Midterm needs to be done by March 8, 2021 by 5pm.

1. This exam has an allocated total value of thirty (30) points and constitutes thirty percent (30%) of your final grade in this course.

2. You must fully respond to the two (2) discussion exercises that are included below. Each of these exercises have an assigned individual value of fifteen (15) points.

3. Your answers to each exercise shall be at least two (2) pages long – “letter” size (8-1/2 x 11); no individual answer shall exceed three (3) pages.

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1

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States

Copyright (c) 1987, The American Law Institute

Case Citations

Rules and Principles

Part 1 – International Law and Its Relation to United States Law

Chapter 1 – International Law: Character and Sources

Restat 3d of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., § 101

§ 101 International Law Defined

International law, as used in this Restatement, consists of rules and principles of general application dealing

with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some

of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.

COMMENTS & ILLUSTRATIONS: Comment:

a. International law and remedies: cross-references. The character and general content of international law are

discussed in the Introductory Note to this chapter. The sources of international law are set forth in § 102. The

remedies for violation of international law are dealt with in Part IX.

b. “State” and “international organization”: cross-references. “State” is defined in § 201, “international

organization” in § 221.

c. Private international law (or conflict of laws). International law, which in most other countries is referred to as

“public international law,” is often distinguished from private international law (called conflict of laws in the United

States). Private international law has been defined as law directed to resolving controversies between private persons,

natural as well as juridical, primarily in domestic litigation, arising out of situations having a significant relationship to

more than one state. See Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws § 2.

In some circumstances, issues of private international law may also implicate issues of public international law, and

many matters of private international law have substantial international significance and therefore may be considered

foreign relations law, § 1. In recent years, private international law has been coordinated and harmonized among states,

and many of its rules are the subject of international agreements. The concepts, doctrines, and considerations that

inform private international law also guide the development of some areas of public international law, notably the

principles limiting the jurisdiction of states to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce law. See Introductory Note to Part IV,

Chapter 1, and § § 402-403, 421, and 431. Increasingly, public international law impinges on private international

activity, for example, the law of jurisdiction and judgments (Part IV) and the law protecting persons (Part VII).

To the extent that conflict of laws in the United States refers to laws of two or more States of the United States, or

conflicts between federal and State law, it is, except as otherwise noted, beyond the scope of this Restatement.

d. General international law and particular agreements between states. Unless otherwise indicated, “international

law” as used in this Restatement is law that applies to states and international (intergovernmental) organizations

generally. It includes law contained in widely accepted multilateral agreements. Undertakings of a particular state or

international organization under a particular international agreement — for example, the obligation of a state under a

bilateral tax treaty with another state — are binding under international law, but the substantive content of such

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United State

2

undertakings is not international law applicable generally (unless there is a wide network of similar bilateral

arrangements that results in general international law; see § 102, Comment f).

e. Comity distinguished. Comity has been variously conceived and defined. A well-known definition is: “Comity,

in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon

the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial

acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens

or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 16 S.Ct. 139, 143,

40 L.Ed. 95 (1895). See also § 403, Comment a.

REPORTERS NOTES: 1. Previous Restatement. The previous Restatement defined international law in § 1 and

elaborated upon that definition in comments to that section. This section indicates the scope of international law; the

character and jurisprudence of international law are dealt with in the Introductory Note to this chapter, and the sources

and evidence of international law in § § 102-103.

Section 1 of the previous Restatement defined international law as follows:

“International Law,” as used in the Restatement of this Subject, means those rules of law applicable to a state or

international organization that cannot be modified unilaterally by it.

As compared with that definition, this section indicates that international law has ceased to apply exclusively to states

and international organizations and now deals also with their relations with individuals and juridical persons. The

reference in the previous Restatement’s definition to the fact that international law cannot be changed unilaterally by a

state is alluded to in the Introductory Note to this chapter.

Section 3 of the previous Restatement, “Effect of Violation of International Law,” is the subject of Part IX of this

Restatement, Remedies. Definitions of “state” and “international organization” contained in § § 4 and 5 of the previous

Restatement are included here in § § 201 and 221.

CROSS REFERENCES: Digest System Key Numbers:

International Law 1

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United State

3

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States

Copyright (c) 1987, The American Law Institute

Case Citations

Rules and Principles

Part 1 – International Law and Its Relation to United States Law

Chapter 1 – International Law: Character and Sources

Restat 3d of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., § 102

§ 102 Sources of International Law

(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international community of states

(a) in the form of customary law;

(b) by international agreement; or

(c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world.

(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them

from a sense of legal obligation.

(3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of

customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in

fact widely accepted.

(4) General principles common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary

law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate.

COMMENTS & ILLUSTRATIONS: Comment:

a. Sources and evidence of international law distinguished. This section indicates the ways in which rules or

principles become international law. The means for proving that a rule or principle has in fact become international law

in one of the ways indicated in this section is dealt with in § 103.

b. Practice as customary law. “Practice of states,” Subsection (2), includes diplomatic acts and instructions as well

as public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of policy, whether they are unilateral or

undertaken in cooperation with other states, for example in organizations such as the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD). Inaction may constitute state practice, as when a state acquiesces in acts of

another state that affect its legal rights. The practice necessary to create customary law may be of comparatively short

duration, but under Subsection (2) it must be “general and consistent.” A practice can be general even if it is not

universally followed; there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be, but it should reflect

wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity. Failure of a significant number of

important states to adopt a practice can prevent a principle from becoming general customary law though it mi ght

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United State

4

become “particular customary law” for the participating states. See Comment e. A principle of customary law is not

binding on a state that declares its dissent from the principle during its development. See Comment d.

c. Opinio juris. For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it must appear that the

states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally

followed but which states feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law. A practice initially

followed by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may become law when states generally come to believe that they are

under a legal obligation to comply with it. It is often difficult to determine when that transformation into law has taken

place. Explicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official statements) is not necessary; opinio juris may be

inferred from acts or omissions.

d. Dissenting views and new states. Although customary law may be built by the acquiescence as well as by the

actions of states (Comment b) and become generally binding on all states, in principle a state that indicates its dissent

from a practice while the law is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule even after it matures.

Historically, such dissent and consequent exemption from a principle that became general customary law has been rare.

See Reporters’ Note 2. As to the possibility of dissent from peremptory norms (jus cogens), see Comment k. A state

that enters the international system after a practice has ripened into a rule of international law is bound by that rule.

e. General and special custom. The practice of states in a regional or other special grouping may create “regional,”

“special,” or “particular” customary law for those states inter se. It must be shown that the state alleged to be bound has

accepted or acquiesced in the custom as a matter of legal obligation, “not merely for reasons of political expediency.”

Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266, 277. Such special customary law may be seen as essentially

the result of tacit agreement among the parties.

f. International agreement as source of law. An international agreement creates obligations binding between the

parties under international law. See § 321. Ordinarily, an agreement between states is a source of law only in the sense

that a private contract may be said to make law for the parties under the domestic law of contracts. Multilateral

agreements open to all states, however, are increasingly used for general legislation, whether to make new law, as in

human rights (Introduction to Part VII), or for codifying and developing customary law, as in the Vienna Convention on

the Law of Treaties. For the law of international agreements, see Part III. “International agreement” is defined in §

301(1). International agreements may contribute to customary law. See Comment i.

g. Binding resolutions of international organizations. Some international agreements that are constitutions or

charters of international organizations confer power on those organizations to impose binding obligations on their

members by resolution, usually by qualified majorities. Such obligations derive their authority from the international

agreement constituting the organization, and resolutions so adoptedby the organization can be seen as “secondary

sources” of international law for its members. For example, the International Monetary Fund may prescribe rules

concerning maintenance or change of exchange rates or depreciation of currencies. See § 821. The International Civil

Aviation Organization may set binding standards for navigation or qualifications for flight crews in aviation over the

high seas.

For resolutions of international organizations that are not binding but purport to state the international law on a

particular subject, see

§ 103, Comment c.

h. The United Nations Charter. The Charter of the United Nations has been adhered to by virtually all states.

Even the few remaining non-member states have acquiesced in the principles it established. The Charter provisions

prohibiting the use of force have become rules of international law binding on all states. Compare Article 2(6). See §

905, Comment g.

Article 103 of the Charter provides:

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and

their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Members seem to have read this article as barring them from making agreements inconsistent with the Charter, and have

refrained from making such agreements. See, e.g., Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S.

No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Article 102 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,

T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N. T.S. 3. And see Comment k.

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5

i. International agreements codifying or contributing to customary law. International agreements constitute

practice of states and as such can contribute to the growth of customary law under Subsection (2). See North Sea

Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark & Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 28-29, 37-43.

Some multilateral agreements may come to be law for non-parties that do not actively dissent. That may be the effect

where a multilateral agreement is designed for adherence by states generally, is widely accepted, and is not rejected by a

significant number of important states. A wide network of similar bilateral arrangements on a subject may constitute

practice and also result in customary law. If an international agreement is declaratory of, or contributes to, customary

law, its termination by the parties does not of itself affect the continuing force of those rules as international law.

However, the widespread repudiation of the obligations of an international agreement may be seen as state practice

adverse to the continuing force of the obligations. See Comment j.

j. Conflict between international agreement and customary law. Customary law and law made by international

agreement have equal authority as international law. Unless the parties evince a contrary intention, a rule established by

agreement supersedes for them a prior inconsistent rule of customary international law. However, an agreement will not

supersede a prior rule of customary law that is a peremptory norm of international law; and an agreement will not

supersede customary law if the agreement is invalid because it violates such a peremptory norm. See Comment k. A

new rule of customary law will supersede inconsistent obligations created by earlier agreement if the parties so intend

and the intention is clearly manifested. Thus, the United States and many other states party to the 1958 Law of the Sea

Conventions accept that some of the provisions of those conventions have been superseded by supervening customary

law. See Introductory Note to Part V.

k. Peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens). Some rules of international law are recognized by the

international community of states as peremptory, permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and invalidate

international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them. Such a peremptory norm is subject

to modification only by a subsequent norm of international law having the same character. It is generally accepted that

the principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force (Comment h) have the character of jus cogens.

See § 331(2) and Comment e to that section.

l. General principles as secondary source of law. Much of international law, whether customary or constituted by

agreement, reflects principles analogous to those found in the major legal systems of the world, and historically may

derive from them or from a more remote common origin. See Introductory Note to Chapter 1 of this Part and Reporters’

Note 1 to this section. General principles common to systems of national law may be resorted to as an independent

source of law. That source of law may be important when there has not been practice by states sufficient to give the

particular principle status as customary law and the principle has not been legislated by general international agreement.

General principles are a secondary source of international law, resorted to for developing international law

interstitially in special circumstances. For example, the passage of time as a defense to an international claim by a state

on behalf of a national may not have had sufficient application in practice to be accepted as a rule of customary law.

Nonetheless, it may be invoked as a rule of international law, at least in claims based on injury to persons (Part VII),

because it is a general principle common to the major legal systems of the world and is not inappropriate for

international claims. Other rules that have been drawn from general principles include rules relating to the

administration of justice, such as the rule that no one may be judge in his own cause; res judicata; and rules of fair

procedure generally. General principles may also provide “rules of reason” of a general character, such as acquiescence

and estoppel, the principle that rights must not be abused, and the obligation to repair a wrong. International practice

may sometimes convert such a principle into a rule of customary law.

m. Equity as general principle. Reference to principles of equity, in the sense of what is fair and just, is common

to major legal systems, and equity has been accepted as a principle of international law in several contexts. See, e.g.,

the delimitation of coastal state zones, § 517. That principle is not to be confused with references to ” equity,” and

distinctions between law and equity as separate bodies of law, in traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence. Reference

to equity as a principle incorporated into international law is also to be distinguished from the power, conferred on the

International Court of Justice in Article 38(2) of the Statute (and on other tribunals in numerous arbitration agreements),

to decide cases ex aequo et bono if the parties agree thereto, which permits the Court to settle a case without being

confined to principles of law. See § 903, Reporters’ Note 9.

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United State

6

REPORTERS NOTES: 1. Statute of International Court of Justice and sources of law. This section draws on Article

38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, a provision commonly treated as an authoritative statement of

the “sources” of international law. Article 38(1) provides:

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it,

shall apply:

(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the

contesting states;

(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

(d) . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as

subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

The Statute of the International Court of Justice does not use the term “sources,” but this Restatement follows

common usage in characterizing customary law, international agreements, and general principles of law as “sources” of

international law, in the sense that they are the ways in which rules become, or become accepted as, international law.

International lawyers sometimes also describe as “sources” the “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly

qualified publicists of the various nations,” mentioned in Article 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the Court, supra. Those,

however, are not sources in the same sense since they are not ways in which law is made or accepted, but opinion-

evidence as to whether some rule has in fact become or been accepted as international law. See § 103.

2. Customary law. No definition of customary law has received universal agreement, but the essence of

Subsection (2) has wide acceptance. See generally Parry, The Sources and Evidences of International Law (1965).

Each element in attempted definitions has raised difficulties. There have been philosophical debates about the very

basis of the definition: how can practice build law? Most troublesome conceptually has been the circularity in the

suggestion that law is built by practice based on a sense of legal obligation: how, it is asked, can there be a sense of

legal obligation before the law from which the legal obligation derives has matured? Such conceptual difficulties,

however, have not prevented acceptance of customary law essentially as here defined. Perhaps the sense of legal

obligation came originally from principles of natural law or common morality, often already reflected in principles of

law common to national legal systems (see Comment l); practice built on that sense of obligation then matured into

customary law. Compare Article 38(1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Reporters’ Note 1), which

refers to “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” Perhaps the definition reflects a later

stage in the history of international law when governments found practice and sense of obligation already in evidence,

and accepted them without inquiring as to the original basis of that sense of legal obligation.

Earlier definitions implied that establishment of custom required that the practice of states continue over an

extended period of time. That requirement began to lose its force after the Second World War, perhaps because

improved communication made the practice of states widely and quickly known, at least where there is broad

acceptance and no or little objection. In North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of Justice agreed

that “the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of

customary international law.” [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 44. The doctrine of the continental shelf, § 515, is sometimes cited

as an example of “instant customary law.” The Truman Proclamation of 1945 was not challenged by governments and

was followed by similar claims by other states. The International Law Commission, engaged in codifying and

developing the law of the sea during the years 1950-56, avoided a clear position as to whether the continental shelf

provisions in its draft convention were codifying customary law or proposing a new development. The provisions were

included in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. It was soon assumed that the doctrine they reflected was part

of international law even for states that did not adhere to the Convention. See the opinion of the International Court of

Justice in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra, at 43. The doctrine of the continental shelf became accepted as

customary law on the basis of assertions of exclusive jurisdiction by coastal states and general acquiescence by other

states, although for some years actual mining on the continental shelf (outside a state’s territorial sea) was not

technologically feasible. The “practice” may be said to have consisted of acts by governments claiming exclusive rights

and denying access to others.

The practice of states that builds customary law takes many forms and includes what states do in or through

international organizations. Comment b. The United Nations General Assembly in particular has adopted resolutions,

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7

declarations, and other statements of principles that in some circumstances contribute to the process of making

customary law, insofar as statements and votes of governments are kinds of state practice, Comment b, and may be

expressions of opinio juris, Comment c. The contributions of such resolutions and of the statements and votes

supporting them to the lawmaking process will differ widely, depending on factors such as the subject of the resolution,

whether it purports to reflect legal principles, how large a majority it commands and how numerous and important are

the dissenting states, whether it is widely supported (including in particular the states principally affected), and whether

it is later confirmed by other practice. “Declarations of principles” may have greater significance than ordinary

resolutions. A memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat suggests that:

in view of the greater solemnity and significance of a “declaration,” it may be considered to impart, on behalf of the

organ adopting it, a strong expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it. Consequently,

insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as

laying down rules binding upon States.

[E/CN.4/L. 610, quoted in 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 8, p. 15, U.N. Doc. E/3616/Rev. 1 (1962)]. The Outer Space

Declaration, for example, might have become law even if a formal treaty had not followed, since it was approved by all,

including the principal “space powers.” See Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the

Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 15, at 15. A spokesman for the

United States stated that his Government considered that the Declaration “reflected international law as accepted by the

members of the United Nations,” and both the United States and the U.S.S.R. indicated that they intended to abide by

the Declaration. See 18 U.N. GAOR, 1st Committee, 1342d meeting, 2 Dec. 1963, pp. 159, 161.

For the effect of General Assembly resolutions on the development of the principle of self-determination, see

Western Sahara (advisory opinion), [1975] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 31. The contribution of a resolution of a multilateral

conference (on the law of the sea) to customary law is cited in Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland),

[1974] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 24-26, 32. For the evidentiary significance of resolutions purporting to state international law, see

§ 103, Comment c.

Resolutions that may contribute to customary law are to be distinguished from resolutions that are legally binding

on members, Comment g and Reporters’ Note 3. The latter, too, may reflect state practice or opinio juris, but they

derive their authority from the charter of the organization, an international agreement in which states parties agreed to

be bound by some of its acts.

International conferences, especially those engaged in codifying customary law, provide occasions for expressions

by states as to the law on particular questions. General consensus as to the law at such a conference confirms customary

law or contributes to its creation. See, e.g., as to the law of the sea, Introductory Note to Part V.

The development of customary law has been described as part of a “process of continuous interaction, of

continuous demand and response,” among decision-makers of different states. These “create expectations that effective

power will be restrained and exercised in certain uniformities of pattern. . . . The reciprocal tolerances . . . create the

expectations of patterns and uniformity in decision, of practice in accord with rule, commonly regarded as law.”

McDougal, “The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea,” 49 Am.J. Int’l L. 357-58 (1955).

That a rule of customary law is not binding on any state indicating its dissent during the development of the rule

(Comment d) is an accepted application of the traditional principle that international law essentially depends on the

consent of states. See Introduction to Part I, Chapter 1. Refusal of states to adopt or acquiesce in a practice has often

prevented its development into a principle of customary law, but instances of dissent and exemption from practice that

developed into principles of general customary law have been few. Scandinavian states successfully maintained a four-

mile territorial sea although a three-mile zone was generally accepted, and Norway successfully maintained a different

system of delimitation of its territorial zone. See Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116.

An entity that achieves statehood becomes subject to international law (§ 206), notably customary law as it had

developed. After the Second World War, many new states came into existence within a brief period. Their spokesmen

rhetorically asked why they should be bound by preexisting law created by European, Christian, imperialistic powers.

In fact, however, the basic principles of customary law were accepted, with new states joining in the process of law-

making, and seeking desired changes in the law through accepted procedures, notably by international agreements

codifying, developing, and sometimes modifying the law.

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8

3. Binding resolutions of international organizations. Comment g refers to prescriptive decisions, such as those of

the International Monetary Fund, or binding resolutions such as those of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII

of the United Nations Charter, which have the effect of law for members of the organization. The United States has

recognized the binding character of such resolutions, for example, the resolution imposing an embargo on products of

Southern Rhodesia. See 22 U.S.C. § 287c. Many other organs of international organizations have limited authority to

impose some binding obligations, for example to determine the budget and the “dues” of each member. See, for

example, the authority of the United Nations General Assembly under Article 17 of the Charter. A number of

international organizations have authority to recommend rules but states are not compelled to adopt them.

4. Conflict between customary law and international agreement. A subsequent agreement will prevail over prior

custom, except where the principle of customary law has the character of jus cogens, but an agreement is ordinarily

presumed to supplement rather than to replace a customary rule. Provisions in international agreements are superseded

by principles of customary law that develop subsequently, where the parties to the agreement so intend, in which case

the earlier provision in the agreement is deemed to have expired by mutual agreement or by desuetude. If an

international agreement provides for denunciation, it will ordinarily be assumed that the agreement was not intended to

be replaced by subsequent custom unless the parties denounce the earlier agreement. See Akehurst, “The Hierarchy of

the Sources of International Law,” 47 Brit.Y.B.Int’l L. 273 (1974-75). Modification of customary law by agreement is

not uncommon, sometimes through bilateral agreements, notably in the various multilateral codifications of recent

decades, such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (see this Restatement, Part III), the conventions on

diplomatic and consular immunities (Part IV, § § 464-70), and the conventions on the law of the sea (Part V). There

have been few instances of rules of customary law developing in conflict with earlier agreements, but that may happen

more frequently as state practice responds to widespread political demands, for example, when states adopted 200-mile

exclusive resource zones in the sea, in effect superseding the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions. See § 514. Compare

Arbitration between the United Kingdom and France on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Decision of June 30,

1977), 18 Int’l Leg.Mat. 397 (1979), 18 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 3 (1983).

5. Agreements codifying customary law. An international agreement may declare that it merely codifies

preexisting rules of customary international law. Such a declaration is evidence to that effect but is not conclusive on

parties to the agreement. The recent “codification treaties” adopted under United Nations auspices declare that their aim

is both codification and progressive development, thus leaving open whether a particular provision is declaratory of old

law or a formulation of new law. See, for example, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Introductory Note to

Part III. Even such a declaration is evidence that the agreement reflects existing law in some respects, and as to these

the declaration may itself be viewed as a form of state practice confirming the customary international law. Of course,

states may disagree as to whether the agreement as a whole or a particular provision reflects existing law. See generally

Baxter, “Treaties and Custom,” 129 Recueil des Cours 25 (1970).

International agreements that do not purport to codify customary international law may in fact do so. International

agreements may also help create customary law of general applicability. Comment i. In North Sea Continental Shelf

Cases, Reporters’ Note 2, at 37, the Court held that the Convention on the Continental Shelf codified the doctrine of the

continental shelf as well as its basic principles, but not provisions as to which reservations were permitted. The Court

suggested that a treaty rule might become “a general rule of international law” if there were “a very widespread and

representative participation in the convention . . . provided it includes that of States whose interests were particularly

affected.” Id. at 42. Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares: “Nothing in Articles 34 to 37

precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third state as a customary rule of international law,

recognized as such.” See § 324, Comment e.

6. Peremptory norms (juscogens). The concept of jus cogens is of relatively recent origin. See Schwelb, “Some

Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission,” 61 Am.J.Int’l L. 946 (1967).

It is now widely accepted, however, as a principle of customary law (albeit of higher status). It is incorporated in the

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 53 and 64. See § 331(2) and Comment e to that section. Comment

k to this section adopts the definition of jus cogens found in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention. The Vienna

Convention requires that the norm (and its peremptory character) must be “accepted and recognized by the international

community of States as a whole” (Art. 53). Apparently that means by “a very large majority” of states, even if over

dissent by “a very small number” of states. See Report of the Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole, May 21,

1968, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11 at 471-72.

Although the concept of jus cogens is now accepted, its content is not agreed. There is general agreement that the

principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force are jus cogens. See Comment k; Verdross and

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United State

9

Simma, Universelles Volkerrecht 83-87 (1976). It has been suggested that norms that create “international crimes” and

obligate all states to proceed against violations are also peremptory. Compare Report of the International Law

Commission on the work of its twenty-eighth session, draft Art. 19, [1976] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 95, 121. Such norms

might include rules prohibiting genocide, slave trade and slavery, apartheid and other gross violations of human rights,

and perhaps attacks on diplomats. Compare § 702, Comment n.

7. General principles. Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Reporters’ Note 1,

speaks of “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” It has become clear that this phrase refers to

general principles of law common to the major legal systems of the world. The general principles are those common to

national legal systems; the view of Soviet scholars that the reference is to principles of international law that have been

accepted by states generally has not gained acceptance. Compare Tunkin, Theory of International Law 190 (1974).

See, generally, Virally, “The Sources of International Law,” in Manual of Public International Law 143-48 (Sorensen,

ed. 1968). In contrast, references to “general principles of international law” ordinarily mean principles accepted as

customary international law whether or not they derive from principles common to national legal systems.

Whether a general principle common to national legal systems is appropriate for absorption by international law

may depend on the development of international law. For example, there is now substantial international law on human

rights (this Restatement, Part VII), and it is plausible to conclude that a rule against torture is part of international law,

since such a principle is common to all major legal systems. See § 702(d); § 701, Reporters’ Note 1.

In addition to being an independent though secondary source of law, general principles are also supportive of other

sources. That a principle is common to the major legal systems may be persuasive in determining whether it has

become a rule of customary law or is implied in an international agreement. See Opinion of Judge Dillard in Appeal

Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), [1972] I.C.J. Rep. 46, 109. For example, “good

faith,” a principle “universally recognized” (preamble, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, § 321, Reporters’

Note 1) was perhaps originally a principle common to the major legal systems, but is now accepted as a principle of

customary law. Compare Case Relating to the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain (Honduras v. Nicaragua),

[1960] I.C.J. Rep. 192, 219, 220, 222, 228, 236 (state cannot in good faith contest long-accepted arbitral award), and

Case of the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [1962] id. 6, 23, 42 (state cannot in good faith challenge

long-accepted boundary). See Lachs, “Some Thoughts on the Role of Good Faith in International Law,” in Declarations

on Principles: A Quest for Universal Peace 47 (Akkerman, van Krieker & Pannenberg eds., 1977); Virally, “Good Faith

In Public International Law,” 77 Am.J.Int’l L. 130 (1983).

8. Equity. The principle of equity is frequently invoked in discourse between states but there are few references to

equity as a legal principle in international judicial decisions. One such reference was in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case

(United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 3. “Equitable principles” have been explicitly accepted as applicable in

the delimitation of boundaries between the continental shelves and between the exclusive economic zones of states, and

the concept has been considered by international tribunals in that context. See § 517 and Reporters’ Note 1 thereto.

9. Previous Restatement. The sources of international law are dealt with briefly in the previous Restatement in the

comments to § 1.

CROSS REFERENCES: Digest System Key Numbers:

International Law 2

Treaties 1

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United State

10

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States

Copyright (c) 1987, The American Law Institute

Case Citations

Rules and Principles

Part 1 – International Law and Its Relation to United States Law

Chapter 1 – International Law: Character and Sources

Restat 3d of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., § 103

§ 103 Evidence of International Law

(1) Whether a rule has become international law is determined by evidence appropriate to the particular source

from which that rule is alleged to derive (§ 102).

(2) In determining whether a rule has become international law, substantial weight is accorded to

(a) judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral tribunals;

(b) judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals;

(c) the writings of scholars;

(d) pronouncements by states that undertake to state a rule of international law, when such

pronouncements are not seriously challenged by other states.

