2. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, what mechanisms within the United Nations help enforce human rights? Are they effective?
The United Nations is known as the central global authority for developing standards on issues and laws all across the world. They are known for being able to develop international norms and find legitimate ways to be able to enforce those standards in countries. In order for all of these standards, norms, and laws to be enforced, there are many different mechanisms within the United States placed there to make sure that everything runs smoothly and that the standards are reached. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the mechanisms within the United Nation include the UNSC Action, UN Human Rights Council, committees of elected experts, various rapporteurs, special representatives and working groups. Together, all of these mechanisms work together to attempt to enforce human rights. What all of these have in common is that they all have the same goals of raising political will as well as public awareness, they also seek to evaluate the ways that states assess issues dealing with human rights, and offer technological advice to states on how to improve how they deal with human rights. In addition to these mechanisms, there are also war crime tribunals such as the International Criminal Court, tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and hybrid courts in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. The war crime tribunals also aid the United Nations in making sure that human rights are being enforced in all of these nations, and if there is a legal issue between two nations on whether the standards are being kept or not, one nation may bring legal action against another.
References:
“The Global Human Rights Regime.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/report/global-human-rights-regime.
———-
—
In what way do INGOs and NGOs (Global Civil Society) participate within the International Human Rights Regime? Are they effective and what are some of the challenges they face?
INGOs and NGOs have become a prominent part of global society. Starting from the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, several countries have now joined various organizations to promote human rights. HRINGOs are motivated by their principles and are powered by their committed constituencies. Hence why they are not afraid to document and publicize human rights violations across the world. This is very important because human rights research documents a world-level process in which oppressed citizens use international channels to publicize human rights violations and pressure their governments and multinational corporations. According to Tsutsui and Min, “At the international level, political opportunities open up for local populations when their governments join intergovernmental human rights organizations via international human rights treaties. By ratifying these treaties, governments expressed their willingness to be judged by a series of benchmarks and to be held ac-countable for failing to live up to their promises. Commitment to these organizations renders the governments more vulnerable to criticism from abroad about their domestic human rights practices, thus providing local populations with in-ternational level opportunities to pressure their governments.” This demonstrates that in order for these countries to be a part of these organizations, they are expected to fit a certain human rights profile. Some of the challenges they face are state sovereignty, global human rights poses a threat to governmental actors because they tend to constrain state behavior in domestic political affairs. A lot of the time, stronger governments such as the United States who fund these organizations don’t want to comply with the rules. Also, there are some governments who choose not to join or sign treaties enabling them not to be punished. Unlike non governmental organizations, governmental agencies tend to be more averse to commit to human rights causes because they are concerned about undermining state sovereignty, which global human rights almost inevitably do. However, because of their flexibility and lack of concern for state sovereignty, NGOs have been able to aggressively push the international human rights government forward. “Global civil society plays a key role in this evolutionary process, as it sustains political life outside governmental networks and enhances progressive movements that governments tend to abhor. With increasing participation of activists in developing countries as well as those in developed countries in global civil society, the potential for more global progressives social movement is growing, as is the potential for real social change in important issue areas such as global inequality and environmentalism”( Tsutsui and Min).
———-
3. According to the CFR, what is one of the greatest challenges of utilizing these mechanisms?
The international human rights system has made many welcome strides, including stronger response in the Muslim world and a lesser degree of commitment to deterrence and responsibility of massacres and major powers. The key processes include UNSC action, the UN Human Rights Council, elected advisory groups, numerous rapporteurs and special delegates as well as working parties. War crimes trials also contribute to standards growth and compliance. All of them aim to increase political will and public opinion, evaluate state and warring parties’ human rights-related actions, and provide states professional guidance on human rights progress. However, these mechanisms are far from consistent. Generally, when they are effective, they change states’ conduct by publicizing abuses rather than by providing technical advice or applying punitive measures. Capacity building—especially for human rights—is often expensive and daunting, viewed with suspicion, and the success of assistance is notoriously hard to measure. In many cases, national governments have signed international commitments to promote and protect human rights, and earnestly wish to implement them, but are incapable of doing so. Myriad treaties, agreements, and statements have enshrined human rights on the international community’s agenda, and some regional organizations have followed suit.
These agreements lack binding clauses to ensure that action matches rhetoric, however, and many important violators have not signed on. Meanwhile, organizations in the Middle East and Asia, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, focus primarily on economic cooperation and have historically made scant progress on human rights. Corruption continues to hamper implementation throughout Latin America and Africa, and a dearth of leadership in African nations has slowed institutionalization. =In addition, states often attach qualifiers to their signatures that dilute their commitments. On the other hand, states are under are no binding obligation to observe or implement rights resolutions unless passed—without a veto—through the UN Security Council or one of the few regional bodies with binding authority over member states. Capacity building—especially for human rights—is often expensive and daunting, viewed with suspicion, and the success of assistance is notoriously hard to measure. In many cases, national governments have signed international commitments to promote and protect human rights, and earnestly wish to implement them, but are incapable of doing so.
Sources:
“The Global Human Rights Regime.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/report/global-human-rights-regime.
Global Civil Society and the International Human Rights Movement: Citizen Participation in
Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations
Author(s): Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Christine Min Wotipka
Source: Social Forces, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Dec., 2004), pp. 587-620
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598341
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Global Civil Society and the International Human
Rights Movement: Citizen Participation
in Human Rights International Nongovernmental
Organi7ations*
KIYOTERU TSUTSUI, State University of New York, Stony Brook
CHRISTINE MIN WOTIPKA, Stanford Universit
y
Abstract
We examine patterns of citizen participation in the global human rights movement
through memberships in human rights international nongovernmental organizations
(HRINGOs). After showing enormous growth in the number ofHRINGOs in recent
decades, we investigate country level characteristics leading to greater participation
in the international human rights movement. Drawing on the social movement
literature and world society theory, we employ multivariate regression analyses to
explain HRINGO memberships in 1978, 1988 and 1998. To understand changes over
time, we also use panel analyses for 1978-88 and 1988-98. The strongest predictors
of memberships in HRINGOs are found to be embeddedness in global civil society
and internationalflows of human resources. The effects of these internationalfactors
grew stronger over time while domesticfactors became less important.
Nongovernmental factors have been the engine of global expansion of human rights
in the post World War II era (Lauren 1998; Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Wiseberg
1992). Among them are international nongovernmental groups such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, which have played key roles in the
formative years of global human rights by promoting international human rights
instruments and publicizing gross human rights violations.’ The contributions of
* The authors contributed equally to this research. We wish to thank John W Meyer, Francisco
O. Ramirez, David John Frank and Jackie Smith for especially helpful advice, as well as the
members of the Stanford Comparative Workshop for suggestions related to this project. We also
thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. We gratefully
acknowledgefinancial supportfrom the National Science Foundation (NSF/SES-0214168. 2002),
and the Bechtel Initiative on Global Growth and Change and the Center on Democracy,
Development and the Rule of Law of the Stanford Institutefor International Studies (Francisco
O. Ramirez and John W Meyer, principal investigators). Direct all correspondence to Kiyoteru
Tsutsui, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY
11794-4356. E-mail: ktsutsui@notes.cc.sunysb.edu.
? The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, December 2004, 83(2):587-62
0
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human rights international nongovernmental organizations (HRINGOs) have
become even more critical in the contemporary international human rights regime;
their unsparing reports of local human rights practice all over the world have been
essential in proceedings of United Nations (U.N.) human rights instruments such
as the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee. Many
HRINGOs have gained official consultative status in the U.N., and have been actively
promoting their visions of human rights standards into the new century.
