Identify a group of victims of some harmful activity who still has not been “discovered” (or “rediscovered”) officially as victims. Describe the types of harm this group is experiencing, and why you think they are still not considered “victims” by many in society.

Suggested outline of the paper

After the introductory paragraph, which should summarize the thesis, why the topic is something we should care about, and how the subsequent paragraphs will be organized, you should explain the meaning of the “discovery” of victims. You should cite the textbook and/or the article “The social construction of violence”. Provide some well-known examples that demonstrate how the “discovery” process tends to unfold, and the major types of actors that are usually involved. 

Next, explain the plight of the group you chose to study for this paper, who is victim of some crime or injustice but generally not recognized as such by the dominant society and the law. What is happening to this group? Why is it happening? Make sure that your discussion is based on research. Provide statistics, in-depth examples, or other types of empirical evidence whenever possible to support important points. 

Next, explain, in your view, why this particular group is not yet viewed as “victims” by the dominant society. Again, cite evidence where appropriate. 

Then, offer some suggestions on how the (re)discovery of this victim group could be moved forward. Are there signs that this group is in the process of being (re)discovered as victims? For example, are there any grassroots campaigns or non-governmental organizations working to bring public attention to the problem? Has there been any proposed legislation (at local, state or federal levels) to address the problem(s) faced by the group? 

Finally, include a conclusion paragraph that concisely summarizes the main points you made in the paper. End strongly! 

Format and References

The paper should be approximately 5 pages (not including title or reference pages), double-spaced, with 12 font and 1” margins. The paper should include in-text citations and a reference page in ASA or APA format. 

In addition to at least one reading from the course, you should cite at least three additional sources. These sources can be academic (peer-review articles and books), but may also include newspaper reports or other news media. 

Personality and Social Psychology Review
1999, Vol. 3, No. 3, 234-245

Copyright C) 1999 by
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

The Social Construction of Violence: The Case of
Sexual and

Domestic Violence

Charlene L. Muehlenhard and Leigh Ann Kimes
Department ofPsychology

University ofKansas

What counts as “violence” is socially constructed, has varied over time, and reflects
power relationships. Informed by social constructionism, we illustrate thesepoints us-
ing as examples sexual violence and domestic violence. We review changes in how so-
ciety andsocial scientists have defined and understood these topics during the last 30
years. We then discuss 3 areas ofcontinuing controversy: who should decide ifsexual
or domestic violence has occurred, what to count as sexual anddomestic violence, and
the role ofgender in defining sexual and domestic violence.

The American public is concerned about violence.
The nightly news brings stories of serial rapists prowl-
ing neighborhoods, estranged husbands murdering
their wives, and strange men molesting children on
their way to school. The public is understandably
frightened and concerned. Social scientists have re-
sponded by attempting to explain why some individu-
als engage in violence and by recommending
solutions.

Although explaining and preventing violence
seems difficult, identifying what behaviors constitute
violence seems, at first glance, to be obvious. The pro-
cess of labeling some behaviors as violent and others
as nonviolent, however, is not as simple or straightfor-
ward as it might seem. How do some behaviors come
to be regarded as violent, worthy of news reports, leg-
islative action, and scholarly inquiry, whereas others
come to be regarded as nonviolent or escape our atten-
tion entirely? How is violence defined, and what dif-
ference does it make?

In this article, we examine how violence is defined
and conceptualized. Our thesis is that what counts as
violence is socially constructed, has varied over time,
and reflects power relationships. Informed by social
constructionism, we illustrate these points using as
examples sexual and domestic violence.

Social Constructionism and Social
Problems

Social constructionism involves “elucidating the
process by which people come to describe, explain,

Requests for reprints should be sent to Charlene L. Muehlenhard,
Department of Psychology, 426 Fraser Hall, University of Kansas,
Lawrence, KS 66045. E-mail: charlenegukans.edu.

or otherwise account for the world in which they
live” (Gergen, 1985, pp. 3-4). Social constructionists
are concerned with examining the words that people
use and the ways in which people understand the
world, the social and political processes that influ-
ence how people define words and explain events,
and the implications of these definitions and explana-
tions-who benefits and who loses because of how
we describe and understand the world. From a social
constructionist perspective, words and concepts we
use “are products of particular historical and cultural
understandings rather than being universal and im-
mutable categories of human experience” (Bohan,
1996, p. xvi). From this perspective, a single, uncon-
tested, universal, or true definition of any concept
does not exist. Definitions of terms depend on who
gets to define them; thus, definitions reflect the inter-
ests of people with power.

Social constructionism provides a perspective for
exploring social problems such as violence. People
have an interest in defining violence in ways that ex-
clude their own behavior (Baumeister, 1996/1997).
Consequently, whose behavior gets defined as violent
and under what circumstances, and who gets to decide
this, reflects the interests of those in power. When
less-powerful people attempt to challenge existing
power relationships and to promote social change, an
initial battleground is often the words used to discuss
these problems (Kelly & Radford, 1998). Definitions
of terms like sexual violence and domestic violence

have the power to label some acts negatively, while ig-
noring and, by implication, condoning other acts. How
these terms are defined affects how people label, ex-
plain, evaluate, and assimilate their own [experi-
ences]. In addition, the definitions ofthese terms con-
vey numerous assumptions about power and coercion,

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SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

sexuality, and gender. (Muehlenhard, Powch, Phelps,
& Giusti, 1992, p. 24)

Thus, when women have attempted to resist the way
they are treated, an important approach has been to
challenge widely accepted definitions of violence, ex-
panding these definitions to include events that were
previously considered acceptable (Kelly & Radford,
1998): “All attempts to create change involve question-
ing who decides ‘what counts’ as victimization and
who defines its meaning and seriousness” (Kelly &
Radford, 1998, p. 71).

