Please see the attached file for additional information regarding this assignment 

Rough Draft Peer Review Forum

In this activity, each student will conduct two peer reviews. Your instructor will assign your reviews to you. Be sure to check the announcements to see whose work you have been assigned to review. Your job as a reviewer is to follow the checklist below and give cogent, professional feedback to the students whom you are assigned to review.

Note: if you do not have two rough drafts to peer review, please contact your instructor.

Please write at least 1 to 1 ½ page of peer review per assignment.

Refer to the list below and make sure you have covered all of the points in your review.

Peer Review Guidelines

· Professional review that looks at the submitted material from the perspective of assessing the concept as if it could work.

· The reviewer may agree or disagree with the submitted material.

· This is not an argument. Consider that you both want to see the author succeed in this endeavor. The reviewer should provide additional information or countering information from the perspective that more may need to be done or other angles considered.

· Do not focus on grammar, spelling, or format (instructor will do this).

· Focus on content as aligned with the topic at hand and supporting their concept.

· Assertions made by the reviewer must be accompanied by an appropriate citation reference (or references).

The peer review process is intended to mirror constructive feedback you will be expected to provide and respond to in the real world to refine a project or identify new unexplored options. Please perform this review with an open mind, as a professional, and with consideration of how you state your questions or comments. This process of review and defense is almost as valuable a learning opportunity as the assignment. When reviewing the original submitted material, either add your comment/question as a tracked change comment to a new version of the document or compile your comments in a separate document that clearly identifies where the comment is to be applied (e.g., section 3, p. 2, para.1: you assert that UAS are superior to manned assets in agriculture, but do not provide a reference supporting this assertion). Keep in mind the purpose of this assignment is to help refine and improve the student’s project while gaining experience performing peer review.

Running Head:

LACK OF STANDARDIZATION IN GROUND CONTROL STATIONS

1

LACK OF STANDARDIZATION IN GROUND CONTROL STATIONS

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Lack of Standardization in Ground Control Stations for Unmanned Aerial Systems

Student

Embry Riddle Aeronautical University

Abstract

Manned and unmanned aircraft originated around the same time period,yet manned advanced significantly in the past century. Throughout that timeframe, many lessons were learned and implemented, such as human factors via regulations and industry standards. In aviation, human factors date back to early World War II, where Paul Fitts and Air Force Captain Richard Jones investigated pilot errors involving flightdeck configurations on manned aircraft. The end goal of the Fitts and Jones investigation was to create a safer and more efficient flight deck for pilots (Human Factors FAA Safety, 2008). Currently Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are faced with many human factor challenges. The lack of standardization in ground control stations has led to accidents and loss of UAS. Challenges on ground control stations are related to the surrounding environment, prioritization of information, legibility of fonts, and tasks taking several steps that can be done in one on manned aircraft (Landry, 2018). Conducting a study similar to the Fitts and Jones one in 1947 could bring standardization of ground control stations on Unmanned Aerial Systems one step closer. Examining accident reports and utilizing direct operator feedback on unmanned aircraft would assist in the design standardization for ground control stations, resulting in safer and more efficient operations.

Lack of Standardization in Ground Control Stations for Unmanned Aerial Systems

Human factors in aviation date back to early World War II. Paul Fitts and Air Force Captain Richard Jones were among the first to investigate different flight deck aircraft configurations with the end goal of reducing accidents (Human Factors FAA Safety, 2008). The purpose of this paper is to describe the study in detail followed by a recommendation of how this research can be applied to unmanned aircraft. Applying these findings to unmanned aircraft would pave the way for standardization of ground control stations.

