only have 3 hours 

PHL273 – Environmental Ethics

Philosophy 273
T/R 1:00pm-2:30pm

BB COLLAB
All classes will be recorded (except

“discussion classes” – see below)

Jordan Thomson
Jackman Humanities Building 432

jordan.arthur.thomson@utoronto.ca
Office Hours: Tuesday, 2:30pm (In our BB

Collab room) or email me for an
appointment.

Course Description

When we think about morality, we usually think about obligations we have to other human
beings. But we have relationships to all kinds of other things, including non-human animals and
the planet we share with them. These relationships raise ethical questions of their own: Do non-
human animals have rights? Is the environment valuable in itself or only in virtue of its benefits
to humans? How should we resolve conflicts between our duties to human beings and those we
may have to the environment which sustains them? In this course, we will examine these issues.

Readings

There are no books to buy. I will distribute all readings electronically via Quercus.

Methodology and Expectations

This is a philosophy course. This means that our readings will feature people arguing for
positions on controversial questions. I do not expect you to have any experience reading or
writing philosophy, nor do I expect you to be familiar with the course material. However, I will
be asking you to write philosophical papers. That is, I will be asking you to do what the people
you are reading are doing, namely arguing for a position on a philosophically interesting and
controversial matter. We will spend some class time talking about how to do this well.

Some of our class meetings have been designated “Discussion Classes” (see the reading
schedule). These are classes I have set aside for discussion. There are no readings to do for these
classes and no new material will be covered. Instead, it is your chance to come and ask questions
about the material we have covered so far. I do this for a number of reasons. For one, it gives us a
bit of a break in what will be a very busy semester. For another, it allows you to ask questions
that did not occur to you during the class time. Note that in order to encourage those who feel
uncomfortable asking questions in recorded lectures, I will NOT be recording these discussion
classes.

Grading Breakdown

Assignment Type Total

Short Essay 1 (3-4 pages) Due February 14 25% or 35%

Short essay 2 (4-5 pages) Due March 28 25% or 35%

Final Exam (Take home) Due April 20 40%

Grading/Essay Notes

1. The essay on which you do best will count for 35% of your final grade, the other will

count for 25%
2. Your essays must be uploaded to Quercus.
3. Late papers from students who have not received an extension will be docked 0.25

percentage points for each day late.

Teaching Assistants

C Dalrymple-Fraser (they/them) – c.dalrymple.fraser@mail.utoronto.ca
Nate Oppel (he/him) – nate.oppel@mail.utoronto.ca
Chris Longley – chris.longley@mail.utoronto.ca

Email Policies

1. When possible, ask questions about course material in class or office hours. Something that

takes 4 or 5 minutes to explain in person can take more than half an hour to type in an email.
Speaking in person is also much more effective: misunderstandings can be cleared up easily
and follow-up questions can be dealt with immediately.

2. Always use your university email address for course business.
3. Place “PHL273” at the beginning of your email subject line. Your email is far less likely to get

lost in the shuffle if you do.

School Policies and Regulations

I am committed to honoring all school policies pertaining to the accommodation of students with
disabilities, regulations pertaining to sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination, and
observance of religious holidays. If observing any religious holidays will prevent you from
attending a class or meeting one of our deadlines, please let me know within the first two weeks
of our semester and arrangements will be made.

Academic Integrity

The school (and I) take academic integrity very seriously. Punishments can be very harsh for
any and all forms of academic misconduct, including, but not limited to, plagiarism. All students
are expected to understand which actions constitute violations of academic integrity and must
adhere to all school policies on the subject. As such, all sections of the school’s website on
academic integrity are required reading for this course. The relevant information can be found
here: http://academicintegrity.utoronto.ca

Some Important Dates – For More, Visit:
https://www.artsci.utoronto.ca/current/dates-deadlines/academic-dates

February 14: First essay due
March 15: Last day to cancel S courses
March 28: Final essay due.
April 20: Take Home Final Due

Academic Integrity

https://www.artsci.utoronto.ca/current/dates-deadlines/academic-dates

Writing Support for Students

The Philosophy Department offers an essay clinic for all undergraduates enrolled in a philosophy
course. Want to discuss a draft of your essay? This is the place to go. Unfortunately, your TA
simply does not have time to read drafts.
http://undergraduate.philosophy.utoronto.ca/philosophy-essay-clinic/

Language Support for Students
Whether you are an ESL student or simply want to improve your English language skills, check
out the English Language Learning resources available to all UofT students enrolled in the
Faculty of Arts and Science. Information is available at the following website:
http://www.artsci.utoronto.ca/current/advising/ell

Other Support for Students

UofT offers support services of many kinds, including support for mental health, housing crises,
sexual assault, and financial distress. If you need help, please ask for it. There are good people
ready and waiting to offer assistance. For more information, visit the following website:
http://studentlife.utoronto.ca/feeling-distressed

http://studentlife.utoronto.ca/feeling-distressed

http://www.artsci.utoronto.ca/current/advising/ell

http://undergraduate.philosophy.utoronto.ca/philosophy-essay-clinic/

Course Description
Readings
Methodology and Expectations
Grading Breakdown
Grading/Essay Notes
Teaching Assistants
Email Policies
School Policies and Regulations
Academic Integrity
• Some Important Dates – For More, Visit: https://www.artsci.utoronto.ca/current/dates-deadlines/academic-dates

Writing Support for Students
Other Support for Students

Paper Prompt #1 (Due February 14 at 11:59pm on Quercus)

In “The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights” Tom Regan argues for the complete
dissolution of commercial farming on the grounds that it violates the right of animals in the sense
of reducing them to the status of “mere things”. That is to say, it violates their right not to be
treated as though their value is exhausted by their usefulness to others.

In a paper of 3-4 pages (double-spaced), critically evaluate Regan’s argument.