Correspondingly, the existing literature has paid much attention to the activities
of such organizations in the international political arena (Lauren 1998; Smith,
Pagnucco & Lopez 1998; Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Wiseberg 1992). What the
literature often downplays, however, are the individual activities of local
constituencies, who find ways to connect with these organizations. Without their
support, HRINGOs cannot carry out their key activities such as detailed reporting
on local human rights practice and active promotion of global human rights models
to local populations. Notwithstanding the importance of local constituencies, few
studies have systematically examined cross-national variations in citizen
participation in HRINGO activities. Why do certain countries have large numbers
of citizens joining HRINGOs? Do they engage in international human rights
activities because their governments’ commitment to global human rights ideas
encourages the citizens to follow suit, or is it the strength of local civil societies
and their linkages to global civil society that lead individuals to get involved in
HRINGOs?2 Do individuals in advanced democracies join HRINGOs to promote
their ideals in the world, or is it individuals under oppressive governments who
join HRINGOs to gain leverage vis-a-vis local governments and to solicit help from
external actors? This research addresses these questions by investigating the patterns
of citizen participation in HRINGOs. Toward that end, we combine tools in two
theoretical perspectives: the social movement literature and the world society
approach.
In recognition of HRINGOs’ contribution to the promotion of human
rights and consequent social changes, we view involvement in HRINGOs as
participation in the international human rights movement. Thus, theoretical
tools in social movement studies should provide significant analytical purchase
for our study. Indeed, the global movement for advancement of human rights
has fueled many domestic social movements and spawned various social
movements at the international level. HRINGOs have initiated and carried forward
many of these activities. Thus, examination of the local-global dynamics within
HRINGOs is critical to understanding the global human rights movement. Drawing
on the social movement literature, we investigate how configuration of political
opportunities, resources for mobilization, and cognitive frames at both domestic
and international levels shape the patterns of citizen participation in HRINGOs.
We also engage the studies on globalization, particularly those from the world
society approach (Meyer et al. 1997). We seek to examine if and how linkages to
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world society might influence individuals’ participation in HRINGOs. In doing
so, we employ new measures of international linkages, which enable us to link the
social movement literature and the world society approach effectively. Furthermore,
we attempt to sort out the different roles of inter-governmental and
nongovernmental organizations in global political processes. Global human rights
ideas pose a threat to governmental actors because they tend to constrain state
behavior in domestic political affairs. Nongovernmental actors, on the other hand,
are less concerned about state sovereignty. Therefore, we expect linkages to global
civil society to have a stronger impact on citizen participation in the international
human rights movement than intergovernmental linkages.
We also expect that global factors have become more important predictors of
citizen participation in HRINGOs over time relative to that of domestic factors. In
early stages of the global human rights movement, individuals in developed
countries led the process, but as human rights become institutionalized in global
politics, participation by citizens of developing countries has grown. By employing
social movement theories and the world society approach in one analysis, our study
explicates the actual processes of”norm cascade,” in which a norm emerges in global
society, achieves a taken-for-granted status, and influences activities of individuals
and organizations across the globe (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Sunstein 1997).
Our core argument is that endogenous factors had some explanatory power early
on, but that external factors have become increasingly important over time
(e.g., Tolbert & Zucker 1983), corresponding with the growth of international
human rights norms. As global civil society increasingly promotes human rights
ideas, countries with citizen engagement in global civil society become more likely
to have citizens who are members in many HRINGOs. Thus, we see global civil
society as a breeding ground for progressive ideas, such as human rights norms.
Our research clarifies the processes through which an international movement
develops into a force in international politics and points to the importance of global
civil society as an important arena for political changes in the contemporary world.
Theoretically, it contributes both to world society theory, by explicating the processes
of norm diffusion, and to social movement theories, by illustrating how
international social movements evolve and what countries lead these movements.
After briefly describing the history of global human rights and HRINGOs’ roles
in it, we present descriptive statistics on the growth of the number of HRINGOs
over the last two centuries and citizen memberships in the organizations over the
past thirty years. We then highlight the two theoretical perspectives described above
and present our main hypotheses. Finally, we examine patterns of citizen
participation in HRINGOs using a multivariate regression analysis for three time
points – 1978, 1988, and 1998 – as well as changes over two ten-year time periods.
We seek to contribute to the literature with longitudinal data on HRINGOs collected
for this research.
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Expansion of Human Rights International Nongovernmental
Organizations in the Post-World War II World
HISTORICAL FACTORS
Research on the history of human rights reports contributions by different actors
in the global expansion of human rights (Buergenthal 1995; Claude &Weston 1992;
Donnelly 1998; Lauren 1998). After World War II, spurred on by many nongov-
ernmental activists (Korey 1998), political leaders of the Allies sought to establish
human rights as a foundation of the new world order (Lauren 1998).3 Their vi-
sions are reflected in the U.N. Charter (1945) and in the U.N. Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (1948), the two documents that laid the foundation for human rights
instruments that followed. Soon thereafter, however, a power struggle between the
two superpowers, oppression in the colonies, and racism within the powerful na-
tions began to impede efforts to promote human rights further in the international
political arena.
When the enthusiasm of powerful governments dwindled, nongovernmental
activists and Third World countries became the central actors in international
human rights activities. Their efforts resulted in the adoptions of several key
U.N. human rights treaties since the 1960s and their ratifications by an
increasing number of states (Wotipka & Tsutsui 2001). Third World countries were
motivated by their anticolonialist fervor and by their aspiration to establish racial
equality in the postcolonial world order. The conviction of these countries is
reflected in the fact that the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) was the first major U.N. human rights treaty
to be adopted. When their domestic human rights practices became targets of
international criticism in the 1970s, however, their enthusiasm gradually waned.
Thus, governments from both the developed and developing world turned from
proponents of the global human rights regime to its doubters and even critics.
As Third World countries diminished their human rights activities in the 1970s,
nongovernmental human rights activists became increasingly instrumental in
moving the global human rights movement forward. Numerous HRINGOs were
established in this period and worked fearlessly to criticize rights-violating
governments. In contrast to HRINGOs, national governments tend to be averse to
criticizing other governments’ domestic practices for fear that this would undermine
state sovereignty in general and justify criticism from other governments regarding
their own domestic violations. In addition, other political factors are taken into
consideration such as trade relations with rights-violating countries and possible
retaliation in other arenas that may result from criticism regarding human rights
issues. In some cases, governmental actors may not be concerned with human
rights and may even work to actively undermine international progress in human
rights as was witnessed by some military governments in Latin America (Lutz &
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Sikkink 2000). HRINGOs, on the other hand, do not share these concerns.
Motivated by their principles and powered by their flexible and committed
constituencies, these organizations document and publicize human rights violations
in virtually all corners of the world. The work of Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, among other HRINGOs, is widely recognized by now; their
publications have become authoritative sources of information on human rights
practices. These organizations continue to constitute a powerful lobby in
contemporary global politics.
DESCRIPTIVE CHANGES
While much research has recognized the importance of HRINGOs in global human
rights politics, few studies have systematically examined them in a cross-national
analysis.4 Using the data we collected on HRINGOs from the 1970s to the 1990s,
we first outline the universe of HRINGOs along a few key dimensions, and then
analyze patterns of memberships in HRINGOs. Our focus is on the two most
important dimensions in understanding global expansion of HRINGOs
founding year and countries from which members come.5
These variables provide us with insights on how the world of HRINGOs has
evolved over time as well as the characteristics of the types of countries whose
citizens led the evolution. To begin, we provide a brief description of the coding
scheme used to collect the data on HRINGOs.