On December 17th, 1903 near Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, aviation history was made. Orville and Wilbur Wright conducted the first successful manned aircraft flight. The gasoline-powered, self-propelled aircraft stayed in the air for 12 seconds and covered 120 feet. Three additional flight tests were conducted that same day. On the last one, the aircraft lasted for 59 seconds and covered 852 feet. The Wright brothers were fueled by innovation and the desire to make their vision a reality. By 1905, they had accomplished creating an aircraft capable of performing complicated maneuvers and flying for 39 minutes (First Airplane Flies, 2009). In 2017, Qatar flew from Auckland to Doha in 17 hours and 30 minutes (Longest Flights in the World, 2017). Clearly, the aviation industry has come a long way from the first 12 seconds of flight. Not only has flight duration increased, but the technology changes have been revolutionary.

The industry has entered a new era where unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have begun to enter the National Airspace System (NAS). A UAS can be utilized in many aspects, and they come in all shapes, sizes, and designs. The birth concept for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), formerly known as remotely controlled aircraft, began with Nikola Tesla in the late 1800ss. Although manned and unmanned aircraft originated in the same era, they did not evolve in the same capacity. Manned aircraft advanced in quantity from a few to tens of thousands, while unmanned had limited production. Critical technologies such as autonomous navigation, remote control, and automatic stabilization were not ready and as a result limited the growth of unmanned aircraft (Newcome, 2004).

As technologies evolved, unmanned aircraft frequented the airspace on a more regular basis. Since the 1990s, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has allowed UAVs to be utilized for, “important public missions such as firefighting, disaster relief, search and rescue, law enforcement, border patrol, scientific research, and testing and evaluation” (Fact Sheet – UAS, 2014). Recently in 2015, the FAA and Department of Transportation proposed a set of regulations for small UAS, under 55 lbs, to enter the National Airspace (Fact Sheet, 2015). These regulations would allow for the safe everyday use of unmanned vehicles. In June of 2016, the FAA released operating requirements, known as Part 107, for non-hobbyists’ unmanned aerial systems under 55 lbs. Part 107 lists regulations for operators such as airspace limitations, visibility, and cargo. In addition for individuals to operate a UAV per Part 107, they must also obtain a remote pilot airman certification with a small UAS rating (FAA, 2016).

Unmanned systems were initially conceptualized with military applications in mind. During World War I, military leaders saw an opportunity for certain missions to minimize casualties in war if unmanned aircraft were in existence. In present day, UAVs are utilized in the military for reconnaissance due to the vast amount of information they can collect on an enemy, an actual weapon itself, or a simulated target (Palik and Nagy, 2019). Although these unmanned systems have advanced in military applications, the market for UAS has grown into the commercial industry.

In the early 2000s, commercial applications evolved for unmanned systems. The utilization of drones in photography, site surveillance and security, package delivery, and recreation took off. As a result of the rapid growth in consumer fields, UAVs have been created by many manufacturers. With many manufacturers in the booming market, these systems have been created on a shorter time frame and with many advancements. These advancements range from size and weight to capability and affordability (Giones and Brem, 2017). With the growth into commercial applications, “the global drone market is estimated to grow from $2 billion in 2016 to nearly $127 billion in 2020” (Moskwa, 2016). As technology develops, unmanned systems will continue to grow into everyday use and eventually become the norm in a vast variety of industries.

Challenges

As with any growing technology, there are a large number of challenges to overcome. These challenges range from detecting and avoiding other aircraft, to figuring out how to fully integrate UAS into the National Airspace. An ongoing challenge that dates back to early World War II is the effects of poor human factor design. Pioneers of human factors changed the way many view research and design for human-machine interaction (Marshall, Barnhart, Hottman, Shappee, and Most, 2011). Although many improvements have been made in the aviation industry with respect to human factors, there are new challenges arising with the latest technologies.

Human factors is the gathering of knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to perform an operation in a safe, efficient, and effective manner. In order to achieve the overall goal in any given situation, the field of human factors stresses the awareness of human characteristics and limitations. Humans are very capable of responding to situations, processing information, and overall learning, but they do have limitations. These limitations can include fatigue, disorientation, and communication failures. The mission of human factors is to address these issues via training programs, awareness, and effective design. In the end, the overall mission of human factors is to not only eliminate but optimize for effectiveness and efficiency (Marshall et al, 2011).