Here are some suggestions for what you might do with this paper:

• Argue that Regan is correct that commercial animal farming is wrong, but that there is a
better argument for this conclusion than Regan’s own.

• Argue that Regan is wrong to think that commercial farming violates the rights of
animals.

• Defend Regan against a compelling criticism.

Some notes:

• I am not asking you to go out and read what others have to say about the topic of animal
rights. In fact, I discourage you from doing so. Not only would this take valuable time,
but you would run the risk of writing a report on what others have to say rather than a
philosophical paper. I want to see an original take on the issue at hand, not a summary of
what some other people think.

• I am not asking you to appeal to any other readings on our syllabus.
• Write as though your reader has no familiarity with the subject matter (e.g., Don’t assume

that your reader knows what Regan’s argument is) Your paper should be accessible to any
reasonably intelligent adult.

• All students must upload their essays to Quercus by 11:59pm.
• If you need an extension, contact me (not your TA).

Assignment Breakdown

A complete essay will contain all of the following (we’ll talk about this in class):

• A short introduction. This is your opportunity to introduce your reader to the topic and
your thesis. Briefly explain the topic you will engage and give your reader a sense of
how your paper is structured. What can he or she expect to encounter in what follows?

• An explicit thesis statement. This is the claim that you will be arguing for in the essay.
Be as clear and explicit as possible. (E.g. “In what follows, I will argue that
_____________”)

• An argument for your thesis statement.
• A well-motivated worry or criticism pertaining to your argument
• A reply to the worry/criticism

Formatting guidelines:

Please observe standard university formatting guidelines for the essay. Failure to do so may cost
you points.

• 12 point serif font (Times or Times New Roman)
• Double spaced
• 1 inch margins all around
• Your name at the top
• Page numbers
• Citations where necessary
• A bibliography
• A descriptive title (“Paper #1” is not a descriptive title). Feel free to have fun with it!

Assignment Submission

To submit your assignment, visit the Assignments section of our course’s Quercus site.

Academic Integrity

Ignorance of the rules governing academic integrity does not excuse violations of the university’s
policies. Visit http://academicintegrity.utoronto.ca for information.

TA Assignments

Your TA will send a class email announcing their office hours. Please refer to the table below to
determine who your TA is.

Student Surname Begins With TA

A – Hui C Dalrymple-Fraser – c.dalrymple.fraser@mail.utoronto.ca

Hur – Rit Chris Longley – chris.longley@mail.utoronto.ca

Riz – Zou Nate Oppel – nate.oppel@mail.utoronto.ca

Writing Support for Students

The Philosophy Department offers an essay clinic for all undergraduates enrolled in a philosophy
course. Want to discuss a draft of your essay? This is the place to go. Unfortunately, your TA
simply does not have time to read drafts. Go here for details: http://uoft.me/essayclinicatutsg

Language Support for Students
Whether you are an ESL student or simply want to improve your English language skills, check
out the English Language Learning resources available to all UofT students enrolled in the
Faculty of Arts and Science. Information is available at the following website:
http://www.artsci.utoronto.ca/current/advising/ell

Academic Integrity

http://uoft.me/essayclinicatutsg

http://www.artsci.utoronto.ca/current/advising/ell

Other Support for Students

UofT offers support services of many kinds, including support for mental health, housing crises,
sexual assault, and financial distress. If you need help, please ask for it. There are good people
ready and waiting to offer assistance. For more information, visit the following website:
http://studentlife.utoronto.ca/feeling-distressed

Administrative Notes

• It is your responsibility to ensure that your paper has been uploaded to Quercus. Once
you believe your file to be submitted, double check that it actually has been.

• It is also your responsibility to ensure that you have uploaded your final draft to
Quercus. Your TA will only read and grade the file that is there at the deadline. PLEASE
double-check that you have uploaded the file you intended to upload.

• Back your work up. Computers and hard drives die, but ensuring that this does not result
in lost work is trivially easy. Here is a list of syncing/backup software that freely provide
more than enough space to keep your academic work backed up and/or synced between
different computers:
◦ tresorit
◦ sync.com
◦ idrive
◦ mega.nz
◦ dropbox
◦ onedrive
◦ google drive

http://studentlife.utoronto.ca/feeling-distressed

Writing Support for Students
Other Support for Students

*

Food Ethics

PAUL POJMAN
Towson University

~., WADSWORTH
t1 CENGAGE Learning·

WADSWORTH
CENGAGE Learning·

Food Ethics

Paul Pojman

Publisher: Clark Baxter

Sr. Sponsoring Editor: Joann Kozyrev

Assistant Editor: Joshua Duncan

Editorial Assistant: Marri Straton

Media Editor: Kimberly Apfelbaum

Marketing Manager: Mark T. Haynes

Marketing Coordinator: Josh Hendrick

Marketing Communications Manager:

Laura Localio

Content Project Management: PreMediaGlobal

Senior Art Director: Jennifer Wahi

Print Buyer: Mary Beth Hennebury

Senior Rights Acquisitions Specialist, Images:

Jennifer Meyer Dare

Senior Rights Acquisition Specialist, Text:

Katie Huha

Production Service: PreMediaGlobal

Cover Designer: Michelle DiMercurio

Cover Image: © Eric lsselee/Ermin
Gutenberger/Getty Images

Compositor: PreMediaGlobal

Printed in the United States of America
3 4 5 6 7 14 13 1

2

© 2012 Wadsworth, Cengage Learning

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copyright herein

may be reproduced, transmitted, stored, or used in any form or by any means

graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including but not limited to photocopying,

recording, scanning, digitizing, taping, Web distribution, information

networks, or information storage and retrieval systems, except as permitted

under Section 107or108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without the

prior written permission of the publisher.