The data used in our analysis are culled from the Yearbook of International
Organizations, published by the Union of International Associations.6 We define
human rights international nongovernmental organizations as those
international nongovernmental organizations that are concerned with the
promotion and protection of human rights in the long term. Human rights here
refer to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of living human
beings. Nongovernmental status requires that the organizations are composed
largely of independent citizens and are free of direct government influence.
To be considered international, an organization must have members from two
or more countries. By specifying the long-term focus of organizations, we
exclude organizations that offer tentative solutions to social problems but do
not aim for any long-term social changes.7 The coding was done taking
advantage of the categorizations employed in the Yearbook for three time
points – 1978, 1988, and 1998. As more categories and specifications emerge
over time, identifying organizations that qualify as HRINGOs becomes increasingly
easier. For 1998, most of the relevant organizations are coded from the category
labeled human rights organizations. In earlier periods, this category did not exist.
Thus, for 1988, we had to expand the scope and code organizations in several
different categories including rights, justice, equality, discrimination, and humanity.
For 1978, we first coded organizations under two English subject headings –
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human and rights. Then, we coded organizations under classified subject headings
– social welfare, women, trade union, and religion, ethics, morals.8 In the following
analyses, we used only organizations that work explicitly to promote and protect
internationally recognized human rights in the long term.9 The data include 96
HRINGOs in 1978, 170 in 1988, and 499 in 1998, indicating a dramatic increase
in HRINGO activities over the thirty
years.
Figures 1 and 2 show graphically the dramatic growth of HRINGOs over time
using information on HRINGOs from the 1998 data file. Figure 1 summarizes
the founding years of HRINGOs, which range from 1839 to 1998. According to
this data set, among 412 HRINGOs for which the founding year is known and that
were still in existence in 1998, 30 of them emerged prior to 1945. In the following
30 years (up to 1975), 77 organizations emerged. In the next 24 years (1975-98),
305 organizations were founded. The growth is particularly dramatic from the mid-
1980s to the early 1990s, as the number of foundings consistently registered over
14.10 Figure 2 captures the cumulative count of HRINGOs and shows even more
dramatically the growth of HRINGOs in this period.
The number of countries with citizen membership in HRINGOs ranges from
2 to 170, and averages about 32 countries per organization with a standard deviation
of 33 for the data in 1998.11
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics on HRINGOs at three time points
including a list of the top ten and bottom ten countries in terms of the number of
memberships in HRINGOs.12 These data on citizen membership confirm the global
expansion of HRINGOs, as the mean number of countries that have citizens
involved in HRINGOs increased from about 12 in 1978 to almost 46 in 1998. The
list of top and bottom ten countries exhibits an interesting pattern. Developed
Western countries consistently occupy the top ten spots, while peripheral developing
countries are at the bottom.13 One might speculate that it is a general pattern that
developed countries have more citizens engaged in HRINGOs. Citizens in the
countries on the low end of memberships may be unable to mobilize due to their
lack of opportunities and resources. More important, however, is the fact that growth
in citizen participation in HRINGOs is not limited to developed countries alone.
Although countries with little citizen engagement tend to be peripheral countries,
their citizens’ participation is increasing nonetheless. We explore these issues in
the next section.
International Linkages and Global Dimensions of Social Movements
Two lines of research guide our analysis of the patterns of participation in
HRINGOs; we explore the literature on social movements and globalization
to investigate global and national level factors that circumscribe participation
in HRINGOs. We seek to contribute to (1) the social movement literature by
exploring the interplay between domestic and global political opportunity
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Founding Years of Human Rights International Nongovernmental
Organizations
I
I
I
I
U
0I
1839 1919 1929 1945 1954 1963 1971 1979 1987 1995
1892 1923 1940 1949 1958 1967 1975 1983 1991
Founding
Year
structures, resource configuration, and framing of the movement; and (2) the
literature on globalization by investigating the impact of linkages to world society,
by sorting out the different roles of international governmental and
nongovernmental actors in global politics and by examining the process of norm
diffusion over time.
Since the international human rights movement is a type of social
movement, theories on social movements ought to be useful in studying
patterns of local actors’ participation in this movement. Three approaches have
figured prominently in the recent growth of the literature on social movements:
political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and cognitive framing
(McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996). Using these approaches, social movement
research has produced many insights into how social movements emerge and
develop. However, as McCarthy (1997) and McAdam (1998) point out, its
traditional emphasis on domestic politics has been a serious limitation in the field,
preventing examination of important factors that lie outside national borders.
In response to this concern, some important contributions on international
dimensions of social movements have emerged over the last few years. They
have examined international political opportunity structures (Imig & Tarrow
1999; Marks & McAdam 1996; McAdam 1998), transnational flows of human
and material resources for movements (Keck & Sikkink 1998a; Smith, Chatfield
& Pagnucco 1997), and new patterns of framing that reflect sensitivity to global
FIGURE 1:
201
10
C
o
u
n
t
Ul –
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audiences (Klandermans et al. 1999). Correspondingly, a few incipient attempts
to theorize global dynamics of contentious politics have appeared (Keck & Sikkink
1998b; McCarthy 1997; Tarrow 1998). Drawing on this emerging literature, we
develop our hypotheses along the three key dimensions of social movement studies.
First, studies have documented that political opportunities available in a polity
shape the form and timing of social movements. Such opportunities include
openness of the institutionalized political system, potential for activists to influence
elites, and perceived probability of forceful repression by the government (McAdam
1996). This line of reasoning predicts that domestic political opportunities are
prerequisites for participation in global social movements. Correspondingly, on
the evolution of the global human rights movement, much literature alludes to
the leading role of individuals in countries with more opportunities for political
activism (Gaer 1995; Wiseberg 1992).
Another line of human rights research documents a world-level process in
which oppressed citizens use international channels to publicize human rights
violations and pressure their governments and multinational corporations
(Keck & Sikkink 1998a; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999). This “boomerang effect”
has become an effective way for oppressed populations to rectify wrongs done
to them. As this process has become fairly common, it might be the case that
these groups are in greater need of developing a connection with global actors
and are joining HRINGOs, whereas citizens who enjoy political freedom are
able to establish domestic organizations to voice their complaints. This perspective
privileges international political opportunities over domestic ones, while the other
hypothesis proposes a spill-over effect of local political opportunities. In our
analysis, we consider both possibilities.
Hypothesis la: Citizens in countries with greater domestic political opportunities
participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal.
Hypothesis 1 b: Citizens in countries with fewer domestic political opportunities
participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal.
At the international level, political opportunities open up for local populations
when their governments join intergovernmental human rights organizations via
international human rights treaties. By ratifying these treaties, governments ex-
press their willingness to be judged by a series of benchmarks and to be held ac-
countable for failing to live up to their promises. Commitment to these organiza-
tions renders the governments more vulnerable to criticism from abroad about
their domestic human rights practices, thus providing local populations with in-
ternational level opportunities to pressure their governments. Some organizations
also have authority to examine individual complaints; local populations can file
complaints to the organizations and ask for investigations into possible human
rights violations.14 We hypothesize that citizens in these countries are more likely
to perceive political opportunities at the global level, which they can use to influ-
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ence local or global human rights politics, and therefore are more likely to join
HRINGOs.
Hypothesis Ic: Citizens in countries with greater global political opportunities
(more memberships in intergovernmental human rights organizations)
participate in more HRINGO memberships, all else being equal.
