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ORI GIN AL PA PER
China’s fare share? The growth of Chinese exports
in world trad
e
Steven Husted • Shuichiro Nishiok
a
Published online: 6 February 2013
� Kiel Institute 2013
Abstract The growth of Chinese exports in market share over the past two dec-
ades is a singular event in the history of world trade. Using data from 1995–2010,
we document this growth in a variety of ways. We show that the expanded trade is
pervasive. Virtually every country in the world has seen China claim a larger
share
of its import market. Then, we use Constant Market Share analysis to determine
which country or countries have lost market share as China’s trade has grown.
Contrary to much discussion in the popular press, we find strong evidence that other
developing countries have not seen export shares fall as a result of China’s gains.
Rather, our results suggest that China’s share growth has come largely at the
expense of exporters based in developed countries, especially Japan and the Unit
ed
States.
Keywords Chinese exports � Constant market share analysis � Export shares
JEL Classification F14 � P33
1 Introduction
Over the past two decades the Chinese economy has grown at a remarkable pace.
Between 1995 and 2007 Chinese real GDP grew at an average annual rate of more
S. Husted (&
)
Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh,
4508 WW Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15216, USA
e-mail: husted1@pitt.edu
S. Nishioka
Department of Economics, West Virginia University,
1601 University Avenue, Morgantown, WV 26506-6025, USA
e-mail: Shuichiro.Nishioka@mail.wvu.edu
123
Rev World Econ (2013) 149:565–58
5
DOI 10.1007/s10290-013-0149-2
than 10 %. Per capita real GDP rose by 250 % over this period.1 One of the leading
factors driving this economic growth has been the extraordinary performance of
Chinese exports. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 2010 China
ranked first in exports to the world market with merchandise export sales of more
than $1.5 trillion and a world market share of 10.4 %. In 1998, China had less than
2 % of the world market. Twenty years earlier, China’s share was essentially zero.
As China’s share of world exports has grown, it has come under increasing pressure
to allow its currency to appreciate; often the criticism of its exchange rate practices
includes charges that other developing and emerging market economies have borne
the brunt in terms of lost export markets.
2
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of Chinese export growth over
the period when its share of world exports rose most rapidly, the years 1995–2010.
We provide detail on the commodity composition of Chinese exports and how this
composition has changed. We also discuss some aspects of the geographic pattern
and commodity composition of Chinese trade. In addition, a fundamenta
l
contribution of this paper is that we provide considerable evidence that the
principal exporting countries that have lost market share to China are developed
countries, especially Japan and the
United States.
We use Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis (i.e., Fagerberg and Sollie 1987)
to determine which of five factors (i.e., market share, commodity composition,
commodity adaptation, market composition, and market adaptation) are responsible
for the rise of Chinese share. During the period we consider, the market share effect
is the critical factor to explain the share change in the world trade. This element of
trade growth captures the extent to which an exporter gains or loses market share
against other exporters independent of changes in the product and destination
pattern of world imports. In particular, almost all share gains of China over the
period 1995–2010 (i.e., the market share effect accounts for 11.6 of 12.9 percentage
points (pp.) of Chinese share gains) stem from the market share effects.3
We also apply CMS analysis to the sub-periods of 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and
2005–2010. In the period of 1995–2000, the share gain of China was relatively moderate
(2.9 pp.) and Japan and Germany lost market share in roughly equal amounts (2.4 and
2.2 pp., respectively). The United States also saw its world export market share rise
during this period, due primarily to the commodity composition effect. That is, the United
States gained market share because the structure of world import demand changed toward
the types of goods that the United States exports. During the period 2000–2005, Chinese
market share increased by 5.8 pp. and the majority of Chinese share gains were
accompanied by the significant market share loss of the United States (-4.0 pp.). Finally,
over the sub-period (2005–2010) that included the great trade collapse of 2008–2009,
1 These numbers use China Version 2 data from the PWT6.3 data set. See ‘‘What is New in PWT 6.3?’’
link on the Penn World Tables site, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php, for a discussion
of the differences between this version of Chinese data and official Chinese data.
2 See, for instance, Arvin Subramanian, ‘‘Who Pays for the Weak Renminbi?’’, 11 February 2010, Vox
Front Page, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4604.
3 With the exception of Sect. 2, the discussion of share changes in the remainder of this section and the
rest of the paper refers to trade in manufactured goods (SITC categories 5–9) among a sample of 92
countries and Hong Kong.
566 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4604
China’s share increased by 4.2 pp. and the market share and commodity
adaptation
effects both explain the share changes. While developed countries’ demands for
manufacturing goods had slowed due to the financial crisis, developing countries’
demands for foreign manufacturing goods were relatively strong. China had increased its
world market share by exporting intensively to emerging developing countries.4
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2 we present an overview of
Chinese trade expansion. In Sect. 3 we discuss CMS analysis, an empirical
technique that provides a method for studying changes in export market shares. In
Sect. 4, we apply CMS to study trade patterns among a sample of 94 countries over
the period 1995–2010 in commodity trade disaggregated at the 5-digit SITC level.
We also apply CMS to study the periods to 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010.
In Sect. 5, we expand our analysis by focusing on export behavior across industries
and in individual export markets. Section 6 offers our conclusions.
2 An overview of Chinese export performance
Figure 1 provides a time series plot of world export shares for five of the world’s
leading exporting countries, Germany, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States over the post World War II era. As the figure shows, since the end of
World War II, only Germany has seen as rapid and as large a rise in world export
share as China. In the eleven year span from 1948 to 1958, Germany’s share of world
exports rose from 1.3 to 10.3 %, roughly matching in both magnitude and duration
China’s performance. However there are several major differences between the two.
First, Germany’s growth almost certainly represented a return for that country to a
market position similar to the one that it had held prior to the war era. Second, at the
time of Germany’s significant growth there were far fewer major exporters
competing for market share. For instance, in the 1950s the combined world export
share of the countries now known as the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries
(NICs) (Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) was virtually zero. In contrast,
since at least the onset of the industrial revolution and prior to the 1990s, China had
never held a significant share of world trade. And, China’s export growth came only
slightly after significant growth by the NICs and simultaneously with major growth
by several other countries that along with China make up the BRICs (Brazil, Russia,
and India), all of whom now also hold relatively large shares of the world market.
Like all major exporting countries, China has a market presence in virtually
every country in the world; this presence has grown in almost every market in recent
years. Using data from the United Nation’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database
we calculated aggregate exporter market shares in 92 countries and 1 territory
(Hong Kong), from all parts of the world.5 Several interesting patterns emerge from
4 In a related study, Wood and Mayer (2011) look at how the entry of China into international markets
over the past three decades has impacted production of primary and labor-intensive products in a wide set
of developing countries. They find that although output and exports of labor-intensive goods continued to
rise following the emergence of China in the 1990s, the growth in these ratios was slower in the 1990s
than in the 1980s.
5 These countries were chosen due to the availability of the import data from UN Comtrade.
China’s fare share 567
123
this exercise. First, the global extent of China’s trade expanded significantly
between 1995 and 2010. By 2010, China had at least 3 % of the market in all of
these countries. Moreover, market share growth was pervasive; over the 1995–201
0
period China’s market share grew in all of these markets. In many cases, especially
in South America, Africa, and smaller European countries, shares were essentially
zero prior to 1995. Table 1 provides some additional summary statistics.
According to the table, geography is clearly important for China’s trade. At the
end of 2010, its highest regional market share was in Asia where among the sample
countries it had an average share of 18.9 %. Its highest market share among all the
Asian countries in the sample stood at 49.1 %.6 Its next highest average regional
market share was in North America; this included 16.7 % of all U.S. merchandise
Table 1 China’s national export market share by region
Countries 2010 national market shares (%) Share changes 1995–2010a
Average SD Maximum Minimum Average SD Maximum Minimum
Africa 20 15.9 9.3 49.1 6.2 13.0 9.1 45.5 3.1
Asia and Pacific 13 18.9 10.7 49.1 4.2 11.8 3.4 15.9 3.8
Europe 31 9.4 6.5 36.0 3.1 8.0 6.0 33.4 2.4
Middle East 7 12.0 1.1 13.3 10.2 10.2 0.7 11.0 9.0
North America 3 16.4 5.2 21.9 11.6 13.1 2.6 15.0 9.5
South America 19 12.7 7.7 35.1 5.2 11.7 7.4 35.1 4.2
Total 93 13.2 8.4 49.1 3.1 10.7 6.9 35.1 2.4
a Share changes are measured in percentage points
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
19
48
19
50
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
%
o
f
w
or
ld
e
xp
or
ts
CHINA
GERMANY
JAPAN
UK
US
Fig. 1 World market export shares 1948–2010
6 This was China’s share of Hong Kong’s market. Among the other Asian countries in this sample China
had more than 25% of Japan’s market in 2010 and more than 10% of the export markets of Thailand,
South Korea, Pakistan, and Singapore.
568 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
imports in 2010. On average, China’s smallest regional market penetration was in
Europe, where its average national market share in 2010 was 9.4 %. Since 2005,
China’s export shares have increased particularly in remote and low-income
countries. For example, the average of China’s export shares in African
countries
increased from 8.3 to 15.9 %. For the South American countries in our sample,
China’s average market share almost doubled, rising from 6.6 to 12.7 %.
As detailed more fully below, China’s export market share has grown in recent
years, and it has changed the mix of goods it supplies to world markets. By value,
virtually all of Chinese exports are manufactured goods. Early on, these exports
were concentrated in Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles (SITC Category 8),
including apparel and toys. While that category still accounts for a significant share
of Chinese exports, more recently Chinese trade growth has been concentrated in
Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC Category 7).
In order to better focus on this change in the commodity composition of trade, we
restrict our attention to exports of differentiated manufactured products disaggre-
gated at the 5-digit SITC level. In much of what follows we continue to analyze data
from a set of 94 countries.7 Our sample includes countries from every continent and
includes countries at various standards of living; slightly more than one-third the
countries chosen in our sample are classified by the World Bank as high-income
countries. In 2010, the countries used in our analysis accounted for 76.8 % of total
world imports.8 Trade among these countries accounted for a majority of all world
merchandise trade in each of the years in our sample.
The first panel of Table 2 provides detail on the composition of Chinese exports
in 1995 and 2010 across broad categories of goods to our sample of markets as well
as the countries identified as developing countries.9 Also included in the table is
China’s portion of total world exports at the 1-digit level (SITC Rev.3) in 1995 and
2010. As the table shows, Chinese exports have been centered in manufactures for
some time. In 1995, 90 % of Chinese exports to our sample countries came from
industries classified in SITC sections 5–9. By 2010, that share had risen to almost
95 % of total exports. Traditionally, Chinese exports have been concentrated in
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles (SITC Category 8). This sector includes many
labor intensive manufactured products such as clothing, footwear, and toys, items
7 In addition to China, we use the following countries: (Africa) Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Niger, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia; (Asia and Pacific) Australia, Hong
Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand; (Europe) Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; (Middle East) Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey; (North America) Canada, Mexico, and the United States; (Central and
South America) Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and
Venezuela.
8 Our data set consists of bilateral trade of 93 countries. We calculate the total world imports from the
sum of total imports of all available countries in UN Comtrade.
9 Developing countries are those not classified as being a high-income country by the World Bank in its
2009 World Development Report.
China’s fare share 569
123
long identified as characteristic examples of Chinese exports. Twenty seven percent
of Chinese exports to our sample countries in 2010 came from this sector. However,
this share had stood at 47 % of total exports to these markets in 1995. Instead, in
recent years, the share of Chinese exports of more sophisticated manufactures has
risen substantially with exports in Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC
Category 7) more than doubling to 51 % of its exports to the sample markets.