COMMENTS & ILLUSTRATIONS: Comment:

a. Primary and secondary evidence of international law. Section 102 sets forth the “sources” of international law,

i.e., the ways in which a rule or principle becomes international law. This section indicates the means of proving, for

example, in a court or other tribunal, that a rule has become international law by way of one or more of the sources

indicated in § 102.

Under Subsection (1), the process of determining whether a rule has been accepted as international law depends on

the particular source of international law indicated in § 102 from which the rule is alleged to derive. Thus, for

customary law the “best evidence” is proof of state practice, ordinarily by reference to official documents and other

indications of governmental action. (Similar forms of proof would be adduced as evidence that a state is not bound by a

principle of law because it had dissented, § 102, Comment d). Law made by international agreement is proved by

reference to the text of the agreement, but appropriate supplementary means to its interpretation are not excluded. See §

325. Subsection (2) refers to secondary evidence indicating what the law has been found to be by authoritative reporters

and interpreters; the order of the clauses is not meant to indicate their relative importance. Such evidence may be

negated by primary evidence, for example, as to customary law, by proof as to what state practice is in fact.

A determination as to whether a customary rule has developed is likely to be influenced by assessment as to

whether the rule will contribute to international order.

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United State

11

For the practice of United States courts in determining international law, see § 113.

b. Judicial and arbitral decisions. Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides: “The

decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” That

provision reflects the traditional view that there is no stare decisis in international law. In fact, in the few permanent

courts, such as the International Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, and the European

Court of Human Rights, there is considerable attention to past decisions. See § 903, Reporters’ Note 8. That may be

expected, too, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established in 1979. In any event, to the extent that

decisions of international tribunals adjudicate questions of international law, they are persuasive evidence of what the

law is. The judgments and opinions of the International Court of Justice are accorded great weight. Judgments and

opinions of international tribunals generally are accorded more weight than those of domestic courts, since the former

are less likely to reflect a particular national interest or bias, but the views of national courts, too, generally have the

weight due to bodies of presumed independence, competence, impartiality, and authority.

Under the foreign relations law of the United States, determinations of international law by courts in the United

States are respected to the same extent as other determinations of law; lower courts must of course accept decisions of

higher courts, and the determinations of the Supreme Court of the United States are conclusive on all courts in the

United States. See § 112(2).

c. Declaratory resolutions of international organizations. States often pronounce their views on points of

international law, sometimes jointly through resolutions of international organizations that undertake to declare what the

law is on a particular question, usually as a matter of general customary law. International organizations generally have

no authority to make law, and their determinations of law ordinarily have no special weight, but their declaratory

pronouncements provide some evidence of what the states voting for it regard the law to be. The evidentiary value of

such resolutions is variable. Resolutions of universal international organizations, if not controversial and if adopted by

consensus or virtual unanimity, are given substantial weight. Such declaratory resolutions of international organizations

are to be distinguished from those special “law-making resolutions” that, under the constitution of an organization, are

legally binding on its members. See § 102, Comment g.

REPORTERS NOTES: 1. Writings of international law scholars. The “teachings of the most highly qualified

publicists of the various nations” are treated in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of International Court of Justice as

subsidiary means for the determination of international law. See § 102, Reporters’ Note 1. Such writings include

treatises and other writings of authors of standing; resolutions of scholarly bodies such as the Institute of International

Law (Institut de droit international) and the International Law Association; draft texts and reports of the International

Law Commission, and systematic scholarly presentations of international law such as this Restatement. Which

publicists are “the most highly qualified” is, of course, not susceptible of conclusive proof, and the authority of writings

as evidence of international law differs greatly. The views of the International Law Commission have sometimes been

considered especially authoritative. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v.

Denmark & Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 33 et seq.

2. Declaratory resolutions of international organizations. Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court

of Justice, § 102, Reporters’ Note 1, does not include resolutions of international organizations among the “subsidiary

means for the determination of rules of law.” However, the Statute was drafted before the growth and proliferation of

international organizations following the Second World War. Given the universal character of many of those

organizations and the forum they provide for the expression by states of their views regarding legal principles, such

resolutions sometimes provide important evidence of law. A resolution purporting to state the law on a subject is some

evidence of what the states voting for the resolution regard the law to be, although what states do is more weighty

evidence than their declarations or the resolutions they vote for. The evidentiary value of such a resolution is high if it

is adopted by consensus or by virtually unanimous vote of an organization of universal membership such as the United

Nations or its Specialized Agencies. On the other hand, majorities may be tempted to declare as existing law what they

would like the law to be, and less weight must be given to such a resolution when it declares law in the interest of the

majority and against the interest of a strongly dissenting minority. See, e.g., the General Assembly resolution declaring

that the use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law (G.A. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17 at 4), and

the “Moratorium Resolution” declaring that no one may mine for resources in the deep-sea bed until there is an agreed

international regime and only in accordance with its terms (G.A. Res. 2574(D), 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, at 11),

both of which were challenged by the United States, a principal power immediately affected by those resolutions. See §

523, Reporters’ Note 2. Even a unanimous resolution may be questioned when the record shows that those voting for it

Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United State

12

considered it merely a recommendation or a political expression, or that serious consideration was not given to its legal

basis. A resolution is entitled to little weight if it is contradicted by state practice, Comment a, or is rejected by

international courts or tribunals. On the other hand, a declaratory resolution that was less than unanimous may be

evidence of customary law if it is supported by thorough study by the International Law Commission or other serious

legal examination. See, for example, the reliance on one United Nations General Assembly resolution but deprecation

of another resolution by the arbitrator in Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic (1977), 17 Int’l

Leg.Mat. 1 (1978).

Resolutions by a principal organ of an organization interpreting the charter of the organization may be entitled to

greater weight. In some instances, such an interpretation may, by the terms of the charter, be binding on the parties, for

example, those of the Council of the International Coffee Organization. See Charter of the International Coffee

Organization, 469 U.N.T.S. 169. Declarations interpreting a charter are entitled to considerable weight if they are

unanimous or nearly unanimous and have the support of all the principal members.

See generally Schachter, “The Crisis of Legitimation in the United Nations,” 50 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International

Ret 3 (1981).

CROSS REFERENCES: Digest System Key Numbers:

International Law 2

CRS

Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

International Law and Agreements:
Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

Michael John Garcia
Legislative Attorney

March 1, 2013

Congressional Research Service

7-5700
www.crs.gov

RL32528

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

Congressional Research Service

Summary
This report provides an introduction to the roles that international law and agreements play in the
United States. International law is derived from two primary sources—international agreements
and customary practice. Under the U.S. legal system, international agreements can be entered into
by means of a treaty or an executive agreement. The Constitution allocates primary responsibility
for entering into such agreements to the executive branch, but Congress also plays an essential
role. First, in order for a treaty (but not an executive agreement) to become binding upon the
United States, the Senate must provide its advice and consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds
majority. Secondly, Congress may authorize congressional-executive agreements. Thirdly, many
treaties and executive agreements are not self-executing, meaning that implementing legislation is
required to provide U.S. bodies with the domestic legal authority necessary to enforce and
comply with an international agreement’s provisions.

The status of an international agreement within the United States depends on a variety of factors.
Self-executing treaties have a status equal to federal statute, superior to U.S. state law, and
inferior to the Constitution. Depending upon the nature of executive agreements, they may or may
not have a status equal to federal statute. In any case, self-executing executive agreements have a
status that is superior to U.S. state law and inferior to the Constitution. Treaties or executive
agreements that are not self-executing have been understood by the courts to have limited status
domestically; rather, the legislation or regulations implementing these agreements are controlling.

The effects of the second source of international law, customary international practice, upon the
United States are more ambiguous and controversial. While there is some Supreme Court
jurisprudence finding that customary international law is part of U.S. law, U.S. statutes that
conflict with customary rules remain controlling. Customary international law is perhaps most
clearly recognized under U.S. law via the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which establishes federal
court jurisdiction over tort claims brought by aliens for violations of “the law of nations.”

Recently, there has been some controversy concerning references made by U.S. courts to foreign
laws or jurisprudence when interpreting domestic statutes or constitutional requirements.
Historically, U.S. courts have on occasion looked to foreign jurisprudence for persuasive value,
particularly when the interpretation of an international agreement is at issue, but foreign
jurisprudence never appears to have been treated as binding. Though U.S. courts will likely
continue to refer to foreign jurisprudence, where, when, and how significantly they will rely upon
it is difficult to predict.

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

Congressional Research Service

Contents
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
Forms of International Agreements ……………………………………………………………………………………. 2

Treaties …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2
Executive Agreements ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
Nonlegal Agreements …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5

Effects of International Agreements on U.S. Law ………………………………………………………………… 6
Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing Agreements ………………………………………………………. 6
Conflict with Existing Laws ………………………………………………………………………………………… 8

Customary International Law ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 9
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) ……………………………………………………………………………………… 10

Reference to Foreign Law by U.S. Courts …………………………………………………………………………. 12

Figures
Figure A-1. Steps in the Making of a Treaty ………………………………………………………………………. 15
Figure A-2. Steps in the Making of an Executive Agreement ………………………………………………. 17

Appendixes
Appendix. Steps in the Making of a Treaty and in the Making of an Executive Agreement ……… 15

Contacts
Author Contact Information…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 18

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

Congressional Research Service 1

Introduction
International law consists of “rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct
of [S]tates and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with
some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.”1 Rules of international law can
be established in three main ways: (1) by international, formal agreement, usually between States
(i.e., countries), (2) in the form of international custom, and (3) by derivation of principles
common to major world legal systems.2

Since its inception, the United States has understood international legal commitments to be
binding upon it both internationally and domestically.3 The United States assumes international
obligations most frequently when it makes agreements with other States or international bodies
that are intended to be legally binding upon the parties involved. Such legal agreements are made
through treaty or executive agreement. The U.S. Constitution allocates primary responsibility for
such agreements to the Executive, but Congress also plays an essential role. First, in order for a
treaty (but not an executive agreement) to become binding upon the United States, the Senate
must provide its advice and consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds majority.4 Secondly,
Congress may authorize congressional-executive agreements. Thirdly, in order to have domestic,
judicially enforceable legal effect, the provisions of many treaties and executive agreements may
require implementing legislation that provides U.S. bodies with the authority necessary to enforce
and comply with an international agreement’s provisions.5

1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 101 (1987). Recorded international law dates back to agreements
between Mesopotamian rulers five thousand years ago, but international law as we understand it began with the Roman
Empire, whose scholars formulated a jus gentium (law of nations) they believed universally derivable through reason.
See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY (2001). The term “international law” appears to
have been coined by Jeremy Bentham in 1789. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 326 n. 1 (Hafner Publ’g Co. 1948) (1789). Although originally governing State-to-State relations, the
scope of international law has grown, beginning in the latter half of the 20th century with the emerging fields of human
rights law and international criminal law, to regulate the treatment and conduct of individuals in certain circumstances.
See, e.g., Universal Declaration on Human Rights, UN GAOR, Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 (1948); Geneva
Convention (Third) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Geneva Convention (Fourth) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Comm., 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (XXI) (1966). See also U.S. State Dept. Pub. No. 3080,
REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 437 (1949) (arguing that crimes
against humanity were “implicitly” in violation of international law even before Nuremberg).
2 RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 102.
3 See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (“[w]hen the United States declared their independence,
they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (“the United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable
to the law of nations”); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to M. Genet, French Minister (June
5, 1793) (construing the law of nations as an “integral part” of domestic law).
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur”).
5 See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.) (finding that international agreements
entered into by the United States are “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
wherever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import
a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the [agreement] addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the
court”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 8 L.Ed. 604 (1833). CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, A
(continued…)

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

Congressional Research Service 2

The effects of customary international law and the law of foreign States (foreign law) upon the
United States are more ambiguous and sometimes controversial. There is some Supreme Court
jurisprudence finding that customary international law is incorporated into domestic law, but this
incorporation is only to the extent that “there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision” in conflict.6 Though foreign law and practice have long been
seen as persuasive by American courts as evidence of customary norms, their use in certain
regards (particularly with respect to interpreting the Constitution) has prompted some criticism by
a number of lawmakers and scholars. This report provides an introduction to the role that
international law and agreements play in the United States.

Forms of International Agreements
The United States regularly enters into international legal agreements with other States or
international organizations that are legally binding as a matter of international law. Under U.S.
law, legally binding international agreements may take the form of treaties or executive
agreements. In this regard, it is important to distinguish “treaty” in the context of international
law, in which “treaty” and “international agreement” are synonymous terms for all binding
agreements,7 and “treaty” in the context of domestic American law, in which “treaty” may more
narrowly refer to a particular subcategory of binding international agreements.8

Treaties
Under U.S. law, a treaty is an agreement negotiated and signed9 by the Executive that enters into
force if it is approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate and is subsequently ratified by the
President. Treaties generally require parties to exchange or deposit instruments of ratification in

(…continued)
STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 4 (Comm. Print 2001); RESTATEMENT, supra
footnote 1, § 111(3).
6 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2003);
Galo-Garcia v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1996) (“where a controlling executive or legislative act … exist[s],
customary international law is inapplicable”); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 939 (D.C. Cir.1988); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). But
see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding that the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, recognized
an individual cause of action for certain egregious violations of the law of nations).
7 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “Vienna
Convention”], art.2. Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it recognizes it as generally
signifying customary international law. See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“we
rely upon the Vienna Convention here as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties …
[b]ecause the United States recognizes the Vienna Convention as a codification of customary international law … and
[it] acknowledges the Vienna Convention as, in large part, the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”)
(internal citations omitted).
8 The term “treaty” is not always interpreted under U.S. law to refer only to those agreements described in Article II,
§ 2 of the Constitution. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (interpreting statute barring discrimination except
where permitted by “treaty” to refer to both treaties and executive agreements); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224
U.S. 583 (1912) (construing the term “treaty,” as used in statute conferring appellate jurisdiction, to also refer to
executive agreements).
9 Under international law, States that have signed but not ratified treaties have the obligation to refrain from acts that
would defeat the object or purpose of the treaty. See Vienna Convention, art. 18.

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

Congressional Research Service 3

order for them to enter into force. A chart depicting the steps necessary for the United States to
enter a treaty is in the Appendix.

The Senate may, in considering a treaty, condition its consent on certain reservations,10
declarations,11 understandings,12 and provisos13 concerning treaty application. If accepted, these
conditions may limit and/or define U.S. obligations under the treaty.14 The Senate may also
propose to amend the text of the treaty itself. The other party or parties to the agreement would
have to consent to these changes in order for them to take effect.

Executive Agreements
The great majority of international agreements that the United States enters into are not treaties
but executive agreements—agreements entered into by the executive branch that are not
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Congress generally requires notification upon
the entry of such an agreement.15 Although executive agreements are not specifically discussed in
the Constitution, they nonetheless have been considered valid international compacts under
Supreme Court jurisprudence and as a matter of historical practice.16

Starting in the World War II era, reliance on executive agreements has grown significantly.17
Whereas 27 published executive agreements (compared to 60 treaties) were concluded by the
United States during the first 50 years of the Republic, from 1939 through 2012 the United States
concluded roughly 17,300 published executive agreements (compared to approximately 1,100
treaties).18 This estimate does not include many legal compacts between the United States and

10 A “reservation” is “a unilateral statement … made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in
their application to that State.” Id. art.2(1)(d). In practice, “[r]eservations change U.S. obligations without necessarily
changing the text, and they require the acceptance of the other party.” TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS, supra footnote 5, at 11; Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23.
11 Declarations are “statements expressing the Senate’s position or opinion on matters relating to issues raised by the
treaty rather than to specific provisions.” TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra footnote 5, at 11.
12 Understandings are “interpretive statements that clarify or elaborate provisions but do not alter them.” Id.
13 Provisos concern “issues of U.S. law or procedure and are not intended to be included in the instruments of
ratification to be deposited or exchanged with other countries.” Id.
14 As a matter of customary international law, States are “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty,” including entering reservations that are incompatible with a treaty’s purposes. Vienna
Convention, arts. 18-19.
15 See 1 U.S.C. § 112b (requiring text of executive agreements to be transmitted to Congress within 60 days, subject to
certain exceptions).
16 E.g., American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (“our cases have recognized that the President has
authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate … this power
having been exercised since the early years of the Republic”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“an
international compact … is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate”).
17 WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (5th ed. 2007).
18 This estimate is based on multiple sources which rely on data provided by the State Department, including TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra footnote 5, at 39 (providing numbers from 1789 through 1999) and
SLOMANSON, supra footnote 17, at 376 (discussing published executive agreements and treaties concluded between
1789 and 2004). Data from 2005 onward compiled from State Department, Office of Treaty Affairs, Reporting
International Agreements to Congress under Case Act (Text of Agreements), at http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/caseact/
(providing text of executive agreements reported to Congress pursuant to 1 U.S.C. § 112b from 1998 onward, except
for those agreements not publicly disclosed because of national security concerns) and through the Legislative
Information System database (identifying treaties submitted to the U.S. Senate for consideration).
(continued…)

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

Congressional Research Service 4

foreign entities that have not been reported. While the precise number of unreported executive
agreements is unknown, there are likely many thousands of agreements (mainly dealing with
“minor or trivial undertakings”19) that are not included in these figures.20

There are three types of prima facie legal executive agreements: (1) congressional-executive
agreements, in which Congress has previously or retroactively authorized an international
agreement entered into by the Executive; (2) executive agreements made pursuant to an earlier
treaty, in which the agreement is authorized by a ratified treaty; and (3) sole executive
agreements, in which an agreement is made pursuant to the President’s constitutional authority
without further congressional authorization. The Executive’s authority to enter the agreement is
different in each case. A chart describing the steps in the making of an executive agreement is in
the Appendix.

In the case of congressional-executive agreements, the “constitutionality … seems well
established.”21 Unlike in the case of treaties, where only the Senate plays a role in approving the
agreement, both houses of Congress are involved in the authorizing process for congressional-
executive agreements. Congressional authorization of such agreements takes the form of a statute
which must pass both houses of Congress. Historically, congressional-executive agreements have
been made for a wide variety of topics, ranging from postal conventions to bilateral trade to
military assistance.22 The North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade are notable examples of congressional-executive agreements.

Agreements made pursuant to treaties are also well-established as legitimate, though controversy
occasionally arises as to whether the agreement was actually imputed by the treaty in question.23
Since the earlier treaty is the “Law of the Land,”24 the power to enter into an agreement required
or contemplated by the treaty lies fairly clearly within the President’s executive function.

(…continued)
According to these figures, between 1789 and 2004, the United States concluded 1,834 treaties and 16,704 published
executive agreements, meaning that roughly 10% of agreements concluded by the United States during that period took
the form of treaties. Id. The percentage of agreements entered as treaties has declined further since 2004.
19 The Case-Zablocki Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-403) requires that all “international agreements” other than treaties be
transmitted to Congress within 60 days of their entry into force for the United States. The act does not define what sort
of arrangements constitute “international agreements,” though the legislative history suggests that Congress “did not
want to be inundated with trivia … [but wished] to have transmitted all agreements of any significance.” H.Rept. 92-
1301, 92nd Cong. (1972). Implementing State Department regulations establish criteria for assessing when a compact
constitutes an “international agreement” that must be reported under the Case-Zablocki Act. These regulations provide
that “[m]inor or trivial undertakings, even if couched in legal language and form,” are not considered to fall under the
purview of the act’s reporting requirements. 22 C.F.R. §181.2(a).
20 In a 1953 congressional hearing, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was asked how many executive agreements
had been entered by the United States pursuant to the NATO Treaty. Dulles replied, with some degree of hyperbole,
“about 10,000….Every time we open a new privy, we have an executive agreement.” Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J.
Res. 43: Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), 877.
21 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra footnote 5, at 5. See also CRS Report 97-896, Why
Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than as Treaties, by Jeanne
J. Grimmett; LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2nd ed. 1996) at 215-18.
22 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra footnote 5, at 5.
23 Id.
24 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“the laws of the United States … [and] all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”).

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Sole executive agreements rely on neither treaty nor congressional authority to provide for their
legal basis. The Constitution may confer limited authority upon the President to promulgate such
agreements on the basis of his foreign affairs power.25 If the President enters into an executive
agreement pursuant to and dealing with an area where he has clear, exclusive constitutional
authority—such as an agreement to recognize a particular foreign government for diplomatic
purposes—the agreement is legally permissible regardless of Congress’s opinion on the matter.26
If, however, the President enters into an agreement and his constitutional authority over the
agreement’s subject matter is unclear, a reviewing court may consider Congress’s position in
determining whether the agreement is legitimate.27 If Congress has given its implicit approval to
the President entering the agreement, or is silent on the matter, it is more likely that the agreement
will be deemed valid. When Congress opposes the agreement and the President’s constitutional
authority to enter the agreement is ambiguous, it is unclear if or when such an agreement would
be given effect. The Litvinov Assignment, under which the Soviet Union purported to assign to
the United States claims to American assets in Russia that had previously been nationalized by
the Soviet Union, is an example of a sole executive agreement.

Nonlegal Agreements
Not every pledge, assurance, or arrangement made between the United States and a foreign party
constitutes a legally binding international agreement. In some cases, the United States makes
“political commitments” or “gentlemen’s agreements” with foreign States. Although these
commitments are nonlegal, they may nonetheless carry significant moral and political weight.
The Executive has long claimed the authority to enter such agreements on behalf of the United
States without congressional authorization, asserting that the entering of political commitments
by the Executive is not subject to the same constitutional constraints as the entering of legally
binding international agreements.28 An example of a nonlegal agreement is the 1975 Helsinki
Accords, a Cold War agreement signed by 35 nations, which contains provisions concerning

25 See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra footnote 5, at 5, citing U.S. CONST. arts. II, § 1
(executive power), § 2 (commander in chief power, treaty power), § 3 (receiving ambassadors). Courts have recognized
foreign affairs as an area of very strong executive authority. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936).
26 See RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 303 (4).
27 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding sole executive agreement concerning the handling of
Iranian assets in the United States, despite the existence of a potentially conflicting statute, given Congress’s historical
acquiescence to these types of agreements); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (“When
the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his powers are at their maximum….
Congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may … invite, measures of independent Presidential responsibility….
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter”) (Jackson, J., concurring). But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531-532( 2008) (suggesting that
Dames & Moore analysis regarding significance of congressional acquiescence might be relevant only to a “narrow set
of circumstances,” where presidential action is supported by a “particularly longstanding practice” of congressional
acquiescence).
28 See generally Robert E. Dalton, Asst. Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, International Documents of a Non-Legally
Binding Character, State Department, Memorandum, March 18, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/65728 (discussing U.S. and international practice with respect to nonlegal, political agreements);
Duncan B. Hollis and Joshua J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507
(2009) (discussing U.S. political commitments made to foreign States and the constitutional implications of the
practice).

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territorial integrity, human rights, scientific and economic cooperation, peaceful settlement of
disputes, and the implementation of confidence-building measures.

An international agreement is generally presumed to be legally binding in the absence of an
express provision indicating its nonlegal nature. State Department regulations recognize that this
presumption may be overcome when there is “clear evidence, in the negotiating history of the
agreement or otherwise, that the parties intended the arrangement to be governed by another legal
system.”29 Other factors that may be relevant in determining whether an agreement is nonlegal in
nature include the form of the agreement and the specificity of its provisions.30

Effects of International Agreements on U.S. Law
The effects that international legal agreements entered into by the United States have upon U.S.
domestic law are dependent upon the nature of the agreement; namely, whether the agreement is
self-executing or non-self-executing, and possibly whether it was made pursuant to a treaty or an
executive agreement.

Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing Agreements
Some provisions of international treaties or executive agreements are considered “self-
executing,” meaning that they have the force of law without the need for subsequent
congressional action.31 Treaty provisions that are not considered self-executing are understood to
require implementing legislation to provide U.S. agencies with legal authority to carry out the
functions and obligations contemplated by the agreement or to make them enforceable in court by
private parties.32 Treaties have been found to be non-self-executing for at least three reasons: (1)
the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without
the enactment of implementing legislation; (2) the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or
Congress by resolution, requires implementing legislation;33 or (3) implementing legislation is

29 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a).
30 Id. See also State Department Office of the Legal Adviser, Guidance on Non-Binding Documents, at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/guidance/.
31 See, e.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2 (2008) (“What we mean by ‘self-executing’ is that the treaty has automatic
domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (“For in a strict
sense the [t]reaty was self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its
provisions.”); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 315, 7 L.Ed. 415 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) (describing a treaty as “equivalent
to an act of the legislature” when it “operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision”), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 8 L.Ed. 604 (1833). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, §
111 & cmt. h.
32 E.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505(“In sum, while treaties may comprise international commitments … they are not
domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it
be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“When the [treaty] stipulations are not self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant to
legislation to carry them into effect, and such legislation is as much subject to modification and repeal by congress as
legislation upon any other subject.”). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 111(4)(a) & cmt. h.
33 For example, in the case of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), the
Senate gave advice and consent subject to a declaration that the treaty was not self-executing. U.S. Reservations,
Declarations, and Understandings to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REC. H.R. 1 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). Congress has specified that neither World
(continued…)

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constitutionally required.34 There is significant scholarly debate regarding the distinction between
self-executing and non-self-executing agreements, including the ability of U.S. courts to apply
and enforce them.35

Until implementing legislation is enacted, existing domestic law concerning a matter covered by
an international agreement that is not self-executing remains unchanged and controlling law in
the United States. However, when a treaty is ratified or an executive agreement is entered into,
the United States acquires obligations under international law and may be in default of those
obligations unless implementing legislation is enacted.36

It has been recognized that Congress may enact legislation to implement U.S. treaty obligations
that would otherwise infringe upon a state’s traditional rights under the Tenth Amendment. In the
1920 case of Missouri v. Holland,37 the Supreme Court upheld a federal law regulating the killing
of migratory birds that had been adopted pursuant to a treaty between the United States and Great
Britain, notwithstanding the fact that a similar statute enacted in the absence of a treaty had been
found to be beyond the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers and unconstitutional on Tenth
Amendment grounds. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes stated:

To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the
powers not delegated to the United States, because by Article II, § 2, the power to make
treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article VI treaties made under the authority of the
United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance
thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land. If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute
about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to
execute the powers of the Government.38

The extent to which Congress may intrude upon traditional state authority through treaty-
implementing legislation remains unclear, though there is reason to believe that it could not enact

(…continued)
Trade Organization (WTO) agreements nor rulings made by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body pursuant to these
agreements have direct legal effect under U.S. domestic law. See CRS Report RS22154, World Trade Organization
(WTO) Decisions and Their Effect in U.S. Law, by Jane M. Smith, Brandon J. Murrill, and Daniel T. Shedd.
34RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 111(4)(a) & reporters’ n. 5-6.
35 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310
(1992); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 (1988); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as
Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008); John
C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1955 (1999).
36 See RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 111, cmt. h.
37 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
38 Id. at 432. Since Holland, a number of federal statutes implementing treaty requirements have been recognized by
reviewing courts as constitutionally permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, e.g., United States v.
Bond, 681 F.3d 149, cert. granted, No. 12-158, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 914 (U.S., Jan. 18, 2013) (applying Holland and
holding that the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 229, was a constitutionally
valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement a treaty requirement); United
States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203, as necessary and
proper to implement the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages); United States v. Wang Kun Lue,
134 F.3d 79 (2nd Cir. 1997) (same). See also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (citing to the Indian Commerce
Clause and Treaty Clause as providing Congress with power to legislate on Indian tribe issues, and stating that
“treaties…can authorize Congress to deal with matters with which otherwise Congress could not deal…”) (internal
quotations omitted).

