Assignment # 2

Examine the article,

China’s fare share? The growth of Chinese exports in world trade (Links to an external site.)

, and compare the pervasive export growth of China’s past to the current economic forecasts seen in

China Under Attack (Links to an external site.)

as it relates to the future of China’s global economic future.

  • Did the forced worker wage increase impact the downtrend, or was it an inevitable restructuring based on worker demands to share the economic wealth?
  • How might this reorganization of trade affect the imports of other, smaller economically developing countries?
  • Is it in the global economy’s best interest to allow more competition or equalize a drop in China’s export production?

Your paper should be 4-6 pages in length, not including the title or reference pages, and conform to

CSU-Global Guide to Writing and APA (Links to an external site.)

.

Include at least four academic peer-reviewed journal articles as references. The CSU-Global Library is a good place to find these references.

Here are links to valuable CSU-Global Library Guides to help you find appropriate sources:

  • International Business Guide (Links to an external site.)
  • Economics Research Guide (Links to an external site.)

ORI GIN AL PA PER

China’s fare share? The growth of Chinese exports
in world trad

e

Steven Husted • Shuichiro Nishiok

a

Published online: 6 February 2013

� Kiel Institute 2013

Abstract The growth of Chinese exports in market share over the past two dec-
ades is a singular event in the history of world trade. Using data from 1995–2010,

we document this growth in a variety of ways. We show that the expanded trade is

pervasive. Virtually every country in the world has seen China claim a larger

share

of its import market. Then, we use Constant Market Share analysis to determine

which country or countries have lost market share as China’s trade has grown.

Contrary to much discussion in the popular press, we find strong evidence that other

developing countries have not seen export shares fall as a result of China’s gains.

Rather, our results suggest that China’s share growth has come largely at the

expense of exporters based in developed countries, especially Japan and the Unit

ed

States.

Keywords Chinese exports � Constant market share analysis � Export shares

JEL Classification F14 � P33

1 Introduction

Over the past two decades the Chinese economy has grown at a remarkable pace.

Between 1995 and 2007 Chinese real GDP grew at an average annual rate of more

S. Husted (&

)

Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh,

4508 WW Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15216, USA

e-mail: husted1@pitt.edu

S. Nishioka

Department of Economics, West Virginia University,

1601 University Avenue, Morgantown, WV 26506-6025, USA

e-mail: Shuichiro.Nishioka@mail.wvu.edu

123

Rev World Econ (2013) 149:565–58

5

DOI 10.1007/s10290-013-0149-2

than 10 %. Per capita real GDP rose by 250 % over this period.1 One of the leading

factors driving this economic growth has been the extraordinary performance of

Chinese exports. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 2010 China

ranked first in exports to the world market with merchandise export sales of more

than $1.5 trillion and a world market share of 10.4 %. In 1998, China had less than

2 % of the world market. Twenty years earlier, China’s share was essentially zero.

As China’s share of world exports has grown, it has come under increasing pressure

to allow its currency to appreciate; often the criticism of its exchange rate practices

includes charges that other developing and emerging market economies have borne

the brunt in terms of lost export markets.

2

The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of Chinese export growth over

the period when its share of world exports rose most rapidly, the years 1995–2010.

We provide detail on the commodity composition of Chinese exports and how this

composition has changed. We also discuss some aspects of the geographic pattern

and commodity composition of Chinese trade. In addition, a fundamenta

l

contribution of this paper is that we provide considerable evidence that the

principal exporting countries that have lost market share to China are developed

countries, especially Japan and the

United States.

We use Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis (i.e., Fagerberg and Sollie 1987)

to determine which of five factors (i.e., market share, commodity composition,

commodity adaptation, market composition, and market adaptation) are responsible

for the rise of Chinese share. During the period we consider, the market share effect

is the critical factor to explain the share change in the world trade. This element of

trade growth captures the extent to which an exporter gains or loses market share

against other exporters independent of changes in the product and destination

pattern of world imports. In particular, almost all share gains of China over the

period 1995–2010 (i.e., the market share effect accounts for 11.6 of 12.9 percentage

points (pp.) of Chinese share gains) stem from the market share effects.3

We also apply CMS analysis to the sub-periods of 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and

2005–2010. In the period of 1995–2000, the share gain of China was relatively moderate

(2.9 pp.) and Japan and Germany lost market share in roughly equal amounts (2.4 and

2.2 pp., respectively). The United States also saw its world export market share rise

during this period, due primarily to the commodity composition effect. That is, the United

States gained market share because the structure of world import demand changed toward

the types of goods that the United States exports. During the period 2000–2005, Chinese

market share increased by 5.8 pp. and the majority of Chinese share gains were

accompanied by the significant market share loss of the United States (-4.0 pp.). Finally,

over the sub-period (2005–2010) that included the great trade collapse of 2008–2009,

1 These numbers use China Version 2 data from the PWT6.3 data set. See ‘‘What is New in PWT 6.3?’’

link on the Penn World Tables site, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php, for a discussion

of the differences between this version of Chinese data and official Chinese data.
2 See, for instance, Arvin Subramanian, ‘‘Who Pays for the Weak Renminbi?’’, 11 February 2010, Vox

Front Page, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4604.
3 With the exception of Sect. 2, the discussion of share changes in the remainder of this section and the

rest of the paper refers to trade in manufactured goods (SITC categories 5–9) among a sample of 92

countries and Hong Kong.

566 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php

http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4604

China’s share increased by 4.2 pp. and the market share and commodity

adaptation

effects both explain the share changes. While developed countries’ demands for

manufacturing goods had slowed due to the financial crisis, developing countries’

demands for foreign manufacturing goods were relatively strong. China had increased its

world market share by exporting intensively to emerging developing countries.4

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2 we present an overview of

Chinese trade expansion. In Sect. 3 we discuss CMS analysis, an empirical

technique that provides a method for studying changes in export market shares. In

Sect. 4, we apply CMS to study trade patterns among a sample of 94 countries over

the period 1995–2010 in commodity trade disaggregated at the 5-digit SITC level.

We also apply CMS to study the periods to 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010.

In Sect. 5, we expand our analysis by focusing on export behavior across industries

and in individual export markets. Section 6 offers our conclusions.

2 An overview of Chinese export performance

Figure 1 provides a time series plot of world export shares for five of the world’s

leading exporting countries, Germany, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the

United States over the post World War II era. As the figure shows, since the end of

World War II, only Germany has seen as rapid and as large a rise in world export

share as China. In the eleven year span from 1948 to 1958, Germany’s share of world

exports rose from 1.3 to 10.3 %, roughly matching in both magnitude and duration

China’s performance. However there are several major differences between the two.

First, Germany’s growth almost certainly represented a return for that country to a

market position similar to the one that it had held prior to the war era. Second, at the

time of Germany’s significant growth there were far fewer major exporters

competing for market share. For instance, in the 1950s the combined world export

share of the countries now known as the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries

(NICs) (Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) was virtually zero. In contrast,

since at least the onset of the industrial revolution and prior to the 1990s, China had

never held a significant share of world trade. And, China’s export growth came only

slightly after significant growth by the NICs and simultaneously with major growth

by several other countries that along with China make up the BRICs (Brazil, Russia,

and India), all of whom now also hold relatively large shares of the world market.

Like all major exporting countries, China has a market presence in virtually

every country in the world; this presence has grown in almost every market in recent

years. Using data from the United Nation’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database

we calculated aggregate exporter market shares in 92 countries and 1 territory

(Hong Kong), from all parts of the world.5 Several interesting patterns emerge from

4 In a related study, Wood and Mayer (2011) look at how the entry of China into international markets

over the past three decades has impacted production of primary and labor-intensive products in a wide set

of developing countries. They find that although output and exports of labor-intensive goods continued to

rise following the emergence of China in the 1990s, the growth in these ratios was slower in the 1990s

than in the 1980s.
5 These countries were chosen due to the availability of the import data from UN Comtrade.

China’s fare share 567

123

this exercise. First, the global extent of China’s trade expanded significantly

between 1995 and 2010. By 2010, China had at least 3 % of the market in all of

these countries. Moreover, market share growth was pervasive; over the 1995–201

0

period China’s market share grew in all of these markets. In many cases, especially

in South America, Africa, and smaller European countries, shares were essentially

zero prior to 1995. Table 1 provides some additional summary statistics.

According to the table, geography is clearly important for China’s trade. At the

end of 2010, its highest regional market share was in Asia where among the sample

countries it had an average share of 18.9 %. Its highest market share among all the

Asian countries in the sample stood at 49.1 %.6 Its next highest average regional

market share was in North America; this included 16.7 % of all U.S. merchandise

Table 1 China’s national export market share by region

Countries 2010 national market shares (%) Share changes 1995–2010a

Average SD Maximum Minimum Average SD Maximum Minimum

Africa 20 15.9 9.3 49.1 6.2 13.0 9.1 45.5 3.1

Asia and Pacific 13 18.9 10.7 49.1 4.2 11.8 3.4 15.9 3.8

Europe 31 9.4 6.5 36.0 3.1 8.0 6.0 33.4 2.4

Middle East 7 12.0 1.1 13.3 10.2 10.2 0.7 11.0 9.0

North America 3 16.4 5.2 21.9 11.6 13.1 2.6 15.0 9.5

South America 19 12.7 7.7 35.1 5.2 11.7 7.4 35.1 4.2

Total 93 13.2 8.4 49.1 3.1 10.7 6.9 35.1 2.4

a Share changes are measured in percentage points

0
5

10

15

20

25

30

19
48

19
50

19
52

19
54

19
56

19
58

19
60

19
62

19
64

19
66

19
68

19
70

19
72

19
74

19
76

19
78

19
80

19
82

19
84

19
86

19
88

19
90

19
92

19
94

19
96

19
98

20
00

20
02

20
04

20
06

20
08

20
10

%
o

f
w

or
ld

e
xp

or
ts

CHINA

GERMANY

JAPAN

UK

US

Fig. 1 World market export shares 1948–2010

6 This was China’s share of Hong Kong’s market. Among the other Asian countries in this sample China

had more than 25% of Japan’s market in 2010 and more than 10% of the export markets of Thailand,

South Korea, Pakistan, and Singapore.

568 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

imports in 2010. On average, China’s smallest regional market penetration was in

Europe, where its average national market share in 2010 was 9.4 %. Since 2005,

China’s export shares have increased particularly in remote and low-income

countries. For example, the average of China’s export shares in African

countries

increased from 8.3 to 15.9 %. For the South American countries in our sample,

China’s average market share almost doubled, rising from 6.6 to 12.7 %.

As detailed more fully below, China’s export market share has grown in recent

years, and it has changed the mix of goods it supplies to world markets. By value,

virtually all of Chinese exports are manufactured goods. Early on, these exports

were concentrated in Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles (SITC Category 8),

including apparel and toys. While that category still accounts for a significant share

of Chinese exports, more recently Chinese trade growth has been concentrated in

Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC Category 7).

In order to better focus on this change in the commodity composition of trade, we

restrict our attention to exports of differentiated manufactured products disaggre-

gated at the 5-digit SITC level. In much of what follows we continue to analyze data

from a set of 94 countries.7 Our sample includes countries from every continent and

includes countries at various standards of living; slightly more than one-third the

countries chosen in our sample are classified by the World Bank as high-income

countries. In 2010, the countries used in our analysis accounted for 76.8 % of total

world imports.8 Trade among these countries accounted for a majority of all world

merchandise trade in each of the years in our sample.

The first panel of Table 2 provides detail on the composition of Chinese exports

in 1995 and 2010 across broad categories of goods to our sample of markets as well

as the countries identified as developing countries.9 Also included in the table is

China’s portion of total world exports at the 1-digit level (SITC Rev.3) in 1995 and

2010. As the table shows, Chinese exports have been centered in manufactures for

some time. In 1995, 90 % of Chinese exports to our sample countries came from

industries classified in SITC sections 5–9. By 2010, that share had risen to almost

95 % of total exports. Traditionally, Chinese exports have been concentrated in

Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles (SITC Category 8). This sector includes many

labor intensive manufactured products such as clothing, footwear, and toys, items

7 In addition to China, we use the following countries: (Africa) Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,

Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco,

Mozambique, Niger, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia; (Asia and Pacific) Australia, Hong

Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,

Singapore, and Thailand; (Europe) Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,

Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,

Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; (Middle East) Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Oman,

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey; (North America) Canada, Mexico, and the United States; (Central and

South America) Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,

Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and

Venezuela.
8 Our data set consists of bilateral trade of 93 countries. We calculate the total world imports from the

sum of total imports of all available countries in UN Comtrade.
9 Developing countries are those not classified as being a high-income country by the World Bank in its

2009 World Development Report.

China’s fare share 569

123

long identified as characteristic examples of Chinese exports. Twenty seven percent

of Chinese exports to our sample countries in 2010 came from this sector. However,

this share had stood at 47 % of total exports to these markets in 1995. Instead, in

recent years, the share of Chinese exports of more sophisticated manufactures has

risen substantially with exports in Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC

Category 7) more than doubling to 51 % of its exports to the sample markets.