In the past 3 decades, definitions of social problems
have been influenced by a greater diversity of voices
from underrepresented groups. During this period,
there have been civil rights movements to call attention
to discrimination based on race, gender, and sexual ori-
entation. The women’s movement has resulted in more
women holding positions ofpower in government, ac-
ademia, business, and the media. Consistent with the
social constructionist perspective that greater power
leads to greater influence over defining and framing
social issues, women have had greater influence on
how sexual and domestic violence is defined and un-
derstood by the public and by social scientists. Exam-
ining how definitions and explanations of sexual and
domestic violence have changed over time illustrates
how these concepts are socially constructed rather than
fixed with any one, unchanging, uncontested meaning.
We now summarize some of these changes.

A Brief History of the Social
Construction of Sexual and

Domestic Violence

Thirty years ago, terms such as wife rape, date
rape, wife beating, and courtship violence did not ex-
ist (Bergen, 1998; Loseke, 1989). Violence was con-
ceptualized as something that occurred between
strangers rather than in families and other close rela-
tionships (Bergen, 1998). The first type of intimate
violence to be regarded as a serious social problem
was child abuse. An article by Kempe, Silverman,
Steele, Droegemueller, and Silver (1962) on the “bat-
tered-child syndrome” was published in the Journal
of the American Medical Association, accompanied
by a supportive editorial (“The Battered-Child Syn-
drome,” 1962)1 and heavy media coverage (Bergen,

Interestingly, this editorial implied that abortions are a form of
child abuse: “By making abortions illegal except under limited cir-
cumstances, civilized society now protects the child in utero. It
should continue to give adequate protection through the early years of
life when the child is still too young to defend himself’ (“The Bat-
tered-Child Syndrome,” p. 42). This example highlights the socially
constructed nature of what counts as abuse.

1998). Child abuse reporting laws soon were passed
in state legislatures (Bergen, 1998). In her analysis of
these events, Bergen attributed this rapid response2 to
the fact that this issue was “safe”: It concerned inno-
cent children who did not provoke the violence.
Other areas of intimate violence, however, were not
addressed until the 1 970s or 1980s.

Evidence suggests that women have been abused
by men throughout history. Often, such violence has
been condoned and even explicitly legalized as an ac-
ceptable way for husbands to discipline their wives,
provided the husbands operated within certain limits.
For example, the “rule of thumb,” thought to have
been instituted by Sir William Blackstone in 1768, al-
lowed a husband to discipline his wife as long as he
hit her with a stick no thicker than his thumb
(Bergen, 1998). Blackstone, discussing English com-
mon law, described the rationale for such a Lkw: If a
husband needs to answer for his wife’s misbehavior,
it is reasonable that he have the power to restrain her
by domestic chastisement (Bergen, 1998). English
common law influenced U.S. law; for example, in
1824, a Mississippi court gave husbands the right to
chastise their wives with corporal punishment (this
policy was changed in 1894; Bergen, 1998).

English common law also influenced U.S. rape
law. English common law treated rape as a property
crime against men, with women being men’s prop-
erty (Brownmiller, 1975). One example concerns
marital rape. In 17th century England, Chief Justice
Sir Matthew Hale declared that a husband cannot be
guilty of raping his wife because once she has given
her sexual consent in marriage, she cannot retract this
consent (Bergen, 1998; Estrich, 1987).3 In the United
States, rape traditionally was defined as a man’s en-
gaging in “sexual intercourse with a female, not his
wife, by force and against her will” (Finkelhor &
Yllo, 1985, p. 1). Thus, because of this marital ex-
emption, it was legal for a husband to force his wife
to have sex; this has changed only recently.

Even into the 1960s and 1970s, psychologists and
sociologists paid little attention to sexual and domestic

2Society’s response to child abuse was “rapid” compared with its
response to other forms of intimate violence. However, the first case
ofchild abuse to glean public attention occurred in 1874. Mary Ellen
Connolly was abused and neglected by her stepparents. Police would
not intervene, and there were no organizations to protect children
from abuse. The child was finally removed from her home by the
American Society for the Prevention ofCruelty to Animals (Bergen,
1998). From this perspective, passing these reporting laws by 1967
was a long time coming. Furthermore, the topic ofchild abuse is still
contested today; “corporal punishment” of children is legal in the
United States and is supported by many people (Gelles & Straus,
1988).

3Legal scholars debate whether Hale was reciting English com-
mon law or custom. Either way, husbands could not be charged with
raping their wives (Estrich, 1987).

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MUEHLENHARD & KIMES

violence, and to the extent that they addressed it, they
often blamed women (see Muehlenhard, Harney, &
Jones, 1992, for a review). For example, Abrahamsen
(1960) investigated rapists’ wives to see how they had
motivated their husbands to rape women. In his case
study ofa rapist, Wille (1961) attributed the rapist’s re-
peated assaults to his mother’s abandoning him, to his
foster mother’s incestuous and dominating style, to his
female boss’s unstable and dominating behavior, and
to the victim’s unconscious desire to be raped. Snell,
Rosenwald, and Robey (1964) evaluated wife beaters’
wives and concluded that the beatings fulfilled both the
husband’s and wife’s needs: “she to be punished for
her castrating activity; he to reestablish his masculine
identity” (p. 111). They concluded that the wives were
aggressive, masculine, frigid, and masochistic and that
the wives called the police only when “a situation
which she has fostered … now appears out of control”
(p. 111). Amir (1971) concluded that 19% of the forc-
ible rapes reported in Philadelphia in 1958 and 1960
had been “victim precipitated,” caused by women who
had deviated from gender roles by engaging in behav-
ior such as using indecent language, going to a man’s
residence, or attending a picnic where alcohol was
present. MacDonald (1971) described women as invit-
ing rape if they talked with strangers or worked in the
garden in two-piece bathing suits. These social scien-
tists’ perspectives on gender roles and violence against
women are evident in their research. They assumed
that women provoked sexual and domestic violence,
and they conducted research to “prove” that “fact.”
Their research served to buttress the social control of
women’s behavior.

