SWOT Analysis according to case

A Hole in A pipeline

SWOT Analysis

Strength:

· Strong attitudes of employees

· Top talented employees

· Excellent customer service 

· Powerful brand presence 

· Large client database 

· Large market shares in auditing and consulting

· Highly ranked business 

· CEO supported change initiatives

Weakness:

· Lack of proper market development 

· Inability to retain women employee

· Large controversies 

· Poor culture for women (“boys club”)

· Lack of top management involvement 

· High competition from local firms 

· Limited services for clients 

· Lack of quantitative goals 

· Lack of work-life balance

Opportunities:

· Alliance with new and smaller consulting firms 

· Creating friendlier/flexible environment for all employees

· Accommodating to employee lifestyles

· CEO supporting change initiative 

· Controlling finances

Threats:

· Tough competition

· Damaging brand reputation (bad word of mouth)

· Upper management doesn’t support change initiatives 

· More security threats

· Legal issues and lawsuits harming the hiring processes of women

9 – 3 0 0 – 0 1

2

R E V : M A Y 2 , 2 0 0

3

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Jane Roessner, Ph.D., prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis
for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective
management. This case is dedicated to the memory of Ellen P. Gabriel, 1955-1999.

Copyright © 1999 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685,
write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School.

R O S A B E T H M O S S K A N T E R

J A N E R O E S S N E R

Deloitte & Touche (A): A Hole in the Pipeline

January 1991 Mike Cook, Chairman and CEO of Deloitte & Touche LLP, America’s third
largest accounting, tax, and management consulting firm, a part of the global network, Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu International, stared at the statistics in disbelief. Of the 50 candidates being
nominated for partnership that year, only four were women. The projections for the next two years
didn’t look any better: only 10% of the candidates for partnership in 1992 were women, and 10% in
1993. Something must be wrong. But, an accountant first and foremost, Cook knew that the numbers
never lie. What was going on?

In 1980, more than 10 years earlier, Cook had taken steps to ensure the firm was hiring women at
an aggressive rate. He recognized that women were flooding into professional services, including
accounting, tax, and consulting. While in 1974, only 24% of all of the accountants in the United States
were women, by 1990 that figure had reached more than 50%.1 Cook wanted to make sure the
percentage of women Deloitte was hiring matched that of women graduating with accounting and
business degrees. By the mid-1980s, fully 50% of its new hires from college campuses were women.
Cook had been prescient in recognizing that hiring and retaining talented women was a strategic
priority for the firm. Once Deloitte was hiring men and women in roughly equal numbers, he
assumed it would be just a matter of time—the 9 to 12 years it typically took to make partner—until
women would be presented for partner at rates approaching 50%. Cook was confident that there was
no glass ceiling at Deloitte; it was simply a matter of waiting for women to work their way through
the pipeline.

But here it was a decade later, and instead of increasing, the numbers were holding stubbornly at
a miserable 10%. Not only that; there was a significant and growing gap in turnover, between the
percentage of women leaving the firm and men—the so-called “gender gap.” In an industry defined
by competition for talent, the gender gap wasn’t a “women’s issue”; it was a strategic business issue.

Cook picked up his legal pad and sketched a graph of his own. The line on top indicated the
steadily upward rate of women being hired by Deloitte. The line below it, trending steadily
downward, indicated the rate of retention of women. He called it “The Stupid Curve”: it didn’t take
a rocket scientist—or even an accountant—to recognize that the growing area in the middle was the

1 P.M. Flynn, J.D. Leeth, and E.S. Levy, “The Evolving Gender Mix in Accounting: Implications for the Future of the
Profession,” Selections, vol. XII, no. 2 (1996): 28-39.

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300-012 Deloitte & Touche (A): A Hole in the Pipeline

2

problem. While the firm was hiring more and more women, it was retaining fewer and fewer.
Deloitte had a talent hemorrhage on its hands.

1980-1991: An Industry in Transition

From Compliance to Value Creation

Not only did Deloitte grow dramatically from 1980 to 1991, becoming by 1991 the American center
of a global network operating in over 100 countries; the nature of its business changed radically. In
1980, the majority of Deloitte’s revenues came from providing services that helped clients comply
with federal laws—for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s requirements for audits
of companies’ financial statements, and the IRS’s requirements for corporate taxation. At that time, a
typical Deloitte office had three basic service lines—A&A (accounting and auditing), tax, and
consulting—with a partner in charge of each service line. Each office was led by an office managing
partner, or OMP, usually an audit partner. Audit was the dominant business, accounting for 50% to
60% of total revenues.