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legislation that infringed upon the essential character of U.S. states, such as through legislation
that commandeered state executive and legislative authorities.39 In January 2013, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Bond v. United States, in which the Court is asked to once again
consider the extent to which the Tenth Amendment acts as a constitutional constraint upon
Congress’s ability to enact treaty-implementing legislation.40

Conflict with Existing Laws
Sometimes, a treaty or executive agreement will conflict with one of the three main tiers of
domestic law—U.S. state law, federal law, or the Constitution. For domestic purposes, a ratified,
self-executing treaty is the law of the land equal to federal law41 and superior to U.S. state law,42
but inferior to the Constitution.43 A self-executing executive agreement is likely superior to U.S.
state law,44 but sole executive agreements may be inferior to conflicting federal law in certain
circumstances (congressional-executive agreements or executive agreements pursuant to treaties
are equivalent to federal law),45 and all executive agreements are inferior to the Constitution.46 In

39 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See generally
Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003). For criticism of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland, and arguments that the treaty power may not expand Congress’s
legislative power, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005).
40 Bond v. United States, No. 12-158, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 914 (U.S., Jan. 18, 2013). The petitioner had been convicted
under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 229, for attempting to poison her
husband’s paramour with toxic chemicals. The petitioner argues that the act, as applied, intrudes upon matters falling
under traditional state authority, and that Congress may not act beyond the scope of its enumerated powers to
implement a treaty. See Bond v. United States, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 12-158 (U.S. Aug. 1, 2012),
available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/12-158-2012-08-01-Bond-Cert-Pet-Final .
41 See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (1888) (“By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no
superior efficacy is given to either over the other.”).
42 See U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2 (“the laws of the United States … [and] all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237
(1796) (“laws of any of the States, contrary to a treaty, shall be disregarded”).
43 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Black, J., plural) (“It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those
who created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our entire
constitutional history and tradition-to construe [the Supremacy Clause] as permitting the United States to exercise
power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions.”); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635,
657 (1853) ( “[t]he treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to
annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States”). See generally
RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 115.
44 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (sole executive agreement concerning settlement of U.S.-Soviet
claims provided federal government with authority to recover claims held in New York banks, despite existence of state
laws that would generally bar their recovery); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203. (1942) (similar).
45 Executive agreements have been held to be inferior to conflicting federal law when the agreement concerns matters
expressly within the constitutional authority of Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655
(4th Cir. 1953) (finding that executive agreement contravening provisions of import statute was unenforceable);
RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 115 reporters’ n.5. However, an executive agreement may trump pre-existing
federal law if it concerns an enumerated or inherent executive power under the Constitution, or if Congress has
historically acquiesced to the President entering agreements in the relevant area. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 230 (“[a]ll
Constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal validity and
obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature”) (quoting The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay)); Dames & Moore, 453
U.S. at 654 (upholding sole executive agreement concerning the handling of Iranian assets in the United States, despite
the existence of a potentially conflicting statute, given Congress’s historical acquiescence to these types of
agreements).
46 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 115.

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cases where ratified treaties or certain executive agreements are equivalent to federal law, the
“last in time” rule establishes that a more recent statute will trump an earlier, inconsistent
international agreement, while a more recent self-executing agreement will trump an earlier,
inconsistent statute.47 In the case of treaties and executive agreements that are not self-executing,
it is the implementing legislation that is controlling domestically, not the agreements or treaties
themselves. “The responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a non-
self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”48 Accordingly, it appears unlikely that
a non-self-executing agreement could be converted into judicially enforceable domestic law via
unilateral presidential action.49

Customary International Law
Customary international law is defined as resulting from “a general and consistent practice of
States followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”50 This means that all, or nearly all,
States consistently follow the practice in question and they must do so because they believe
themselves legally bound, a concept often referred to as opinio juris sive necitatis (opinio juris).
If States generally follow a particular practice but do not feel bound by it, it does not constitute
customary international law.51 Further, there are ways for States to avoid being subject to
customary international law. First, a State which is a persistent objector to a particular
requirement of customary international law is exempt from it.52 Second, under American law, the
United States can exempt itself from customary international law requirements by passing a
contradictory statute under the “last in time” rule.53 As a result, while customary international law
may be incorporated, its impact when in conflict with other domestic law appears limited.

In examining State behavior to determine whether opinio juris is present, courts might look to a
variety of sources, including, inter alia, relevant treaties, unanimous or near-unanimous
declarations by the United Nations General Assembly concerning international law,54 and whether
noncompliance with an espoused universal rule is treated as a breach of that rule.55

47 Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
48 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 525-226.
49 Id. (holding that presidential memorandum ordering a U.S. state court to give effect to non-self-executing- treaty
requirement did not constitute federal law preempting the state’s procedural default rules). For further discussion, see
CRS Report RL34450, Can the President Compel Domestic Enforcement of an International Tribunal’s Judgment?
Overview of Supreme Court Decision in Medellin v. Texas, by Michael John Garcia.
50 RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 102(2).
51 Id. at § 102 cmt. c.
52 Id. at § 102, reporters’ n. 2. The philosophy underlying the consistent objector exemption is that States are bound by
customary international law because they have at least tacitly consented to it. Binding them to abide to customary
practices despite their explicit rejection of these norms would violate their sovereign rights—though States are likely
still bound in the case of peremptory, jus cogens norms which are thought to permit no State derogation, such as the
international prohibition against genocide or slavery. See Colom v. Peru, 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20); U.K. v. Norway,
1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec.18).
53 Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (When…[a statute and treaty] relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but, if the two are
inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other: provided, always, the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is
self-executing.”).
54RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 102 (2) cmt. c. For a discussion of potential difficulties in relying U.N. General
Assembly Resolutions as evidence of customary international law, see Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory
(continued…)

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In 1900, the Supreme Court stated that customary international law “is our law,” but only when
there is not already a controlling executive or legislative act.56 There does not appear to be a case
where the Court has ever struck down a U.S. statute on the ground that it violated customary
international law. However, customary international law can potentially affect how domestic law
is construed. If two constructions of an ambiguous statute are possible, one of which is consistent
with international legal obligations and one of which is not, courts will often construe the statute
so as not to violate international law, presuming such a statutory reading is reasonable.57

Some particularly prevalent rules of customary international law can acquire the status of jus
cogens norms—peremptory rules which permit no derogation, such as the international
prohibition against slavery or genocide.58 For a particular area of customary international law to
constitute a jus cogens norm, State practice must be extensive and virtually uniform.59

The Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
Perhaps the clearest example of U.S. law incorporating customary international law is via the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), sometimes referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act.60 The ATS
originated as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and establishes federal court jurisdiction over tort
claims brought by aliens for violations of either a treaty of the United States or “the law of
nations.”61 Until 1980, this statute was rarely used, but in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second
Circuit relied upon it to award a civil judgment against a former Paraguayan police official who
had allegedly tortured the plaintiffs while still in Paraguay. In doing so, the Filartiga Court
concluded that torture constitutes a violation of the law of nations and gives rise to a cognizable

(…continued)
and Practice: General Course in Public International Law, 178 Rec. Des Cours 111-121 (1982-V).
55 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004) (declining to apply protections espoused by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights because it “does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international
law”).
56 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. As a result, it is the opinion of some commentators that “no enactment of
Congress may be challenged on the grounds that it violates customary international law.” Wade Estey, The Five Bases
of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 21 HASTINGS INT’L. &
COMP. L. REV. 177, 180 (1997). See also Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua, 859 F.2d at 940.
57 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, J.) (“an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains….”). But see Sampson v.
Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1151-54 (7th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that given the “present uncertainty
about the precise domestic role of customary international law,” application of this canon of construction to resolve
differences between ambiguous congressional statutes and customary international law should be used sparingly).
58RESTATEMENT, supra footnote 1, § 702, cmt. n.
59 Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001), citing North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of
Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/The Netherlands) 1969 I.C.J. 51/52 (Feb. 20) & RESTATEMENT,
supra footnote 1, § 102 (2) cmt. k. & reporters’ n. 6.
60 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
61 For additional background on the ATS, see CRS Report RL32118, The Alien Tort Statute: Legislative History and
Executive Branch Views, by Jennifer K. Elsea; and CRS Report R42925, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.:
Corporate Liability and Extraterritoriality Under the Alien Tort Statute , by Richard M. Thompson II.

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claim under the ATS.62 Since that time, the ATS has been used by aliens on a number of occasions
to pursue civil judgments against persons or entities for alleged human rights violations.63

Until recently, the Supreme Court had not addressed the scope of the causes of action available to
aliens under the ATS. In 2004, however, the Supreme Court heard Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,64 a
case in which the plaintiff attempted to derive from the Alien Tort Statute a cause of action for
violation of rules of customary international law. The case arose from the 1985 seizure of a
Mexican national, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, on suspicion of assisting in the torture of a Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent. When extradition attempts failed, the DEA contracted with
Mexican nationals, including Jose Francisco Sosa, to abduct Alvarez-Machain from his home and
bring him to the United States so he could be arrested by federal officers.65 After a lengthy
procedural challenge,66 Alvarez-Machain was acquitted by the district court. In 1993, he returned
to Mexico and commenced a civil suit against the United States and Sosa for his allegedly
arbitrary arrest and detention, with his claim against Sosa being made under the ATS. The holding
in Sosa clarifies when and whether the ATS provides for a cause of action on the basis of an
alleged violation of customary international law.

The Supreme Court interpreted the ATS as being primarily a jurisdictional statute, giving federal
courts authority to entertain claims but not creating a statutory cause of action. Nonetheless, an
assessment of historical materials led the Sosa majority to conclude that the statute “was intended
to have practical effect the moment it became law … [based] on the understanding that the
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”67 Claims could be pursued under the
ATS based on violations of present-day international customary law, but such violations should
“rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” which existed at the time the
ATS was enacted (e.g., a violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, or
piracy).68 Applying this standard, the Court held that Sosa’s claim of arbitrary and unlawful arrest
did not give rise to relief under the ATS.

The Court declined to provide examples of modern-day violations of the law of nations that might
provide grounds for an ATS claim, and counseled restraint in finding them.69 However, the
majority opinion cites to Filartiga on a number of occasions, including citing in dicta to the
Filartiga Court’s finding that “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the

62 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980). The court based its conclusion that torture was prohibited under international law upon
sources including, inter alia, U.N. resolutions, the U.N. Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
63 See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2nd Cir. 2003) (Peruvian plaintiffs brought personal
injury claims under ATS against American mining company, alleging that pollution from mining company’s Peruvian
operations had caused severe lung disease); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (former prisoners in
Ethiopia filed lawsuit under ATS against former Ethiopian official for torture); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd
Cir.1995) (Bosnian plaintiffs brought suit against the self-proclaimed leader of unrecognized Bosnian-Serbian entity
under the ATS for war crimes).
64 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
65 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
66 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
67 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
68 Id. at 725.
69 Id. at 723..

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pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”70 The
Court did not, however, view provisions contained in either the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—two documents
signed by the United States (and in the case of the ICCPR, ratified as a treaty) that have been
widely recognized as evidence of customary international norms—as necessarily reflecting the
existence of a customary international norm sufficient to support an ATS claim.71 The application
of customary international law in U.S. courts, at least with respect to providing grounds for aliens
to pursue civil claims under the ATS, appears limited in scope.72

The Supreme Court is expected to issue a ruling this term in the case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., which may provide further clarity as to the scope of entities covered by the ATS
and the statute’s extraterritorial reach. The case concerns a lawsuit brought by Nigerian citizens
against two non-U.S. corporations which allegedly aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
the commission of widespread human rights abuses. The Court is expected to decide whether
corporations may be held liable under the ATS for violations of the laws of nations or, perhaps
more broadly, the extent to which the ATS applies to conduct occurring wholly outside the United
States. The outcome of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel may have significant implications
for future litigation under the ATS.73

Reference to Foreign Law by U.S. Courts
In recent years, foreign or international legal sources have increasingly been cited by the Supreme
Court when considering matters of U.S. law. While these sources have been looked to for
persuasive value, they have not been treated as binding precedent by U.S. courts.74 Reference to
foreign law or jurisprudence is not a new occurrence. For example, in 1815, the Supreme Court
noted that “decisions of the Courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon a law
common to every country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect.”75 With respect to
international law and treaty interpretation, at least, foreign practice and understanding have
always been considered to have persuasive value.76 However, domestic court reference to foreign

70 Id. at 732.
71 Id. at 734-735.
72 Id. See also, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 1032(2006) (while claim of torture was cognizable under ATS, claims of arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment were not); Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2006) (cross-border child abduction by
parent did not constitute violation of “law of nations” cognizable under ATS); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163
(2nd Cir. 2009) (jurisdiction existed under ATS for claim against private company that, with the aid of Nigerian
government, allegedly violated customary international prohibition on non-consensual human medical
experimentation), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
73 For discussion and analysis of the Kiobel case, see CRS Report R42925, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.:
Corporate Liability and Extraterritoriality Under the Alien Tort Statute , by Richard M. Thompson II.
74 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006) (while Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, to which the United States was a party, gave the International Court of Justice jurisdiction to
settle disputes between parties regarding the treaty’s meaning, ruling by the international tribunal was not binding
precedent on U.S. courts; if “treaties are to be given effect as federal law … determining their meaning as a matter of
federal law is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department, headed by the one [S]upreme Court
established by the Constitution”) (citations and quotations omitted).
75 Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191 (1815).
76 See, e.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507(Court interpretation of international agreement may be aided by examining
negotiating and drafting history and the post-ratification understanding of contracting parties); Zicherman v. Korean
(continued…)

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law and practice has become increasingly controversial.77 There is some dispute among scholars
and policymakers over the extent to which American courts can and should rely on foreign
practices in making decisions interpreting U.S. statutes and the Constitution, particularly
following recent Supreme Court rulings that referred to foreign jurisprudence.78

Possibly the most notable recent references to foreign law by the Supreme Court occurred in the
2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas79 and the 2005 case of Roper v. Simmons.80 In Lawrence, the
Court held that a Texas statute outlawing same-sex sodomy violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In an earlier Court decision upholding anti-sodomy laws, Bowers v.
Hardwick, Chief Justice Burger had written that practices akin to those in question in Lawrence
had been prohibited throughout Western history.81 Writing for the majority in Lawrence, Justice
Kennedy responded to this claim by noting that decisions by other nations and the European
Court of Human Rights within the past few decades conflicted with the reasoning and holding of
Bowers. The Lawrence Court’s opinion went on to imply in dicta that trends in other countries’
understandings of “human freedom” can inform our own, though the anti-sodomy statute was
struck down on separate grounds.82

(…continued)
Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217 (1996) (same); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987) (using U.N.
interpretative materials to “provide significant guidance in construing” the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (finding that “the opinions of our sister
signatories to be entitled to considerable weight” when interpreting agreement provisions); Sumitomo Shoji America,
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184 n.10 (1981) (position of Japanese government entitled to great weight when
interpreting provisions of U.S.-Japan treaty); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928) (finding that provisions of
treaties “should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and
reciprocity between them”).
77 Recent controversy has focused on citations to contemporary foreign law in U.S. courts’ analyses of the meaning and
scope of U.S. constitutional provisions. But citations to foreign law may also occur in other, sometimes less
controversial, contexts. For example, a federal or U.S. state statute may recognize action taken by a foreign government
as being relevant to the person’s eligibility for a federal or state right or benefit (e.g., whether to recognize a marriage
occurring in another country; or the implications that a foreign criminal conviction may have upon an non-citizen’s
ability under U.S. immigration laws to enter or remain in the United States). Litigation concerning these domestic
statutes may occasionally compel U.S. courts to interpret and apply foreign law. Moreover, the law of a U.S. state may
authorize the recognition of a foreign judgment or arbitration award. Further, a U.S. state’s choice of law rules may
require application of foreign law in certain civil disputes taking place between private parties (e.g., when a person
brings suit against a person residing in the U.S. state on account of injurious activities that occurred overseas). In recent
years, the possibility that U.S. state courts might apply religious law to settle family disputes, or might enforce an anti-
defamation judgment of a foreign state which does not protect free speech to the same degree as the United States, has
been the subject of legislative enactments at the state or federal level, and, in some instances, litigation. For discussion
of these issues, see CRS Report R41824, Application of Religious Law in U.S. Courts: Selected Legal Issues, by
Cynthia Brougher, and CRS Report R41417, The SPEECH Act: The Federal Response to “Libel Tourism” (discussing
the SPEECH Act, P.L. 111-223, which bars U.S. state and federal courts from bars U.S. courts from recognizing or
enforcing a foreign judgment for defamation unless certain requirements are satisfied, including consistency with the
U.S. Constitution and section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934, which accords legal protections to providers of
interactive computer services which block or screen offensive material).
78 See generally Steven G. Calabresi and Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court And Foreign Sources Of Law:
Two Hundred Years Of Practice And The Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005)
(discussing historical usage of foreign law by Supreme Court and controversy regarding usage in recent cases involving
constitutional interpretation).
79 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
80 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
81 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
82 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-577. In dissent, Justice Scalia referred to the majority’s discussion of foreign law as
“meaningless … [d]angerous dicta.” Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

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Congressional Research Service 14

In Roper, the Court held that the execution of persons who were juveniles at the time of their
capital offenses was prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In earlier cases,
the Court had struck down the death penalty for juvenile offenders under the age of 16,83 but
found that there was not a national consensus against the execution of those persons who were
aged 16 or 17 at the time of the offense.84 The Court in Roper held that “evolving standards of
decency” had led to a consensus that the execution of juvenile offenders was “cruel and unusual”
punishment prohibited under the Constitution.85 Besides citing to U.S. state practice and the
views of non-governmental, domestic groups as evidence confirming a national consensus against
executing juvenile offenders, the Roper Court also noted “the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty.”86 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, stated that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome,
does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”87

It is not yet clear how persuasive foreign law is considered to be, or whether the Court’s decisions
in Lawrence, Roper, and other cases evidence a growing practice of looking to foreign
jurisprudence to inform constitutional or statutory interpretation. Thus far, it does not appear that
an American court has based its holding on a question of statutory or constitutional interpretation
solely on foreign law. Although foreign law and practice have historically had a role in American
jurisprudence and courts will likely continue to refer to it, where, when, and how significantly
they will rely upon it is difficult to predict.

83 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
84 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
85 For further discussion, see CRS Report RS21969, Capital Punishment and Juveniles, by Alison M. Smith.
86 Id. at 578.
87 Id.

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

CRS-15

Appendix. Steps in the Making of a Treaty and in the Making of an Executive
Agreement

Figure A-1. Steps in the Making of a Treaty

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

CRS-16

Source: Reprinted from Congressional Research Service, Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, A Study Prepared for the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations 8-9 (Comm. Print 2001).

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

CRS-17

Figure A-2. Steps in the Making of an Executive Agreement

Source: Reprinted from Congressional Research Service, Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, A Study Prepared for the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations 8-9 (Comm. Print 2001).

International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law

Congressional Research Service 18

Author Contact Information

Michael John Garcia
Legislative Attorney
mgarcia@crs.loc.gov, 7-3873

~1 ~~

The Evolution of International Law:
colonial and postcolonial realities

ANTONY ANGHIE

ABSTRACT The colonial and postcolonial realities of international law have
been obscured by the analytical frameworks that governed traditional scholar-
ship on the subject. This article sketches out a history of the evolution of
international law that focuses in particular on the manner in which imperialism
shaped the discipline. It argues that colonialism, rather than being a peripheral
concern of the discipline, is central to the formation of international law and, in
particular, its founding concept, sovereignty. It argues that international law
has always been animated by the civilising mission, the project of governing and
transforming non-European peoples, and that the current war on terror is an
extension of this project.

The colonial and postcolonial realities of international law have been
obscured and misunderstood as a consequence of a persistent and deep seated
set of ideas that has structured traditional scholarship on the history and
theory of international law. This article seeks to identify these structures,
suggesting ways in which they have limited the understanding of the
relationship between imperialism and international law. It then sketches a set
of alternative perspectives that may offer a better appreciation of the imperial
aspects of international law, and their enduring effects on the contemporary
international system. 1 My purpose, then, is to sketch a history of the
relationship between imperialism and international law in the evolution of
international law from the 16th century to the present, and to suggest a set
of analytic and conceptual tools that are adequate for the purposes of
illuminating this history.

The traditional understanding of international law regards colonialism-
and, indeed, non-European societies and their practices more generally-as
peripheral to the discipline proper because international law was a creation of
Europe. The explicitly and unquestionably European character of interna-
tionallaw has been powerfully and characteristically asserted by historians of
the discipline such as JHW Verzijl:

Now there is one truth that is not open to denial or even to doubt, namely that
the actual body of international law, as it stands today, not only is the product
of the conscious activity of the European mind, but also has drawn its vital

Antony Anghie is in the SJ Quinney School of Lalv, University of Utah, 332 South, 1400 East, Salt Lake
City, UT 84112-0730, USA. Email: anghiet@law.utah.edu.

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/06/050739-15 © 2006 Third World Quarterly
001: 10.1080/01436590600780011 739

ANTONY ANGHIE

essence from a common source of beliefs, and in both of these aspects it is
mainly of Western European origin. 2

International law in this view consists of a series of doctrines and principles
that were developed in Europe, that emerged out of European history and
experience, and that were extended in time to the non-European world which
existed outside the realm of European international law.

Thus, for instance, the classical concept of sovereignty, which stipulated
that all sovereigns are equal and that sovereign states have absolute power
over their own territory, emerged from the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.
Non-European states lacked this sovereignty, and the development of
international law can be seen in part as the ‘Expansion of International
Society’,3 the process by which Westphalian sovereignty was extended to
include the societies of the non-European world. This process was tri-
umphantly completed through the mechanism of decolonisation that ensured
the emergence of sovereign states from what had previously been the
colonised societies of Asia, Africa and the Americas. Seen in this way, coloni-
sation was an unfortunate-but perhaps necessary-historical episode whose
effects have been largely reversed by the role that international law has played,
particularly through the United Nations system, of promoting decolonisation
by both institutional and doctrinal mechanisms. Whatever the earlier
associations between imperialism and international law, then, imperialism is
a thing of the past.

A further problematic that has preoccupied international law scholars and
that has inevitably shaped traditional understandings of the relationship
between colonialism and international law emerged most explicitly in the
19th century, when John Austin, an English jurist whose views had an
enormous significance for international law, argued that law and order were
only explicable in a system governed by an overarching sovereign that could
create and enforce the law. Consequently, international law could not be
regarded as law properly so called since the international system lacked such
a sovereign. This problematic emerged as a corollary of the Westphalian
model of sovereignty which stipulates the equality of sovereign states. Since
that time, at least, the question: ‘how is legal order to be established among
equal and sovereign states?’ has preoccupied the discipline, and the greatest
scholars of international law have developed numerous theories questioning
the Austinian paradigm and elaborating on how international law is ‘law’
despite the absence of an overarching sovereign that legislates and then
enforces the law.

Finally, the history of international law is structured around the idea that
different phases of the history of the discipline were characterised by
distinctive styles of jurisprudence. Naturalism, which prevailed from the
beginnings of the modern discipline in the 16th century to roughly the end of
the 18th century, stipulated that international law was to be found in
‘nature’; it could be ascertained through the employment of reason, and this
transcendent ‘natural’ law-which had religious origins-was binding on all
states. Positivism, the jurisprudence that has prevailed since the 19th century,

740

EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

and which continues to be the dominant mode of thinking, prescribes that a
state can only be bound by rules to which it has consented. Pragmatism is
associated with the emergence of international institutions that provided the
international system with a new set of technologies with which to address
international problems. All three strands of jurisprudence continue to playa
role in the international system. However, they are seen as embodying quite
distinctive ideas of law, society and the international system.

The non-European world plays an insignificant role within each of these
schemes. Certainly, the non-European world posed numerous problems to
the international system. How were these peoples to be governed? On what
legal basis could their lands be occupied? But these were viewed as practical,
secondary problems that did not impinge on the great theoretical issues
confronting the discipline. Rather, the principal analytic frameworks
governing the discipline precluded any real examination of non-European
societies and people, and the ways in which they impinged upon and shaped
the making of international law. For instance, the Austinian problem of ‘how
is order to be created among sovereign states’ prevents an exploration of the
status of the non-European societies that were designated as non-sovereign
by the jurisprudence of the time. The problem of ‘order among sovereign
states’ arises, then, only in the context of sovereign European states, and the
transformation of this problem into the central theoretical dilemma of the
discipline systematically occludes the study of non-European societies. It
avoids the question: how was it decided that non-European states were not
sovereign in the first place? Asking this question in turn raises further issues.
Rather than adopting the traditional view of sovereignty as an exclusively
European product extended into a non-European world that was somehow,
naturally, non-sovereign, we might see sovereignty doctrine as consisting in
part of mechanisms of exclusion which expel the non-European society from
the realm of sovereignty and power. This is then a prelude to the grand
redeeming project of bestowing sovereignty on the dark places of the earth.4

In other words, sovereignty doctrine expels the non-European world from its
realm, and then proceeds to legitimise the imperialism that resulted in the
incorporation of the non-European world into the system of international
law. The process of transforming the non-European world is completed
through decolonisation, which enables the non-European state to emerge as a
sovereign and equal member of the global community. In short, these
mechanisms of exclusion are as essential a part of the sovereignty doctrine
as the mechanisms of incorporation and transformation, colonialism
and decolonisation that are the subject of the conventional histories of
international law. And if, as I argue, the mechanisms of exclusion that
deprive the non-European world of ‘Western’ sovereignty persist and endure
despite the official end of the colonial period, then it might become necessary
to rethink the standard accounts of both colonialism and decolonisation. 5

Rather then focusing on the paradigm of ‘order among sovereign states’,
then, I would argue that the evolution of international law, and the role of
non-European societies within this process, may be better understood in
terms of the problem of cultural difference. International law may be seen as

741

ANTONY ANGHIE

an attempt to establish a universal system of order among entItles
characterised as belonging to different cultural systems. This problem gives
rise to what might be termed the ‘dynamic of difference’: international law
posits a gap, a difference between European and non-European cultures and
peoples, the former being characterised, broadly, as civilised and the latter as
uncivilised (and all this implies in terms of the related qualities of each of
these labels).