The 1970s brought changes, however. In the early
1970s, a group of women in England, many of whom
themselves had been battered, established the first
shelter for battered women, Chiswick Women’s Aid
(Pizzey, 1974/1977). Feminists established the first
such shelter in the United States in 1972 (Bergen,
1998). In 1974, Pizzey, an English grass-roots activ-
ist and one of the founders of Chiswick Women’s
Aid, wrote Scream Quietly or the Neighbors Will
Hear, the first book on wife abuse. Martin’s 1976
book, Battered Wives, helped publicize wife abuse in
the United States; Martin construed battering as a
way for husbands to maintain their patriarchal domi-
nance, establishing a new framework for conceptual-
izing wife battering. By 1977, even Reader’s Digest
was describing wife beating as “one of this country’s
least recognized and most appalling social problems”
(as cited in Loseke, 1989, p. 191). A few years later,
Makepeace (1981) documented physical violence in
college students’ heterosexual relationships, a phe-
nomenon he called “courtship violence.” Battering in
lesbian and gay relationships has only recently been
acknowledged (Bergen, 1998).

Whereas feminist activists in England emphasized
domestic violence, feminist activists in the United
States emphasized rape (Bergen, 1998; Pizzey,
1974/1977).4 Griffin’s 1971 article, “Rape: The
All-American Crime,” and Brownmiller’s 1975 book,
Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, empha-
sized the violent nature of rape, rape as a form of so-
cial control over women, and the social construction
of sexuality as an expression of male dominance in
this culture. Through grass-roots activism, feminists
established rape crisis centers to assist rape victims.

The early antirape movement, based on accepted
knowledge about the nature of rape, focused on rape
by strangers (Bergen, 1998). A few early studies did
address acquaintance rape (e.g., Kanin, 1957, 1967),
but they generated little public attention (Bergen,
1998). A 1982 Ms. magazine article on a hidden form
of rape occurring on college campuses-known as
“date rape”-generated a lot of attention, however
(Bergen, 1998). Researchers such as Koss (e.g., Koss,
Gidycz, & Wisniewski, 1987; Koss & Oros, 1982)
and Russell (1984) conducted research showing that
rape was much more common than had been realized,
that most of these rapes were committed by acquain-
tances, and that few of these rapes ever came to the
attention of the criminal justice system.

Currently, there are more rape crisis centers and
more shelters for battered women, although still not
enough. Marital rape is now a crime in all 50 U.S.
states, although in some states rape by a husband is
defined more narrowly than rape by a stranger
(Bergen, 1998; X, 1994). Research on sexual and do-
mestic violence has proliferated, and researchers sel-
dom blame women for their own victimization.

In summary, the way that social scientists and polit-
ical activists have constructed violence has changed
dramatically during the past 3 decades: Our images of
who perpetrates violence now include acquaintances
as well as strangers and undetected as well as con-
victed offenders. Our explanations have moved from
asking what the victim did wrong toward examining
the perpetrator and society. Many controversies re-
main, however, to which we now turn.

Current Controversies

Although we regard the changes over the last 30
years as positive, we do not mean to imply that social

4Pizzey (1974/1977) herselfthought that American feminists had
it backward:

I knew [America] was one of the most violent countries in the world
and that it had pioneered the studies on baby battering, but all that one
ever read about was rape crisis centers. It seemed obvious to me that
America had put the cart before the horse and that the huge publicity
about rape (horrifying as it is) obscured the fact that theman who rapes
is also the boy who as a child has been conditioned to see all women as
objects for his service. (pp. 6-7)

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SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

scientists or political activists have finally found the
“true” definitions of sexual and domestic violence.
From a social constructionist perspective, there is no
such thing as a true definition. There are ongoing
struggles to define sexual and domestic violence and
to frame the ways in which we think about these
problems.

Who Should Define These Problems?

Who has “the authority to define reality remains a
key arena of political struggle” (Kelly & Radford,
1998, p. 75). What counts as sexual or domestic vio-
lence can be decided by many people (e.g., legisla-
tors, social scientists, perpetrators, victims), all with
different implications.

One approach is to rely on legal definitions of sex-
ual and domestic violence. Such definitions are com-
pelling in that they are our official government-
approved definitions, with the weight ofthe culture be-
hind them. They convey an air of objectivity; they
seem like the real definitions of these terms. There is
nothing objective about the law, however. Laws are
written by legislatures composed predominantly of
White men from upper socioeconomic groups who
frame these problems from their own perspectives.
Furthermore, legislators create de jure definitions, but
victims (who decide whether to report incidents to au-
thorities), police and prosecutors (who decide whether
to move cases through the criminal justice system), and
juries (who decide whether to convict) all create de
facto definitions. If an incident does not fit the defini-
tion of any one of these groups, it will drop out of the
legal system. Thus, cases that result in convictions are
likely to reflect the narrowest and most stereotypic def-
initions of sexual or domestic violence (Estrich, 1987;
Holmstrom & Burgess, 1978). Examining the crimes
of convicted offenders to draw conclusions about the
nature of sexual and domestic violence perpetuates
these narrow definitions.

In contrast, another approach is to allow the indi-
viduals involved to define their own experiences.
This approach at first glance might seem empowering
to persons with less power than legislators or other
officials, but in practice, it presents numerous diffi-
culties. Whereas who is or is not a legislator or police
officer is clear independent of anyone’s definition of
sexual or domestic violence, who is or is not involved
in a violent incident is contingent on how violence is
defined. For example, allowing perpetrators to define
their own behavior is obviously problematic. People
are reluctant to see themselves as violent
(Baumeister, 1996/1997). Even convicted offenders,
defined as perpetrators according to the exceedingly
narrow definitions of the criminal justice system, are

reluctant to see themselves as violent (Dobash &
Dobash, 1998; Ptacek, 1988; Scully, 1990). It might
seem to make sense, though, to allow victims to de-
fine their experiences. This idea is also complicated,
however, because it is not always clear who is a vic-
tim. The notion of allowing victims to label incidents
themselves implies that it is clear a priori who is a
victim and hence who is entitled to label the incident.
Sometimes, however, the distinction between victims
and perpetrators is contested; in many violent rela-
tionships, both persons claim to be victims of the
other person’s aggression (Istar, 1996; Loseke, 1989;
Marrujo & Kreger, 1996).
We might assume that victims have broader defi-

nitions of sexual and domestic violence than do legis-
lators, but this is not always the case. Sometimes,
even women whose experiences meet legal defini-
tions of rape do not regard themselves as rape vic-
tims. Koss, Dinero, Seibel, and Cox (1988) identified
women who had been raped, based on Ohio’s legal
definition of rape. Of these women, only 27% labeled
their experiences as “rape.”5 Warshaw (1994) pre-
sented numerous interviews with women whose ex-
periences met legal definitions of rape but who did
not initially label their experiences as such.