Audit was primarily an annuity business: 75% of Deloitte’s audit business was recurring. In
audit, the emphasis was on continuity, “growing up on the client” while taking an increasing amount
of responsibility each year. Sixty-five percent of the tax business was also recurring; tax work was
largely technical, most of it performed in the Deloitte office rather than at the client site.

In the 1980s, however, the biggest area of growth for Deloitte and firms like it—the so-called “Big
6,” including Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen & Co., KPMG Peat Marwick, Coopers & Lybrand, and
Price Waterhouse—was in consulting, both as a separate component and as consultative services
within the audit and tax functions. (See Exhibit 1, The Big 6 as of 1991.) Consulting work had a very
different dynamic from the traditional tax and audit functions: it was project-oriented, less local,
involving a lot of travel; and, because it was not necessarily recurring, it was much more
entrepreneurial. Consulting attracted aggressive types; in the 1980s, the line on consultants was,
“They hunt it, they kill it, and they eat it.”

The economic downturn in the early 1990s caused many businesses to pull back in many areas
and look to outsiders to bring in expertise that had previously been in-house. The trend throughout
corporate America was toward outsourcing—shifting away from all areas that were not essential to
their business strategy. The downsizing that began in the early 1990s—major corporations cutting
thousands of jobs—fueled the dramatic growth of the Big 6 firms, which picked up the growing
outsourcing business. For example, Deloitte might provide an entire internal audit function or tax
administration function for companies that used to do it themselves. Where Deloitte previously
provided the know-how but not the people to staff such projects, now they were a major provider of
talent to corporations that no longer found it efficient or cost-effective to have the staff on their own
payroll.

These changes made hiring and training professionals a strategic imperative. “This value-based
service was heavily driven by the expertise and the experience of our people,” Cook explained. “It
put a much higher premium on people who have extensive experience and training. And it changed
our training equation completely, in terms of conveying knowledge-based information as opposed to
just ‘here are the rules; make sure that you get the right numbers on the right lines.’”

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3

Moreover, it made retaining professionals even more critical. “This was not about hiring 10 people
so that you could have four of them left at the end of five years,” Cook explained, “and two of them
after 10 years, one of whom made partner. This was about hiring 10 people and having all 10 of them
at the end of five years.” Deloitte recognized that a certain amount of turnover would always be part
of the business; typically, the firm lost a significant number of its professionals to clients each year.
“We always knew turnover was very expensive and always wished it were lower,” Cook explained,
“but we never had the driving, strategic need to address that issue as we did when we saw the
business transform into this value-based business.”

Competition for Talent

The other significant change from 1980 to 1991 was that the marketplace for high-talent,
experienced professionals became fiercely competitive. The limit on Deloitte’s growth was not a
matter of demand for its services, but a matter of supply—having enough people on hand to meet
that demand. It was a simple matter, according to Cook, of how much “inventory” Deloitte had to
sell in the marketplace: “If your revenue is the product of your people and their value in the
marketplace, and you can keep more of them with high talent and strong experience, then you’ll have
a competitive advantage.”

Working for Deloitte & Touche

Deloitte & Touche was divided into two parts: Audit, Tax, and Related Services (ATR); and
Deloitte Consulting. Traditionally, Deloitte & Touche was dominated by audit and tax services, and
virtually all new hires entered the firm right out of college. Increasingly, the practice developed a
much broader set of consultative specialties; new hires entered the firm at varying levels, with
varying levels of experience. Work in the audit and tax divisions had a similar structure of job levels,
years to promotion, and compensation. (See Exhibit 2, Job Levels.) A college graduate entering the
audit practice typically spent one year as a staff accountant, followed by one year as a “semi-senior.”
Staff accountants typically worked on basic sections of an audit while semi-seniors worked on more
sophisticated concepts and more sophisticated sections of the balance sheet. A “senior” worked on
multiple sections of the audit and supervised the staff accountants. From entry through the senior
level, a total of five years, professionals worked on a single engagement at a time, ranging anywhere
from a week to several months, depending on the size and sophistication of the client.

