hi

looking for someone to  do

A brief discussion of this case paper (optional reading):

Leadership implications in complex projects: The Boeing Dreamliner and Jim McNerney

• Consider the following problem areas in your response – (1) Stakeholder communications analysis.

attached is the already written stakeholder communication analysis paper , just need someone to follow click the link read the article and merge it with the paper.

also attached is example of my team mate part, it can serve as a guide to writing mine. thanks

urgent please please

Stakeholder

Communications and Analysis

Effective communication is regarded as one of the most crucial aspects of a project or any change initiative. Therefore, this stakeholders’ communications and analysis plan will help address the core questions around the project’s communication efforts (Jain et al., 2017). The following are some of the critical questions that are essential in planning for stakeholders’ communications and analysis.

· Who are the people who need to know about your change?

· What are the likely concerns for each group?

· How are you going to ensure they understand it?

· What are the key points you need each group of people to know/understand?

· How will you respond to them to ensure you build a critical mass that supports your change?

Stakeholder Analysis

A stakeholder analysis refers to the essential way people who are required to know about the change are identified and their likely concern in the project. Therefore, presented below is a brief guide that will help develop a stakeholder analysis (Alsulaimi & Abdullah, 2020). The steps involved include.

Step II: Categorizing Stakeholders

In this step, it is very instrumental to categorize all stakeholders regarding their influence and attention. What needs to be considered is the amount of influence that every stakeholder group has or will have on the project’s success or any change that is likely to be incurred (Alsulaimi & Abdullah, 2020). Additionally, every stakeholder group’s possible attention concerning the project’s success needs to be considered. However, there is a great need to map each stakeholder group in terms of

Influence

–

Attention

as shown in the diagram below.

High

Mapping Influence and Attention

To continue with this example of a change that involves project management and communication of any change required in the project, the board of directors, administrative, professional staff, and Head of departments may all have a high degree of both influence and attention in enabling the success of the change initiative as well as the success of the project (Di Maria, 2018).

Employees

may have low influence and insufficient attention. It’s essential to monitor stakeholders over time; the Head of departments may increase in attentiveness due to a number of factors as the change initiative evolves, so may the customers and suppliers.

Stakeholder Management

Throughout the project, every stakeholder must be managed to meet all their communication needs. Therefore, with the use of information systems, a stakeholder will be tracked to ensure that he/she is adequately moving to his/her desired place of project buy-in (Eskerod & Larsen, 2018). that means all stakeholders don’t need to be in full approval; it is essential to ensure acceptance to minimize any chances of active opposition.

Communication

Plan

Provided that there is a better understanding of who the stakeholders are, it is now time to develop an effective communication plan. Nevertheless, the communication plan is responsible for providing a well-planned, structured approach to communications. It ensures that all stakeholders are involved in achieving the project’s objective through consultations of their areas of interest and concern.

Key Messages: the key messages that are required to reinforce a communication need to be considered. But they will be very different for each stage of the project or change initiative (Alsulaimi & Abdullah, 2020). Therefore, below are some example of critical messages that relate to the success of a project of any change initiative that might arise in the process of completing a project.

· The new methodologies introduced in the project have an evidence base that supports the project as a superior practice.

· All employees and other staff will receive professional development in any new methodology introduced.

· There are benefits for all stakeholders from adopting the new methodologies.

· There will be not one who will be adversely affected due to the new completion of the project and any new methodology introduced.

Channel: It very essential to consider several channels for communication. For instance, any change by mail is infrequent to be considered effective (Eskerod & Larsen, 2018). Therefore, the communication channels that are deemed effective include meetings, project briefs, video links, teleconference, and one-on-one. In that case, a project manager needs to consider the most instrumental channel for the relevant audience and the message that he/she is trying to convey.

After getting a better understanding of all relevant stakeholders, the key messages that need to be communicated, and the most effective communication channels, the next thing is to develop a communication plan. Below is a table showing an example of putting it all together into a communication plan for the completion of a project.

Monthly

The communication plan will identify how all the key stakeholders will be communicated with the relevant frequency and medium. The plan establishes the content of communication required by each stakeholder and what it intends to accomplish.