According to Marshall et al., nearly half of UAV accidents are due to human error (2011). Human factor studies aim to eliminate errors and truly understand the operation and systems at hand. Since humans are prone to errors, McLay and Anderson state that systems must be designed and developed with these human errors in mind (2018). The study of human factors is important because it analyzes how limitations can affect human performance, recognition, and cognizance. Human factor engineers look into how individuals pay attention, allocate concentration, perceive warnings and cautions, and investigate historic human interaction with the system. An example of human factor issues resulting in negative consequences is the Avianca Flight 410. In March of 1988, an Avianca flight crashed into mountainous terrain due to “poor crew teamwork and cockpit distractions, including non-flying personnel present in the cockpit” (Salas and Maurino, 2010). As a result of this accident and subsequent studies, it was found that crew interactions were critical to the operations of an aircraft. Therefore, subpar interactions can contribute to human errors in the skies as seen in Avianca Flight 410.

Unmanned aerial systems face numerous human factor challenges. When examining the system as a whole, there are many ways safety can be compromised. Issues impacting UAS safety are a reduction in sensory data, loss of datalink, and a lack of standardization in design for the ground station control. Currently, no regulations exist for the ground control centers for unmanned aerial vehicle. Conversely, for manned aircraft, there are very strict cockpit industry standards. According to Landry, “the cockpits of conventional aircraft evolved gradually over the decades, incorporating principles learned from accidents and incidents” (2018, p. 388). There are many aspects that need to be considered when designing an efficient cockpit whether used in a manned or unmanned aircraft. According to Howe, factors that need to be taken into consideration are the familiarity of setup of the displays and controls, visual indications, cabin temperature, and emergency activation (2017). All these indications and visual displays provide the essential information for the operator to accomplish the mission safely and efficiently.

The ground control station is where the operator and potentially other personnel such as the payload operator work to accomplish the mission’s objectives. The ground control station is the equivalent of the cockpit on a manned aircraft. Although both these environments have the potential to significantly affect the operation, they have different regulations on who can be in the cockpit. In the case of manned aircraft, Sec. 121.542 states that it is a flight crew member’s responsibility to not engage “in nonessential conversations within the cockpit and nonessential communications between the cabin and cockpit crews” (FAA, n.d.) among other things like eating or reading publications not related to safety. According to Landry, the ground station control environment is very different, people come and go and conversations are held on a constant basis. The silence and concentration needed to perform certain critical tasks such as takeoffs and landings are often distrubed (2017). On the other hand, applying a sterile cockpit rule may create other issues such as difficulty concentrating during low workload phases (Landry, 2017). In summary, ground control stations need a balance between minimizing distractions during critical phases of flight but being careful to not create environments that induce fatigue.

The challenges continue for unmanned vehicles in the displays of the ground control station. In many cases, operators experience confusion based on the lack of prioritization of information. For example, a warning may appear on the display, but the operator cannot identify it due to other non-crucial information being presented first. Additionally, difficult to read fonts and the lack of consistency in displays makes it difficult to adjust to the system, resulting in overload. In some cases, routine tasks that take one step on a manned aircraft end up taking several steps to accomplish the same action (Landry, 2018). These challenges make the operators job more difficult and strenuous. As a result, operators are more likely to commit errors that can result in fatalities, making unmanned aerial vehicles unreliable.

Recommendations

Manned and unmanned aircraft both originated around the same time frame. However, while manned aircraft took off, unmanned aircraft continued development in the labs. During the last century of aviation, many studies have been conducted for manned aircraft that provided valuable lessons learned. These lessons and studies can be applied in some way or another to unmanned aircraft. In 1947, psychologist Paul Fitts and Air Force Captain Richard Jones conducted a study examining the effects of different configuration of flight decks on aircraft. Their end goal was to minimize distraction and provide an efficient and user-friendly flight deck (Human Factors FAA Safety, 2008). In the following paragraphs, the study is described in detail followed by a recommendation of how this research can be applied to unmanned aircraft.