The period 2005–2010 includes the onset of the Great Recession in the United
States and elsewhere and the consequent 2008–2009 collapse in world trade.10 As
Table 2 Structure of world exports and imports
SITC Rev 3 Commodities I. Composition of
Chinese exports all
countries
II. China’s shares in
world (China’s/World
export
s)
1995 2010 1995 2010
(a) Structure of Chinese exports
0 Food and live animals 4.5 2.0 3.4
5.0
1 Beverages and tobacco 0.4 0.1 2.4 1.9
2 Crude materials 2.4 0.8 2.8 2.3
3 Mineral fuels 2.4 1.0 2.3 1.3
4 Animal and vegetable oils 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.6
5 Chemicals and related products 3.9 4.7 2.2 5.8
6 Manufactured goods (materials) 15.3 12.6 5.5 15.0
7 Machinery and transport equipment 23.2 50.8 3.1 19.0
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 47.3 27.4 18.9 33.3
9 Other commodities 0.5 0.8 1.0 3.8
SITC Rev 3 Commodities III. The levels of total imports (2005 = 1)
Developing countries Developed countries
1995 2010 1995 2010
(b) Structure of world imports
0 Food and live animals 0.789 1.647 0.788 1.642
1 Beverages and tobacco 1.296 2.108 1.840 1.853
2 Crude materials 0.360 1.728 0.533 1.533
3 Mineral fuels 0.248 2.729 0.542 3.748
4 Animal and vegetable oils 0.495 1.345 0.935 1.692
5 Chemicals and related products 0.448 1.703 0.629 1.319
6 Manufactured goods (materials) 0.583 1.684 0.841 1.283
7 Machinery and transport equipment 0.561 1.558 0.867 0.934
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.391 1.622 0.843 1.022
9 Other commodities 2.841 1.471 0.536 1.394
We use import data of 94 countries for panels I and II
10 For detail on this period see Richard Baldwin, The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences, and
Prospects, VoxEU eBook, 2009, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297.
570 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297
has been documented by the Nabli (2010) developing countries have rebounded
much more strongly from the downturn, and these countries have accounted for
much of the growth in trade over the past several years. This pattern shows up well
in the second panel of Table 2 where we document the levels of imports for
developing and developed countries for each product group. We set the import
values of year 2005 as 1. For example, while the import values of Category 7
increased from 1 in 2005 to 1.558 in 2010 and those of Category 8 increased from 1
to 1.622 for developing markets, the corresponding values are 0.934 and 1.022 for
exports to developed
country markets.
China’s world market shares changes over this period followed the transforma-
tion described above. Between 1995 and 2010, its share of Industry 7 exports to the
world increased by a factor of six, while its Industry 8 market share increased by
slightly less than 15 pp. We are not the first to point out the recent growth in the
sophistication of Chinese exports. Rodrik (2006, p. 4) calculates that by 2002 China
had an export bundle ‘‘of a country with an income per capita level three times
higher than China’s’’. In a related study, Schott (2008) focuses on Chinese exports
to the United States. He finds that the composition of this export bundle
‘‘increasingly overlaps with that of the world’s most developed economies’’ (Schott
2008, p. 34).
The data in Tables 1 and 2 document the growth of Chinese exports and the
change in the sectoral composition of these goods over the period 1995–2010.
Clearly, the rapid growth of China in the world market has had market share
implications for other exporting nations. A number of papers have focused on
various aspects of the recent growth of Chinese exports on global competition.
One focus of attention has been on whether the growth has occurred due to an
expansion of the variety of goods exported (the extensive margin) or a growth in
trade of existing varieties (the intensive margin). Broda and Weinstein (2006) find
that over the last quarter of the twentieth century roughly 30 % of U.S. import
growth was at the extensive margin, with China the largest contributor. However,
using Chinese export data disaggregated at the HS-8 level, Amiti and Freund (2010)
report that most of Chinese export growth to the world between 1997 and 2005 was
in existing varieties. Most recently, Manova and Zhang (2009) using firm level data
on Chinese trading firms find that a relatively few large firms are responsible for
substantial share of exports; these firms export to many markets, and many are
foreign owned.
A principal focus of our paper is on which other exporting countries are losing
foreign markets due to the rise of China. Other papers have also attempted to
address this question. Using a gravity model, Hanson and Robertson (2010) study
ten developing countries they identify as potential losers to Chinese competition.
However, they find Chinese export expansion over the 1995–2005 period has had
only a modest negative impact on the exports of these other countries. In an earlier
study, Ahearne et al. (2003) use VAR analysis to see if Chinese exports reduce the
exports of other Asian economies. They find instead a positive correlation between
exports from these two sources. These findings along with the industry classifica-
tions of Chinese exports suggest that major competing countries with China in
world export markets may be developed rather than developing countries. In the
China’s fare share 571
123
remainder of this paper, we try to identify which countries have lost share and to
provide a measure of the size of the losses. We also focus on the growth of Chinese
exports at broad industry levels and in individual export markets. We turn now to
describe the modeling strategy we employ to answer these questions.
3 Market shares methodology
Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis has long been used to study export
performance.11 This modeling approach treats as a norm of behavior that a country’s
market share will remain constant over time. If instead it changes, that must be due
to changes in competitiveness or changes in demand from the world as a whole or in
individual markets. The analysis then proceeds to decompose export share changes
in order to identify these factors. In the 1950s and 1960s, CMS was a popular tool of
analysis. In a well-known paper, however, Richardson (1971) criticized its use,
arguing that the signs and magnitudes of the measured effects depend upon in part
on the methods used in their calculation.
Taking these criticisms into account, Fagerberg and Sollie (1987) (hereafter FS) have
proposed several refinements to traditional CMS analysis. These include improved
theoretical consistency via the use of Laspeyres weights throughout and an explicit
economic interpretation of all decomposed terms. They have also extended the
traditional model to include two additional terms which measure the adaptability of the
export sector of a country to changes in the commodity and national market
composition
of world exports.12 We now turn to a brief derivation of their model.
First, consider the change in exporters’ shares in each importer’s market. We
define the value of imports of product i from country k to l is defined as m
i
kl. The
market share of country k (an exporter) in product i in market l (an importer) is
akli ¼
mkli =
X
k
mkli ð1Þ
Product i’s share of country l’s total imports is defined as
bli ¼
X
k
mkli =
X
i
X
k
mkli ð2Þ
Since the market share of country k is written as
Mkl ¼
X
i
akli b
l
i;
the change in country k’s share of market l between an initial year (time 0) and
year t is
DMkl ¼ Mklt �Mkl0 :
11 See Leamer and Stern (1970) Chapter 7 for a derivation of the original model and the references
therein for examples of its use.
12 Irwin (1995) uses the FS approach to study changes in the export market share of Great Britain in the
early twentieth century.
572 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
This equation can be rewritten as the sum of three terms:
DMkl ¼ DMkla þ DMklb þ DMklab ð3Þ
where
DMkla ¼
X
i
ðaklit � akli0Þbli0 ð4Þ
DMklb ¼
X
i
akli0ðblit � bli0Þ ð5Þ
DMklab ¼
X
i
ðaklit � akli0Þðblit � bli0Þ ð6Þ
Equation (4) is the effect of changes in the market share, weighting the change in
exporter k’s share of product i exports by the initial share of the product in market l.
Equation (5) is the effect of changes in the product composition of importer l,
weighted by the initial share of the product from country k. The final term, Eq. (6),
is a residual term which can be written as
DMklab ¼ rklab
X
i
ðaklit � �aklt � akli0 þ �akl0 Þ
2
” #0:5 X
i
ðblit � bli0Þ
2
” #0:5
ð7Þ
where rklab is the correlation coefficient between the changes in market shares and the
changes in product shares.
FS then extend the decomposition exercise from one market to the world market.
The country l’s share of world imports is defined as:
cl ¼
X
k
X
i
mkli =
X
k
X
l
X
i
mkli ð8Þ
In this case, we can write the market share of county k in world market as
Mk ¼
X
l
Mklcl:
The change in Mk between time 0 and time t is
DMk ¼ DMkm þ DMkc þ DMkm
c
¼ DMka þ DMkb þ DMkab þ DMkc þ DMkmc
where
DMka ¼
X
l
cl0
X
i
ðaklit � akli0Þbli0
” #
ð9Þ
DMkb ¼
X
l
cl0
X
i
akli0ðblit � bli0Þ
” #
ð10Þ
DMkab ¼
X
l
cl0
X
i
ðaklit � akli0Þðblit � bli0Þ
” #
ð11Þ
China’s fare share 573
123
DMkc ¼
X
l
Mkl0 ðclt � cl0Þ ð12Þ
DMkmc ¼
X
l
ðMklt �Mkl0 Þðclt � cl0Þ ð13Þ
Our analysis focuses on Eqs. (9)–(13); following FS, each can be interpreted as a
separate factor that influences export performance.
Equation (9) is the market share effect. This term captures the change in an
exporter’s share of each product in each country, holding constant the initial
commodity composition and the country distribution of world imports. Thus, it
captures the extent to which an exporter gains market share independent of changes
in the product and destination pattern of world imports. Equation (10) is the
commodity composition effect. The commodity composition effect measures the
influence of the changing share of products in world trade on an exporter’s overall
share. If, for instance, the structure of world imports changes towards more
manufactured goods and away from agricultural products, the exporters of
manufactured goods (agricultural goods) would see an increase (a decrease) in
their market shares.
Equation (11) is the commodity adaptation effect. The commodity adaptation
effect identifies whether the change in the structure of a country’s exports is
correlated with changes in the commodity composition of world imports. This
number is zero if the country changes its export structure at the same rate as all
countries exporting to the world market. Equation (12) is the market composition
effect. This effect measures the influence of changes in the country demand pattern
of world imports. Thus, it identifies the countries that increase their world market
share by selling their products heavily in expanding markets. Finally, Eq. (13) is the
market adaptation effect. This effect captures the correlation between a country’s
export destinations and world export destinations.
4 Empirical results from the CMS approach
4.1 Share changes from 1995 to 2010
For each country in our study, the change in market share of the world market is
decomposed into the five effects discussed above. The results from 1,832 products
for regional exports and a selected set of countries are given in Table 3.13 The right-
most column in table provides the overall percentage change in the total sample
export market share for each of the regions and sample countries over the period
13 We concentrate on 1,832 5-digit exports of goods that Rauch (1999) and Hallak (2006) define as
differentiated products at the 3-digit level. To be consistent across 93 countries for years 1995, 2000,
2005, and 2010, we use the 5-digit level data, which is the highest disaggregation possible for our study.
Most of these products are from 1-digit SITC sectors of 5–8. Since there are gaps in 5-digit sub-products
673 and 676 (some types of iron and steel products), we exclude products from these two sectors. We
study the CMS decomposition for the country and region level separately. While we use 93 countries for
each of l and k for the country-level analysis, we use the country aggregates of 6 regions for each of l and
k for the regional analysis.
574 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
1995–2010.14 The other five columns represent different effects, corresponding to
Eqs. (9)–(13), and add up to the total change.
The first thing to note about the table is that for most countries in the study, overall
export shares hardly changed over the sample period (see the last column). This
stability of trade shares is a stylized fact of trade patterns at the bilateral level first
pointed out and analyzed by Cassing and Husted (2004, 2009) in two related studies.
The principal exceptions to this pattern of export share stability over the sample period
are China (?12.87 pp.), Japan (-5.28 pp.) and the United States (-4.29 pp.), and four
European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom) combined
(-5.25 pp.). These results clearly imply that the growth in Chinese export market share
has come largely at the expense of exporters in developed countries, in particular Japan
and the United States, rather than exporters in developing countries. Since Canada also
lost market share, each of the G7 countries saw market shares drop over this period,
several by more than one percentage point. In fact, the G7 countries explain around 80
percent of all the share losses. We turn now to discuss what factors have contributed to
these changes in trade shares.