Conclusion

Every stakeholder has his/her own unique needs, which require to be addressed individually. Additionally, all projects have primary stakeholders that need to be identified, and proper communication is a key to ensure all their needs have been addressed appropriately.

Reference

Alsulaimi, A., & Abdullah, T. (2020, March). Management of Stakeholder Communications in IT Projects. In 2020 3rd International Conference on Computer Applications & Information Security (ICCAIS) (pp. 1-6). IEEE. Retrieved from

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9096842

Di Maria, D. L. (2018). Navigating Stakeholder Communications. International Educator, 27(5), 50-52. Retrieved from

https://search.proquest.com/openview/5c26215a21553e724e21d50f6d29b969/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=44755

Eskerod, P., & Larsen, T. (2018). Advancing project stakeholder analysis by the concept’ shadows of the context’. International Journal of Project Management, 36(1), 161-169. Retrieved from

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263786317301114

Jain, T., Aguilera, R. V., & Jamali, D. (2017). Corporate stakeholder orientation in an emerging country context: A longitudinal cross-industry analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, 143(4), 701-719. Retrieved from

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-016-3074-1

Planning Project Communications and Analysis 

In order to navigate communications successfully throughout a project’s lifecycle, a cohesive communication plan must be instituted from the beginning of the project. A project’s leadership team must develop and maintain understanding of what the information needs are. Communications requirements analysis is the first step in defining a communication plan and it is important to define the types of information to deliver, who receives the information, the format for communicating information, and the timing of the information’s release and distribution (Communication Systems, 2007, Watt, 2014). The Boeing project was a highly complex project with several moving parts. Crucial information in complex projects can be lost or delayed if the communications plan is not functioning correctly (Darnell and Preston, 2016). Because this project was highly complex, it would have required a heavily detailed communication plan from Boeing which would ensure that the information needed by the project team and stakeholders was generated to support the project’s schedule and decisions. Utilizing a communications system would have alleviated some of the difficulties Boeing and its project members faced. It is unknown if Boeing had such systems in place. 

During this project, Boeing introduced a new risk and revenue sharing contract with its suppliers, called the “build-to-performance” model, and introduced a new assembly method where subcontractors were required to integrate their own subsystems. According to this case, many subcontractors were not able to meet delivery schedules due to lack of experience in the subsystem design and integration and noted a lack of guidelines and training. Not communicating or understanding the lack of training upfront proved to be a misstep that caused significant schedule delays and inappropriate documentation for final delivery. Many of these same subcontractor’s organizations were located overseas. It is unclear, and would have been important, if Boeing noted the differences in time zones and calculated any differences to ensure important meetings or deadlines were not missed (Darnell & Preston, 2016).  

Communication, or the lack of it, has an impact on a project’s success and thus, project owners should ensure consistent and open communication (Rajkumar, 2010). Partially through the Boeing project there was a change in leadership which could have caused disruptions to business relationships and communication channels to the project’s team and stakeholders. It is important to implement communication systems to ensure complete understanding of messages and eliminate obstacles which prevent effective communication to all identified project members and stakeholders.  

