t
fe
el
in
g,

in
st
ea
d,

al
w
ay
s
pu
re
an
al
ys
is

N
ot
e:

P
=
pu

rc
ha
si
ng

de
pa
rt
m
en
t;
L
=
lo
gi
st
ic
s
de
pa
rt
m
en
t;
Q

=
qu

al
it
y
de
pa
rt
m
en
t;
D

=
de
ve
lo
pm

en
t
de
pa
rt
m
en
t;
T
=
te
ch
ni
ca
l
de
pa
rt
m
en
t;
K
P
I,
ke
y
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce

in
di
ca
to
rs
;
L
C
C
,
lo
w

co
st
co
un

tr
y;

R
F
Q
,
re
qu

es
t
fo
r
qu

ot
e;

T
C
O
,
to
ta
l
co
st
of

ow
ne
rs
hi
p.

Global Sourcing Decision Making 171

(BU) manager stated, “they [the production and R&D engineers]
want to have the best technical solution, but they do not consider
the costs.” If an engineer is not happy with the supplier choice
of purchasing, it is easy for them to “manipulate” or change the
technical requirements to rule out unwanted suppliers. In both
cases, high intensity politics occurred, which was initially caused
by misaligned goals and escalated by one function that domi-
nated the others throughout the decision process.

Summing up the above observations, we noticed that differing
interests between functions accompanied by parties’ abuse of
power escalate conflict and lead to high intensity politics [EPSI-
LON, GAMMA], whereas highly divergent interests combined
with balanced power distribution result in discussion and negoti-
ation leading to medium intensity of politics [ALPHA, BETA].
Where goals are aligned and power is balanced between func-
tions [DELTA], no politics emerges. Therefore, we posit:

Proposition 1b: The higher the goal misalignment and
power imbalance between functions, the higher the inten-
sity of functional politics prevalent in GSDM processes.

Across each of the cases that feature politics at varying inten-
sity [ALPHA, BETA, GAMMA, EPSILON], we found that poli-
tics affects procedural rationality of GSDM, yet the directionality
of the influences varied across cases. Our data indicate that this
directionality is not determined by the intensity of politics, but
rather by its type. Power imbalance is decisive for determining
the type of politics (Figure 2). Subsequently, we elaborate on
when politics adopts which type and how it affects procedural
rationality.

Previous research is equivocal in its view on whether politics
and procedural rationality should be considered as competing or
complementary variables in attaining procedural rationality (Janis

Table 4: Summary of abstract codes per construct and case

Procedural
rationality Functional politics Goal misalignment Power imbalance Justified intuition Creative intuition

Alpha High Medium High Low High Low
Beta High Medium High Low High Low
Gamma Low High High High Low High
Delta High Low Low Low High Low
Epsilon Low High High High Low High

Start

No politics

Politics

Negotiating
politics

Assertive
politics

No influence
on procedural

rationality

Positive
influence on
procedural
rationality

Negative
influence on
procedural
rationality

Goal
misalignment

= low

Goal
misalignment

= high

Power
imbalance

= low
Power
imbalance
= high

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Epsilon

Delta

− Competition between
functions fosters
discussion and improves
quality of inputs

− Parties pursue their goals,
but no function abuses its
power

− Combination of negative
effects: Powerful function
pursues its own goals and
pushes others to the side

− Due to relative alignment
of goals, there is no
reason to abuse power
and therefore no politics
appears

Figure 2: Origin and effects of functional politics.

172 A. Stanczyk et al.

1989; Dean and Sharfman 1993). According to our cases
(GAMMA and EPSILON), negative effects of politics on proce-
dural rationality can be observed when goals are misaligned and
power is imbalanced, which leads to power abuse by decision-
making participants. We refer to this type of politics as assertive
politics. In the cases of ALPHA and BETA, low power imbal-
ance was visible. This constellation prevented one function from
dominating the GSDM process, instead leading to negotiations
between the involved representatives about the most desirable
choices. Thus, this type is labeled as negotiating politics. Subse-
quently, we answer why assertive politics and negotiating politics
have an opposing influence on the procedural rationality of
GSDM.

At ALPHA and BETA, politics is driven by high goal mis-
alignment between functions (especially between purchasing and
quality at ALPHA and between purchasing and development at
BETA) yet low power imbalance. Different functional interests
foster competition between functions, which in turn enhances the
quality of inputs (see Table 3). The development manager at
BETA comments: “The goal is to find technically adequate prod-
ucts that meet the targets of both ‘camps.’ Of course, the inter-
ests are sometimes distinct among colleagues, but we need to
come together in the final decision because essentially we pursue
a common goal.” To reach the common goal, negotiations
between the commercial and technical functions take place.
ALPHA’s quality manager illustrates a potentially conflicting sit-
uation from the decision process concerning differing interests,
emphasizing how procedural rationality is fostered by a type of
politics that is more “negotiation” than “power fight.” “If (. . .) a
supplier has a higher price but (. . .) has more innovative ideas,
or cooperates well with R&D, then the R&D function wants to
protect this supplier. Purchasing then (. . .) wants to achieve their
goals, from the cost perspective. That is where the discussion
starts, but nothing such as a power fight, or ‘showing muscles’
occurs (. . .). The criteria sets are so well-balanced that in the best
case the knockout criteria are decisive.”

Evenly distributed functional power allows the decision crite-
ria to be critical in the decision process. Thus, conflicts from
goal misalignment can be resolved immediately, based on facts,
or do not emerge in the first place. At BETA, the development
manager indicated that “[global] sourcing for direct materials is
defined to the smallest detail so that all analyses are traceable
and reproducible.” Their procurement manager stresses, “[he] has
clearly defined partial steps to conduct data analysis to ensure
comparability across sourcing alternatives, which also fosters
acceptance of the analysis among counterparts.” Furthermore, at
BETA, the development manager representing the technical func-
tion elaborates: “The technology is defined by us, purchasing is
specialized in scanning the market landscape. Therefore, we
depend on each other.” Our findings indicate that negotiating
politics leads to increased scrutiny in data collection, discussion
over obtained facts as well as a deep focus on the analysis of
available data. Pursuing different goals at the functional level
can be resolved through fruitful debate and negotiation between
the GSDM team members and through attaining high transpar-
ency in conducting analysis, as no one is in a position to manip-
ulate or withhold information. Thus, a constellation of high goal
misalignment and low power imbalance, constituting negotiating
politics, has a positive impact on procedural rationality in
GSDM. This finding is consistent with the literature asserting
that politics foster discussion which decreases uncertainty and

enhances acceptance, and assures that all necessary aspects of
the decision are evaluated (Nutt 2004; Elbanna 2006).

At GAMMA and EPSILON, assertive politics driven by a
combination of high goal misalignment and high power imbal-
ance was observed, which in turn negatively affected procedural
rationality. In both cases, one dominating function was able to
use its power throughout the GSDM process, which resulted in
manipulation and data distortion. The dominating functions (pur-
chasing at EPSILON and production engineering at GAMMA)
sought to impose their preferred solution on the rest of the team.
At EPSILON, the “mighty” purchasing function asserted itself
already in the data collection phase trying to limit the number of
sourcing options, and finally manipulated the solution develop-
ment phase by excluding the analysis of transport cost and risks
provided by the logistics function. At GAMMA, the powerful
technicians also became actively involved in the data collection
phase, trying to favor established suppliers in the later analysis
phase by imposing a specific technical requirement on the pro-
curement department early in their supplier search. Such occur-
rences influence the comprehensiveness of the decision process
to a strong extent. At GAMMA, the purchasing manager reports,
“this was a problem because they [the production engineers]
have their favorites [suppliers]. They tend to prefer suppliers they
know already, which prevents the firm from benefiting from sup-
ply market dynamics so that we forego lower prices.” Therefore,
at GAMMA, “engineers are really ‘mighty’” and “can manipu-
late technical specifications to achieve their desired solution,
which in turn can be dangerous for the company’s competitive-
ness” as indicated by the purchasing manager. Moreover, the
regional BU manager at GAMMA noted that all functions are
capable of collecting and providing relevant information in their
analyses; however, the dominating function imposes its approach
based on their interests. Consequently, the overall analysis is dis-
torted. To achieve a final solution, the regional BU manager tries
to balance between influences of the more powerful technical
function, the suggestions of the procurement function and local
commercial goals.

At EPSILON, the logistics function preferred the landed cost
perspective to the unit cost and savings view of purchasing.
However, this analysis was not conducted prior to a decision to
source from China. The procurement team leader stated, “logis-
tics was confronted with savings and this is how the discussion
with them finished. They have their preferences but they do not
fit our purchasing reality.” Hence, the solution preferred by the
most powerful function (procurement in the case of EPSILON)
had a dominating influence on the analytical procedures through-
out GSDM. The negative influence of assertive politics on proce-
dural rationality also resonates with early contributions stating
that politics creates animosity and information distortion, which
causes its negative effect on performance (Bourgeois and Eisen-
hardt, 1988).

Based on the presented findings, we conclude that the direc-
tionality of the impact on procedural rationality is not determined
by the intensity of politics, but rather by its type. In GSDM
where negotiating politics resulted from high goal misalignment
but low power imbalance, procedural rationality was enhanced;
in GSDM where assertive politics resulted from high goal mis-
alignment and high power imbalance, procedural rationality dete-
riorated. In addition to the more convincing theoretical rationale
laid out before for individual cases, the influences of power
imbalance on the type of politics and on procedural rationality

Global Sourcing Decision Making 173

are also better supported by the cross-case data (Table 4). The
better fit is particularly visible for cases Alpha and Beta. Hence,
we propose:

Proposition 1c: The intensity of politics does not determine
the directionality of influence on procedural rationality.

Proposition 1d: Given high goal misalignment, high (low)
power imbalance gives politics an assertive (negotiating)
type. Assertive (negotiating) politics influences procedural
rationality negatively (positively).

Intuition and procedural rationality

As noted in our literature review, similar to the impact of politics
on procedural rationality, the empirical findings on the link
between intuition and procedural rationality do not allow for
unambiguous conclusions (cf. Khatri and Ng 2000; Elbanna
2006; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Akinci and Sadler-Smith
2012). In our findings, we differentiate between “creative intui-
tion” and “justified intuition” (Simon 1987) as the cases indicate
that intuition plays an equivocal role and can influence procedural
rationality in GSDM either negatively or positively. We use the
label creative intuition to denote a usage of intuition that is based
strongly on the more intrapersonal and difficult to communicate
gut-feeling component of intuition. Contrarily, justified intuition
identifies a usage of intuition that is based more strongly on prior
experience, which can be more easily documented, shared and
discussed with others and, thus be formalized to a certain extent.