I
i

For product information and technology assistance, contact us at
Cengage Learning Customer & Sales Support, 1-800-354-9706

For permission to use material from this text or product,
submit all requests online at www.cengage.com/permissions.

Further permissions questions can be emailed to

permissionrequest@cengage.com.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2010940887

ISBN-13: 978-1-111-77230-7

ISBN-10: 1-111-77230-

4

Wadsworth

20 Channel Center Street

Boston, MA 02210

USA

Cengage Learning is a leading provider of customized learning solutions

with office locations around the globe, including Singapore, the United

Kingdom, Australia, Mexico, Brazil and Japan. Locate your local office at

international.cengage.com/region.

Cengage Learning products are represented in Canada by

Nelson Education, Ltd.

For your course and learning solutions, visit www.cengage.com.

Purchase any of our products at your local college store or at our preferred

online store www.cengagebrain.com.

Instructors: Please visit login.cengage.com and log in to access

instructor-specific resources.

*
To Louis and Theo Pojman: From Ancestors to Descendants

30 CH A PT ER 2 • ANIMAL RIGHTS

average, or nonnal, intelligence quotient for two
different races, say whites and blacks. Then substi-
tute the term “white” for every occurrence of
“men” and “black” for every occurrence of “dog”
in the passage quoted; and substitute “high I.Q.”
for “rationality” and when Benn talks of “imbe-
ciles” replace this term by “dumb whites”-that
is, whites who fall well below the nom1al white
I.Q. score. Finally, change “species” to “race.”
Now re-read the passage. It has become a defence
of a rigid, no-exceptions division between whites
and blacks, based on I.Q. scores, not withstanding an
admitted overlap between whites and blacks in this

respect. The revised passage is, of course, outra-
geous, and this is not only because we have made
fictitious assumptions in our substitutions. The
point is that in the original passage Benn was de-
fending a rigid division in the amount of consider-
ation due to members of different species, despite
admitted cases of overlap. If the original did not, at
first reading strike us as being as outrageous as the
revised version does, this is largely because although
we are not racists ourselves, most of us are specie-
sists. Like the other articles, Benn’s stands as a warn-
ing of the ease with which the best minds can fall
victim to a prevailing ideology.

NOTES

1. The Methods of Ethics (7th Ed.), p. 382.

2. For example, R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason
(Oxford, 1963); and J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Harvard, 1972). For a brief account of the essential
agreement on this issue between these and other
positions, see R. M. Hare, “Rules of War and
Moral Reasoning,” Philosophy and Public Affairs,
vol. 1, no. 2 (1972).

3. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
ch. XVII.

4. I owe the term “speciesism” to Richard Ryder.

5. In order to produce 1 lb. of protein in the form of
beef or veal, we must feed 21 lbs. of protein to the
animal. Other forms of livestock are slightly less
inefficient, but the average ratio in the U.S. is still
1 :8. It has been estimated that the amount of
protein lost to humans in this way is equivalent to
90% of the annual world protein deficit. For a brief
account, see Frances Moore Lappe, Diet for a Small
Planet (Friends of The Earth/Ballantine, New York,
1971), pp. 4-11.

6. Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (Stuart, London,
1964). For an account of farming conditions, see
my Animal Liberation (New York Review Com-
pany, 1975).

7. In R. Brandt (ed.), Social Justice (Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, 1962), p. 19.

8. Frankena, Op. cit., p. 23.

9. H. A. Bedau, “Egalitarianism and the Idea of
Equality” in Nomos IX: Equality, ed. J. R. Pennock
and J. W. Chapman (Atherton Press, New York,
1967).

10. G. Vlastos, ”Justice and Equality” in Brandt, Social
Justice, p. 48.

11. For example, Bernard Williams, “The Idea of
Equality,” in Philosophy, Politics and Society (second
series), ed. P. Laslett and W. Runciman (Blackwell,
Oxford, 1962), p. 118; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice,
pp. 509-10.

12. Nomos IX: Equality; the passages quoted are on
p. 62ff.

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. According to Singer, what is the relationship
between civil rights movements and the animal
rights movement?

2. What is speciesism? Why is it bad, according to
Singer? Do you agree?

3. Are all humans equal, according to Singer? In
what way are all sentient beings equal?

4. How does Singer apply the notion of equal
consideration of interests?

TOM REGAN• THE RADICAL EGALITARIAN CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 3

1

4

The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights
TOM REGAN

Professor of philosophy at North Carolina State University and a leading animal rights
advocate in the United States, Tom Regan is the author ef several articles and books on
moral philosophy, including The Case for Animal Rights (1983).

Regan disagrees with Singer’s utilitarian program for animal liberation, for he rejects
utilitarianism as lacking a notion of intrinsic worth. Regan’s position is that animals and
humans all have equal intrinsic value on which their right to life and concern are based.
Regan is revolutionary. He calls for not reform but the total abolition of the use ef animals
in science, the total dissolution ef the commercial animal agriculture system, and the total
elimination ef commercial and sport hunting and trapping. “The fundamental wrong is the
system that allows us to view animals as our resources . … Lab animals are not our tasters; we
are not their kings.”

I regard myself as an advocate of animal rights-as a
part of the animal rights movement. That move-
ment, as I conceive it, is committed to a number
of goals, including:

1. the total abolition of the use of animals in science

2. the total dissolution of commercial animal
agriculture

3. and the total elimination of commercial and
sport hunting and trapping.

There are, I know, people who profess to be-
lieve in animal rights who do not avow these goals.
Factory farming they say, is wrong-violates ani-
mals’ rights-but traditional animal agriculture is
all right. Toxicity tests of cosmetics on animals
violate their rights; but not important medical
research-cancer research, for example. The club-
bing of baby seals is abhorrent; but not the harvest-
ing of adult seals. I used to think I understood this

reasoning. Not any more. You don’t change unjust
institutions by tidying them up.

