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Ape and Human Cognition: What’s the
Difference?

Michael Tomasello and Esther Herrmann
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany

Abstract
Humans share the vast majority of their cognitive skills with other great apes. In addition, however, humans have also evolved a
unique suite of cognitive skills and motivations—collectively referred to as shared intentionality—for living collaboratively,
learning socially, and exchanging information in cultural groups.

Keywords
apes, culture, cognition, evolution, cooperation

Surely one of the deepest and most important questions in all of

the psychological sciences is how human cognition is similar to

and different from that of other primates. The main datum is this:

Humans seemingly engage in all kinds of cognitive activities that

their nearest primate relatives do not, but at the same time there is

great variability among different cultural groups. All groups have

complex technologies but of very different types; all groups use

linguistic and other symbols but in quite different ways; all

groups have complex social institutions but very different ones.

What this suggests is that human cognition is in some way bound

up with human culture. Here we argue that this is indeed the case,

and we then try to explain this fact evolutionarily.

Similarities in Ape and Human Cognition

The five great ape species (orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees,

bonobos, humans) share a common ancestor from about 15 mil-

lion years ago, with the last three sharing a common ancestor

from about 6 million years ago (see Fig. 1 for a picture of chim-

panzees). Since great apes are so closely related to one another

evolutionarily, it is natural that they share many perceptual,

behavioral, and cognitive skills.

Great ape cognitive worlds

Many different studies suggest that nonhuman great apes (here-

after great apes) understand the physical world in basically the

same way as humans. Like humans, apes live most basically in

a world of permanent objects (and categories and quantities of

objects) existing in a mentally represented space. Moreover,

they understand much about various kinds of events in the

world and how these events relate to one another causally (see

Tomasello & Call, 1997, for a review). Apes’ and other

primates’ cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world

almost certainly evolved in the context of foraging for food.

As compared with other mammals, primates may face special

challenges in locating their daily fare, since ripe fruits are pat-

chy resources that are irregularly distributed in space and time.

Other studies suggest that great apes understand their social

worlds in basically the same way as humans as well. Like

humans, apes live in a world of identifiable individuals with

whom they form various kinds of social relationships—for

example, in terms of dominance and ‘‘friendship’’—and they

recognize the third-party social relationships that other individ-

uals have with one another. Moreover, they go beneath this

understanding of social behavior and relationships to understand

the goals and perceptions of social partners acting as intentional

agents (see Call & Tomasello, 2008, for a review). Apes’ and

other primates’ cognitive skills for dealing with the social world

evolved mainly in the context of competition with groupmates

for valued resources, and primates, as compared with other

mammals, live in especially complex social groups (leading to

so-called Machiavellian intelligence; Byrne & Whiten, 1988).

Great ape cognitive operations

Great apes also operate on their cognitive worlds in ways very

similar to humans. Thus, apes not only perceive and understand

things in the immediate here and now but they also recall things

Corresponding Author:

Michael Tomasello, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology,

Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Deutscher

Platz 6, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany

E-mail: tomas@eva.mpg.de

Current Directions in Psychological
Science
19(1) 3-8
ª The Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0963721409359300
http://cdps.sagepub.com

they have perceived in the past and anticipate or imagine things

that might happen in the future. For example, in a recent study,

some great apes used a tool to retrieve food, and when the food

was gone they dropped the tool and left. Later, when they

returned, more food was there but the necessary tool was not.

After only a few repetitions of this procedure, the apes learned

to take the tool with them after using it, in anticipation of the

next trial when they would need it again (Mulcahy & Call,

2006).

Great apes also can make inferences about what one per-

ceived state or event implies about another. For example, in

another experiment, great apes were faced with two cups, and

they knew that only one of them contained food. They then

watched as a human shook one. Not only were they able to infer

which one had food when they heard it in there, they were also

able to infer which one had food (i.e., the other one) when the

shaken cup made no sound. This is a kind of reasoning by

exclusion (analogous to disjunctive syllogism in formal logic):

(a) the food is in one of the cups; (b) it is not in this one

(inferred from lack of sound—causal reasoning); (c) so then

it must be in the other one. The apes thus used their knowledge

and reasoning to imagine the food in the correct cup (Call,

2004).

Apes also can reason about the decision making of other

individuals. For instance, in a recent study, human-raised chim-

panzees observed a human successfully solving a problem in a

particular way. The chimpanzees then either followed that way

or not depending on whether their particular circumstances—

that is, the obstacles to solving the problem—were the same

or different as those that had faced the human demonstrator.

They seemingly reasoned about why the human had chosen the

behavioral means she had (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, &

Tomasello, 2007).

Differences in Ape and Human Cognition

Since humans have brains three times larger than other great

apes—and share so many basic cognitive skills with them—it

would be natural to assume that humans are just more cogni-

tively sophisticated than apes in a general way. But this is not

the case; the situation is much more interesting than that.

Fig. 1. Chimpanzees in a social group.