This gap having been established, what follows is the formulation of
doctrines that are designed to efface this gap: to bring the uncivilized/
aberrant/violent/backward/oppressed into the realm of civilisation, the
universal order governed by (European) international law. This distinction
between the civilised and the uncivilised, the animating distinction of
imperialism, is crucial to the formation of sovereignty doctrine, which can be
understood as providing certain cultures with all the powers of sovereignty,
while excluding others. In short, cultural difference precedes and profoundly
shapes sovereignty doctrine-whereas the traditional approach asserts that
an established sovereignty manages the problem of cultural difference. This
basic dynamic is played out, in different vocabularies and doctrines,
throughout the history of international law. And, further, its replication in
all the distinctive styles of jurisprudence-naturalism, positivism and
pragmatism-suggests its profoundly enduring character. Colonialism, then,
far from being peripheral to the discipline of international law, is central to
its formation. It was only because of colonialism that international law
became universal; and the dynamic of difference, the civilising mission, that
produced this result, continues into the present.

The colonial origins of international law

Contact between European and non-European peoples, of course, has
taken place for many centuries. As the European presence in non-European
areas intensified, however, beginning in the 15th and 16th centuries, legal
doctrines were developed to manage more complex forms of interaction
between European and non-European states, and these extended, inevi-
tably, to doctrines that purported to account for the acquisition of
sovereignty over non-European peoples. These doctrines, invariably, were
created by Europeans, or adapted by Europeans, for their own purposes,
although scholarship has shown that many important international
legal principles relating, for example, to the law of treaties and the law of
war, were also developed, understood and practised by non-European
states. 6

Many of these themes may be illustrated by an examination of a work
commonly regarded as one of the first texts of modern international law,
Francisco de Vitoria’s On the Indians Lately Discovered. 7 Vitoria here
addresses the complex legal problems that arose from Spanish claims to
sovereignty over the Americas following Columbus’ voyage. Drawing upon
the naturalist and theological jurisprudence of the period, Vitoria argued that
all peoples, including the Indians, were governed by a basic ‘natural law’.

742

EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

While others characterised the Indians as heathens, and animals, lacking any
cognisable rights, Vitoria instead humanely asserts of the Indians that:

the true state of the case is that they are not of unsound mind, but have
according to their kind, the use of reason. This is clear, because there is a
certain method in their affairs, for they have polities which are orderly arranged
and they have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and
workshops, and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason:
they also have a kind of religion. Further, they make no errors in matters which
are self-evident to others: this is witness to their use of reason. 8

It is because of his acknowledgement of the humanity of the Indians of the
New World that Vitoria is remembered as a champion of the rights of
indigenous and non-European peoples. Equally, it is precisely because they
possess reason that the Indians are bound by a universal natural law. And yet
Vitoria also considers the possibility that, while there is an order apparent in
Indian affairs, it is a deficient order because it fails to meet the universal
criteria established by natural law:

Although the a~origines in question are (as has been said above) not wholly
unintelligent, yet they are a little short of that condition, and so are unfit to
found or administer a lawful State upto the standard required by human and
civil claims. Accordingly they have no proper laws nor magistrates, and are not
even capable of controlling their family affairs. 9

As a consequence, Vitoria suggests that proper government must be
established over the Indians by the Spanish, who, he argues, must govern
as trustees over the uncivilised Indians. The Indians now are children in need
of a guardian. There is a gap, then, between the ontologically ‘universal’
Indian and the historically, socially ‘particular’ Indian that can only be
remedied, it transpires, by the intervention of the Spanish, who are
characterised as the agents of natural law. Seen in this way, the recognition
of the humanity of the Indians has ambiguous consequences because it serves
in effect to bind them to a natural law which, despite its claims to
universality, appears derived from an idealised European view of the world,
based on a European identity. Consequently, it is almost inevitable that the
Indians, by their very existence and their own unique identity and cultural
practices, violate this law, which appears to deal equally with both the
Spanish and the Indians, but which produces very different effects because of
the asymmetries between the Spanish and the Indians.

The ramifications of these asymmetries become clearer when Vitoria
proceeds to enunciate the principles of natural law: ‘The Spaniards have a
right to travel to the lands of the Indians and to sojourn there, so long as
they do no harm, and they can not be prevented by the Indians’. 10 These
apparently innocuous rights to trade and travel have profound consequences
for the Indians, for, as Vitoria further argues, “to keep certain people out of
the city or province as being enemies, or to expel them when already there,

743

ANTONY ANGHIE

are acts of war’. 11 Thus, any Indian resistance to Spanish incursions would
amount to an act of aggression by the Indians that justified the Spanish in
using force in self-defence-and, in so doing, in endlessly expanding their
territory, conquering the native rulers in the process. Violence arises, in
Vitoria’s system, through the inevitable violation by the Indian of the natural
law by which he is bound.

Once commenced, war, in Vitoria’s scheme, has an overwhelming and
transformative character. It is through war that the aberrant Indian identity
might be effaced. It is clear, furthermore, that war against the barbaric
Indians has a different character from war waged against a civilised,
Christian adversary. In describing this war, Vitoria reverts to principles and
arguments developed earlier, in the times of the Crusades. The Indian is like
the Saracen, a pagan:

And so when the war is at that pass that the indiscriminate spoliation of all
enemy-subjects alike and the seizure of all their goods are justifiable, then it is
also justifiable to carryall enemy-subjects off into captivity, whether they be
guilty or guiltless. And inasmuch as war with pagans is of this type, seeing that
it is perpetual and that they can never make amends for the wrongs and
damages they have wrought, it is indubitably lawful to carry off both the
children and the women of the Saracens into captivity and slavery.12

The barbaric Indian exists beyond the existing rules of law; war against the
Indians is ‘perpetual’, their guilt or innocence is irrelevant. Thus, both bound
by the law and yet outside its protections, the Indian is the object of the most
extreme aspects of sovereignty, which can expand and innovate its practices
and manifestations precisely because of this peculiar, in-between status.

I have dwelt on Vitoria’s work because it illustrates several crucial and
enduring aspects of the relationship between colonialism and international
law, and this in a text regarded as the first modern work of the discipline.
Vitoria’s work demonstrates, for instance, the centrality of commerce to
international law, and how commercial exploitation necessitates war. It
shows, furthermore, how an apparently benevolent approach of including the
aberrant Indian within a universal order is then a basis for sanctioning and
transforming the Indian. The Indian is characterised in a number of different
and sometimes contrasting ways: as economic man anxious to trade with the
Spanish; as oppressed by his own rulers and looking to the Spanish to
liberate him; as backward and in need of guidance; as irredeemably and
hopelessly savage and violent. In each of these cases Spanish intervention
appears the appropriate response. And Spanish violence is characterised as,
simultaneously, overwhelming, liberating, transforming, humanitarian. My
argument, furthermore, is that Vitoria’s attempt to address the problem of
difference demonstrates the complex relationship between culture and
sovereignty, for Vitoria’s jurisprudence decrees that certain cultures-such
as that of the Spanish-are universal and enjoy the full rights of sovereignty,
whereas other cultural practices-like those of the Indians-are condemned
as uncivilised and non-sovereign.

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EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The same structure of ideas is evident in the 19th century, the apogee of
imperial expansion, and the period when positivism was established as the
major jurisprudence of international law. Unlike naturalism, which argues
that all states are subject to a higher universal law, positivism, in basic terms,
asserts that the state is the exclusive creator of law, and cannot be bound by
any law unless it has consented to it. There is no higher authority than the
sovereign, according to this system of jurisprudence. Nominally, at least,
under the system of naturalism both European and non-European societies
were bound by the universal natural law which was the foundation of
international law. I3 Positivist jurists, however, devised a series of formal
doctrines that used explicitly racial and cultural criteria to decree certain
states civilised, and therefore sovereign, and other states uncivilised and non-
sovereign. Thus non-European societies were expelled from the realm of
international law. Lacking legal personality, these societies were incapable of
advancing any legally cognisable objection to their dispossession, and were
thus reduced to objects of conquest and exploitation.

This law legitimised conquest as legal, and decreed that lands inhabited by
people regarded as inferior and backward were terra nullius. In other cases
imperial powers claimed that native chiefs had entered into treaties which
gave those powers sovereignty over non-European territories and peoples.
The ability of natives to enter into such treaties was paradoxical, given that
they were characterised as entirely lacking in legal status. What is clear from
an examination of the treaties, however, is that international lawyers granted
the natives such status, quasi-sovereignty, for the purposes of enabling them
to transfer rights, property and sovereignty. The right of the native to dispose
of himself or his resources was in effect upheld by these treaties, just as in
Vitoria native personality is established so that it may be bound by
international law.

Once again, Western standards were declared universal, and the failure of
non-Western states to adhere to these standards denoted a lack of civilisation
that justified intervention and conquest. Thus John Westlake, the Whewell
Professor of International Law at Cambridge, declared in 1894, that
‘Government is the Test of Civilization’ and elaborated:

When people of European race come into contact with American or African
tribes, the prime necessity is a government under the protection of which the
former may carryon the complex life to which they have become accustomed in
their homes, which may prevent that life from being disturbed by contests
between different European powers for supremacy on the same soil, and which
may protect the natives in the enjoyment of a security and well being at least
not less than they had enjoyed before the arrival of the strangers. Can the
natives furnish such a government, or can or can it be looked for from
the Europeans alone? In the answer to that question lies, for international law,
the difference between civilization and the want of it. 14

Westphalian sovereignty denoted the right of a state to establish its own
system of government within its territory. In the case of the non-European

745

ANTONY ANGHIE

state, however, its internal system had to comply with standards that in effect
presupposed a European presence within that polity. Thus countries such as
Siam, which were never formally colonised, were compelled to enter into a
humiliating system of unequal treaties, capitulations according to which
foreigners were governed by their own law rather than that of the non-
European state. Non-European societies that failed to establish the
conditions in which Europeans could live and trade could then be justifiably
replaced by European governance, which proclaimed itself as bringing
with it civilisation and stability, and, indeed, better protection for the
natives themselves. Such government was essential and inevitable, as ‘The
inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there is land to cultivate,
ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, sport to enjoy, curiosity to be
satisfied’ .15

Many of the legal doctrines used at this time dealt not only with relations
between European and non-European states but between European states
who were intent on acquiring title over the non-European territories. These
doctrines were developed for preventing conflict between European states
over who had proper title to a non-European land. Thus, at the Berlin
Conference of 1884-85 the great European powers of the period met in
Berlin to decide on how Africa was to be divided among them. The resulting
division of the continent, which occurred with no regard to the complex
system of political organisation that operated within that territory, has
created enduring problems. 16

By the end of the 19th century European expansion had ensured that
European international law had been established globally as the one single
system that applied to all societies. It was in this way that European
international law became universal.

Decolonisation and the postcolonial state

The trauma of the First World War generated many changes in international
law and relations. Most significantly, the imperial character of the discipline
was recognised and criticised by scholars and statesmen in the inter-war
period who denounced the international law of the 19th century that had
legitimised colonial exploitation. The League of Nations attempted to
formulate a new approach towards colonies, which were now labelled
‘backward territories’. Whereas in the 19th century the division between
Europe and uncivilised non-Europe had been formulated principally through
an elaboration of racial and cultural categories, the League of Nations
characterised the differences between the civilised and uncivilised in economic
terms, the ‘advanced’ and the ‘backward’.

As a consequence of these shifts, the territories of the defeated powers (the
Ottoman Empire and Germany), rather than being acquired as colonies by
the victors, were placed under the authority of the Mandate System of the
League of Nations. I?

The purpose of this system was, through international supervision, to
ensure the ‘well being and development’ of the mandate territories;18 it was

746

EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

even contemplated that the most advanced territories, such as Iraq, would
become sovereign states. These territories were placed under the control of
Mandate Powers-Britain and France, most often-who acted as trustees on
behalf of the League towards the backwards peoples, and were ultimately
accountable to the League.

The League of Nations is studied most often in terms of its failed attempts
to prevent international aggression. For the Third World, however, what is
perhaps most important about the League was its attempt to create a set of
techniques that were uniquely devised for the specific purpose of transform-
ing backward, non-European societies into modern societies. Once more,
whereas the interior realm of Western states (and of course of their colonies)
was immune from international scrutiny by the League, the non-European
mandate territories were completely accessible to the technologies of this, the
first major international institution. The League’s ambitions to establish
international peace were thwarted by the obdurate sovereignty of Western
states-and of Japan, which was in effect treated as a Western state. In the
case of the Mandate System, by contrast, the League was confronted by a
novel and contrasting task, that of creating sovereignty and promoting self-
government. As a consequence, once more, it was in the non-European world
that the League could devise legal, administrative and institutional
mechanisms to address this great challenge, and in so doing develop the
technologies of management and control that have become entrenched in the
repertoire of techniques subsequently used by international institutions.

While this project suggested the first attempts to achieve something like
decolonisation and to create an international law that would further rather
than suppress the aspirations of Third World peoples, the character of the
sovereignty to be enjoyed by the non-European peoples was problematic. As
Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the Indian Foreign Office recommended, regarding the
sovereign Iraq that Britain-the mandatory power-should bring into
existence:

What we want to have in existence, what we ought to have been creating in
this time, is some administration with Arab institutions which we can safely
leave while pulling the strings ourselves; something that won’t cost very much,
which Labor can swallow consistent with its principles, but under which our
economic and political interests will be secure. 19

In essence, while the Mandate System worked towards the creation of
sovereign states, or at least politically developed, ‘self-governing’ societies,
both the ‘sovereignty’ and ‘government’ of the non-European society were
created with a view to furthering Western interests. Third world sovereignty,
then, at least to the extent that it was shaped by international institutions,
and by Western states acting through international institutions, was created
in a way that could continue to serve Western interests. Crudely put, an
examination of the Mandate System illuminates the ways in which political
sovereignty could be created to be completely consistent with economic
subordination.

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ANTONY ANGHIE

The Mandate System, of course, did not apply to the victorious colonial
powers, such as Britain and France. Sustained nationalist protest by Third
World peoples, however, ensured that decolonisation had become a central
preoccupation of the international system. The United Nations responded by
creating a number of institutional mechanisms for the furtherance of
decolonisation, and by extending and adapting the doctrine of self-
determination to colonial territories. The newly independent states signifi-
cantly changed the composition of the international community, as they
became a majority in the UN system. Most significantly, this enabled the
sovereign Third World states to use international law and sovereignty
doctrines to further their own interests and to articulate their own views of
international law. The new states were especially intent on protecting their
recently won sovereignty and negating the enduring effects of colonialism.
Thus they sought to establish a set of principles that outlawed conquest and
aggression, and prevented intervention in Third World affairs. Further, the
new states used their numbers in the General Assembly to pass a number of
resolutions directed at creating a ‘New International Economic Order,.20 This
initiative was especially important, as the new states realised that political
sovereignty would be meaningless without corresponding economic indepen-
dence. Thus the new states sought to regain control over their natural
resources through the nationalisation of foreign entities that had acquired
rights over these resources during the colonial period.

Issues such as the terms on which a state could nationalise a foreign entity
became particularly controversial. International economic law, which
determined these issues, became a central arena of struggle between the
West and the new states. The new states argued that this body of law had
been created by the West to further its own interests and that they had played
no role themselves in its formation. While several Western scholars
acknowledged the legitimacy of the claims made by the new states, Western
states argued that they were not bound by the principles authored by the
Third World because of the basic rule that a state could not be bound by
international rules unless it agreed to be so bound. 21 Nevertheless, the West
proceeded to argue, the Third World was bound by the older rules of inter-
national economic law that the West had authored. Indeed, the West argued,
acceptance of these and the other established rules of the international system
was a condition of becoming an independent, sovereign state. In this context,
Third World sovereignty was again articulated principally as a basis for being
bound by international norms. The Third World initiatives, undertaken in
the belief that colonialism was embodied in certain specific doctrines relating,
for instance, to conquest or the rate of compensation payable upon
nationalisation, confronted the problem that the colonial past could not be
so easily excised from the discipline.

My argument is that colonialism had shaped not only those doctrines of
international law explicitly devised for the very purpose of suppressing the
Third World, but also had also profoundly shaped the very foundations of
international law, including the ostensibly neutral doctrine of sovereignty.
The end of formal colonialism, while extremely significant, did not result in

748

EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

the end of colonial relations. Rather, in the view of Third World societies,
colonialism was replaced by neo-colonialism; Third world states continued to
play a subordinate role in the international system because they were
economically dependent on the West, and the rules of international economic
law continued to ensure that this would be the case.

The acquisition of sovereignty by the Third World state had numerous
other repercussions. The postcolonial state, in many ways, adopted the
models of development, progress and the nation-state that had first been
articulated in the Mandate System and that had been further refined and
elaborated by development theories such as modernisation theory. The
leaders of these states sometimes consisted of elites with close ties with the
West; in other cases they derived their power from affiliations with
superpowers in the context of the ongoing Cold War. Further, Third World
states divided along ethnic lines experienced civil wars as different ethnic
groups fought for control of the state.

The postcolonial state, then, engaged in its own brutalities: women,
minorities, peasants, indigenous peoples and the poorest were the victims.
The international human rights law that emerged as a central and
revolutionary part of the United Nations period offered one mechanism by
which Third World peoples could seek protection, through international law,
from the depredations of the sometimes pathological Third World state. It
was for this reason that international human rights law held a special interest
and appeal for Third World scholars.

Human rights law was controversial, however, precisely because it
legitimised the intrusion of international law in the internal affairs of a
state: it could be used to justify further intervention by the West in the Third
World. Aspects of this intervention became evident after the collapse of the
USSR and the intensification of globalisation. The ascendancy of neoliberal
economic policy and the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
presented new challenges to Third World states. International financial
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank played an increasingly
intrusive role in the economies of Third World states, and attempted to use
their considerable powers to reform the political and social structures of these
states, this in the name of promoting ‘good governance’, a project that
entailed drawing in various strategic ways on international human rights law.
The virtues of good governance are apparently self-evident. But the meaning
of the terms remains open and contestable and these institutions attempted to
use an amended version of human rights law to further their neoliberal
policies in the guise of ‘good governance’, rather than enabling real
empowerment of Third World citizens. In this way these international
institutions, which proclaimed that the project of ‘good governance’ was
entirely novel and necessary, were in many ways replicating the earlier efforts
of their predecessor, the Mandate System and its efforts to promote ‘self-
government’. The demand made by the international financial institutions
(IFIS) that these states reform their internal arrangements was compared by
some scholars with the system of capitulations that had previously been used
by European states to demand the reform of non-European states. 22

749

ANTONY ANGHIE

Towards the present: the ‘war on terror’

Following the 9/11 attacks many international law and international
relations scholars argued that a new and unique threat confronted the
international community, and that established international law was
inadequate for the challenges it presented. As a consequence, scholars
proposed a range of theories that purported to reform the laws of war,
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights to address these
new realities. What these arguments generally overlooked is that Third
World countries themselves have suffered the worst consequences of
terrorism for many years without attempting, as the USA is now doing, to
dismantle the fundamental norms of international law relating to human
rights and the use of force established by the system of the UN Charter, all in
the name of effecting this supposedly essential adaptation.

What is clear, however, is that the ‘war on terror’-articulated in the
National Security Strategy of the USA and now launched by that country-
with its willingness to use pre-emptive force against ‘rogue states’ and its
ambitions to transform Middle Eastern countries into peace-loving democ-
racies, resembles in many ways a much earlier imperial venture. The rhetoric
employed by President Bush to justify the invasion of Iraq disconcertingly
resembles the rhetoric used by Vitoria to justify the Spanish conquest of the
Indians. Once again, then, it is the barbaric, the uncivilised, that has prompted
a concerted attempt to reconstruct international law. Ironically, however,
these efforts to create a new international law appropriate for the allegedly
unprecedented times in which we live have involved returning to a primordial
and formative structure of international law, the civilising mission. This has
resulted in the formulation of a new form of imperialism that asserts itself in
the name of ‘national security’, as self-defence.

The imperial dimension of these initiatives is so explicit and unmistakable
that even scholars and institutions who were largely indifferent, if not
impervious, to the phenomenon of imperialism have begun to focus on the
relationship between imperialism and the international system. A large and
sometimes dishevelled literature has resulted, and prominent Western
scholars such as Niall Ferguson have argued for the return of an imperial
system of management headed by the USA. 23 There is a happy assumption
made in much of these supposedly expert writings-the validity of which has
only been questioned by the violence in Iraq-that imperial rule would be
welcomed and acquiesced to by those who are subjected to it.

There are certain dangers associated with this sudden focus on imperial-
ism, and not only because of the calls for its return. I would argue that the
Iraq episode and the war on terror more generally are simply very explicit
and obvious examples of imperial practices. Imperialism is experienced in
the Third World, I would suggest, in a much more everyday way through,
for example, international economic regimes, supported and promoted by
international law and institutions that systematically disempower and sub-
ordinate the people of the Third World.2~ This is the ‘everyday’ imperialism,
the quotidian and mundane imperialism, that is accepted as somehow normal

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EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

and that is furthered and promoted not only by the USA, but by European
states that otherwise have opposed US policy in Iraq. Much has been made on
both sides of the Atlantic about the differences between Europe and the
USA. 25 But, I would argue, whatever separates Europe and USA, they are in
many ways arguing for different versions of an imperial international system,
one more explicit than the other. For the Third World, I suspect, imperialism
is not an aberration that has emerged with the US actions in Iraq. Rather,
imperialism is an integral aspect of day-to-day international relations. What is
required, then, is an understanding of how imperial relations and structures of
thought continue to operate in an ostensibly neutral setting. This would reveal
how imperialism has always been a part of the international system, as
opposed to a phenomenon that has suddenly emerged with the US war on
terror and against Iraq.

The current war on terror involves the return of a much older form of
imperialism. Equally, however, there is a certain novelty about the present
that requires closer analysis, as the USA’s policy appears to be premised on
the belief that only the use of force and the transformation of alien and
threatening societies into ‘democratic’ states will ensure its security.

I have argued that the transformation of the peoples and polities of the
non-European world is a continuing preoccupation of international law from
its Vitorian beginnings. That transformation was seen principally in terms of
enabling economic exploitation; now, however, the transformation of the
non-European world is seen as essential for physical security.

Yet what events in Iraq and elsewhere have suggested is that US policies
have only exacerbated the situation, and are more likely to generate
resentment and retaliation. The paradoxes emerge: while proclaiming to
further human rights, the USA has persistently violated them, while seeking
to prevent terrorism, it has generated further violence. There is a cycle of
violence here that could make the attempts to create a Kantian world of
peace-loving democratic states into a guarantee of endless war rather than
perpetual peace.

Conclusions

The use of international law to further imperial policies is, I have argued, a
persistent feature of the discipline. The civilising mission, the dynamic of
difference, continues now in this globalised, terror-ridden world, as
international law seeks to transform the internal characteristics of societies,
a task which is endless, for each act of bridging generates resistance, reveals
further differences that must in turn be addressed by new doctrines and
institutions. This is not to say, however, that these imperial ambitions and
structures have always prevailed; rather, they have been continuously
contested at every level by Third World peoples. Equally, of course, Third
World states have often engaged in what might be regarded as colonial
practices, in relation both to other, smaller states and to minorities and
indigenous peoples within their own boundaries. Colonial practices, further,
suffer from their own contradictions and incoherence. But they certainly

751

ANTONY ANGHIE

pervade every aspect of the discipline. The questions that then arise are
whether, how and to what extent international law can be used for the
purposes of furthering the interests of Third World peoples-protecting them
against the excesses of the authoritarian and sometimes genocidal state, on
the one hand, and advancing their interests in the international sphere on the
other. Third World international lawyers, immediately following the period
of decolonisation, placed a special faith in international law, believing that it
could achieve these results. However, this faith proved unfounded, and many
international initiatives that were explicitly humanitarian and anti-colonial-
such as the Mandate System-became a vehicle for imperialism. As a result,
some scholars have eloquently argued that the Third World should dispense
with international law altogether. But this not a feasible option, simply
because that would leave open the field of international law to the imperial
processes I have sketched, and this in a context where international law plays
an increasingly vital role in the public sphere, where questions of violation,
injury, legitimacy are all discussed in terms of international law. Interna-
tional law operates, I have tried to suggest, at every level: international and
national; economic, political and social; private and public. And it is in all
these arenas that it is now imperative to understand the operations of
imperialism and how they might be opposed and overcome. This is an issue
that must surely concern all international lawyers, North and South, who
intend international law to make good on its promise of furthering the cause
of global justice.

Notes

1 This article presents arguments that are developed at greater length in Antony Anghie, Imperialism,
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

2 JHW Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, 10 vols, Leiden: AW Sijthoff, 1968, Vol I,
pp 435-436.

3 See Hedley Bull & Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984. For an important critical treatment of the same theme, see Onuma Yasuaki,
‘When was the law of international society born? An inquiry of the history of international law from an
intercivilizational perspective’, Journal of the History of International Law, 2, 2000, pp 1- 66.

4 On this theme, see Martti Kosekenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003, pp 98 – 178.

5 This approach draws heavily on the work of pioneering postcolonial scholars, eg Edward Said,
Orientalism, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978; Said, Culture and Imperialism, New York: Knopf,
1993; and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Post-Colonial Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999.

6 Important works that deal with these themes include TO Elias, Africa and the Development of
International Law, Leiden: AW Sijthoff, 1972; RP Anand, New States and International Law, New
Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972; and CH Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the
Law of Nations in the East Indies, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. For a more recent work that offers
an important Third World perspective, see Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns
and Africans, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

7 See Francisco de Victoria (1557/1917) De Indis et de Ivre Belli Relectiones, ed Ernest Nys, trans John
Pawley Bate, Washington, .DC: Carnegie Institute of Washington. This work consists of lectures that
Vitoria gave with the titles that might be broadly translated as ‘On the Indians lately’ and ‘On the law
of war made by the Spaniards on the barbarians’. Significantly, this is the first work in the series ‘The
Classics of International Law’ published by the Carnegie Institute of Washington. Victoria is more
usually referred to as ‘Vitoria’ and I have used the latter name.