Fitts and Jones conducted analysis on pilot error with the end goal of determining the best methods to design a flight deck that would eliminate accidents due to pilot error and improve the overall efficiency. They believed that these pilot errors were a result of poor design characteristics of the flight deck.

The Fitts and Jones study examined 270 pilot errors. The accounts of the errors were collected via reports and interviews. The pilots involved in these 270 errors ranged from the Army Air Force Institute of Technology to former pilots in civilian universities. The accounts were either received from the pilot that directly committed the error or by an eyewitness. Following the review of all the errors, 50 pilots were individually interviewed and asked to describe in detail an account in which they committed an error due to misunderstanding a situation involving an instrument, signal, and/or instructions. Fitts and Jones then proceeded to have 50 other pilots interviewed in groups of five to 10 individuals. The results of the discussions were then categorized these errors into 9 categories: misinterpreting instruments that had more than one indication, reversing an instrument, signal interpretation, legibility, mistaking one instrument for another, instruments that were inoperative, scale interpretation, illusions, and forgetting to check an instrument before takeoff (Fitts and Jones, 1947).

Fitts and Jones concluded that although not all accidents can be eliminated, the amount can be decreased if instrumentation is designed with the pilot’s perception in mind. In order to accomplish this challenge, human requirements for an instrument’s display needed to be researched. Instrumentation errors affected everyone regardless of experience level. Simple fixes that were recommended that would make a difference included utilizing uniform direction-of-motion for all instruments, auditory signals for cautions/warnings, legibility of instrumentation, and consistent scale for dials throughout flight deck (Fitts and Jones, 1947). As the study made clear, instrumentation and displays posed a great challenge for manned aircraft back in the 1950s. As a result of these difficulties and their potential negative consequences, regulations were created that resulted in a standardized flight deck, checklists for critical phases of flight, and overall safer and more efficient flight for manned aircraft.

As George Santayana famously quoted, “Those who fail to study history are doomed to repeat it” (Newcome, 2004). With the lessons learned by manned aircraft in the past century, there is a huge opportunity to implement them on unmanned aerial systems and prevent past mistakes from being repeated. A study like the one previously done by Fitts and Jones focusing on unmanned aircraft would help identify issues in ground control stations. Identifying these issues would minimize errors and as a result increase reliability of unmanned aircraft. The end goal for the ground station control should be to have regulations that require standardization. With standardization, operators are more likely to accomplish missions safely and efficiently.

Conclusions

In conclusion, Fitts and Jones were among the first to investigate how the challenges of human factors can affect a pilot on a manned aircraft. Although, manned and unmanned are not the same there are many lessons that can be learned from the last century, such as Fitts and Jones study. Their study into how flight deck configurations affected pilots provided great insight into the lack of design with pilot perception in mind. A study similar to this one conducted on unmanned aircraft would help identify issues that operators are experiencing. Gathering accident reports and pilot feedback would be instrumental in designing a ground control station that operators could work safely and efficiently. These findings would pave the way for standardization of ground control stations.

References

Federal Aviation Administration. (n.d.). Retrieved from

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgFAR.nsf/0/dd19266cebdac9db852566ef006d346f!OpenDocument

.

Fact Sheet – Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). (2015, February 15). Retrieved from

https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=18297

.

Fact Sheet – Small Unmanned Aircraft Regulations (Part 107). (2016, June 21). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=20516.

First Airplane Flies. (2009, November 24). Retrieved from

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/first-airplane-flies

.

Fitts, P. M. & Jones, R.E. (1947) Psychological aspects of instrument display. H. W. Sinaiko (Ed.), Selected papers on human factors in the design and use of control systems. (p. 359-396). New York: Dover Publications.