Leadership implications in complex projects: The Boeing Dreamliner and Jim McNerney1 Gina Vega Organizational Ergonomics Note to Faculty: There is a teaching note available to faculty only for this case. To obtain the document, please request it directly from the PMITeach.org administrator at pmcurriculum@pmi.org on your school letterhead. In defense of criticism of Boeing’s 787 production delays, CEO Jim McNerney explained: We are trying to come up with the strongest set of partnerships we can with the people that supply our major systems and structures. In defense, we are trying to respond to the pressures of governments buying fewer things at lower prices, with less favorable contract terms. And that pressure cannot just stop at Boeing. We have to find willing partners [to share the burden]. And on the commercial side, low-cost carriers and a very flattish global economy leads you to the same conclusion. So the ‘no-fly list’ is people who don’t want to play ball, who only want to hide behind the contractual language of their current programs. We’re going to give those who do want to work with us more business—or we’ll move some things in-house. This is a not a rape, pillage and plunder exercise. This is the reality we all face. The majority of [suppliers] are beginning to have productive discussions with us. We have some holdouts, people who take the position that the pressure should only be absorbed by Boeing, notwithstanding the fact that 65 percent of most of our airplanes are built by suppliers…we both have to demand lots of productivity [improvements] to offset price pressure. Those that work with us in that way will find more volume. We are the biggest player. My message is, ‘Don’t bet against us.’i The Boeing Dreamliner Boeing Corporation was one of the world’s largest manufacturers of commercial aircraft, ranking 27th on the Fortune 500 list in 2016. When it announced the delivery of its first 787 Dreamliner transporter to its first customer, All Nippon Airways, in September, 2011, it was almost 40 months later than originally planned, after a long series of unexpected delays. The actual development cost of the project had been estimated at about US$40 billion but came in over twice the original estimate. One year later, a malfunction was discovered in one of the aircraft’s lithium batteries, which caught fire after takeoff. These problems led to months of grounding, imposed by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration), of the entire Dreamliner fleet already in service. The Dreamliner was designed to be a revolutionary project in terms of physical characteristics, technology, management style, financing, design and engineering management, quality assurance, and assembly processes. Many of these initiatives were intentionally taken on to benefit from new developments in aviation technology and to speed up design and development; however, they posed unexpected challenges for both the company and the project team. 1 This case is based on Shenhar, A.J., V. Holzmann, B. Melamed & Y. Zhao. (2016). The challenge of innovation in highly complex projects: What can we learn from Boeing’s Dreamliner experience? Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2; 62-78. A New Organizational Paradigm Boeing adopted a new organizational paradigm for the development of Dreamliner and decided to outsource an unprecedented portion of the design, engineering, manufacturing, and production to a global network of 700 local and foreign suppliers. With more than 70% foreign development content, this decision turned Boeing’s traditional supply chain into a development chain. Tier-1 suppliers became responsible for the detailed design and manufacturing of 11 major subassemblies, while Boeing only did system integration and final assembly. Figure 1 lists the project’s major subassemblies and their tier-1 suppliers. Furthermore, Boeing came up with a new risk and revenue sharing contract with its suppliers, called the “build-to-performance” model (as differentiated from the more typical “build-to-spec” or “build-toprint” models). According to the model, contract suppliers bore the non-recurring R&D cost up-front, owned the intellectual property of their design, and got paid a share of the revenues from future aircraft sales. Table 1 summarizes the main features of this model. Under this model, the suppliers’ roles were dramatically changed from mere subcontractors to strategic partners who had a long-term stake in the project. This model created some risks, which caused extensive integration problems and additional delays. Finally, Boeing employed a new assembly method. Subcontractors were required to integrate their own subsystems and send their preassembled subsystems to a single final assembly site. The goal was to reduce Boeing’s integration effort by leveraging subcontractors to do more work compared with previous projects. However, many of these subcontractors were not able to meet their delivery schedules due to lack of experience in subsystem design and integration, as well as insufficient guidelines and training. As a consequence, parts and assemblies, which were sent to Boeing for integration, were missing the appropriate documentation, including instructions for final assembly. Unanticipated Consequences Supply chain and design delays increased, as did Boeing’s financial losses, including penalties for late delivery of the aircraft. CEO McNerney had to face some hard facts based on earlier decisions. He acknowledged that his new paradigm may have been flawed, “We got a little bit seduced that it would all come together seamlessly and the same design rules would be applied everywhere in the world and corners wouldn’t be cut and financial realities wouldn’t hit certain folks.”ii McNerney’s approach to workers, suppliers, and labor resources was notably off-putting, according to many in Washington State, Boeing’s corporate home. Since 2011 when Boeing opened its non-unionized South Carolina assembly plant where salaries were approximately $10/hour less than those of the unionized workers in Washington Stateiii, worker relationships have been troubled. While admirers have touted his efficiency and ability to deliver profits, alienated professionals at every level, along with union members, have described McNerney as “cold-blooded.” One labor specialist stated, “A lot of employees feel top management doesn’t value them, treats them as expendable…[creating an atmosphere of] lowered trust, anger and disgruntlement.”iv According to Richard Aboulafia, noted aerospace specialist, “Management believes if it continues to squeeze suppliers and labor, the problem[s] will be solved. Again, the track record here is not great. Most of the manufacturing world tell a very different story. Whether it’s with cars, aircraft or turbines, productivity improvements often come from the shop floor. That means convincing the people who build things to identify ways to reduce scrap, improve work flow and eliminate defects. To promote the kind of process improvements that happen in the factory, a work force needs incentives such as profit-sharing or other compensation. At the very least, machinists and engineers need to believe their work is valued. Taking away pensions at a time of record sales is simply a bad way to motivate workers to go the extra mile. Boeing right now embodies a strange combination of very good and very bad.” v McNerney’s management style created its own problems. He vacillated between maintaining his dispassionate, hands-off general management style with multiple-times per day meetings with executives during the Dreamliner grounding crisis. His revolving door policy for managers in charge of the 787 project (four in as many years)vi generated a sense of uncertainty at all levels in the company and increased pressure to meet goals quickly. This focus on urgency caused him to reflect, after having resolved the major problems in the Dreamliner, that the plane could have been completed sooner had Boeing listened more to the customer and less to innovative technology. He said, in a rare interview in 2014, “What I would like to have done is pursued 70 percent of the technology that still would have satisfied 95 percent of [customer desire]. It would have gotten to them quicker, and it would have cost us less…You get excited about these projects, and things creep into the design and you lose discipline sometimes. We just need to be reminded about that.”vii As described by an anonymous former Boeing executive, “The sense I always got from him in meetings is that it could have been any business…If we’d been making cameras or autos or doing bond trading, it would have all been the same to him. The net effect is distancing from the people who come to work there every day, who bring their hearts and souls to it and want to make it more than a job.”viii