Table 3 Export market share change decomposition: selected countries (1995–2010)
Fagerberg and Sollie decomposition (1,832 SITC 5-digit products)
Market
share
Commodity
composition
Commodity
adaptation
Market
composition
Market
adaptation
Total change
in share
Africa 0.111 -0.059 0.033 0.011 0.011 0.108
Kenya 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.001
Asia and Pacific 5.353 -3.995 5.078 -0.068 0.350 6.719
China 11.594 -0.808 3.048 -1.131 0.163 12.867
India 0.676 0.038 0.114 -0.061 -0.012 0.755
Indonesia 0.266 -0.029 0.011 -0.039 -0.065 0.145
Japan -6.450 -1.359 1.767 0.369 0.396 -5.277
Malaysia -0.640 -0.396 0.520 -0.381 0.232 -0.665
South Korea -0.993 -1.051 1.775 0.130 0.661 0.523
Europe -6.499 2.293 1.258 -0.129 -0.260 -3.337
France -1.539 0.307 0.201 0.050 -0.037 -1.018
Germany -1.704 0.148 0.152 0.644 -0.178 -0.938
Italy -1.267 -0.281 -0.163 0.228 -0.131 -1.616
United Kingdom -2.011 0.864 -0.337 -0.130 -0.065 -1.680
North America -6.155 1.525 0.311 0.021 -0.123 -4.420
Canada -1.173 0.201 0.139 -0.169 0.025 -0.977
Mexico 0.732 0.055 0.283 -0.132 -0.091 0.847
United States -5.977 0.808 0.979 0.284 -0.383 -4.290
South America 0.231 0.063 -0.169 0.165 0.003 0.293
Brazil -0.021 0.020 0.028 0.031 0.025 0.083
Middle East 0.476 0.146 -0.003 0.000 0.018 0.637
For the regional-level analysis, we use the country aggregates of 6 regions for k and l
14 Values for the countries not listed in Table 3 tended to be very small. They are available on request.
China’s fare share 575
123
First, according to the decomposition reported in the table, the market share
effect appears to be responsible for most of the changes in export performance by
the countries in our sample. During the period from 1995 to 2010, the market share
effect was strongly positive for China (?11.59 pp.) and strongly negative for
Japan (-6.45 pp.) and the United States (-5.98 pp.). With few exceptions, the
commodity composition effect, the market composition effect, the commodity
adaptation effect, and the market adaptation effect play only small roles in
explaining the changes in world trade shares. In the case of China, while the
commodity adaptation effect (?3.05 pp.) contributes to the gain of Chinese
market share, the remaining effects do not play significant roles. The fact that the
market share effect played such an important role in China’s export share gain is
consistent with Amiti and Freund’s (2010) findings that China’s export growth
was largely at the intensive margin.15
Consistent with the findings of Hanson and Robertson (2010), developing
countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Mexico did not lose their market
shares in this period despite China’s export growth. Indeed, all saw their shares rise,
although by much smaller amounts than China’s increase. Again, as was the case
with China, Japan, and the United States, the market share effect appears to have
been the primary factor responsible for the change in total market share.
Why, in particular, are market share losses to China concentrated in Japan and
the United States? One answer may be outsourcing by exporters in these two
countries to firms in China. As noted, without identifying the countries involved,
Manova and Zhang (2009) report that ‘‘Chinese joint ventures and affiliates of
foreign multinationals were responsible for fully 75 %’’ of the increase in China’s
trade flows between 2003 and 2005 (Manova and Zhang 2009, p. 2). We have no
way to identify which countries host the parent companies of these firms although
there is considerable evidence that Japanese firms may be involved. Tomiura (2008)
reports that in recent years China has been the destination country for more than half
of all the outsourcing done by Japanese firms.
Evidence that FDI may be responsible for lost U.S. export share is much less
strong. Branstetter and Foley (2007) assert that U.S. FDI in China is only an
extremely small portion of total U.S. FDI activity. Moreover, they argue that more
than 90 % of the production of U.S. affiliates in China is sold in China rather than
exported to the United States or other markets. Thus, for the United States, FDI in
China is at most only responsible for a share decline in the Chinese market although
we have no way to examine outsourcing between unaffiliated firms. While FDI may
not be directly responsible for U.S. market share losses, it is likely that outsourcing
of assembly and production to non-related Chinese firms may play an important
role. In Sect. 5 we discuss this point further.
4.2 Share changes within sub-periods
Table 4a–c provide detail on market share changes for the three sub-periods of our
sample, 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010, respectively. As we saw in the
15 We explore this point in depth below.
576 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
Table 4 Export market share change decomposition: selected countries
Fagerberg and Sollie decomposition (1,832 SITC 5-digit products)
Market
share
Commodity
composition
Commodity
adaptation
Market
composition
Market
adaptation
Total change
in share
(a) 1995–2000
Asia and Pacific 1.333 -0.551 0.276 0.408 -0.404 1.062
China 3.192 -0.190 0.030 -0.115 0.017 2.935
Japan -1.972 -0.304 -0.093 0.049 -0.119 -2.440
Europe -2.176 -1.261 -0.012 -1.780 0.200 -5.030
France -0.404 -0.239 0.122 -0.228 0.065 -0.685
Germany -1.259 -0.684 -0.013 -0.330 0.109 -2.177
Italy -0.439 -0.621 -0.090 -0.264 0.090 -1.323
United Kingdom -0.278 0.348 -0.113 -0.165 0.053 -0.155
North America 0.490 1.930 -0.192 1.351 0.190 3.768
Canada -0.034 0.197 0.080 0.497 0.052 0.792
Mexico 0.603 0.051 0.065 0.319 0.116 1.154
USA -0.539 1.509 -0.077 1.089 -0.160 1.823
(b) 2000–2005
Asia and Pacific 5.049 -1.377 0.288 0.215 -0.036 4.139
China 6.446 -0.426 0.306 -0.493 -0.067 5.766
Japan -2.137 -0.171 0.024 0.473 -0.046 -1.857
Europe -0.397 1.669 -0.148 1.202 -0.072 2.254
France -0.353 0.267 -0.086 0.209 -0.045 -0.007
Germany 0.435 0.322 -0.152 0.571 -0.094 1.082
Italy -0.116 0.199 -0.216 0.276 -0.061 0.082
United Kingdom -0.804 0.057 -0.146 0.114 -0.089 -0.869
North America -5.365 -0.360 0.027 -1.310 0.124 -6.883
Canada -0.572 0.043 -0.130 -0.420 0.049 -1.030
Mexico -0.124 -0.006 0.045 -0.372 0.009 -0.447
USA -4.039 -0.403 0.040 -1.221 0.216 -5.406
(c) 2005–2010
Asia and Pacific 1.348 -2.688 2.776 -0.137 0.219 1.518
China 2.886 -0.569 2.202 -0.586 0.233 4.166
Japan -2.220 0.339 0.666 0.159 0.074 -0.981
Europe -3.604 2.020 1.065 0.089 -0.130 -0.560
France -0.798 0.338 0.120 0.078 -0.063 -0.325
Germany -0.979 0.589 0.420 0.194 -0.068 0.156
Italy -0.581 0.178 -0.052 0.078 0.003 -0.375
United Kingdom -0.864 0.371 -0.035 -0.097 -0.031 -0.655
North America -1.776 0.555 0.232 -0.271 -0.046 -1.306
Canada -0.699 -0.004 0.168 -0.274 0.069 -0.739
Mexico 0.300 -0.045 0.156 -0.224 -0.048 0.139
USA -2.156 0.337 1.001 0.226 -0.114 -0.706
China’s fare share 577
123
previous section, market share effects tend to account for most of the largest
components of the share changes. For instance, in the period of 1995–2000, three of
the four countries in the table that saw the biggest overall changes in market share
were China (2.9 pp.), Germany (-2.2 pp.) and Japan (-2.4 pp.). According to the
FS decomposition, the largest component of these changes owes to market share
effects: China (3.19 pp.), Japan (-1.97 pp.), and Germany (-1.26 pp.). The US
export share also rose during this period by 1.8 pp. owing largely to the commodity
composition effect. That is, the United States gained its market share because the
structure of world imports changed towards the goods that the United States had
concentrated.
During the period of 2000–2005, the Chinese overall market share increased by
5.8 pp. and the majority of Chinese share gains were accompanied by the almost
identical overall market share loss of the United States (-5.4 pp.). Again, market
share effects accounted for almost (or more than) the entirety of these changes.
Finally, over the period of the great trade collapse (2005–2010), China’s share had
increased by 4.17 pp. and the market share and commodity adaptation effects
account for most of the overall share changes. While developed countries’ demands
for manufacturing goods had slowed due to the financial crisis, developing
countries’ demands for foreign manufacturing goods were relatively strong. China
had increased its world market share by exporting intensively to emerging
developing countries.
5 Empirical results: products and markets
We now turn our attention to an extended analysis of changes in market shares
across various regions and industries. To document further the nature of
competition between Chinese exporters and exporters from other countries, we
focus on bilateral competition in each of the markets in our sample using first
data on the aggregate of trade in the 2,001 5-digit differentiated products used to
develop Table 3.
Consider Figures 2a through 2f. In these, we compare Chinese export share
changes from 1995 to 2010 (measured on the horizontal axis) versus the export
market share changes for six possible competitor countries (measured on the vertical
axis) in the 91 remaining import markets in our sample.
Figure 2a plots market share changes from 1995 to 2010 for China and the
United States in the 91 importer markets. According to the figure the United States
lost market share in all but eighteen countries (most of these are developing
countries such as Tanzania), while China gained share in all countries. Figure 2b
plots the market share changes for China and Japan. Similar to the United States,
Japan lost market share in most countries in our sample, particularly in those in the
Asian and Pacific regions.
Figure 2c and d provides the market share changes for Malaysia and Mexico, two
of the countries that Hanson and Robertson considered as potential competitors,
each vis-à-vis China. Perhaps surprisingly, but consistent with the Hanson–
Robertson conclusions, there are no clear market losses for Malaysia and Mexico
578 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
relative to China during the period. Consider, for instance, the case of Malaysia.
Most of the observations in the Fig. 2c lie in the positive quadrant, suggesting that
over this period exporters from the two countries may not compete strongly in at
-15.0
-1
3.0
-1
1.0
-9.0
-7.0
-5.0
-3.0
-1.0
1.0
3.0
5.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 7
0.0
Sh
ar
e
ch
an
ge
o
f
U
SA
(
19
95
-2
01
0)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(a) Share changes between China and USA in 3rd markets
-20.0
-15.0
–
10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
Sh
ar
e
ch
an
ge
o
f
Ja
pa
n
(1
99
5-
20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(b) Share changes between China and Japan in 3rd markets
–
6.0
–
4.0
–
2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
Sh
ar
e
ch
an
ge
o
f
M
al
ay
si
a
(1
99
5-
20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(c) Share changes between China and Malaysia in 3rd markets
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
Sh
ar
e
ch
an
ge
o
f
M
ex
ic
o
(1
99
5-
20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(d) Share changes between China and Mexico in 3rd markets
-30.0
-25.0
-20.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
Sh
ar
e
ch
an
ge
o
f
G
er
m
an
y
(1
99
5-
20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(e) Share changes between China and Germany in 3rd markets
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
Sh
ar
e
ch
an
ge
o
f
In
di
a
(1
99
5-
20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(f) Share changes between China and India in 3rd markets
Fig. 2 Competition between China and selected countries in third markets (1995–2010)
China’s fare share 579
123
least these third country markets.16 The data also suggest that Mexico and China do
not compete strongly in third country markets. As Fig. 2d shows, there is essentially
no correlation between market share changes in the two countries. Indeed, Mexico’s
export shares in most markets hardly changed over the period, even as China’s
shares rose across the board.
Finally in Fig. 2e and f we diagram competition between China and two other
countries, Germany and India. Consider first Fig. 2e. As the plot shows and as was
the case with the United States and Japan, most of the observations are located in the
lower quadrant of the diagram, suggesting that Germany also experienced market
share losses in the face of Chinese competition. Figure 2f provides detail on the
relationship between China and India in third markets. As the figure shows, the
relationship between Indian and Chinese market share changes over the decade from
1995 to 2010 is very similar to that between Mexico and China. Again there is little
or no evidence of close competition between the exports of these countries in third
country markets.
We turn now to focus on the major industrial sectors involved in the export
market share changes detailed above. One factor that has clearly played a significant
role in the growth of Chinese exports is the fragmentation of production across a
number of countries. In a recent paper, Koopman et al. (2008) attempt to determine
how much of the value added in Chinese exports comes from China. Using input–
output analysis, they conclude that as of 2007, Chinese value added in its exports
stood at roughly 60 %, although for relatively sophisticated electronic goods
Chinese value added was closer to 30 %.
It is impossible for us to separate the 1,832 goods in our study into inputs and
outputs. However, we can use CMS analysis on a narrower industry level to see
what differences, if any, may be due to fragmentation. Again, using data from our
ninety four country sample, Table 5 provides further detail on market share changes
for China, Japan, and the United States by region and industry. In each of these
regions for both SITC 1-digit industries 7 (machinery and transport equipment) and
8 (miscellaneous manufactures), Chinese export shares rose significantly, with gains
exceeding 10 pp. in most markets. And, as the table shows, regardless of region and
product, Chinese market share gains came at the expense of other developed
countries. In many cases, the largest losses again were experienced by Japan and the
United States.