Giones, F., & Brem, A. (2017). From toys to tools: The co-evolution of technological and entrepreneurial developments in the drone industry. Business Horizons, 60(6), 875-884. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2017.08.001

Howe, S. (2017). The leading human factors deficiencies in unmanned aircraft systems. Hampton: NASA/Langley Research Center.

Human Factors FAA Safety. (2008). Chapter 14 Human Factors [PDF file]. Retrieved from https://www.faasafety.gov/files/gslac/courses/content/258/1097/AMT_Handbook_Addendum_Human_Factors

Landry, S. J. (2017;2018;). Handbook of human factors in air transportation systems (1st;1; ed.). Milton: CRC Press. doi:10.1201/9781315116549

LONGEST FLIGHTS IN THE WORLD. (2017). Accountancy SA, , 8. Retrieved from

http://ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/1903042066?accountid=27203

Marshall, D. M., Barnhart, R. K., Hottman, S. B., Shappee, E., & Most, M. T. (Eds.). (2011). Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems. Retrieved from

https://ebookcentral.proquest.com

McLay, R. W., & Anderson, R. N. (Eds.). (2018). Engineering standards for forensic application. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.co

Moskwa, W. (2016, May 9). World drone market seen nearing $127 billion in 2020, PwC says. Available at https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/tech/world-drone-market-seen-nearing-127bn-2020-pwc-says/

Newcome, L. R., & Books24x7, I. (2004). Unmanned aviation: A brief history of unmanned aerial vehicles. Reston, Va: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. doi:10.2514/4.868894

Palik, M., & Nagy, M. (2019). BRIEF HISTORY OF UAV DEVELOPMENT. Repulestudomanyi Kozlemenyek, 31(1), 155-165. doi:

http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/10.32560/rk.2019.1.13

Salas, E., & Maurino, D. (Eds.). (2010). Human factors in aviation. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com

Running head: UAS HUMAN FACTORS

1

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HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES IN USAF MQ-9 GROUND CONTROL STATIONS

Research Paper

Human Factors Issues in USAF MQ-9 Ground Control Stations

Student

Human Factors in Unmanned Aerospace Systems

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

1 December 2019

Abstract

In most recent years, the rapid advancement of aviation technology has led to the establishment of a new type of aerial platform known as Unmanned Aerospace Systems (UAS), however, even though many various sectors such as military, agriculture, law enforcement, aerial photography have benefited tremendously from their usage and advantages, many major human factors issues continue to exist to this day. The relationship between human-machine interface has long been a controversial topic specifically in military UAS environments. Here, researchers demonstrated the effects caused by poorly designed MQ-9 Ground Control Stations (GCS) and the impact to pilots and sensor operators. Fifty consenting Air Force MQ-9 pilots and sensor operators from Creech Air Force Base, NV were asked to participate in a study involving GCS design limitations. Overall, the study concluded that poor cockpit design, fatigue, limitations to see-and-avoid capability, and lack of auditory cues were among the most significant human factors that affected performance. Additionally, further research is required in the area of GCS design improvement in order to provide a more user-friendly interface between operators and the UAS itself.

Keywords: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, human factors, MQ-9, GCS