8 Vitoria, De Indis, p 127.
9 Ibid, p 161.

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EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

10 Ibid, P 150.
11 Ibid, P 151.
12 Ibid, P 181.
13 See Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of International Law in the East Indies.
14 John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1894, p 141.
15 Ibid, P 142.
16 Makau wa Mutua, ‘Why redraw the map of Africa? A moral and legal inquiry’, Michigan Journal of

International Law, 16, 1995, pp 1113 -1176.
17 For an early and masterly account of the system, see Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of

Nations, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1930.
18 This was stipulated by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which created the

Mandate System. Ibid, p 591.
19 Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914-32, London: Ithaca Press, 1976, p 37.
20 The classic work on this subject is Mohammed Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic

Order, New York: Holmes and Meir, 1979.
21 Fundamental norms, jus cogens norms, are an exception to this broad principle.
22 David Fidler, ‘A kinder, gentler system of capitulations? International law, structural adjustment

policies, and the standard of liberal, globalized, civilization’, Texas International Law Journal, 35,2000,
p 387.

23 Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global
Power, New York: Basic Books, 2003.

24 See, for example, BS Chimni, ‘International institutions today: an imperial global state in the making’,
European Journal of International Law, 15 (1), 2004, pp 1-37.

25 See, for example, Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004.

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• Article Contents

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• Issue Table of Contents

Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 5, Reshaping Justice: International Law and the Third World (2006), pp. 707-958
Front Matter [pp. 707-902]
Reshaping Justice: International Law and the Third World: An Introduction [pp. 711-712]
Overview
What May the ‘Third World’ Expect from International Law? [pp. 713-725]
International Law and the Future [pp. 727-737]
The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities [pp. 739-753]
Recreating the State [pp. 755-766]
Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy [pp. 767-783]
Regional/Civilizational Perspectives
Why Should Muslims Abandon Jihad? Human Rights and the Future of International Law [pp. 785-797]
Poverty, Agency and Resistance in the Future of International Law: An African Perspective [pp. 799-814]
Between Civilisation and Barbarism: Creole Interventions in International Law [pp. 815-832]
‘I Heard It All before’: Egyptian Tales of Law and Development [pp. 833-853]
Substantive/Normative Perspectives
The Civilised Self and the Barbaric Other: Imperial Delusions of Order and the Challenges of Human Security [pp. 855-869]
Political Asylum and Torture: A Comparative Analysis [pp. 871-883]
International Environmental Law, Water and the Future [pp. 885-901]
Resistance in the Age of Empire: Occupied Discourse Pending Investigation [pp. 903-922]
Exiled to a Liminal Legal Zone: Are We All Palestinians Now? [pp. 923-936]
Building Women into Peace: The International Legal Framework [pp. 937-957]
Back Matter [pp. 958-958]

1

The nature and development of international law

In the long march of mankind from the cave to the computer a central role
has always been played by the idea of law – the idea that order is necessary
and chaos inimical to a just and stable existence. Every society, whether
it be large or small, powerful or weak, has created for itself a framework
of principles within which to develop. What can be done, what cannot
be done, permissible acts, forbidden acts, have all been spelt out within
the consciousness of that community. Progress, with its inexplicable leaps
and bounds, has always been based upon the group as men and women
combine to pursue commonly accepted goals, whether these be hunting
animals, growing food or simply making money.

Law is that element which binds the members of the community to-
gether in their adherence to recognised values and standards. It is both
permissive in allowing individuals to establish their own legal relations
with rights and duties, as in the creation of contracts, and coercive, as
it punishes those who infringe its regulations. Law consists of a series of
rules regulating behaviour, and reflecting, to some extent, the ideas and
preoccupations of the society within which it functions.

And so it is with what is termed international law, with the important
difference that the principal subjects of international law are nation-states,
not individual citizens. There are many contrasts between the law within
a country (municipal law) and the law that operates outside and between
states, international organisations and, in certain cases, individuals.

International law itself is divided into conflict of laws (or private inter-
national law as it is sometimes called) and public international law (usually
just termed international law).1 The former deals with those cases, within
particular legal systems, in which foreign elements obtrude, raising ques-
tions as to the application of foreign law or the role of foreign courts.2

1 This term was first used by J. Bentham: see Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, London, 1780.

2 See e.g. C. Cheshire and P. North, Private International Law, 13th edn, London, 1999.

1

2 i n te r nat i o na l l aw

For example, if two Englishmen make a contract in France to sell goods
situated in Paris, an English court would apply French law as regards the
validity of that contract. By contrast, public international law is not sim-
ply an adjunct of a legal order, but a separate system altogether,3 and it is
this field that will be considered in this book.

Public international law covers relations between states in all their myr-
iad forms, from war to satellites, and regulates the operations of the many
international institutions. It may be universal or general, in which case the
stipulated rules bind all the states (or practically all depending upon the
nature of the rule), or regional, whereby a group of states linked geograph-
ically or ideologically may recognise special rules applying only to them,
for example, the practice of diplomatic asylum that has developed to its
greatest extent in Latin America.4 The rules of international law must be
distinguished from what is called international comity, or practices such as
saluting the flags of foreign warships at sea, which are implemented solely
through courtesy and are not regarded as legally binding.5 Similarly, the
mistake of confusing international law with international morality must
be avoided. While they may meet at certain points, the former discipline
is a legal one both as regards its content and its form, while the concept of
international morality is a branch of ethics. This does not mean, however,
that international law can be divorced from its values.

In this chapter and the next, the characteristics of the international
legal system and the historical and theoretical background necessary to a
proper appreciation of the part to be played by the law in international
law will be examined.

Law and politics in the world community

It is the legal quality of international law that is the first question to be
posed. Each side to an international dispute will doubtless claim legal
justification for its actions and within the international system there is
no independent institution able to determine the issue and give a final
decision.

Virtually everybody who starts reading about international law does so
having learned or absorbed something about the principal characteristics
of ordinary or domestic law. Such identifying marks would include the

3 See the Serbian Loans case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 14, pp. 41–2.
4 See further below, p. 92.
5 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 44; 41 ILR, p. 29. See also M.

Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’, 47 BYIL, 1974–5, p. 1.

mpeterson
Rectangle

d eve l o p m e n t o f i n te r nat i o na l l aw 13

in structure and content. To fail to recognise this encourages a utopian
approach which, when faced with reality, will fail.47 On the other hand, the
cynical attitude with its obsession with brute power is equally inaccurate,
if more depressing.

It is the medium road, recognising the strength and weakness of in-
ternational law and pointing out what it can achieve and what it cannot,
which offers the best hope. Man seeks order, welfare and justice not only
within the state in which he lives, but also within the international system
in which he lives.

Historical development48

The foundations of international law (or the law of nations) as it is under-
stood today lie firmly in the development of Western culture and political
organisation.

The growth of European notions of sovereignty and the independent
nation-state required an acceptable method whereby inter-state relations
could be conducted in accordance with commonly accepted standards of

47 Note, of course, the important distinction between the existence of an obligation under
international law and the question of the enforcement of that obligation. Problems with
regard to enforcing a duty cannot affect the legal validity of that duty: see e.g. Judge
Weeramantry’s Separate Opinion in the Order of 13 September 1993, in the Bosnia case,
ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 325, 374; 95 ILR, pp. 43, 92.

48 See in particular A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, rev. edn, New
York, 1954; Encyclopedia of Public International Law (ed. R. Bernhardt), Amsterdam, 1984,
vol. VII, pp. 127–273; J. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, Leiden,
10 vols., 1968–79, and M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and
Fall of International Law, 1870–1960, Cambridge, 2001. See also W. Grewe, The Epochs of
International Law (trans. and rev. M. Byers), New York, 2000; A. Cassese, International
Law in a Divided World, Oxford, 1986, and Cassese, International Law, 2nd edn, Oxford,
2005, chapter 2; Nguyen Quoc Dinh, P. Daillier and A. Pellet, Droit International Public,
7th edn, Paris, 2002, p. 41; H. Thierry, ‘L’Evolution du Droit International’, 222 HR, 1990
III, p. 9; P. Guggenheim, ‘Contribution à l’Histoire des Sources du Droit des Gens’, 94
HR, 1958 II, p. 5; A. Truyol y Serra, Histoire de Droit International Public, Paris, 1995;
D. Gaurier, Histoire du Droit International Public, Rennes, 2005; D. Korff, ‘Introduction à
l’Histoire de Droit International Public’, 1 HR, 1923 I, p. 1; P. Le Fur, ‘Le Développement
Historique de Droit International’, 41 HR, 1932 III, p. 501; O. Yasuaki, ‘When was the
Law of International Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of International Law from
an Intercivilisational Perpective’, 2 Journal of the History of International Law, 2000, p. 1,
and A. Kemmerer, ‘The Turning Aside: On International Law and its History’ in Progress
in International Organisation (eds. R. A. Miller and R. Bratspies), Leiden, 2008, p. 71.
For a general bibliography, see P. Macalister-Smith and J. Schwietzke, ‘Literature and
Documentary Sources relating to the History of International Law’, 1 Journal of the History
of International Law, 1999, p. 136.

14 i n te r nat i o na l l aw

behaviour, and international law filled the gap. But although the law of
nations took root and flowered with the sophistication of Renaissance
Europe, the seeds of this particular hybrid plant are of far older lineage.
They reach far back into history.

Early origins

While the modern international system can be traced back some 400 years,
certain of the basic concepts of international law can be discerned in polit-
ical relationships thousands of years ago.49 Around 2100 BC, for instance,
a solemn treaty was signed between the rulers of Lagash and Umma, the
city-states situated in the area known to historians as Mesopotamia. It
was inscribed on a stone block and concerned the establishment of a
defined boundary to be respected by both sides under pain of alienating
a number of Sumerian gods.50 The next major instance known of an im-
portant, binding, international treaty is that concluded over 1,000 years
later between Rameses II of Egypt and the king of the Hittites for the
establishment of eternal peace and brotherhood.51 Other points covered
in that agreement signed, it would seem, at Kadesh, north of Damascus,
included respect for each other’s territorial integrity, the termination of a
state of aggression and the setting up of a form of defensive alliance.

Since that date many agreements between the rival Middle Eastern
powers were concluded, usually aimed at embodying in a ritual form a
state of subservience between the parties or attempting to create a political
alliance to contain the influence of an over-powerful empire.52

49 See D. J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity, Cambridge, 2001.
50 Nussbaum, Law of Nations, pp. 1–2. Note the discovery in the excavated city of Ebla, the

capital of a civilisation at least 4,500 years old, of a copy of a political treaty between Ebla
and the city of Abarsal: see Times Higher Education Supplement, 19 May 1995, p. 20. See
also R. Cohen, On Diplomacy in the Ancient Near East: The Amarna Letters, Discussion
Paper of the Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester, 1995; O. Butkevych,
‘History of Ancient International Law: Challenges and Prospects’, 5 Journal of the History
of International Law, 2003, p. 189; A. Altman, ‘Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of
International Law. The Early Dynastic Period in Southern Mesopotamia’, 6 Journal of the
History of International Law, 2004, p. 153, and ‘Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of
International Law. (2) The Old Akkadian and Ur III Periods in Mesopotamia’, 7 Journal of
the History of International Law, 2005, p. 115.

51 Nussbaum, Law of Nations, pp. 1–2.
52 Preiser emphasises that the era between the seventeenth and fifteenth centuries BC wit-

nessed something of a competing state system involving five independent (at various times)
states: Bernhardt, Encyclopedia, vol. VII, pp. 133–4.

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d eve l o p m e n t o f i n te r nat i o na l l aw 27

Yet, on the other hand, the doctrine of Natural Law has been employed
to preserve the absoluteness of sovereignty and the sanctity of private
possessions. The theory has a reactionary aspect because it could be argued
that what was, ought to be, since it evolved from the social contract or
was divinely ordained, depending upon how secular one construed the
law of nature to be.

The nineteenth century

The eighteenth century was a ferment of intellectual ideas and ratio-
nalist philosophies that contributed to the evolution of the doctrine of
international law. The nineteenth century by contrast was a practical, ex-
pansionist and positivist era. The Congress of Vienna, which marked the
conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, enshrined the new international order
which was to be based upon the European balance of power. International
law became Eurocentric, the preserve of the civilised, Christian states, into
which overseas and foreign nations could enter only with the consent of
and on the conditions laid down by the Western powers. Paradoxically,
whilst international law became geographically internationalised through
the expansion of the European empires, it became less universalist in con-
ception and more, theoretically as well as practically, a reflection of Eu-
ropean values.90 This theme, the relationship between universalism and
particularism, appears time and again in international law. This century
also saw the coming to independence of Latin America and the forging
of a distinctive approach to certain elements of international law by the
states of that region, especially with regard to, for example, diplomatic
asylum and the treatment of foreign enterprises and nationals.91

There are many other features that mark the nineteenth century.
Democracy and nationalism, both spurred on by the wars of the French
revolution and empire, spread throughout the Continent and changed
the essence of international relations.92 No longer the exclusive concern

90 See Nussbaum, Law of Nations, pp. 186–250, and, e.g., C. H. Alexandrowicz, The European–
African Confrontation, Leiden, 1973. See also B. Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins of Interna-
tional Law. European Expansion and the Classical Standard of Civilisation’, 7 Journal of the
History of International Law, 2005, p. 1, and C. Sylvest, ‘International Law in Nineteenth-
Century Britain’, 75 BYIL, 2004, p. 9.

91 See below, chapters 3 and 14 respectively. See also H. Gros Espiell, ‘La Doctrine du Droit
International en Amérique Latine avant la Première Conférence Panaméricaine’, 3 Journal
of the History of International Law, 2001, p. 1.

92 See especially A. Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, London,
1969.

28 i n te r nat i o na l l aw

of aristocratic élites, foreign policy characterised both the positive and the
negative faces of nationalism. Self-determination emerged to threaten the
multinational empires of Central and Eastern Europe, while nationalism
reached its peak in the unifications of Germany and Italy and began to
exhibit features such as expansionism and doctrines of racial superior-
ity. Democracy brought to the individual political influence and a say
in government. It also brought home the realities of responsibility, for
wars became the concern of all. Conscription was introduced throughout
the Continent and large national armies replaced the small professional
forces.93 The Industrial Revolution mechanised Europe, created the eco-
nomic dichotomy of capital and labour and propelled Western influence
throughout the world. All these factors created an enormous increase
in the number and variety of both public and private international in-
stitutions, and international law grew rapidly to accommodate them.94

The development of trade and communications necessitated greater in-
ternational co-operation as a matter of practical need. In 1815, the Final
Act of the Congress of Vienna established the principle of freedom of
navigation with regard to international waterways and set up a Central
Commission of the Rhine to regulate its use. In 1856 a commission for the
Danube was created and a number of other European rivers also became
the subject of international agreements and arrangements. In 1865 the In-
ternational Telegraphic Union was established and in 1874 the Universal
Postal Union.95

European conferences proliferated and contributed greatly to the de-
velopment of rules governing the waging of war. The International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, founded in 1863, helped promote the series of
Geneva Conventions beginning in 1864 dealing with the ‘humanisation’
of conflict, and the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 established the
Permanent Court of Arbitration and dealt with the treatment of prisoners
and the control of warfare.96 Numerous other conferences, conventions
and congresses emphasised the expansion of the rules of international law
and the close network of international relations. In addition, the academic
study of international law within higher education developed with the ap-
pointment of professors of the subject and the appearance of specialist
textbooks emphasising the practice of states.

93 G. Best, Humanity in Warfare, London, 1980; Best, War and Law Since 1945, Oxford, 1994,
and S. Bailey, Prohibitions and Restraints in War, Oxford, 1972.

94 See e.g. Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, and The Evolution of International Or-
ganisations (ed. E. Luard), Oxford, 1966.

95 See further below, chapter 23. 96 See further below, chapter 21.

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d eve l o p m e n t o f i n te r nat i o na l l aw 29

Positivist theories dominate this century. The proliferation of the pow-
ers of states and the increasing sophistication of municipal legislation
gave force to the idea that laws were basically commands issuing from a
sovereign person or body. Any question of ethics or morality was irrele-
vant to a discussion of the validity of man-made laws. The approach was
transferred onto the international scene and immediately came face to
face with the reality of a lack of supreme authority.

Since law was ultimately dependent upon the will of the sovereign in
national systems, it seemed to follow that international law depended
upon the will of the sovereign states.

This implied a confusion of the supreme legislator within a state with
the state itself and thus positivism had to accept the metaphysical identity
of the state. The state had a life and will of its own and so was able to
dominate international law. This stress on the abstract nature of the state
did not appear in all positivist theories and was a late development.97

It was the German thinker Hegel who first analysed and proposed
the doctrine of the will of the state. The individual was subordinate to
the state, because the latter enshrined the ‘wills’ of all citizens and had
evolved into a higher will, and on the external scene the state was sovereign
and supreme.98 Such philosophies led to disturbing results in the twenti-
eth century and provoked a re-awakening of the law of nature, dormant
throughout the nineteenth century.

The growth of international agreements, customs and regulations in-
duced positivist theorists to tackle this problem of international law and
the state; and as a result two schools of thought emerged.

The monists claimed that there was one fundamental principle which
underlay both national and international law. This was variously posited
as ‘right’ or social solidarity or the rule that agreements must be car-
ried out (pacta sunt servanda). The dualists, more numerous and in
a more truly positivist frame of mind, emphasised the element of
consent.

For Triepel, another German theorist, international law and domestic
(or municipal) law existed on separate planes, the former governing in-
ternational relations, the latter relations between individuals and between
the individual and the state. International law was based upon agreements
between states (and such agreements included, according to Triepel, both

97 See below, chapter 2.
98 See e.g. S. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, London, 1972, and Friedmann, Legal

Theory, pp. 164–76.

30 i n te r nat i o na l l aw

treaties and customs) and because it was dictated by the ‘common will’
of the states it could not be unilaterally altered.99

This led to a paradox. Could this common will bind individual states
and, if so, why? It would appear to lead to the conclusion that the will of
the sovereign state could give birth to a rule over which it had no control.
The state will was not, therefore, supreme but inferior to a collection
of states’ wills. Triepel did not discuss these points, but left them open
as depending upon legal matters. Thus did positivist theories weaken
their own positivist outlook by regarding the essence of law as beyond
juridical description. The nineteenth century also saw the publication of
numerous works on international law, which emphasised state practice
and the importance of the behaviour of countries to the development of
rules of international law.100

The twentieth century

The First World War marked the close of a dynamic and optimistic cen-
tury. European empires ruled the world and European ideologies reigned
supreme, but the 1914–18 Great War undermined the foundations of Eu-
ropean civilisation. Self-confidence faded, if slowly, the edifice weakened
and the universally accepted assumptions of progress were increasingly
doubted. Self-questioning was the order of the day and law as well as art
reflected this.

The most important legacy of the 1919 Peace Treaty from the point of
view of international relations was the creation of the League of Nations.101

The old anarchic system had failed and it was felt that new institutions
to preserve and secure peace were necessary. The League consisted of an
Assembly and an executive Council, but was crippled from the start by
the absence of the United States and the Soviet Union for most of its life
and remained a basically European organisation.

While it did have certain minor successes with regard to the mainte-
nance of international order, it failed when confronted with determined
aggressors. Japan invaded China in 1931 and two years later withdrew from
the League. Italy attacked Ethiopia, and Germany embarked unhindered

99 Friedmann Legal Theory, pp. 576–7. See also below, chapter 4.
100 See e.g. H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law, New York, 1836; W. E. Hall, A Treatise

on International Law, Oxford, 1880; Von Martens, Völkerrecht, Berlin, 2 vols., 1883–6;
Pradier-Fodéré, Traité de Droit International Public, Paris, 8 vols., 1855–1906; and Fiore,
Il Diritto Internazionale Codificato e la Sua Sanzione Giuridica, 1890.

101 See Nussbaum, Law of Nations, pp. 251–90, and below, chapter 22.

d eve l o p m e n t o f i n te r nat i o na l l aw 31

upon a series of internal and external aggressions. The Soviet Union, in
a final gesture, was expelled from the organisation in 1939 following its
invasion of Finland.

Nevertheless much useful groundwork was achieved by the League in
its short existence and this helped to consolidate the United Nations later
on.102

The Permanent Court of International Justice was set up in 1921 at The
Hague and was succeeded in 1946 by the International Court of Justice.103

The International Labour Organisation was established soon after the end
of the First World War and still exists today, and many other international
institutions were inaugurated or increased their work during this period.

Other ideas of international law that first appeared between the wars
included the system of mandates, by which colonies of the defeated powers
were administered by the Allies for the benefit of their inhabitants rather
than being annexed outright, and the attempt was made to provide a form
of minority protection guaranteed by the League. This latter creation was
not a great success but it paved the way for later concern to secure human
rights.104

After the trauma of the Second World War the League was succeeded in
1946 by the United Nations Organisation, which tried to remedy many of
the defects of its predecessor. It established its site at New York, reflecting
the realities of the shift of power away from Europe, and determined to
become a truly universal institution. The advent of decolonisation fulfilled
this expectation and the General Assembly of the United Nations currently
has 192 member states.105

Many of the trends which first came to prominence in the nineteenth
century have continued to this day. The vast increase in the number of
international agreements and customs, the strengthening of the system
of arbitration and the development of international organisations have
established the essence of international law as it exists today.

Communist approaches to international law

Classic Marxist theory described law and politics as the means whereby
the ruling classes maintained their domination of society. The essence
of economic life was the ownership of the means of production, and all

102 See also G. Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations, London, 1973.
103 See below, chapter 19. 104 See below, chapter 6.
105 Following the admission of Montenegro on 28 June 2006.

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Issue:5Volume: 1
By: Pieter H.F. Bekker

Date: November 11, 1996

Home (/) / Insights (/insights) / Advisory Opinions of the World Court on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

Advisory Opinions of the World Court on the
Legality of Nuclear Weapons

On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), popularly known as the World Court,
delivered two advisory opinions on separate requests received from the World Health
Organization and the General Assembly of the United Nations, respectively, relating to the
legality of nuclear weapons under international law. The principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, whose Statute forms an integral part of the UN Charter, consists of 15 judges
representing the different regions and principal legal systems of the world. In addition to the
Court’s function of delivering judgments in contentions cases submitted to it by states, it may
issue non-binding advisory opinions at the request of certain UN organs and agencies.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

On December 20, 1994, the UN General Assembly requested the ICJ to give an advisory
opinion on the question: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted
under international law?”

At the outset, the ICJ confirmed the Assembly’s broad competence to make such a request,
deriving from the UN Charter and the Assembly’s longstanding activities regarding
disarmament and nuclear weapons. The Court also found that the request related to a legal
question within the meaning of the ICJ Statute and the UN Charter and that there were no
compelling reasons to refuse the request, even though the question put to it did not relate to a
specific dispute and was couched in abstract terms.

In determining the legality or illegality of the threat or external use of nuclear weapons, the ICJ
decided that the most directly relevant applicable law governing the Assembly’s question

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consisted of (1) the provisions of the UN Charter relating to the threat or use of force, (2) the
principles and rules of international humanitarian law that form part of the law applicable in
armed conflict and the law of neutrality, and (3) any relevant specific treaties on nuclear
weapons. In applying this law, the Court considered it imperative to take into account certain
unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, in particular their destructive capacity that can
cause untold human suffering for generations to come.

The Court first considered the provisions of the UN Charter relating to the threat or use of force.
Although Article 2(4) (generally prohibiting the threat or use of force), Article 51 (recognizing
every state’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs)
and Article 42 (authorizing the Security Council to take military enforcement measures) do not
refer to specific weapons, the Court held that they apply to any use of force, regardless of the
type of weapon employed. The Court noted that the UN Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor
permits, the use of any specific weapon (including nuclear weapons) and that a weapon that is
already unlawful per se by treaty or custom does not become lawful by reason of its being used
for a legitimate purpose under the Charter. Whatever the means of force used in self-defense,
the dual customary condition of necessity and proportionality and the law applicable in armed
conflict apply, including such further considerations as the very nature of nuclear weapons and
the profound risks associated with their use.

The ICJ also considered the question whether a signalled intention to use force if certain
events occur qualifies as an unlawful “threat” under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. According to
the Court, the notions of “threat” or “use” of force under Article 2(4) work in tandem in that the
illegal use of force in a given case will likewise make the threat to use such force unlawful. The
Court pointed out that the mere possession of nuclear weapons would not constitute an
unlawful “threat” to use force contrary to Article 2(4), unless the particular use of force
envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state
or would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations or, in the event that it were
intended as a means of defense, such envisaged use of force would violate the principles of
necessity and proportionality.

The Court next examined the law applicable in situations of armed conflict by addressing two
questions: (1) are there specific rules in international law regulating the legality or illegality of
recourse to nuclear weapons per se, and (2) what are the implications of the principles and
rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict and the law of neutrality?

The ICJ noted that international customary and treaty law do not contain any specific
prescription authorizing the threat or use of nuclear weapons or any other weapon in general or
in certain circumstances, in particular those of the exercise of legitimate self-defense. Nor,
however, is there any principle or rule of international law that would make the legality of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons or of any other weapons dependent on a specific
authorization. State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such
does not result from an absence of authorization but is rather formulated in terms of prohibition.

The Court examined whether any such prohibition of recourse to nuclear weapons can be
found in treaty law. With regard to certain specific treaties dealing with the acquisition,
manufacture, possession, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons, the Court noted that
these treaties “point to an increasing concern in the international community” with regard to
nuclear weapons, and concluded that they “could therefore be seen as foreshadowing a future
general prohibition of the use of such weapons, but they do not constitute such a prohibition by
themselves.” As to those treaties that address the issue of recourse to nuclear weapons, the
Court observed that they “testify to a growing awareness of the need to liberate the community
of States and the international public from the dangers resulting from the existence of nuclear

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weapons,” but that these treaties also do not amount to a comprehensive and universal
conventional prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.