ALPHA, DELTA, and BETA relied on justified intuition char-
acterized by their reliance on experience and personal judgment
in the studied GSDM situations. In those cases, the grounding of
judgments is made transparent so that it is traceable by all team
members. At ALPHA and DELTA, subjective judgments about
suppliers had to be codified so that the rationales for the judg-
ment are documented and transparent to the team. Formalized
intuitive contributions support the building up of historic knowl-
edge of supplier performance in supplier evaluation tools. This
experience is therefore not proprietary to individuals but shared
among decision-making teams (see Table 3).

The example of ALPHA highlights the fact that formally codi-
fied experience played an important role in their GSDM pro-
cesses for the last years and hence became a justified type of
intuition. For example, the quality manager stated, “When draw-
ing from experience, we rely on historic facts.” The head of stra-
tegic purchasing confirmed: “Gut feeling is not a decision
criterion, but experience is.” The professional experience of team
members is certainly important so that ALPHA tries to code it in
hard data concerning quality, dependability, and other perfor-
mance criteria. Hence, the supplier history and experience are
made available to the sourcing committee, but the experience of
the individual decision maker is also shared because of the docu-
mentation. Thus, the standardized and justified track record of
historic supplier performance allows the firm to objectify experi-
ence and intuition. The vice president of sourcing at ALPHA sta-
ted, “If two suppliers are comparable in their offerings and
capabilities, then the coded experience helps selecting the better
option.”

In a similar vein, the purchasing director at DELTA
highlighted: “We have our formal supplier rating system, and

then the softer facts are added to this database.” He also
acknowledged that “there is always a little bit of intuition, but it
must be formally reasoned and presented,” meaning that they use
historic supplier data and site impressions from recent audits in
addition to gut feeling. Extant research has identified a firm’s
ability to rely on past experiences as beneficial especially given
time constraints and the complexity of the decision task (Khatri
and Ng 2000; Elbanna 2006; Akinci and Sadler-Smith 2012).
Thus, we conclude that the observed type of justified intuition
has a positive effect on procedural rationality as it completes the
picture for decision makers and helps them make a final choice.

At the companies GAMMA and EPSILON, we observed that
GSDM process participants tend to make decisions largely based
on gut feeling and personal experience. In those two cases, crea-
tive intuition shaped the GSDM process. For example, at EPSI-
LON the purchasing function preferred sourcing from China
without investigating other options, as they wanted to follow the
trend based on their gut feeling. Moreover, EPSILON’s head of
procurement immediately wanted to limit the analytical inputs
from other functions because of his sense that analysis of the pro-
curement function provides the strongest case for China sourcing.
The purchasing manager at EPSILON stressed that they rely
strongly on creative intuition when conducting the commercial
analysis: “We have different scenarios, where everything counts:
data, gut feeling, nose, and heart.” At GAMMA, supplier trust-
worthiness is evaluated based on personal judgment of decision
group members instead of a historic supplier performance record
to this point. For both GS tasks in which the analysis was
grounded in creative intuition, lower levels of procedural rational-
ity were present. At GAMMA, due to the creative intuition of a
decision team member, it was decided to refrain from further ana-
lyzing potentially suitable GS alternatives. As a result, no data on
any of these alternatives was collected. At EPSILON, creative
intuition entailed limiting analytical inputs from other parties or
limiting the disclosure of own analytical scrutiny or lack of scru-
tiny. Literature in the field suggests that relying on specific factors
due to their availability in managers’ mental schema, rather than
their substantiation for the decision situation at hand has a nega-
tive effect on analytical transparency and the resulting outcome
(Sulsky and Day 1992; Harris 1994). Hence, we propose:

Proposition 2: Justified intuition (creative intuition) has a
positive (negative) impact on the procedural rationality of
GSDM processes.

DISCUSSION

Considering our research design, we studied the GSDM pro-
cesses with the primary focus on procedural rationality as a
dependent variable. Throughout the research, it turned out that
procedural rationality could not be captured without investigating
politics and intuition. Our findings suggest that both notions
occur simultaneously with varying intensities and different types;
in Figure 3 we show that assertive politics pairs with creative
intuition (GAMMA, EPSILPON) and negotiating politics with
justified intuition (ALPHA, BETA). At DELTA no politics and
justified intuition was observed in decision processes. Subse-
quently, we discuss the respective combinations of intuition and
politics types jointly, together with their influences on procedural
rationality in GSDM as depicted and summarized in Figure 4.

174 A. Stanczyk et al.

Negotiating politics and justified intuition

In the case of ALPHA and BETA, the respective functional
goals are misaligned, although power is evenly distributed,
ensuring that all involved departments provide their analytical

inputs, while justified intuition complements rational analysis.
For example, when two suppliers receive similar scores in the
analytical supplier rating, justified personal impressions help in
making a final choice. The head of strategic procurement at
ALPHA describes it as follows: “Yes, of course we have con-

Figure 3: Joint view on politics and intuition.

Figure 4: Concluding model.

Note: aAlternatively to a correlation between the concepts, the data would also support a causal influence of power imbalance on the
form of intuition, as portrayed in the discussion section.

Global Sourcing Decision Making 175

flicting goals with our counterparts in terms of costs, quality, and
availability.” The same informant states, “solving conflicts means
to bring about objectivity, data, and facts.” Similarly, the vice
president for corporate category management mentions, “under
certain conditions it is possible to reach out to historic experi-
ences as additional decision support.” The quality manager con-
firms the role of experience: “Experience plays a significant role,
whereas gut feeling does not. Thus, as a first thing we rely on
facts and facts are supported by proven historic facts and experi-
ences.” At BETA, similarly, conflicting goals and a balanced
power distribution shape the GSDM process, if required, to reach
a final decision.

Moreover, for both cases (ALPHA and BETA) the power bal-
ance is secured by the equal vote distribution. In stalemate situa-
tions, discussions and negotiations bring the GSDM team to a
mutually agreed solution and final decision. Hence, in such a
case experience and gut feeling also need to be justified to stand
the test of discussion and negotiations with functional counter-
parts who have opposing opinions or alternative preferred
options. Moreover, deploying justified intuitive analysis requires
transparency to enable an open and informed debate. Hence, the
need to at least formally comment and reflect on intuition leads
to a “quasi”-fact based discussion between conflicting actors.
Therefore, our findings suggest that under the condition of nego-
tiating politics, the need to justify intuition as a result of low
power imbalance inside the GSDM team enhances procedural
rationality. We regard this insight as a hint that low power
imbalance may lead to justified intuition.

The co-existence of justified intuition and negotiating politics
appears to be mutually supportive of procedural rationality in
GSDM. This finding enables top management to guide the deci-
sion-making team based on formalized rules as to how a final
recommendation has to be developed and presented to the super-
ordinate committee. As illustrated by ALPHA and BETA, such
formal guidance seems to lead to functionally balanced and fact-
based analytics throughout GSDM procedures.

Assertive politics and creative intuition

The assertive type of politics at GAMMA and EPSILON has a
strong impact on the decision-making procedures. In both cases,
the process is dominated, even manipulated, by the most power-
ful function; consequently, analytical scrutiny is low (see Fig-
ure 3). This in turn is assumed to result in lower levels of
procedural rationality (Propositions 1d and 2) (see Figure 4). For
example, at EPSILON, the department in charge of coordinating
the analytical process (purchasing) relied on creative intuition to
a large extent because of their pre-inclination to source from
China. This is illustrated by the fact that the total cost analysis
that was preferred by the logistics function was not conducted,
which might have resulted in the choice of an alternative sourc-
ing option. At GAMMA, it is claimed that the “process is based
on common sense [. . .], and everyone basically knows what to
do,” which indicates reliance on creative intuition. The regional
BU manager responsible for the final solution confirms that the
analysis relies “2/3 on facts and 1/3 on intuition.” Additionally,
as previously discussed, the engineering function does not show
openness toward new sourcing options. The purchasing manager
observed, “if engineers are unhappy with a potential switch of
suppliers, it is easy for them to manipulate based on technical
alterations.” The regional BU manager affirms this point: “For

the technician it is very easy to say that he cannot accomplish
his task because the stuff [the component] you bought for me is
rubbish. So please explain this to my department head. – No pur-
chasing guy would do that.” Consequently, the solution develop-
ment is heavily influenced by the respective powerful managers
responsible for the sourcing project (Chief Procurement Officer
at EPSILON and BU Head at GAMMA). Moreover, they involve
their counterparts only when necessary and have considerable
freedom with regard to collecting decision input parameters. Due
to the latitude in contributing analytical inputs from different
functions, the procedural dominance of the one powerful function
in combining these inputs is enabled. Therefore, one could argue
that the powerful functions can get away with applying creative
intuition precisely because of their power position. Hence, the
data suggest that the use of power manifests in their reliance on
creative intuition and information distortion as a political tactic
to make the case for their preferred GS alternative. Given the
corresponding influence in the previous configuration of negotiat-
ing politics and justified intuition, the findings presented here
may actually result from a causal influence of power imbalance
on the type of intuition. In the cases where assertive politics and
creative intuition are visible jointly, both influences simulta-
neously jeopardize procedural rationality in GSDM (Figure 3).
For the sake of precaution, we refrain from positing such an
influence formally, yet recommend it as a topic for future
research.

This finding first cautions top management teams to strive to
balance power between functions, as power imbalance is the root
cause of these negative influences. In the short term, when power
distribution cannot be changed, calls for formalizing GSDM pro-
cedures can be expected to mitigate the negative influences of
asymmetric power distributions. Thus, our findings on GAMMA
and EPSILON provide evidence that assertive politics correlates
with the reliance on creative intuition imposed by the powerful
function of the decision process. Both states were observed to
negatively affect procedural rationality in GSDM (Figure 4).

CONCLUSIONS

Contributions to research

In this paper, we present findings from five organizations that
performed GS projects. In particular, we examine how, why, and
when the procedural rationality in their decision making is
affected by functional politics and intuition.