Managers and senior managers worked on multiple engagements simultaneously. As they
accumulated experience, they developed industry and service line expertise—specializing, for
example, in financial institutions, utilities, consumer-intensive businesses, or high technology—and
focused on working with clients in those industries. After 10 to 12 years, senior managers looked
forward to the major promotion: admission to partnership. Deloitte partners were equity owners of
the firm. They functioned as account managers, reviewing the work of all the staff below them; had
sole authority to sign official audit opinions for the firm; and were active in developing new business.

Consulting differed from the tax and audit functions in several ways: The entry level was
typically from an MBA program rather than college graduate. There was more tension in consulting
for quick advancement than in audit or tax. Work was done on an engagement-by-engagement basis,
highly dependent on the problem being solved for the client. Consulting entailed more travel, more
business development—and higher compensation. In many ways, work for Deloitte Consulting had
more in common with other consulting firms—McKinsey, Bain, or Booz Allen—than with Deloitte’s
audit and tax divisions.

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4

The Merger

In December 1989, Deloitte & Touche LLP was created in the merger of two accounting firms,
Deloitte Haskins & Sells, and Touche Ross & Co. Only two months earlier, two other major
accounting firms had merged to create Ernst & Young. The “Big 8” was down to the “Big 6”—just six
firms competing for worldwide business. Although Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Touche Ross looked
similar on paper—each with 10,000 employees and $800 million in revenue—they had sharply
contrasting cultures. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, formed in 1898, had a reputation as “the auditor’s
auditor,” a conservative, buttoned-down, risk-averse firm. Touche Ross was consultancy-driven, an
entrepreneurial, scrappy, kick-ass firm, the youngest of The Big 6. At the time, the business press
called the merger “the marriage of Jimmy Stewart and Madonna.” Everyone in the new firm knew
who was a “D-guy” or a “T-guy.”

The new Deloitte & Touche scrambled to integrate the two firms—client service capabilities,
offices, and systems. At the same time, there was an intense focus on client service, in an effort to
fend off competitors who were nipping at the new firm’s heels everywhere they could. To
compound the challenge, within a month of the merger the U.S. economy plunged into a full-scale
recession. By the time the recession was over 18 months later, the number of employees had been cut
from 20,000 to 15,000—a cut equivalent of half of one of the predecessor firms.

If the merger temporarily threw the new firm into chaos, it also made it more receptive to change.
“We were building a new culture for a new firm,” Cook said. “We approached the merger as an
opportunity to have a fresh look at everything. In 1991, once the dust settled, Cook asked Human
Resources for statistics on the numbers of men and women being nominated for partner that year,
and a projection of women up for partner in the next two years. While Cook was shaking his head at
the numbers, retaining talented women wasn’t high on most partners’ agendas. They were worried
that the bottom was falling out of their business.

To Cook, however, the gaping hole in the pipeline wasn’t a gender problem; it was a business
problem. “You can’t hire 50% of your people and have them leaving at increasing rates,” he
explained, “or you’re going to have a human resources disaster.” Turnover was expensive—Deloitte
conservatively estimated the cost of replacing an employee to be 150% of annual compensation; and
it was a particular problem for a professional services firm.

Analyzing Talent Issues: Why Are Women Leaving?

Cook thought he already knew why women were leaving. He had grown up in the firm; like
virtually all of the senior partners at Deloitte, all of them men, his wife had stayed home to keep
house and raise their three children. Cook always expected somewhat higher turnover in women
than men because, as he saw it, “Men have two choices: they’ll work for us or they’ll work for
somebody else. Women have three choices: they’ll work for us or they’ll work for somebody else or
they’ll raise a family. And because they have that third choice, there will always be higher turnover
in women than men.” But he was determined not to let The Stupid Curve get any worse.

In January 1992, Deloitte’s board established the “Task Force on the Retention and Advancement
of Women,” charging it with a one-year mission to learn why women were leaving the firm at a faster
rate than men and develop recommendations to reverse the trend. In selecting the 19 Task Force
members, most of them partners, Mike Cook included a cross-section of the organization—
representatives from each division (consulting, audit, and tax); men and women, younger and older,

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Deloitte & Touche (A): A Hole in the Pipeline 300-012

5

from offices across the United States; people who were single, married without children, married
with children. Cook chaired the Task Force and attended all meetings.