There are several reasons why individuals whose
experiences meet legal definitions of sexual or do-
mestic violence would not use these labels for their
own experiences. In our culture, there are vivid ste-
reotypes about rape and battering. For example, rape
is when a strange man with a knife jumps out of the
bushes or a dark alley or breaks into a woman’s home
while she is sleeping in her own bed; battering is
when an out-of-control man relentlessly beats his
helpless wife, who is unable to leave him because she
is economically and emotionally dependent on him,
and she cowers and cries rather than fighting back.
Such images come from laws, movies, magazines,
jokes, pornography, and so forth (Burt, 1991; Loseke,
1989; Reinholtz, Muehlenhard, Phelps, & Satterfield,
1995). Individuals whose experiences do not match
one of these stereotypes might not regard themselves
as victims of rape or battering (Kahn, Mathie, &
Torgler, 1994). Consistent with the stereotype of the

5There is some disagreement about whether the component of
Koss et al.’s (1988) definition ofrape involving alcohol and drugs ac-
tually corresponded to Ohio’s legal definition of rape (for a discus-
sion, see Muehlenhard et al., 1994). When this component is included
in the definition, Koss et al. found that 15% of college women had
been raped; when this component is excluded from the definition, the
prevalence is 1 1% (Koss& Cook, 1998). Thus, this component ofthe
definition cannot account for the large percentage ofwomen who met
Koss et al.’s definition ofrape but who did not construe their experi-
ences as “rape.” A substantial percentage ofwomen who reported ex-
periencing sexual intercourse, oral or anal sex, or penetration with
objects because they were physically forced still did not describe
their experiences as rape.

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MUEHLENHARD & KIMES

stranger rapist described previously, Koss et al.
(1988) found that victims of acquaintance rape were
less likely than victims of stranger rape (as Koss et
al., 1988, defined it) to label their experiences as rape
(23% vs. 55%, respectively).6

Defining oneself as a victim may also threaten a
person’s self-image. Phillips (1996, as cited in Kahn,
1998) interviewed women and found that, although
almost all had experienced sexual violence, none la-
beled her experiences as rape. Doing so would have
threatened their self-image as “a together, in control,
agentic woman who could take care of herself’ (p. 5).
Furthermore, there was a lack of fit between the sim-
plified ways in which the women viewed victimiza-
tion and the complexity of their own experiences.

Defining someone as an unacknowledged victim
of sexual or domestic violence presents a paradox.
Feminist researchers value letting women define their
own experiences but also advocate for broader defini-
tions of rape than the stereotypes portray. This results
in situations in which feminist researchers classify
women as rape victims, but the women do not clas-
sify themselves as rape victims. Gilbert (as cited in
Kahn, 1991) called this an insult to women: “This
implies women don’t know when they’re being raped
until a researcher tells them. … This is insulting” (p.
7C). Similarly, Gutmann (1991) asked, “If you have
to convince a woman that she has been raped, how
meaningful is that conclusion?” (p. 219). Both
Gilbert and Gutmann, however, argued for an ex-
tremely narrow definition of rape: Gilbert (1991) ar-
gued that feminist researchers’ definitions of rape
were too broad, resulting in a “phantom epidemic of
sexual assault” (p. 54); he reportedly told students
that “comparing real rape to date rape is like compar-
ing cancer to the common cold” (X, 1994, p. 152).
Gutmann argued that men should not be considered
guilty of rape unless they actually intended to commit
rape; she advocated excusing men who interpreted
women’s refusals as foreplay. Consistent with the so-
cial constructionist perspective, then, the issue of
who should define sexual and domestic violence is
controversial, inextricably related to politics and
power.

How To Define Sexual and
Domestic Violence

How words are defined can have a powerful effect,
yet this effect can be so subtle that often it is not appar-
ent even to those who use the words. Loseke (1989)

presented an example of this phenomenon. The No-
vember 23, 1983, issue of Christianity Today (as cited
in Loseke, 1989) said the following about defining
wife abuse: “While definitions of wife abuse vary …
the evidence of extreme violence done to women ren-
ders any definition moot” (p. 201). Analyzing this
statement, Loseke wrote, “The preceding quote argues
that definitions do not matter-yet this writer already
had assumed that ‘wife abuse’ is about ‘extreme vio-
lence done to women”‘ (p. 201).

Loseke (1989) examined how wife abuse was con-
structed in popular magazines. Wife abuse was first
mentioned in popular magazines in 1974. Few maga-
zine articles defined wife abuse explicitly, but many
defined it implicitly by describing it or by typifying it
through personal stories. In the definitions they con-
structed, wife abuse involved extreme physical vio-
lence (beating, choking, threatening with knives) and
extreme emotional violence (a husband’s locking his
wife in their home while he was at work or threaten-
ing to lock her in a coffin-like box). This violence oc-
curred on a continuing basis; grew worse with time;
resulted in physical injuries (broken bones, bleeding,
permanent injuries) and emotional trauma (living in
extreme terror or domestic hell); and ultimately af-
fected the children, who witnessed it, and future gen-
erations, who would repeat the cycle (Loseke, 1989).
The attacks were described as irrational, occurring
even though the wives did nothing wrong. Wives of
respectable, economically successful men were not
exempt from this problem. The definitions con-
structed in popular magazines matched the defini-
tions constructed by experts: Wife abuse involves
severe, repeated, and consequential violence (Loseke,
1989).