The period 2005–2010 includes the onset of the Great Recession in the United

States and elsewhere and the consequent 2008–2009 collapse in world trade.10 As

Table 2 Structure of world exports and imports

SITC Rev 3 Commodities I. Composition of

Chinese exports all

countries

II. China’s shares in

world (China’s/World

export

s)

1995 2010 1995 2010

(a) Structure of Chinese exports

0 Food and live animals 4.5 2.0 3.4

5.0

1 Beverages and tobacco 0.4 0.1 2.4 1.9

2 Crude materials 2.4 0.8 2.8 2.3

3 Mineral fuels 2.4 1.0 2.3 1.3

4 Animal and vegetable oils 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.6

5 Chemicals and related products 3.9 4.7 2.2 5.8

6 Manufactured goods (materials) 15.3 12.6 5.5 15.0

7 Machinery and transport equipment 23.2 50.8 3.1 19.0

8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 47.3 27.4 18.9 33.3

9 Other commodities 0.5 0.8 1.0 3.8

SITC Rev 3 Commodities III. The levels of total imports (2005 = 1)

Developing countries Developed countries

1995 2010 1995 2010

(b) Structure of world imports

0 Food and live animals 0.789 1.647 0.788 1.642

1 Beverages and tobacco 1.296 2.108 1.840 1.853

2 Crude materials 0.360 1.728 0.533 1.533

3 Mineral fuels 0.248 2.729 0.542 3.748

4 Animal and vegetable oils 0.495 1.345 0.935 1.692

5 Chemicals and related products 0.448 1.703 0.629 1.319

6 Manufactured goods (materials) 0.583 1.684 0.841 1.283

7 Machinery and transport equipment 0.561 1.558 0.867 0.934

8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.391 1.622 0.843 1.022

9 Other commodities 2.841 1.471 0.536 1.394

We use import data of 94 countries for panels I and II

10 For detail on this period see Richard Baldwin, The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences, and

Prospects, VoxEU eBook, 2009, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297.

570 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297

has been documented by the Nabli (2010) developing countries have rebounded

much more strongly from the downturn, and these countries have accounted for

much of the growth in trade over the past several years. This pattern shows up well

in the second panel of Table 2 where we document the levels of imports for

developing and developed countries for each product group. We set the import

values of year 2005 as 1. For example, while the import values of Category 7

increased from 1 in 2005 to 1.558 in 2010 and those of Category 8 increased from 1

to 1.622 for developing markets, the corresponding values are 0.934 and 1.022 for

exports to developed

country markets.

China’s world market shares changes over this period followed the transforma-

tion described above. Between 1995 and 2010, its share of Industry 7 exports to the

world increased by a factor of six, while its Industry 8 market share increased by

slightly less than 15 pp. We are not the first to point out the recent growth in the

sophistication of Chinese exports. Rodrik (2006, p. 4) calculates that by 2002 China

had an export bundle ‘‘of a country with an income per capita level three times

higher than China’s’’. In a related study, Schott (2008) focuses on Chinese exports

to the United States. He finds that the composition of this export bundle

‘‘increasingly overlaps with that of the world’s most developed economies’’ (Schott

2008, p. 34).

The data in Tables 1 and 2 document the growth of Chinese exports and the

change in the sectoral composition of these goods over the period 1995–2010.

Clearly, the rapid growth of China in the world market has had market share

implications for other exporting nations. A number of papers have focused on

various aspects of the recent growth of Chinese exports on global competition.

One focus of attention has been on whether the growth has occurred due to an

expansion of the variety of goods exported (the extensive margin) or a growth in

trade of existing varieties (the intensive margin). Broda and Weinstein (2006) find

that over the last quarter of the twentieth century roughly 30 % of U.S. import

growth was at the extensive margin, with China the largest contributor. However,

using Chinese export data disaggregated at the HS-8 level, Amiti and Freund (2010)

report that most of Chinese export growth to the world between 1997 and 2005 was

in existing varieties. Most recently, Manova and Zhang (2009) using firm level data

on Chinese trading firms find that a relatively few large firms are responsible for

substantial share of exports; these firms export to many markets, and many are

foreign owned.

A principal focus of our paper is on which other exporting countries are losing

foreign markets due to the rise of China. Other papers have also attempted to

address this question. Using a gravity model, Hanson and Robertson (2010) study

ten developing countries they identify as potential losers to Chinese competition.

However, they find Chinese export expansion over the 1995–2005 period has had

only a modest negative impact on the exports of these other countries. In an earlier

study, Ahearne et al. (2003) use VAR analysis to see if Chinese exports reduce the

exports of other Asian economies. They find instead a positive correlation between

exports from these two sources. These findings along with the industry classifica-

tions of Chinese exports suggest that major competing countries with China in

world export markets may be developed rather than developing countries. In the

China’s fare share 571

123

remainder of this paper, we try to identify which countries have lost share and to

provide a measure of the size of the losses. We also focus on the growth of Chinese

exports at broad industry levels and in individual export markets. We turn now to

describe the modeling strategy we employ to answer these questions.

3 Market shares methodology

Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis has long been used to study export

performance.11 This modeling approach treats as a norm of behavior that a country’s

market share will remain constant over time. If instead it changes, that must be due

to changes in competitiveness or changes in demand from the world as a whole or in

individual markets. The analysis then proceeds to decompose export share changes

in order to identify these factors. In the 1950s and 1960s, CMS was a popular tool of

analysis. In a well-known paper, however, Richardson (1971) criticized its use,

arguing that the signs and magnitudes of the measured effects depend upon in part

on the methods used in their calculation.

Taking these criticisms into account, Fagerberg and Sollie (1987) (hereafter FS) have

proposed several refinements to traditional CMS analysis. These include improved

theoretical consistency via the use of Laspeyres weights throughout and an explicit

economic interpretation of all decomposed terms. They have also extended the

traditional model to include two additional terms which measure the adaptability of the

export sector of a country to changes in the commodity and national market

composition

of world exports.12 We now turn to a brief derivation of their model.

First, consider the change in exporters’ shares in each importer’s market. We

define the value of imports of product i from country k to l is defined as m

i

kl. The

market share of country k (an exporter) in product i in market l (an importer) is

akli ¼

mkli =

X

k

mkli ð1Þ

Product i’s share of country l’s total imports is defined as

bli ¼
X

k

mkli =
X

i
X
k

mkli ð2Þ

Since the market share of country k is written as

Mkl ¼
X

i

akli b
l
i;

the change in country k’s share of market l between an initial year (time 0) and

year t is

DMkl ¼ Mklt �Mkl0 :

11 See Leamer and Stern (1970) Chapter 7 for a derivation of the original model and the references

therein for examples of its use.
12 Irwin (1995) uses the FS approach to study changes in the export market share of Great Britain in the

early twentieth century.

572 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

This equation can be rewritten as the sum of three terms:

DMkl ¼ DMkla þ DMklb þ DMklab ð3Þ

where

DMkla ¼
X

i

ðaklit � akli0Þbli0 ð4Þ

DMklb ¼
X

i

akli0ðblit � bli0Þ ð5Þ

DMklab ¼
X

i

ðaklit � akli0Þðblit � bli0Þ ð6Þ

Equation (4) is the effect of changes in the market share, weighting the change in

exporter k’s share of product i exports by the initial share of the product in market l.

Equation (5) is the effect of changes in the product composition of importer l,

weighted by the initial share of the product from country k. The final term, Eq. (6),

is a residual term which can be written as

DMklab ¼ rklab
X

i

ðaklit � �aklt � akli0 þ �akl0 Þ
2

” #0:5 X

i

ðblit � bli0Þ
2

” #0:5
ð7Þ

where rklab is the correlation coefficient between the changes in market shares and the

changes in product shares.

FS then extend the decomposition exercise from one market to the world market.

The country l’s share of world imports is defined as:

cl ¼
X

k
X
i
mkli =
X
k
X
l
X
i

mkli ð8Þ

In this case, we can write the market share of county k in world market as

Mk ¼
X

l

Mklcl:

The change in Mk between time 0 and time t is

DMk ¼ DMkm þ DMkc þ DMkm

c

¼ DMka þ DMkb þ DMkab þ DMkc þ DMkmc

where

DMka ¼
X

l

cl0

X
i

ðaklit � akli0Þbli0

” #
ð9Þ

DMkb ¼
X

l
cl0
X
i

akli0ðblit � bli0Þ
” #

ð10Þ

DMkab ¼
X

l
cl0
X
i

ðaklit � akli0Þðblit � bli0Þ
” #

ð11Þ

China’s fare share 573

123

DMkc ¼
X

l

Mkl0 ðclt � cl0Þ ð12Þ

DMkmc ¼
X

l

ðMklt �Mkl0 Þðclt � cl0Þ ð13Þ

Our analysis focuses on Eqs. (9)–(13); following FS, each can be interpreted as a

separate factor that influences export performance.

Equation (9) is the market share effect. This term captures the change in an

exporter’s share of each product in each country, holding constant the initial

commodity composition and the country distribution of world imports. Thus, it

captures the extent to which an exporter gains market share independent of changes

in the product and destination pattern of world imports. Equation (10) is the

commodity composition effect. The commodity composition effect measures the

influence of the changing share of products in world trade on an exporter’s overall

share. If, for instance, the structure of world imports changes towards more

manufactured goods and away from agricultural products, the exporters of

manufactured goods (agricultural goods) would see an increase (a decrease) in

their market shares.

Equation (11) is the commodity adaptation effect. The commodity adaptation

effect identifies whether the change in the structure of a country’s exports is

correlated with changes in the commodity composition of world imports. This

number is zero if the country changes its export structure at the same rate as all

countries exporting to the world market. Equation (12) is the market composition

effect. This effect measures the influence of changes in the country demand pattern

of world imports. Thus, it identifies the countries that increase their world market

share by selling their products heavily in expanding markets. Finally, Eq. (13) is the

market adaptation effect. This effect captures the correlation between a country’s

export destinations and world export destinations.

4 Empirical results from the CMS approach

4.1 Share changes from 1995 to 2010

For each country in our study, the change in market share of the world market is

decomposed into the five effects discussed above. The results from 1,832 products

for regional exports and a selected set of countries are given in Table 3.13 The right-

most column in table provides the overall percentage change in the total sample

export market share for each of the regions and sample countries over the period

13 We concentrate on 1,832 5-digit exports of goods that Rauch (1999) and Hallak (2006) define as

differentiated products at the 3-digit level. To be consistent across 93 countries for years 1995, 2000,

2005, and 2010, we use the 5-digit level data, which is the highest disaggregation possible for our study.

Most of these products are from 1-digit SITC sectors of 5–8. Since there are gaps in 5-digit sub-products

673 and 676 (some types of iron and steel products), we exclude products from these two sectors. We

study the CMS decomposition for the country and region level separately. While we use 93 countries for

each of l and k for the country-level analysis, we use the country aggregates of 6 regions for each of l and

k for the regional analysis.

574 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

1995–2010.14 The other five columns represent different effects, corresponding to

Eqs. (9)–(13), and add up to the total change.

The first thing to note about the table is that for most countries in the study, overall

export shares hardly changed over the sample period (see the last column). This

stability of trade shares is a stylized fact of trade patterns at the bilateral level first

pointed out and analyzed by Cassing and Husted (2004, 2009) in two related studies.

The principal exceptions to this pattern of export share stability over the sample period

are China (?12.87 pp.), Japan (-5.28 pp.) and the United States (-4.29 pp.), and four

European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom) combined

(-5.25 pp.). These results clearly imply that the growth in Chinese export market share

has come largely at the expense of exporters in developed countries, in particular Japan

and the United States, rather than exporters in developing countries. Since Canada also

lost market share, each of the G7 countries saw market shares drop over this period,

several by more than one percentage point. In fact, the G7 countries explain around 80

percent of all the share losses. We turn now to discuss what factors have contributed to

these changes in trade shares.