The Court then examined customary international law. First, it determined that the non-use of
nuclear weapons does not amount to a customary prohibition, because the world community is
profoundly divided on the issue. Second, the Court examined whether certain General
Assembly resolutions that deal with nuclear weapons signify the existence of a rule of
customary international law prohibiting recourse to nuclear weapons. In the Court’s view,
although these resolutions are “a clear sign of deep concern regarding the problem of nuclear
weapons” and “reveal the desire of a very large section of the international community to take,
by a specific and express prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a significant step forward
along the road to complete nuclear disarmament,” they fall short of a customary rule
specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such.

The ICJ next considered whether recourse to nuclear weapons must be considered as illegal in
the light of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict
and of the law of neutrality. The Court stated that the cardinal principles of international
humanitarian law prescribing the conduct of military operations are: (1) the protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects and the prohibition of the use of weapons incapable of
distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, and (2) the prohibition on causing
unnecessary suffering to combatants by using certain weapons. According to the Court, the
fundamental rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict must be observed by all
states whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they
constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law. The ICJ agreed with the
vast majority of states as well as writers that there can be no doubt as to the applicability of the
principles and rules of humanitarian law in armed conflict to a possible threat or use of nuclear
weapons, despite the fact that these principles and rules had evolved prior to the invention of
nuclear weapons. It also found that the customary principle of neutrality is applicable, subject to
the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, to all international armed conflict, whatever type of
weapons might be used (although the principle of neutrality is not well defined, and the ICJ left
its content undefined here, it is generally regarded as requiring at least that no attack be made
on a state that has declared itself a neutral and is conducting itself accordingly).

Despite the undisputed applicability of the principles and rules of humanitarian law and of the
law of neutrality to nuclear weapons, the ICJ found that the conclusions to be drawn from this
applicability were controversial. The Court admitted that, in view of the unique characteristics of
nuclear weapons, their use “in fact seems scarcely reconcilable” with the strict requirements
dictated by the law applicable in armed conflict. The judges being evenly divided, ICJ President
Mohammed Bedjaoui used his casting vote to hold that the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. At the
same time, the ICJ held that it did not have a sufficient basis for a definitive conclusion as to
whether the use of nuclear weapons would or would not be at variance with the principles and
rules of law applicable in armed conflict in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which a
state’s very survival is at stake.

Finally, the Court examined the obligation to negotiate in good faith a complete nuclear
disarmament, recognized in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of 1968. The ICJ judges held unanimously that the obligation enshrined in Article VI
involves “an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear disarmament in all its aspects-by
adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in
good faith.” The Court noted that this twofold obligation to pursue and conclude negotiations in
accordance with the basic principle of good faith formally concerns the 182 states parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, constituting the vast majority of the
international community.

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Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict

On July 8, 1996, the ICJ ruled also that it was unable to comply with a request received on
September 1993 from the World Health Organization (WHO) to give an advisory opinion on the
following question: “In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under
international law including the WHO Constitution?” The Court ruled, 11-3, that although the
WHO is duly authorized under the UN Charter to request advisory opinions from the ICJ and
the opinion requested concerned a legal question, the request submitted by the WHO did not
relate to a question arising within the scope of the activities of that organization as required by
Article 96(2) of the UN Charter.

The Court pointed out that its jurisdiction to provide an advisory opinion in response to a
request by a specialized agency requires that: (1) the specialized agency requesting the
opinion must be duly authorized, under the UN Charter, to request advisory opinions from the
ICJ, (2) the opinion requested must relate to a “legal question” within the meaning of the ICJ
Statute and the UN Charter, and (3) the opinion requested must relate to a question that arises
within the scope of the activities of the specialized agency requesting the opinion.

Regarding the third condition, the Court emphasized the importance of the relevant rules, and
in particular the constituent instrument, of the WHO in determining the scope of its activities
against the background of the question it posed. In interpreting the constituent instrument of an
international organization, the character of which is conventional and at the same time
institutional (being a treaty establishing an international organization), the Court observed that
the following elements deserve special attention: (i) the nature of the international organization,
(ii) the objectives assigned to the organization by its founders, (iii) the imperatives associated
with the effective performance of the functions of the organization, and (iv) the organization’s
own practice.

The ICJ observed that none of the 22 functions listed in the WHO Constitution expressly refers
to the legality of any activity hazardous to health, or depends upon the legality of the situations
in which that organization must act. Article 2 states that the WHO discharges its functions “to
achieve its objective,” which Article 1 defines as “the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health.” According to the Court, the functions listed in Article 2 authorize the
WHO to deal with the effects on health of the use of nuclear weapons, or any other hazardous
activity, and to take preventive measures that are aimed at protecting the health of populations
in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged in.

Having found the request to relate not to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on health,
but rather the legality of the use of such weapons in view of their health and environmental
effects, the Court concluded that there was insufficient connection between the request and the
functions of the WHO to support the Court’s jurisdiction. According to the ICJ: “the legality or
illegality of the use of nuclear weapons in no way determines the specific measures, regarding
health or otherwise (studies, plans, procedures, etc.), which could be necessary in order to
prevent or cure some of their effects.”

The Court acknowledged that international organizations can exercise subsidiary or “implied”
powers not expressly provided for in the basic instruments that govern their activities. However,
it held that the competence to address the legality of the use of nuclear weapons could not be
deemed a necessary implication of the WHO Constitution in the light of the purposes member
states had assigned to it. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to disregarding the principle
of speciality according to which international organizations operate in limited fields.

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The ICJ explained that the logic of the UN Charter system demonstrates that the United
Nations was invested with powers of general scope and that specialized agencies such as the
WHO were invested with sectorial powers. The responsibilities of the WHO are necessarily
restricted to the sphere of public health, and cannot encroach on the responsibilities of other
parts of the UN system. More specifically, questions concerning the use of force, the regulation
of armaments, and disarmament are within the competence of the United Nations and outside
that of the specialized agencies.

Finally, the Court pointed out that none of the WHO’s reports and resolutions was in the nature
of a practice of the WHO concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. It held
that in general the WHO is not empowered to seek an opinion on the interpretation of its
Constitution in relation to matters outside the scope of its functions.
******
These advisory opinions of the World Court are of considerable significance to the
development of the law of nuclear weapons and international organizations. Although the Court
concluded that it was unable to hold definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which the very
survival of a state would be at stake (thereby leaving the door to legality open) and it could not
give the opinion requested by the WHO, the legal reasoning leading to these conclusions
reflects the Court’s authoritative views on important issues of international law. Although the
opinions are non-binding, in preparing them the Court follows the same rules and procedures
that govern its binding judgments delivered in contentious cases submitted to it by sovereign
states.

Further Reading
Ian Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14 ICLQ 437 (1965).
David M. Corwin, The Legality of Nuclear Arms under International Law, 5 Dickinson JIL 271
(1986).
Richard Falk, Lee Meyrowitz & Jack Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, 20
Ind JIL 541 (1980).
William R. Hearn, The International Legal Regime Regulating Nuclear Deterrence and Warfare,
61 B.Y.B.I.L. 199 (1981).
Frits Kalshoven, Arms, Armaments and International Law, 191 RdC 183 (1985 II).
Elliott L. Meyrowitz, Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: The Relevance of International Law
(1990).
Elliott L. Meyrowitz, The Opinions of Legal Scholars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons,
24 Stanford JIL 111 (1987).
Istvan Pogany, ed., Nuclear Weapons and International Law (1987).
Alfred P. Rubin, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, 8 Fletcher Forum 45 (1984).
Nagendra Singh & Edward McWhinney, Nuclear Weapons and Contemporary International
Law (2nd Rev.Ed. 1989).
Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 28
McGill LJ 543 (1982).

Dr. Peter H.F. Bekker is an attorney with Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts in New York.
He is Chair of the International Courts Committee of the American Bar Association’s Section of
International Law and Practice. He was a member of the Registry of the International Court of
Justice in The Hague between 1992-1994.

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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2594729

General Principles of Law, Judicial Creativity and the

Development of International Criminal Law

Fabián O. Raimondo*

I. Introduction

The International Criminal Tribunals have often invoked Article 38 of the International

Court of Justice Statute and the ‘usual sources of international law’ in order to identify

the law applicable to their operations.
1
As is well known, the principal sources of

international law are international treaties, custom, and general principles of law.
2
In

international criminal law, the expression ‘general principles of law’ is by and large used

to mean legal principles generally recognized in national law. This understanding is

present in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
3
as well as by the

text of Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
4

Classically, general principles of law as a source of international law are deemed

to be subsidiary in nature; subsidiary, in the sense that if there exists an applicable

conventional or customary rule, this shall prevail.
5
The ad hoc Tribunals have resorted to

general principles of law in their decisions in order to fill legal gaps, to interpret unclear

legal rules, and to reinforce their legal reasoning by applying a conventional or a

customary rule of international law and a general principle of law simultaneously.
6
In

contrast with the Internatioanl Court of Justice (ICJ) for instance, the ad hoc Tribunals

have frequently had recourse to general principles of law in order to address legal

gaps. This may be largely due to the fact that international criminal law at the time of the

creation of the Tribunals was a fairly new field of international law and was thus

considerably under-developed.
7
It is worth observing that the gap-filling function of

*
Assistant Professor of Public International Law, Maastricht University. Member of the List of Counsel

before the International Criminal Court.
1
See, for example, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, T.Ch. IIquater, 16

November 1998, § 414; and Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment on Allegation of Contempt against Prior

Counsel, Milan Vujin, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, App.Ch., 31 January 2000, §13.
2
Cf. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). According to Pellet and Daillier,

international lawyers agree that that legal provision reflects general international law. See Pellet, Alain and

Daillier, Patrick, Droit international public, 7
th

edition, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et Jurisprudence,

2002, p. 114, § 59.
3
For an examination of the case law of the ad hoc tribunals on general principles of law see generally

Raimondo, Fabián, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and

Tribunals, The Hague, Brill / Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2008, 234 pp.
4
Also in general international law it prevails the conception of general principles of law as being those

generally recognized in foro domestico; see Raimondo, Fabián, ibid., pp. 41-42. For an opposite

conception, i.e. general principles of law encompass principles generally recognized in national law and

principles generally recognized in international law see Case concerning Pulp Mills (Argentina v.

Uruguay), Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, International Court of Justice, 20 April 2010, §§

26-51.
5
See Article 5 of the draft resolution by the Institut de Droit International, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit

International, Paris, Pedone, Vol. 37, pp. 324-325, 328.
6
See Raimondo, Fabián, op. cit. 3, pp. 171-173.

7
For an explanation of the then rudimentary character of international criminal law see Cassesse, Antonio,

International Criminal Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008 (2
nd

edn.)), pp. 3-13..

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2594729

2

general principles of law has been particularly important in the practice of the ad hoc

Tribunals, and for international criminal law more generally, because it has helped to

identify those areas of the field in need of further regulation.

General principles of law are abstractions of legal rules from national legal

orders. Given the malleability of their legal content, the ad hoc Tribunals have at times

been tempted to pinpoint a general principle that best suited their needs in the case at

hand. In doing so, the question has been prompted as to whether international courts or

tribunals can make law. The classical view is that judicial bodies do not create law, but

rather that they assist in identifying those rules of international law which do

exist.
8
However, in modern times that view has been challenged by a number of

international lawyers, such as Rosalyn Higgins, Alan Boyle, and Christine

Chinkin.
9
This chapter explores issues of judicial creativity by the ad hoc Tribunals in

the context of their application of general principles of law. It demonstrates that some of

those instances led to the development of international criminal law, perhaps to the point

of judicial law-making. It submits that it will be rather more difficult for the ICC to be as

creative as the ad hoc Tribunals have been with regard to the application of general

principles of law, as the legal regime of ICC is much more detailed than those pertaining

to the latter judicial bodies.

This chapter considers the treatment of general principles of law by the ad hoc

Tribunals in the context of their inherent powers and in relation to the applicable

substantive law. Section II considers the role that has been played in the practice and

jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals against the background of their perceived inherent

powers. It shows how the ICTY adjusted the meaning of the principle that courts must be

‘established by law’ to the specific circumstances of international criminal justice.

The

disccussion of the ICTR’s application of the iura novit curia principle in appellate

proceedings considers how this led to the enactment of a precise provision on this matter

in the Tribunal’s regulations. This section also considers whether the ad hoc Tribunals

have the inherent power to deal with contempt under general principles of law. Section

III explores the use of general principles of law in the context of the substantive law of

defences and crimes. It shows the influence of the discussion of duress as a complete

defence under general principles of law on the Rome Statute of the ICC and considers

how the ICTY crafted a definition of the crime of rape via recourse to general principles

of law. By way of a contrast, Section IV outlines the emerging case law of the ICC on

general principles of law and in doing so, anticipates a more restricted role for this source

in the future in international criminal law than that which has been seen to date. The

conclusion is drawn in Section V that the ad hoc tribunals have identified areas of

international criminal law in need of regulation and have determined the existence and

content of some ‘general principles of law’ to the point of judicial lawmaking.

8
Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux of the

Proceedings of the Committee, 16 June-24 July 1920, intervention by Baron Descamps at p. 336.
9
See Higgins, Rosalyn, Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use It, New York, Oxford

University Press, 1995, p. 3 et seq; Boyle, Alan and Chinkin, Christine, The Making of International Law,

New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, chapter 6.

3

II. General Principles of Law and the Inherent Powers of the ad hoc

Tribunals

International courts and tribunals apply general principles of law by analogy,
10

that is, to

the extent that there is an appropriate similarity between the national law institution from

which the legal principle derives (the source of the analogy) and the parallel international

law institution in which the legal principle would apply (the target of the analogy).
11

Once the existence of an appropriate analogy is established, the application of general

principles of law by international courts and tribunals requires the previous transposition

of those principles from national legal systems into international law. During the

transposition, general principles of law may require ‘adaptation’ to their new setting,

international law, given the different approaches between international law and national

legal systems regarding sources, subjects, and enforcement mechanisms. Otherwise, they

may be applied in international law without prior adaptation.
12

Judge Cassese has vigorously opposed mechanical transpositions of national law

concepts, such as general principles of law, into international criminal law.
13

In his view,

the reasons for this are threefold. First, international criminal courts and tribunals should

look at all the means available at the international level before resorting to national law.

Secondly, international criminal law results from the combination of civil law and

common law systems;
14

it is thus unique, in that it possesses a legal logic that is

significantly different from that of each of those two legal families. Thirdly, international

criminal proceedings are rather different from national criminal proceedings.
15

Judge

Cassesse was right in affirming that national law concepts, including general principles of

law, should not be mechanically applied at the international level. But his other two

arguments are not necessarily compelling. Thus, it is right to avow that one should

examine international law before having recourse to national law; after all, it is

understood that international courts and tribunals apply first and foremost international

law. The initial examination should cover the principal sources of international law, that

is, international treaties and customary law, and for the ad hoc Tribunals, the binding

resolutions of the United Nations Security Council which contained the Statutes of the

ICTY and the ICTR.

However, it is worth recalling that the combination of civil law and common law

systems is not limited to international criminal law and international trials. National

criminal procedures are to differing extents always hybrid and ‘pure’; inquisitorial or

10

See Lauterpacht, Hersch, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (With Special

Reference to International Arbitration), London, Longman, Green and Co., 1927, pp. 81-87; Anzilotti,

Dionisio, Corso di Diritto Internazionale, 3ª ed., Rome, Atheneum, 1928, pp. 106-109.
11

This terminology follows Weinreb, Lloyd, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument,

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 20-21.
12

See Raimondo, op. cit. 3, p. 58 et seq.
13

Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Case No. IT-

96-22-A, App. Ch., 7 October 1997.
14

As explained elsewhere (see op. cit. 3, p. 55), there is a preference for the term ‘Romano-Germanic’ to

the term ‘civil law’ because it acknowledges the efforts made by universities of Latin and German

countries to develop legal studies after the 12
th

century. However in this chapter, the term ‘civil law’ is

used for the sake of consistency with the other chapters of this collection.
15

Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Case No. IT-

96-22-A, App. Ch., 7 October 1997, paras 2-5.

4

adversarial criminal procedures probably do not exist.
16

In addition, the combination of

civil law and common law elements would not unavoidably thwart the application of

general principles of law, because, by definition, these are legal principles common to the

main legal families of the world.
17

Furthermore, it should be noted that the quintessence of national and international

trials is the same, i.e. establishing whether a criminal offence has been perpetrated, and,

in the affirmative, determining the quantum and modality of the penalty to be imposed on

the convicted person.
18

The basic analogies between domestic and international criminal

law make possible the transposition of general principles of law into international

criminal law and their ensuing application to the case in hand.

Accordingly, although it is acceptable to argue that the transposition of general

principles of law into the international arena must not be mechanic, it is also right to

assert that the ad hoc Tribunals have in fact never rejected the application of general

principles of law into international criminal law just because of their inconsistency with

the structure of the latter. Furthermore, the practice of the ad hoc Tribunals reveals that

in those exceptional junctures in which some incongruity arose, the Tribunal concerned

has adjusted the contents of the general principle of law at stake to the features of

international law and applied it to the case. A clear example of this is the application by

the ICTY in the Tadić case of the general principle of law that courts must be established

by law.
19

According to the Defence in Tadić, the establishment of the ICTY was illegal

because it was not established by law. To be duly established by law, in its view, the

ICTY should have been created by treaty or by an amendment of the United

Nations Charter.
20

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the

European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the American

Convention on Human Rights insist on the right to a fair trial by a competent,

independent, and impartial tribunal established by law.
21

In the Defence’s view, this right

is a general principle of law because of its fundamental nature and since it is a minimum

condition for the administration of international criminal justice.
22

The Appeals Chamber held that the principle whereby courts must be established

by law imposes an international obligation that applies only to domestic systems of

16

Pastor, Daniel, ‘El sistema penal internacional del Estatuto de Roma. Aproximaciones jurídicas críticas’,

in Baigún, David et al., Estudios sobre justicia penal. Homenaje al Profesor Julio B. J. Maier, Buenos

Aires, Editores del Puerto, 2005, pp. 701-702.
17

See for example the definition of general principles of law in Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute of the

ICC, especially the French version, as it is more telling in that regard.
18

See Gil y Gil, Alicia, Derecho penal internacional: especial consideración del delito de genocidio,

Madrid, Tecnos, 1999, p. 20.
19

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case

No. IT-94-1-AR72, App. Ch., 2 October 1995, § 42.
20

Ibid., paras 26-27.
21

Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR reads as follows: ‘In the determination of any criminal charge against him,

or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a

competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’ This right is also provided for the

ECHR (Article 6, paragraph 1) and the ACHR (Article 8, paragraph 1). For a commentary on that legal

provision of the ICCPR see Joseph, Sarah et al., op. cit. 301, pp. 391-426.
22

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case

No. IT-94-1-AR72, App. Ch., 2 October 1995, § 41.

5

criminal justice.
23

It went on to explain that the principle cannot mean the same at both

the national and international levels, as the legislative, executive and judicial division of

powers which prevails in the generality of national legal systems does not apply to the

international setting nor to the United Nations. Hence, the separation of powers element

of the condition that a tribunal be ‘established by law’ does not apply in the international

context.
24

In spite of these considerations, the Appeals Chamber did not refuse to apply the

principle that courts must be established by law, but it interpreted the principle in a

different way from the typical interpretation at the national level. According to the

Appeals Chamber, an international court or tribunal is deemed to be established by law if

it provides for all guarantees of fairness in full conformity with internationally recognized

human rights standards.
25

In its view, this interpretation is the ‘most sensible’ and ‘most

likely meaning’ in international law.
26

Given that the ICTY is ‘established by law’,

because the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal guarantee a fair

trial as well as the impartiality and independence of the judges,
27

the Appeals Chamber

dismissed the Defence’s appeal on this ground.
28

It is true that the meaning of the principle that a court must be established by law

cannot be the same at the international level as that at the level of national legal

systems. The reason is that in national legal systems the word ‘law’ in the term

‘established by law’ means the law of the parliament or congress
29

and, as the Appeals

Chamber declared, there is no such thing in international society. The Appeals Chamber

did not, however, reject the application of the principle but rather adjusted the meaning of

the principle to the special characteristics of the international setting. Following the

adjustment, the principle meant for the Appeals Chamber that an international criminal

court or tribunal is ‘to be rooted in the rule of law and offer all guarantees embodied in

the relevant international instruments’.
30

It would appear that the adjustment added little or nothing to the meaning of the

principle given that the ICTY, as well as any other international criminal court or

tribunal, are already bound to comply with the rule of law and to ensure a fair trial for

accused persons. The obligation to ensure a fair trial was also laid down in the Statutes

of the ad hoc Tribunals and in customary law.
31

What is more, the ICTY Appeals

Chamber deemed that this due process obligation was part of ius cogens, that Article 14

of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ‘reflects an imperative norm

of international law to which the Tribunal must adhere’.
32

In short, the ICTY was already

23

Ibid., § 42.
24

Ibid., para 43.
25

Ibid., para 45.
26

Ibid.
27

Ibid., paras 45-46.
28

Ibid., para 47.
29

See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case

No. IT-94-1-AR72, App.Ch., 2 October 1995, § 43.
30

Ibid., para 42.
31

Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment (Reasons), Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, App.Ch., 1 June

2001, para 51.
32

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin,

Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, App. Ch., 27 February 2001, p. 3. See also Lambert-Abdelgawad, Elisabet,

‘Les Tribunaux pénaux pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et le Rwanda et l’appel aux sources du droit international

6

bound to comply with the rule of law regardless of the applicability of the principle that

courts must be established by law.

Consequently, if one takes for granted that the ICTY should be rooted in the rule

of law pursuant to its regulatory instruments and to customary law, then the best

interpretation of the principle ‘courts must be established by law’ is the second possible

interpretation mentioned by the Appeals Chamber. It considered that ‘established by

law’ means the establishment of international courts and tribunals by an organ with the

power to take compulsory decisions, such as the UN Security Council when acting under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
33

Yet, the Appeals Chamber rejected this interpretation

as, in its view, the ‘most sensible and most likely meaning of the term in the context of

international law’ is that ‘established by law’ means that the ICTY must be rooted in the

rule of law.
34

Be this as it may, this example also shows the flexibility of the legal

content of general principles of law, an adaptability that has allowed for the crafting of

general principles of law to best suit the interests of the ad hoc Tribunals.

The Tadić approach to general principles of law paved the way for further

reliance on this source of international law and also for the adoption of a flexible

approach in its interpretation. General principles of law were used to fill perceived gaps

in the law by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Kambanda case.
35

In its judgment, the

Appeals Chamber applied the iura novit curia principle, as Kambanda had put forward on

appeal that if the Appeals Chamber were to dismiss his chief request to reverse the guilty

verdict and order a retrial, it should also revise the whole sentence on five legal

grounds. However, he failed to submit any legal ground and the Prosecution argued, in

its turn, that the appellant’s failure to put forward any legal arguments was enough reason

at the outset to dismiss Kambanda’s submissions.
36

Against this background, the Appeals

Chamber held that in the case of errors of law, the arguments of the parties do not exhaust

the subject. In other words: iura novit curia. In this vein, it considered the issue raised

on appeal even in the absence of substantial argument presented by the appellant.
37

This example illustrates that legal problems adjudicated by international criminal

courts and tribunals on the basis of general principles of law may result in the enactment

of suitable legal rules to address such problems. In fact, two years after Kambanda the

President of the ICTR Appeals Chamber enacted the Practice Direction on Formal

Requirements for Appeal from Judgments.
38

One of those requirements is that legal

reasons are submitted with regard to the grounds of appeal.
39

If a party to the appellate

proceedings does not comply with the requirements stipulated in the Practice Direction, a

Pre-Trial Judge or the Appeals Chamber may, ‘within its discretion, decide upon an

appropriate sanction, which can include an order for clarification or re-filing. The

Appeals Chamber may also reject a filing or dismiss submissions therein’.
40

des droits de l’homme’, in Delmas-Marty, Mireille et al. (eds.), Les sources du droit international pénal,

Paris, Société de législation comparée, 2004, p. 105.
33

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case

No. IT-94-1-AR72, App.Ch., 2 October 1995, para 44.
34

Ibid., para 45.
35

Kambanda v. The Prosecutor, Judgment, Case No. ICTR97-23-A, App. Ch., 19 October 2000.
36

Ibid., para 96.
37

Ibid., para 98.
38

Text in http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/pracdirections/formalreqe.htm.
39

Ibid., Article 4(a).
40

Ibid., Article 13.

7

The use of general principles of law has been particularly promintent at the ad hoc

Tribunals in the context of the inherent power, or otherwise, to deal with the matter of

contempt. It has revealed an at times questionable method for determining the existence

of general principels of law. The ad hoc Tribunals have usually determined the existence

and content of general principles of law by relying on their own or other international

decisions, or by comparative law.
41

The comparison of national legal systems typically

consists of two distinct actions, which can be termed the ‘vertical move’ and the

‘horizontal move’.
42

The ‘vertical move’ is the process of abstraction of domestic legal

rules aimed at distilling an underlying legal principle.
43

The ad hoc Tribunals have

derived general principles of law chiefly from national constitutions, statutes, and court

decisions. Such a methodology is acceptable because in general domestic criminal law is

to be found in those legal sources.
44

The ‘horizontal move’ is the corroboration that the

generality of nations in fact acknowledges the legal principle obtained as a result of the

vertical move.
45

It would appear that the ad hoc Tribunals have at times manipulated the process

of abstraction of legal rules from national legal systems, so as to create a legal principle

apt for settling the legal issue at hand rather than to identify an existing legal principle.

In the judgment on allegation of contempt against the prior counsel of Dŭsko Tadić, this

matter came to the fore. In its judgment, the ICTY Appeals Chamber asserted the

existence of a general principle of law whereby courts have an inherent power to deal

with contempt.
46

The accused submitted that the changes made to Rule 77 of the

ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence during the relevant period expanded the ambit of

conduct that amounted to contempt of the Tribunal, thereby jeopardizing his due process

rights.
47

Rule 77 describes the conduct that amounts to contempt.
48

Prior to the last

amendment of Rule 77, it had stated in paragraph (E) that nothing in the rule affected the

inherent power of the ICTY to hold in contempt persons who knowingly and wilfully

interfered with its administration of justice. Since that amendment, Rule 77 no longer

refers to such an inherent power.