According to Loseke (1989), limiting wife abuse to
extreme violence ignores the “normal” violence in
American homes: the pushing, shoving, and slapping
that leaves few, if any, injuries and that is regarded as
normal or at least tolerable:

Such a definition encourages public support since it al-
lows Americans simultaneously to [abhor] the ex-
treme violence of “wife abuse” while maintaining be-
liefs that some violence is “tolerable”; it allows
Americans simultaneously to feel sympathy for the
pure victims of “wife abuse” while maintaining that
other women do not deserve sympathy because they
seem implicated in their victimization. (p. 202)

Thus, such a definition does not challenge the idea that
some violence is acceptable toward somewomen under
some conditions.

Feminist activists have developed alternate con-
ceptualizations of domestic violence that emphasize
one person’s power and control over another person

238

6Victims of acquaintance and stranger rape differed in how they
labeled their experiences but not in their subsequent depression, anxi-
ety, problems with relationships and sex, or thoughts of suicide.

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SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

rather than extreme physical violence. In a model
used by the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project
(n.d.), the following are all considered components of
domestic violence against women in heterosexual re-
lationships: emotional abuse (making a woman feel
guilty or bad about herself, calling her names, humili-
ating her); economic abuse (preventing a woman
from getting or keeping a job, giving her an allow-
ance, not letting her know about family income); iso-
lating her (controlling what a woman does, whom she
talks with, or where she goes; using jealously to jus-
tify control over her); using children (making a
woman feel guilty about the children, threatening to
take the children away); and even using “male privi-
lege” (a man’s treating a woman like a servant, mak-
ing all the big decisions, and being the one who
defines men’s and women’s roles), as well as more
overtly violent acts of intimidation, threats, and phys-
ical and sexual violence. A similar model for domes-
tic violence in lesbian relationships also includes acts
such as threatening to “out” a partner, questioning if
a partner is a “real” lesbian, enforcing internalized
homophobia, and claiming that the domestic violence
must be “mutual abuse” because women cannot
abuse other women. Using these models, the line be-
tween abusive and nonabusive relationships is not as
clear as it would be with narrower definitions requir-
ing severe physical violence or injuries. Many rela-
tionships include name-calling, jealousy, and male
privilege. When only the most blatantly violent be-
haviors count, subtle forms of power and control be-
come acceptable.

From the perspective of a power-and-control
model of domestic violence, there are numerous
problems with the physical violence model of domes-
tic violence. For example, focusing on physical vio-
lence rather than on power and control can lead to
interventions in which the therapist recommends that
a battered woman alter her behavior to do her part in
breaking the cycle of violence (Adams, 1988). Fol-
lowing this advice, the batterer agrees to stop batter-
ing, and the victim agrees to stop whatever behaviors
had provoked the battering (e.g., nagging, withhold-
ing sex). In effect, then, the therapist is complicit
with the batterer in controlling the victim’s behavior.

Similar points can be made for sexual violence.
Limiting the definition of sexual violence to situa-
tions involving extreme physical force means that
“normal” power and control get treated as acceptable.
For example, the most common strategy men use to
have sexual intercourse with unwilling women is ig-
noring their refusals without using physical force
(Muehlenhard & Linton, 1987; Rapaport & Burkhart,
1984). The woman may not resist because of fear,
confusion, or embarrassment about making a scene
(Warshaw, 1994). If she does not resist, force is un-

necessary. Such incidents do not fit definitions that
require extreme physical force.

There are other models for thinking about sexual
coercion, however. Like the alternate models of do-
mestic violence discussed previously, many of these
models focus on power and control rather than on
physical force. Kelly and Radford (1998; also see
Kelly, 1987) counted a wide variety of acts as sexual
violence: rape, pressure to have sex, obscene phone
calls, sexual harassment, flashing, and so forth. In
this model, “the more common, everyday abuses
women experience [are linked to] the less common
experiences labelled as crimes” (Kelly, 1987, p. 59),
with the common factor being that “men use a variety
of methods of abuse, coercion, and force to control
women” (Kelly, 1987, p. 58). With the possible ex-
ception of sexual murder, Kelly and Radford (1998)
declined to rank the seriousness of these experiences.
Instead, they regarded the impact of the experiences,
some of which occur repeatedly, as varying depend-
ing on a complex amalgam of individual and contex-
tual factors. If all these acts are counted as sexual
violence, the distinctions between “victims” and
other women becomes blurred because almost all
women have experienced some of these incidents.
Rather than just a few women being victimized, all
women are affected by “normal” gender relations as
currently constructed in this culture.

Another approach is to define sexual violence as sex
obtained without the other person’s consent rather than
as sex obtained using force. Such a model has been in-
troduced into the legal systems of Canada and parts of
Australia, where responsibility for explicitly seeking
sexual consent is placed on the accused (Kelly &
Radford, 1998). What constitutes consent, however,
can be contested. An individual’s freedom to refuse or
consent to sex is often limited. For example, economic
need may pressure a woman into a marriage and sexual
activity in which she might otherwise choose not to en-
gage. If a woman believes, perhaps correctly, that re-
fusing to have sex with her husband will lead to
divorce and that divorce will lead to economic hard-
ship, perhaps even homelessness (Liebow, 1993), how
free is she to refuse sex? “When material conditions
preclude 99 percent ofyour options, it is not meaning-
ful to call the remaining 1 percent-what you are do-
ing-your choice … consent is not a meaningful
concept” (MacKinnon, 1990, p. 4). A group known as
Women Against Sex argued that, in this culture,
women are never really free to give or refuse sexual
consent because sex is part of a “package deal-with
love, security, emotional support, and sex all going to-
gether” (A Southern Women’s Writing Collective
[ASWWC], 1990, p. 147). Because rejecting sex is
likely to result in losing the entire package, they argued
that sex is in fact compulsory for all women.