Table 3 Export market share change decomposition: selected countries (1995–2010)

Fagerberg and Sollie decomposition (1,832 SITC 5-digit products)

Market

share

Commodity

composition
Commodity
adaptation
Market
composition
Market
adaptation

Total change

in share

Africa 0.111 -0.059 0.033 0.011 0.011 0.108

Kenya 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.001

Asia and Pacific 5.353 -3.995 5.078 -0.068 0.350 6.719

China 11.594 -0.808 3.048 -1.131 0.163 12.867

India 0.676 0.038 0.114 -0.061 -0.012 0.755

Indonesia 0.266 -0.029 0.011 -0.039 -0.065 0.145

Japan -6.450 -1.359 1.767 0.369 0.396 -5.277

Malaysia -0.640 -0.396 0.520 -0.381 0.232 -0.665

South Korea -0.993 -1.051 1.775 0.130 0.661 0.523

Europe -6.499 2.293 1.258 -0.129 -0.260 -3.337

France -1.539 0.307 0.201 0.050 -0.037 -1.018

Germany -1.704 0.148 0.152 0.644 -0.178 -0.938

Italy -1.267 -0.281 -0.163 0.228 -0.131 -1.616

United Kingdom -2.011 0.864 -0.337 -0.130 -0.065 -1.680

North America -6.155 1.525 0.311 0.021 -0.123 -4.420

Canada -1.173 0.201 0.139 -0.169 0.025 -0.977

Mexico 0.732 0.055 0.283 -0.132 -0.091 0.847

United States -5.977 0.808 0.979 0.284 -0.383 -4.290

South America 0.231 0.063 -0.169 0.165 0.003 0.293

Brazil -0.021 0.020 0.028 0.031 0.025 0.083

Middle East 0.476 0.146 -0.003 0.000 0.018 0.637

For the regional-level analysis, we use the country aggregates of 6 regions for k and l

14 Values for the countries not listed in Table 3 tended to be very small. They are available on request.

China’s fare share 575

123

First, according to the decomposition reported in the table, the market share

effect appears to be responsible for most of the changes in export performance by

the countries in our sample. During the period from 1995 to 2010, the market share

effect was strongly positive for China (?11.59 pp.) and strongly negative for

Japan (-6.45 pp.) and the United States (-5.98 pp.). With few exceptions, the

commodity composition effect, the market composition effect, the commodity

adaptation effect, and the market adaptation effect play only small roles in

explaining the changes in world trade shares. In the case of China, while the

commodity adaptation effect (?3.05 pp.) contributes to the gain of Chinese

market share, the remaining effects do not play significant roles. The fact that the

market share effect played such an important role in China’s export share gain is

consistent with Amiti and Freund’s (2010) findings that China’s export growth

was largely at the intensive margin.15

Consistent with the findings of Hanson and Robertson (2010), developing

countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Mexico did not lose their market

shares in this period despite China’s export growth. Indeed, all saw their shares rise,

although by much smaller amounts than China’s increase. Again, as was the case

with China, Japan, and the United States, the market share effect appears to have

been the primary factor responsible for the change in total market share.

Why, in particular, are market share losses to China concentrated in Japan and

the United States? One answer may be outsourcing by exporters in these two

countries to firms in China. As noted, without identifying the countries involved,

Manova and Zhang (2009) report that ‘‘Chinese joint ventures and affiliates of

foreign multinationals were responsible for fully 75 %’’ of the increase in China’s

trade flows between 2003 and 2005 (Manova and Zhang 2009, p. 2). We have no

way to identify which countries host the parent companies of these firms although

there is considerable evidence that Japanese firms may be involved. Tomiura (2008)

reports that in recent years China has been the destination country for more than half

of all the outsourcing done by Japanese firms.

Evidence that FDI may be responsible for lost U.S. export share is much less

strong. Branstetter and Foley (2007) assert that U.S. FDI in China is only an

extremely small portion of total U.S. FDI activity. Moreover, they argue that more

than 90 % of the production of U.S. affiliates in China is sold in China rather than

exported to the United States or other markets. Thus, for the United States, FDI in

China is at most only responsible for a share decline in the Chinese market although

we have no way to examine outsourcing between unaffiliated firms. While FDI may

not be directly responsible for U.S. market share losses, it is likely that outsourcing

of assembly and production to non-related Chinese firms may play an important

role. In Sect. 5 we discuss this point further.

4.2 Share changes within sub-periods

Table 4a–c provide detail on market share changes for the three sub-periods of our

sample, 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010, respectively. As we saw in the

15 We explore this point in depth below.

576 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

Table 4 Export market share change decomposition: selected countries

Fagerberg and Sollie decomposition (1,832 SITC 5-digit products)
Market
share
Commodity
composition
Commodity
adaptation
Market
composition
Market
adaptation
Total change
in share

(a) 1995–2000

Asia and Pacific 1.333 -0.551 0.276 0.408 -0.404 1.062

China 3.192 -0.190 0.030 -0.115 0.017 2.935

Japan -1.972 -0.304 -0.093 0.049 -0.119 -2.440

Europe -2.176 -1.261 -0.012 -1.780 0.200 -5.030

France -0.404 -0.239 0.122 -0.228 0.065 -0.685

Germany -1.259 -0.684 -0.013 -0.330 0.109 -2.177

Italy -0.439 -0.621 -0.090 -0.264 0.090 -1.323

United Kingdom -0.278 0.348 -0.113 -0.165 0.053 -0.155

North America 0.490 1.930 -0.192 1.351 0.190 3.768

Canada -0.034 0.197 0.080 0.497 0.052 0.792

Mexico 0.603 0.051 0.065 0.319 0.116 1.154

USA -0.539 1.509 -0.077 1.089 -0.160 1.823

(b) 2000–2005

Asia and Pacific 5.049 -1.377 0.288 0.215 -0.036 4.139

China 6.446 -0.426 0.306 -0.493 -0.067 5.766

Japan -2.137 -0.171 0.024 0.473 -0.046 -1.857

Europe -0.397 1.669 -0.148 1.202 -0.072 2.254

France -0.353 0.267 -0.086 0.209 -0.045 -0.007

Germany 0.435 0.322 -0.152 0.571 -0.094 1.082

Italy -0.116 0.199 -0.216 0.276 -0.061 0.082

United Kingdom -0.804 0.057 -0.146 0.114 -0.089 -0.869

North America -5.365 -0.360 0.027 -1.310 0.124 -6.883

Canada -0.572 0.043 -0.130 -0.420 0.049 -1.030

Mexico -0.124 -0.006 0.045 -0.372 0.009 -0.447

USA -4.039 -0.403 0.040 -1.221 0.216 -5.406

(c) 2005–2010

Asia and Pacific 1.348 -2.688 2.776 -0.137 0.219 1.518

China 2.886 -0.569 2.202 -0.586 0.233 4.166

Japan -2.220 0.339 0.666 0.159 0.074 -0.981

Europe -3.604 2.020 1.065 0.089 -0.130 -0.560

France -0.798 0.338 0.120 0.078 -0.063 -0.325

Germany -0.979 0.589 0.420 0.194 -0.068 0.156

Italy -0.581 0.178 -0.052 0.078 0.003 -0.375

United Kingdom -0.864 0.371 -0.035 -0.097 -0.031 -0.655

North America -1.776 0.555 0.232 -0.271 -0.046 -1.306

Canada -0.699 -0.004 0.168 -0.274 0.069 -0.739

Mexico 0.300 -0.045 0.156 -0.224 -0.048 0.139

USA -2.156 0.337 1.001 0.226 -0.114 -0.706

China’s fare share 577

123

previous section, market share effects tend to account for most of the largest

components of the share changes. For instance, in the period of 1995–2000, three of

the four countries in the table that saw the biggest overall changes in market share

were China (2.9 pp.), Germany (-2.2 pp.) and Japan (-2.4 pp.). According to the

FS decomposition, the largest component of these changes owes to market share

effects: China (3.19 pp.), Japan (-1.97 pp.), and Germany (-1.26 pp.). The US

export share also rose during this period by 1.8 pp. owing largely to the commodity

composition effect. That is, the United States gained its market share because the

structure of world imports changed towards the goods that the United States had

concentrated.

During the period of 2000–2005, the Chinese overall market share increased by

5.8 pp. and the majority of Chinese share gains were accompanied by the almost

identical overall market share loss of the United States (-5.4 pp.). Again, market

share effects accounted for almost (or more than) the entirety of these changes.

Finally, over the period of the great trade collapse (2005–2010), China’s share had

increased by 4.17 pp. and the market share and commodity adaptation effects

account for most of the overall share changes. While developed countries’ demands

for manufacturing goods had slowed due to the financial crisis, developing

countries’ demands for foreign manufacturing goods were relatively strong. China

had increased its world market share by exporting intensively to emerging

developing countries.

5 Empirical results: products and markets

We now turn our attention to an extended analysis of changes in market shares

across various regions and industries. To document further the nature of

competition between Chinese exporters and exporters from other countries, we

focus on bilateral competition in each of the markets in our sample using first

data on the aggregate of trade in the 2,001 5-digit differentiated products used to

develop Table 3.

Consider Figures 2a through 2f. In these, we compare Chinese export share

changes from 1995 to 2010 (measured on the horizontal axis) versus the export

market share changes for six possible competitor countries (measured on the vertical

axis) in the 91 remaining import markets in our sample.

Figure 2a plots market share changes from 1995 to 2010 for China and the

United States in the 91 importer markets. According to the figure the United States

lost market share in all but eighteen countries (most of these are developing

countries such as Tanzania), while China gained share in all countries. Figure 2b

plots the market share changes for China and Japan. Similar to the United States,

Japan lost market share in most countries in our sample, particularly in those in the

Asian and Pacific regions.

Figure 2c and d provides the market share changes for Malaysia and Mexico, two

of the countries that Hanson and Robertson considered as potential competitors,

each vis-à-vis China. Perhaps surprisingly, but consistent with the Hanson–

Robertson conclusions, there are no clear market losses for Malaysia and Mexico

578 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

relative to China during the period. Consider, for instance, the case of Malaysia.

Most of the observations in the Fig. 2c lie in the positive quadrant, suggesting that

over this period exporters from the two countries may not compete strongly in at

-15.0

-1

3.0

-1

1.0

-9.0

-7.0

-5.0

-3.0

-1.0

1.0
3.0
5.0

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 7

0.0

Sh
ar

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ch

an
ge

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f

U
SA

(
19

95
-2

01
0)

Share change of China (1995-2010)

(a) Share changes between China and USA in 3rd markets

-20.0

-15.0

10.0

-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0

Sh
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Ja
pa

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(1

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5-

20
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)
Share change of China (1995-2010)

(b) Share changes between China and Japan in 3rd markets

6.0

4.0

2.0

0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
Sh
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an
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M
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a
(1

99
5-
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Share change of China (1995-2010)

(c) Share changes between China and Malaysia in 3rd markets

-2.0

-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
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Share change of China (1995-2010)

(d) Share changes between China and Mexico in 3rd markets

-30.0

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(1

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Share change of China (1995-2010)

(e) Share changes between China and Germany in 3rd markets

-4.0

-2.0
0.0
2.0
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6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
Sh
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In
di

a
(1
99
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)
Share change of China (1995-2010)

(f) Share changes between China and India in 3rd markets

Fig. 2 Competition between China and selected countries in third markets (1995–2010)

China’s fare share 579

123

least these third country markets.16 The data also suggest that Mexico and China do

not compete strongly in third country markets. As Fig. 2d shows, there is essentially

no correlation between market share changes in the two countries. Indeed, Mexico’s

export shares in most markets hardly changed over the period, even as China’s

shares rose across the board.

Finally in Fig. 2e and f we diagram competition between China and two other

countries, Germany and India. Consider first Fig. 2e. As the plot shows and as was

the case with the United States and Japan, most of the observations are located in the

lower quadrant of the diagram, suggesting that Germany also experienced market

share losses in the face of Chinese competition. Figure 2f provides detail on the

relationship between China and India in third markets. As the figure shows, the

relationship between Indian and Chinese market share changes over the decade from

1995 to 2010 is very similar to that between Mexico and China. Again there is little

or no evidence of close competition between the exports of these countries in third

country markets.

We turn now to focus on the major industrial sectors involved in the export

market share changes detailed above. One factor that has clearly played a significant

role in the growth of Chinese exports is the fragmentation of production across a

number of countries. In a recent paper, Koopman et al. (2008) attempt to determine

how much of the value added in Chinese exports comes from China. Using input–

output analysis, they conclude that as of 2007, Chinese value added in its exports

stood at roughly 60 %, although for relatively sophisticated electronic goods

Chinese value added was closer to 30 %.

It is impossible for us to separate the 1,832 goods in our study into inputs and

outputs. However, we can use CMS analysis on a narrower industry level to see

what differences, if any, may be due to fragmentation. Again, using data from our

ninety four country sample, Table 5 provides further detail on market share changes

for China, Japan, and the United States by region and industry. In each of these

regions for both SITC 1-digit industries 7 (machinery and transport equipment) and

8 (miscellaneous manufactures), Chinese export shares rose significantly, with gains

exceeding 10 pp. in most markets. And, as the table shows, regardless of region and

product, Chinese market share gains came at the expense of other developed

countries. In many cases, the largest losses again were experienced by Japan and the

United States.

To explore further how market shares for various exporting countries changed

within export product segments, we again present results from CMS analysis. In part

(a) of Table 6 we look at how export shares of products included in the Machinery

and Transport Equipment (SITC Category 7) for a selection of our sample countries

have changed between 1995 and 2010. This industrial sector contains electrical

goods and other products whose production increasingly involves fragmented

processing across various countries. China’s share of world exports from this sector

increased more than 16 pp. over our sample period. Three quarters of this share

growth is accounted for by the market share effect; the commodity adaptation effect

accounts for virtually all of the rest of the growth. That is, as world demand for

16 This is also consistent with the results reported in Ahearne et al. (2003).

580 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

imports of these goods has grown, Chinese firms have played a major role in their

assembly and export. Consistent with the results reported in Table 3, as China’s

share exports of Category 7 products has grown, export shares of Japan and the

United States have both fallen, in this case 8.2 and 6.3 pp., respectively. And,

similar again to the results of Table 3, these share losses were dominated by the

market share effect. These results suggest that a significant portion of the market

share changes for these three countries occurs in industrial sectors where processing

trade is especially important.