Summary

The history of unmanned aviation can be tracked all the way back to the early 1900s, when Orville Wright and Charles Kettering were placed in charge of supervising a secret project that helped develop the world’s first self-flying aerial torpedo – deemed the “Kettering Bug” – which could fly autonomously to a pre-determined target and detonate. As the years passed by and technology advanced, so did Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Just like civilian aviation has come a long way since the Wright Brothers’ first flight in 1903, so has military aviation, and the same can be said about unmanned aviation. More specifically, the US military has relied heavily upon UAS to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions around the globe so much, that most operations nowadays are 24/7. In the Air Force, one such platform is the MQ-9 Reaper. Built by General Atomics and first flown in 2001, the MQ-9 is considered a medium-altitude Remote Piloted Aircraft (RPA) with a turboprop engine, 66-foot wingspan, and loiter time of over 25 hours. Capable of carrying a mixed load of armament weighing up to 3,800 pounds, the MQ-9 is considered an extremely reliable aircraft that in many cases meets or even exceeds manned aircraft reliability standards. The crew requirement for operating an MQ-9 Reaper is two – one pilot that is responsible for flying the aircraft and one Sensor Operator (SO) that operates all sensors and payloads on board. To do this, the crew operates from a Ground Control Station (GCS), which can either be inside a fixed facility such as a typical room in a building, or in a separate, mobile structure that resembles a container – some of which can be configured to house two crews inside that can operate two separate aircraft at any given time. The GCS, however, comes with its own set of limitations, most of which can be attributed to human factors.

Issue

In a study conducted on 25 November, 2019 at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, 50 pilots and SOs from the same squadron were tasked to list the human factors challenges they faced in the GCS that negatively interfered with the performance of their duties. Of note, the sample size taken had an average experience level of 1,000 flight hours and 50% of the pilots polled had previous experience in flying manned aircraft; this specific statistic helped provide an effective comparison between manned and unmanned human factors issues. Overall, the study concluded that MQ-9 crews are experiencing multiple human factors issues in the GCS, ranging from design limitations and lack of sensory cues that need to be addressed and mitigated properly in order to ensure the high productivity of the crew and the success of the mission.

Significance of Issue

The study revealed that MQ-9 crews are experiencing multiple human factors issues that range from poor GCS design, fatigue, limited visibility, and lack of auditory cues. Crews stated that the design of the Pilot/SO (PSO) workstations is not user-friendly, as the two major complaints were poorly positioned aircraft controls and auxiliary display monitors too far apart from the central heads-up-display (HUD). Furthermore, the condition lever on the PSO workstation is in a position that could easily cause an engine shutdown if the operator is not careful with proper hand placement. The study also revealed that the lack of the seat-of-the-pants feel makes it harder for crews to analyze a situation such as turbulence, compared to manned flying. While manned pilots can more easily detect a stall or unusual attitude, unmanned pilots have to rely solely on electronic information, as there are no mushy feelings of the controls, buffeting, or kinesthesia present in the GCS that will warn them.

The Air Force currently uses two different types of GCSs for the MQ-9: the Block 15 and the Block 30. The Block 15 is the older version and is not as advanced as the Block 30, however, this paper focuses on the Block 15 since many units have not yet transitioned to the newer version and the differences between the two are minute. A typical MQ-9 GCS is configured with two identical PSO racks with the pilot in the left seat and the SO in the right. As pictured in Figure 1, the center screen on each rack is the aircraft HUD which displays telemetry such as airspeed, altitude and engine gauges. It is through this screen that the pilot primarily operates the aircraft – it is the central hub for the instrument crosscheck. Above the HUD is another screen called the tracker display that shows the aircraft on a constantly updated moving map. Additional settings can be found on this screen such as link status and aircraft radio frequencies. Directly below the HUD are two smaller touch-screens called the Heads-Down-Displays (HDDs) that show various aircraft system parameters such as engine, electrical, fuel, and weapons data. The crew can select different displays by typing in a corresponding number to that display. For instance, if the pilot wishes to see the status of all fuel tanks and the quantity in each one, then they would type 48 (48 is the fuel status menu) and all parameters would show up on the HDD. Two additional screens on the left side of the pilot rack and right side of the SO rack respectively, display information such as maps with other active aircraft in the airspace, secure internet chat rooms that enable communication through written means, and aircraft checklists. Finally, two screens in between the two racks display information such as landing times, fuel consumption rates, and other mission planning tools. A telephone is also located in between the racks, as well as the aircraft and ground radios. As seen, there is a lot of information readily available to the crew, however, this increases the amount of time spent crosschecking all the data which can be distracting at times.