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MUEHLENHARD & KIMES

Other writers have called attention to subtle yet
powerful social pressures that make individuals less
free to refuse or consent to sex. Gavey (1992) wrote
about the negative labeling of women who refuse sex
(e.g., “sexually uptight,” p. 340) and the “tyranny ofin-
ferred ‘normality”‘ (p. 331), which dictates how often
and under what circumstances “normal” women
should have sex. These “technologies of heterosexual
coercion” (p. 329) can hide sexual coercion even from
those who are coerced (Gavey, 1992). Morgan’s
(1974/1992) definition ofrape even included sex initi-
ated by the female victim if she initiated it out of “fear
of losing the guy, fear ofbeing thought a prude, fear of
hurting his fragile feelings,fear” (p. 84). MacKinnon
(1987) wrote, “Politically, I call it rape every time a
woman has sex and feels violated” (p. 82). She was not
suggesting that men be arrested as rapists based on this
criterion; instead, she proposed this definition to en-
courage people to reevaluate and change their sexual
relationships.
Women Against Sex has taken perhaps the most

extreme position in broadening the concept of sexual
violence. They argued that all sex subordinates
women because sexuality has been constructed by the
patriarchy. Thus, “while a woman might evade em-
pirical force, she literally cannot evade conceptual or
definitional sexual force” (ASWWC, 1990, p. 142).
They argued that even if women feel desire, this de-
sire is constructed by the patriarchy and is hence op-
pressive to women. They argued for radical celibacy,
rejecting all sex, even lesbian sex and masturbation.

Whether an act is considered to be sexual violence
depends not only on the type of coercion involved but
also the sexual acts involved. Most people consider
forced sexual intercourse, and perhaps fellatio or anal
sex, to count as sexual violence. Other sexual behav-
iors, such as clitoral stimulation, are less likely to be
considered important enough to count. Such defini-
tions reflect how sexuality is constructed in our cul-
ture. Many people consider penile-vaginal intercourse
the only form of “real” sex (Chalker, 1994; Sanders &
Reinisch, 1999; Valdez & Muehlenhard, 1998). This
may occur in part because penile-vaginal intercourse
is the only sexual act that can lead to procreation and in
part because of a phallocentric perspective on sexual-
ity. That is, even though the clitoris is more relevant
than the vagina to female sexual arousal, defining
“real” sex as vaginal penetration may occur because
the vagina is more relevant to male sexual arousal, and
in our culture, sex is defined from a male perspective:
“It seems reasonable to assume that men have a vested
interest in the doctrine that the vagina is more relevant
to sexuality than the clitoris is. The vagina is relevant
to male sexuality” (Rotkin, 1972/1986, p. 386). “Defi-
nitions broad enough to include sexual acts between
two women, which cannot involve penile penetration,

are beyond the scope of what many people regard as
serious sexual assault” (Muehlenhard, Powch, et al.,
1992, p. 29).

Generally speaking, feminists have broadened the
definitions of what counts as sexual or domestic vio-
lence. None of these definitions is without contro-
versy. Some criticism comes from conservatives such
as Gilbert (1991), discussed previously, but other
criticism comes from feminists. For example, Roiphe
(1993) criticized broad definitions of rape, saying
that “the suggestion lurking behind [such broad defi-
nitions] of rape is that men are not just physically but
intellectually and emotionally more powerful than
women” (p. 68; see Muehlenhard, Sympson, Phelps,
& Highby, 1994, for a critique of Roiphe’s argu-
ments). Few feminists accept the radical celibacy ad-
vocated by Women Against Sex. Thus, although most
feminists applaud the expansion of the definitions of
sexual and domestic violence over the past 30 years,
there is no consensus as to how broad these defini-
tions should be.

The Role of Gender in Defining
Sexual and Domestic Violence

According to popular magazines, the role of gender
in domestic violence is clear: Domestic violence is
something that men do to women. The husbands in
these magazine stories are described as stereotypically
masculine with macho values, and the wives are de-
scribed as stereotypically feminine-selfless, fearful,
dependent (Loseke, 1989). When police respond to ac-
tual domestic violence calls, however, the situation is
not always so clear. Police often hear reports ofmutual
violence, or ofno violence, or sometimes ofwomen at-
tacking men (Loseke, 1989).

At least 30 studies have shown that women report
using physical violence against their partners as fre-
quently as-or more frequently than-men do (Currie,
1998). The data from most ofthese studies came from
the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS; Gelles & Straus,
1988). This scale asks respondents ifthey or their part-
ners have ever used a series of tactics during disagree-
ments and fights with their partners. These tactics are
classified into three categories: rational discussion
(e.g., discussing an issue calmly, getting information
to back up their side); verbal or nonverbal expressions
of anger (e.g., insulting or swearing, sulking or refus-
ing to talk, throwing something); and physical violence
(e.g., pushing, kicking, beating up). This scale is gen-
der neutral: Women and men are asked the same ques-
tions. In the studies mentioned previously, at least as
many women as men reported engaging in these be-
haviors. Does this mean that women are at least as vio-
lent as men-that at least as many women as men
engage in domestic violence?

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SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

This research has generated debate among domes-
tic violence researchers and activists. Critics have ar-
gued that we cannot determine who has or has not
engaged in domestic violence simply by their reports
of who hit whom (Currie, 1998; Kurz, 1998). Instead,
we need to know about the motives for and conse-
quences of the violence. The CTS does not ask about
this information.7

Currie’s (1998) qualitative study of the meaning
of violence to the women and men involved in it il-
lustrated how complicated this issue is. Currie gave
Canadian female and male college students the CTS
and, in addition, asked them to write explanations of
the incidents they reported on the CTS to help put the
incidents into context. Men actually reported experi-
encing more violent incidents than did women. How-
ever, women reported being more likely than men to
miss school because of the violence, and only women
reported a need for medical attention. More men
(72.2%) than women (53.5%) said they did not report
the incidents because they saw them as “trivial.”

In many instances, both women’s and men’s quali-
tative descriptions downplayed the incidents reported
on the CTS. When men downplayed violent incidents
they had experienced, Currie (1998) interpreted this
as evidence that the incidents had not really been that
bad; she concluded that, when men complete the
CTS, they “upgrade” minor incidents, making them
appear worse than they really were. When women
downplayed violent incidents they had experienced,
however, Currie interpreted this to mean that the
women were excusing or rationalizing men’s violent
behavior; she concluded that the CTS underestimates
the violence that women experience. Perhaps she is
right, but perhaps some men and some women “up-
grade” incidents on the CTS, whereas other women
and men minimize the violence they experience.