To explore further how market shares for various exporting countries changed
within export product segments, we again present results from CMS analysis. In part
(a) of Table 6 we look at how export shares of products included in the Machinery
and Transport Equipment (SITC Category 7) for a selection of our sample countries
have changed between 1995 and 2010. This industrial sector contains electrical
goods and other products whose production increasingly involves fragmented
processing across various countries. China’s share of world exports from this sector
increased more than 16 pp. over our sample period. Three quarters of this share
growth is accounted for by the market share effect; the commodity adaptation effect
accounts for virtually all of the rest of the growth. That is, as world demand for
16 This is also consistent with the results reported in Ahearne et al. (2003).
580 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
imports of these goods has grown, Chinese firms have played a major role in their
assembly and export. Consistent with the results reported in Table 3, as China’s
share exports of Category 7 products has grown, export shares of Japan and the
United States have both fallen, in this case 8.2 and 6.3 pp., respectively. And,
similar again to the results of Table 3, these share losses were dominated by the
market share effect. These results suggest that a significant portion of the market
share changes for these three countries occurs in industrial sectors where processing
trade is especially important.
Part (b) of Table 6 looks at export share changes in all other industrial sectors
that produce differentiated products (i.e., the all differentiated products except those
in SITC 1-digit sector 7). As the table shows, over our sample period Chinese
market share rose in these sectors as well, and again, much of the growth can be
attributed to the market share effect. However, unlike the results in Part (a),
Japanese and U.S. market share losses were much lower.
The fact that the market share effect plays such a predominant role with Chinese
export expansion is fully consistent with the Amiti and Freund (2010) finding that
Chinese exports have grown along the intensive rather than extensive margin. The
largest component of this expansion (and the largest simultaneous loss of export
market shares in Japan and the United States) occurred in industrial sectors that now
Table 5 Changes in export shares of China, Japan, and USA for reginal markets (1995–2010)
North
America
Euro Asia and
Pacific
Others Total
I. Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 3, industry 7)
China 18.436 11.565 20.573 16.285 16.416
Japan -12.726 -4.919 -9.185 -4.044 -8.120
USA -3.485 -5.375 -8.913 -10.388 -6.345
Developing (exclude China) 4.936 6.153 2.038 7.048 4.430
Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -7.161 -7.424 -4.513 -8.901 -6.381
II. Miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 3, industry 8)
China 20.508 14.746 0.795 26.350 13.325
Japan -5.356 -1.296 -0.492 -2.253 -2.107
USA -3.880 -2.044 -4.974 -11.252 -3.517
Developing (exclude China) -2.779 1.606 1.010 2.000 0.321
Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -8.493 -13.012 3.661 -14.845 -8.023
III. Other industries (SITC 3, industries 0–6, and 9)
China 9.272 4.392 7.022 11.962 6.886
Japan -4.474 -0.448 -0.700 -0.750 -1.210
USA -6.992 2.019 -2.511 -4.915 -0.726
Developing (exclude China) 0.697 2.510 1.839 4.096 2.801
Developed (exclude Japan and USA) 1.498 -8.473 -5.651 -10.393 -7.750
The countries in each region correspond to Table 1
China’s fare share 581
123
T
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582 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
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China’s fare share 583
123
involve considerable fragmentation in the production process. This suggests that
FDI and/or outsourcing provide an explanation for at least some of our results.
6 Conclusions
The growth of Chinese exports both in volume and in market share over the past two
decades is a singular event in the history of world trade. Using data from
1995–2010, we document this growth in a variety of ways. First, we show that the
expanded trade is pervasive. Virtually every country in the world has seen China
claim a larger share of its import market. Then, we use CMS analysis to try to
determine which country or countries have lost market share as China’s trade has
grown. We show that Chinese export share growth is best explained by the market
share effect. That is, Chinese exports have grown in large part as an expansion of
trade within product lines where Chinese firms had had early success. This finding is
consistent with other studies that attribute Chinese exports as growing at the
intensive margin.
Moreover, contrary to much discussion in the popular press, we find strong
evidence that other developing countries have not seen export shares fall as a result
of China’s gains. Rather, our results suggest that China’s share growth has come
largely at the expense of exporters based in Japan and the United States and
involved in processing trade.
Acknowledgments This research was begun when the first author was on sabbatical leave as a Research
Fellow at the Adam Smith Research Foundation at the University of Glasgow. He thanks them for their
superb hospitality. We also thank an anonymous referee for guidance and Jim Cassing, Asatoshi
Maeshiro, and Tom Rawski for helpful comments, and the Economics Department at WVU for financial
support. The usual proviso applies.
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http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/research-review/045.html
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/research-review/045.html
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Abstract
Introduction
An overview of Chinese export performance
Market shares methodology
Empirical results from the CMS approach
Share changes from 1995 to 2010
Share changes within sub-periods
Empirical results: products and markets
Conclusions
Acknowledgments
References
O R I G I N A L P A P E R
China’s fare share? The growth of Chinese exports
in world trade
Steven Husted • Shuichiro Nishioka
Published online: 6 February 2013
� Kiel Institute 2013
Abstract The growth of Chinese exports in market share over the past two dec-
ades is a singular event in the history of world trade. Using data from 1995–2010,
we document this growth in a variety of ways. We show that the expanded trade is
pervasive. Virtually every country in the world has seen China claim a larger
share
of its import market. Then, we use Constant Market Share analysis to determine
which country or countries have lost market share as China’s trade has grown.
Contrary to much discussion in the popular press, we find strong evidence that other
developing countries have not seen export shares fall as a result of China’s gains.
Rather, our results suggest that China’s share growth has come largely at the
expense of exporters based in developed countries, especially Japan and the United
States.
Keywords Chinese exports � Constant market share analysis � Export shares
JEL Classification F14 � P33
1 Introduction
Over the past two decades the Chinese economy has grown at a remarkable pace.
Between 1995 and 2007 Chinese real GDP grew at an average annual rate of more
S. Husted (&
)
Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh,
4508 WW Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15216, USA
e-mail: husted1@pitt.edu
S. Nishioka
Department of Economics, West Virginia University,
1601 University Avenue, Morgantown, WV 26506-6025, USA
e-mail: Shuichiro.Nishioka@mail.wvu.edu
123
Rev World Econ (2013) 149:565–58
5
DOI 10.1007/s10290-013-0149-2
than 10 %. Per capita real GDP rose by 250 % over this period.
1
One of the leading
factors driving this economic growth has been the extraordinary performance of
Chinese exports. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 2010 China
ranked first in exports to the world market with merchandise export sales of more
than $1.5 trillion and a world market share of 10.4 %. In 1998, China had less than
2 % of the world market. Twenty years earlier, China’s share was essentially zero.
As China’s share of world exports has grown, it has come under increasing pressure
to allow its currency to appreciate; often the criticism of its exchange rate practices
includes charges that other developing and emerging market economies have borne
the brunt in terms of lost export markets.
2
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of Chinese export growth over
the period when its share of world exports rose most rapidly, the years 1995–2010.
We provide detail on the commodity composition of Chinese exports and how this
composition has changed. We also discuss some aspects of the geographic pattern
and commodity composition of Chinese trade. In addition, a fundamenta
l
contribution of this paper is that we provide considerable evidence that the
principal exporting countries that have lost market share to China are developed
countries, especially Japan and the
United States.
We use Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis (i.e., Fagerberg and Sollie 1987)
to determine which of five factors (i.e., market share, commodity composition,
commodity adaptation, market composition, and market adaptation) are responsible
for the rise of Chinese share. During the period we consider, the market share effect
is the critical factor to explain the share change in the world trade. This element of
trade growth captures the extent to which an exporter gains or loses market share
against other exporters independent of changes in the product and destination
pattern of world imports. In particular, almost all share gains of China over the
period 1995–2010 (i.e., the market share effect accounts for 11.6 of 12.9 percentage
points (pp.) of Chinese share gains) stem from the market share effects.
3
We also apply CMS analysis to the sub-periods of 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and
2005–2010. In the period of 1995–2000, the share gain of China was relatively moderate
(2.9 pp.) and Japan and Germany lost market share in roughly equal amounts (2.4 and
2.2 pp., respectively). The United States also saw its world export market share rise
during this period, due primarily to the commodity composition effect. That is, the United
States gained market share because the structure of world import demand changed toward
the types of goods that the United States exports. During the period 2000–2005, Chinese
market share increased by 5.8 pp. and the majority of Chinese share gains were
accompanied by the significant market share loss of the United States (-4.0 pp.). Finally,
over the sub-period (2005–2010) that included the great trade collapse of 2008–2009,
1
These numbers use China Version 2 data from the PWT6.3 data set. See ‘‘What is New in PWT 6.3?’’
link on the Penn World Tables site, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php, for a discussion
of the differences between this version of Chinese data and official Chinese data.
2
See, for instance, Arvin Subramanian, ‘‘Who Pays for the Weak Renminbi?’’, 11 February 2010, Vox
Front Page, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4604.
3
With the exception of Sect. 2, the discussion of share changes in the remainder of this section and the
rest of the paper refers to trade in manufactured goods (SITC categories 5–9) among a sample of 92
countries and Hong Kong.
566 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4604
China’s share increased by 4.2 pp. and the market share and commodity
adaptation
effects both explain the share changes. While developed countries’ demands for
manufacturing goods had slowed due to the financial crisis, developing countries’
demands for foreign manufacturing goods were relatively strong. China had increased its
world market share by exporting intensively to emerging
developing countries.
4
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2 we present an overview of
Chinese trade expansion. In Sect. 3 we discuss CMS analysis, an empirical
technique that provides a method for studying changes in export market shares. In
Sect. 4, we apply CMS to study trade patterns among a sample of 94 countries over
the period 1995–2010 in commodity trade disaggregated at the 5-digit SITC level.
We also apply CMS to study the periods to 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010.
In Sect. 5, we expand our analysis by focusing on export behavior across industries
and in individual export markets. Section 6 offers our conclusions.
2 An overview of Chinese export performance
Figure 1 provides a time series plot of world export shares for five of the world’s
leading exporting countries, Germany, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States over the post World War II era. As the figure shows, since the end of
World War II, only Germany has seen as rapid and as large a rise in world export
share as China. In the eleven year span from 1948 to 1958, Germany’s share of world
exports rose from 1.3 to 10.3 %, roughly matching in both magnitude and duration
China’s performance. However there are several major differences between the two.
First, Germany’s growth almost certainly represented a return for that country to a
market position similar to the one that it had held prior to the war era. Second, at the
time of Germany’s significant growth there were far fewer major exporters
competing for market share. For instance, in the 1950s the combined world export
share of the countries now known as the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries
(NICs) (Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) was virtually zero. In contrast,
since at least the onset of the industrial revolution and prior to the 1990s, China had
never held a significant share of world trade. And, China’s export growth came only
slightly after significant growth by the NICs and simultaneously with major growth
by several other countries that along with China make up the BRICs (Brazil, Russia,
and India), all of whom now also hold relatively large shares of the world market.
Like all major exporting countries, China has a market presence in virtually
every country in the world; this presence has grown in almost every market in recent
years. Using data from the United Nation’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database
we calculated aggregate exporter market shares in 92 countries and 1 territory
(Hong Kong), from all parts of the world.
5
Several interesting patterns emerge from
4
In a related study, Wood and Mayer (2011) look at how the entry of China into international markets
over the past three decades has impacted production of primary and labor-intensive products in a wide set
of developing countries. They find that although output and exports of labor-intensive goods continued to
rise following the emergence of China in the 1990s, the growth in these ratios was slower in the 1990s
than in the 1980s.
5
These countries were chosen due to the availability of the import data from UN Comtrade.
China’s fare share 567
123
this exercise. First, the global extent of China’s trade expanded significantly
between 1995 and 2010. By 2010, China had at least 3 % of the market in all of
these countries. Moreover, market share growth was pervasive; over the 1995–201
0
period China’s market share grew in all of these markets. In many cases, especially
in South America, Africa, and smaller European countries, shares were essentially
zero prior to 1995. Table 1 provides some additional summary statistics.