Part (b) of Table 6 looks at export share changes in all other industrial sectors

that produce differentiated products (i.e., the all differentiated products except those

in SITC 1-digit sector 7). As the table shows, over our sample period Chinese

market share rose in these sectors as well, and again, much of the growth can be

attributed to the market share effect. However, unlike the results in Part (a),

Japanese and U.S. market share losses were much lower.

The fact that the market share effect plays such a predominant role with Chinese

export expansion is fully consistent with the Amiti and Freund (2010) finding that

Chinese exports have grown along the intensive rather than extensive margin. The

largest component of this expansion (and the largest simultaneous loss of export

market shares in Japan and the United States) occurred in industrial sectors that now

Table 5 Changes in export shares of China, Japan, and USA for reginal markets (1995–2010)

North

America

Euro Asia and

Pacific

Others Total

I. Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 3, industry 7)

China 18.436 11.565 20.573 16.285 16.416

Japan -12.726 -4.919 -9.185 -4.044 -8.120

USA -3.485 -5.375 -8.913 -10.388 -6.345

Developing (exclude China) 4.936 6.153 2.038 7.048 4.430

Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -7.161 -7.424 -4.513 -8.901 -6.381

II. Miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 3, industry 8)

China 20.508 14.746 0.795 26.350 13.325

Japan -5.356 -1.296 -0.492 -2.253 -2.107

USA -3.880 -2.044 -4.974 -11.252 -3.517

Developing (exclude China) -2.779 1.606 1.010 2.000 0.321

Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -8.493 -13.012 3.661 -14.845 -8.023

III. Other industries (SITC 3, industries 0–6, and 9)

China 9.272 4.392 7.022 11.962 6.886

Japan -4.474 -0.448 -0.700 -0.750 -1.210

USA -6.992 2.019 -2.511 -4.915 -0.726

Developing (exclude China) 0.697 2.510 1.839 4.096 2.801

Developed (exclude Japan and USA) 1.498 -8.473 -5.651 -10.393 -7.750

The countries in each region correspond to Table 1

China’s fare share 581

123

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582 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

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China’s fare share 583

123

involve considerable fragmentation in the production process. This suggests that

FDI and/or outsourcing provide an explanation for at least some of our results.

6 Conclusions

The growth of Chinese exports both in volume and in market share over the past two

decades is a singular event in the history of world trade. Using data from

1995–2010, we document this growth in a variety of ways. First, we show that the

expanded trade is pervasive. Virtually every country in the world has seen China

claim a larger share of its import market. Then, we use CMS analysis to try to

determine which country or countries have lost market share as China’s trade has

grown. We show that Chinese export share growth is best explained by the market

share effect. That is, Chinese exports have grown in large part as an expansion of

trade within product lines where Chinese firms had had early success. This finding is

consistent with other studies that attribute Chinese exports as growing at the

intensive margin.

Moreover, contrary to much discussion in the popular press, we find strong

evidence that other developing countries have not seen export shares fall as a result

of China’s gains. Rather, our results suggest that China’s share growth has come

largely at the expense of exporters based in Japan and the United States and

involved in processing trade.

Acknowledgments This research was begun when the first author was on sabbatical leave as a Research
Fellow at the Adam Smith Research Foundation at the University of Glasgow. He thanks them for their

superb hospitality. We also thank an anonymous referee for guidance and Jim Cassing, Asatoshi

Maeshiro, and Tom Rawski for helpful comments, and the Economics Department at WVU for financial

support. The usual proviso applies.

References

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Comrades or competitors? (Working Paper 27-2003). Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

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(Eds.), China’s growing role in world trade. Cambridge: National Bureau

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Branstetter, L., & Foley, C. F. (2007). Facts and fallacies about U.S. FDI in China. (NBER Working

Paper 13470).

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international trade: Essays in honor of Mordechai Kreinin (pp. 91–109). Cheltonham: Edward

Elgar.

Cassing, J., & Husted, S. (2009). Transient products but persistent trade patterns. Journal of Economic

Studies, 36(6), 583–595.

Fagerberg, J., & Sollie, G. (1987). The method of constant market shares analysis reconsidered. Applied

Economics, 19(12), 1571–1583.

Hallak, J. C. (2006). Product quality and the direction of trade. Journal of International Economics, 68(1),

238–265.

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In R. Feenstra & S.-J. Wei (Eds.), China’s growing role in world trade. Cambridge: National Bureau

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Irwin, D. (1995). The Lion’s share: Britain’s export performance revisited, 1899–1929. Structural

Change and Economic Dynamics, 6(1), 97–109.

Koopman, R., Wang, Z., & Wei S.-J. (2008). How much of Chinese exports is really made in China?

Assessing domestic value-added when processing trade is pervasive. (NBER Working Paper 14109).

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Leamer, E., & Stern, R. (1970). Quantitative international economics. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Manova, K., & Zhang, Z. (2009). China’s Exporters and Importers: Firms, products and trade partners.

(NBER Working Paper 15249). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Nabli, M. K. (Ed.) (2010). The great recession and developing countries. Washington, DC: The World

Bank.

Rauch, J. E. (1999). Networks versus markets in international trade. Journal of International Economics,

48(1), 7–35.

Richardson, J. D. (1971). Constant market shares analysis of export growth. Journal of International

Economics, 1(2), 227–239.

Rodrik, D. (2006). What’s so special about China’s exports? (NBER Working Paper 11947). Cambridge,

MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Schott, P. K. (2008). The relative sophistication of Chinese exports. Economic Policy, 23(1), 5–49.

Tomiura, E. (2008). Offshore Outsourcing by Japanese firms. Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and

Industry, Research & Review #2008/3. On the web at: http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/research-

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http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/research-review/045.html

http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/research-review/045.html

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  • China’s fare share? The growth of Chinese exports in world trade
  • Abstract
    Introduction
    An overview of Chinese export performance
    Market shares methodology
    Empirical results from the CMS approach
    Share changes from 1995 to 2010
    Share changes within sub-periods
    Empirical results: products and markets
    Conclusions
    Acknowledgments
    References

O R I G I N A L P A P E R

China’s fare share? The growth of Chinese exports
in world trade

Steven Husted • Shuichiro Nishioka

Published online: 6 February 2013

� Kiel Institute 2013

Abstract The growth of Chinese exports in market share over the past two dec-
ades is a singular event in the history of world trade. Using data from 1995–2010,

we document this growth in a variety of ways. We show that the expanded trade is

pervasive. Virtually every country in the world has seen China claim a larger

share

of its import market. Then, we use Constant Market Share analysis to determine

which country or countries have lost market share as China’s trade has grown.

Contrary to much discussion in the popular press, we find strong evidence that other

developing countries have not seen export shares fall as a result of China’s gains.

Rather, our results suggest that China’s share growth has come largely at the

expense of exporters based in developed countries, especially Japan and the United

States.

Keywords Chinese exports � Constant market share analysis � Export shares

JEL Classification F14 � P33

1 Introduction

Over the past two decades the Chinese economy has grown at a remarkable pace.

Between 1995 and 2007 Chinese real GDP grew at an average annual rate of more

S. Husted (&

)

Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh,

4508 WW Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15216, USA

e-mail: husted1@pitt.edu

S. Nishioka

Department of Economics, West Virginia University,

1601 University Avenue, Morgantown, WV 26506-6025, USA

e-mail: Shuichiro.Nishioka@mail.wvu.edu

123

Rev World Econ (2013) 149:565–58

5

DOI 10.1007/s10290-013-0149-2

than 10 %. Per capita real GDP rose by 250 % over this period.
1

One of the leading

factors driving this economic growth has been the extraordinary performance of

Chinese exports. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 2010 China

ranked first in exports to the world market with merchandise export sales of more

than $1.5 trillion and a world market share of 10.4 %. In 1998, China had less than

2 % of the world market. Twenty years earlier, China’s share was essentially zero.

As China’s share of world exports has grown, it has come under increasing pressure

to allow its currency to appreciate; often the criticism of its exchange rate practices

includes charges that other developing and emerging market economies have borne

the brunt in terms of lost export markets.

2

The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of Chinese export growth over

the period when its share of world exports rose most rapidly, the years 1995–2010.

We provide detail on the commodity composition of Chinese exports and how this

composition has changed. We also discuss some aspects of the geographic pattern

and commodity composition of Chinese trade. In addition, a fundamenta

l

contribution of this paper is that we provide considerable evidence that the

principal exporting countries that have lost market share to China are developed

countries, especially Japan and the

United States.

We use Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis (i.e., Fagerberg and Sollie 1987)

to determine which of five factors (i.e., market share, commodity composition,

commodity adaptation, market composition, and market adaptation) are responsible

for the rise of Chinese share. During the period we consider, the market share effect

is the critical factor to explain the share change in the world trade. This element of

trade growth captures the extent to which an exporter gains or loses market share

against other exporters independent of changes in the product and destination

pattern of world imports. In particular, almost all share gains of China over the

period 1995–2010 (i.e., the market share effect accounts for 11.6 of 12.9 percentage

points (pp.) of Chinese share gains) stem from the market share effects.
3

We also apply CMS analysis to the sub-periods of 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and

2005–2010. In the period of 1995–2000, the share gain of China was relatively moderate

(2.9 pp.) and Japan and Germany lost market share in roughly equal amounts (2.4 and

2.2 pp., respectively). The United States also saw its world export market share rise

during this period, due primarily to the commodity composition effect. That is, the United

States gained market share because the structure of world import demand changed toward

the types of goods that the United States exports. During the period 2000–2005, Chinese

market share increased by 5.8 pp. and the majority of Chinese share gains were

accompanied by the significant market share loss of the United States (-4.0 pp.). Finally,

over the sub-period (2005–2010) that included the great trade collapse of 2008–2009,

1
These numbers use China Version 2 data from the PWT6.3 data set. See ‘‘What is New in PWT 6.3?’’

link on the Penn World Tables site, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php, for a discussion

of the differences between this version of Chinese data and official Chinese data.
2

See, for instance, Arvin Subramanian, ‘‘Who Pays for the Weak Renminbi?’’, 11 February 2010, Vox

Front Page, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4604.
3

With the exception of Sect. 2, the discussion of share changes in the remainder of this section and the

rest of the paper refers to trade in manufactured goods (SITC categories 5–9) among a sample of 92

countries and Hong Kong.

566 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php

http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4604

China’s share increased by 4.2 pp. and the market share and commodity

adaptation

effects both explain the share changes. While developed countries’ demands for

manufacturing goods had slowed due to the financial crisis, developing countries’

demands for foreign manufacturing goods were relatively strong. China had increased its

world market share by exporting intensively to emerging

developing countries.

4

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2 we present an overview of

Chinese trade expansion. In Sect. 3 we discuss CMS analysis, an empirical

technique that provides a method for studying changes in export market shares. In

Sect. 4, we apply CMS to study trade patterns among a sample of 94 countries over

the period 1995–2010 in commodity trade disaggregated at the 5-digit SITC level.

We also apply CMS to study the periods to 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010.

In Sect. 5, we expand our analysis by focusing on export behavior across industries

and in individual export markets. Section 6 offers our conclusions.

2 An overview of Chinese export performance

Figure 1 provides a time series plot of world export shares for five of the world’s

leading exporting countries, Germany, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the

United States over the post World War II era. As the figure shows, since the end of

World War II, only Germany has seen as rapid and as large a rise in world export

share as China. In the eleven year span from 1948 to 1958, Germany’s share of world

exports rose from 1.3 to 10.3 %, roughly matching in both magnitude and duration

China’s performance. However there are several major differences between the two.

First, Germany’s growth almost certainly represented a return for that country to a

market position similar to the one that it had held prior to the war era. Second, at the

time of Germany’s significant growth there were far fewer major exporters

competing for market share. For instance, in the 1950s the combined world export

share of the countries now known as the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries

(NICs) (Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) was virtually zero. In contrast,

since at least the onset of the industrial revolution and prior to the 1990s, China had

never held a significant share of world trade. And, China’s export growth came only

slightly after significant growth by the NICs and simultaneously with major growth

by several other countries that along with China make up the BRICs (Brazil, Russia,

and India), all of whom now also hold relatively large shares of the world market.

Like all major exporting countries, China has a market presence in virtually

every country in the world; this presence has grown in almost every market in recent

years. Using data from the United Nation’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database

we calculated aggregate exporter market shares in 92 countries and 1 territory

(Hong Kong), from all parts of the world.
5

Several interesting patterns emerge from

4
In a related study, Wood and Mayer (2011) look at how the entry of China into international markets

over the past three decades has impacted production of primary and labor-intensive products in a wide set

of developing countries. They find that although output and exports of labor-intensive goods continued to

rise following the emergence of China in the 1990s, the growth in these ratios was slower in the 1990s

than in the 1980s.
5

These countries were chosen due to the availability of the import data from UN Comtrade.

China’s fare share 567

123

this exercise. First, the global extent of China’s trade expanded significantly

between 1995 and 2010. By 2010, China had at least 3 % of the market in all of

these countries. Moreover, market share growth was pervasive; over the 1995–201

0

period China’s market share grew in all of these markets. In many cases, especially

in South America, Africa, and smaller European countries, shares were essentially

zero prior to 1995. Table 1 provides some additional summary statistics.