What’s wrong-what’s fundamentally wrong-:
with the way animals are treated isn’t the details ‘
that vary from case to case. It’s the whole system.
The forlornness of the veal calf is pathetic-heart
wrenching; the pulsing pain of the chimp with elec-
trodes planted deep in her brain is repulsive; the
slow, torturous death of the raccoon caught in the
leg hold trap, agonizing. But what is funda-:
mentally wrong isn’t the pain, isn’t the suffering,
isn’t the deprivation. These compound what’s wrong.
Sometimes–often-they make it much worse. But
they are not the fundamental wrong.

The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us
to view animals as our resources, here for us-to be
eaten, or surgically manipulated, or put in our cross
hairs for sport or money. Once we accept this view
of animals-as our resources-the rest is as predict-
able as it is regrettable. Why worry about their

From In Defense ef Animals, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985). Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers.

32 CHAPTER 2 •ANIMAL RIGHTS

loneliness, their pain, their death? Since animals ex-
ist for us, here to benefit us in one way or another,
what hanns them really doesn’t matter-or matters
only if it starts to bother us, makes us feel a trifle
uneasy when we eat our veal scampi, for example.
So, yes, let us get veal calves out of solitary confine-
ment, give them more space, a little straw, a few
companions. But let us keep our veal scampi.

But a little straw, more space, and a few com-
panions don’t eliminate-don’t even touch-the
fundamental wrong, the wrong that attaches to our
viewing and treating these animals as our resources.
A veal calf killed to be eaten after living in close
confinement is viewed and treated in this way: but
so, too, is another who is raised (as they say) “more
humanely.” To right the fundamental wrong of our
treatment of farm animals requires more than mak-
ing rearing methods “more human” -requires
something quite different-requires the total dissolu-
tion of commercial animal agriculture.

How we do this-whether we do this, or as in
the case of animals in science, whether and how we
abolish their use-these are to a large extent politi-
cal questions. People must change their beliefs be-
fore they change their habits. Enough people,
especially those elected to public office, must be-
lieve in change-must want it-before we will
have laws that protect the rights of animals. This
process of change is very complicated, very de-
manding, very exhausting, calling for the efforts of
many hands-in education, publicity, political or-
ganization and activity, down to the licking of en-
velopes and stamps. As a trained and practicing
philosopher the sort of contribution I can make is
limited, but I like to think, important. The cur-
rency of philosophy is ideas-their meaning and
rational foundation-not the nuts and bolts of the
legislative process say, or the ‘mechanics of commu-
nity organization. That’s what I have been explor-
ing over the past ten years or so in my essays and
talks and, more recently, in my book, The Case for
Animal Rights.

1
I believe the major conclusions I

reach in that book are true because they are sup-
ported by the weight of the best arguments. I believe
the idea of animal rights has reason, not just emo-
tion, on its side.

In the space I have at rn.y disposal here I can only
sketch, in the barest outlines, some of the main fea-
tures of the book. Its main themes-and we should
not be surprised by this-involve asking and answer-
ing deep foundational moral questions, questions
about what morality is, how it should be understood,
what is the best moral theory all considered. I hope I
can convey something of the shape I think this theory
is. The attempt to do this will be–to use a word
a friendly critic once used to describe my work-
cerebral. In fact I was told by this person that my
work is “too cerebral.” But this is misleading. My
feelings about how animals sometimes are treated
are just as deep and just as strong as those of my
more volatile compatriots. Philosophers do-to use
the jargon of the day-have a right side to their brains.
If it’s the left side we contribute or mainly should-
that’s because what talents we have reside there.

How to proceed? We begin by asking how the
moral status of animals has been understood by
thinkers who deny that animals have rights. Then
we test the mettle of their ideas by seeing how well
they stand up under the heat of fair criticism. If we
start our thinking in this way we soon find that
some people believe that we have no duties directly
to animals-that we owe nothing to them-that we
can do nothing that wrongs them. Rather, we can do
wrong acts that involve animals, and so we have
duties regarding them, though none to them.
Such views may be called indirect duty views. By
way of illustration:

Suppose your neighbor kicks your dog. Then
your neighbor has done something wrong. But
not to your dog. The wrong that has been done
is a wrong to you. After all, it is wrong to upset
people, and your neighbor’s kicking your dog up-
sets you. So you are the one who is wronged, not
your dog. Or again: by kicking your dog your
neighbor damages your property. And since it is
wrong to damage another person’s property, your
neighbor has done something wrong-to you, of
course, not to your dog. Your neighbor no more
wrongs your dog than your car would be wronged
if the windshield were smashed. Your neighbor’s
duties involving your dog are indirect duties to
you. More generally, all of our duties regarding

TOM REGAN• THE RADICAL EGALITARIAN CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 33

animals are indirect duties to one another-to
humanity.

How could someone try to justify such a view?
One could say that your dog doesn’t feel anything
and so isn’t hurt by your neighbor’s kick, doesn’t
care about the pain since none is felt, is as unaware
of anything as your windshield. Someone could say
this but no rational person will since, among other
considerations, such a view will commit one who
holds it to the position that no human being feels
pain either-that human beings also don’t care
about what happens to them. A second possibility
is that though both humans and your dog are hurt
when kicked, it is only human pain that matters.
But, again, no rational person can believe this.
Pain is pain wheresoever it occurs. If your neigh-
bor’s causing you pain is wrong because of the pain
that is caused, we cannot rationally ignore or dis-
miss the moral relevance of the pain your dog feels.

Philosophers who hold indirect duty views-
and many still do-have come to understand that
they must avoid the two defects just noted-avoid,
that is, both the view that animals don’t feel any-
thing as well as the idea that only human pain can
be morally relevant. Among such thinkers the sort
of view now favored is one or another form of
what is called contractarianism.