According to the table, geography is clearly important for China’s trade. At the
end of 2010, its highest regional market share was in Asia where among the sample
countries it had an average share of 18.9 %. Its highest market share among all the
Asian countries in the sample stood at 49.1 %.
6
Its next highest average regional
market share was in North America; this included 16.7 % of all U.S. merchandise
Table 1 China’s national export market share by region
Countries 2010 national market shares (%) Share changes 1995–20
10
a
Average SD Maximum Minimum Average SD Maximum Minimum
Africa 20 15.9 9.3 49.1 6.2 13.0 9.1 45.5 3.1
Asia and Pacific 13 18.9 10.7 49.1 4.2 11.8 3.4 15.9 3.8
Europe 31 9.4 6.5 36.0 3.1 8.0 6.0 33.4 2.4
Middle East 7 12.0 1.1 13.3 10.2 10.2 0.7 11.0 9.0
North America 3 16.4 5.2 21.9 11.6 13.1 2.6 15.0 9.5
South America 19 12.7 7.7 35.1 5.2 11.7 7.4 35.1 4.2
Total 93 13.2 8.4 49.1 3.1 10.7 6.9 35.1 2.4
a
Share changes are measured in percentage points
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
19
48
19
50
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
%
o
f
w
or
ld
e
xp
or
ts
CHINA
GERMANY
JAPAN
UK
US
Fig. 1 World market export shares 1948–2010
6
This was China’s share of Hong Kong’s market. Among the other Asian countries in this sample China
had more than 25% of Japan’s market in 2010 and more than 10% of the export markets of Thailand,
South Korea, Pakistan, and Singapore.
568 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
imports in 2010. On average, China’s smallest regional market penetration was in
Europe, where its average national market share in 2010 was 9.4 %. Since 2005,
China’s export shares have increased particularly in remote and low-income
countries. For example, the average of China’s export shares in African
countries
increased from 8.3 to 15.9 %. For the South American countries in our sample,
China’s average market share almost doubled, rising from 6.6 to 12.7 %.
As detailed more fully below, China’s export market share has grown in recent
years, and it has changed the mix of goods it supplies to world markets. By value,
virtually all of Chinese exports are manufactured goods. Early on, these exports
were concentrated in Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles (SITC Category 8),
including apparel and toys. While that category still accounts for a significant share
of Chinese exports, more recently Chinese trade growth has been concentrated in
Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC Category 7).
In order to better focus on this change in the commodity composition of trade, we
restrict our attention to exports of differentiated manufactured products disaggre-
gated at the 5-digit SITC level. In much of what follows we continue to analyze data
from a set of 94 countries.
7
Our sample includes countries from every continent and
includes countries at various standards of living; slightly more than one-third the
countries chosen in our sample are classified by the World Bank as high-income
countries. In 2010, the countries used in our analysis accounted for 76.8 % of total
world imports.
8
Trade among these countries accounted for a majority of all world
merchandise trade in each of the years in our sample.
The first panel of Table 2 provides detail on the composition of Chinese exports
in 1995 and 2010 across broad categories of goods to our sample of markets as well
as the countries identified as developing countries.
9
Also included in the table is
China’s portion of total world exports at the 1-digit level (SITC Rev.3) in 1995 and
2010. As the table shows, Chinese exports have been centered in manufactures for
some time. In 1995, 90 % of Chinese exports to our sample countries came from
industries classified in SITC sections 5–9. By 2010, that share had risen to almost
95 % of total exports. Traditionally, Chinese exports have been concentrated in
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles (SITC Category 8). This sector includes many
labor intensive manufactured products such as clothing, footwear, and toys, items
7
In addition to China, we use the following countries: (Africa) Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Niger, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia; (Asia and Pacific) Australia, Hong
Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand; (Europe) Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; (Middle East) Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey; (North America) Canada, Mexico, and the United States; (Central and
South America) Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and
Venezuela.
8
Our data set consists of bilateral trade of 93 countries. We calculate the total world imports from the
sum of total imports of all available countries in UN Comtrade.
9
Developing countries are those not classified as being a high-income country by the World Bank in its
2009 World Development Report.
China’s fare share 569
123
long identified as characteristic examples of Chinese exports. Twenty seven percent
of Chinese exports to our sample countries in 2010 came from this sector. However,
this share had stood at 47 % of total exports to these markets in 1995. Instead, in
recent years, the share of Chinese exports of more sophisticated manufactures has
risen substantially with exports in Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC
Category 7) more than doubling to 51 % of its exports to the sample markets.
The period 2005–2010 includes the onset of the Great Recession in the United
States and elsewhere and the consequent 2008–2009 collapse in world trade.
10
As
Table 2 Structure of world exports and imports
SITC Rev 3 Commodities I. Composition of
Chinese exports all
countries
II. China’s shares in
world (China’s/World
exports)
1995 2010 1995 2010
(a) Structure of Chinese exports
0 Food and live animals 4.5 2.0 3.4
5.0
1 Beverages and tobacco 0.4 0.1 2.4 1.9
2 Crude materials 2.4 0.8 2.8 2.3
3 Mineral fuels 2.4 1.0 2.3 1.3
4 Animal and vegetable oils 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.6
5 Chemicals and related products 3.9 4.7 2.2 5.8
6 Manufactured goods (materials) 15.3 12.6 5.5 15.0
7 Machinery and transport equipment 23.2 50.8 3.1 19.0
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 47.3 27.4 18.9 33.3
9 Other commodities 0.5 0.8 1.0 3.8
SITC Rev 3 Commodities III. The levels of total imports (2005 = 1)
Developing countries Developed countries
1995 2010 1995 2010
(b) Structure of world imports
0 Food and live animals 0.789 1.647 0.788 1.642
1 Beverages and tobacco 1.296 2.108 1.840 1.853
2 Crude materials 0.360 1.728 0.533 1.533
3 Mineral fuels 0.248 2.729 0.542 3.748
4 Animal and vegetable oils 0.495 1.345 0.935 1.692
5 Chemicals and related products 0.448 1.703 0.629 1.319
6 Manufactured goods (materials) 0.583 1.684 0.841 1.283
7 Machinery and transport equipment 0.561 1.558 0.867 0.934
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.391 1.622 0.843 1.022
9 Other commodities 2.841 1.471 0.536 1.394
We use import data of 94 countries for panels I and II
10
For detail on this period see Richard Baldwin, The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences, and
Prospects, VoxEU eBook, 2009, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297.
570 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297
has been documented by the Nabli (2010) developing countries have rebounded
much more strongly from the downturn, and these countries have accounted for
much of the growth in trade over the past several years. This pattern shows up well
in the second panel of Table 2 where we document the levels of imports for
developing and developed countries for each product group. We set the import
values of year 2005 as 1. For example, while the import values of Category 7
increased from 1 in 2005 to 1.558 in 2010 and those of Category 8 increased from 1
to 1.622 for developing markets, the corresponding values are 0.934 and 1.022 for
exports to developed
country markets.
China’s world market shares changes over this period followed the transforma-
tion described above. Between 1995 and 2010, its share of Industry 7 exports to the
world increased by a factor of six, while its Industry 8 market share increased by
slightly less than 15 pp. We are not the first to point out the recent growth in the
sophistication of Chinese exports. Rodrik (2006, p. 4) calculates that by 2002 China
had an export bundle ‘‘of a country with an income per capita level three times
higher than China’s’’. In a related study, Schott (2008) focuses on Chinese exports
to the United States. He finds that the composition of this export bundle
‘‘increasingly overlaps with that of the world’s most developed economies’’ (Schott
2008, p. 34).
The data in Tables 1 and 2 document the growth of Chinese exports and the
change in the sectoral composition of these goods over the period 1995–2010.
Clearly, the rapid growth of China in the world market has had market share
implications for other exporting nations. A number of papers have focused on
various aspects of the recent growth of Chinese exports on global competition.
One focus of attention has been on whether the growth has occurred due to an
expansion of the variety of goods exported (the extensive margin) or a growth in
trade of existing varieties (the intensive margin). Broda and Weinstein (2006) find
that over the last quarter of the twentieth century roughly 30 % of U.S. import
growth was at the extensive margin, with China the largest contributor. However,
using Chinese export data disaggregated at the HS-8 level, Amiti and Freund (201
0)
report that most of Chinese export growth to the world between 1997 and 2005 was
in existing varieties. Most recently, Manova and Zhang (2009) using firm level data
on Chinese trading firms find that a relatively few large firms are responsible for
substantial share of exports; these firms export to many markets, and many are
foreign owned.
A principal focus of our paper is on which other exporting countries are losing
foreign markets due to the rise of China. Other papers have also attempted to
address this question. Using a gravity model, Hanson and Robertson (2010) study
ten developing countries they identify as potential losers to Chinese competition.
However, they find Chinese export expansion over the 1995–2005 period has had
only a modest negative impact on the exports of these other countries. In an earlier
study, Ahearne et al. (2003) use VAR analysis to see if Chinese exports reduce the
exports of other Asian economies. They find instead a positive correlation between
exports from these two sources. These findings along with the industry classifica-
tions of Chinese exports suggest that major competing countries with China in
world export markets may be developed rather than developing countries. In the
China’s fare share 571
123
remainder of this paper, we try to identify which countries have lost share and to
provide a measure of the size of the losses. We also focus on the growth of Chinese
exports at broad industry levels and in individual export markets. We turn now to
describe the modeling strategy we employ to answer these questions.
3 Market shares methodology
Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis has long been used to study export
performance.
11
This modeling approach treats as a norm of behavior that a country’s
market share will remain constant over time. If instead it changes, that must be due
to changes in competitiveness or changes in demand from the world as a whole or in
individual markets. The analysis then proceeds to decompose export share changes
in order to identify these factors. In the 1950s and 1960s, CMS was a popular tool of
analysis. In a well-known paper, however, Richardson (1971) criticized its use,
arguing that the signs and magnitudes of the measured effects depend upon in part
on the methods used in their calculation.
Taking these criticisms into account, Fagerberg and Sollie (1987) (hereafter FS) have
proposed several refinements to traditional CMS analysis. These include improved
theoretical consistency via the use of Laspeyres weights throughout and an explicit
economic interpretation of all decomposed terms. They have also extended the
traditional model to include two additional terms which measure the adaptability of the
export sector of a country to changes in the commodity and national market
composition
of world exports.
12
We now turn to a brief derivation of their model.
First, consider the change in exporters’ shares in each importer’s market. We
define the value of imports of product i from country k to l is defined as m
i
kl
. The
market share of country k (an exporter) in product i in market l (an importer) is
akli ¼ m
kl
i =
X
k
mkli ð1Þ
Product i’s share of country l’s total imports is defined as
bli ¼
X
k
mkli =
X
i
X
k
mkli ð2Þ
Since the market share of country k is written as
Mkl ¼
X
i
akli b
l
i;
the change in country k’s share of market l between an initial year (time 0) and
year t is
DMkl ¼ Mklt � M
kl
0 :
11
See Leamer and Stern (1970) Chapter 7 for a derivation of the original model and the references
therein for examples of its use.
12
Irwin (1995) uses the FS approach to study changes in the export market share of Great Britain in the
early twentieth century.
572 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
This equation can be rewritten as the sum of three terms:
DMkl ¼ DMkla þ DM
kl
b þ DM
kl
ab ð3Þ
where
DMkla ¼
X
i
ðaklit � a
kl
i0Þb
l
i0 ð4Þ
DMklb ¼
X
i
akli0ðb
l
it � b
l
i0Þ ð5Þ
DMklab ¼
X
i
ðaklit � a
kl
i0Þðb
l
it � b
l
i0Þ ð6Þ
Equation (4) is the effect of changes in the market share, weighting the change in
exporter k’s share of product i exports by the initial share of the product in market l.
Equation (5) is the effect of changes in the product composition of importer l,
weighted by the initial share of the product from country k. The final term, Eq. (6),
is a residual term which can be written as
DMklab ¼ r
kl
ab
X
i
ðaklit � �a
kl
t � a
kl
i0 þ �a
kl
0 Þ
2
” #0:5 X
i
ðblit � b
l
i0Þ
2
” #0:5
ð7Þ
where rklab is the correlation coefficient between the changes in market shares and the
changes in product shares.