Currie (1998) suggested that gender stereotypes are
inextricably related to what behaviors get defined as
violent:

On one hand, women normalize male violence as “un-
derstandable” or “excusable,” a response that con-
forms to the notion ofmen as typically aggressive. On
the other hand, because women are traditionally typi-
fied as passive, violent behavior on their part is notable
or remarkable although not a serious threat to men. In
short, the way gender plays itself out in heterosexual
violence is far more complex than can be captured

7Data suggest that women are more seriously injured than men
and that women and men often have different motives for striking
their partners: Violent wives typically report self-defense or retalia-
tory reasons for their violence, whereas violent husbands more often
report external or situational factors or coercive and controlling rea-
sons (Hamberger & Potente, 1994; White & Kowalski, 1994).

through research designed to “count” violent inci-
dents. (p. 107)

Currie concluded that ultimately this is a political rather
than an empirical question: Whether domestic violence
should best be characterized as “male violence” or
“mutual combat” depends on “whose definition counts.
From this perspective, answers to the question ‘who is
violent’ are not empirical, but rather political, because
they are linked to larger issues surrounding the produc-
tion of knowledge” (p. 107).

Unlike domestic violence researchers, sexual vio-
lence researchers have almost exclusively asked
women about their experiences as victims and men
about their experiences as perpetrators, in effect defin-
ing sexual violence as something that men do to
women. Studies that have asked women and men if
they have experienced coercive sex generally have
found that fewer men than women report such experi-
ences, although the percentages vary depending on the
wording of the questions. For example, in one study,
more men than women reported engaging in “un-
wanted” sexual intercourse (Muehlenhard & Cook,
1988); many of these incidents, however, seemed un-
wanted in some ways but wanted in other ways (e.g.,
sex engaged in because of peer pressure; to gain more
experience; to be more popular; or to avoid appearing
shy, afraid, inexperienced, or homosexual).

Researchers who have asked both women and men
about their experiences with sexual coercion gener-
ally have found that, on the average, men who report
experiencing coercive sex report less serious conse-
quences than do women who report experiencing co-
ercive sex (Muehlenhard & Long, 1988; Satterfield &
Muehlenhard, 1996; Struckman-Johnson, 1988). For
example, Satterfield and Muehlenhard (1996) asked
women and men if they had ever been in a situation
in which someone started doing something sexual to
them without their consent and they decided to go
along with it, even though they did not want to. Sig-
nificantly more of the women (58%) than the men
(26%) reported such an experience. In their subse-
quent reactions to the event, women reported more
confusion and anger, self-blame, and depression than
did men; men reported more thoughts that the inci-
dent had been either inconsequential or fun than did
women. These results indicate that, although women
and men reported experiencing the same type of inci-
dent, their experiences differed, with women report-
ing more negative experiences than men, on the
average. The concept of “the average” is problematic,
however, because there was considerable variation
among women and among men, with both women
and men spanning the entire range of responses on
most scales. Some men reported more trauma than
did some women. Thus, any generalization constru-

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MUEHLENHARD & KIMES

ing women’s reactions as serious and men’s reactions
as trivial-or treating women and men as monolithic
groups-would have been inadequate.

Both gender-specific and gender-neutral definitions
of sexual and domestic violence have implications.
Gender-specific definitions that include only men’s vi-
olence toward women ignore men who are victimized
by women and ignore women and men victimized by
persons ofthe same sex, including those in lesbian and
gay relationships, Thus, such definitions perpetuate
gender-role stereotypes that men are invulnerable, in
control, and sexually insatiable, whereas women are
vulnerable, passive, and merely sexual gatekeepers, ei-
ther acquiescing to or declining men’s initiatives but
having no sexual agency themselves (Muehlenhard,
1998). Furthermore, by ignoring lesbian and gay rela-
tionships, such definitions perpetuate compulsory het-
erosexuality, a term Rich (1980) used to describe the
cultural context that ignores lesbianism and presents
heterosexuality as women’s only option.

Gender-neutral definitions, in contrast, acknowl-
edge men who are victimized by women and acknowl-
edge women and men who are victimized by others of
the same sex. Thus, they challenge gender-role stereo-
types and compulsory heterosexuality. Ignoring gen-
der, however, ignores how gender has been
constructed in our culture. Merely looking at fre-
quency rates without considering what the incidents
mean to the women and men involved is likely to be
misleading. Ignoring gender also ignores the impact of
violence on all women and men in society, even those
not directly involved (e.g., women fear rape signifi-
cantly more than do men, which limits women’s free-
dom; Gordon & Riger, 1989; Poirier & Muehlenhard,
1998). Numerous feminist authors have critiqued
gender-neutral approaches to social problems:
MacKinnon (1990) wrote, “Gender neutrality means
that you cannot take gender into account … neutrality
enforces a non-neutral status quo” (p. 12). Along simi-
lar lines, Rush (1990) argued that gender neutrality is a
strategy used in the backlash against feminism: “Gen-
der neutrality is rooted in the idea that both genders,
male and female, are equally oppressed and that any at-
tempt to hold men and male institutions accountable
for transgressions against women is no longer fashion-
able nor acceptable” (p. 170). Rhode (1990) argued
that, by focusing on gender similarities, feminists may
“risk reinforcing a value structure they seek to chal-
lenge. Affirmations of similarity between women and
men may inadvertently universalize or validate norms
ofthe dominant social group, norms that have been in-
attentive to women’s interests, experiences, and per-
spectives” (p. 3).

Whether sexual and domestic violence should be
defined as gender specific or gender neutral is an ongo-
ing struggle among researchers and activists. “How-

ever commonplace the term male violence is to femi-
nist researchers and activists today, gendering violence
against women has been and remains a protracted
struggle” (Currie, 1998, p. 97). Kurz (1998) identified
gender-neutral terms likefamily violence, intimate vio-
lence, and domestic violence as one of the factors that
prevent us from seeing how violence against women
permeates society and affects all aspects of women’s
lives. Kurz argued that “these constructs convey the
impression that violence is directed by all family mem-
bers against all other family members, and they mask
the facts ofwho is being violent to whom” (p. 197).