Lois Evans, a highly successful partner on the consulting side of the firm, recalled the first meeting
of the Task Force, in a large conference room in the Manhattan office. After Cook explained why he
had assembled the group and sketched the scope of the problem, he asked them to go around the
table and talk about how they felt about being part of this initiative. “The general sentiment
expressed was, ‘I appreciate being here, this is an important issue, I’m looking forward to getting
involved,’” Evans recalled. But as her turn got closer, she realized that she didn’t feel that way at
all—and she said so:

I wasn’t that happy to be there. In fact, I was very uncomfortable being there. I had spent
my entire career not making my gender an issue. And to think that here I was going to spend
my time on a Task Force—and Mike had made it clear that he expected us to be spokespeople
back into the organization and visible leaders of something, even though we didn’t know what
that “something” was going to be.

Evans’s discomfort, it turned out, was shared by many of the successful women in the firm. They
had worked hard, proven themselves, and gotten ahead. End of story. Ellen Stafford-Sigg, a new
senior manager on the consulting side at the time, remembers being curious about the Task Force and
its work, but “skeptical that it would be perceived as an affirmative action type of program.” She
was concerned that “by focusing on women and differences, I was going to have to explain more or
prove more to my male colleagues that I was really as good as they were… I was concerned that this
was something that was going to set me apart from my male colleagues, and I was working pretty
hard to fit in with them.”

The Task Force members set about their work with the expertise and efficiency of a team of
consultants on an important engagement. First, they examined Deloitte’s personnel records for the
previous three years: how many men and women had been hired at each level, how many women
had been promoted, the turnover rate for both women and men. The data were illuminating:
although men and women left the firm in roughly equal numbers at the entry level, at higher and
higher levels, women were leaving at an ever-increasing rate.

Next, the Task Force hired Catalyst, a nonprofit research organization that advises corporations on
how to move women ahead. Catalyst began by interviewing 40 high-potential women who had left
Deloitte in the previous year. In their official exit interviews, the women had said they loved the
firm, but had decided to do something else. However, it turned out that exit interviews are not very
reliable; they are not anonymous and, as the Task Force discovered, nobody burns their bridges in
exit interviews. The confidential Catalyst interviews told a different story. Over 70% of the women
who had left Deloitte were still employed full-time one year later. Another 20% were working part-
time at other firms. Fewer than 10% were at home with small children, and even they intended to
return to full-time work in the near future. The interviewees just didn’t want to work for Deloitte—or
any place like it.

The Catalyst interviews and the 500-page report of its findings were destroyed. “There was a
great deal of concern about litigation,” Cook explained. “In fact, many people said we shouldn’t be
looking into it for precisely that reason.” But their gist is remembered all too well. “Those of us who
were on the Task Force can remember exactly where we were when we read the report, what chair
we were sitting in,” Jim Wall, Deloitte’s National Human Resources director, recalled. “It boiled
down to: ‘This is a lousy place for a woman to work.’”

“It was a tough report to read,” agreed Ellen Gabriel, a partner and Task Force member:

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300-012 Deloitte & Touche (A): A Hole in the Pipeline

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Most of the women were saying, “I don’t feel valued. I feel like the minute I say I’m getting
married or having a child, I’m written off. I don’t feel there’s anybody willing to invest in me.
I don’t have a mentor. I don’t know where I’m going. I don’t know what kind of a career I
want. I don’t see women in leadership positions. I don’t see role models. The women who
made it kill themselves working, or they never got married or they didn’t have kids, and that’s
not what I want for myself.” These were savvy women, a lot of them here three, four, five
years, saying, “This is a pretty ugly place to work if you’re a woman.”

Catalyst also interviewed 500 people throughout Deloitte in small, all-men and all-women focus
groups. According to Gabriel, men reported that it was “uncomfortable” to mentor women: “It was
uncomfortable to give a woman difficult feedback because you didn’t know if she was going to break
down and cry in your office. You were never sure whether a woman was going to stay or not, so you
weren’t as likely to put her in charge of a high-profile assignment.” In short, Gabriel concluded, “A
lot of people were making a lot of assumptions about other people’s lives: A woman doesn’t want to
travel, doesn’t want to be out at night. A woman doesn’t want to go out and have drinks because she
has other commitments. So we won’t even ask her because she’ll feel bad about saying no.”