By testing these hypotheses, we delineate the interplay between local and
global political opportunity structures. We also make inferences about the in-
teraction between global and local civil societies and about the directionality
(unidirectional or bi-directional) of the influences; we explore whether global civil
society encourages local populations to join the international human rights move-
ment, or local civil societies mobilize to create and sustain such movements.
Second, research on resource mobilization has found that flows of resources
for mobilization and the strength of preexisting organizational structures and
social networks circumscribe the potential for social movements. On the
domestic level, resources that are available for citizens often shape the possibility
of social movements for human rights. Populations with more resources are
more likely to engage in postmaterialist movements, which prioritize
noneconomic factors such as a sense of belonging and aesthetic concerns as
their goals (Inglehart 1977, 1990). In other words, once basic human needs have
been met, citizens can turn their attention to other needs. The human rights
movement is often considered an example of such postmaterialist movements.
On the international level, inflows of resources across borders, both material
and human, facilitate a country’s connection to the international human rights
movement. Citizens in such countries not only have the advantage of having
more mobilizational resources for social movements, but also have human
networks through which they link with global civil society and join the human
rights movement. These arguments lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Citizens in more developed countries participate in more
HRINGOs, all else being equal.
Hypothesis 2b: Citizens in countries with greater international inflows of human
and material resources participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal.
Third, the literature on framing points to the importance of the cognitive
dimensions in mobilizing individuals for social movements. Movement leaders
need to choose effective ways of framing that would facilitate understanding
of the issues at stake and convince individuals to participate in the movement
(Brysk 2000; Clark 2001). Domestically, the level of education of a country’s
population influences the level of cognitive understanding of human rights
issues. Citizens who are better educated may possess the cultural capital needed to
be aware of their rights, to recognize when those rights have not been met, and to
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possess the tools needed to articulate demands and to organize for change (Tarrow
1987). This argument leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Citizens in countries with higher levels of education participate in
more HRINGOs, all else being equal.
On the international level, we argue that linkages to global civil society facilitate
a cognitive understanding of human rights issues. Here, we make use of world
society theory to advance the argument. The world society theoretical perspective
explains globalization processes by arguing that world models for state and society,
organization, and relations have expanded over time, especially since the end of
World War II (Meyer et al. 1997). Such models are available to all countries
regardless of their economic, social, or political characteristics. By meeting world
standards of nation-statehood, countries are able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of
other nations. The result has been increasing isomorphism among national
governments over time in their structures, behavior and policies.
We argue that the globalization of the human rights regime reflects the triumph
of world models of progress and justice within which the individual person is
assigned a central role. As reflected in the models, nation-states are expected to
pursue progress and justice and to do so by enhancing the capacities of individuals
and protecting their rights (Ramirez 2001; Ramirez & Meyer 1998). One example
of this is the changing nature of the discourse surrounding the rights of women
over the past two centuries (Berkovitch 1999).
The international human rights regime has impacted the formal policies and
structures of many nation-states (Jacobson 1996; McNeely 1995). In order to be
part of the international human rights regime, countries are expected to fit a certain
human rights profile, which includes participating in human rights organizations
and conferences, signing international and regional human rights treaties and
conventions, and developing domestic human rights law and policy (Ramirez et
al. 2002).
The expansion and intensification of networks linking countries,
organizations, and people to one another facilitate the development and
dissemination of these world models. This is especially the case with human
rights. International organizations (IOs), including both governmental and
nongovernmental ones, serve as a key networking mechanism for the diffusion
of world models. Through involvement with IOs, citizens get exposed to models
concerning progress and justice, and eventually regard attention to human
rights to be the norm. As a result, they would be more likely to engage in
activities specific to human rights, such as participation in HRINGOs. Thus,
the more connections a country has with international society, the more likely
its citizens are to participate in many HRINGOs. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4a: Citizens in countries having greater connections to international
society participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal.
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However, the influence of these international connections may differ depending
on the type of connections. Recent scholarship on globalization has suggested that
international governmental and nongovernmental arenas may be two separate
spheres operating by different principles and logic (Boli & Thomas 1997; Jang &
Luo 2000). This distinction is particularly striking in a field such as human rights
(Tsutsui 2004). As discussed above, governmental agents and nongovernmental
organizations have been taking turns leading the efforts to establish human rights
as a major global political agenda. Since the 1970s, however, it has been
nongovernmental actors that are more aggressive in promoting human rights ideas
and publicizing human rights violations. Governmental agencies tend to be more
averse to commit to human rights causes because they are concerned about
undermining state sovereignty, which global human rights almost inevitably do.
Nongovernmental actors, on the other hand, are less concerned about state
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sovereignty and therefore are more active and flexible in human rights activities.
Given the appreciatively more active role global civil society has played in the
promotion of human rights, linkage to it should have a greater impact on citizen
engagement in HRINGOs. Thus the second part of this hypothesis reads as follows:
Hypothesis 4b: Linkage to global civil society has a stronger effect than linkage to
the intergovernmental world on citizen participation in HRINGOs, all else being
equal.
Finally, we expect the effects of global civil society to be stronger in more re-
cent periods. While in earlier periods domestic factors might have determined
whether a country’s citizens were represented in HRINGOs, international factors
ought to have become more important in recent years as globalization connects
more local actors and as human rights becomes more institutionalized in global
society.’5 As the literature on norm cascade specifies, once a norm attains a taken-
for-granted status, its influence on local political actors grows dramatically, lead-
ing to isomorphic political structure and practice across the globe. Since human
rights ideas are considered to have reached the taken-for-granted status in the mid-
1980s (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999), the impact of linkages to global civil society
ought to have increased since then.
Data and Measures
The descriptive analysis above suggests that developed Western countries tend to
have more citizens engaged in human rights international nongovernmental
organizations. Over time, however, individuals in developing countries have
increased their participation in HRINGOs. In this section, we build on the
descriptive analysis to provide explanations for those national characteristics that
lead to a greater number of memberships in HRINGOs. In order to test the
hypotheses we have laid out earlier, we employ ordinary least-squares regression
analyses to explain HRINGO memberships in 1978, 1988 and 1998. To understand
changes over time, we also use panel analyses for 1978-88 and 1988-98.16 All of
the analyses use a constant set of 77 countries, which are listed in the Appendix.
Our dependent variable is the number of HRINGOs in which each country’s
citizens participate as described in a previous section. It is measured in 1978,
1988, and 1998, as are the independent variables, unless otherwise stated. To
correct for the skewed distribution of HRINGOs, we tested several transfor-
mations of the variable. The square root transformation approximated the
normal distribution the best, and results using this measure yielded stronger model
fits than those with other transformation, such as natural log.
We use the following independent variables to test the hypotheses presented
earlier. To measure the availability of domestic political opportunities, we use in-
dicators of the level of civil and political rights granted to local populations. We
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combine the measures of civil liberties and political rights from Freedom House
(2001) to create a composite index of domestic political opportunities. The indi-
ces each measure degrees of political rights and civil liberties on 1-7 range scales.
We flipped the original index so that high scores coincide with high degrees of lib-
erties and rights (e.g., Costa Rica and Norway) whereas low scores are given to
countries with fewer civil liberties and political rights (e.g., Myanmar and Soma-
lia). Thus, our measure of civil and political rights ranges from 2 to 14, with a
score of 14 representing a country with the greatest protection of civil and political
rights.17
As for political opportunity structures at the international level, we use
memberships in human rights intergovernmental organizations (HRIGOs) as
the measure. The variable quantifies national memberships in international
governmental organizations that are human rights-related in each of the three
time points. Similar to the dependent variable, this measure comes from the
Union of International Associations (Various years).