The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, as the study
of cross-functional GSDM was thus far limited to recent notable
exceptions (Moses and �Ahlstr€om 2008; Kaufmann et al. 2014),
we elaborate on GSDM at the process level, expounding upon
the presence and divergent types of functional politics and intui-
tion in GSDM processes. By doing so, we follow a call for more
information on how cross-functional GSDM processes can be
conducted effectively (Kotabe and Murray 2004; Moses and
�Ahlstr€om 2008). Moreover, we went into more detail and decom-
posed core facets of functional politics and intuition, thereby
offering differentiated findings of their impact on procedural
rationality (Figure 3; Table 4). We fill the depicted research gap
in an inductive reasoning approach and derive a series of testable
propositions (see Figure 3). Thus, we responded to the plea for
theory building research on this subject.

176 A. Stanczyk et al.

Second, we contribute to existing GS literature by providing
theoretical explanations for our empirical findings, drawing on
the strategic decision-making literature. Our findings suggest that
despite the prevalence of functional politics and intuition in
GSDM teams, firms can still organize for effective and rational
GSDM by controlling the level of functional politics and making
intuition justified and transparent. Moreover, we provide a firm-
internal perspective on why GS may have failed in the past,
which is a valuable knowledge extension of the primarily sup-
plier and sourcing location-focused view on GS failure. Hence,
the currently discussed trend of reshoring and in-sourcing U.S.
and European manufacturing (Ellram et al. 2013) may, at least
partly, have internal causes associated with historically flawed
internal GSDM processes.

Third, we believe that our study has some merit for research
on cross-functional decision making in general. Our results indi-
cate that the ongoing controversial debate on the effects of poli-
tics on procedural rationality may be enriched, possibly even
resolved, when due attention is paid not only to the intensity of
politics that results from goal misalignment and power imbalance
but also to its context and type. Our findings indicate that with-
out a dominant player, political behavior may be channeled into
cross-functional negotiation processes for the best solution (nego-
tiating politics), leveraged by a justified type of intuition, which
results in enhanced procedural rationality. In contrast, when a
single party dominates the decision-making process, political
behavior seems to become an instrument for enforcing the will
of this party (assertive politics), accompanied by creative intui-
tion practices, thereby decreasing procedural rationality.

Contributions to GS practice

Based on our empirical case study findings we can advise man-
agers responsible for the organization of GS to be more aware of
the types of functional politics and intuition to attain the
deserved quality of the GSDM process. Our findings provide ini-
tial indication that goal misalignment in itself is not a problem as
long as there is no powerful player dominating a sourcing team
(assertive politics). Therefore, controlling the power balance
between functions allows firms to create beneficial effects on the
decision process even when goals among the participating func-
tions are misaligned (negotiating politics). Moreover, misaligned
goals appear to be a necessary condition for functional politics to
occur and affect procedural rationality.

Additionally, we found support for the notion that partici-
pants in GS rely on intuition in their analysis of sourcing alter-
natives. We observed the prevalence of creative intuition and
justified intuition. Our findings suggest that discussion increases
the need for decision team members to provide objective rea-
sons for their experience-based judgment of supplier capabili-
ties. Hence, the need to objectify past experience based on hard
(i.e., explicated and formalized) data prevents creative (i.e.,
somewhat speculative and difficult to communicate) intuition,
which in turn positively affects procedural rationality in GSDM
teams. Thus, embedding historic data such as formal supplier
evaluations into the analytical procedures of GS prevents crea-
tive judgment from dominating the decision-making procedures.
Over time, the pool of analyzed and documented sourcing alter-
natives will grow, which increases the amount of documented
experience available to future GS tasks. Without such need for
formalized reasoning, creative intuition poses a threat to the

information-gathering phase, the scrutiny of analytical tech-
niques, the solution development phase and ultimately final
choice. A high reliance on creative intuition is especially dan-
gerous for procedural rationality in GSDM. In particular, extant
powerful functions can leverage their position through assertive
political behavior, ruling out otherwise viable GS alternatives
through creative intuition; this in turn leads to low analytical
scrutiny.

Limitations and future research

In light of our research questions and research design, we found
case study research well-suited to investigate how firms config-
ure GSDM processes, as well as when and why politics and
intuition affect procedural rationality in GSDM (Dubois and
Araujo 2007). As with any inductive case-based research,
despite a methodologically rigorous approach, our findings need
to be externally validated because they could be specific to the
mechanical engineering firms in the empirical context that we
investigated (cf. Figure 4). Therefore, we encourage future
research to deductively test our derived propositions, for exam-
ple in a survey research design or in another qualitative
research design across a larger number of sourcing projects
from different supply chain and industry settings. In doing so,
future research may contribute to our understanding of how
companies could effectively control for the level of politics in
cross-functional sourcing teams. For example, there may be
important differences depending on the technical complexity of
the sourcing category (task), its relative importance, and associ-
ated supply market complexity that require further attention
(Kraljic 1983). To develop our research path further, we also
encourage experimental research where multiple members of a
sourcing team have to make a sourcing decision under different
levels of information asymmetry. Although these limitations
need to be addressed in future research, they do not seem to
question our findings substantially concerning how companies
can attain procedural rationality in cross-functional GSDM
teams.

APPENDIX

SEMISTRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDELINE

Authors’ note: We depict typical prompts that we applied when-
ever it was necessary. However, we sought to begin with open
questions and let respondents speak freely. Questions were some-
times only addressed if relevant in the specific context.

INTRODUCTION

We would like to speak about how global sourcing works at your
firm. Please think about the sourcing of an important complex
product in a direct spend category. During the interview, please
always refer to this particular product.

General

1 What is your understanding of global sourcing? How is it
defined and implemented/lived in your organization?

Global Sourcing Decision Making 177

Decision situation

Please explain the background of this particular global sourcing
decision.

2 What were your motives for global sourcing? For example
cost reduction, expansion, improved quality, availability, etc.?

3 Had you already used the product before the global sourc-
ing decision was made? Who produced it then and where?
What was the level of purchasing novelty of the particular
product?

4 How important was that decision for your company? Can you
back up this level of importance with quantitative data?

5 How often do you make such decisions?

Decision-making process

Please describe in detail how the decision process evolved and
what happened.

6 Can you outline the decision-making process in general?
Which steps were involved?

7 Do you have any preplanned procedure that guides you
through the process of deciding? Are there any formal docu-
ments accompanying that process? Was an action plan agreed
upon?

8 What are the decision committees for global sourcing deci-
sion making in your firm? Who are members of these com-
mittees? Who makes the final decision?

9 Was there a need (or requirement) to coordinate among dif-
ferent functions? Which functions/departments were
involved? Which corporate functions were involved and
which hierarchical levels did they belong to?

10 Which goals do the involved departments have? Can you
elaborate on the goal coherence of individual departments/
functions? Which are shared and which are individual goals?

11 How powerful are the functions/departments participating in
the decision?

12 What roles did the participants play? How is the interaction
among the departments and functions organized?

13 How did the interaction between them occur? How did they
communicate?

14 Do you distribute certain tasks among departments and func-
tions, for example, commercial and financial evaluation is
done by purchasing and the technical evaluation is done by
R&D and production?

15 Could you say if there were any partial decisions taken to
achieve the final one (e.g., departmental decisions)? Who has
the power to decide upon what? What did these parties
decide upon?

16 How long before the final decision did the team members
meet for the first time to talk about the specific global sourc-
ing case? How often did you meet? What is the level of
proximity?

17 To what extent was either the decision process as a whole or
partial decisions influenced by judgments, gut feelings, or
personal experiences?

18 What information did you use in making such decisions and
where did it come from? Are there any specific tools that
you use for the analysis? Are there joint tools between the
functions or are they stand-alone and autonomous?

19 On which criteria did you base your decision? What was
the most important factor for you to be able to make a
decision on sourcing that product? What are the decision-
making criteria for global sourcing decisions in your
company? Which performance criteria are the most impor-
tant and why?

20 How did you evaluate the relevant performance criteria
throughout the global sourcing process? How were the other
departments/functions involved in the evaluation of the crite-
ria?

21 Could you describe in detail how the decision process with
its partial decisions took place? Please elaborate on the order
of actions and who did what.

22 Were there any coalitions formed in the discussions? Who
formed groups and why? Were negotiations conducted
among the participants? Was there external resistance regard-
ing the global sourcing decision?

23 How would you assess the level of agreement or disagree-
ment of the outcome of the global sourcing decision?

Decision outcome

24 What was the outcome of the decision making? Please elabo-
rate.

25 Do you assess the outcome of this decision as beneficial?
What are the key performance indicators you use for evalua-
tion? Can you name any clear benefits?

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SHORT BIOGRAPHIES

Alina Stanczyk (MA Warsaw School of Economics) is a
Doctoral Candidate at EBS Business School in Wiesbaden,
Germany. Prior to her doctoral studies she worked as an Ana-
lyst at McKinsey & Company in Warsaw. Her research interests
include global sourcing and decision making. Her most recent
research focuses on costs, challenges, and risks associated with
global sourcing.

Kai Foerstl (Dr. rer. pol., EBS Business School) is Professor
of Supply Chain Management at the German Graduate School of
Management and Law (GGS), Heilbronn. His research and teach-
ing activities relate to global sourcing, reshoring/insourcing, and
sustainable supply chain management. His research has been
published in Journal of Business Logistics, Journals of Supply
Chain Management, International Journal of Operations and
Production Management, International Journal of Production
Research, and other outlets.

Christian Busse (Dr. rer. pol. WHU—Otto Beisheim School
of Management) is a Senior Researcher and Lecturer at the Swiss
Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. His research interests
relate to sustainability in global supply chains, the research-prac-
tice gap, as well as research methodology. His research has been
published in International Journal of Physical Distribution and
Logistics Management, Journal of Business Logistics, Journal of
Supply Chain Management, Organizational Research Methods,
and other journals.

Constantin Blome (Dr. rer. pol. TU Berlin) is Full Professor
of Operations Management at University of Sussex, UK and
GlaxoSmithKline Chaired Professor in Strategic Sourcing and
Procurement at Universite catholique de Louvain, Belgium. His
research interests include sustainable supply chains, innovation in
supply networks, as well as supply chain risk management.