FS then extend the decomposition exercise from one market to the world market.
The country l’s share of world imports is defined as:
cl ¼
X
k
X
i
mkli =
X
k
X
l
X
i
mkli ð8Þ
In this case, we can write the market share of county k in world market as
Mk ¼
X
l
Mklcl:
The change in M
k
between time 0 and time t is
DMk ¼ DMkm þ DM
k
c þ DM
k
m
c
¼ DMka þ DM
k
b þ DM
k
ab þ DM
k
c þ DM
k
mc
where
DMka ¼
X
l
cl0
X
i
ðaklit � a
kl
i0Þb
l
i0
” #
ð9Þ
DMkb ¼
X
l
cl0
X
i
akli0ðb
l
it � b
l
i0Þ
” #
ð10Þ
DMkab ¼
X
l
cl0
X
i
ðaklit � a
kl
i0Þðb
l
it � b
l
i0Þ
” #
ð11Þ
China’s fare share 573
123
DMkc ¼
X
l
Mkl0 ðc
l
t � c
l
0Þ ð12Þ
DMkmc ¼
X
l
ðMklt � M
kl
0 Þðc
l
t � c
l
0Þ ð13Þ
Our analysis focuses on Eqs. (9)–(13); following FS, each can be interpreted as a
separate factor that influences export performance.
Equation (9) is the market share effect. This term captures the change in an
exporter’s share of each product in each country, holding constant the initial
commodity composition and the country distribution of world imports. Thus, it
captures the extent to which an exporter gains market share independent of changes
in the product and destination pattern of world imports. Equation (10) is the
commodity composition effect. The commodity composition effect measures the
influence of the changing share of products in world trade on an exporter’s overall
share. If, for instance, the structure of world imports changes towards more
manufactured goods and away from agricultural products, the exporters of
manufactured goods (agricultural goods) would see an increase (a decrease) in
their market shares.
Equation (11) is the commodity adaptation effect. The commodity adaptation
effect identifies whether the change in the structure of a country’s exports is
correlated with changes in the commodity composition of world imports. This
number is zero if the country changes its export structure at the same rate as all
countries exporting to the world market. Equation (12) is the market composition
effect. This effect measures the influence of changes in the country demand pattern
of world imports. Thus, it identifies the countries that increase their world market
share by selling their products heavily in expanding markets. Finally, Eq. (13) is the
market adaptation effect. This effect captures the correlation between a country’s
export destinations and world export destinations.
4 Empirical results from the CMS approach
4.1 Share changes from 1995 to 2010
For each country in our study, the change in market share of the world market is
decomposed into the five effects discussed above. The results from 1,832 products
for regional exports and a selected set of countries are given in Table 3.
13
The right-
most column in table provides the overall percentage change in the total sample
export market share for each of the regions and sample countries over the period
13
We concentrate on 1,832 5-digit exports of goods that Rauch (1999) and Hallak (2006) define as
differentiated products at the 3-digit level. To be consistent across 93 countries for years 1995, 2000,
2005, and 2010, we use the 5-digit level data, which is the highest disaggregation possible for our study.
Most of these products are from 1-digit SITC sectors of 5–8. Since there are gaps in 5-digit sub-products
673 and 676 (some types of iron and steel products), we exclude products from these two sectors. We
study the CMS decomposition for the country and region level separately. While we use 93 countries for
each of l and k for the country-level analysis, we use the country aggregates of 6 regions for each of l and
k for the regional analysis.
574 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
1995–2010.
14
The other five columns represent different effects, corresponding to
Eqs. (9)–(13), and add up to the total change.
The first thing to note about the table is that for most countries in the study, overall
export shares hardly changed over the sample period (see the last column). This
stability of trade shares is a stylized fact of trade patterns at the bilateral level first
pointed out and analyzed by Cassing and Husted (2004, 2009) in two related studies.
The principal exceptions to this pattern of export share stability over the sample period
are China (?12.87 pp.), Japan (-5.28 pp.) and the United States (-4.29 pp.), and four
European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom) combined
(-5.25 pp.). These results clearly imply that the growth in Chinese export market share
has come largely at the expense of exporters in developed countries, in particular Japan
and the United States, rather than exporters in developing countries. Since Canada also
lost market share, each of the G7 countries saw market shares drop over this period,
several by more than one percentage point. In fact, the G7 countries explain around 80
percent of all the share losses. We turn now to discuss what factors have contributed to
these changes in trade shares.
Table 3 Export market share change decomposition: selected countries (1995–2010)
Fagerberg and Sollie decomposition (1,832 SITC 5-digit products)
Market
share
Commodity
composition
Commodity
adaptation
Market
composition
Market
adaptation
Total change
in share
Africa 0.111 -0.059 0.033 0.011 0.011 0.108
Kenya 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.001
Asia and Pacific 5.353 -3.995 5.078 -0.068 0.350 6.719
China 11.594 -0.808 3.048 -1.131 0.163 12.867
India 0.676 0.038 0.114 -0.061 -0.012 0.755
Indonesia 0.266 -0.029 0.011 -0.039 -0.065 0.145
Japan -6.450 -1.359 1.767 0.369 0.396 -5.277
Malaysia -0.640 -0.396 0.520 -0.381 0.232 -0.665
South Korea -0.993 -1.051 1.775 0.130 0.661 0.523
Europe -6.499 2.293 1.258 -0.129 -0.260 -3.337
France -1.539 0.307 0.201 0.050 -0.037 -1.018
Germany -1.704 0.148 0.152 0.644 -0.178 -0.938
Italy -1.267 -0.281 -0.163 0.228 -0.131 -1.616
United Kingdom -2.011 0.864 -0.337 -0.130 -0.065 -1.680
North America -6.155 1.525 0.311 0.021 -0.123 -4.420
Canada -1.173 0.201 0.139 -0.169 0.025 -0.977
Mexico 0.732 0.055 0.283 -0.132 -0.091 0.847
United States -5.977 0.808 0.979 0.284 -0.383 -4.290
South America 0.231 0.063 -0.169 0.165 0.003 0.293
Brazil -0.021 0.020 0.028 0.031 0.025 0.083
Middle East 0.476 0.146 -0.003 0.000 0.018 0.637
For the regional-level analysis, we use the country aggregates of 6 regions for k and l
14
Values for the countries not listed in Table 3 tended to be very small. They are available on request.
China’s fare share 575
123
First, according to the decomposition reported in the table, the market share
effect appears to be responsible for most of the changes in export performance by
the countries in our sample. During the period from 1995 to 2010, the market share
effect was strongly positive for China (?11.59 pp.) and strongly negative for
Japan (-6.45 pp.) and the United States (-5.98 pp.). With few exceptions, the
commodity composition effect, the market composition effect, the commodity
adaptation effect, and the market adaptation effect play only small roles in
explaining the changes in world trade shares. In the case of China, while the
commodity adaptation effect (?3.05 pp.) contributes to the gain of Chinese
market share, the remaining effects do not play significant roles. The fact that the
market share effect played such an important role in China’s export share gain is
consistent with Amiti and Freund’s (2010) findings that China’s export growth
was largely at the
intensive margin.
15
Consistent with the findings of Hanson and Robertson (2010), developing
countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Mexico did not lose their market
shares in this period despite China’s export growth. Indeed, all saw their shares rise,
although by much smaller amounts than China’s increase. Again, as was the case
with China, Japan, and the United States, the market share effect appears to have
been the primary factor responsible for the change in total market share.
Why, in particular, are market share losses to China concentrated in Japan and
the United States? One answer may be outsourcing by exporters in these two
countries to firms in China. As noted, without identifying the countries involved,
Manova and Zhang (2009) report that ‘‘Chinese joint ventures and affiliates of
foreign multinationals were responsible for fully 75 %’’ of the increase in China’s
trade flows between 2003 and 2005 (Manova and Zhang 2009, p. 2). We have no
way to identify which countries host the parent companies of these firms although
there is considerable evidence that Japanese firms may be involved. Tomiura (2008)
reports that in recent years China has been the destination country for more than half
of all the outsourcing done by Japanese firms.
Evidence that FDI may be responsible for lost U.S. export share is much less
strong. Branstetter and Foley (2007) assert that U.S. FDI in China is only an
extremely small portion of total U.S. FDI activity. Moreover, they argue that more
than 90 % of the production of U.S. affiliates in China is sold in China rather than
exported to the United States or other markets. Thus, for the United States, FDI in
China is at most only responsible for a share decline in the Chinese market although
we have no way to examine outsourcing between unaffiliated firms. While FDI may
not be directly responsible for U.S. market share losses, it is likely that outsourcing
of assembly and production to non-related Chinese firms may play an important
role. In Sect. 5 we discuss this point further.
4.2 Share changes within sub-periods
Table 4a–c provide detail on market share changes for the three sub-periods of our
sample, 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010, respectively. As we saw in the
15
We explore this point in depth below.
576 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
Table 4 Export market share change decomposition: selected countries
Fagerberg and Sollie decomposition (1,832 SITC 5-digit products)
Market
share
Commodity
composition
Commodity
adaptation
Market
composition
Market
adaptation
Total change
in share
(a) 1995–2000
Asia and Pacific 1.333 -0.551 0.276 0.408 -0.404 1.062
China 3.192 -0.190 0.030 -0.115 0.017 2.935
Japan -1.972 -0.304 -0.093 0.049 -0.119 -2.440
Europe -2.176 -1.261 -0.012 -1.780 0.200 -5.030
France -0.404 -0.239 0.122 -0.228 0.065 -0.685
Germany -1.259 -0.684 -0.013 -0.330 0.109 -2.177
Italy -0.439 -0.621 -0.090 -0.264 0.090 -1.323
United Kingdom -0.278 0.348 -0.113 -0.165 0.053 -0.155
North America 0.490 1.930 -0.192 1.351 0.190 3.768
Canada -0.034 0.197 0.080 0.497 0.052 0.792
Mexico 0.603 0.051 0.065 0.319 0.116 1.154
USA -0.539 1.509 -0.077 1.089 -0.160 1.823
(b) 2000–2005
Asia and Pacific 5.049 -1.377 0.288 0.215 -0.036 4.139
China 6.446 -0.426 0.306 -0.493 -0.067 5.766
Japan -2.137 -0.171 0.024 0.473 -0.046 -1.857
Europe -0.397 1.669 -0.148 1.202 -0.072 2.254
France -0.353 0.267 -0.086 0.209 -0.045 -0.007
Germany 0.435 0.322 -0.152 0.571 -0.094 1.082
Italy -0.116 0.199 -0.216 0.276 -0.061 0.082
United Kingdom -0.804 0.057 -0.146 0.114 -0.089 -0.869
North America -5.365 -0.360 0.027 -1.310 0.124 -6.883
Canada -0.572 0.043 -0.130 -0.420 0.049 -1.030
Mexico -0.124 -0.006 0.045 -0.372 0.009 -0.447
USA -4.039 -0.403 0.040 -1.221 0.216 -5.406
(c) 2005–2010
Asia and Pacific 1.348 -2.688 2.776 -0.137 0.219 1.518
China 2.886 -0.569 2.202 -0.586 0.233 4.166
Japan -2.220 0.339 0.666 0.159 0.074 -0.981
Europe -3.604 2.020 1.065 0.089 -0.130 -0.560
France -0.798 0.338 0.120 0.078 -0.063 -0.325
Germany -0.979 0.589 0.420 0.194 -0.068 0.156
Italy -0.581 0.178 -0.052 0.078 0.003 -0.375
United Kingdom -0.864 0.371 -0.035 -0.097 -0.031 -0.655
North America -1.776 0.555 0.232 -0.271 -0.046 -1.306
Canada -0.699 -0.004 0.168 -0.274 0.069 -0.739
Mexico 0.300 -0.045 0.156 -0.224 -0.048 0.139
USA -2.156 0.337 1.001 0.226 -0.114 -0.706
China’s fare share 577
123
previous section, market share effects tend to account for most of the largest
components of the share changes. For instance, in the period of 1995–2000, three of
the four countries in the table that saw the biggest overall changes in market share
were China (2.9 pp.), Germany (-2.2 pp.) and Japan (-2.4 pp.). According to the
FS decomposition, the largest component of these changes owes to market share
effects: China (3.19 pp.), Japan (-1.97 pp.), and Germany (-1.26 pp.). The US
export share also rose during this period by 1.8 pp. owing largely to the commodity
composition effect. That is, the United States gained its market share because the
structure of world imports changed towards the goods that the United States had
concentrated.