According to the table, geography is clearly important for China’s trade. At the

end of 2010, its highest regional market share was in Asia where among the sample

countries it had an average share of 18.9 %. Its highest market share among all the

Asian countries in the sample stood at 49.1 %.
6

Its next highest average regional

market share was in North America; this included 16.7 % of all U.S. merchandise

Table 1 China’s national export market share by region

Countries 2010 national market shares (%) Share changes 1995–20

10

a

Average SD Maximum Minimum Average SD Maximum Minimum

Africa 20 15.9 9.3 49.1 6.2 13.0 9.1 45.5 3.1

Asia and Pacific 13 18.9 10.7 49.1 4.2 11.8 3.4 15.9 3.8

Europe 31 9.4 6.5 36.0 3.1 8.0 6.0 33.4 2.4

Middle East 7 12.0 1.1 13.3 10.2 10.2 0.7 11.0 9.0

North America 3 16.4 5.2 21.9 11.6 13.1 2.6 15.0 9.5

South America 19 12.7 7.7 35.1 5.2 11.7 7.4 35.1 4.2

Total 93 13.2 8.4 49.1 3.1 10.7 6.9 35.1 2.4

a
Share changes are measured in percentage points

0
5
10

15

20

25

30

19
48

19
50

19
52

19
54

19
56

19
58

19
60

19
62

19
64

19
66

19
68

19
70

19
72

19
74

19
76

19
78

19
80

19
82

19
84

19
86

19
88

19
90

19
92

19
94

19
96

19
98

20
00

20
02

20
04

20
06

20
08

20
10

%
o

f
w

or
ld

e
xp

or
ts

CHINA

GERMANY

JAPAN

UK

US

Fig. 1 World market export shares 1948–2010

6
This was China’s share of Hong Kong’s market. Among the other Asian countries in this sample China

had more than 25% of Japan’s market in 2010 and more than 10% of the export markets of Thailand,

South Korea, Pakistan, and Singapore.

568 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

imports in 2010. On average, China’s smallest regional market penetration was in

Europe, where its average national market share in 2010 was 9.4 %. Since 2005,

China’s export shares have increased particularly in remote and low-income

countries. For example, the average of China’s export shares in African

countries

increased from 8.3 to 15.9 %. For the South American countries in our sample,

China’s average market share almost doubled, rising from 6.6 to 12.7 %.

As detailed more fully below, China’s export market share has grown in recent

years, and it has changed the mix of goods it supplies to world markets. By value,

virtually all of Chinese exports are manufactured goods. Early on, these exports

were concentrated in Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles (SITC Category 8),

including apparel and toys. While that category still accounts for a significant share

of Chinese exports, more recently Chinese trade growth has been concentrated in

Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC Category 7).

In order to better focus on this change in the commodity composition of trade, we

restrict our attention to exports of differentiated manufactured products disaggre-

gated at the 5-digit SITC level. In much of what follows we continue to analyze data

from a set of 94 countries.
7

Our sample includes countries from every continent and

includes countries at various standards of living; slightly more than one-third the

countries chosen in our sample are classified by the World Bank as high-income

countries. In 2010, the countries used in our analysis accounted for 76.8 % of total

world imports.
8

Trade among these countries accounted for a majority of all world

merchandise trade in each of the years in our sample.

The first panel of Table 2 provides detail on the composition of Chinese exports

in 1995 and 2010 across broad categories of goods to our sample of markets as well

as the countries identified as developing countries.
9

Also included in the table is

China’s portion of total world exports at the 1-digit level (SITC Rev.3) in 1995 and

2010. As the table shows, Chinese exports have been centered in manufactures for

some time. In 1995, 90 % of Chinese exports to our sample countries came from

industries classified in SITC sections 5–9. By 2010, that share had risen to almost

95 % of total exports. Traditionally, Chinese exports have been concentrated in

Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles (SITC Category 8). This sector includes many

labor intensive manufactured products such as clothing, footwear, and toys, items

7
In addition to China, we use the following countries: (Africa) Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,

Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco,

Mozambique, Niger, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia; (Asia and Pacific) Australia, Hong

Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,

Singapore, and Thailand; (Europe) Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,

Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,

Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; (Middle East) Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Oman,

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey; (North America) Canada, Mexico, and the United States; (Central and

South America) Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,

Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and

Venezuela.
8

Our data set consists of bilateral trade of 93 countries. We calculate the total world imports from the

sum of total imports of all available countries in UN Comtrade.
9

Developing countries are those not classified as being a high-income country by the World Bank in its

2009 World Development Report.

China’s fare share 569

123

long identified as characteristic examples of Chinese exports. Twenty seven percent

of Chinese exports to our sample countries in 2010 came from this sector. However,

this share had stood at 47 % of total exports to these markets in 1995. Instead, in

recent years, the share of Chinese exports of more sophisticated manufactures has

risen substantially with exports in Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC

Category 7) more than doubling to 51 % of its exports to the sample markets.

The period 2005–2010 includes the onset of the Great Recession in the United

States and elsewhere and the consequent 2008–2009 collapse in world trade.
10

As

Table 2 Structure of world exports and imports

SITC Rev 3 Commodities I. Composition of

Chinese exports all

countries

II. China’s shares in

world (China’s/World

exports)

1995 2010 1995 2010

(a) Structure of Chinese exports

0 Food and live animals 4.5 2.0 3.4

5.0

1 Beverages and tobacco 0.4 0.1 2.4 1.9

2 Crude materials 2.4 0.8 2.8 2.3

3 Mineral fuels 2.4 1.0 2.3 1.3

4 Animal and vegetable oils 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.6

5 Chemicals and related products 3.9 4.7 2.2 5.8

6 Manufactured goods (materials) 15.3 12.6 5.5 15.0

7 Machinery and transport equipment 23.2 50.8 3.1 19.0

8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 47.3 27.4 18.9 33.3

9 Other commodities 0.5 0.8 1.0 3.8

SITC Rev 3 Commodities III. The levels of total imports (2005 = 1)

Developing countries Developed countries

1995 2010 1995 2010

(b) Structure of world imports

0 Food and live animals 0.789 1.647 0.788 1.642

1 Beverages and tobacco 1.296 2.108 1.840 1.853

2 Crude materials 0.360 1.728 0.533 1.533

3 Mineral fuels 0.248 2.729 0.542 3.748

4 Animal and vegetable oils 0.495 1.345 0.935 1.692

5 Chemicals and related products 0.448 1.703 0.629 1.319

6 Manufactured goods (materials) 0.583 1.684 0.841 1.283

7 Machinery and transport equipment 0.561 1.558 0.867 0.934

8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.391 1.622 0.843 1.022

9 Other commodities 2.841 1.471 0.536 1.394

We use import data of 94 countries for panels I and II

10
For detail on this period see Richard Baldwin, The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences, and

Prospects, VoxEU eBook, 2009, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297.

570 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297

has been documented by the Nabli (2010) developing countries have rebounded

much more strongly from the downturn, and these countries have accounted for

much of the growth in trade over the past several years. This pattern shows up well

in the second panel of Table 2 where we document the levels of imports for

developing and developed countries for each product group. We set the import

values of year 2005 as 1. For example, while the import values of Category 7

increased from 1 in 2005 to 1.558 in 2010 and those of Category 8 increased from 1

to 1.622 for developing markets, the corresponding values are 0.934 and 1.022 for

exports to developed

country markets.

China’s world market shares changes over this period followed the transforma-

tion described above. Between 1995 and 2010, its share of Industry 7 exports to the

world increased by a factor of six, while its Industry 8 market share increased by

slightly less than 15 pp. We are not the first to point out the recent growth in the

sophistication of Chinese exports. Rodrik (2006, p. 4) calculates that by 2002 China

had an export bundle ‘‘of a country with an income per capita level three times

higher than China’s’’. In a related study, Schott (2008) focuses on Chinese exports

to the United States. He finds that the composition of this export bundle

‘‘increasingly overlaps with that of the world’s most developed economies’’ (Schott

2008, p. 34).

The data in Tables 1 and 2 document the growth of Chinese exports and the

change in the sectoral composition of these goods over the period 1995–2010.

Clearly, the rapid growth of China in the world market has had market share

implications for other exporting nations. A number of papers have focused on

various aspects of the recent growth of Chinese exports on global competition.

One focus of attention has been on whether the growth has occurred due to an

expansion of the variety of goods exported (the extensive margin) or a growth in

trade of existing varieties (the intensive margin). Broda and Weinstein (2006) find

that over the last quarter of the twentieth century roughly 30 % of U.S. import

growth was at the extensive margin, with China the largest contributor. However,

using Chinese export data disaggregated at the HS-8 level, Amiti and Freund (201

0)

report that most of Chinese export growth to the world between 1997 and 2005 was

in existing varieties. Most recently, Manova and Zhang (2009) using firm level data

on Chinese trading firms find that a relatively few large firms are responsible for

substantial share of exports; these firms export to many markets, and many are

foreign owned.

A principal focus of our paper is on which other exporting countries are losing

foreign markets due to the rise of China. Other papers have also attempted to

address this question. Using a gravity model, Hanson and Robertson (2010) study

ten developing countries they identify as potential losers to Chinese competition.

However, they find Chinese export expansion over the 1995–2005 period has had

only a modest negative impact on the exports of these other countries. In an earlier

study, Ahearne et al. (2003) use VAR analysis to see if Chinese exports reduce the

exports of other Asian economies. They find instead a positive correlation between

exports from these two sources. These findings along with the industry classifica-

tions of Chinese exports suggest that major competing countries with China in

world export markets may be developed rather than developing countries. In the

China’s fare share 571

123

remainder of this paper, we try to identify which countries have lost share and to

provide a measure of the size of the losses. We also focus on the growth of Chinese

exports at broad industry levels and in individual export markets. We turn now to

describe the modeling strategy we employ to answer these questions.

3 Market shares methodology

Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis has long been used to study export

performance.
11

This modeling approach treats as a norm of behavior that a country’s

market share will remain constant over time. If instead it changes, that must be due

to changes in competitiveness or changes in demand from the world as a whole or in

individual markets. The analysis then proceeds to decompose export share changes

in order to identify these factors. In the 1950s and 1960s, CMS was a popular tool of

analysis. In a well-known paper, however, Richardson (1971) criticized its use,

arguing that the signs and magnitudes of the measured effects depend upon in part

on the methods used in their calculation.

Taking these criticisms into account, Fagerberg and Sollie (1987) (hereafter FS) have

proposed several refinements to traditional CMS analysis. These include improved

theoretical consistency via the use of Laspeyres weights throughout and an explicit

economic interpretation of all decomposed terms. They have also extended the

traditional model to include two additional terms which measure the adaptability of the

export sector of a country to changes in the commodity and national market

composition

of world exports.
12

We now turn to a brief derivation of their model.

First, consider the change in exporters’ shares in each importer’s market. We

define the value of imports of product i from country k to l is defined as m

i

kl

. The

market share of country k (an exporter) in product i in market l (an importer) is

akli ¼ m
kl
i =

X

k

mkli ð1Þ

Product i’s share of country l’s total imports is defined as

bli ¼
X

k

mkli =
X

i
X
k

mkli ð2Þ

Since the market share of country k is written as

Mkl ¼
X

i

akli b
l
i;

the change in country k’s share of market l between an initial year (time 0) and

year t is

DMkl ¼ Mklt � M
kl
0 :

11
See Leamer and Stern (1970) Chapter 7 for a derivation of the original model and the references

therein for examples of its use.
12

Irwin (1995) uses the FS approach to study changes in the export market share of Great Britain in the

early twentieth century.

572 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

This equation can be rewritten as the sum of three terms:

DMkl ¼ DMkla þ DM
kl
b þ DM

kl
ab ð3Þ

where

DMkla ¼
X

i

ðaklit � a
kl
i0Þb

l
i0 ð4Þ

DMklb ¼
X

i

akli0ðb

l
it � b

l
i0Þ ð5Þ

DMklab ¼
X

i

ðaklit � a
kl
i0Þðb

l
it � b

l
i0Þ ð6Þ

Equation (4) is the effect of changes in the market share, weighting the change in

exporter k’s share of product i exports by the initial share of the product in market l.

Equation (5) is the effect of changes in the product composition of importer l,

weighted by the initial share of the product from country k. The final term, Eq. (6),

is a residual term which can be written as

DMklab ¼ r
kl
ab

X
i

ðaklit � �a
kl
t � a

kl
i0 þ �a

kl
0 Þ

2

” #0:5 X

i

ðblit � b

l
i0Þ

2

” #0:5
ð7Þ

where rklab is the correlation coefficient between the changes in market shares and the

changes in product shares.

FS then extend the decomposition exercise from one market to the world market.