Global Sourcing Decision Making 181

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Decision Science

s

Volume 45 Number 6
December 2014

© 2014 Decision Sciences Institute

Assessing Antec

ed

ents of Socially
Responsible Supplier Selection in Three
Global Supply Chain Contexts

Stanley E. Griffis†
Supply Chain Management Department, Broad College of Business, Michigan State University,
East Lansing, MI, 48824, e-mail: griffis@bus.msu.edu

Chad W. Autry
Department of Marketing and Supply Chain Management, College of Business, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, e-mail: autry@utk.edu

LaDonna M. Thornton
Department of Management, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE, 68588,
e-mail: lthornton2@unl.edu

Anis ben Brik
Eneref Institute, 475 North Street, Doylsetown, PA 18901, e-mail: anis.brik@eneref.org

ABSTRACT

A number of highly publicized, controversial lapses in social responsibility within global
supply chains have forced managers and scholars to reexamine long-held perspectives
on supplier selection. Extending Carter and Jennings’ department-level study of pur-
chasing social responsibility, our research assesses the role of supply managers’ ethical
intentions and three key antecedents that drive socially responsible supplier selection

.

Comparing evidence from firms operating in China, the United States, and the Unit

ed

Arab Emirates, we identify three key drivers of supply managers’ ethical intentions and
examine both their direct and indirect impacts on socially responsible supplier selection.
We find differential support for the predictor relationships on supply manager ethical
intentions across national contexts and mediated versus nonmediated models. These ob-
servations bear important implications for firms conducting global supply management.
[Submitted: October 5, 2012. Revised: March 16, 2013. Accepted: June 4, 2013.]

Subject Areas: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Supply Manage-
ment, Ethical Intentions, Purchasing, Supplier Selection, Global, Supply
Chain, and Socially Responsible.

†Corresponding author.

1187

1188 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

INTRODUCTION

Modern firms often look to gain advantage over rivals through supply management.
Within supply management, supplier selection is a key decision area. Historically,
supplier selection research has focused on identifying the suppliers that are likely
to maximize economic outcomes for the firm (e.g., Hakansson and Wootz, 1975;
Spekman, 1988; Ellram, 1990; Weber, Current, & Benton, 1991; Akinc, 1993;
Choi and Hartley, 1996). However, numerous highly publicized lapses in social
responsibility (SR) have forced a reexamination of supplier selection criteria, to
include noneconomic, qualitative rationale. Furthermore, despite SR’s importance
for supply managers, scholarly understanding of SR within the supply management
context has lagged behind its practice.

To address these two issues, Carter and Jennings (2004) introduced the no-
tion of purchasing social responsibility (PSR), an organizational-level business
characteristic indicating a firm’s “purchasing activities . . . meet the ethical and
discretionary responsibilities expected by society” (p. 151). Their (2004) assess-
ment of the supply management functions of 1,000 U.S.-based consumer products
manufacturers concluded with a call for additional research at: multiple levels
of engagement (i.e., the firm; the supply management functional area; and sup-
ply management employees), across industries; and across international contexts
(Carter and Jennings, 2004, p. 170–171). Yet surprisingly, only very limited follow-
up research has further addressed SR in the supply chain context, to augment
practice and theory development.

Although the (2004) study assesses the SR “orientation” of a firm’s supply
management function via the PSR variable, it operationalized PSR very broadly:
(i) as a firm-level orientation and (ii) subsuming the entire breadth of an orga-
nization’s purchasing-related activities. Specifically, Carter and Jennings (2004

)

operationalized PSR as a multidimensional orientation held by the supply man-
agement functional unit that reflects a general focus on SR principles across all
related tasks. However, this view does not consider that supply management em-
ployees within the unit have significant autonomy and might not execute specified
purchasing tasks consistent with the PSR position held by the unit or the firm.

To address this gap, we identify a new activity-specific dependent variable
identified as socially responsible supplier selection (SRSS). We formally define
SRSS as a firm’s capabilities for and/or orientation toward selection of suppli-
ers that embrace CSR principles when conducting normal operations. SRSS, a
narrower concept than PSR, reflects how supply managers within a purchasing
unit invoke SR principles and standards when selecting suppliers. Given that most
organizational buyers act somewhat autonomously when making all but the most
strategic purchases (Kraljic 1983), their discretion in behaving in socially responsi-
ble ways—or not—potentially impacts both the brand value and financial position
of their employing firms.

Furthermore, our research also considers the increasing importance of au-
tonomous supply manager behavior as supply chains continue to globalize. The
importance of global sourcing as a supply management strategy has long been
observed: a decade ago, Kotabe and Murray (2004) noted: “[companies] that have
a limited scope of global sourcing are at a disadvantage over those that exploit
it to the fullest extent in the globally competitive marketplace . . . ” (p. 9). Both

Griffis et al. 1189

managers (Orpen, 1987) and customers (Maignan, 2001) are shown to differ across
national settings as to corporate social responsibility levels and expectations, and
so the consideration of SRSS from a multinational perspective is salient for supply
management practice.

Toward this goal, we examine our theoretical model using data from three
national samples known to vary significantly in their disposition toward SR: China,
the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Our findings suggest varied
predictors of SRSS by nation, and therefore should be important for supply chain
executives and human resource professionals to consider as they recruit and retain
supply managers in the studied world regions and others that are culturally similar.

BACKGROUND LITERATURE

Historically, supplier selection research has focused on how different supplier
characteristics, evaluation frameworks, and selection metrics can be leveraged to
gain economic rents (Hakansson and Wootz, 1975; Spekman, 1988; Ellram, 1990;
Weber et al., 1991; Dominguez and Zinn, 1994). However, the more contemporary
research has increasingly assessed qualitative selection factors, such as supplier
fit with customers’ business strategies, postselection buyer–supplier relationship
issues, and (of particular interest here) social responsibility issues impacting the
selection process. The emergent focus on qualitative issues informs but does not
entirely supplant the traditionally used economic-based selection criteria (e.g.,
Kannan and Tan, 2002; Wisner, 2003; Defee, Esper, & Mollenkopf, 2009).

Our study specifically focuses on the social and ethical perspectives on busi-
ness that have come to complement economic criteria as key predictors of success.
As supply chains globalize, managers within the same supply chain may hold
different views of SR that can potentially lead to conflict. This sort of potential
misalignment is especially important for researchers and managers to consider,
given that adherence to ethical and SR standards have been identified as salient
factors for supply management success (Ringov and Zollo, 2007). For exam-
ple, when hiring global supply managers to select and build partnerships with
strategic suppliers, firms such as Associated British Foods now train managers
on local ethical/SR expectations of partners in the host nation before assigning
them to expatriate positions (Awramenko, 2010). Based on cultural differences
theories published in recent years, we expect to find meaningful variation in
SRSS and its antecedent relationships across the United States, United Arab
Emirates, and China based on the different perspectives held by each nation’s
population (and ergo, workforce).

Furthermore, although existing business ethics research causally links em-
ployees’ ethical intentions with their SR behaviors regardless of national context
(cf., McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Matten and Moon, 2008; Lindgreen,
Swaen, & Campbell, 2009), specific examinations of how ethical intentions im-
pact purchasing agents’ supplier selection decisions are absent. This research gap
is uniquely problematic given supply managers’ significant autonomy and low or-
ganizational visibility within boundary-spanning roles that render them susceptible
to ethical dilemma exposure by virtue of job design.

1190 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

Hypotheses
Antecedents of supply manager ethical intentions

The business ethics literature suggests three prominent antecedents of a supply
manager’s ethical intentions that have not been examined within a single study: the
employees’ ethical orientation, top management’s ethical behaviors, and external
pressures to behave ethically. No single theoretical framework addresses these
factors together, so we support the first three hypotheses with diverse literatures.

We focus first on employees’ ethical orientation. Orientations encompass
the sets of beliefs, morals, and values among employees, which are collectively
embraced by a firm’s employees in aggregate (Nahm, Vonderembse, & Koufteros,
2004). Employee ethics are demonstrably influenced by the orientations held by
coworkers within their work organizations (Douglas, Davidson, & Schwartz, 2001),
which in turn drive the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors they experience while
working (Hatch, 1993; Nahm et al. 2004). Extrapolating to the supply manage-
ment domain, consistent with Weber (1993), we propose that employees’ ethical
orientation is a precursor to supply manager ethical intentions. We formally de-
fine employees’ ethical orientation as the employees’ shared understanding of
ethical standards by which an action is determined as right or wrong. Employee
ethics, morals and beliefs are shown to be psychologically ingrained but quasi-
static (Denison, 1996); the ethically oriented employee acts with consideration of
morals and beliefs, and thereby ethics influences subsequent behavioral intentions,
actions, and behaviors (Trevino, 1986; Schein, 2004). Drawing on socialization
theory, orientations are taught and reinforced by coworkers to promote consistent
behavioral norms (van Maanen and Schein, 1979). A purchasing organization’s
ethical orientation should therefore positively influence supply managers’ ethical
intentions (SMEI). We hypothesize that:

H1: Employees’ ethical orientation is positively associated with SMEI

Schein (1999) notes that top management is charged with creating and per-
petuating organizational expectations in the form of workplace norms and regula-
tions, and are expected to lead employees by example. Thus, top management’s
ethical behaviors should be distinct from the employees’ ethical orientation (to
verify that these factors are conceptually different in the supply management con-
text, we conduct discriminant validity checks before data analysis, as described
in the methodology section). Top manager ethicality has long been espoused as a
primary determinant of employee ethical behavior (Carlson and Perrewe, 1995),
as the ethical behaviors undertaken by leaders serve to define acceptable behav-
ior, actions, and intentions (Bavaria, 1991; Carlson and Perrewe, 1995), and top
management ethicality should increase the employees’ propensity to abide by such
norms (Trevino, 1986). Institutional and leader–member exchange theories support
that top managers’ positive organizational images strongly influence the actions of
their formal and informal subordinates (Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997).

Supply management provides a unique context for assessment of the top
management ethical behaviors (TMEBs)—subordinate ethical intentions relation-
ship. In modern supply chain organizations, top management must closely mon-
itor supply managers to ensure that decisions are aligned with the overarching

Griffis et al. 1191

firm interests due to agency issues (Slone, Mentzer, & Dittman, 2007). Supply man-
agers might deviate from ethical behavior for two reasons: their unilateral spending
decisions may conflict with other firm objectives (e.g., personal gain outweighs
cost minimization, quality, or long-term relationships), and their decision-making
autonomy may likewise invite unscrupulous behavior linked to self interests. We
assess this hypothesis:

H2: Top management ethical behaviors are positively associated with SMEI.