To measure the size of national resources, we use gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP) in current international
dollars (World Bank 2001). We took the natural log transformation to correct
for the skewed distribution. To measure international flows of resources, we use
two variables. The first is the number of people entering the country in the
short term, which is a proxy for inflows of human resources. This measure
captures the openness of national borders to people from abroad, which
facilitates activists to come in and work on human rights issues in the country.
The second variable is import of goods and services as a percentage of the GDP,
which measures inflows of material resources. It represents the openness of a
country to material resources coming from abroad.’8 Both of these variables
come from World Development Indicators (2001) and are logged.19
Our arguments concerning cognitive dimensions lead to two types of measures,
one for domestic and the other for global level measures. The first is education.
We use tertiary enrollment ratios for the age cohort likely to be enrolled in that
level of education (20-24 year-olds).20 The variable is available from the World
Bank (2001) and is transformed (natural log) to correct for skewed distributions.21
The second set of variables measure the level of a country’s involvement in
international society. We follow the convention in world society research, and use
memberships in international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and
memberships in international governmental organizations (IGOs). We corrected
for the skewed distribution by first adding one to all cases and then performing a
natural log transformation for both variables. In order to ensure independence
from HRIGOs and HRINGOs variables, we subtracted the numbers of HRIGO
and HRINGO memberships from each country’s memberships in overall IGOs
and INGOs, respectively. Both IGO and INGO measures come from the Union of
International Associations (Various years). Table 2 summarizes the definitions and
descriptive statistics of these variables.
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We ran three cross sections using variables measured in 1978, 1988, and 1998,
respectively. In the two panel analyses (1978-88 and 1988-98), we included the
lagged dependent variable as well as explanatory variables, which are lagged ten
years.
Results
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES
In this section, we present the results for three cross-sectional analyses using the
number of memberships in HRINGOs in 1978, 1988 and 1998. Results are
summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5. For all three time points, model 1 tests the
effects of domestic factors on the number of memberships in HRINGOs, while
in models 2 and 3 we add measures of international factors. We begin by
reporting the results for 1978.
Model 1 reports the effects of domestic political opportunities and cognitive
understanding, measured by the civil and political rights index and education,
respectively. We initially attempted an analysis with the measure of resource
availability at the domestic level, gross domestic product per capita (logged).
However, since the variable was very highly correlated with education (over .85),
and did not have a significant effect, we are not presenting the results with the
GDP variable. In model 1, the effects of education are positive and significant. The
effects of civil and political rights are also significant, although at a lower level.
In model 2, we added the following international factors: HRIGO memberships,
which measures international political opportunities, international inflows of
human and material resources, and memberships in IGOs. The openness of a
country to people outside has a positive significant effect, while the openness of a
country to foreign goods and services has a negative and significant effect. These
results suggest that international flows of human resources have a positive impact
on citizen participation in the international human rights movement, while flows
of material resources have the opposite impact. The former finding is consistent
with our hypothesis, but the latter is opposite to our hypothesis and calls for more
discussion. Memberships in IGOs has a positive significant effect. The effect loses
significance in model 3, however, with inclusion of linkage to global civil society
measured as memberships in INGOs.22 Thus, our hypothesis that international
linkages, particularly those to global civil society, have positive effects on
HRINGO memberships finds support. With the addition of these linkage variables,
other variables gradually lose significance. In model 3, all the other variables lose
significance as we introduce memberships in INGOs.23 The overall model fit
increases quite a bit as well. These findings indicate a strong impact of linkage to
global civil society on citizen participation in the international human rights
movement.
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Table 4 shows the results of the same analyses for the next time point, 1988.
The results for 1988 are different from those for 1978 in some interesting ways.
The positive effect of domestic political opportunity structures measured as
civil and political rights becomes stronger in this period; it is significant in all
three models. The effect of HRIGOs becomes significant in model 2. These
results suggest stronger effects of both domestic and international political
opportunity structures in this period. In model 2, international flows of human
resources continue to have a positive impact whilst flows of material resources
have a negative one. IGOs continue to exert a positive and significant effect in this
model. In the final model, INGO linkage has the strongest effect and eliminates
the effects of HRIGOs, flows of material resources, and IGOs, but the rights variable
continues to be positive and significant in 1988.
Finally, Table 5 summarizes the results for 1998. The results are very similar to
those for 1988 except that the level of significance changes for some variables. This
suggests that the patterns of participation in HRINGOs have remained largely the
same in this period. Citizens in countries with greater domestic opportunities, more
inflows of human resources, and stronger linkage to global civil society are more
likely to participate in the international human rights movement. In all three years,
the adjusted R-squares are the highest in model 3, which includes INGO
memberships. However, the overall amount of variation that is accounted for by
the model goes down slightly over time (.869, .838, and .786 in 1978, 1988, and
1998, respectively). This suggests that, over time, participation in HRINGOs
becomes increasingly institutionalized and therefore more difficult to capture.
Panel Analyses
To examine what factors predict changes in citizen participation in HRINGOs, we
carried out panel analyses with a ten-year lag for two time points, 1978-88 and
1988-98. The explanatory variables used in the analyses are the same as those used
in the cross-sections except that we add the lagged dependent variable. The risk
involved in such an analysis is that the lagged variable accounts for all of the
variation in the later time period. Indeed, this is what we find in the models we ran
using the same dependent variable as was used in the cross-sections, that is, total
memberships in HRINGOs.24 For the panels presented here, we make use of a
slightly different dependent variable. It measures the change in
HRINGO
memberships between the later time period (e.g., 1988) and the earlier one
(e.g., 1978).25 We do this for both 1978-88 and 1988-98. Results for the first panel
are reported in Table 6.
The findings suggest that the strongest predictor of change in citizen
memberships in HRINGOs between 1978-88 is the degree of civil and political
rights ten years prior. In all three models, holding other variables constant, this
variable consistently registers a strong positive significant effect (p < .001),
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suggesting that domestic political opportunities increase the level of participation
in the international human rights movement. The lagged dependent variable has a
weakly significant (p < .05) and positive effect in only the first model. In all models,
the effects of education, HRIGO memberships, and international flows of human
and material resources are insignificant. Memberships in IGOs, as seen in model 2,
have a strongly significant and positive effect on HRINGO memberships, but the
effect is wiped out in model 3 when we add INGO memberships, which has a weakly
significant effect. This last model explains the greatest amount of variation (adjusted
R2 = .584). Thus, domestic political opportunities and linkage to global civil society
predict the growth in HRINGO memberships from 1978 to 1988, with the former
having a much stronger effect.
The picture changes in the analysis of the 1988-98 period. The results in Table 7
show that the lagged dependent variable, international human inflows, and linkage
to global civil society have positive significant effects on the dependent variable.
The level of domestic political opportunities, which had a strong positive significant
effect in all models in the earlier period, is negative and significant in the first
model and insignificant in the rest.26 No other variables show significant effects in
any models. These findings suggest that citizens in countries that had joined the
international human rights movement by 1988 continue to grow in their
memberships to HRINGOs in the following ten years, and that individuals in
countries with greater inflows of human resources and stronger linkage to global
civil society also expand their participation in the movement. In other words, global
factors predict increase in citizen participation in the international human rights
movement better than domestic factors controlling for the lagged dependent
variable. In addition, a greater amount of the variance is accounted for in this
analysis than in the analysis of the 1978-88 period.