The country l’s share of world imports is defined as:

cl ¼
X

k
X
i
mkli =
X
k
X
l
X
i

mkli ð8Þ

In this case, we can write the market share of county k in world market as

Mk ¼
X

l

Mklcl:

The change in M
k

between time 0 and time t is

DMk ¼ DMkm þ DM

k
c þ DM

k
m

c

¼ DMka þ DM
k
b þ DM

k
ab þ DM

k
c þ DM
k
mc
where

DMka ¼
X

l

cl0

X
i
ðaklit � a
kl
i0Þb

l
i0

” #
ð9Þ

DMkb ¼
X

l
cl0
X
i

akli0ðb
l
it � b

l
i0Þ

” #
ð10Þ

DMkab ¼
X

l
cl0
X
i
ðaklit � a
kl
i0Þðb
l
it � b
l
i0Þ

” #
ð11Þ

China’s fare share 573

123

DMkc ¼
X

l

Mkl0 ðc

l
t � c

l
0Þ ð12Þ

DMkmc ¼
X

l

ðMklt � M
kl
0 Þðc

l
t � c

l
0Þ ð13Þ

Our analysis focuses on Eqs. (9)–(13); following FS, each can be interpreted as a

separate factor that influences export performance.

Equation (9) is the market share effect. This term captures the change in an

exporter’s share of each product in each country, holding constant the initial

commodity composition and the country distribution of world imports. Thus, it

captures the extent to which an exporter gains market share independent of changes

in the product and destination pattern of world imports. Equation (10) is the

commodity composition effect. The commodity composition effect measures the

influence of the changing share of products in world trade on an exporter’s overall

share. If, for instance, the structure of world imports changes towards more

manufactured goods and away from agricultural products, the exporters of

manufactured goods (agricultural goods) would see an increase (a decrease) in

their market shares.

Equation (11) is the commodity adaptation effect. The commodity adaptation

effect identifies whether the change in the structure of a country’s exports is

correlated with changes in the commodity composition of world imports. This

number is zero if the country changes its export structure at the same rate as all

countries exporting to the world market. Equation (12) is the market composition

effect. This effect measures the influence of changes in the country demand pattern

of world imports. Thus, it identifies the countries that increase their world market

share by selling their products heavily in expanding markets. Finally, Eq. (13) is the

market adaptation effect. This effect captures the correlation between a country’s

export destinations and world export destinations.

4 Empirical results from the CMS approach

4.1 Share changes from 1995 to 2010

For each country in our study, the change in market share of the world market is

decomposed into the five effects discussed above. The results from 1,832 products

for regional exports and a selected set of countries are given in Table 3.
13

The right-

most column in table provides the overall percentage change in the total sample

export market share for each of the regions and sample countries over the period

13
We concentrate on 1,832 5-digit exports of goods that Rauch (1999) and Hallak (2006) define as

differentiated products at the 3-digit level. To be consistent across 93 countries for years 1995, 2000,

2005, and 2010, we use the 5-digit level data, which is the highest disaggregation possible for our study.

Most of these products are from 1-digit SITC sectors of 5–8. Since there are gaps in 5-digit sub-products

673 and 676 (some types of iron and steel products), we exclude products from these two sectors. We

study the CMS decomposition for the country and region level separately. While we use 93 countries for

each of l and k for the country-level analysis, we use the country aggregates of 6 regions for each of l and

k for the regional analysis.

574 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

1995–2010.
14

The other five columns represent different effects, corresponding to

Eqs. (9)–(13), and add up to the total change.

The first thing to note about the table is that for most countries in the study, overall

export shares hardly changed over the sample period (see the last column). This

stability of trade shares is a stylized fact of trade patterns at the bilateral level first

pointed out and analyzed by Cassing and Husted (2004, 2009) in two related studies.

The principal exceptions to this pattern of export share stability over the sample period

are China (?12.87 pp.), Japan (-5.28 pp.) and the United States (-4.29 pp.), and four

European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom) combined

(-5.25 pp.). These results clearly imply that the growth in Chinese export market share

has come largely at the expense of exporters in developed countries, in particular Japan

and the United States, rather than exporters in developing countries. Since Canada also

lost market share, each of the G7 countries saw market shares drop over this period,

several by more than one percentage point. In fact, the G7 countries explain around 80

percent of all the share losses. We turn now to discuss what factors have contributed to

these changes in trade shares.

Table 3 Export market share change decomposition: selected countries (1995–2010)

Fagerberg and Sollie decomposition (1,832 SITC 5-digit products)

Market

share

Commodity

composition
Commodity
adaptation
Market
composition
Market
adaptation

Total change

in share

Africa 0.111 -0.059 0.033 0.011 0.011 0.108

Kenya 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.001

Asia and Pacific 5.353 -3.995 5.078 -0.068 0.350 6.719

China 11.594 -0.808 3.048 -1.131 0.163 12.867

India 0.676 0.038 0.114 -0.061 -0.012 0.755

Indonesia 0.266 -0.029 0.011 -0.039 -0.065 0.145

Japan -6.450 -1.359 1.767 0.369 0.396 -5.277

Malaysia -0.640 -0.396 0.520 -0.381 0.232 -0.665

South Korea -0.993 -1.051 1.775 0.130 0.661 0.523

Europe -6.499 2.293 1.258 -0.129 -0.260 -3.337

France -1.539 0.307 0.201 0.050 -0.037 -1.018

Germany -1.704 0.148 0.152 0.644 -0.178 -0.938

Italy -1.267 -0.281 -0.163 0.228 -0.131 -1.616

United Kingdom -2.011 0.864 -0.337 -0.130 -0.065 -1.680

North America -6.155 1.525 0.311 0.021 -0.123 -4.420

Canada -1.173 0.201 0.139 -0.169 0.025 -0.977

Mexico 0.732 0.055 0.283 -0.132 -0.091 0.847

United States -5.977 0.808 0.979 0.284 -0.383 -4.290

South America 0.231 0.063 -0.169 0.165 0.003 0.293

Brazil -0.021 0.020 0.028 0.031 0.025 0.083

Middle East 0.476 0.146 -0.003 0.000 0.018 0.637

For the regional-level analysis, we use the country aggregates of 6 regions for k and l

14
Values for the countries not listed in Table 3 tended to be very small. They are available on request.

China’s fare share 575

123

First, according to the decomposition reported in the table, the market share

effect appears to be responsible for most of the changes in export performance by

the countries in our sample. During the period from 1995 to 2010, the market share

effect was strongly positive for China (?11.59 pp.) and strongly negative for

Japan (-6.45 pp.) and the United States (-5.98 pp.). With few exceptions, the

commodity composition effect, the market composition effect, the commodity

adaptation effect, and the market adaptation effect play only small roles in

explaining the changes in world trade shares. In the case of China, while the

commodity adaptation effect (?3.05 pp.) contributes to the gain of Chinese

market share, the remaining effects do not play significant roles. The fact that the

market share effect played such an important role in China’s export share gain is

consistent with Amiti and Freund’s (2010) findings that China’s export growth

was largely at the

intensive margin.

15

Consistent with the findings of Hanson and Robertson (2010), developing

countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Mexico did not lose their market

shares in this period despite China’s export growth. Indeed, all saw their shares rise,

although by much smaller amounts than China’s increase. Again, as was the case

with China, Japan, and the United States, the market share effect appears to have

been the primary factor responsible for the change in total market share.

Why, in particular, are market share losses to China concentrated in Japan and

the United States? One answer may be outsourcing by exporters in these two

countries to firms in China. As noted, without identifying the countries involved,

Manova and Zhang (2009) report that ‘‘Chinese joint ventures and affiliates of

foreign multinationals were responsible for fully 75 %’’ of the increase in China’s

trade flows between 2003 and 2005 (Manova and Zhang 2009, p. 2). We have no

way to identify which countries host the parent companies of these firms although

there is considerable evidence that Japanese firms may be involved. Tomiura (2008)

reports that in recent years China has been the destination country for more than half

of all the outsourcing done by Japanese firms.

Evidence that FDI may be responsible for lost U.S. export share is much less

strong. Branstetter and Foley (2007) assert that U.S. FDI in China is only an

extremely small portion of total U.S. FDI activity. Moreover, they argue that more

than 90 % of the production of U.S. affiliates in China is sold in China rather than

exported to the United States or other markets. Thus, for the United States, FDI in

China is at most only responsible for a share decline in the Chinese market although

we have no way to examine outsourcing between unaffiliated firms. While FDI may

not be directly responsible for U.S. market share losses, it is likely that outsourcing

of assembly and production to non-related Chinese firms may play an important

role. In Sect. 5 we discuss this point further.

4.2 Share changes within sub-periods

Table 4a–c provide detail on market share changes for the three sub-periods of our

sample, 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010, respectively. As we saw in the

15
We explore this point in depth below.

576 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

Table 4 Export market share change decomposition: selected countries

Fagerberg and Sollie decomposition (1,832 SITC 5-digit products)
Market
share
Commodity
composition
Commodity
adaptation
Market
composition
Market
adaptation
Total change
in share

(a) 1995–2000

Asia and Pacific 1.333 -0.551 0.276 0.408 -0.404 1.062

China 3.192 -0.190 0.030 -0.115 0.017 2.935

Japan -1.972 -0.304 -0.093 0.049 -0.119 -2.440

Europe -2.176 -1.261 -0.012 -1.780 0.200 -5.030

France -0.404 -0.239 0.122 -0.228 0.065 -0.685

Germany -1.259 -0.684 -0.013 -0.330 0.109 -2.177

Italy -0.439 -0.621 -0.090 -0.264 0.090 -1.323

United Kingdom -0.278 0.348 -0.113 -0.165 0.053 -0.155

North America 0.490 1.930 -0.192 1.351 0.190 3.768

Canada -0.034 0.197 0.080 0.497 0.052 0.792

Mexico 0.603 0.051 0.065 0.319 0.116 1.154

USA -0.539 1.509 -0.077 1.089 -0.160 1.823

(b) 2000–2005

Asia and Pacific 5.049 -1.377 0.288 0.215 -0.036 4.139

China 6.446 -0.426 0.306 -0.493 -0.067 5.766

Japan -2.137 -0.171 0.024 0.473 -0.046 -1.857

Europe -0.397 1.669 -0.148 1.202 -0.072 2.254

France -0.353 0.267 -0.086 0.209 -0.045 -0.007

Germany 0.435 0.322 -0.152 0.571 -0.094 1.082

Italy -0.116 0.199 -0.216 0.276 -0.061 0.082

United Kingdom -0.804 0.057 -0.146 0.114 -0.089 -0.869

North America -5.365 -0.360 0.027 -1.310 0.124 -6.883

Canada -0.572 0.043 -0.130 -0.420 0.049 -1.030

Mexico -0.124 -0.006 0.045 -0.372 0.009 -0.447

USA -4.039 -0.403 0.040 -1.221 0.216 -5.406

(c) 2005–2010

Asia and Pacific 1.348 -2.688 2.776 -0.137 0.219 1.518

China 2.886 -0.569 2.202 -0.586 0.233 4.166

Japan -2.220 0.339 0.666 0.159 0.074 -0.981

Europe -3.604 2.020 1.065 0.089 -0.130 -0.560

France -0.798 0.338 0.120 0.078 -0.063 -0.325

Germany -0.979 0.589 0.420 0.194 -0.068 0.156

Italy -0.581 0.178 -0.052 0.078 0.003 -0.375

United Kingdom -0.864 0.371 -0.035 -0.097 -0.031 -0.655

North America -1.776 0.555 0.232 -0.271 -0.046 -1.306

Canada -0.699 -0.004 0.168 -0.274 0.069 -0.739

Mexico 0.300 -0.045 0.156 -0.224 -0.048 0.139

USA -2.156 0.337 1.001 0.226 -0.114 -0.706

China’s fare share 577

123

previous section, market share effects tend to account for most of the largest

components of the share changes. For instance, in the period of 1995–2000, three of

the four countries in the table that saw the biggest overall changes in market share

were China (2.9 pp.), Germany (-2.2 pp.) and Japan (-2.4 pp.). According to the

FS decomposition, the largest component of these changes owes to market share

effects: China (3.19 pp.), Japan (-1.97 pp.), and Germany (-1.26 pp.). The US

export share also rose during this period by 1.8 pp. owing largely to the commodity

composition effect. That is, the United States gained its market share because the

structure of world imports changed towards the goods that the United States had

concentrated.

During the period of 2000–2005, the Chinese overall market share increased by

5.8 pp. and the majority of Chinese share gains were accompanied by the almost

identical overall market share loss of the United States (-5.4 pp.). Again, market

share effects accounted for almost (or more than) the entirety of these changes.

Finally, over the period of the great trade collapse (2005–2010), China’s share had

increased by 4.17 pp. and the market share and commodity adaptation effects

account for most of the overall share changes. While developed countries’ demands

for manufacturing goods had slowed due to the financial crisis, developing

countries’ demands for foreign manufacturing goods were relatively strong. China

had increased its world market share by exporting intensively to emerging

developing countries.

5 Empirical results: products and markets

We now turn our attention to an extended analysis of changes in market shares

across various regions and industries. To document further the nature of

competition between Chinese exporters and exporters from other countries, we

focus on bilateral competition in each of the markets in our sample using first

data on the aggregate of trade in the 2,001 5-digit differentiated products used to

develop Table 3.