During the period of 2000–2005, the Chinese overall market share increased by
5.8 pp. and the majority of Chinese share gains were accompanied by the almost
identical overall market share loss of the United States (-5.4 pp.). Again, market
share effects accounted for almost (or more than) the entirety of these changes.
Finally, over the period of the great trade collapse (2005–2010), China’s share had
increased by 4.17 pp. and the market share and commodity adaptation effects
account for most of the overall share changes. While developed countries’ demands
for manufacturing goods had slowed due to the financial crisis, developing
countries’ demands for foreign manufacturing goods were relatively strong. China
had increased its world market share by exporting intensively to emerging
developing countries.
5 Empirical results: products and markets
We now turn our attention to an extended analysis of changes in market shares
across various regions and industries. To document further the nature of
competition between Chinese exporters and exporters from other countries, we
focus on bilateral competition in each of the markets in our sample using first
data on the aggregate of trade in the 2,001 5-digit differentiated products used to
develop Table 3.
Consider Figures 2a through 2f. In these, we compare Chinese export share
changes from 1995 to 2010 (measured on the horizontal axis) versus the export
market share changes for six possible competitor countries (measured on the vertical
axis) in the 91 remaining import markets in our sample.
Figure 2a plots market share changes from 1995 to 2010 for China and the
United States in the 91 importer markets. According to the figure the United States
lost market share in all but eighteen countries (most of these are developing
countries such as Tanzania), while China gained share in all countries. Figure 2b
plots the market share changes for China and Japan. Similar to the United States,
Japan lost market share in most countries in our sample, particularly in those in the
Asian and Pacific regions.
Figure 2c and d provides the market share changes for Malaysia and Mexico, two
of the countries that Hanson and Robertson considered as potential competitors,
each vis-à-vis China. Perhaps surprisingly, but consistent with the Hanson–
Robertson conclusions, there are no clear market losses for Malaysia and Mexico
578 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
relative to China during the period. Consider, for instance, the case of Malaysia.
Most of the observations in the Fig. 2c lie in the positive quadrant, suggesting that
over this period exporters from the two countries may not compete strongly in at
-15.0
-1
3.0
-1
1.0
-9.0
-7.0
-5.0
-3.0
-1.0
1.0
3.0
5.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 7
0.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of
U
S
A
(
19
95
-2
01
0)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(a) Share changes between China and USA in 3rd markets
-20.0
-15.0
–
10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of
J
ap
an
(
19
95
-2
01
0)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(b) Share changes between China and Japan in 3rd markets
–
6.0
–
4.0
–
2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of
M
al
ay
si
a
(1
99
5-
20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(c) Share changes between China and Malaysia in 3rd markets
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of
M
ex
ic
o
(1
99
5-
20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(d) Share changes between China and Mexico in 3rd markets
-30.0
-25.0
-20.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of
G
er
m
an
y
(1
99
5-
20
10
)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(e) Share changes between China and Germany in 3rd markets
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
S
ha
re
c
ha
ng
e
of
I
nd
ia
(
19
95
-2
01
0)
Share change of China (1995-2010)
(f) Share changes between China and India in 3rd markets
Fig. 2 Competition between China and selected countries in third markets (1995–2010)
China’s fare share 579
123
least these third country markets.
16
The data also suggest that Mexico and China do
not compete strongly in third country markets. As Fig. 2d shows, there is essentially
no correlation between market share changes in the two countries. Indeed, Mexico’s
export shares in most markets hardly changed over the period, even as China’s
shares rose across the board.
Finally in Fig. 2e and f we diagram competition between China and two other
countries, Germany and India. Consider first Fig. 2e. As the plot shows and as was
the case with the United States and Japan, most of the observations are located in the
lower quadrant of the diagram, suggesting that Germany also experienced market
share losses in the face of Chinese competition. Figure 2f provides detail on the
relationship between China and India in third markets. As the figure shows, the
relationship between Indian and Chinese market share changes over the decade from
1995 to 2010 is very similar to that between Mexico and China. Again there is little
or no evidence of close competition between the exports of these countries in third
country markets.
We turn now to focus on the major industrial sectors involved in the export
market share changes detailed above. One factor that has clearly played a significant
role in the growth of Chinese exports is the fragmentation of production across a
number of countries. In a recent paper, Koopman et al. (2008) attempt to determine
how much of the value added in Chinese exports comes from China. Using input–
output analysis, they conclude that as of 2007, Chinese value added in its exports
stood at roughly 60 %, although for relatively sophisticated electronic goods
Chinese value added was closer to 30 %.
It is impossible for us to separate the 1,832 goods in our study into inputs and
outputs. However, we can use CMS analysis on a narrower industry level to see
what differences, if any, may be due to fragmentation. Again, using data from our
ninety four country sample, Table 5 provides further detail on market share changes
for China, Japan, and the United States by region and industry. In each of these
regions for both SITC 1-digit industries 7 (machinery and transport equipment) and
8 (miscellaneous manufactures), Chinese export shares rose significantly, with gains
exceeding 10 pp. in most markets. And, as the table shows, regardless of region and
product, Chinese market share gains came at the expense of other developed
countries. In many cases, the largest losses again were experienced by Japan and the
United States.
To explore further how market shares for various exporting countries changed
within export product segments, we again present results from CMS analysis. In part
(a) of Table 6 we look at how export shares of products included in the Machinery
and Transport Equipment (SITC Category 7) for a selection of our sample countries
have changed between 1995 and 2010. This industrial sector contains electrical
goods and other products whose production increasingly involves fragmented
processing across various countries. China’s share of world exports from this sector
increased more than 16 pp. over our sample period. Three quarters of this share
growth is accounted for by the market share effect; the commodity adaptation effect
accounts for virtually all of the rest of the growth. That is, as world demand for
16
This is also consistent with the results reported in Ahearne et al. (2003).
580 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
123
imports of these goods has grown, Chinese firms have played a major role in their
assembly and export. Consistent with the results reported in Table 3, as China’s
share exports of Category 7 products has grown, export shares of Japan and the
United States have both fallen, in this case 8.2 and 6.3 pp., respectively. And,
similar again to the results of Table 3, these share losses were dominated by the
market share effect. These results suggest that a significant portion of the market
share changes for these three countries occurs in industrial sectors where processing
trade is especially important.
Part (b) of Table 6 looks at export share changes in all other industrial sectors
that produce differentiated products (i.e., the all differentiated products except those
in SITC 1-digit sector 7). As the table shows, over our sample period Chinese
market share rose in these sectors as well, and again, much of the growth can be
attributed to the market share effect. However, unlike the results in Part (a),
Japanese and U.S. market share losses were much lower.
The fact that the market share effect plays such a predominant role with Chinese
export expansion is fully consistent with the Amiti and Freund (2010) finding that
Chinese exports have grown along the intensive rather than extensive margin. The
largest component of this expansion (and the largest simultaneous loss of export
market shares in Japan and the United States) occurred in industrial sectors that now
Table 5 Changes in export shares of China, Japan, and USA for reginal markets (1995–2010)
North
America
Euro Asia and
Pacific
Others Total
I. Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 3, industry 7)
China 18.436 11.565 20.573 16.285 16.416
Japan -12.726 -4.919 -9.185 -4.044 -8.120
USA -3.485 -5.375 -8.913 -10.388 -6.345
Developing (exclude China) 4.936 6.153 2.038 7.048 4.430
Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -7.161 -7.424 -4.513 -8.901 -6.381
II. Miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 3, industry 8)
China 20.508 14.746 0.795 26.350 13.325
Japan -5.356 -1.296 -0.492 -2.253 -2.107
USA -3.880 -2.044 -4.974 -11.252 -3.517
Developing (exclude China) -2.779 1.606 1.010 2.000 0.321
Developed (exclude Japan and USA) -8.493 -13.012 3.661 -14.845 -8.023
III. Other industries (SITC 3, industries 0–6, and 9)
China 9.272 4.392 7.022 11.962 6.886
Japan -4.474 -0.448 -0.700 -0.750 -1.210
USA -6.992 2.019 -2.511 -4.915 -0.726
Developing (exclude China) 0.697 2.510 1.839 4.096 2.801
Developed (exclude Japan and USA) 1.498 -8.473 -5.651 -10.393 -7.750
The countries in each region correspond to Table 1
China’s fare share 581
123
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582 S. Husted, S. Nishioka
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China’s fare share 583
123
involve considerable fragmentation in the production process. This suggests that
FDI and/or outsourcing provide an explanation for at least some of our results.
6 Conclusions
The growth of Chinese exports both in volume and in market share over the past two
decades is a singular event in the history of world trade. Using data from
1995–2010, we document this growth in a variety of ways. First, we show that the
expanded trade is pervasive. Virtually every country in the world has seen China
claim a larger share of its import market. Then, we use CMS analysis to try to
determine which country or countries have lost market share as China’s trade has
grown. We show that Chinese export share growth is best explained by the market
share effect. That is, Chinese exports have grown in large part as an expansion of
trade within product lines where Chinese firms had had early success. This finding is
consistent with other studies that attribute Chinese exports as growing at the
intensive margin.
Moreover, contrary to much discussion in the popular press, we find strong
evidence that other developing countries have not seen export shares fall as a result
of China’s gains. Rather, our results suggest that China’s share growth has come
largely at the expense of exporters based in Japan and the United States and
involved in processing trade.
Acknowledgments This research was begun when the first author was on sabbatical leave as a Research
Fellow at the Adam Smith Research Foundation at the University of Glasgow. He thanks them for their
superb hospitality. We also thank an anonymous referee for guidance and Jim Cassing, Asatoshi
Maeshiro, and Tom Rawski for helpful comments, and the Economics Department at WVU for financial
support. The usual proviso applies.
References
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Abstract
Introduction
An overview of Chinese export performance
Market shares methodology
Empirical results from the CMS approach
Share changes from 1995 to 2010
Share changes within sub-periods
Empirical results: products and markets
Conclusions
Acknowledgments
References
10 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WINTER 2014
China Under
Attack
On January 31, 2014, one of China’smany trust companies, the China CreditTrust, nearly went bankrupt and had tobe bailed out by unknown sources.Some say it was China’s LehmanBrothers moment. In late December2013, Foxconn, the Chinese assemblyfirm with 1.2 million Chinese workers,
announced its intention to build a production facility in the
United States. On December 5, 2013, China’s new aircraft car-
rier, the Liaoning, was sailing in the South China Sea when a
vessel from its carrier group came less than 1,400 feet from the
USS Cowpens, a Ticonderoga-class missile cruiser. The near-
collision was the result of an ever more apparent game of
“chicken” between the United States and China. The three seem-
ingly unrelated events may be individually important, but they
are symptomatic of changing dynamics affecting China’s inter-
action with the United States and the West more generally.
China’s competitiveness has been deeply eroded in recent
years. The old revenue and cash inflows China had enjoyed dis-
appeared when the financial crisis damaged consumption in the
industrialized world. Since then, Chinese workers have been
B Y K . P H I L I P P A M A L M G R E N
An economy amazingly
vulnerable to bad news.
Philippa Malmgren is the founder of DRPM Group. These ideas
are further explored in her upcoming book, Signals. She
previously served on the White House National Economic
Council in 2001 and 2002.
THE MAGAZINE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
220 I Street, N.E., Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202-861-0791 • Fax: 202-861-0790
www.international-economy.com
editor@international-economy.com
WINTER 2014 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 11
MALMGREN
hurt by both the deterioration of a powerful export engine
and the rapidly rising cost of living.
Chinese official data shows inflation is not too bad.