Here, very crudely, is the root idea: morality
consists of a set of rules that individuals voluntarily
agree to abide by-as we do when we sign a con-
tract (hence the name: contractarianism). Those
who understand and accept the terms of the con-
tract are covered directly-have rights created by,
and recognized and protected in, the contract. And
these contractors can also have protection spelled
out for others who, though they lack the ability
to understand morality and so cannot sign the con-
tract themselves, are loved or cherished by those
who can. Thus young children, for example, are
unable to sign and lack rights. But they are pro-
tected by the contract nonetheless because of the
sentimental interests of others, most notably their
parents. So we have, then, duties involving these
children, duties regarding them, but no duties to
them. Our duties in their case are indirect duties
to other human beings, usually their parents.

As for animals, since they cannot understand
the contract, they obviously cannot sign; and since
they cannot sign; they have no rights. Like children,
however, some animals are the objects of the
sentimental interest of others. You, for example,
love your dog . . . or cat. So these animals-those
enough people care about: companion animals,
whales, baby seals, the American bald eagle-these
animals, though they lack rights themselves, will be
protected because of the sentimental interests of ,
people. I have, then, according to contractarianism,
no duty directly to your dog or any other animal,
not even the duty not to cause them pain or suffer-
ing; my duty not to hurt them is a duty I have to
those people who care about what happens to
them. As for other animals, where no or little sen-
timental interest is present-farm animals, for ex-
ample, or laboratory rats-what duties we have
grow weaker and weaker, perhaps to the vanishing
point. The pain and death they endure, though
real, are not wrong if no one cares about them.

Contractarianism could be a hard view to re-
fute when it comes to the moral status of animals if
it was an adequate theoretical approach to the moral
status of human beings. It is not adequate in this
latter respect, however, which makes the question
of its adequacy in the former-regarding animals-
utterly moot. For consider: morality, according to
the (crude) contractarian position before us, consists
of rules people agree to abide by. What people?
Well, enough to make a difference-enough, that
is, so that collectively they have the power to en-
force the rules that are drawn up in the contract.
That is very well and good for the signatories-but
not so good for anyone who is not asked to sign.
And there is nothing in contractarianism of the sort
we are discussing that guarantees or requires that
everyone will have a chance to participate equita-
bly in framing the rules of morality. The result is
that this approach to ethics could sanction the most
blatant forms of . social, economic, moral, and
political injustice, ranging from a repressive caste
system to systematic racial or sexual discrimination.
Might, on this theory, does make right. Let those
who are the victims of injustice suffer as they
will. It matters not so long as no one else-no

34 CHAPTER 2 •ANIMAL RIGHTS

contractor, or too few of them-cares about it.
Such a theory takes one’s moral breath away …
as if, for example, there is nothing wrong with
apartheid in South Africa if too few white South
Africans are upset by it. A theory with so little to
recommend it at the level of the ethics of our
treatment of our fellow humans cannot have any-
thing more to recommend it when it comes to the
ethics of how we treat our fellow animals.

The version of contractarianism just examined
is, as I have noted, a crude variety, and in fairness to
those of a contractarian persuasion it must be noted
that much more refined, subtle, and ingenious va-
rieties are possible. For example, John Rawls, in his
A Theory ef Justice, sets forth a version of contractar-
ianism that forces the contractors to ignore the ac-
cidental features of being a human being-for
example, whether one is white or black, male or
female, a genius or of modest intellect. Only by
ignoring such features, Rawls believes, can we in-
sure that the principles of justice contractors would
agree upon are not based on bias or prejudice.
Despite the improvement a view such as Rawls’s
shows over the cruder forms of contractarianism,
it remains deficient: it systematically denies that
we have direct duties to those human beings who
do not have a sense of justice-young children, for
instance, and many mentally retarded humans. And
yet it seems reasonably certain that, were we to
torture a young child or a retarded elder, we would
be doing something that wrongs them, not some-
thing that is wrong if (and only if) other humans
with a sense of justice are upset. And since this is
true in the case of these humans, we cannot ratio-
nally deny the same in the case of animals.

Indirect duty views, then, including the best
among them, fail to command our rational assent.
Whatever ethical theory we rationally should ac-
cept, therefore, it must at least recognize that we
have some duties directly to animals, just as we
have some duties directly to each other. The next
two theories I’ll sketch attempt to meet this
requirement.

The first I call the cruelty-kindness view. Simply
stated, this view says that we have a direct duty to
be kind to animals and a direct duty not to be cruel

to them. Despite the familiar, reassuring ring of
these ideas, I do not believe this view offers an
adequate theory. To make this clearer, consider
kindness. A kind person acts from a certain kind
of motive-compassion or concern, for example.
And that is a virtue. But there is no guarantee
that a kind act is a right act. If I am a generous
racist, for example, I will be inclined to act kindly
toward members of my own race, favoring their
interests above others. My kindness would be real
and, so far as it goes, good. But I trust it is too
obvious to require comment that my kind acts
may not be above moral reproach-may, in fact,
be positively wrong because rooted in injustice.
So kindness, not withstanding its status as a virtue
to be encouraged, simply will not cancel the weight
of a theory of right action.

Cruelty fares no better. People or their acts are
cruel if they display either a lack of sympathy for or,
worse, the presence of enjoyment in, seeing another
suffer. Cruelty in all its guises is a bad thing-is a
tragic human failing. But just as a person’s being
motivated by kindness does not guarantee that they
do what is right, so the absence of cruelty does not
assure that they avoid doing what is wrong. Many
people who perform abortions, for example, are not
cruel, sadistic people. But that fact about their char-
acter and motivation does not settle the terribly dif-
ficult question about the morality of abortion. The
case is no different when we examine the ethics of
our treatment of animals. So, yes, let us be for kind-
ness and against cruelty. But let us not suppose that
being for the one and against the other answers ques-
tions about moral right and wrong.