Consider Figures 2a through 2f. In these, we compare Chinese export share

changes from 1995 to 2010 (measured on the horizontal axis) versus the export

market share changes for six possible competitor countries (measured on the vertical

axis) in the 91 remaining import markets in our sample.

Figure 2a plots market share changes from 1995 to 2010 for China and the

United States in the 91 importer markets. According to the figure the United States

lost market share in all but eighteen countries (most of these are developing

countries such as Tanzania), while China gained share in all countries. Figure 2b

plots the market share changes for China and Japan. Similar to the United States,

Japan lost market share in most countries in our sample, particularly in those in the

Asian and Pacific regions.

Figure 2c and d provides the market share changes for Malaysia and Mexico, two

of the countries that Hanson and Robertson considered as potential competitors,

each vis-à-vis China. Perhaps surprisingly, but consistent with the Hanson–

Robertson conclusions, there are no clear market losses for Malaysia and Mexico

578 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

relative to China during the period. Consider, for instance, the case of Malaysia.

Most of the observations in the Fig. 2c lie in the positive quadrant, suggesting that

over this period exporters from the two countries may not compete strongly in at

-15.0

-1

3.0

-1

1.0

-9.0

-7.0

-5.0

-3.0

-1.0

1.0
3.0
5.0

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 7

0.0

S
ha

re
c

ha
ng

e
of

U
S

A
(

19
95

-2
01

0)

Share change of China (1995-2010)

(a) Share changes between China and USA in 3rd markets

-20.0

-15.0

10.0

-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0

S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of

J
ap

an
(

19
95
-2
01
0)
Share change of China (1995-2010)

(b) Share changes between China and Japan in 3rd markets

6.0

4.0

2.0

0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of

M
al

ay
si

a
(1

99
5-

20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)

(c) Share changes between China and Malaysia in 3rd markets

-2.0

-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of

M
ex

ic
o

(1
99

5-
20

10
)

Share change of China (1995-2010)

(d) Share changes between China and Mexico in 3rd markets

-30.0

-25.0

-20.0
-15.0

-10.0

-5.0
0.0
5.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of

G
er

m
an

y
(1

99
5-
20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)

(e) Share changes between China and Germany in 3rd markets

-4.0

-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of

I
nd

ia
(

19
95
-2
01
0)
Share change of China (1995-2010)

(f) Share changes between China and India in 3rd markets

Fig. 2 Competition between China and selected countries in third markets (1995–2010)

China’s fare share 579

123

least these third country markets.
16

The data also suggest that Mexico and China do

not compete strongly in third country markets. As Fig. 2d shows, there is essentially

no correlation between market share changes in the two countries. Indeed, Mexico’s

export shares in most markets hardly changed over the period, even as China’s

shares rose across the board.

Finally in Fig. 2e and f we diagram competition between China and two other

countries, Germany and India. Consider first Fig. 2e. As the plot shows and as was

the case with the United States and Japan, most of the observations are located in the

lower quadrant of the diagram, suggesting that Germany also experienced market

share losses in the face of Chinese competition. Figure 2f provides detail on the

relationship between China and India in third markets. As the figure shows, the

relationship between Indian and Chinese market share changes over the decade from

1995 to 2010 is very similar to that between Mexico and China. Again there is little

or no evidence of close competition between the exports of these countries in third

country markets.

We turn now to focus on the major industrial sectors involved in the export

market share changes detailed above. One factor that has clearly played a significant

role in the growth of Chinese exports is the fragmentation of production across a

number of countries. In a recent paper, Koopman et al. (2008) attempt to determine

how much of the value added in Chinese exports comes from China. Using input–

output analysis, they conclude that as of 2007, Chinese value added in its exports

stood at roughly 60 %, although for relatively sophisticated electronic goods

Chinese value added was closer to 30 %.

It is impossible for us to separate the 1,832 goods in our study into inputs and

outputs. However, we can use CMS analysis on a narrower industry level to see

what differences, if any, may be due to fragmentation. Again, using data from our

ninety four country sample, Table 5 provides further detail on market share changes

for China, Japan, and the United States by region and industry. In each of these

regions for both SITC 1-digit industries 7 (machinery and transport equipment) and

8 (miscellaneous manufactures), Chinese export shares rose significantly, with gains

exceeding 10 pp. in most markets. And, as the table shows, regardless of region and

product, Chinese market share gains came at the expense of other developed

countries. In many cases, the largest losses again were experienced by Japan and the

United States.

To explore further how market shares for various exporting countries changed

within export product segments, we again present results from CMS analysis. In part

(a) of Table 6 we look at how export shares of products included in the Machinery

and Transport Equipment (SITC Category 7) for a selection of our sample countries

have changed between 1995 and 2010. This industrial sector contains electrical

goods and other products whose production increasingly involves fragmented

processing across various countries. China’s share of world exports from this sector

increased more than 16 pp. over our sample period. Three quarters of this share

growth is accounted for by the market share effect; the commodity adaptation effect

accounts for virtually all of the rest of the growth. That is, as world demand for

16
This is also consistent with the results reported in Ahearne et al. (2003).

580 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

123

imports of these goods has grown, Chinese firms have played a major role in their

assembly and export. Consistent with the results reported in Table 3, as China’s

share exports of Category 7 products has grown, export shares of Japan and the

United States have both fallen, in this case 8.2 and 6.3 pp., respectively. And,

similar again to the results of Table 3, these share losses were dominated by the

market share effect. These results suggest that a significant portion of the market

share changes for these three countries occurs in industrial sectors where processing

trade is especially important.

Part (b) of Table 6 looks at export share changes in all other industrial sectors

that produce differentiated products (i.e., the all differentiated products except those

in SITC 1-digit sector 7). As the table shows, over our sample period Chinese

market share rose in these sectors as well, and again, much of the growth can be

attributed to the market share effect. However, unlike the results in Part (a),

Japanese and U.S. market share losses were much lower.

The fact that the market share effect plays such a predominant role with Chinese

export expansion is fully consistent with the Amiti and Freund (2010) finding that

Chinese exports have grown along the intensive rather than extensive margin. The

largest component of this expansion (and the largest simultaneous loss of export

market shares in Japan and the United States) occurred in industrial sectors that now

Table 5 Changes in export shares of China, Japan, and USA for reginal markets (1995–2010)

North

America

Euro Asia and

Pacific

Others Total

I. Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 3, industry 7)

China 18.436 11.565 20.573 16.285 16.416

Japan -12.726 -4.919 -9.185 -4.044 -8.120

USA -3.485 -5.375 -8.913 -10.388 -6.345

Developing (exclude China) 4.936 6.153 2.038 7.048 4.430

Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -7.161 -7.424 -4.513 -8.901 -6.381

II. Miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 3, industry 8)

China 20.508 14.746 0.795 26.350 13.325

Japan -5.356 -1.296 -0.492 -2.253 -2.107

USA -3.880 -2.044 -4.974 -11.252 -3.517

Developing (exclude China) -2.779 1.606 1.010 2.000 0.321

Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -8.493 -13.012 3.661 -14.845 -8.023

III. Other industries (SITC 3, industries 0–6, and 9)

China 9.272 4.392 7.022 11.962 6.886

Japan -4.474 -0.448 -0.700 -0.750 -1.210

USA -6.992 2.019 -2.511 -4.915 -0.726

Developing (exclude China) 0.697 2.510 1.839 4.096 2.801

Developed (exclude Japan and USA) 1.498 -8.473 -5.651 -10.393 -7.750

The countries in each region correspond to Table 1

China’s fare share 581

123

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582 S. Husted, S. Nishioka

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China’s fare share 583

123

involve considerable fragmentation in the production process. This suggests that

FDI and/or outsourcing provide an explanation for at least some of our results.

6 Conclusions

The growth of Chinese exports both in volume and in market share over the past two

decades is a singular event in the history of world trade. Using data from

1995–2010, we document this growth in a variety of ways. First, we show that the

expanded trade is pervasive. Virtually every country in the world has seen China

claim a larger share of its import market. Then, we use CMS analysis to try to

determine which country or countries have lost market share as China’s trade has

grown. We show that Chinese export share growth is best explained by the market

share effect. That is, Chinese exports have grown in large part as an expansion of

trade within product lines where Chinese firms had had early success. This finding is

consistent with other studies that attribute Chinese exports as growing at the

intensive margin.

Moreover, contrary to much discussion in the popular press, we find strong

evidence that other developing countries have not seen export shares fall as a result

of China’s gains. Rather, our results suggest that China’s share growth has come

largely at the expense of exporters based in Japan and the United States and

involved in processing trade.

Acknowledgments This research was begun when the first author was on sabbatical leave as a Research
Fellow at the Adam Smith Research Foundation at the University of Glasgow. He thanks them for their

superb hospitality. We also thank an anonymous referee for guidance and Jim Cassing, Asatoshi

Maeshiro, and Tom Rawski for helpful comments, and the Economics Department at WVU for financial

support. The usual proviso applies.

References

Ahearne, A. G., Fernald, J. G., Loungani, P., & Schindler, J. W. (2003). China and emerging Asia:

Comrades or competitors? (Working Paper 27-2003). Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

Amiti, M., & Freund, C. (2010). An Anatomy of China’s export growth. In R. Feenstra & S.-J. Wei

(Eds.), China’s growing role in world trade. Cambridge: National Bureau

of Economic Research.

Branstetter, L., & Foley, C. F. (2007). Facts and fallacies about U.S. FDI in China. (NBER Working

Paper 13470).

Cambridge,

MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Broda, C., & Weinstein, D. E. (2006). Globalization and the gains from variety. Quarterly Journal of

Economics, 121(2), 541–585.

Cassing, J., & Husted, S. (2004). Trade pattern persistence. In M. Plummer (Ed.), Empirical methods in

international trade: Essays in honor of Mordechai Kreinin (pp. 91–109). Cheltonham: Edward

Elgar.

Cassing, J., & Husted, S. (2009). Transient products but persistent trade patterns. Journal of Economic

Studies, 36(6), 583–595.

Fagerberg, J., & Sollie, G. (1987). The method of constant market shares analysis reconsidered. Applied

Economics, 19(12), 1571–1583.

Hallak, J. C. (2006). Product quality and the direction of trade. Journal of International Economics, 68(1),

238–265.

Hanson, G., & Robertson, R. (2010). China and the manufacturing exports of other developing countries.

In R. Feenstra & S.-J. Wei (Eds.), China’s growing role in world trade. Cambridge: National Bureau

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Irwin, D. (1995). The Lion’s share: Britain’s export performance revisited, 1899–1929. Structural

Change and Economic Dynamics, 6(1), 97–109.

Koopman, R., Wang, Z., & Wei S.-J. (2008). How much of Chinese exports is really made in China?

Assessing domestic value-added when processing trade is pervasive. (NBER Working Paper 14109).

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Leamer, E., & Stern, R. (1970). Quantitative international economics. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Manova, K., & Zhang, Z. (2009). China’s Exporters and Importers: Firms, products and trade partners.

(NBER Working Paper 15249). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Nabli, M. K. (Ed.) (2010). The great recession and developing countries. Washington, DC: The World

Bank.

Rauch, J. E. (1999). Networks versus markets in international trade. Journal of International Economics,

48(1), 7–35.

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Economics, 1(2), 227–239.

Rodrik, D. (2006). What’s so special about China’s exports? (NBER Working Paper 11947). Cambridge,

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China’s fare share 585

123

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  • China’s fare share? The growth of Chinese exports in world trade
  • Abstract
    Introduction
    An overview of Chinese export performance
    Market shares methodology
    Empirical results from the CMS approach
    Share changes from 1995 to 2010
    Share changes within sub-periods
    Empirical results: products and markets
    Conclusions
    Acknowledgments
    References

10 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WINTER 2014

China Under
Attack
On January 31, 2014, one of China’smany trust companies, the China CreditTrust, nearly went bankrupt and had tobe bailed out by unknown sources.Some say it was China’s LehmanBrothers moment. In late December2013, Foxconn, the Chinese assemblyfirm with 1.2 million Chinese workers,
announced its intention to build a production facility in the
United States. On December 5, 2013, China’s new aircraft car-
rier, the Liaoning, was sailing in the South China Sea when a
vessel from its carrier group came less than 1,400 feet from the
USS Cowpens, a Ticonderoga-class missile cruiser. The near-
collision was the result of an ever more apparent game of
“chicken” between the United States and China. The three seem-
ingly unrelated events may be individually important, but they
are symptomatic of changing dynamics affecting China’s inter-
action with the United States and the West more generally.

China’s competitiveness has been deeply eroded in recent
years. The old revenue and cash inflows China had enjoyed dis-
appeared when the financial crisis damaged consumption in the
industrialized world. Since then, Chinese workers have been

B Y K . P H I L I P P A M A L M G R E N

An economy amazingly
vulnerable to bad news.

Philippa Malmgren is the founder of DRPM Group. These ideas
are further explored in her upcoming book, Signals. She
previously served on the White House National Economic
Council in 2001 and 2002.