But the Chinese government wants to maintain the façade
that markets are functioning favorably and the GDP defla-
tor is small, ensuring high “real” growth rates. The actual
inflation rate faced by locals is far higher than the data
shows. Of course, some argue a gap exists in the United
States as well. The reality though, is that the prices of
energy and food have been high and rising rapidly in
recent years. Food and fuel account for 40 percent to 70
percent of a Chinese worker’s expenses. Consider the
price of beef, which, like most proteins, has kept hitting
all-time record highs in the last few years. Failure to pro-
vide the Chinese public with protein at a moderate price is
a recipe for serious social unrest. Oil may not seem expen-
sive in the West, but anything over $100 per barrel trans-
lates to fuel and other energy expenses high enough to
warrant moving production to the United States where
energy is increasingly cheap, leading to job losses in
China.
These pressures have generated demands for higher
pay. Wage demands for skilled Chinese workers are run-
ning at a 70 percent annual increase, according to people
who run real businesses in China. The government has
actively tried pushing up low-end wages by 30 percent per
year. Wage demands have escalated to the point that
wages in Mexico are already 20 percent cheaper than in
China. Meanwhile, China’s workers demand more, but in
weak job markets Western workers are prepared to work
much harder for much less, thus narrowing the wage dif-
ferential. This is one reason that many manufacturing
firms are leaving China for Mexico, the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and Eastern Europe. Cheaper
energy, better quality control, and shorter shipment times
are additional incentives for geographical shift at a time
when margins need to be protected.
In the West, a debate rages about whether there is a
manufacturing revival, but the facts are clear: not only is
Apple leaving China for the United States, but now
Foxconn, the Chinese assembler of Apple products, is
building its first production facility in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, citing cheap energy as a primary reason for
the move into a fracking area. Companies, American and
Chinese alike, that make simple, low-value-added items
such as Hula Hoops (Wham-O) and yarn (Keer Group) are
now migrating from China to the United States as well.
In other words, the old Chinese export-driven business
model is breaking down. This is not just a technical eco-
nomic problem. It is a political problem. After all, if the
Access to the shipping lanes in
and out of China has become an
increasingly high-priority issue.
That’s how 90 percent of critical
food and energy supplies arrive
in China and also how most
things leave China. Yet all China
sees is the ever-increasing
presence of the U.S. Navy
encircling them and rendering
sea access less certain.
Left, the USS Cowpens,
nicknamed “the Mighty Moo,”
departs San Diego for a
seven-month Western Pacific
deployment on
September 17, 2013.
U
.S
.
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China’s shadow banking system seems to
have grown by the size of the entire
U.S. financial system in last year alone.
Continued on page 68
68 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WINTER 2014
MALMGREN
leadership in China cannot make people rich before
they get old, then the public will ask questions like:
“Why is the wealth in this society being distributed
to someone else, not me?” The Chinese are well
aware that this dangerous question underpinned the
Arab Spring and now continues to fan the flames of
social unrest that has appeared from Brazil to South
Africa, and threatens China itself. Failure to provide
the already agitated public with food and energy at a
tolerable “right price” could evolve into an existen-
tial threat to the current political order.
Given all that, imagine how vulnerable China is
to any more bad news. Yet bad news keeps coming.
Bad news came on January 31, 2014, when an ICBC
trust called “Credit Equals Gold Number 1,” which
supposedly had some ¥$3 billion worth of assets,
came within hours of becoming China’s Lehman
Brothers. It received a last-minute bailout from a
still-unidentified backer.
The problems are by no means solved. Some 43
percent of all of China’s trust products come due in
2014 and 80 percent mature before 2016. Most are
collateralized by property or raw materials such as
iron ore or copper. It has been said that at least 40
percent of the iron ore and a similar amount of the
copper in storage within China’s ports serves as col-
lateral for these trusts. Obviously, the collateral is not
worth what it was during the boom, so cash calls are
in play. The next spot of trouble came on February 7,
2014, when “Songhua River #77 Shanxi Opulent
Blessing Project,” which was backed by iron ore,
failed to repay investors the nearly ¥300 million it
had raised from them. There will be more such prob-
lems given that China’s shadow banking system
seems to have grown by the size of the entire U.S.
financial system in last year alone. In the main, the
fast-growing, highly leveraged financial system has
been used to fund more and more building and infra-
structure projects with dubious cash flow-generating
ability.
With all this bad news, and given China’s inabil-
ity to provide sufficient food, energy, or raw materi-
als at tolerable prices to its public, it starts to become
apparent to Chinese leaders that there is a need to
shift blame abroad and do whatever is necessary to
protect the national interest. As Oscar Wilde said, “It
is not whether you win or lose but how you place the
blame.” It is worth dissecting the ways in which
blame is being allocated today in China.
The United States is a prime target. It is per-
ceived to have “caused” the crisis through misman-
agement of not only its own economy, but the world
economy. Now it is said that the United States
threatens the world by attempting to foment and
export inflation. Many in China argue that the rea-
son hard asset prices have exploded upward since
the crisis began is because of America’s quantitative
easing policy. Not only did free money in the West
work its way into emerging market asset prices from
property to stocks, but the prices of critical soft
commodities, namely food, have also been driven
upward by quantitative easing. The Fed can claim
that emerging markets should have raised their own
interest rates and allowed their currencies to appre-
ciate earlier to counter any fallout. But the Chinese
know that a stronger yuan and higher interest rates
cannot make more pork or more oil, and would have
shut down the already faltering export engine.
From a Chinese point of view, it is argued that
America always defaults on its debts through infla-
tion. That’s how America paid for the American
Revolution, the Civil War, and the war in Vietnam,
when the currencies of each era—the consols, the
continentals and greenbacks—became devalued or
worthless.
And, some Chinese are quick to note, such
inflation is not a victimless crime. They echo the
sentiment that the villain Goldfinger expressed to
the mythic hero James Bond when he said, “Mr.
Bond, they have a saying in Chicago: ‘Once is hap-
penstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it’s
China’s competitiveness has been
deeply eroded in recent years.
Wage demands for skilled Chinese
workers are running at
a 70 percent annual increase.
Continued from page 11
WINTER 2014 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 69
MALMGREN
enemy action.’” And enemy action it is. For China,
and many other emerging market governments, a
default by the United States and other industrialized
economies is not just an economic event. It is a
national security issue. The problem is not simply
that these investors are going to be paid back in
pieces of paper that are losing value. The Chinese
fear they may be losing money on their massive
holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds.
But these worries are just part of a growing con-
cern. A bigger worry is the price consequences when
large economies start inflating faster.
There is a reason, they believe, that the prices of
beef, pork, shrimp, and other core proteins have hit
record highs since quantitative easing began. There is
a reason the oil price has stubbornly remained above
$100 per barrel. There is a reason the stock markets
and property markets around the world have soared,
thus widening the gap between the rich and the poor.
The attempts by the largest economies in the world to
engage in record efforts to debase the currency are
seen by many Chinese as working. The value of
paper fiat money is declining and the value of hard
assets is rising. Central banks in the industrialized
world are succeeding in their efforts to create infla-
tion. Inflation is occurring. It is just occurring in the
weakest, poorest
part of a highly integrated world
economy: the emerging markets.
As the Chinese saying goes, “Wars are fought
with silver bullets.” The opening salvo in this new
war has been fired, in their view, by the export of
inflation from the United States and other industrial-
ized economies to emerging markets.
So access to food and energy at the right price
has now become a national security requirement. It is
not only about averting an Arab Spring. The political
leadership also need a new peg to hang their hat on.
If they cannot make the Chinese rich before they get
old, then they can be seen to be protecting vital
national interests in the face of growing efforts by the
most powerful nations to push economic pains on to
vulnerable economies such as China’s.
In this context of thinking about the future,
access to the shipping lanes in and out of China has
become an increasingly high-priority issue. After all,
that’s how 90 percent of critical food and energy sup-
plies arrive in China and also how most things leave
China. Yet all China sees is the ever-increasing pres-
ence of the U.S. Navy encircling them and rendering
sea access less certain. Let’s not forget that 10 per-
cent of the world’s fish supply comes from these
“near seas.” The massive new gas fields in the dis-
puted island territories also take on new value given
the rising economic and political pressures. Can it
really be any surprise to see China becoming much
more aggressive in asserting its rights to the “near
seas” given the picture a home? Nose-to-nose stand-
offs between the People’s Liberation Army and
America, or America’s allies in the region, such as
the Liaoning/Cowpens incident, are only just begin-
ning. China announced an Air Defense Identification
Zone in November 2013. The Chinese insist that all
aircraft and ships must comply with their procedures
for entering this space, which stretches to Taiwan and
Japan. America responded by sending in B-52
bombers within hours of the announcement without
any effort to demonstrate recognition much less com-
pliance. Japan has said it intends to nationalize some
280 of the 400 islands, most within the ADIZ, whose
ownership it disputes with China. Japanese Foreign
Minister Fumio Kishida intimated on February 14,
2014, that it will permit U.S. nuclear weapons within
Japanese territory if there is a “clear and present
Wage demands have escalated
to the point that wages in Mexico
are already 20 percent cheaper
than in China.
Inflation is occurring. It is just
occurring in the weakest, poorest
part of a highly integrated world
economy: the emerging markets.
70 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WINTER 2014
MALMGREN
threat.” The United States meanwhile persists with
the rhetorical “pivot strategy” while continuing to
build up weapons capabilities in the region. And
China pursues a defense strategy that aims to deny
any opponent the ability to utilize its own weapons.
This drives China’s efforts to deepen control over
space, satellites, cyberspace, and communications
hardware and software.
It is all too human, and especially easy for politi-
cians, to look for ways to divert attention from
domestic pressures to externally imposed disrup-
tions, especially when the cauldron of domestic pres-
sure is intensifying. After all, the more China bails
out domestic institutions and stimulates the domestic
economy, the more they risk stoking the very infla-
tion that would further foment social protest. China
has a finer line to tread than many other places. Too
much inflation and too little growth can also inflame
the public.
The Fed’s view, in theory, is right. China and
many other emerging markets should just let their
currencies appreciate to offset any inflationary
impulses. But the political reality is that you cannot
expect policymakers to hit the public when they are
already down. More likely, the Chinese will let their
currency fall in order to slow the deterioration of
their export engine.
China and other emerging markets no doubt
need to take responsibility for their own economic
situation. However, the industrialized world should
not be surprised if the policy response aims to avoid
inflicting more pain on their citizens. If anything, we
should expect China
to devalue, not revalue.
Yes, this
would be inflationary. But how can China compete
when so many emerging markets are devaluing and
when they believe the United States is heading down
that path ultimately as well? Looked at from another
angle, why would anyone expect the yuan to remain
strong in light of their loss of competitiveness, their
rising inflationary pressures, and the revelations that
the domestic financial system is filled with losses
rather than rich with savings?
Nor should anyone be surprised to see China
using other policy tools to protect its citizens from
the adverse impact of global economic forces. The
United States might want China to revalue but there
are other options for exploitation with state power.
Beefing up the military and intensifying the acquisi-
tion of valuable assets around the world is a viable
policy choice, too.
Remember that it is not only blame that needs
allocating when the world economy weakens. Pain
also needs to be distributed. China deeply disagrees
with America’s view that Chinese workers should just
tighten their belts and accept the pain. They have
already revalued by 40 percent against the U.S. dollar
since 2005. It is outrageous to most emerging markets
that the United States and the industrialized world
want China to take more pain given their own unwill-
ingness to pursue austerity. To the emerging markets,
it is deeply ironic that the U.S. authorities expect
China to raise interest rates and to revalue when U.S.
officials deny U.S. monetary policy has any spillover
effects, especially when many emerging markets
experienced historic capital outflows and devalua-
tions once U.S. monetary policy began to reverse.
Similarly, the Chinese cannot be blamed for
being suspicious that the United States and the West
might be choosing inflation as a means of defaulting
on debt, especially given that U.S. policymakers
seem committed to avoiding any risk of deflation—
which implies taking all the risk with inflation. And
they wonder, what if the inflation rate the industrial-
ized world needs to resolve its debt kills or severely
damages emerging markets along the way? China
cannot be blamed for fearing the normal conse-
quences of inflation: higher prices. Nor can they be
blamed for being paranoid. By one measure, China is
being defaulted upon, encircled, and threatened on
multiple levels. One cannot really be surprised that
China may respond to their rising duress using what-
ever means necessary. �
From a Chinese point of view, it is
argued that America always defaults
on its debts through inflation.
If anything, we should expect China
to devalue, not revalue.
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