Further Specifications
We tried several additional variables in analyses not reported in the models
presented above.27
Our account of the historical process leading to the expansion of HRINGOs
around the world indicated that both developed and developing countries
played the lead role in establishing human rights issues as a legitimate global
political concern. On one hand, most countries that can boast of large numbers of
citizens who are members of HRINGOs and HRINGO headquarters are located
in Western Europe and in the U.S. and Canada. However, as we have reiterated
throughout this article, human rights is not to be viewed as a venture limited to
core countries.28 To explore potential regional diversity, we used regional dummy
variables, which produced somewhat inconsistent results. In some models of the
cross-sections and the panel analyses, the dummy variable for Middle East/North
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governmental organizations at national level, 1978
(add one, log). 5.57 .98
Measured by memberships in international non-
governmental organizations at national level, 1988
(add one, log). 6.29 .81
Measured by memberships in international non-
governmental organizations at national level, 1998
(add one, log). 6.60 .83
We used indices of the degree of human rights abuses in countries culled from
Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department’s annual reports. Scores
ranged from 1-5 with low scores indicating low levels of human rights abuses (Ball
2000; Poe & Tate 1994). The results for these measures failed to produce any
significant results.
We also consider other factors that may be influencing the rise of international
nongovernmental organizations. It has been argued that starting in the mid 1970s,
official development assistance (ODA) from the U.S. was frequently provided to
lesser-developed countries via international nongovernmental organizations. Given
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TABLE 3: Cross-sectional Analysis of Memberships in Human Rights
International Nongovernmental Organizations (HRINGOs), 1978
Model 1 Model 2
Model 3
Education .68*** .33** .07
(.09) (.09) (.08)
Rights index .05t .04 .01
(.03) (.03) (.02)
HRIGO memberships .07 .08
(.07) (.06)
Human inflows .25t
(.13)
Imports of goods and services -.31 * -.13
(.13) (.12)
IGO memberships 1.5*** -19
(.31) (.36)
INGO memberships 1.22***
(.18)
Constant 2.32*** -3.33* -2.36*
(.24) (1.36) (.98)
Adjusted R2 .640 .794 .869
(N= 77)
Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. Variables mea-
sured in c. 1978.
t p <.10 * p <.05 p < .01 p < .001 (two-tailedtests)
that much ODA addresses basic human needs, it is possible that the rise of HRINGO
memberships in these countries is driven by ODA and the organizations stemming
from them. To test this possibility, we used a measure of official development
assistance and official aid (in current $US) in the analyses for lesser-developed
countries (i.e., those receiving aid for those years). The results for the cross-sections
were not stable over time. The variable was positive and significant for 1988 and
1998 but did not exert a significant effect for any year when the INGO variable
was added to the models. In each of the panel analyses, the variable failed to reach
significance.
Lastly, we also considered the issue of multicollinearity. Correlations among
variables were not extremely high. Among all independent variables, tertiary
education enrollment and the development measure (GDP) were the most highly
correlated, and therefore, we excluded the development measure in our tables.
Furthermore, the stability of coefficients and standard errors across most models
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provides some confidence that multicollinearity was not a problem. Although the
results tended to change with the inclusion of the INGO variable, this owes more
to the strength of its effect than multicollinearity.
Discussion
The foregoing analyses reveal a striking finding: international factors explain
country level variation in citizen participation in the international human
rights movement better than domestic factors with the exception of domestic
political opportunities. Considering the effects found in the panel analyses, we see
that endogenous variables, namely rights, had a strong positive impact in the earlier
period. In the later era, exogenous variables, particularly memberships in INGOs
and international human inflows, have a strong and positive impact on citizen
memberships in HRINGOs. When human rights are less institutionalized, internal
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conditions (local political opportunities) are more consequential, and when human
rights are more institutionalized worldwide, linkages to the world matter more.
Furthermore, both memberships in INGOs and international human inflows are
processes at the global civil society level and not at the intergovernmental level.
We discuss these international factors first.
The effects of linkages to international society, both in terms of memberships
in IGOs (in models 2) and INGOs (in models 3), are strong in all but one
analysis. The positive effects for both variables support the idea that linkages
to world models concerning human rights encourage participation in the
international human rights movement. The effects of IGO memberships disappear,
however, when we add INGO memberships in all the analyses. As we discussed
earlier, nongovernmental actors have played key roles in the global expansion of
.81**
(.16)
.12*
(.06)
.02
(.17)
.19***
(.05)
.08
(.07)
.85**
(.24)
-.71*
(.28)
2.13**
(.59)
-.25
(.15)
.09*
(.04)
.003
(.06)
-.28
(.25)
.14
(.61)
2.22***
(.34)
-7.00**
(2.28)
.786
4.44***
(.53)
.431
-5.73
(2.70)
.705
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TABLE 6: Panel Analysis of Change in Memberships in Human Rights
International Nongovernmental Organizations (HRINGOs),
1978-88
Lagged DV
HRINGOs, 1978
Independent variables
Education
Rights index
HRIGO memberships
Human inflows
Imports of goods and services
IGO memberships
INGO memberships
Constant
Adjusted R2
(N= 77)
.003
(.11)
.15***
(.03)
.03
(.09)
.26
(.17)
-.10
(.16)
1.41**
(.43)
1.30***
(.35)
.519
-.06
(.12)
.15″**
(.03)
.04
(.09)
-.09
(.16)
.86
(.55)
.60+
(.35)
-3.77*
(1.72)
.581
-.07
(.12)
.14***
(.03)
-3.04t
(1.54)
.584
Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. Variables mea-
sured inc. 1978.
t p < .10 * p <.05 ** p <.01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
human rights; they have a greater commitment to human rights issues and are less
concerned about eroding state sovereignty. Thus, citizens in those countries that
are well connected to global civil society – where human rights activism has been
intensifying – will become more aware of human rights issues, and are more likely
to get involved in the international human rights movement. This finding provides
support for the argument in world society research that international governmental
and nongovernmental arenas need separate analytical treatment.
International inflows of human and material resources show divergent effects.
Inflows of human resources measured as people entering the country in the short
Model 1
.29*
(.11)
Model 2
-.07
(.15)
Model 3
-.22
(.18)
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term exert a positive significant effect on citizen memberships in HRINGOs in all
analyses except the first panel (1978-88). On the other hand, inflows of material
resources measured as imports of goods and services are negatively associated with
the dependent variable, although the effect is significant only in cross-sectional
models without the INGO variable. The effect of human resources provides partial
support for our argument, but the negative effect of imports is rather puzzling.
The effect of human inflows indicates that openness of national borders to people
from outside facilitates local actors to gain mobilizational resources, including
ideas about human rights and connections to human rights activists outside, thus
encouraging them to join the international human rights movement. Thus, this
indicator can be deemed as a measure of linkage to global civil society; it therefore
provides further support for the world society argument.30 The negative effect of
imports suggests a need for a better measurement of inflows of material resources
for social movements. Because the vast majority of imported goods have no bearing
on potential for social movements, the variable may be simply measuring
international economic exchange, or even dependence on foreign goods. Thus,
the negative effect may be showing that citizens in a dependent economy are less
likely to have the capacity to participate in the international human rights
movement.
On the other hand, few of the domestic factors influence HRINGO
memberships. Among them, political opportunity structure is the only variable
that has a significant effect even when international factors are included in the
analysis. Most of the analyses show that domestic political opportunities
increase citizen participation in HRINGOs. This provides support for the
argument about a spillover effect of domestic political opportunities as opposed
to the argument about a boomerang effect. It is worth noting that the effect of
this variable becomes negative (and significant in the first model) in the second
panel. Thus, while advanced democracies with many political opportunities
may have led the international human rights movement in the earlier period,
countries with lower levels of civil and political rights account for the expansion
of citizen memberships in HRINGOs in the second period. This suggests a process
of “catching-up” to memberships more in line with those of their democratic
equivalents. The second panel captures the expansion of HRINGOs in the period
since human rights have gained taken-for-granted status in the international
political arena. Thus, the “catching-up” process may be deemed as a “norm cascade,”
in which accepted norms of human rights impact local actors across the globe (Risse,
Ropp & Sikkink 1999). Linkages to international civil society were important factors
in this “catching-up” process; countries with more inflows of human resources and
greater memberships in INGOs were more likely to increase citizen participation
in HRINGOs.