Some people think the theory we are looking
for is utilitarianism. A utilitarian accepts two moral
principles. The first is a principle of equality: every-
one’s interests count, and similar interests must be counted
as having similar weight or importance. White or black,
male or female, American or Iranian, human or
animal: everyone’s pain or frustration matter and
matter equally with the like pain or frustration of
anyone else. The second principle a utilitarian ac-
cepts is the principle of utility: do that act that will
bring about the best balance ef satisfaction over frustration
for everyone affected by the outcome.

TOM REGAN• THE RADICAL EGALITARIAN CASE FOR ANIMAL Kll..:JH 1 ~

As a utilitarian, then, here is how I am to ap-
proach the task of deciding what I morally ought to
do: I must ask who will be affected ifl choose to do
one thing rather than another, how much each in-
dividual will be affected, and where the best results
are most likely to lie-which option, in other
words, is most likely to bring about the best results,
the best balance of satisfaction over frustration. That
option, whatever it may be, is the one I ought to
choose. That is where my moral duty lies.

The great appeal of utilitarianism rests with its
uncompromising egalitarianism: everyone’s interests

· count and count equally with the like interests of
everyone else. The kind of odious discrimination
some forms of contractarianism can justify-
discrimination based on race or sex, for example–
seems disallowed in principle by utilitarianism, as is
speciesism-systematic discrimination based on spe-
cies membership.

The sort of equality we find in utilitarianism,
however, is not the sort an advocate of animal or
human rights should have in mind. Utilitarianism
has no room for the equal moral rights of dijferent in-
dividuals because it has no room for their equal inherent
value or worth. What has value for the utilitarian is
the satisfaction of an individual’s interests, not the
individual whose interests they are. A ·universe in
which you satisfy your desire for water, food, and
warmth, is, other things being equal, better than a
universe in which these desires are frustrated. And
the same is true in the case of an animal with similar
desires. But neither you nor the animal have any
value in your own right. Only your feelings do.

Here is an analogy to help make the philosoph-
ical point clearer: a cup contains different liquids-
sometimes sweet, sometimes bitter, sometimes a
mix of the two. What has value are the liquids:
the sweeter the better, the bitter the worse. The
cup-the container-has no value. It’s what goes
into it, not what they go into, that has value. For
the utilitarian, you and I are like the cup; we have
no value as individuals and thus no equal value.
What has value is what goes into us, what we serve
as receptacles for; our feelings of satisfaction have
positive value, our feelings of frustration have neg-
ative value.

Serious problems arise for utilitarianism when
we remind ourselves that it enjoins us to bring
about the best consequences. What does this

1

mean? It doesn’t mean the best consequences for
me alone, or for my family or friends, or any other
person taken individually. No, what we must do is,
roughly, as follows: we must add up-somehow!-
the separate satisfactions and frustrations of
everyone likely to be affected by our choice, the
satisfactions in one column, the frustrations in the
other. We must total each column for each of
the opinions before us. That is what it means to
say the theory is aggregative. And then we must
choose that option which is most likely to bring
about the best balance of totaled satisfactions over
totaled frustrations. Whatever act would lead to
this outcome is the one we morally ought to per-
form-is where our moral duty lies. And that act
quite clearly might not be the same one that
would bring about the best results for me person-
ally, or my family or friends, or a lab animal. The
best aggregated consequences for everyone con-
cerned are not necessarily the best for each
individual.

That utilitarianism is an aggregative theory-
that different individuals’ satisfactions or frustrations
are added, or summed, or totaled-is the key ob-
jection to this theory. My Aunt Bea is old, inactive,
a cranky, sour person, though not physically ill. She
prefers to go on living. She is also rather rich. I
could make a fortune if I could get my hands on
her money, money she intends to give me in any
event, after she dies, but which she refuses to give
me now. In order to avoid a huge tax bite, I plan to
donate a handsome sum of my profits to a local
children’s hospital. Many, many children will ben-
efit from my generosity, and much joy will be
brought to their parents, relatives, and friends. If I
don’t get the money rather soon, all these ambitions
will come to naught. The once-in-a-lifetime-
opportunity to make a real killing will be gone.
Why, then, not really kill my Aunt Bea? Oh, of
course I might get caught. But I’m no fool and,
besides, her doctor can be counted on to cooperate
(he has an eye for -the same investment and I hap-
pen to know a good deal about his shady past). The

36 CHAPTER 2 •ANIMAL RIGHTS

deed can be done … professionally, shall we say.
There is very little chance of getting caught. And
as for my conscience being guilt ridden, I am a
resourceful sort of fellow and will take more than
sufficient comfort-as I lie on the beach at
Acapulco-in contemplating the joy and health I
have brought to so many others.

Suppose Aunt Bea is killed and the rest of the
story comes out as told. Would I have done any-
thing wrong? Anything immoral? One would have
thought that I had. But not according to utilitari-
anism. Since what I did brought about the best
balance of totaled satisfaction over frustration for
all those affected by the outcome, what I did was
not wrong. Indeed, in killing Aunt Bea the physi-
cian and I did what duty required.

This same kind of argument can be repeated in
all sorts of cases, illustrating time after time, how the
utilitarian’s position leads to results that impartial
people find morally callous. It is wrong to kill my
Aunt Bea in the name of bringing about the best
results for others. A good end does not justify an
evil means. Any adequate moral theory will have to
explain why this is so. Utilitarianism fails in this
respect and so cannot be the theory we seek.