The Catalyst report identified three areas crucial to the advancement and retention of women:

Male-dominated work environment First, women described Deloitte’s work environment as
male-dominated—organized around male behavior, male ways of doing things, male filters, all of
which was a foreign language for women. Because of that, women felt intrinsically less worthy, less
valued, less important, less like they were making a contribution. While there was nothing wrong
with male norms of behavior, Catalyst pointed out, they are different from women’s, and there had to
be a way of recognizing that and adjusting for it in the culture. Otherwise, women would always feel
like second-class citizens.

Opportunities for career advancement Second, Catalyst reported, women in the firm
consistently perceived that they had fewer opportunities for career advancement than men. The
built-in systems for advancement—mentoring, coaching, counseling, networking—that worked for
the men didn’t work for the women. Because women were not being mentored, were not getting
their fair share of the best assignments, were not being included in informal networks, and didn’t
have role models of successful women, they were coming to the same conclusion: “I’m not going to
get ahead here, so I might as well cut my losses now and move on.”

Work/life balance The third issue Catalyst identified was work/life balance—coping with the
often crushing work schedule that was typical of the firm. Although this was assumed to be the
major reason women were leaving the firm, Catalyst ranked it as third in importance. For many
women, however, it was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Ellen Gabriel summed up their
sentiment: “It would be one thing to do this job if the environment were supportive and if I thought I
could get ahead. But without those two, who needs it?”

According to Jim Wall, the Catalyst report boiled down to, “You know what, guys? You grew up
here and you think this is a great place. But there is a whole class of people who don’t agree with
you. And by the way, a lot of the younger men don’t agree with you either. And if you think you’re
going to grow this business 25% to 30% a year with 25% to 30% of the people leaving, you’ve got
another think coming.”

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Deloitte & Touche (A): A Hole in the Pipeline 300-012

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Presentation of Findings

In January 1993, one year after it was convened, the Task Force presented its findings and
preliminary recommendations to the Management Committee, a group of 20 to 25 senior partners, all
of them male. (See Exhibit 3, Summary of Findings and Exhibit 4, Recommendations and
Implementation Strategy.) The three-hour meeting was critical: the Task Force knew that if the
Management Committee didn’t support this initiative, it wouldn’t fly.

Jim Copeland, managing partner of the Atlanta office at the time, recalled his initial reaction to the
presentation:

1991 is burned in the brains of all Deloitte & Touche partners as a colossal disaster of a
year—the adverse economic impact of the merger, the economy, the S&L debacle, the M&A
business which we prided ourselves on just went dead. So we were sitting there two years
later, just dead in water financially, with serious economic and motivation problems. All the
partners were unhappy because they weren’t going to make any money this year. And Mike
Cook said, “You know what we’re going to do? We’re going to have a women’s initiative.” Of
all the things to put on the radar screen at that point in time. Nobody thought it was a bad
thing to do. But as the Titanic was going down, it was “We’re going to paint the lifeboats.”

Not only did the timing strike Copeland as peculiar; he wasn’t even convinced there was a
problem. “We hire the right number of people,” he said, “we put them in the pot, they sink or swim
just like everybody else.” Some die-hards in the firm actually argued that the “problem” of female
turnover could be solved easily: just stop hiring so many women. The Task Force’s answer to that
argument was to point to the business case. “We’re hiring the best talent at the business schools, and
half of them are women,” they explained to the partners. “If you’d like us to cut that down to 25%
women and 75% men, where are we going to get the next 25% of the men? Lower capability. And let
that more capable 25% of women go to our competitors.” The business case worked for the senior
partners, Copeland explained:

The compelling information for me was that at one time we hired 100 men. Ten years later
we made the best 10 men partners. And now we were hiring 50 men and 50 women, and
taking the best 10 out of 50 men instead of the best 10 out of 100. So we had to be diluting the
quality of the partnership. By golly, that one got my attention on this issue in a serious way. It
was clear from the numbers that we were diluting the talent pool. But I still wasn’t convinced
that there was an environmental problem.

Copeland’s “environmental” skepticism was shared by many of the senior partners. “We were
patting ourselves on the back,” Cook recalled, “saying this was an equal opportunity place and we
didn’t have any cultural issues, it was all just mechanics and it would work itself out.” The skeptics
in the meeting began voicing their opinions—“Our clients are never going to like this flexible work
arrangement” and so on. “What’s the problem,” one Management Committee member asked
rhetorically. “I’m not really sure what you’re trying to tell us.”