References

Aboulafia, R. (March 9, 2015). Boeing should not lean on labor to cover 787 losses, Aviation Week & Space Technology. Vol 177, Issue 9: 1. Anselmo, J.C., C Joseph, and G. Norris. (June 17, 2013). ‘Don’t bet against us,” Aviation Week and Space Technology. Vol 175 Issue 20: 72. Anselmo, J.C. and G. Warwick. (July 14, 2014). ‘Not backing off,’ Aviation Week and Space Technology. Vol 176, Issue 24: 62-64. Gates, D. (December 1, 2014). Boeing boss Jim McNerney’s turbulent tenure, Seattle Times. http://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-boss-jim-mcnerneyrsquos-turbulent-tenure/ (Retrieved May 30, 2016). Hymowitz, C. and T. Black. (January 18, 2013). It’s not his mess, just his to clean up, Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Issue 4314: 14-16. Ostrower, J. and J.S. Lublin. (January 24, 2013). The two men behind the 787, The Wall Street Journal. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324039504578260164279497602. Retrieved May 30, 2016. Shenhar, A.J., V. Holzmann, B. Melamed, and Y. Zhao. (2016). The challenge of innovation in highly complex projects: What can we learn from Boeing’s Dreamliner experience?, Project Management Journal. Vol 47, No. 2: 62-78. Wilhellm, S. (April 8, 2015). Boeing’s South Carolina workers make $10 per hour less than those in Everett, Seattle News. http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2015/04/08/boeings-south-carolinaworkers-make-10-less-per.html (Retrieved May 30, 2016). i Anselmo,et al. (6/17/2013). Don’t bet against us. ii Ostrower, J. and J.S. Lublin. (1/24/2013). The two men behind the 787. iii Wilhellm, S. (4/8/2015). Boeing’s South Carolina workers make $10 per hour less than those in Everett. iv Gates, D. (12/1/2014) Boeing boss Jim McNerney’s turbulent tenure. v Aboulafia R. (3/9/2015). Boeing should not lean on labor to cover 787 losses. vi Hymowitz, C., T. Black. (1/18/2013). It’s not his mess, just his to clean up. vii Anselmo, J.C. and G. Warwick. (7/14/2014). ‘Not backing off.’ viii Gates, op cit. Figure 1: 787 Project’s Tier-1 Suppliers