In its treatment of the issue, the Appeals Chamber held that as a preliminary point

it was necessary to examine the general question of the ICTY’s power to deal with

contempt. It found that the ICTY has this power as it is necessary for an international

criminal tribunal to take action against interferences in the administration of justice. As

for the content of the power, that could be determined in light of the ‘usual sources of

41

See Raimondo, Fabián, op. cit. 3, p. 173 et seq.
42

Cf. Elias, Olufemi and Lim, Chin, ‘”General Principles of Law”, “Soft” Law and the Identification of

International Law’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 28, 1997, pp. 3-49.
43

Raimondo, Fabián. op. cit. 3, pp. 46-50.
44

Ibid.
45

Ibid., pp. 51-57.
46

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Case

No. IT-94-1-A-R77, App. Ch., 31 January 2000.
47

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Case

No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, App. Ch., 31 January 2000, para

12.

48

Rule 77 was adopted on 11 February 1994, revised on 30 January 1995, amended on 25 July 1997,

revised again on 12 November 1997 and amended again on 13 December 2001. See

www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm (last visited on 25 May 2010).

8

international law’.
49

Customary law did not regulate the matter, in the Tribunal’s

view.
50

Thus the Appeals Chamber proceeded to examine the ‘general principles of law

common to the major legal systems of the world, as developed and refined (where

applicable) in international jurisprudence’:
51

in short, the general principles of law.

Despite the fact that the law of contempt originated in the context of the common

law, many civil law legal systems have passed legislation with parallel results.
52

While

the power to deal with contempt in common law legal systems is part of the inherent

jurisdiction of the courts, in the civil law legal family the power comes into existence

only if enacted by legislation.
53

In spite of those findings, the Appeals Chamber

concluded that the ICTY’s inherent power to deal with contempt had existed since the

establishment of the ICTY and it was not contingent on the existence of a specific

provision of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
54

It is not certain whether there is a

general principle of law giving courts the inherent power to deal with contempt, contrary

to the Appeals Chamber’s contention. The reason is that, as the Appeals Chamber

showed, in the national legal systems of civil law countries the power to deal with

contempt is only granted by a legislative act. There is thus no legal principle common to

the main legal families of the world in that particular regard.

Scholarly writings on this judgment have disapproved of the Appeals Chamber’s

conclusion. According to Cockayne, the conclusion is disconcerting because the

evidence presented by the Appeals Chamber can also be interpreted in the sense that civil

law legal systems do not consider it vital for criminal courts to have the power to deal

with contempt, and that, where the power is deemed essential, it must be granted by

legislation. Had the ICTY followed that approach, it would have been able to exercise

such power only if the United Nations Security Council had invested it with such.
55

The

‘identification’ of a general principle of law that courts have the inherent power to deal

with contempt has amounted to judicial lawmaking, as the ICTY expanded the scope of

jurisdiction attributed to it by the Security Council by relying on and applying a principle

whose very existence is in fact doubtful. Beyond such procedural matters, the ad hoc

Tribunals have also used general principles of law as a means for judicial creativity in the

field of substantive criminal law.

III. General Principles and the Substantive Law

49

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Case

No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, App. Ch., 31 January 2000, para 13.
50

Ibid., § 14.
51

Ibid., § 15.
52

Ibid.
53

Ibid., § 17.
54

‘The inherent power of the Tribunal to deal with contempt has necessarily existed ever since its creation,

and the existence of that power does not depend upon a reference being made to it in the Rules of

Procedure and Evidence. As the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the current formulation of Rules 77(A)

to (D) falls within that inherent power, the amendments made in December 1998 did not increase the nature

of the conduct which amounts to contempt to the prejudice of the Respondent’s rights.’ Ibid., § 28. The

finding was reaffirmed in a subsequent decision: Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgment on Appeal by Anto

Nobilo against Finding of Contempt, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, App. Ch., 30 May 2001, para 38.
55

Cockayne, James, ‘Commentary’, in Klip, André and Sluiter, Göran (eds.), Annotated Leading Cases of

International Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1999-

2000, Antwerpen, Intersentia, Vol. 4, 2002, p. 193.

9

The ad hoc Tribunals have resorted to general principles of law across a spectrum of

legal issues that have arisen in the course of their acitivities. In the context of the

substantive international criminal law, general principles of law have been relied upon by

the Tribunals in establishing the scope of permissible defences and in defining the

elements of specific crimes. The judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the

Erdemović case provides one of the most prominent examples of the crucial importance

that general principles of law may play as a source of international criminal law. The

same tribunal relied upon the principle of human dignity in the Furundžija proceedings in

order to advance a definition of the crime of rape under international criminal law.

In the Erdemović Appeals Chamber judgment,
56

the bench had to deal with

particularly contentious legal problems, as is evidenced in part by the appending of five

separate opinions to the judgment by the members of the Appeals Chamber. As far as

general principles of law are concerned, the majority of the Appeals Chamber denied the

existence of a principle whereby duress is a complete defence to a charge of crimes

against humanity or war crimes involving the killing of innocent persons.
57

Moreover, it

determined the existence of the general principle of law whereby duress is a mitigating

factor in sentencing.

Erdemović was charged with one count of a crime against humanity, or

alternatively with one count of a violation of the laws or customs of war. He had pleaded

guilty to the crime against humanity charge and the Trial Chamber had upheld the plea

and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment.
58

Following this, the Defence mounted an

appeal requesting the Appeals Chamber to revise the sentence, for the reason that the

crime had been committed under duress. The Appeals Chamber, by three votes to two,

held that duress is not a complete defence in international law to a charge of crimes

against humanity or war crimes involving the killing of innocent human beings.
59

According to Judges McDonald and Vohrah, the law to be applied was to be derived from

the sources listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. After

finding no applicable customary rule on the issue at hand, they compared a broad

spectrum of national legal systems in order to extract, if possible, a general principle of

law. In so doing they found the principle that duress is a mitigating factor in sentencing,

but not a complete defence against a charge involving the killing of innocent human

beings.
60

Judge Li was of the same opinion in that regard.
61

It is worth observing that the

comparative law analysis undertaken by Judges McDonald and Vohrah was

comprehensive. In encompassed thirty national legal systems which covered civil law

systems, common law systems, and a hybrid category which they called ‘criminal law of

other states’ (China, Ethiopia, Japan, Morocco and Somalia).

56

Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-A, App. Ch., 7 October 1997.
57

For a general discussion on that issue see Ambos, Kai, ‘Other Grounds for Excluding Criminal

Responsibility’, in Cassese, Antonio et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A

Commentary, Vol. I, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 1003–1048.
58

Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-A, App. Ch., 7 October 1997, paras 1–10.
59

Ibid., para 19.
60

Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Judgment, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,

Case No. IT-96-22-A, App.Ch., 7 October 1997, § 40, 55-72.
61

Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, Case No. IT-96-22-A,

App.Ch., 7 October 1997, § 3.

10

The judgment reveals that, notwithstanding the subsidiary nature of general

principles of law as a source of international law, these principles may have a decisive

role to play in international criminal law. Had the Appeals Chamber held that duress was

a complete defence under general principles of law, the defendant would have been

declared not guilty and released since he had been charged with only one count. Given

that the majority of the Appeals Chamber did not find that such a general principle

existed, Erdemović was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.
62

As far as personal

defences are concerned, it may be the case that an individual’s liberty may depend on the

existence of a pertinent general principle of law.

In a more general sense, this treatment of the issue of duress as a complete

defence in international law to a charge of murder as a crime against humanity or war

crime has been the first divisive ICTY decision with respect to general principles of law.

The decision has led to the progressive development of international criminal law, albeit

with the reverse result: the ICC Statute acknowledges duress as a defence to such crimes,

meaning that the States Parties to this treaty have not followed the precedent of the

Appeals Chamber.
63

The judicial creativity of the Appeals Chamber was not favoured by

the drafts of the Rome Statute.

In the application of substantive international criminal law, the ad hoc Tribunals

have sometimes interpreted legal rules in light of value-oriented general principles such

as the principle of human dignity. Such a course of action has arguably resulted in

judicial law making from the bench. One such example is the resort to the principle of

human dignity by the ICTY in the Furundžija judgment in order to define the crime of

rape under international criminal law. The Prosecutor charged the defendant with a count

of violations of the laws and customs of war (outrages upon personal dignity including

rape under Article 3 of the Statute). The alleged act of rape consisted of forced oral

penetration. The Trial Chamber was unable to find a definition of the crime of rape

under the ICTY Statute or customary international law. Moreover it could not ascertain

the elements of the crime of rape under general principles of international criminal law

and general principles of international law. As a result, in order to interpret Article 3 of

the Statute, it deemed it crucial ‘to look for principles of criminal law common to the

major legal systems of the world’,
64

i.e. general principles of law

The Trial Chamber first found that the majority of national legal systems, from

both the civil law and the common law families, do not consider forced oral penetration

to be rape.
65

It would follow that under general principles of law the definition of the

crime of rape does not cover forced oral penetration. However, the Trial Chamber

adopted the following legal reasoning in confirming the act amounted to rape. First,

forced oral penetration is a humiliating and degrading attack on human dignity. Second,

the quintessence of international humanitarian law and human rights law lies in the

62

See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-T bis, T.Ch. II ter, 5 March

1998, disposition.
63

Schabas, William, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge, Cambridge

University Press, 2001, pp. 90–91. See also Article 31, paragraph 1 (d), ICC Statute. See also Ambos, Kai,

‘Other Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility’, in Cassesse, Antonio et al. (eds.), The Rome

Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002,

Vol. I, p. 1010 et seq.
64

Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, T. Ch. II, 10 December 1998, para 177.
65

Ibid., § 181.

11

safeguard of human dignity. Thirdly, given the preceding reasons, forced oral

penetration should be qualified as rape.
66

In the end the Trial Chamber defined the actus

reus of the crime of rape as follows: (i) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the

vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by

the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by

coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.
67

The material

element (actus reus) of the crime of rape as stated by the Trial Chamber is clearly wider

than that under general principles of law, by including forced oral penetration.

Regrettably, the majority of national legal systems still consider such misconduct as

sexual assault and not rape.

By relying on the value-oriented general principle of human dignity, the Trial

Chamber put forward a highly influential argument. Yet, it is worth observing that the

definition of the crime of rape by the Trial Chamber amounted to the creation of law

because it involved the formulation for the first time of a precise and detailed definition

of the objective and subjective elements of the crime of rape, rather than to the

identification of existing law.
68

This approach confirms how general principles of law

have acted as a useful source for the judicial creativity exercised by the ad hoc

Tribunals.More generally, it is worth observing that this Trial Chamber’s decision also

led to the progressive development of international criminal law: the Elements of Crimes

of the ICC contain a very similar definition of the actus reus of the crime of rape as a

crime against humanity and as a war crime.
69

IV. General Principles of Law at the ICC: Limiting Judicial Creativity?

The starting point for an analysis of the legal regime of general principles of law in the

context of the ICC is Article 21 of the Rome Statute, which states the law applicable by

the Court. This article sets out the specific law of the ICC, its Statute, the Elements of

Crimes, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
70

and the more general sources of

international law, including conventions, custom, and general principles of law.
71

It

specifies that: ‘general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal

systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would

normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not

inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized

66

Ibid., para 183.
67

Ibid., para 185.
68

See further the contribution of Niamh Hayes to this collection.
69

See Elements of Crimes pertaining to Articles 7(1)(g)-1 and 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 common

to both provisions read as follows: ‘1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in

penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ,

or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. 2. The

invasion was commited by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence,

duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by

taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of

giving genuine consent…’ The Elements of Crimes of the ICC were adopted on 9 September 2002 and

entered into force on the same date (source: http://www.icc-

cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Elements+of+Crimes.htm).
70

Article 21(1)(a).
71

Article 21(1)(b)-(c).

12

norms and standards’.
72

The formulation of this provision suggests that the ICC is to

apply general principles of law if no applicable rules can be identified in the special law

of the court or in conventional or customary law. The purpose, therefore, is to fill legal

gaps.

Unlike the Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ad hoc Tribunals,

the law of the ICC is almost all-encompassing and very detailed. It provides for legal

rules and regulates aspects of the proceedings that were not legislated for at the ad hoc

Tribunals, such as the functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber, the elements of the

crimes, and victims’ participation in the process. This, together with the fact that the ad

hoc Tribunals have determined many customary rules of international criminal law (and,

in so doing, making them accessible to the ICC for their application pursuant to Article

21(1)(b)), limits the possibility for the ICC to resort to general principles of law in order

to fill gaps. It is thus not surprising that there have been just a few instances in which a

chamber of the Court has thus far dealt with such principles.

The first instance of such reliance on general principles related to an application

by the Prosecutor for extraordinary review of a decision denying leave to appeal.
73

The

Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not provide for any extraordinary

review,
74

but the Prosecutor submitted that such a review could be granted on the basis of

general principles of law.
75

However, the Appeals Chamber noted that in all the civil law

and common law legal systems referred to by the Prosecutor, the right to review

decisions of lower courts is granted by legislation, and it accordingly dismissed the

motion. Concerning the practice of witness proofing, that is, measures intended to help

testifying witnesses in the process of recollection, the Pre-Trial found a great divergence

in the various national legal systems examined,
76

and concluded that there was no general

principle of law permitting witness proofing.
77

The ICC has also resorted to general principles in the context of the burden of

proof with regard to the evidence submitted in support of victims’ applications for

participation in the proceedings and the admissibility of evidence, an issue that is not

covered by the Rome Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Pre-Trial

Chamber applied the general principle of law that the burden of proof is on the claimant.

It also accepted, based on ICJ case law,
78

the general principle of law that proof may be

administered by means of circumstantial evidence.
79

The Pre-Trial Chamber’s later

decision to revoke the prohibition of contact and communication between two defendants

72

Rome Statute, Article 21(1)(c).
73

Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for

Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Case

No.: ICC-01/04, App.Ch., 13 July 2006.
74

Ibid., § 3.
75

Ibid., §§ 5, 22.
76

Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga

Dyilo, Decision on the Practices of Witnesses Familiarization and Witness Proofing, Case No.: ICC-01/04-

01/06, PT.Ch. I, 8 November 2006, § 36.
77

Ibid., § 42.
78

See Raimondo, Fabián, op. cit. 3, p. 28.
79

Situation in Uganda in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo,

Dominic Ongwen, Decision on Victims’Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06,

a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, PT Ch. II, 10 August

2007, §§ 13, 15.

13

was a dismissal of the Prosecutor’s application, because the analysis of case law made in

the Application was limited to merely two national jurisdictions. In the Pre-Trial

Chamber’s view, the sample was too limited to evidence the existence of a relevant

general principle of law.
80

These examples are few and far between, and highlight the

fact that the specialised law of the ICC is quite detailed in comparison with that of the ad

hoc Tribunals. The existence also of an important corpus of customary international

criminal law will also reduce the likelihood of identifiable legal gaps and thus remove the

necessity for resort to general principles of law in the future.

VIII. Conclusion

General principles of law have on occasion proved to be the ‘magic stick’ via which the

ad hoc Tribunals have been able to express their judicial creativity. By identifying gaps

in their statutes and rules of procedure and evidence, as well as in customary law, the ad

hoc Tribunals turned to these principles to address areas of international criminal law that

were in need of further regulation, such as the inherent powers of an international

criminal tribunal, grounds for excluding criminal responsibility and the definition of

crimes. In interpreting legal rules with the help of general principles of law, the ad hoc

Tribunals have often crafted precise and detailed legal rules, as was the case with the

crime of rape. The practice of the Tribunals thus challenges the fiction that judges do not

make law but rather that they simply identify and apply it.

The jurisprudence demonstrates that, as far as the application of general principles

of law is concerned, the ad hoc Tribunals have at times been extraordinarily creative.

Their position of forerunners allowed them to do so. In addition, the era in which the

Tribunals started operating, the 1990s, was marked by goodwill, enthusiasm and great

expectations, while international criminal law was under-developed. This scene and spirit

may have encouraged the ad hoc Tribunals to read beyond the black letter of the law and

to fill the book of international criminal law with newly found and created rules. It is

remarkable to contrast this approach with the ICC, a treaty-based institution with an

elaborate Statute that began operating in a new millennium. The ICC is much more

cautious in its use of general principles of law. So far, it has mainly turned to this source

of law to elaborate on procedural principles and it has done so mainly at the instigation of

the Prosecutor. The contrast between the ad hoc Tribunals’ use of general principles of

law with the more cautious approach of the ICC is illustrative of general principles of law

as a subsidiary source of law. It demonstrates that particularly in nascent areas and new

domains of international law, this source of law can play a powerful role. The ad hoc

Tribunals are to be praised for their functional and creative use of this source of law for

the advancement of the project of international criminal justice.

80

Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga

and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision Revoking the Prohibition of Contact and Communication between

Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, PT.Ch. I, 13 March 2008, p.

12.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ADVISORY OPINION OF

8

JULY

1

9

9

6

19

96

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

LICEITE DE LA MENACE OU DE L’EMPLOI
D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES

AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 8 JUILLET 1996

Official citation:

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, I. C.l. Reports 1996, p.

22

6

Mode officie1 de citation:

Lichte de fa menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucleaires,
avis consultatif, C.I. I. Recueil 1996, p. 2

26

ISSN 00

7

4

–

44

41

ISBN 92-1-0707

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5

Sales number
N° de vente: 679

1996
8 July

General List
No. 95

226
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1996

8 July 1996

LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Jurisdiction of the Court to give the advisory opinion requested – Article 65,
paragraph 1, of the Statute – Body authorized to request an opinion –
Article 96, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Charter – Activities of the General
Assembly – “Legal question” – Political aspects of the question posed –
Motives said to have inspired the request and political implications that the
opinion might have.

Discretion of the Court as to whether or not it will give an opinion –
Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute – Compelling reasons – Vague

and

abstract question – Purposes for which the opinion is sought – Possible effects
of the opinion on current negotiations – Duty of the Court not to legislate.

Formulation of the question posed – English and French texts – Clear
objective – Burden of proof

Applicable law – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights –
Arbitrary deprivation of life – Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide – Intent against a group as such – Existing norms
relating to the safeguarding and protection of the environment – Environmen-
tal considerations as an element to be taken into account in the implementation
of the law applicable in armed conflict – Application of most directly relevant
law: law of the Charter and law applicable in armed conflict.

Unique characteristics of nuclear weapons.
Provisions of the Charter relating to the threat or use offorce – Article 2,

paragraph 4 – The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of
any specific weapon – Article 51 – Conditions of necessity and proportionality
– The notions of “threat” and “use” of force stand together – Possession of
nuclear weapons, deterrence and threat.

Specific rules regulating the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the recourse to
nuclear weapons as such – Absence of specific prescription authorizing the
threat or use of nuclear weapons – Unlawfulness per se: treaty law – Instru-
ments prohibiting the use of poisoned weapons – Instruments expressly pro-
hibiting the use of certain weapons of mass destruction – Treaties concluded
in order to limit the acquisition, manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons,
the deployment and testing of nuclear weapons – Treaty of Tlatelolco –
Treaty of Rarotonga – Declarations made by nuclear-weapon States on the

4

226
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNEE 1996

8 juillet 1996

LICEITE DE LA MENACE OU DE L’EMPLOI
D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES

Competence de la Cour pour donner l’avis consultatif demande – Article 65,
paragraphe 1, du Statut – Organe autorise it solliciter un avis – Article 96,
paragraphes 1 et 2, de la Charte – Activites de l’Assemblee generate –
« Question juridique» – Aspects politiques de la question posee – Mobiles qui
auraient inspire la requete et implications politiques que pourrait avoir l’avis.

Pouvoir discretionnaire de la Cour de decider si elle doit donner un avis –
Article 65, paragraphe 1, du Statut – Raisons decisives – Question floue

et

abstraite – Fins auxquelles l’avis est demande – Effets possibles de l’avis sur
des negociations en cours – Devoir de la Cour de ne pas legiferer.

Libelle de la question posee – Versions francoise et anglaise – Objectif clair
– Charge de la preuve.

Droit applicable – Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques
– Privation arbitraire de la vie – Convention pour la prevention et la repres-
sion du crime de genocide – Intentionnalite envers un groupe comme tel –
Normes en vigueur en matiere de sauvegarde et de protection de l’environnement
– Considerations ecologiques en tant qu ‘element it prendre en compte dans la
mise en auvre du droit applicable dans les conflits armes – Application du droit
le plus directement pertinent: droit de la Charte et droit applicable dans les
conflits armes.

Caracteristiques propres aux armes nucleaires.
Dispositions de la Charte ayant trait it la menace ou it l’emploi de la force –

Article 2, paragraphe 4 – La Charte n’interdit ni ne permet expressement
l’emploi d’aucune arme particuliere – Article 51 – Conditions de necessite et
de proportionnalite – Les notions de «menace» et d’« emploi» de la force vont
de pair – Possession d’armes nucleaires, dissuasion et menace.

Regles specifiques regissant la liceite ou l’illiceite du recours aux armes
nucleaires en tant que telles – Absence de prescription specifique autorisant la
menace ou l’emploi d’armes nucleaires – Illiceite per se: droit conventionnel-
Instruments interdisant l’emploi d’armes empoisonnees – Instruments prohi-
bant expressement l’emploi de certaines armes de destruction massive – Traites
conclus en vue de limiter l’acquisition, la fabrication et fa possession d’armes
nucleaires, le deploiement d’armes nucleaires et les essais nucleaires – Traite
de Tlatelolco – Traite de Rarotonga – Declarations faites par les Etats dotes

4

1996
8 juillet

Role general
n? 95

2

27

THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

occasion of the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty – Absence of compre-
hensive and universal conventional prohibition of the use or the threat of use of
nuclear weapons as such – Unlawfulness per se: customary law – Consistent
practice of non-utilization of nuclear weapons – Policy of deterrence – Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions affirming the illegality of nuclear weapons – Con-
tinuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris and the still strong adherence
to the practice of deterrence.

Principles and rules of international humanitarian law – Prohibition of
methods and means of warfare precluding any distinction between civilian and
military targets or resulting in unnecessary suffering to combatants – Martens
Clause – Principle of neutrality – Applicability of these principles and rules to
nuclear weapons – Conclusions.

Right of a State to survival and right to resort to self-defence – Policy of
deterrence – Reservations to undertakings given by certain nuclear-weapon
States not to resort to such weapons.

Current state of international law and elements offact available to the Court
– Use of nuclear weapons in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which
the very survival of a State is at stake.

Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty – Obligation to negotiate in good
faith and to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

ADVISORY OPINION

Present: President BEDJAOUI; Vice-President SCHWEBEL; Judges aDA,
GUILLAUME, SHAHABUDDEEN, WEERAMANTRY, RANJEVA, HERCZEGH,

SRI, FLEISCHHAUER, KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN, FERRARI BRAVO,

HIGGINS; Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

On the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,

THE COURT,

composed as above,

gives the following Advisory Opinion:

I. The question upon which the advisory opinion of the Court has been
requested is set forth in resolution 49/75 K adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations (hereinafter called the “General Assembly”) on

15

Decem-
ber 1994. By a letter dated 19 December 1994, received in the Registry by
facsimile on

20

December 1994 and filed in the original on 6 January 1995,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations officially communicated to the
Registrar the decision taken by the General Assembly to submit the question
to the Court for an advisory opinion. Resolution 49/75 K, the English text of
which was enclosed with the letter, reads as follows:

“The General Assembly,

Conscious that the continuing existence and development of nuclear
weapons pose serious risks to humanity,

Mindful that States have an obligation under the Charter of the United

5

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 227

d’armes nucleaires d l’occasion de la prorogation du traite de non-proliferation
– Absence d’interdiction conventionnelle complete et universelle d’emploi ou de
menace d’emploi des armes nucleaires en tant que telles – Illiceite per se: droit
coutumier – Pratique constante de non-utilisation des armes nucleaires – Poli-
tique de dissuasion – Resolutions de l’Assemblee generale affirmant l’illiceite
des armes nucleaires – Tensions subsistant entre une opinio juris naissante et
une adhesion encore forte d la pratique de la dissuasion.

Principes et regles du droit international humanitaire – Interdiction des
methodes et moyens de guerre ne permettant pas de distinguer entre cibles
civiles et cibles militaires ou ayant pour effet de causer aux combattants des
souffrances inutiles – Clause de Martens – Principe de neutralite – Applica-
bilite de ces principes et regles aux armes nucleaires – Consequences.

Droit d’un Etat d la survie et droit de recourir d la legitime defense – Poli-
tique de dissuasion – Reserves d des engagements pris par certains Etats dotes
d’armes nucleaires de ne pas recourir d ces armes.

Etat actuel du droit international et elements de fait d la disposition de la
Cour – Emploi d’armes nucleaires dans une circonstance extreme de legitime
defense dans laquelle la survie meme d’un Etat serait en cause.

Article VI du traite de non-proliferation – Obligation de negocier de bonne
foi et de parvenir au desarmement nucleaire dans tous ses aspects.

AVIS CONSULTATIF

Presents: M. BEDJAOUI, President; M. SCHWEBEL, Vice-President; MM. ODA,
GUILLAUME, SHAHABUDDEEN, WEERAMANTRY, RANJEVA, HERCZEGH,

SHI, FLEISCHHAUER, KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN, FERRARI BRAVO,

Mille HIGGINS, juges; M. VALENCIA-OSPINA, Greffier.

Sur la liceite de la menace ou de I’emploi d’armes nucleaires,

LA COUR,

ainsi composee,

donne l’avis consultatif suivant :

I. La question sur laquelle un avis consultatif est demande a la Cour est
enoncee dans la resolution 49/75 K que I’Assemblee generale des Nations Unies
(ci-apres denommee l’c Assemblee generale») a adoptee Ie 15 decembre 1994.
Par une lettre en date du 19 decembre 1994, recue au Greffe par telecopie Ie
20 decembre 1994 et dont I’original a ete enregistre Ie 6 janvier 1995, Ie Secre-
taire general de l’Organisation des Nations Unies a officiellement communique
au Greffier la decision prise par I’Assemblee generale de soumettre cette ques-
tion ala Cour pour avis consultatif. La resolution 49/75 K, dont Ie texte anglais
etait joint a cette lettre, se lit comme suit:

«L ‘Assemblee generate,

Considerant que I’existence des armes nucleaires et la poursuite de leur
mise au point font courir de graves dangers a l’humanite,

Sachant que les Etats ont en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies I’obli-

5

2

28

THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State,

Recalling its resolutions

16

53 (XVI) of

24

November 1961, 33

17

1 B of

14

December 1978,

34

/83 G of II December 1979,

35

/152 D of

12

Decem-
ber 1980,

36

/92 I of 9 December 1981,

45

/59 B of 4 December 1990 and
46/

37

D of 6 December 1991, in which it declared that the use of nuclear
weapons would be a violation of the Charter and a crime against
humanity,

Welcoming the progress made on the prohibition and elimination of
weapons of mass destruction, including the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 1 and the Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction 2,

Convinced that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only
guarantee against the threat of nuclear war,

Noting the concerns expressed in the Fourth Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that
insufficient progress had been made towards the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time,

Recalling that, convinced of the need to strengthen the rule of law in
international relations, it has declared the period 1990-1999 the United
Nations Decade of International Law ‘,

Noting that Article 96, paragraph I, of the Charter empowers the
General Assembly to request the International Court of Justice to give an
advisory opinion on any legal question,

Recalling the recommendation of the Secretary-General, made in his
report entitled ‘An Agenda for Peace,4, that United Nations organs that
are authorized to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Inter-
national Court of Justice turn to the Court more frequently for such
opinions,

Welcoming resolution 46/

40

of 14 May 1993 of the Assembly of the
World Health Organization, in which the organization requested the Inter-
national Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on whether the use of
nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict would be a
breach of its obligations under international law, including the Constitu-
tion of the World Health Organization,

Decides, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice urgently to
render its advisory opinion on the following question: ‘Is the threat or use
of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international
law?’