To illustrate the negative consequences of using
gender-neutral models of domestic violence, advo-
cates of the male violence model describe what hap-
pened when Steinmetz (1977-1978), using data from
the CTS, introduced the idea of the battered husband
syndrome, which she claimed was the most
underreported form of family violence. The topic was
picked up by the media, and estimates of the number
of battered husbands were soon exaggerated (Gelles
& Straus, 1988). Conservative politicians used these
claims as an excuse to decrease funding for shelters
for battered women, arguing that if women are as vi-
olent as men, there is no justification for shelters for
battered women. In Chicago, this rationale was used
to block funding for a shelter for battered women and
their children. In New Hampshire, resources were di-
rected away from battered women’s shelters to open
shelters for battered husbands, which have subse-
quently closed because of a “complete absence of cli-
entele” (Currie, 1998, p. 109). Furthermore, the
discourse on battered husbands and mutual combat
can make it more difficult for battered women to es-
cape their violent relationships “by reducing the plau-
sibility of their ‘victim status’ in the public’s mind”
(Currie, 1998, p. 99).

Gendering domestic violence, defining men as vio-
lent and women as victims, also has been criticized,
however. Domestic violence among same-sex couples
has been “virtually ignored” by researchers, in part be-
cause of “rampant heterosexism among social scien-
tists” (Bergen, 1998, p. 114), who defined the term
family violence as referring only to traditional hetero-
sexual couples, and in part because of the belief that
women would not batter other women and that any vio-
lence between men would be a fair fight (Bergen,
1998). The few studies that have been done on this
topic suggest that domestic violence occurs in lesbian
and gay relationships at about the same rates as in het-
erosexual relationships (Elliott, 1996).

Elliott (1996) criticized the gendered model of vio-
lence used by the battered women’s movement:

The basic philosophy of the battered women’s move-
ment [has been] that patriarchy and sexism are respon-

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SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

sible for all violence. Thus, of course, women cannot
abuse and men cannot be victims…. Because it was so
difficult to explain away women as batterers and men
as victims when using the movement’s established
philosophy of violence, gays and lesbians were pur-
posefully silenced. (p. 6)

Similarly, Letellier (1996) wrote that “gender-based
heterosexist theories ofbattering preclude the possi-
bility of male victims or female perpetrators of vio-
lence” (p. 75). Renzetti (1996) recommended that, to
make domestic violence services truly welcoming to
battered lesbians, gender-neutral materials should be
used. These critiques are illustrated by Currie’s (1998)
study ofviolence experienced by Canadian college stu-
dents. This study was extensive, involving 4,623 ques-
tionnaires distributed to students across campus. How-
ever, Currie did not include violence in lesbian and gay
relationships in her study, saying that this would re-
quire “an entirely different approach and research
methodology” (p. 109). Violence in lesbian and gay re-
lationships does not fit easily into gender-specific defi-
nitions of domestic violence.8

In summary, there is no one correct way to define
sexual and domestic violence. Various definitions re-
flect the interests of heterosexual men, heterosexual
women, and lesbians and gay men. Clearly, who gets
to define violence has tremendous influence on the
conclusions one can draw from research and on the so-
cial policies based on those conclusions.

Summary and Conclusions

Howwe define violence has important implications.
Terms like date rape and wife beating provide people
with words to describe and understand their experi-
ences. Definitions ofthese terms influence what behav-
iors are considered unacceptable-worthy of public
condemnation, research, and legislative action-and
what behaviors are considered acceptable and normal.
Narrowly drawn definitions ofviolence mean that these
problems will be perceived as rare, attributed to a few
deviant individuals. Broader definitions, in contrast,
mean that these problems will be perceived as wide-
spread, which challenges the status quo.

It would be satisfying ifwe could provide the “true”
definitions of sexual and domestic violence. There is
no such thing as a true, objective definition, however.
Definitions reflect the interests of the people who cre-
ate and promote them. Words mean whatever people
with power agree that they mean.

It also would be satisfying if we could at least say
that, over the last 30 years, definitions have im-
proved-that we have made progress in how we de-
fine these issues. Terms like progress or
improvement are meaningless without a specific goal,
however. To say that changes in definitions represent
progress would imply that there is one goal that ev-
eryone is trying to achieve or one perspective on
which everyone agrees. This is seldom the case. For
example, in the past 30 years, the definitions of rape
used by many people have expanded to include situa-
tions that previously would not have counted as rape.
Is this progress because these broader definitions in-
clude the experiences of more women and men and
no longer accept a status quo in which a certain
amount of sexual coercion is accepted as just part of
life? Or have these definitions been broadened too far
so that they trivialize the word rape and construct
women as passive and unable to stand up to men? We
cannot say that a particular definition represents
progress without specifying what we consider to be
progress. Our specification of what we consider prog-
ress would be based on our definition reflecting our
interests.

Social scientists are in a powerful position to con-
struct terms. In research, writings, and lectures to stu-
dents, we often construct concepts either explicitly or
implicitly. Sometimes we define terms explicitly by
stating definitions or creating operational definitions;
at other times, we define terms implicitly by the exam-
ples we choose to typify a concept. We also help con-
struct concepts by selecting which research questions
to ask and which variables to study. In all these ways,
we contribute to the cultural debate about how these
terms will be defined.
We urge all social scientists to think about the

power they have to construct these concepts. We urge
them to consider who benefits, who loses, and what is
implied through the questions they choose to ask and
the way they define terms. Clearly, definitions are cre-
ated and modified by people; this is readily apparent
given how the definitions of sexual and domestic vio-
lence have changed over the past 30 years. Because of
the importance of definitions in framing social prob-
lems, the struggle to promote some definitions over
others will continue, and social scientists will continue
their role in shaping concepts. This role is inevitable;
carrying out this role oblivious to the potential implica-
tions of these actions is not.

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