In sum, the analyses indicate that while the developed democracies may have
contributed to the expansion of HRINGOs in earlier periods, countries with greater
linkages to global civil society, many of them with a weak economy and an
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TABLE 7: Panel Analysis of Change in Memberships in Human Rights
International Nongovernmental Organizations (HRINGOs),
1988-1998
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Lagged DV
HRINGOs, 1988
Independent variables
Education
Rights index
HRIGO memberships
Human inflows
Imports of goods and services
IGO memberships
INGO memberships
Constant
Adjusted R2
(N = 77)
Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. Variables mea-
sured in c. 1988.
*
p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
undemocratic polity, have been the driving force for the expansion in recent
periods. The panel analyses demonstrate the shift in the effects of independent
variables dramatically. The first panel (1978-88) shows that domestic political
opportunities have a stronger effect on growth in citizen memberships in
HRINGOs than linkages to global civil society. In the period from 1988 to 1998,
however, domestic opportunities are no longer relevant and the effects of linkages
to global civil society and human inflows become the most important factors,
underscoring the norm cascade that was taking place. This finding suggests a
parallel to the process in which local social capital nurtures democracy in a country
.44*
(.17)
-.23
(.16)
-.07
(.05)
.64***
(.13)
-.25
(.16)
-.04
(.05)
-.07
(.06)
.88***
(.11)
.02
(.15)
-.11*
(.05)
-.06
(.06)
.71**
(.20)
-.28
(.22)
.48
(.46)
-.18
(.22)
-.31
(.53)
1.35**
(.42)
1.47***
(.40)
-1.87
(2.07)
.640 .577
-2.23
(2.18)
.629
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(Paxton 2002); just as vibrant civil society and vigorous associational life are
beneficial for the establishment of a democratic political system in a country, linkage
to global civil society works as what might be called “global social capital” and
encourages advancement of human rights in international society.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to provide a macro-sociological understanding of the
expansion of the international human rights movement with empirical data on
HRINGOs.
On the global level, the data show that the overall number of HRINGOs
and citizen memberships increased dramatically, especially within the past
twenty years, corroborating the expansion of the international human rights
movement. At the national level, we find that many countries have increased
their participation in the international human rights movement in the last few
decades. While wealthy Western countries tend to have the most citizens who
are membersof HRINGOs, the least wealthy or peripheral countries consistently
register the lowest level of citizen participation. However, our statistical analyses
of the factors that affect citizen participation in HRINGOs suggest that rich
democratic countries are not driving the expansion alone. Indeed, citizens in less
industrialized and less democratic countries are increasing their involvement in
international human rights activities. Our analyses show that linkage to global civil
society is a key factor in drawing citizens into human rights activism.
This article makes unique contributions to the study of social movements, as
it presents the first statistical analyses that explore the dynamics between global
and local factors affecting social movements. An emerging literature in social
movement studies has speculated on the international factors in contemporary
social movements, but few scholars have attempted to test these effects in empirical
quantitative analyses. Our analyses show that global factors, particularly linkage to
global civil society, have strong effects on participation in the international human
rights movement controlling for domestic factors. This is especially the case in the
more recent era when human rights were more institutionalized the world over.
Considering the active roles nongovernmental actors play in other types of social
movements, such as environmental activism and peace movements, and their
increasing level of transnational coalition, one might argue that global civil society
is an important factor in contemporary social movements in general. Another
variable that can also be considered a measure of linkage to global civil society,
human resource flows, showed a strong impact on involvement in global human
rights activism. Thus, future research on contemporary social movements, whether
transnational or domestic, might need to examine the role of global civil society
as well as global-level political opportunities and international resource flows.
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This research also provides new insights in the globalization literature. First,
we use new measures of international linkages that not only enable testing the
impact of global factors in social movements, but also add new dimensions to
the study of global politics. Research in the world society approach has
emphasized the effects of linkages to global society on local politics, but has
used memberships in international organizations almost exclusively. This often
invited criticisms about the underspecification of the effects of linkages. Our
linkage variables specify what effects different types of linkages exert, as we
operationalize them along the three key dimensions in social movement
theories. Thus, we combine the two literatures, social movement theories and
globalization literature, and create a set of analytical tools that expand our
understanding of contemporary social movements and global-local dynamics
in them.
Our analysis also confirms the process of norm cascade and clarifies the
mechanisms by which global norms impact local politics. In earlier periods,
when human rights ideas had not become globally accepted norms, endogenous
factors shaped individuals’ participation in HRINGOs. With the consolidation
of global human rights norms since the mid-1980s, however, global factors have
become the most powerful predictors of participation in the global human
rights movement. These findings also contribute to the world society literature,
as they specify changes in the impact of global models over time.
Finally, our analyses sort out different effects of international governmental
and nongovernmental actors. Research on global politics has suggested the different
roles for the two sectors, as do studies on international human rights. Our findings
confirm the argument that nongovernmental actors have been playing the leading
role in the expansion of global human rights in the last few decades. Because of
their flexibility and lack of concern for state sovereignty, they have been able to
aggressively push the international human rights movement forward. We suspect
that this is the case in other global issues such as environmentalism and global
inequality. Thus, understanding of the evolution of the international human rights
movement would provide insights into how other international progressive social
movements might evolve. While these movements tend to originate in advanced
democracies, as they diffuse throughout the world, participation by citizens in
developing countries increases and pushes the movement forward to impact global
and local politics. Global civil society plays a key role in this evolutionary process,
as it sustains political life outside governmental networks and enhances progressive
movements that governments tend to abhor. With increasing participation of
activists in developing countries as well as those in developed countries in global
civil society, the potential for more global progressive social movements is growing,
as is the potential for real social change in important issue areas such as global
inequality and environmentalism. By focusing on one of the most prominent
international social movements, the human rights movement, this study offers an
important first step to understanding these global trends.
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1. We also note that some human rights nongovernmental organizations are domestic in
their scope (Ball 2000). Although studies of human rights nongovernmental organizations
that operate at the national level contribute to the working of local human rights politics,
they do not directly address an important aspect of human rights politics, namely, the
interaction between global and local human rights movements. Our research examines
international human rights nongovernmental organizations, and hence enables us to
explore the connection between global and local human rights processes and the interplay
between international governmental networks and global civil society.
2. We use the term global civil society to refer to the realm of international collective life
in which nongovernmental actors form networks, advance claims and establish solidarity
(Wapner 2002).
3. Recent scholarship has pointed out the contributions by small countries as well (Waltz
2001).
4. See for an exception, Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco (1997).
5. We note that our membership data only measure the breadth of country participation,
not the depth of participation. To examine the depth of participation, we need data on
how many people from each country has joined HRINGOs. Future research should
consider whether the breadth and depth of participation are correlated.
6. See Boli and Thomas (1997) for more on the Yearbook and on data quality and coding
issues.
7. Some of these organizations make great contributions to human rights protection,
but to the extent they are focused on short-term relief regardless of who the victims are
and do not aim for structural changes, we see them as not interested in promoting human
rights in the long term.