What to do? Where to begin anew? The place
to begin, I think, is with the utilitarian’s view of the
value of the individual-or, rather, lack of value. In
its place suppose we consider that you and I, for
example, do have value as individuals-what we’ll
call inherent value. To say we have such value is to
say that we are something more than, something
different from, mere receptacles. Moreover, to in-
sure that we do not pave the way for such injustices
as slavery or sexual discrimination, we must believe
that all who have inherent value have it equally,
regardless of their sex, race, religion, birthplace,
and so on. Similarly to be discarded as irrelevant
are one’s talents or skills, intelligence and wealth,
personality or pathology, whether one is loved and
admired-or despised and loathed. The genius and
the retarded child, the prince and the pauper, the
brain surgeon and the fruit vendor, Mother Theresa
and the most unscrupulous used car salesman-all
have inherent value, all possess it equally, and all have
an equal right to be treated with respect, to be treated in
ways that do not reduce them to the status of

things, as if they exist as resources for others. My
value as an individual is independent of my useful-
ness to you. Yours is not dependent on your
usefulness to me. For either of us to treat the other
in ways that fail to show respect for the other’s
independent value is to act immorally-is to violate
the individual’s rights.

Some of the rational virtues of this view-what
I call the rights view-should be evident. Unlike
(crude) contractarianism, for example, the rights
view in principle denies the moral tolerability of
any and all forms of racial, sexual, or social discrim-
ination; and unlike utilitarianism, this view in prin-
ciple denies that we can justify good results by using
evil means that violate an individual’s rights-denies,
for example, that it could be moral to kill my Aunt
Bea to harvest beneficial consequences for others.
That would be to sanction the disrespectful treatment
of the individual in the name of the social good,
something the rights view will not-categorically
will not-ever allow.

The rights view-or so I believe-is rationally
the most satisfactory moral theory. It surpasses all
other theories in the degree to which it illuminates
and explains the foundation of our duties to one
another-the domain of human morality. On this
score, it has the best reasons, the best arguments, on
its side. Of course, if it were possible to show that
only human beings are included within its scope,
then a person like myself, who believes in animal
rights, would be obliged to look elsewhere than to
the rights view.

But attempts to limit its scope to humans only
can be shown to be rationally defective. Animals, it
is true, lack many of the abilities humans possess.
They can’t read, do higher mathematics, build a
bookcase, or make baba ghanoush. Neither can
many human beings, however, and yet we don’t
say-and shouldn’t say-that they (these humans)
therefore have less inherent value, less of a right to
be treated with respect, than do others. It is the
similarities between those human beings who
most clearly, most noncontroversially have such
value-the people reading this, for example-it is
our similarities, not our differences, that matter
most. And the really crucial, the basic similarity is
simply this; we are each ef us the experiencing subject ef a

TOM REGAN• THE RADICAL EGALITARIAN CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 37 ii

life, each of us a conscious creature having an individual
welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness
to others. We want and prefer things; believe and
feel things; recall and expect things. And all these
dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and
pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction
and frustration, our continued existence or our un-
timely death-all make a difference to the quality
of our life as lived, as experienced by us as indivi-
duals. As the same is true of those animals who
concern us (those who are eaten and trapped, for
example), they, too, must be viewed as the
experiencing subjects of a life with inherent value
of their own.

There are some who resist the idea that animals
have inherent value. “Only humans have such
value,” they profess. How might this narrow view
be defended? Shall we say that only humans have
the requisite intelligence, or autonomy, or reason?
But there are many, many humans who will fail to
meet these standards and yet who are reasonably
viewed as having value above and beyond their
usefulness to others. Shall we claim that only hu-
mans belong to the right species-the species Homo
sapiens? But this is blatant speciesism. Will it be said,
then, that all-and only-humans have immortal
souls? Then our opponents more than have their
work cut out for them. I am myself not ill-
disposed to there being immortal souls. Personally,
I profoundly hope I have one. But I would not
want to rest my position on a controversial, ethical
issue on the even more controversial question about
who or what has an immortal soul. That is to dig
one’s hole deeper, not climb out. Rationally, it is
better to resolve moral issues without making more
controversial assumptions than are needed. The
question of who has inherent value· is such a ques-
tion, one that is more rationally resolved without
the introduction of the idea of immortal souls than
by its use.

Well, perhaps some will say that animals .have
some inherent value, only less than we do. Once
again, however, attempts to defend this view can
be shown to lack rational justification. What could
be the basis of our having more inherent value than
animals? Will it be their lack of reason, or auton-
omy, or intellect? Only if we are willing to make

the same judgment in the case of humans who are
similarly deficient. But it is not true that such
humans-the retarded child, for example, or the
mentally deranged-have less inherent value than
you or I. Neither, then, can we rationally sustain
the view that animals like them in being the
experiencing subjects of a life have less inherent
value. All who have inherent value have it equally,
whether they be human animals or not.

Inherent value, then, belongs equally to those
who are the experiencing subjects of a life.
Whether it belongs to others-to rocks and rivers,
trees and glaciers, for example-we do not know. , l
And may never know. But neither do we need to
know, if we are to make the case for animal rights.
We do not need to know how many people, for
example, are eligible to vote in the next presidential
election before we can know whether I am. Simi-
larly, we do not need to know how many individuals
have inherent value before we can know that some
do. When it comes to the case for animal rights,
then what we need to know is whether the animals
who, in our culture are routinely eaten, hunted,
and used in our laboratories, for example, are like
us in being subjects of a life. And we do know this.
We do know that many-literally, billions and
billions-of these animals are subjects of a life in
the sense explained and so have inherent value if
we do. And since, in order to have the best theory
of our duties to one another, we must recognize our
equal inherent value, as individuals, reason-not sen-.
timent, not emotion-reason compels us to recognize
the equal inherent value ef these animals. And, with
this, their equal right to be treated with respect.