THE MAGAZINE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
220 I Street, N.E., Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20002

Phone: 202-861-0791 • Fax: 202-861-0790
www.international-economy.com
editor@international-economy.com

WINTER 2014 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 11

MALMGREN

hurt by both the deterioration of a powerful export engine
and the rapidly rising cost of living.

Chinese official data shows inflation is not too bad.
But the Chinese government wants to maintain the façade
that markets are functioning favorably and the GDP defla-
tor is small, ensuring high “real” growth rates. The actual
inflation rate faced by locals is far higher than the data
shows. Of course, some argue a gap exists in the United
States as well. The reality though, is that the prices of
energy and food have been high and rising rapidly in
recent years. Food and fuel account for 40 percent to 70
percent of a Chinese worker’s expenses. Consider the
price of beef, which, like most proteins, has kept hitting
all-time record highs in the last few years. Failure to pro-
vide the Chinese public with protein at a moderate price is
a recipe for serious social unrest. Oil may not seem expen-
sive in the West, but anything over $100 per barrel trans-
lates to fuel and other energy expenses high enough to
warrant moving production to the United States where
energy is increasingly cheap, leading to job losses in
China.

These pressures have generated demands for higher
pay. Wage demands for skilled Chinese workers are run-
ning at a 70 percent annual increase, according to people
who run real businesses in China. The government has
actively tried pushing up low-end wages by 30 percent per
year. Wage demands have escalated to the point that
wages in Mexico are already 20 percent cheaper than in
China. Meanwhile, China’s workers demand more, but in
weak job markets Western workers are prepared to work
much harder for much less, thus narrowing the wage dif-
ferential. This is one reason that many manufacturing

firms are leaving China for Mexico, the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and Eastern Europe. Cheaper
energy, better quality control, and shorter shipment times
are additional incentives for geographical shift at a time
when margins need to be protected.

In the West, a debate rages about whether there is a
manufacturing revival, but the facts are clear: not only is
Apple leaving China for the United States, but now
Foxconn, the Chinese assembler of Apple products, is
building its first production facility in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, citing cheap energy as a primary reason for
the move into a fracking area. Companies, American and
Chinese alike, that make simple, low-value-added items
such as Hula Hoops (Wham-O) and yarn (Keer Group) are
now migrating from China to the United States as well.

In other words, the old Chinese export-driven business
model is breaking down. This is not just a technical eco-
nomic problem. It is a political problem. After all, if the

Access to the shipping lanes in
and out of China has become an
increasingly high-priority issue.
That’s how 90 percent of critical
food and energy supplies arrive
in China and also how most
things leave China. Yet all China
sees is the ever-increasing
presence of the U.S. Navy
encircling them and rendering
sea access less certain.

Left, the USS Cowpens,
nicknamed “the Mighty Moo,”
departs San Diego for a
seven-month Western Pacific
deployment on
September 17, 2013.

U
.S

.
N

A
V

Y
P

H
O

TO
B

Y
M

A
S

S
C

O
M

M
U

N
IC

AT
IO

N
S

P
EC

IA
LI

S
T

1S
T

C
LA

S
S

E
LL

IO
TT

F
A

B
R

IZ
IO

China’s shadow banking system seems to

have grown by the size of the entire

U.S. financial system in last year alone.

Continued on page 68

68 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WINTER 2014

MALMGREN

leadership in China cannot make people rich before
they get old, then the public will ask questions like:
“Why is the wealth in this society being distributed
to someone else, not me?” The Chinese are well
aware that this dangerous question underpinned the
Arab Spring and now continues to fan the flames of

social unrest that has appeared from Brazil to South
Africa, and threatens China itself. Failure to provide
the already agitated public with food and energy at a
tolerable “right price” could evolve into an existen-
tial threat to the current political order.

Given all that, imagine how vulnerable China is
to any more bad news. Yet bad news keeps coming.
Bad news came on January 31, 2014, when an ICBC
trust called “Credit Equals Gold Number 1,” which
supposedly had some ¥$3 billion worth of assets,
came within hours of becoming China’s Lehman
Brothers. It received a last-minute bailout from a
still-unidentified backer.

The problems are by no means solved. Some 43
percent of all of China’s trust products come due in
2014 and 80 percent mature before 2016. Most are
collateralized by property or raw materials such as
iron ore or copper. It has been said that at least 40
percent of the iron ore and a similar amount of the
copper in storage within China’s ports serves as col-
lateral for these trusts. Obviously, the collateral is not
worth what it was during the boom, so cash calls are
in play. The next spot of trouble came on February 7,
2014, when “Songhua River #77 Shanxi Opulent
Blessing Project,” which was backed by iron ore,
failed to repay investors the nearly ¥300 million it
had raised from them. There will be more such prob-
lems given that China’s shadow banking system
seems to have grown by the size of the entire U.S.
financial system in last year alone. In the main, the
fast-growing, highly leveraged financial system has
been used to fund more and more building and infra-
structure projects with dubious cash flow-generating
ability.

With all this bad news, and given China’s inabil-
ity to provide sufficient food, energy, or raw materi-

als at tolerable prices to its public, it starts to become
apparent to Chinese leaders that there is a need to
shift blame abroad and do whatever is necessary to
protect the national interest. As Oscar Wilde said, “It
is not whether you win or lose but how you place the
blame.” It is worth dissecting the ways in which
blame is being allocated today in China.

The United States is a prime target. It is per-
ceived to have “caused” the crisis through misman-
agement of not only its own economy, but the world
economy. Now it is said that the United States
threatens the world by attempting to foment and
export inflation. Many in China argue that the rea-
son hard asset prices have exploded upward since
the crisis began is because of America’s quantitative
easing policy. Not only did free money in the West
work its way into emerging market asset prices from
property to stocks, but the prices of critical soft
commodities, namely food, have also been driven
upward by quantitative easing. The Fed can claim
that emerging markets should have raised their own
interest rates and allowed their currencies to appre-
ciate earlier to counter any fallout. But the Chinese
know that a stronger yuan and higher interest rates
cannot make more pork or more oil, and would have
shut down the already faltering export engine.

From a Chinese point of view, it is argued that
America always defaults on its debts through infla-
tion. That’s how America paid for the American
Revolution, the Civil War, and the war in Vietnam,
when the currencies of each era—the consols, the
continentals and greenbacks—became devalued or
worthless.

And, some Chinese are quick to note, such
inflation is not a victimless crime. They echo the

sentiment that the villain Goldfinger expressed to
the mythic hero James Bond when he said, “Mr.
Bond, they have a saying in Chicago: ‘Once is hap-
penstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it’s

China’s competitiveness has been

deeply eroded in recent years.

Wage demands for skilled Chinese

workers are running at

a 70 percent annual increase.

Continued from page 11

WINTER 2014 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 69

MALMGREN

enemy action.’” And enemy action it is. For China,
and many other emerging market governments, a
default by the United States and other industrialized
economies is not just an economic event. It is a
national security issue. The problem is not simply
that these investors are going to be paid back in
pieces of paper that are losing value. The Chinese
fear they may be losing money on their massive
holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds.

But these worries are just part of a growing con-
cern. A bigger worry is the price consequences when
large economies start inflating faster.

There is a reason, they believe, that the prices of
beef, pork, shrimp, and other core proteins have hit

record highs since quantitative easing began. There is
a reason the oil price has stubbornly remained above
$100 per barrel. There is a reason the stock markets
and property markets around the world have soared,
thus widening the gap between the rich and the poor.
The attempts by the largest economies in the world to
engage in record efforts to debase the currency are
seen by many Chinese as working. The value of
paper fiat money is declining and the value of hard
assets is rising. Central banks in the industrialized
world are succeeding in their efforts to create infla-
tion. Inflation is occurring. It is just occurring in the
weakest, poorest

part of a highly integrated world

economy: the emerging markets.

As the Chinese saying goes, “Wars are fought
with silver bullets.” The opening salvo in this new
war has been fired, in their view, by the export of
inflation from the United States and other industrial-
ized economies to emerging markets.

So access to food and energy at the right price
has now become a national security requirement. It is
not only about averting an Arab Spring. The political

leadership also need a new peg to hang their hat on.
If they cannot make the Chinese rich before they get
old, then they can be seen to be protecting vital
national interests in the face of growing efforts by the
most powerful nations to push economic pains on to
vulnerable economies such as China’s.

In this context of thinking about the future,
access to the shipping lanes in and out of China has
become an increasingly high-priority issue. After all,
that’s how 90 percent of critical food and energy sup-
plies arrive in China and also how most things leave
China. Yet all China sees is the ever-increasing pres-
ence of the U.S. Navy encircling them and rendering
sea access less certain. Let’s not forget that 10 per-
cent of the world’s fish supply comes from these
“near seas.” The massive new gas fields in the dis-
puted island territories also take on new value given
the rising economic and political pressures. Can it
really be any surprise to see China becoming much
more aggressive in asserting its rights to the “near
seas” given the picture a home? Nose-to-nose stand-
offs between the People’s Liberation Army and
America, or America’s allies in the region, such as
the Liaoning/Cowpens incident, are only just begin-
ning. China announced an Air Defense Identification
Zone in November 2013. The Chinese insist that all
aircraft and ships must comply with their procedures
for entering this space, which stretches to Taiwan and
Japan. America responded by sending in B-52
bombers within hours of the announcement without
any effort to demonstrate recognition much less com-
pliance. Japan has said it intends to nationalize some
280 of the 400 islands, most within the ADIZ, whose
ownership it disputes with China. Japanese Foreign
Minister Fumio Kishida intimated on February 14,
2014, that it will permit U.S. nuclear weapons within
Japanese territory if there is a “clear and present

Wage demands have escalated

to the point that wages in Mexico

are already 20 percent cheaper

than in China.

Inflation is occurring. It is just

occurring in the weakest, poorest

part of a highly integrated world
economy: the emerging markets.

70 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WINTER 2014

MALMGREN

threat.” The United States meanwhile persists with
the rhetorical “pivot strategy” while continuing to
build up weapons capabilities in the region. And
China pursues a defense strategy that aims to deny
any opponent the ability to utilize its own weapons.
This drives China’s efforts to deepen control over
space, satellites, cyberspace, and communications
hardware and software.

It is all too human, and especially easy for politi-
cians, to look for ways to divert attention from
domestic pressures to externally imposed disrup-
tions, especially when the cauldron of domestic pres-
sure is intensifying. After all, the more China bails
out domestic institutions and stimulates the domestic
economy, the more they risk stoking the very infla-
tion that would further foment social protest. China
has a finer line to tread than many other places. Too
much inflation and too little growth can also inflame
the public.

The Fed’s view, in theory, is right. China and
many other emerging markets should just let their
currencies appreciate to offset any inflationary
impulses. But the political reality is that you cannot
expect policymakers to hit the public when they are
already down. More likely, the Chinese will let their
currency fall in order to slow the deterioration of
their export engine.

China and other emerging markets no doubt
need to take responsibility for their own economic
situation. However, the industrialized world should

not be surprised if the policy response aims to avoid
inflicting more pain on their citizens. If anything, we
should expect China

to devalue, not revalue.

Yes, this
would be inflationary. But how can China compete
when so many emerging markets are devaluing and
when they believe the United States is heading down
that path ultimately as well? Looked at from another
angle, why would anyone expect the yuan to remain
strong in light of their loss of competitiveness, their
rising inflationary pressures, and the revelations that
the domestic financial system is filled with losses
rather than rich with savings?

Nor should anyone be surprised to see China
using other policy tools to protect its citizens from
the adverse impact of global economic forces. The
United States might want China to revalue but there
are other options for exploitation with state power.
Beefing up the military and intensifying the acquisi-
tion of valuable assets around the world is a viable
policy choice, too.

Remember that it is not only blame that needs
allocating when the world economy weakens. Pain
also needs to be distributed. China deeply disagrees
with America’s view that Chinese workers should just
tighten their belts and accept the pain. They have
already revalued by 40 percent against the U.S. dollar
since 2005. It is outrageous to most emerging markets
that the United States and the industrialized world
want China to take more pain given their own unwill-
ingness to pursue austerity. To the emerging markets,
it is deeply ironic that the U.S. authorities expect
China to raise interest rates and to revalue when U.S.
officials deny U.S. monetary policy has any spillover
effects, especially when many emerging markets
experienced historic capital outflows and devalua-
tions once U.S. monetary policy began to reverse.

Similarly, the Chinese cannot be blamed for
being suspicious that the United States and the West
might be choosing inflation as a means of defaulting
on debt, especially given that U.S. policymakers
seem committed to avoiding any risk of deflation—
which implies taking all the risk with inflation. And
they wonder, what if the inflation rate the industrial-
ized world needs to resolve its debt kills or severely
damages emerging markets along the way? China
cannot be blamed for fearing the normal conse-
quences of inflation: higher prices. Nor can they be
blamed for being paranoid. By one measure, China is
being defaulted upon, encircled, and threatened on
multiple levels. One cannot really be surprised that
China may respond to their rising duress using what-
ever means necessary. �

From a Chinese point of view, it is

argued that America always defaults

on its debts through inflation.

If anything, we should expect China

to devalue, not revalue.

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