4 Tomasello, Herrmann

An overall comparison

In a recent study, Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, and

Tomasello (2007) gave an extensive battery of cognitive tasks to

large numbers of chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2-year-old

human children. The tasks assessed all kinds of cognitive skills

for dealing with both the physical and the social world. If what

differentiates humans from their nearest primate relatives is

simply a greater degree of general intelligence—better skills

of perceptual discrimination, larger working memories, more

inferencing skills, and so forth—then the children should have

differed from the apes uniformly across all the different kinds

of tasks. But that was not the case. The finding was that the chil-

dren were very similar to the apes in their cognitive skills for

dealing with space, quantities, and causality; 2-year-olds still

have their same basic great-ape skills for dealing with the phys-

ical world. But these same 2-year-old children—still preliterate,

prenumerical, and preschool—showed much more sophisticated

cognitive skills for dealing with the social world in terms of

intention-reading, social learning, and communication.

So early in ontogeny human infants show some quantitative

advantages over apes in social-cognitive skills that they do not

show in other cognitive domains. The proposal is that the chil-

dren’s special social-cognitive skills represent the dawning of a

special kind of cultural intelligence evolved for participating in

a cultural group. Participating in a cultural group will then

enhance all of children’s cognitive skills across the board,

including those for dealing with the physical world—as chil-

dren, for example, imitate others’ tool use, acquire a language

and all its conceptual categories, learn mathematical symbols

and operations via instruction, and so forth. Children’s special

skills of social cognition thus bootstrap their skills of physical

cognition by enabling them to collaborate with, communicate

with, and learn from others in the cultural group.

Evolutionarily, the key difference is that humans have

evolved not only social-cognitive skills geared toward competi-

tion, but also social-cognitive skills and motivations geared

toward complex forms of cooperation—what we call skills and

motivations for shared intentionality (Tomasello, Carpenter,

Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Most important are skills and moti-

vations for shared intentionality in children’s (a) collaboration

and communication and (b) cultural learning and transmission.

Collaboration and communication

Virtually all of humans’ highest cognitive achievements are not

the work of individuals acting alone but rather of individuals

collaborating in groups. Other great apes, especially chimpan-

zees, coordinate their actions with others in a number of com-

plex ways—for example, in capturing small animals and in

coalitions and alliances in intragroup conflicts (Muller &

Mitani, 2005). But humans collaborate and communicate with

one another in especially complex ways that go beyond simple

coordination, ending up with such things as complex social

institutions structured by joint goals, division of labor, and

communicative symbols.

The ability to collaborate and communicate with others in

sophisticated, species-unique ways is apparent even in prelin-

guistic human infants (see Fig. 2). In a recent comparative

study, human 1-year-olds and juvenile chimpanzees each

engaged in a collaborative task with a human adult. When the

adult stopped participating, the chimpanzees simply tried to

solve the task alone. The human children, in contrast, employed

various forms of communication to try to reengage the adult

into the task. The children seemed to understand that the two

of them had committed themselves to doing this together and

it simply would not do if the adult was shirking her duty. The

collaboration was structured by joint goals and joint commit-

ments to one another (Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006).

It is not difficult to see in these simple activities the roots of the

kind of collaborative commitments and activities that structure

human social institutions, from governments to religions.

And the way humans communicate is fundamentally coop-

erative as well. Humans do not just try to get others to do what

they want them to—which is what most animal communication

(and much human communication) is about—but they also

communicate simply to inform others of things helpfully and

to share emotions and attitudes with them freely. Human

infants communicate in this cooperative way even before they

acquire language, especially with the pointing gesture

(Tomasello, Carpenter, & Lizskowski, 2007). Human lan-

guages, as the pinnacles of human communication, rely on

these cooperative motives as well, but they are also constituted

by fundamentally cooperative communicative devices—

known as linguistic conventions (or symbols)—whose mean-

ings derive from a kind of cooperative agreement that we will

all use them in the same way (Tomasello, 2008).

Both collaborative activities with shared goals and coopera-

tive communication using shared symbols are structured by

joint attention. This means that as children work together with

others or communicate with them, they have a mutual aware-

ness that this is what they are doing: We are both committed

to this joint goal; or, we are both focused on this same object

together. This creates the possibility of culturally constituted

entities that exist because, and only because, everyone in the

group believes and acts as if they do—for example, such things

as marriage and money and presidents (Searle, 1995).

Cultural learning and transmission

All great apes, especially chimpanzees and orangutans, trans-

mit some behaviors and information across generations cultu-

rally (Whiten & van Schaik, 2007). But the human way of

living depends fundamentally and totally on cultural learning

and transmission. In particular, the human way of living

depends on processes of cultural evolution in which material

and symbolic artifacts and social practices accumulate modifi-

cations over time (ratchet up in complexity), such that they

have a ‘‘history’’ within the group upon which others can

always build (Tomasello, 1999).