That, very roughly, is the shape and feel of the
case for animal rights. Most of the details of the
supporting argument are missing. They are to be
found in the book I alluded to earlier. Here, the
details go begging and I must in closing, limit my-
self to four final points.

The first is how the theory that underlies the case
for animal rights shows that the animal rights move-
ment is a part of, not antagonistic to, the human rights
movement. The theory that rationally grounds the .
rights of animals also grounds the rights of humans.
Thus are those involved in the animal rights move-
ment partners in the struggle to secure respect for

human rights-the rights of women, for example, or
minorities and workers. The animal rights movement
is cut from the same moral cloth as these.

Second, having set out the broad outlines of the
rights view, I can now say why its implications for
farming and science, for example, are both clear and
uncompromising. In the case of using animals in sci-
ence, the rights view is categorically abolitionist. Lab
animals are not our tasters; we are not their kings. Because
these animals are treated-routinely, systematically-
as if their value is reducible to their usefulness to
others, they are routinely systematically treated
with a lack of respect, and thus their rights routinely,
systematically violated. This is just as true when they
are used in trivial, duplicative, unnecessary or unwise
research as it is when they are used in studies that
hold out real promise of ~uman benefits. We can’t
justify harming or killing a human being (my Aunt
Bea, for example) just for these sorts of reasons.
Neither can we do so even in the case of so lowly
a creature as a laboratory rat. It is not just refinement
or reduction that are called for, not just larger,
cleaner cages, not just more generous use of anes-
thetic or the elimination of multiple surgery, not
just tidying up the system. It is replacement-
completely. The best we can do when it comes to
using animals in science is-not to use them. That is
where our duty lies, according to the rights view.

As for commercial animal agriculture, the rights
view takes a similar abolitionist position. The fun-
damental moral wrong here is not that animals are
kept in stressful close confinement, or in isolation,
or that they have their pain and suffering, their
needs and preferences ignored or discounted. All
these are wrong, of course, but they are not the
fundamental wrong. They are symptoms and effects
of the deeper, systematic wrong that allows these
animals to be viewed and treated as lacking inde-
pendent value, as resources , for us-as, indeed, a
renewable resource. Giving farm animals more space,
more natural environments, more companions does
not right the fundamental wrong, any more than
giving lab animals more anesthesia or bigger, cleaner
cages would right the fundamental wrong in their
case. Nothing less than the total dissolution of com-
mercial animal agriculture will do this, just as, for

similar reasons I won’t develop at length here, mo-
rality requires nothing less than the total elimination
of commercial and sport hunting and trapping. The
rights view’s implications, then, as I have said, are
clear-and are uncompromising.

My last two points are about philosophy-my
profession. It is most obviously, no substitute for
political action. The words I have written here
and in other places by themselves don’t change a
thing. It is what we do with the thoughts the words
express-our acts, our deeds-that change things.
All that philosophy can do, and all I have at-
tempted, is to offer a vision of what our deeds could
aim at. And the why. But not the how.

Finally, I am reminded of my thoughtful critic, the
one I mentioned earlier, who chastised me for being
“too cerebral.” Well, cerebral I have been: indirect
duty views, utilitarianism, contractarianism-hardly
the stuff deep passions are made 0£ I am also re-
minded, however, of the image another friend once
set before me–the image of the ballerina as expres-
sive of disciplined passion. Long hours of sweat and
toil, of loneliness and practice, of doubt and fatigue;
that is the discipline of her craft. But the passion is
there, too: the fierce drive to excel, to speak through
her body, to do it right, to pierce our minds. That is
the image of philosophy I would leave with you; not
“too cerebral,” but disciplined passion. Of the disci-
pline, enough has been seen. As for the passion:

There are times, and these are not infrequent,
when tears come to my eyes when I see, or read, or
hear of the wretched plight of animals in the hands
of humans. Their pain, their suffering, their loneli-
ness, their innocence, their death. Anger. Rage.
Pity. Sorrow. Disgust. The whole creation groans
under the weight of the evil we humans visit upon
these mute, powerless creatures. It is our heart, not
just our head, that calls for an end, that demands of
us thq.t we overcome, for them, the habits and
forces behind their systematic oppression. All great
movements, it is written, go through three stages:
ridicule, discussion, adoption. It is the realization of
this third stage-adoption-that demands both our
passion and our discipline, our heart and our head.
The fate of animals is in our hands. God grant we are
equal to the task.

NOTE

1. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983).

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. How is Regan’s position on animal rights dif-
ferent from Singer’s? Explain.

2. What are Regan’s reasons for granting animals
equal moral rights?

5

3. Does Regan allow for experimentation on
animals? If we have to test a dangerous AIDS
vaccine, on whom should we test it?

A Critique of Regan’s Animal Rights Theory
MARY ANNE WARREN

The author of many articles in moral philosophy, Mary Anne Warren teaches philosophy at
San Francisco State University.

Warren reconstructs Regan’s argument for animal rights and criticizes it for depending
on the obscure notion of inherent value. She then argues that all rational human beings
are equally part of the moral community since we can reason with each other about our
behavior, whereas we cannot so reason with an animal. She puts forth a “weak animal
rights theory,” which asserts that we ought not to be cruel to animals or kill them without

good reason.

Tom Regan has produced what is perhaps the de-
finitive defense of the view that the basic moral
rights of at least some non-human animals are in
no way inferior to our own. In The Case for Animal
Rights, he argues that all normal mammals over a
year of age have the same basic moral rights.

1
Non-

human mammals have essentially the same right not

to be harmed or killed as we do. I shall call this “the
strong animal rights position,” although it is weaker
than the claims made by some animal liberationists
in that it ascribes rights to only some sentient
animals.

2

I will argue that Regan’s case for the strong
animal rights position is unpersuasive and that this

Reprinted from Between the Species, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall 1987) by pennission of Mary Anne Warren.