With which one Task Force member, the once-reluctant Lois Evans, one of the top-ranked
women in the firm, looked him right in the eye and said, “What we’re trying to tell you is, there are
days when this is really a crappy place for a woman to work.”

Her words stopped the partners in their tracks. As Ellen Gabriel remembered the moment, “You
could have heard a pin drop. Everybody sort of took a step back and said, ‘Well, if Lois feels that
way, then what must that be like?’”

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300-012 Deloitte & Touche (A): A Hole in the Pipeline

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The moment seems to have become part of the firm’s family history, recalled and recounted by
partner after partner. “For all of us who had pride in the organization,” Cook said, “to be told that by
a partner we really respected, who had come up through the organization, was just a jolting moment.
It had more impact than all the charts and numbers… We had to confront the fact that we weren’t
what we thought we were, which was a gender-neutral, warm and fuzzy, met-our-mission-statement
kind of an outfit.”

“You can’t believe the impact that has on somebody who’s spent 25 years of their life trying to
make this firm into a great place to work,” Jim Copeland said. “We thought we were building the
greatest place to work in the world, and this female partner stands up and says, ‘No it isn’t. It
sucks.’” It was starting to dawn on Deloitte partners that their firm might need to change. The
question now was what to change, and how.

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300-012 -9-

Exhibit 1 The Big 6 after 1991

Number of
% Revenue Clients Revenue Split (%)

Fiscal U.S. Net Change vs. Number Registered Management
Year Revenue Previous of Number Number with the Audit and Consulting

Rank Firm/HQ Location End ($ Million) Year Partners of Staff of Offices SEC Attest Tax Services

1 Arthur Andersen & Co/
New York Aug $2,463.5 8.0 1,370 18,586 89 1,738 35 21 44

2 Ernst & Young/
New York Sept 2,240 0 1,921 15,869 111 2,559 52 23 25

3 Deloitte & Touche/
Wilton, Connecticut June 1,952 1.6 1,525 11,075 116 2,079 55 23 22

4 KPMG Peat Marwick/
New York June 1,813 0 1,555 11,445 135 2,201 53 29 18

5 Coopers & Lybrand/
New York Sept 1,470 3.9 1,282 11,419 98 1,455 57 19 24

6 Price Waterhouse/
New York June 1,300 8.3 950 8,500 113 1,828 45 27 28

Source: Public Accounting Report, “The PAR Top 100,” Strafford Publications, Atlanta, Georgia.

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300-012 Deloitte & Touche (A): A Hole in the Pipeline

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Exhibit 2 Deloitte & Touche: Job Levels (1991)

Job Level Years to Promotion

Audit and Tax

Staff accountant 1
Semi-senior 1
Senior 3

Manager 2-3
Senior Manager 2-4

Partner [after 8-12 years]

Deloitte Consulting

Note: The rate of job progression in consulting is
faster than in audit and taxes; compensation is
higher; and professionals typically enter at
varying levels with varying experience.

Associate consultant (pre-MBA) 2
Senior consultant (MBA entry) 1-3
Manager 2-3
Senior Manager 3-4
Partner

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300-012 -11-

Exhibit 3 Summary of Findings of the Task Force on the Retention and Advancement of Women

Source: “Recommendations and Implementation Strategy,” Preliminary Discussion Document, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, January 15, 1993.

This document is authorized for use only by Matthew Spears (Mattspears16@hotmail.com). Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Please contact customerservice@harvardbusiness.org or 800-988-0886 for additional copies.

300-012 -12-

Exhibit 4 Recommendations and Implementation Strategy of the Task Force on the Retention and Advancement of Women

Source: “Recommendations and Implementation Strategy,” Preliminary Discussion Document, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, January 15, 1993.
This document is authorized for use only by Matthew Spears (Mattspears16@hotmail.com). Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Please contact customerservice@harvardbusiness.org or 800-988-0886 for additional copies.

300-012 -13-

Exhibit 4 (continued)

Source: “Recommendations and Implementation Strategy,” Preliminary Discussion Document, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, January 15, 1993.
This document is authorized for use only by Matthew Spears (Mattspears16@hotmail.com). Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Please contact customerservice@harvardbusiness.org or 800-988-0886 for additional copies.