Much empirical research on social learning and imitation

has shown that young children understand and reproduce, to

Ape and Human Cognition 5

a greater extent than other apes, not just the environmental

result of others’ actions but also the behavioral and cognitive

processes used to produce that result (Whiten, 2005). In addi-

tion, other important aspects of cultural learning in humans

derive from their special cooperative skills and motivations,

and these add to the power of the human cultural ratchet as

well. Specifically, adults teach children things intentionally—

whereas teaching is not an important dimension in the lives

of other great apes, if it exists at all—and teaching is a form

of altruistic cooperation (free donation of information). Human

children are especially attuned to adults teaching them things

(Gergely & Csibra, 2006), and they trust adult instruction

implicitly based on their cooperative motives. Indeed, when

adults teach them things, children trust this so much they

often jump to normative conclusions. Thus, they learn not just

that this is how the adult did it, but that this is how it is done—

this is how we in this group do it, how it ought to be done. For

example, in a recent study, 3-year-old children who witnessed a

puppet playing a game in a manner discrepant with the way

they had been taught objected strenuously: The puppet was not

doing it ‘‘right’’ (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008).

Such normative judgments derive, almost certainly, from iden-

tifying with the group in terms of how ‘‘we’’ do things.

And so to complement their special skills of collaborating

with others in the moment, human children also come into the

world ready to ‘‘collaborate,’’ as it were, with forebears in their

culture, by adopting their artifacts, symbols, skills, and prac-

tices via imitation and instructed learning. Their cooperative

identification with the group leads them to learn not just that

this is a useful way to do things to meet individual goals, but

it is the ‘‘right’’ way to do things, at least for members of this

group. This almost moral dimension makes human cultural

learning especially powerful in comparison to that of their clo-

sest primate relatives.

The Coevolution of Human Culture and
Cognition

As compared with their nearest great-ape relatives, humans

occupy an incredibly wide range of environmental niches

Fig. 2. Collaboration in young children.

6 Tomasello, Herrmann

covering almost the entire planet. To deal with everything

from the Arctic to the tropics, humans as a species have

evolved a highly flexible suite of cognitive skills. But these

are not individual cognitive skills that enable individuals to

survive alone in the tundra or rain forest, but rather they are

social-cognitive skills that enable them to develop, in concert

with others in their cultural groups, creative ways of coping

with whatever challenges may arise. Humans have not only

skills of individual intentional action and cognition but also

skills and motivations for sharing intentions and cognition

with others.

What most clearly distinguishes human cognition from

that of other primates, therefore, is their adaptations for

functioning in cultural groups. Groups of individuals co-

operate together to create artifacts and practices that accu-

mulate improvements (rachet up in complexity) over time,

thus creating ever-new cognitive niches (Tomasello, 1999).

Children must be equipped to participate in this process dur-

ing their development by means of species-unique cognitive

skills for collaboration, communication, and cultural learn-

ing. Humans are thus characterized to an inordinate degree

by what has been called niche construction and gene–culture

coevolution (Richerson & Boyd, 2005), as the species has

evolved cognitive skills and motivations enabling them to

function effectively in any one of many different self-built

cultural worlds.

Some important questions for future research include the

following:

� How precisely do children’s skills of collaboration and imi-
tative learning differ from those of other great apes?

� Do great apes teach? Is human teaching part and parcel of
their more cooperative way of communicating, or some-

thing different?

� What are the differences in motivation and emotion that
contribute to humans’ special cooperative tendencies and

skills?

� How do humans’ skills of cultural creation and cultural
learning differ across cultures—especially those that

emerge early in ontogeny?

Recommended Reading

Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). (See References). A concise review

of research on chimpanzee social cognition (theory of mind) over

the past 30 years.

Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernández-Lloreda, M., Hare, B., & Toma-

sello, M. (2007). (See References). Results of the administration

of a very large cognitive test battery to large numbers of chimpan-

zees, orangutans, and 2-year-old human children.

Richerson, P.J., & Boyd, R. (2005). (See References). A comprehen-

sive description of research and theory on the nature of human cul-

ture in evolutionary context.

Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005).

(See References). A theoretical framework for thinking about how

skills and motivations of shared intentionality manifest themselves

during human ontogeny.

Tomasello, M. (2008). (See References). A theoretical account of how

cooperative communication, including conventional languages,

emerged in human evolution.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to

the authorship and/or publication of this article.

References

Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2007).

Enculturated chimpanzees imitate rationally. Developmental Sci-

ence, 10, F31–38.

Byrne, R.W., & Whiten, A. (Eds.). (1988). Machiavellian Intelli-

gence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys,

Apes, and Humans. New York: Oxford University

Press.

Call, J. (2004). Inferences about the location of food in the great apes

(Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pyg-

maeus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 118, 232–241.

Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Do chimpanzees have a

theory of mind: 30 years later. Trends in Cognitive Science,

12, 187–192.

Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2006). Sylvia’s recipe: The role of imita-

tion and pedagogy in the transmission of cultural knowledge. In

N.J. Enfield, & S.C. Levinson (Eds.), Roots of human sociality:

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Mulcahy, N.J., & Call, J. (2006). Apes save tools for future use. Sci-

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Muller, M.N., & Mitani, J.C. (2005). Conflict and cooperation in wild

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8 Tomasello, Herrmann

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