8. For all years, we examined all organizations in the relevant categories, and coded only
those that fit our definition of international human rights organizations.
9. Part of the process both authors took in rating the organizations was to give each
organization a score on a four-point scale (0-3) with 3 meaning “definitely a HRINGO”
to 0, “not a HRINGO.” Using these scores, we compared ratings using reliability analyses.
Average measure intraclass correlations were over .92 for all three years, leading us to
believe that our codings were accurate and consistent. In the following analyses we include
only those organizations that have a score of 3.
10. The apparent drop-off since the mid-1990s has more to do with the reporting
process, which delays entry into the Yearbook by several years, than with an actual decline
in founding.
11. The total number of countries with citizen members (aggregate number of countries
listed as having membership in HRINGOs) is 1,847 for 1978, 3,443 for 1988, and 7,132
for 1998.
12. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics on HRINGOs at three time points
including a list of the top ten and bottom ten countries in terms of the number of
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memberships in HRINGOs.”1 According to the UIA, representatives from each
organization were asked the following question to ascertain organizational and/or
individual memberships: “Please indicate the countries in which your organization has
[members]. Also, please indicate any international organizational members.”
13. Note also that quite a few of the countries included in this table do not make it into
our analyses due to missing data on our independent variables. This is especially true of
small, developing countries.
14. The processes by which individuals can file complaints are exemplified in the
procedure in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights established by Resolution 1503 in
1970, and the first optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (entered into force in 1976), which is monitored by the Human Rights Committee.
15. This argument is parallel to that of Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan (1997): they found
that endogenous factors circumscribed the patterns of female enfranchisement in earlier
periods but that exogenous factors became more important over time, corresponding to
the increasing institutionalization of the female enfranchisement at the international level.
16. We also ran the panel analysis for 1978-98. The results are largely similar to those
for 1988-98.
17. Recognizing differences in civil liberties and political rights, we first ran the models
using the two indices separately and found very similar results to the ones presented in
the following sections. This, combined with their high degree of collinearity, is the reason
we decided to combine the two measures into the rights index reported in this paper.
The analyses were also run using a measure of democracy from the Polity IV Project. As
the data were less complete than those used here, we report just the results for the rights
index. The results were very similar and are available from the authors upon request.
18. We note that this variable includes some nonmaterial resources: “services” inevitably
include resources that do not necessarily take the materialized form. Nevertheless, the
vast majority of “goods and services” measured by this variable can be distinguished from
human inflows and therefore, we deem this variable to measure inflows of material
resources.
19. Direct measures of flows of international human rights activists and funding would
be ideal for testing the argument that inflows of mobilizational resources encourage
participation in the international human rights movement. However, such data are not
readily available for a large number of countries. In addition, our measures have the
advantage of capturing flows of resources objectively and generally, thus enabling us to
take into account the spillover effects of inflows of resources. See Keck and Sikkink (1998a)
for a description of U.S. foundation grants for international human rights work from
1977-91.
20. We also tried a secondary enrollment ratio variable in place of the tertiary enrollment
ratio variable. The results for secondary and tertiary enrollment were nearly identical.
Because human rights education is primarily done at higher education levels and citizens
with higher education are more likely to join HRINGOs, we report just the results with
this variable. The other results are available from the authors.
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21. Data for 1975 provided the most complete data for the 1978 time point, as did 1995
for the 1998 time point, while data for 1988 were complete.
22. In model 3, we did not include the measure of international inflows of human
resources as it was highly correlated with INGOs.
23. Because of this, our arguments about earlier models have to be taken with caution.
Yet, we find the results of model 1 to be important since they allow us to compare the
impact of domestic and international factors over time.
24. These results are available from the authors by request.
25. This compares with yet another possibility, that is, the percent growth (time minus
time over time1). As the time measure is close to zero for several countries in the analysis,
we decided to use the method described here.
26. In order to further specify the effects of the Rights index, we broke the countries
into two groups, one with just the less-rights countries (1-7 on Rights variable) and the
other with just the more-rights countries (8-14 on Rights variable), and ran the same
panel analyses as presented in Tables 6 and 7. For more-rights countries, there is no
effect for rights in the earlier period; in the more recent period, the effect is negative.
For less-rights countries, the effect of rights is positive in the earlier period; in the more
recent period, there is no effect. This suggests that in the earlier period, citizens in relatively
democratic countries among the less-rights countries were more likely to participate in
HRINGOs while individuals in more-rights countries were equally likely to participate
in HRINGOs. In the recent period, citizens in the most democratic countries are not
increasing their participation in HRINGOs any longer, while those in less-rights countries
are participating in HRINGOs across the board. We also ran the panels with a dummy
variable for MORE and LESS rights [1= more rights (8-14) and 0 = less rights (1-7)] in
place of the rights index. The results were virtually identical to those presented here for
both panels. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting we run this
analysis.
27. Results described in this section are available from the authors upon request.
28. Boli and Thomas (1997) argue that by “promoting human rights ideology and
critiquing world inequality, many international nongovernmental organizations resist the
interests of the core” (fn. 2).
29. According to Crystal (1994), few Middle East human rights organizations are regional
in character. Those organizations that were able to emerge in the 1980s tend to be national
in their scope and membership. This may explain why citizens in this region are less
likely to join HRINGOs.
30. This is an important point as this finding undermines a potential criticism that
participation in HRINGOs is simply an extension of participation in INGOs in general.
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Issue Table of Contents
Social Forces, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Dec., 2004), pp. 457-879
Front Matter [pp. 490 – 790]
Editor’s Note [pp. 457 – 458]
Theory Debates
Revisiting General Theory in Historical Sociology [pp. 459 – 489]
Why “Unobservables” Cannot Save General Theory: A Reply to Mahoney [pp. 491 – 501]
Networks
The Paradox of Social Organization: Networks, Collective Efficacy, and Violent Crime in Urban Neighborhoods [pp. 503 – 534]
Cloning Headless Frogs and Other Important Matters: Conversation Topics and Network Structure [pp. 535 – 557]
Marriage Timing in Nepal: Organizational Effects and Individual Mechanisms [pp. 559 – 586]
Mobilization and Social Movements
Global Civil Society and the International Human Rights Movement: Citizen Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations [pp. 587 – 620]
Strategy Matters: The Contingent Value of Social Capital in the Survival of Local Social Movement Organizations [pp. 621 – 651]
Corn, Klansmen, and Coolidge: Structure and Framing in Social Movements [pp. 653 – 690]
Anti-Semitism as a Response to Perceived Jewish Power: The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania before the Holocaust [pp. 691 – 708]
Military
Military Service during the Vietnam Era: Were There Consequences for Subsequent Civilian Earnings? [pp. 709 – 730]
When Race Makes No Difference: Marriage and the Military [pp. 731 – 757]
Towards Equality
Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality: Opinion Change in Women and Men, 1974-1998 [pp. 759 – 789]
Maternal Employment during Northern Vietnam’s Era of Market Reform [pp. 791 – 822]
Public Sociologies: Reparations in the U.S.
Getting to Reparations: Japanese Americans and African Americans [pp. 823 – 840]
If a Tree Falls in the Wilderness: Reparations, Academic Silences, and Social Justice [pp. 841 – 864]
Book Reviews
untitled [pp. 865 – 867]
untitled [pp. 867 – 869]
untitled [pp. 869 – 871]
untitled [pp. 871 – 874]
untitled [pp. 874 – 876]
untitled [pp. 876 – 878]
untitled [pp. 878 – 879]
Back Matter
9/17/2018 The power of shame – A survey of human-rights law
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