Figure 1. General Atomics Legacy Ground Control Station. Adapted from “Legacy GCS,” 2014, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. Retrieved from http://www.ga-asi.com/legacy-gcs

Each workstation encompasses a keyboard, mouse, control stick (joystick) on the right side and four levers on the left side. Both workstations are identical design-wise in case the pilot side rack malfunctions and has to use the SO side. The functions of each workstation’s controls are different as the pilot’s side controls the aircraft while the SO side controls payload operation and settings such as iris, camera type, and camera zoom. Specifically, the condition lever, which is located between the flap and throttle lever on the pilot’s side, controls the engine and allows fuel flow to the engine when in the forward position, closes or stops fuel flow (shuts the engine down) in the middle position, and feathers the propeller blades to reduce drag in the aft position (Carrigan, 2015). Having that said, out of all the levers and switches in the GCS, the condition lever is the most critical one since it directly affects engine operation. The research, however, revealed that the location of the condition lever is in a poorly chosen area since pilots can accidentally bump the lever with their arm when trying to manipulate the auxiliary screen on the left-hand side of the PSO rack. One pilot even revealed that his sleeve got caught on the lever as which moved it full aft, however, he was quick to react and immediately placed it back in the forward position before the command link could reach the aircraft. Furthermore, the study revealed that the condition lever can be easily mistaken for the flap lever due to its close proximity and same color. In certain cases, such as an in-flight emergency that requires engine shutdown either due to an engine fire or failure, the checklist will direct crews to place the condition lever in the aft position in order to feather the propeller blades and reduce drag. This provides the pilot with a better glide ratio and preserves as much altitude as possible. However, due to the close proximity and same color of the flap lever, the pilot can easily mistake it with the condition lever which can be detrimental during an emergency where time is of the essence. If the condition lever is not pulled in time, the propeller will not feather and the high drag that is created will severely impact the glide ratio. In other words, the aircraft will quickly descend out of the sky, losing much-needed altitude. Interestingly enough, only the speed lever knob – which is located to the right of the throttle and controls engine revolutions-per-minute – is painted red; all the other levers are painted black. This can further enhance the confusion between the flap and condition lever. As seen in Figure 2, the location of the condition lever in close proximity to the flap lever and the similarity in color make it easier for crews to confuse the two which, in emergency situations can prove to be costly.

Figure 2. PPO Setup with Condition Lever. Adapted from Human Factors Analysis of Predator B Crash. Retrieved from https://hal.pratt.duke.edu/sites/hal.pratt.duke.edu/files/u13/Human%20Factors%20Analysis%20of%20Predator%20B%20Crash%20

Another human factor issue is the relatively colder temperature inside the GCS compared to outside ambient temperature. Due to the various amount of equipment such as communication boxes, electrical panels, and displays that require constant, adequate cooling, the indoor temperature of a GCS is lower than what most humans are comfortable with; in some cases, around 64 – 67 degrees. Vimalanathan and Babu (2014) concluded that indoor room temperature has a 38 percent effect on performance, health, and productivity of office workers (Vimalanathan & Babu, 2014). Furthermore, the equipment also produces constant noise that creates distractions and makes it difficult to listen to the radio. Research has also shown that daytime noise exposure had a sustained effect on nighttime sleep, including shorter deep sleep and lower sleep efficiency (Guo, et al., 2017). Because of this, crews noted that the GCS causes fatigue which negatively affects performance. Due to the large amount of displays and long periods of endurance in the seat, research revealed that eye strain, shoulder and lower back pain, and headaches were some of the side effects. Because the displays are not located closely to the main HUD, crews have to constantly move their eyes back and forth as part of their normal crosscheck. According to human factors engineers, the three zones (i.e. “cones”) of visual location are “Easy Eye Movement” (foveal movement), “Maximum Eye Movement” (peripheral vision with saccades), and “Head Movement” (Kamine, 2008). In a study conducted by NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center, Kamine & Haber (2018) measured instrument display visual angles to determine how well conventional aircraft and the MQ-9 ground control station (GCS) complied with these standards, and how they compared with each other (Kamine & Haber, 2018). It was discovered that all conventional vertical and horizontal visual angles lay within the cone of “Easy Eye Movement” and some in the “Maximum Eye Movement”, however, most instrument vertical visual angles of the MQ-9 GCS lay outside the cone of “Easy Eye Movement” (Kamine & Haber, 2018). In other words, the majority of MQ-9 GCS visual displays lay outside the cone of “Easy Eye Movement” which can cause eye strain. Reduced blinking rate and symptoms of eyestrain in operators of Visual Display Terminals (VDT) is not something new. Yakaishi and Namada (1999) concluded that reduced blinking rate, eyestrain, and uncomfortable eyes are more prevalent among VDT operators compared with office workers doing comparative jobs not involving VDTs (Yakaishi & Namada, 1999).