We are also concerned with the impact of external pressures exerted by sup-
ply chain partners on the ethicality of supply manager decision making. Suppliers
and customers shape organizations’ ethical orientations, affecting decision making
in many contexts (Berman et al., 1999, p. 491). As Robertson, Lamin, and Livanis
(2010) note, “it is not just an individual’s personal characteristics and [internal en-
vironment] that influence evaluation and decision making, but also their [external]
stakeholders” (p. 170).

Stakeholder theory offers additional possibilities for assessing external sup-
ply chain partner influences on supply manager behavioral intentions. Customers
are increasingly a concern as environmental, safety, and product origin issues in-
fluence their purchase decisions (Brown and Dacin, 1997; Handelman and Arnold,
1999). Research has long indicated that some customers are willing to pay more for
environmentally, ecologically, and socially sound products (Laroche, Bergeron, &
Barbaro-Forleo, 2001).

In addition, special interest groups are more attuned to the societal impact
of firms worldwide (Roberts, 2003; Carroll and Buchholtz, 2008). They scrutinize
and publicly denounce perceived unethical sourcing (Roberts, 2003). In addition,
suppliers have become more influential in pressuring customer firms to be more
ethical as activist groups have become increasingly influential, and socially re-
sponsible and ethical behavior has become institutionalized in business settings
(Campbell, 2007). Thus,

H3: External pressure for ethical behavior is positively associated with SMEI.

SRSS and the ethical intentions mediator

Our first three hypotheses are largely consistent with previous research (i.e.,
Handelman and Arnold, 1999; Carter and Jennings, 2004). However, in this study
we extend the previous work by exploring the direct relationships between the
three antecedents and SRSS, and further, whether these relationships are mediated
by SMEI. That is, supply manager behavioral intentions may be very strictly gov-
erned by the three external forces we describe, and in such cases, the significant
resources expended on ethical training could be wasted. Alternatively, supply man-
ager ethical intentions may mediate the relationships, thus supporting augmented
ethical training in one or more of our global supply contexts of interest. We assess
these possibilities comparatively.

Specifically, in H1–H3, the three antecedents were proposed to directly in-
fluence SMEI. However, do these forces also directly impact SRSS or is the effect
mediated by the supply manager’s ethical intentions? We might expect supply
manager ethical intentions to partially explain the level of SRSS held by the

1192 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

purchasing unit, but direct effects may also exist, linking employees’ ethical ori-
entation, TMEBs, and external pressure for ethical behavior to SRSS. We note that
we ignore the possibility of a direct effect on SRSS from the third antecedent, top
management support for ethical behavior, given that many firms decentralize this
decision. We had no way to assess the possibility with our current data. Further
research may examine this issue.

Given that ethical orientations are already linked to socially responsible
behavior in information technology settings (Vitell et al., 2003), we speculate
that in purchasing organizations where employee ethical behavior is present and
evidenced in top management behaviors, SRSS will associate positively. Similarly,
we expect that the potential risks associated with CSR failures may motivate firms
to reconsider external impacts on supplier selection from supply chain partners.
Furthermore, firm employees may desire to avoid the public backlash and scrutiny
created by CSR failures through contemplating how supplier selection decisions
may affect stakeholders.

Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), although traditionally viewed as a
macro-level theory, has seen recent developments that suggest individual em-
ployees are also sensitive to external pressures, and so the theory has recently been
operationalized at the micro-level of analysis (i.e., Prottas, 2008; Pless, Maak,
and Waldman, 2012). Although early theorization focused only on shareholders
as having impact on internal behaviors, modern applications of stakeholder the-
ory allow for multiple external constituents such as suppliers and customers, thus
fostering predictions related to supply chain partners. We argue that publicity sur-
rounding CSR-related failures causes firms to revisit which and whether suppliers
or customers should be appeased (i.e., Friedman and Miles, 2004), and what types
of supply manager decisions should resolve conflicts between firm and partner
objectives (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Blattberg, 2004).

Under this view, SRSS should be an expected outcome for firms under pres-
sure from their suppliers or customers to consider CSR implications when making
sourcing decisions. However, as evidenced in other settings where employees’
ethical orientations act in concert with firm’s ethical guidelines and efforts to in-
form their actions (Douglas et al., 2001), it is possible that external influences
alone will not fully explain how ethically employees execute their duties. The
supply manager’s own ethical intentions may also help explain firm-level SRSS
decisions. Accordingly, we propose competing mediation hypotheses, such that
both employee intentions and the drivers of the same intentions are both plausible
predictors of SRSS:

H4a: SMEI mediate the relationships between the focal antecedents and SRSS.

H4b: The focal antecedents impact SRSS positively and directly, without me-
diation by SMEI.

National Context Moderator

China, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States were selected as research
contexts based on the diversity of their national orientations toward CSR-related
issues and because these nations also provide a culturally heterogeneous sample
frame based on the Kogut and Singh (1988) index of cultural distance. Via these

Griffis et al. 1193

samples we can assess the robustness and generalizability of our SRSS-related
findings.

The nations included in our study are posited to differ in their antecedent—
ethical intentions relationships due to their differential approaches on the power
distance and collectivism aspects of Hofstede’s (1984) national cultural dimen-
sions, which are cited as those dimensions most closely associated with economic
organizational dynamics (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Kirkman et al., 2009).
Power distance refers to the extent to which individuals within a national context
are accepting of variations in individuals’ relative power, and are therefore recep-
tive to the status, authority, and/or leadership of others (Hofstede, 1984; Patel,
Harrison, & McKinnon, 2002). Alternatively, collectivism refers to the extent to
which occupants of a cultural context relate to others within their society/social
group based on cognitive and emotional attachments (Husted and Allen, 2008).
Of the countries under examination, China and the United Arab Emirates each
have been established as having extremely high power distance (score = 80, per
Hofstede and Hofstede 2005), thus implying that formalized or hierarchically
governed business structures are commonplace, whereas the United States (40)
has a relatively low power distance reflective of more egalitarian governance. In
addition, the United States is extremely individualistic (score = 91), reflecting
lower levels within-workgroup homogeneity or integration, whereas China (20)
is considered an extremely collectivistic society, and the United Arab Emirates is
relatively collectivistic to neutral (38).

We can theorize magnitudinal differences in the relationships between the
three focal antecedents and supply manager ethical intentions based on the power
distance and collectivism characteristics of the national cultures under review.
Employees from high power distance cultures are known to be more deferential
to formal authority, are more receptive to organizational hierarchy, and tend not to
question organizational norms (Atwater et al. 2002; Kirkman et al., 2009). As a
result, we might expect the supply managers from the Chinese and U.A.E. samples
to exhibit greater ethical intentions based on based on TMEBs.

Similarly, there already exists limited evidence that employees working in
firms in highly collectivist contexts are less likely to make ethically questionable
or risky behavioral choices than are those in individualist contexts, due to the
greater value placed on the common good of everyone within the firm and its
interconnected social system (Trevino, 1986; Husted and Allen, 2008). However,
evidence also exists that in some highly individualized cultural contexts, firms and
their members are more likely to view internal and external stakeholders as “ex-
tensions” of the individual due to the presence of strong fiduciary ties between the
individual and the stakeholder, whether perceived or actual (Williams and Zinkin,
2008). These theoretical premises combine to form a “u-shaped” collectivism per-
spective for supply managers. Managers acting based on a neutral position on the
collectivism continuum would be expected to yield less susceptibility to external
pressure for ethical behavior or employees’ ethical orientation than those at either
extreme. On this basis, we hypothesize that external pressure to behave ethically
and the employees’ ethical orientation will more strongly impact supply manager
ethical intentions for the Chinese and U.S. samples than for the U.A.E. sample.

1194 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

H5a: The relationship between TMEBs and SMEI will be stronger for the
Chinese and U.A.E. samples than for the U.S. sample.

H5b: The relationship between employees’ ethical orientation and SMEI will
be stronger for the Chinese and U.S. samples than for the U.A.E. sample.

H5c: The relationship between external pressure for ethical behavior and
SMEI will be stronger for the Chinese and U.S. samples than for the
U.A.E. sample.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data Collection Procedures and Sample Frames

Given the lack of secondary data available to assess SRSS phenomena, primary
data collection was necessary. A questionnaire was designed in electronic and pa-
per formats following Dillman (2008), with items adapted from studies involving
similar constructs of interest. Item texts and measurement properties for each mea-
surement scale appear in the Appendix. Because a multinational sample including
both Chinese and English speaking participants was required, the survey was con-
structed in both languages with measurement invariance established across the
samples. Chinese respondents received surveys written in that language, whereas
English versions captured managerial responses in both the United States and the
United Arab Emirates. However, as Zhao et al. (2006) note, some professional
words and concepts in English do not have a direct Chinese equivalent. Thus,
to develop the Chinese language survey, Singh’s (1995) back-translation process
was used with professional translators hired to maximize equivalence. All English
items were translated to Chinese by one professional translator and then translated
back to English by another. Misaligned meanings and syntax were corrected fol-
lowing translation and the process was repeated. After two iterations no differences
remained.

Given the study objectives, samples of supply managers representing the
three countries of interest were targeted for hypothesis testing. The participants in
each national setting were restricted to job titles indicating direct involvement in
goods and services procurement. Respondents were first contacted via e-mail, and
if necessary, next by phone. Variations in response mode were based upon national
norms and Internet availability. Specifically, given Internet ubiquity in the United
States and United Arab Emirates, respondents there were offered an opportunity
to respond either online (via Zoomerang) or in paper/FAX format. Based on
concerns that uneven Internet access might present nonresponse bias concerns
for the Chinese sample, the survey was distributed through the postal service in
paper format, and by e-mail. Past research has demonstrated that responses by
paper and electronic/Internet surveys within a single study generate equivalent
data quality (Griffis et al., 2003).

The China Business Directory was utilized to identify potential Chinese re-
spondents who could be classified as manufacturers, service providers, or retailers.
Within these classes, 800 potential respondents were randomly sampled. To obtain
participation, we contacted the organization’s top-listed executive. To encour-
age replies, the researchers contacted respondents three times via e-mail or with

Griffis et al. 1195

reminder cards through regular mail. We received 88 responses through e-mail and
18 through regular mail (13.0% response rate). Although a low rate by conven-
tional standards, Chinese managers are notoriously difficult to sample. This rate
does provide sufficient statistical power to test the hypotheses.