Compared to a manned aircraft where the pilot is physically located in the seat, UAS operators are located hundreds or even thousands of miles away from the aircraft and lack several sensory cues such as ambient visual input, kinesthetic, vestibular, and auditory information (Damilano, et al., 2012). The limited field of view, image resolution, and refresh rate – constrained by the data-link bandwidth – make it difficult for a UAS operator to see-and-avoid other aircraft in the sky. Additionally, since there is no seat-of-the-pants feel, crews indicated that the lack of sensory cues limits their ability to detect turbulence or erratic engine operation/vibration. As opposed to a manned pilot that can easily sense turbulence, erratic engine operation, unusual attitudes, or vibrations, UAS operators must rely on other sources of information – mainly electronic; the sense of balance and equilibrium provided by the inner ear is absent.

Recommendations

It is evident that many human factors challenges exist in MQ-9 Block 15 GCSs, however, there are many recommendations that could be implemented in order to improve crew performance. One recommendation is that the condition lever should be placed in a position that will allow quicker identification and separation from the other levers. Given the importance of this lever, it should be placed in an isolated location on the workstation, away from other controls. Also, installing a guard switch over it will ensure that it is not inadvertently pulled back by the pilot’s arm or sleeve. Additionally, color-coding the condition lever such as bright yellow and black will ensure that in times of emergencies, less time is spent trying to identify the lever and more time is spent trying to handle the emergency.

A second recommendation is that auxiliary display monitors should be placed as close to the HUD as possible. This will allow for an easier and quicker crosscheck for the crews, as well as alleviate any eye strain caused by excessive eye movement. The HUD itself should also be modified to provide a wider field of view width that will increase situational awareness. By displaying a wider horizon, crews can more easily detect and avoid other aircraft in the sky and weather phenomena such as potential cloud formations, lightning, and thunderstorms.

A third recommendation would be to include warnings of critical anomalous events that

involve more than one type of sensory mode such as both an auditory and visual warning of critical anomalous events (Williams, 2008). For example, in addition to a visual indication of engine RPM, providing the pilot with the option of listening to the actual engine noise would tremendously assist with detecting any unusual sounds. That option could be as simple as clicking a button and instantly listening to the aircraft engine whenever the pilot choses to do so.

Lastly, similar to manned aircraft, installing a stick shaker can help aid the pilot in recognizing an impending stall.

Conclusion

The MQ-9 GCS has come a long way since its original inception by incorporating various changes to its design, however, research has shown that there are still many human factors challenges that crews are facing. Therefore, additional research on human factor implications on MQ-9 GCSs must be conducted that will allow for continuous updating and refinement of cockpit design, monitor placement, audio-sensory cueing, and human-machine interaction. This would require additional funding, however, it is an absolute necessity if crews are expected to perform at their highest. As technology continues to improve, GCSs must be constantly refined, while always taking human factors considerations into account, in order to keep up with the constant demands placed on UAS operators.

References

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