For the United Arab Emirates, we sourced respondents from the Dubai Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry (DCCI) membership database. Initially, 800 e-mail
contacts were made to gain participation. Based on each respondent’s preference,
questionnaires were then e-mailed or faxed. We followed-up with duplicate cover
letters and questionnaires to non-respondents three weeks following the initial
communication, with the process repeated for up to three times following three
subsequent 3-week periods. The final response set included 210 responses (26.25%
response rate).

The sample for the United States was selected using Zoomerang’s Zoom-
Panel. ZoomPanel consists of potential research participants who are rewarded
for their participation in research studies. The participants work in a variety of
industries and hold positions ranging from laborers to top executives. Despite
initial concerns about the use of rewarded panels, their utility and quality has
been demonstrated in the past in business research (Deutskens et al., 2004) and in
supply/operations management specifically (Autry et al., 2010). Panel members
are prequalified for appropriate job position, industry, and experience related to
the research question; all unqualified responses are removed. From a sample frame
of 1000 supply managers working in the United States, 165 valid responses were
obtained (16.5% response rate).

Measurement

Measures for the constructs of interest were adapted from Carter and Jennings’
(2004) survey, but with some meaningful differences applied as needed to meet
the current research goals. For the items in the questionnaire, the respondent was
asked to serve as a key respondent for the purchasing unit as a whole. Before
deploying the survey, all items were subjected to two rounds of pretesting with a
large panel of supply chain managers. The completed survey was also assessed
for content validity by four academic researchers having expertise in SR or supply
management. The feedback was used to improve the questionnaire pre-usage.

Endogenous Variable: SRSS

The items used to measure SRSS were based conceptually on a subset of
the items used to tap Carter and Jennings’ (2004) PSR that were specifically
linked to the supplier selection task, resulting in a formative, first-order measure
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). Respondents were asked to indicate
agreement or disagreement with eight statements describing how they select sup-
pliers with CSR principles in mind. A 7-point Likert scale was used to measure
each statement with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = to strongly agree.

Exogenous Variables

All exogenous variables were measured with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from
1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.

1196 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

Employees’ ethical orientation (EEO) refers to the underlying orientation of
the firm’s employees toward ethical behavior. Three items adapted from Salam
(2009) and Carter and Jennings (2004) were used as measures. Adjustments were
made to Carter and Jennings’ (2004) similar scale because examination of their
survey stems revealed their measures to be focused on employee values as an-
tecedents to departmental SR, which differed from the current purpose; rather, we
are interested here in the enduring current employee orientation related to ongoing
ethical behavior. TMEB refers to the actions and examples supporting ethical be-
havior represented by the organization’s leaders. The three items used to measure
top management ethical behavior were also based closely on those used by Salam
(2009) and Carter and Jennings (2004).

External pressure to behave ethically (EPBE) is the extent to which suppliers
or customers subject the organizations under observation to ethicality expectations.
The three items used to measure this construct were adapted from Carter and
Jennings (2004) and Carter and Carter (1998). SMEI refer to the supply manager’s
(lack of) propensity to breach ethical norms in the supply chain relationship context.
These items were adapted from Carter and Jennings (2004) and Carter (2000).
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with statements
related to how they behave when selecting suppliers.

Control Variables

Three control variables representing industry sector, organization size, and firm
ownership structure were included to check for impact on the intermediate and
final outcomes of interest. Industry sector and firm size are commonly understood
such that they warrant no discussion. Given the global setting of the study, a brief
note on ownership structure is warranted. The ownership structure (e.g., public,
private, government owned, joint venture) of an organization could influence how
much stakeholders effect organizational practices and whether socially responsible
behaviors are rewarded or promoted by the host government. Each of the three
control variables was measured on a discrete (categorical) scale depicting the range
of possible states.

Sample Characteristics

As shown in Table 1, the samples from the three nations include companies head-
quartered in many countries, though in each national sample the majority was
headquartered in the host country. In China, companies from 14 other nations were
included in addition to host country firms, indicative of China’s market emergence.
Across all three samples, company sizes skew somewhat to the small side in terms
of sales dollars and employees (<%50M USD; <100 employees). A broad variety of industries are represented, with light manufacturing, transportation/logistics, and construction being represented most prominently. Most firms sampled were privately owned (cross-sample average: 58%), with the

United Arab Emirates

showing a strong majority (83%). A plurality of respondents work in middle or
upper management positions, though strong minorities hold executive or lower
management roles.

Griffis et al. 1197

Table 1: Sample characteristics.

China U.A.E.

United States

Location headquarters Country % Country % Country %
CHN 52 U.A.E. 91.4 United States 93

United States 24 KUW 2.4 FRA 2
UK 5 UK 1.4 CAN 1

CAN 4 AUS 1 FIN 1
GER 3 GER .5 GER 1
AUS 2 HKG .5 KSA 1
UKR 2 IND .5 UK 1
BEL 1 KSA .5
BRZ 1 LEB .5
CZE 1 QAT .5
HKG 1 TUR .5
JAP 1 United States .5
NED 1
RUS 1
SWE 1

Last year sales % % %
$0–$50M USD 49.0 76.4 48.5
$50M–$500M USD 22.1 18.7 21.8
Greater than $500M 28.9 4.9 29.7
Primary industry % % %
Transportation/logistics 13.9

5.

3 12.2
Construction 11.7 29.2 7.9
Light manufacturing 11.7 13.9 13.4
Heavy manufacturing 11.7 4.8 4.9
Retail 6.4 10.1 11.0
Other 44.6 36.7 50.6
Ownership structure % % %
Privately held 42.4 83.0 54.8
Publicly held 23.9 5.0 23.9
Pub/Prv. joint 9.8 10.5 11.0
Government owned 23.9 1.5 10.3
Respondent position % % %
Top executive 15.4 27.6 11.5
Upper management 18.3 29.5 40.6
Middle management 21.2 19.5 30.9
Lower management 21.2 16.2 7.9
Other 23.9 5.2 9.1

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

We employed partial least squares SEM (PLS-SEM Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted,
2003; Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011) to analyze the data, using SmartPLS 2.0
software (Ringle, Wende, and Will, 2005). Although covariance-based SEM (CB-
SEM) is a commonly applied method, the objectives of this research and properties
of the data gathered necessitated the use of PLS-SEM over CB-SEM, for several

1198 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

Table 2: Descriptive statistics.

Construct 1 2 3 4 5

1. Employees’ ethical orientation 1.00 .53 .61 .34 .47
2. Stakeholder pressure for ethical behavior .73*** 1.00 .44 .26 .34
3. Top management support for ethical

behavior
.78*** .66*** 1.00 .38 .47

4. SMEI .59*** .51*** .62*** 1.00 .59
5. SRSS .69*** .66*** .69*** .77*** 1.00
Mean 5.19 4.71 5.20 5.33 5.09
Standard deviation 1.40 1.43 1.47 1.48 1.37
Average variance extracted 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.82
Composite reliability .77 .88 .89 .92 .92

*Estimate is significant to p < .05. **Estimate is significant to p < .01. ***Estimate is significant to p < .001. Note: Coefficients above the diagonal represent shared variance between constructs. All construct average variance extracted (AVE) estimates exceed shared variances for related constructs, supporting discriminant validity (per Fornell and Larker, 1981).

reasons. First, the measures of SRSS used were adapted from a subsample of
the Carter and Jennings (2004) PSR measures, but are not representative of that
concept as a whole. Rather, only a subset of the PSR items were adapted for use
in the different context of this study. As such, the new construction of SRSS must
be considered developmental and the testing of the antecedents upon SRSS is
made in a predictive rather than a confirmatory manner. This is a situation where
Hair et al. (2011) recommend PLS-SEM over CB-SEM (p. 140). In addition,
the assumption of multivariate normality necessary to the use of CB-SEM was
violated in the obtained sample, in particular for the measures of EEO and SRSS,
and as such CB-SEM should not be used (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000).
Furthermore, SRSS was composed of a mix of items that represent a formative
rather than reflective theoretical structure, that is, according to Jarvis, Mackenzie
and Podsakoff “ . . . [t]he indicators need not be interchangeable for formative
measurement models but should be for reflective measurement models” (2003,
p. 203). For constructs (defined by) formative measurement, and given its use
within the model with (other) reflective measures, PLS-SEM is recommended
(Hair et al., 2012). These analyses are described below.

Psychometric Analyses

We began by constructing a measurement model using the SmartPLS software. As
seen in the Appendix, factor loadings are high (in excess of 0.74), with low standard
errors. Furthermore, as seen in Table 2, average variances extracted ranged from
0.79 to 0.83, indicating high convergent validity (i.e., greater than 0.50). Composite
reliabilities from 0.77 to 0.92 indicated reliable scale construction (i.e., greater than
the 0.70). We assessed composite reliability as it considers actual factor loadings
rather than assuming equal weight for each item, as in calculating Chronbach’s α.

Griffis et al. 1199

We assessed discriminant validity by comparing average variance extracted
for each individual construct to its shared variance with all other constructs, with a
higher AVE than shared variance for a pairing of constructs supporting discriminant
validity (Table 2). The largest shared variance value occurs for the purchasing
organization’s valuation of ethical behavior/top management support pairing at
0.61. The AVEs for these constructs are 0.79 and 0.81, respectively, suggesting
discriminant validity. All other shared variances were below 0.61, and all AVE
values 0.79 or greater, leading us to consider discriminant validity concerns as
minimal.

Bias and Invariance Assessments

Because we employed a survey methodology, the data were tested for three forms
of response bias frequently associated with surveys. We performed checks for
social desirability bias, common method variance, and nonresponse bias. We also
assessed the measurement invariance, the equivalence of our focal constructs across
sample settings, because our survey was administered in different languages.

Social desirability bias

Data quality can be affected when survey respondents reply to questions in a
manner the respondent hopes will be viewed favorably by others (Thompson and
Phua, 2005). Social desirability bias was a potential threat (Crowne and Marlowe,
1960). Several steps were taken to assess and mitigate this possibility. Following the
advice of Crowne and Marlowe (1960), respondents were specifically instructed
at the outset of the survey to respond for their company rather than offering
their own values or feelings. In this way, social desirability bias was partially
mitigated for SRSS by effectively allowing the respondent to “hide” among the
individuals in the purchasing group. In addition, social desirability bias for all
other scales employed in the study was assessed through item pretesting as well
as post hoc analyses. As suggested by Steenkamp, de Jong, and Baumgartner
(2010), social desirability was assessed using a multidimensional scale measuring
self-perceptions of emotional, intellectual, and social qualities (ERT) as well as
attributes related to responsibility and interpersonal relationships (MRT). We note
that empirical research by Steenkamp et al. (2010) led them to the conclusion
that the traditionally employed social desirability construct provided by Crowne
and Marlowe (1964) can generate a false negative reading due to its single factor
structure/unidimensionality confounding the emotional and relational rationale
for responding in a socially desirable manner. Thus, we employ the Steenkamp
et al. multidimensional version, while acknowledging its relative immaturity within
quantitative business research contexts. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
were conducted related to all major study variables to determine if there was a
significant relationship between the social desirability dimensions of ERT and MRT
with the constructs within the model. As neither factor significantly associated with
the focal concepts, social desirability bias was deemed nonproblematic.

1200 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

Common method and nonresponse biases

Concerns of common method bias were addressed by employing the prescriptions
of Podsakoff et al. (2003). Specifically, two steps were undertaken: (i) dependent
and independent measures were separated within the surveys, and (ii) post hoc
analysis was performed to verify that no correlation existed between contiguous
but theoretically unrelated items. Observation of the recommended correlations
suggests common method bias is nonproblematic in the current study. In addition,
steps were taken to mitigate the potential impacts of nonresponse bias for each
of the samples. Measures were taken to increase the overall response rates for all
samples, and the research team conducted abbreviated follow-up phone surveys
for the Chinese sample to assess possible differences in response patterns between
nonrespondents and respondents; no significant differences were found across these
two groups (Lambert and Harrington, 1990). As a second test of non-response bias,
the first and late quartile waves for all samples were compared to each other for
statistical equivalence according to procedures of Armstrong and Overton (1977).
Evidence showed the subsamples to be equivalent, suggesting nonresponse bias
did not meaningfully impact the focal relationships.

Measurement invariance

International business research undertaken across multiple countries must ensure
that conceptually equivalent measurements are taken in order for comparisons
across models to be trustworthy (Vandenburg and Lance, 2000). Because we col-
lected data in Arabic, Chinese, and U.S. national contexts using English and
Chinese language surveys, invariance of construct measures in this study was
assessed via multigroup CFA, as per Steenkamp et al. (2010).

We first defined a configural invariance model using M-Plus modeling soft-
ware with no cross-group factor constraint imposed. Configural invariance assesses
whether the same pattern of factor loadings exists across samples drawn from dif-
ferent countries. Our results indicated that the baseline model with free factor
loadings fit the data well (NFI = .93; RMSEA = .055). The normed χ 2 was 2.117,
below the critical value of 3.00, and thus we inferred from these statistics that
configural invariance existed across the three samples.

Next, we tested the metric invariance to examine whether factor loadings are
identical for each scale item between any two samples. We constrained all the factor
loadings to be equal across the samples, and results showed that the metric models
fit the data (minimum NFI = .90; maximum RMSEA = .079), and the changes
in chi-square were not significant, thus the full metric invariance models were not
significantly worse than a baseline model. Finally, we evaluated scalar invariance
to determine whether cross-national differences in means of observed items are due
to differences in the means of the underlying constructs by constraining all factor
loadings and intercepts to be equal across groups (minimum NFI = .88; maximum
RMSEA = .08). These analyses provide adequate support for invariance, though
per Vandenburg and Lance (2000), we caution against extrapolating our findings
to other cultural scenarios.

Griffis et al. 1201

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1202 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

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Griffis et al. 1203

Hypotheses Testing

To evaluate our hypotheses, we ran a series of models using SmartPLS 2.0. The
results of testing appear in Table 3 and visually depicted in Figure 1. For each
country setting, modeling Step One provides a baseline model containing only
the control variable associations with SRSS in the upper block. Then, a direct
effects model is presented, linking the controls and antecedents to SRSS. Step
Two in each case is similar, but connected to the mediating variable. It contains
control and direct effects models assessing the linkages with SMEI, and is therefore
useful for assessing Hypotheses 1–3 in each national setting. Step Three in each
national case then assesses all of the prior effects (controls, antecedents, and
SMEI) on SRSS simultaneously, and is therefore useful for assessing mediation
hypotheses H4a and H4b (which are competing hypotheses). Finally, by comparing
the significance patterns of Model 3 across all three relevant contexts, we evaluate
H5.

Figure 1: Theoretical model. Country listed with hypotheses represents the sam-
ple(s) where hypotheses are supported.

Employee
Ethical O
(EEO)

Top Mana
Ethical Be
(TMEB)

Externa al Pressure
to Behave
Ethicall ly (EPBE)

s’
rientation

gement
haviors

H1+: U

H3+: UAE, USA

USA, UAE

H2+ UA :

Legend: Country listed with hypotheses represent ts the sample(s) where hypotheses are supported

AE

Supply
Ethical
(SMEI)

H4+

Manager’s
Intentions

)

H5: National moderator
(China, USA, UAE)

Soc
Res
Sup
(SR

ially
ponsible
plier Selection
SS)

We first examined the significance and direction of the EEO coefficients
relating to SMEI in Step Two, as a means of evaluating H1. This hypothesis was
supported in the Chinese and U.S. models (B = 0.49, p < .001; B = 0.39, p < .001), but not in the U.A.E. model (model E1: B = 0.11, p > .05). Similarly, to test
H2, we examined the significance and direction of the TMEB coefficients relating
to SMEI in Step Two. This hypothesis was supported in the U.A.E. model only
(B = 0.30, p < .01), whereas in the Chinese and U.S. models, the relation was

1204 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

unsupported (B = 0.02, p > .05; B = 0.09, p > .05). To test H3, we examined the
significance and direction of the EPBE coefficients in Step Two. This hypothesis
was supported in the U.S. model (B = 0.30, p < .01); but not the U.A.E. or Chinese models (B = −0.02, p > .05; B = −0.08, p > .05).

The fourth hypothesis explores the possibility that SMEI may serve to me-
diate the relationships between the focal antecedents and SRSS. We used Shrout
and Bolger’s (2002) approach to test mediation; the antecedents were first related
to the outcome (Step One), and then to the mediator (Step Two), and then finally,
the mediator to the outcome (Step Three). Via this sequence, full mediation can be
claimed when the direct antecedent–outcome relationship is null in the full model
while the combined indirect effect is significant (Preacher and Hayes, 2004), and
partial mediation exists when both direct and indirect/combined effects are present.
We used the Sobel (1982) test to determine the combined indirect effects.

Employing these procedural guidelines, we observe evidence supporting
three SMEI mediation relationships, as displayed in Step Three. We consider them
on a country-by-country basis. First, we observe in the Chinese context that SMEI
fully mediates the EEO-SRSS relationship in the Chinese context (EEO → SMEI
= 0.49, p < .05; SMEI → SRSS = 0.64, p < .05, when EEO → SRSS = 0.15, p > .10, with Sobel = 2.31, p < .05). Second, we observe full mediation of the TMEB–SRSS relationship by SMEI for the U.A.E. sample (TMEB → SMEI = 0.30, p < .05; SMEI → SRSS = 0.51, p < .05, when TMEB → SRSS = 0.11, p > .10, with Sobel = 2.13, p < .05). Third, we observe full mediation of the EEO–SRSS relationship by SMEI in the U.S. sample (EEO → SMEI = 0.39, p < .05; SMEI → SRSS = 0.66, p < .05, when EEO → SRSS = −0.09, p > .10, with
Sobel = 2.78, p < .05). Fourth, we observe full mediation of the EPBE–SRSS relationship by SMEI for the U.S. sample (EPBE → SMEI = 0.30, p < .05; SMEI → SRSS = 0.66, p < .05, when EPBE → SRSS = 0.11, p > .10, with Sobel =
2.21, p < .05). In the remainder of the antecedent/nation scenarios, no mediating effect of SMEI is observed. We address the implication of the four revealed cases below.

Via1 the fifth hypothesis, we predicted that the three antecedents’ impacts
on supply manager ethical intentions would vary by world region. For the two
of the three tested instances—those for which the u-shaped collectivism effect
was predicted (H5b and H5c)—we observed support. As predicted in H5b, the
direct relationship between EEO and SMEI was significant for the Chinese and
U.S. samples, but was insignificant for the U.A.E. sample. However, the U.S.
sample was the only one to exhibit a strong EPBE–SMEI impact. Surprisingly,
this direct path was nonsignificant for the Chinese sample. Furthermore, though
national cultural theory provides a rational basis for expecting that TMEB would be
stronger for the Chinese and U.A.E. samples than the U.S. sample, we again observe
a surprising antipathy on the part of the Chinese sample to SMEI, via another
nonsignificant effect. This leads to a compelling and interesting synopsis; only the
EEO appears to drive SMEI for the Chinese sample, whereas TMEB and EPBE
have negligible effect. Given China’s emergence as a leading manufacturing nation,
these observations beg additional analysis, which we conduct in the discussion that
follows.

Griffis et al. 1205

DISCUSSION

The primary contributions of this research are threefold: (i) we apply the Carter and
Jennings (2004) logic regarding the departmental notion of PSR to a narrower but
important supply management domain: supplier selection; (ii) we assess supply
manager ethical intentions as a mediator of three focal antecedent–SRSS relation-
ships; and most importantly, (iii) we examine the relationships between SRSS and
its predictors in three nationally diverse cultures. Our observations suggest that
SRSS appears to be motivated differently across these national contexts of interest,
leading to important practical and theoretical implications.

China

With regard to China, we observe two interesting effects: a direct effect linking
EPBE to SRSS and an indirect effect linking EEO to SRSS via the SMEI mediator.
In China, firms’ EEO correlates with SMEI, but not EPBE or TMEB. Thus, only
when the purchasing organization employees are ethics-oriented are the supply
manager’s ethical intentions meaningfully impacted. In our sample, the Chinese
supply manager willingly enacts SRSS to gain external favor, but internalizes SRSS
only when the localized employee orientation has influenced his/her perspective.
Given that top management behavior and external pressure do not influence the
indirect relationship on SRSS through ethical intentions, this finding implies that
other forces outside the scope of our study are driving significant variance in supply
manager ethical intentions.

More interesting, however, is the lack of significant national moderation
effects impacting SMEI, as per H5. A possible explanation for the unexpected lack
of top management and external effects that merits future consideration is Guanxi.
Guanxi is a system prevalent in northeast Asia whereby business partners are
selected based upon preexisting personal and business relationships. Particularly
in China, conformance to Guanxi is expected if a corporation or manager wishes
to succeed (Lovett, Simmons, & Kali, 1999; Dunfee and Warren, 2001). Perhaps
in the case of this study, Guanxi has its locus in the purchasing department, that
is, agents view the department as their central network and elevate it to higher
status than other influencers. Given the lack of a significant relationship between
TMEB or EPBE on SMEI in an otherwise hierarchical and collectivist society,
might SMEI better be explained by their participation in a Guanxi network? For
managers and firms operating outside of their home environment, this would be a
key factor that merits study before interacting with Chinese supply partners.

United States

Versus China, the sampled U.S. supply managers respond differently to external
pressures—we observe a direct relationship between EPBE and SRSS. This may
be related to customer-oriented pressures within the U.S. market. Blocker et al.
(2011) find that modern U.S.-based firms are more likely to be highly customer-
oriented than those from other nations. However, the formation of SMEI for the
U.S. sample appears more complex than for the Chinese sample. Although in
the Chinese sample the only identified direct antecedent of SMEI was EEO, in
the U.S.A. sample these SMEI is impacted by both the EEO and EPBE. In effect,

1206 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

customers and suppliers impact SRSS both directly and indirectly through their
influence on supply managers. This is consistent with the notions of and supply
chain orientation found in prior research within Westernized economic settings
(Kelley, 1992; Blocker et al., 2011).

Generally speaking, American activists and customers could be more edu-
cated on how business practices affect society and the environment. Furthermore,
the low level of power distance within U.S. society creates a culture where con-
cerned individuals or groups may challenge corporate actions deemed harmful
to society. Accordingly, activists and customer groups have greater success pres-
suring businesses in the United States. Hence, supply management employees in
the United States appear responsive to stakeholder needs and wants, as the recent
theorization suggests.

United Arab Emirates

United Arab Emirates results differ significantly from the Chinese and U.S. cases;
for the U.A.E. sample, SRSS is a fully mediated outcome of TMEB via SMEI.
Unlike the Chinese and American samples, in the United Arab Emirates, EEO
and EPBE do not influence SMEI or SRSS either directly or indirectly. Rather,
SMEI fully mediates the relationship between TMEB and SRSS. The remaining
antecedent effects display no significant direct or indirect effects.

In a nation where SR behaviors are widely accepted within business and
social interactions, why are the ethical intentions of the supply manager directly
related to SRSS whereas the influences of external partners and the employees’
ethical orientation are less relevant? The relative institutionalization of SR practices
in the United Arab Emirates might effectively raise the baseline expectations of
SR behaviors (including SRSS) for all individuals in the firm, including supply
managers. In contrast with the other regions studied, the mean score on the SRSS
variable for the United Arab Emirates is higher and has a smaller standard deviation
(5.28/1.06 for the United Arab Emirates, vs. 5.09/1.37 for the combined sample).

In the United Arab Emirates, are SR activities viewed as compulsory, even
sans formal policies handed down by top management? If so, then the influ-
ences of external stakeholders, national culture, and coworkers may conflate to
be perceived as a singular institutional force. This is especially possible given the
emphasis the United Arab Emirates has placed in recent years upon ethics and
social responsibility through government initiatives and highly publicized regu-
lation (Vijayarghavan, 2011). In this study, U.A.E. SMEI is shaped by only one
antecedent force: TMEB. This implies that top management example is the single
most important differentiator of SRSS in U.A.E. businesses, though rote levels of
SMEI and SRSS would generally be high, regardless.

IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The human capital and social responsibility requirements for operating global
supply chains are growing, and mistakes can be costly. Our findings help inform
decision makers as to how to influence the ethical intentions of supply managers
in expatriate or local national positions toward SRSS. Furthermore, these results

Griffis et al. 1207

highlight the importance of identifying, recruiting, and training supply managers to
be better aligned with the social responsibility objectives of the organization. With
these findings, better hiring decisions can be made to better match candidates’
ethical orientations to these (and similar) global assignments, gain cost savings
associated with employee retention, while promoting more efficient, effective and
socially responsible supply chain management. Supply managers themselves may
also benefit financially from a more precise calibration of localized training efforts
and informal communication capabilities.

Our exploratory findings offer a robust initial view of the SRSS phenomenon
across settings known to differ widely on SR issues. Our findings related to the
role of SMEI within the SRSS process display stark contrasts by location. Yet as
with all studies, limitations prohibit extrapolating our findings too carelessly to
other samples or contexts. Although we assessed the SRSS phenomenon in three
national settings, underlying governmental and social movements in these nations
that are not captured by our study might influence results of follow-up studies.
Furthermore, the majority of our respondents in the two less-developed nations are
residents of large cities. Geographical or geopolitical differences (either globally
or regionally) should be considered as controls in future studies.

Furthermore, as often occurs in empirical research, as many questions arose
as were answered. The influence of SMEI was evidenced in all three settings,
but it played different roles in the model for each location. The explanations for
these differences in ethicality and its value remain undiscovered. Future studies
would benefit from a more granular exploration than the national setting: perhaps
subcultural or local characteristics caused respondents to enact or not enact SRSS in
the ways reported. Furthermore, given that the study treated supplier and customers
as a homogenous subgroup exerting external pressure on the supply management
function, future research may benefit from analysis of these groups separately, to
determine their unique effects on SMEI. Via additional research efforts such as
these, firms operating global supply chains would have a better basis from which
to conduct supply manager hiring, training, orientation, and SRSS assessment.

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Appendix

MEASUREMENT ITEMS AND FACTOR LOADINGS

Construct Item Loading

Employees’ ethical orientation
(EEO)

EEO1: Morals held by individual
employees

.938

(7-point Likert scale anchored as
1 = not at all valued, 7 =
valued to a great extent)

EEO2: Desires of individuals to
do what is right

.918

EEO3: Underlying values held by
employees

.905

Top management ethical behaviors
(TMEB)

TMEB1: Ethical examples set by
top management

.903

(7-point Likert scale anchored as
1 = not at all valued, 7 =
valued to a great extent)

TMEB2: Ethical requirements set
by senior managers

.898

TMEB3: Top-down ethical
initiatives introduced by leaders

.899

External pressure for ethical
behavior (EPBE)

EPBE1: Social programs
sponsored by our
customers/suppliers

.878

(7-point Likert scale anchored as
1 = not at all valued, 7 =
valued to a great extent)

EPBE2: Awareness of social
issues by our
customers/suppliers

.905

EPBE3: Customer/supplier desires
to work with socially
responsible partners

.929

Supply managers’ ethical
intentions (SMEI)

SMEI1: We avoid using terms in
our contracts that would allow
us to take unfair advantage over
suppliers

.905

(7-point Likert Scale anchored as
1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree)

SMEI2: We avoid tactics that
could mislead supplier
salespeople

.885

SMEI3: We never lie or exaggerate
when dealing with suppliers.

.937

SMEI4: We avoid blaming our
suppliers for mistakes that were
our own fault

.941

Socially responsible supplier
selectiona (SRSS)

SRSS1: We try to choose suppliers
whose processes and products
are environmentally safe

.869

1214 Antecedents of SRSS in Three Global Supply Chain Contexts

Construct Item Loading

(7-point Likert scale anchored as
1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree).

SRSS2: We try to choose suppliers
that use recyclable or reusable
packaging

.772

SRSS3: We try to choose suppliers
who participate in green
purchasing initiatives with us

.838

SRSS4: We try to choose suppliers
that use nonhazardous materials
and processes

.837

SRSS5: We try to choose suppliers
that pay their employees a fair
wage to live on

.868

SRSS6: We try to choose suppliers
that do not use sweatshop labor

.741

SRSS7: We try to choose suppliers
that do not use child labor

.816

SRSS8: We try to choose suppliers
that operate a safe work
environment

.886

To tap individual supply manager(s) behaviors, the following question stem was used for
this question: “Please agree or disagree with the statements related to how you and/or the
other individual supply managers in your purchasing organization choose the company’s
suppliers.”

Stanley E. Griffis is an Associate Professor of Logistics at Michigan State Uni-
versity. His research interests include customer-focused impacts of supply chain
operations, social network in supply chains, practical vehicle routing in real-world
supply chains, and the role of supply chains in disruption recovery. He has pub-
lished work in Journal of Business Logistics, Journal of Operations Management,
Journal of Management, Omega – The International Journal of Management Sci-
ence, Transportation Journal, International Journal of Production Economics, and
the International Journal of Production Research.

Chad W. Autry is the William J. Taylor Professor of Supply Chain Management
at the University of Tennessee. He received his BBA and PhD in business ad-
ministration from the University of Oklahoma, and an MBA from Oklahoma City
University. His research focuses on the impacts of plural simultaneous forms of
connectivity in the supply chain, inclusive of social relationships, business pro-
cesses, and information technology linkages, as well as the reciprocal linkage
between supply chain corporate performance and social responsibility. His work
has appeared in various academic outlets in the supply chain management and gen-
eral management fields. He is currently Editor in Chief of the Journal of Supply
Chain Management.

LaDonna M. Thornton is an assistant professor of supply chain management in
the College of Business at the University of Nebraska. She received her PhD in

Griffis et al. 1215

logistics from the University of Tennessee College of Business, an MBA from
Vanderbilt University, and a BSBA in operations management, transportation &
logistics, and purchasing from The Ohio State University. Prior to joining academia
she worked in industry as a Transportation Manager and Distribution Manager. Her
research has been published in Journal of Business Logistics, Journal of Supply
Chain Management and the International Journal of Physical Distribution and
Logistics Management. Her current research focuses on behavioral issues as well
as social and political dynamics within supply chain management.

Anis Ben Brik is the President of the Eneref Institute, a sustainable develop-
ment research and advocacy organization focused on raising awareness of the role
sustainable supply chain initiatives can play in emerging economies. He was for-
merly Director of Social Policy for the Prime Minister’s office of the United Arab
Emirates, and Director of Policy and Planning for the UAE Federal Demographic
Council. He has taught sustainable concepts at several universities worldwide. He
holds business degrees from Harvard Business School and the London School of
Economics.

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