1 Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.
2 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supple-

ment No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix 1.
3 Resolution 44/

23

.
4 A/47/277-S/24I I I.”

6

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 22

8

gation de s’abstenir de recourir ala menace ou al’emploi de la force contre
l’integrite territoriale ou l’independance politique de tout Etat,

Rappelant ses resolutions 1653 (XVI) du 24 novembre 1961,33/71 B du
14 decembre 1978, 34/83 G du

11

decembre 1979, 35/152 D du 12 de-
cembre 1980, 36/92 I du 9 decembre 1981,45/59 B du 4 decembre 1990 et
46/37 D du 6 decembre 1991, dans lesquelles elle a declare que l’emploi
d’armes nucleaires constituerait une violation de la Charte et un crime
contre l’humanite,

Se felicitant des progres accomplis en ce qui concerne l’interdiction et
I’elimination des armes de destruction massive, notamment la conclusion
de la convention sur l’interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et
du stockage des armes bacteriologiques (biologiques) ou a toxines et sur
leur destruction 1 et de la convention sur l’interdiction de la mise au point,
de la fabrication, du stockage et de l’utilisation d’armes chimiques et sur
leur destruction 2,

Convaincue que l’elimination complete des armes nucleaires est la seule
garantie contre la menace d’une guerre nucleaire,

Natant l’inquietude exprimee lors de la quatrieme conference des parties
chargee de l’examen du traite sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires
devant Ie peu de progres accomplis vers I’elimination complete des armes
nucleaires dans les meilleurs delais,

Rappelant que, convaincue qu’il faut renforcer la primaute du droit
dans les relations internationales, elle a declare la peri ode 1990-199

9

Decennie des Nations Unies pour Ie droit international.’,

Natant qu’elle peut, en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’article 96 de la
Charte, demander a la Cour internationale de Justice un avis consultatif
sur toute question juridique,

Rappelant que, dans son rapport intitule «Un agenda pour la paix»”, Ie
Secretaire general a recommande aux organes des Nations Unies qui sont
autorises a demander des avis consultatifs it la Cour internationale de Jus-
tice de s’adresser plus souvent it la Cour pour obtenir d’elle de tels avis,

Se felicitant de la resolution 46/40 de I’Assemblee de l’Organisation
mondiale de la Sante, en date du 14 mai 1993, dans laquelle l’Organisation
demande it la Cour internationale de Justice de donner un avis consultatif
sur la question de savoir si l’utilisation d’armes nucleaires par un Etat au
cours d’une guerre ou d’un autre conflit arme constituerait une violation
de ses obligations au regard du droit international, y compris la Constitu-
tion de l’Organisation mondiale de la Sante,

Decide, conforrnement au paragraphe 1 de l’article 96 de la Charte des
Nations Unies, de demander it la Cour internationale de Justice de rendre
dans les meilleurs delais un avis consultatif sur la question suivante:
«Est-il permis en droit international de recourir it la menace ou it l’emploi
d’armes nucleaires en toute circonstance?»

1 Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annexe.
2 Voir Documents officiels de l’Assemblee generale, quarante-septieme session,

supplement n” 27 (A/47/27), appendice 1.
3 Resolution 44/23.
4 A/47/277-SI2411I.»

6

2

29

THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

2. Pursuant to Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Secretary-General
of the United Nations communicated to the Court a dossier of documents
likely to throw light upon the question.

3. By letters dated

21

December 1994, the Registrar, pursuant to Article 66,
paragraph 1, of the Statute, gave notice of the request for an advisory opinion
to all States entitled to appear before the Court.

4. By an Order dated 1 February 1995 the Court decided that the States
entitled to appear before it and the United Nations were likely to be able to fur-
nish information on the question, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of
the Statute. By the same Order, the Court fixed, respectively, 20 June 1995 as
the time-limit within which written statements might be submitted to it on the
question, and 20 September 1995 as the time-limit within which States and
organizations having presented written statements might submit written com-
ments on the other written statements in accordance with Article 66, para-
graph 4, of the Statute. In the aforesaid Order, it was stated in particular that
the General Assembly had requested that the advisory opinion of the Court be
rendered “urgently”; reference was also made to the procedural time-limits
already fixed for the request for an advisory opinion previously submitted to
the Court by the World Health Organization on the question of the Legality of
the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict.

On 8 February 1995, the Registrar addressed to the States entitled to appear
before the Court and to the United Nations the special and direct communica-
tion provided for in Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

5. Written statements were filed by the following States: Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Burundi, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt,
Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy,
Japan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Nauru, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Qatar, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Solomon
Islands, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
United States of America. In addition, written comments on those written
statements were submitted by the following States: Egypt, Nauru and Solomon
Islands. Upon receipt of those statements and comments, the Registrar com-
municated the text to all States having taken part in the written proceedings.

6. The Court decided to hold public sittings, opening on

30

October 1995, at
which oral statements might be submitted to the Court by any State or organi-
zation which had been considered likely to be able to furnish information on
the question before the Court. By letters dated 23 June 1995, the Registrar
requested the States entitled to appear before the Court and the United
Nations to inform him whether they intended to take part in the oral proceed-
ings; it was indicated, in those letters, that the Court had decided to hear,
during the same public sittings, oral statements relating to the request for an
advisory opinion from the General Assembly as well as oral statements con-
cerning the above-mentioned request for an advisory opinion laid before the
Court by the World Health Organization, on the understanding that the United
Nations would be entitled to speak only in regard to the request submitted by
the General Assembly, and it was further specified therein that the participants
in the oral proceedings which had not taken part in the written proceedings
would receive the text of the statements and comments produced in the course
of the latter.

7. By a letter dated 20 October 1995, the Republic of Nauru requested the
Court’s permission to withdraw the written comments submitted on its behalf

7

MENACE au EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 229

2. Conformement a l’article 65, paragraphe 2, du Statut, le Secretaire gene-
ral de l’Organisation des Nations Unies a communique a la Cour un dossier
contenant des documents pouvant servir a elucider la question,

3. Par des lettres en date du 2.1 decembre 1994, Ie Greffier a notifie la requete
pour avis consultatif a tous les Etats admis a ester devant la Cour, conforme-
ment a l’article 66, paragraphe 1, du Statut.

4. Par nne ordonnance en date du 1er fevrier 1995, la COUf- a decide que les
Etats admis a ester devant elle et l’Organisation des Nations Unies etaientsus-
ceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur la question, conformement it l’ar-
ticle 66, paragraphe 2, du Statut. Par la meme ordonnance, la Cour a fixe,
respectivement, au 20 juin 1995 la date d’expiration du delai dans lequel des
exposes ecrits pourraient lui etre presentes sur cette question et au 20 septembre
1995 la date d’expiration du delai dans lequelles Etats ou organisations ayant
presente un expose ecrit pourraient presenter des observations ecrites sur les
autres exposes ecrits conformement a l’article 66, paragraphe 4, du Statui.
Dans ladite ordonnance, il etait notamment fait etat de ce que l’ Assemblee
generaIe avait demande que l’avis consultatif de 1a Cour soit rendu «dans les
meilleurs delais»; il y etait par ailleurs fait reference aux delais de procedure
deja fixes aux fins de la demande d’avis consultatif anterieurement soumise a la
Cour par l’Organisation mondiale de la Sante sur la question de la Liceite de
l’utilisation des armes nucleaires par un Etat dans un conflit arme. .

Le 8 fevrier 1995, le Greffier a adresse aux Etats admis a ester devant la Cour
et a I’Organisation des Nations Unies la communication speciale et directe pre-
vue a l’article 66, paragraphe 2, du Statut.

5. Des exposes ecrits ont etc deposes par les Etats suivants: Allemagne, Bos-
nie-Herzegovine, Burundi, Egypte, Equateur, Etats-Unis d’ Amerique, Federa-
tion de Russie, Finlande, France, Iles Marshall, lIes Salomon, Inde, Repu-
blique islamique d’Iran, Irlande, Italie, Japan, Lesotho, Ma1aisie, Mexique,
Nauru, Nouvelle-Zelande, Pays-Bas, Qatar, Republique populaire democratique
de Coree, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, Saint-Marin,
Samoa et Suede. Par ailleurs, des observations ecrites sur ces exposes ecrits ant
ete presentees par les Etats suivants: Egypte, Iles Salomon et Nauru. Des recep-
tion de ces exposes et de ces observations, Ie Greffier en a transmis Ie texte a
tous les Etats ayant pris part a la procedure ecrite,

6. La Cour a decide de tenir, a cornpter du 30 octobre 1995, des audiences
publiques au cours desquelles des exposes oraux pourraient etre faits devant
elle par tout Etat et toute organisation ayant ete juges susceptibles de fournir
des renseignements sur la question a elle soumise. Par des lettres en date du
23 juin 1995, Ie Greffier a prie les Etats admis it ester devant la Cour et l’Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies de lui faire savoir s’ils avaient l’intention de parti-
ciper a la procedure orale; il etait indique, dans ces Iettres, que la Cour avait
decide d’entendre au cours d’une seule serie d’audiences publiques les exposes
oraux relatifs a la demande d’avis consultatif de l’ Assemblee generale et ceux
concernant la demande d’avis consultatif susmcntionnee dont la Cour avait ete
saisie par l’Organisation mondiale de la Sante, etant entendu que l’Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies ne serait habilitee aprendre la parole qu’a propos de la
demande soumise par l’ Assemblee generale ; et il y etait par ailleurs precise que
les participants a la procedure orale n’ayant pas pris part a la procedure ecrite
se verraient communiquer Ie texte des exposes et observations produits dans Ie
cadre de cette derniere procedure.

7. Par une lettre en date du 20 oetobre 1995, la Republique de Nauru a
demande a la Cour l’autorisation de retirer les observations ecrites qui avaient

7

230 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

in a document entitled “Response to submissions of other States”. The Court
granted the request and, by letters dated 30 October 1995, the Deputy-Regis-
trar notified the States to which the document had been communicated, speci-
fying that the document consequently did not form part of the record before
the Court.

8. Pursuant to Article

10

6 of the Rules of Court, the Court decided to make
the written statements and comments submitted to the Court accessible to the
public, with effect from the opening of the oral proceedings.

9. In the course of public sittings held from 30 October 1995 to 15 Novem-
ber 1995, the Court heard oral statements in the following order by:

for the Commonwealth
of Australia:

for the Arab Republic
of Egypt:

for the French Republic:

for the Federal Republic
of Germany:

for Indonesia:

for Mexico:

for the Islamic
Republic of Iran:

for Italy:

for Japan:

8

Mr. Gavan Griffith, Q.c., Solicitor-General of
Australia, Counsel,

The Honourable Gareth Evans, Q.C., Senator,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Counsel;

Mr. George Abi-Saab, Professor of International
Law, Graduate Institute of International Stud-
ies, Geneva, Member of the Institute of Interna-
tional Law;

Mr. Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Director of Legal
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor of International Law,
University of Paris X and Institute of Political
Studies, Paris;

Mr. Hartmut Hillgenberg, Director-General of
Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Mr. Johannes Berchmans Soedarmanto
Kadarisman, Ambassador of Indonesia to the
Netherlands;

H.E. Mr. Sergio Gonzalez Galvez, Ambassador,
Under-Secretary of Foreign Relations;

H.E. Mr. Mohammad J. Zarif, Deputy Minister,
Legal and International Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs;

Mr. Umberto Leanza, Professor of International
Law at the Faculty of Law at the University of
Rome “Tor Vergara”, Head of the Diplomatic
Legal Service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Mr.Takekazu Kawamura, Ambassador,
Director General for Arms Control and Scien-
tific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Takashi Hiraoka, Mayor of Hiroshima,
Mr. Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki;

MENACE OU EMPLOI O’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 230

ete presentees en son nom dans un document intitule «Reponse aux conclu-
sions des autres Etats», La Cour a accede acette demande et, par des lettres en
date du 30 octobre 1995, le Greffier adjoint en a informe les Etats qui avaient
recu communication de ce document, en precisant que ledit document ne faisait
en consequence pas partie du dossier dont la Cour etait saisie.

8. Conformement a l’article 106 du Reglement, la Cour a decide de rendre
accessible au public le texte des exposes ecrits et des observations ecrites a la
date d’ouverture de la procedure orale.

9. Au cours d’audiences publiques tenues du 30 octobre 1995 au 15 no-
vembre 1995, la Cour a entendu en leurs exposes oraux et dans l’ordre sui-
vant:

pour le Commonwealth
d’Australie:

pour la Republique arabe
d’Egypte:

pour la Republique francaise :

pour la Republique federale
d’Allemagne:

pour l’Indonesie:

pour Ie M exique:

pour la Republique islamique
d’Iran:

pour l’Italie:

pour le Japon:

M. Gavan Griffith, Q.c., Solicitor-General
d’ Australie, conseil,

l’honorable Gareth Evans, Q.c., senateur, mi-
nistre des affaires etrangeres, conseil;

M. Georges Abi-Saab, professeur de droit inter-
national a l’Institut universitaire de hautes
etudes internationales de Geneve, membre de
l’Institut de droit international;

M. Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, directeur des
affaires juridiques au ministere des affaires
etrangeres,

M. Alain Pellet, professeur de droit internatio-
nal a l’Universite de Paris X et a l’Institut
d’etudes politiques de Paris;

M. Hartmut Hillgenberg, directeur general des
affaires juridiques du ministere des affaires
etrangeres ;

S. Exc. M. Johannes Berchmans Soedarmanto
Kadarisman, ambassadeur d’Indonesie aux
Pays-Bas;

S. Exc. M. Sergio Gonzalez Galvez, ambas-
sadeur, ministre adjoint des affaires etran-
geres;

S. Exc. M. Mohammad 1. Zarif, ministre adjoint
aux affaires juridiques et internationales, mi-
nistere des affaires etrangeres;

M. Umberto Leanza, professeur de droit inter-
national a la faculte de droit de l’Universite
de Rome «Tor Vergata», chef du service du
contentieux diplomatique du ministere des
affaires etrangeres ;

S. Exc. M. Takekazu Kawamura, ambassadeur,
directeur general au controle des armements
et aux affaires scientifiques, ministere des
affaires etrangeres,

M. Takashi Hiraoka, maire d’Hiroshima,
M. Iccho Itoh, maire de Nagasaki;

8

2

31

THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

for Malaysia:

for New Zealand:

for the Philippines:

for Qatar:

for the Russian
Federation:

for San Marino:

for Samoa:

for the Marshall Islands:

for Solomon Islands:

9

H.E. Mr. Tan Sri Razali Ismail, Ambassador, Per-
manent Representative of Malaysia to the United
Nations,

Dato’ Mohtar Abdullah, Attorney-General;

The Honourable Paul East, Q.c., Attorney-General
of New Zealand,

Mr. Allan Bracegirdle, Deputy Director of Legal
Division of the New Zealand Ministry for For-
eign Affairs and Trade;

H.E. Mr. Rodolfo S. Sanchez, Ambassador of the
Philippines to the Netherlands,

Professor Merlin N. Magallona, Dean, College of
Law, University of the Philippines;

H.E. Mr. Najeeb ibn Mohammed AI-Nauimi,
Minister of Justice;

Mr. A. G. Khodakov, Director, Legal Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Mrs. Federica Bigi, Embassy Counsellor, Official
in Charge of Political Directorate, Department
of Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Mr. Neroni Slade, Ambassador and Perma-
nent Representative of Samoa to the United
Nations,

Miss Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Assistant
Professor, Graduate Institute of International
Studies, Geneva,

Mr. Roger S. Clark, Distinguished Professor of Law,
Rutgers University School of Law, Camden, New
Jersey;

The Honourable Theodore G. Kronmiller, Legal
Counsel, Embassy of the Marshall Islands to the
United States of America,

Mrs. Lijon Eknilang, Council Member, Rongelap
Atoll Local Government;

The Honourable Victor Ngele, Minister of Police
and National Security,

Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor of Law, Universite
libre de Bruxelles,

Mr. Eric David, Professor of Law, Universite libre
de Bruxelles,

Mr. Philippe Sands, Lecturer in Law, School of
Oriental and African Studies, London Univer-
sity, and Legal Director, Foundation for Inter-
national Environmental Law and Development,

Mr. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of Inter-
national Law, University of Cambridge;

MENACE OU EMPLOI O’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 231

pour la M alaisie:

pour la Nouvelle-Zelande :

pour les Philippines:

pour Qatar:

pour la Federation
de Russie:

pour Saint-Marin:

pour le Samoa:

pour les Iles Marshall:

pour les Iles Salomon:

S. Exc. M. Tan Sri Razali Ismail, ambassadeur,
representant permanent de la Malaisie aupres
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies,

Dato’ Mohtar Abdullah, Attorney-General;

I’honorable Paul East, Q.c., Attorney-General
de Nouvelle-Zelande,

M. Allan Bracegirdle, directeur adjoint de la
division juridique du ministere des affaires
etrangeres et du commerce exterieur de Nou-
velle-Zelande ;

S. Exc. M. Rodolfo S. Sanchez, ambassadeur
des Philippines aux Pays-Bas,

M. Merlin M. Magallona, professeur, doyen de la
faculte de droit de l’Universite des Philippines;

S. Exc. M. Najeeb ibn Mohammed AI-Nauimi,
ministre de la justice;

M. A. G. Khodakov, directeur du service juri-
dique du ministere des affaires etrangeres;

M?” Federica Bigi, conseiller d’ambassade,
fonctionnaire en charge de la direction poli-
tique au ministere des affaires etrangeres;

S. Exc. M. Neroni Slade, ambassadeur, repre-
sentant permanent du Samoa aupres de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies,

Mile Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, chargee
d’enseignement a l’Institut universitaire de
hautes etudes internationales de Geneve,

M. Roger S. Clark, professeur a la faculte de
droit de l’Universite Rutgers, Camden, New
Jersey;

I’honorable Theodore G. Kronmiller, conseiller
juridique de I’ambassade des lies Marshall
aux Etats-Unis d’Amerique,

M?” Lijon Eknilang, membre du conseil, gou-
vernement local de I’atoll de Rongelap;

S. Exc. I’honorable Victor Ngele, ministre de la
police et de la securite nationale,

M. Jean Salmon, professeur de droit a l’Univer-
site libre de Bruxelles,

M. Eric David, professeur de droit a l’Univer-
site libre de Bruxelles,

M. Philippe Sands, charge de cours a la School
of Oriental and African Studies de I’Univer-
site de Londres et directeur juridique de la
Foundation for International Environmental
Law and Development,

M. James Crawford, professeur de droit inter-
national, titulaire de la chaire Whewell a
I’U niversite de Cambridge;

9

2

32

THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

for Costa Rica: Mr. Carlos Vargas-Pizarro, Legal Counsel and
Special Envoy of the Government of Costa Rica;

for Zimbabwe:

for the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland:

for the United States
of America:

The Rt. Honourable Sir Nicholas Lyell, Q.C., M.P.,
Her Majesty’s Attorney-General;

Mr. Conrad K. Harper, Legal Adviser, United
States Department of State,

Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal
Adviser, United States Department of State,

Mr. John H. McNeill, Senior Deputy General
Counsel, United States Department of Defense;

Mr. Jonathan Wutawunashe, Charge d’affaires a.i.,
Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe in the
Netherlands.

Questions were put by Members of the Court to particular participants in the
oral proceedings, who replied in writing, as requested, within the prescribed
time-limits; the Court having decided that the other participants could also
reply to those questions on the same terms, several of them did so. Other ques-
tions put by Members of the Court were addressed, more generally, to any par-
ticipant in the oral proceedings; several of them replied in writing, as requested,
within the prescribed time-limits.

* * *

10. The Court must first consider whether it has the jurisdiction to
give a reply to the request of the General Assembly for an advisory
opinion and whether, should the answer be in the affirmative, there is any
reason it should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction.

The Court draws its competence in respect of advisory opinions from
Article 65, paragraph 1, of its Statute. Under this Article, the Court

“may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request
of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to make such a request”.

11. For the Court to be competent to give an advisory opinion, it is
thus necessary at the outset for the body requesting the opinion to be
“authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
to make such a request”. The Charter provides in Article 96, para-
graph 1, that: “The General Assembly or the Security Council may
request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on
any legal question.”

Some States which oppose the giving of an opinion by the Court
argued that the General Assembly and Security Council are not entitled

10

MENACE au EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 232

pour le Costa Rica: M. Carlos Vargas-Pizarro, conseiller juridique
et envoye special du Gouvernement du Costa
Rica;

pour le Zimbabwe:

pour le Royaume- Uni de
Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord:

pour les Etats- Unis
d’Amerique:

le tres honorable sir Nicholas Lyell, Q.c., M.P.,
Attorney-General;

M. Conrad K. Harper, conseiller juridique du
departement d’Etat,

M. Michael J. Matheson, conseiller juridique
adjoint principal du departement d’Etat,

M. John H. McNeill, conseillerjuridique adjoint
principal du departement de la defense;

M. Jonathan Wutawunashe, charge d’affaires
a.i. de l’ambassade du Zimbabwe aux Pays-
Bas.

Des membres de la Cour ont pose des questions a certains participants a
la procedure orale et ceux-ci y ont repondu par ecrit, ainsi qu’ils en avaient
Me pries, dans les delais prevus a cet effet; la Cour ayant decide que les autres
participants pourraient egalement repondre a ces questions dans les memes
conditions, plusieurs d’entre eux l’ont fait. D’autres questions posees par des
membres de la Cour ont Me adressees, plus generalement, a tout participant
a la procedure orale; plusieurs d’entre eux y ont repondu par ecrit, ainsi qu’ils
en avaient ete pries, dans les delais prevus a cet effet.

* * *

10. La Cour examinera en premier lieu la question de savoir si elle a
competence pour donner une reponse a Ia demande d’avis consultatif
dont I’a saisie l’ Assemblee generale et, dans I’affirmative, s’il existerait
des raisons pour elle de refuser d’exercer une telle competence.

La Cour tire sa competence pour donner des avis consultatifs de l’ar-
ticle 65, paragraphe 1, de son Statuto Aux termes de cette disposition, Ia
Cour

«peut donner un avis consultatif sur toute question juridique, a Ia
demande de tout organe ou institution qui aura ete autorise par la
Charte des Nations Unies ou conformement a ses dispositions a
demander cet avis».

11. Pour que Ia Cour ait competence aux fins de donner un avis
consultatif, il faut done tout d’abord que l’organe qui sollicite I’avis soit
«autorise par Ia Charte des Nations Unies ou conformement ases dispo-
sitions a demander cet avis». La Charte, a l’article 96, paragraphe 1, dis-
pose: «L’Assemblee generale ou le Conseil de securite peut demander a
Ia Cour internationale de Justice un avis consultatif sur toute question
juridique. »

Certains Etats qui se sont opposes a ce que la Cour rende un avis en
l’espece ont soutenu que l’ Assemblee generale et Ie Conseil de securite ne

10

233 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

to ask for opinions on matters totally unrelated to their work. They
suggested that, as in the case of organs and agencies acting under
Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and notwithstanding the difference
in wording between that provision and paragraph 1 of the same Article,
the General Assembly and Security Council may ask for an advisory
opinion on a legal question only within the scope of their activities.

In the view of the Court, it matters little whether this interpretation of
Article 96, paragraph 1, is or is not correct; in the present case, the Gen-
eral Assembly has competence in any event to seise the Court. Indeed,
Article 10 of the Charter has conferred upon the General Assembly a
competence relating to “any questions or any matters” within the scope
of the Charter. Article 11 has specifically provided it with a competence
to “consider the general principles … in the maintenance of international
peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and
the regulation of armaments”. Lastly, according to Article

13

, the Gen-
eral Assembly “shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the
purpose of … encouraging the progressive development of international
law and its codification”.

12. The question put to the Court has a relevance to many aspects of
the activities and concerns of the General Assembly including those relat-
ing to the threat or use of force in international relations, the disarma-
ment process, and the progressive development of international law. The
General Assembly has a long-standing interest in these matters and in
their relation to nuclear weapons. This interest has been manifested in the
annual First Committee debates, and the Assembly resolutions on nuclear
weapons; in the holding of three special sessions on disarmament (1978,
1982 and 1988) by the General Assembly, and the annual meetings of the
Disarmament Commission since 1978; and also in the commissioning of
studies on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, it
does not matter that important recent and current activities relating to
nuclear disarmament are being pursued in other fora.

Finally, Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter cannot be read as
limiting the ability of the Assembly to request an opinion only in those
circumstances in which it can take binding decisions. The fact that the
Assembly’s activities in the above-mentioned field have led it only to the
making of recommendations thus has no bearing on the issue of whether
it had the competence to put to the Court the question of which it is
seised.

13. The Court must furthermore satisfy itself that the advisory opinion
requested does indeed relate to a “legal question” within the meaning of
its Statute and the United Nations Charter.

The Court has already had occasion to indicate that questions

“framed in terms of law and rais[ingJ problems of international law
… are by their very nature susceptible of a reply based on law …

11

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 233

sont pas habilites a demander des avis sur des questions sans rapport
aucun avec leurs travaux. Ils ont donne a entendre que, comme dans le
cas d’organes ou d’institutions agissant en vertu de l’article 96, para-
graphe 2, de la Charte, et nonobstant les differences de redaction entre
cette disposition et le paragraphe 1 du meme article, l’ Assemblee generale
et le Conseil de securite ne peuvent demander d’avis consultatif sur une
question juridique que si celle-ci se pose dans le cadre de leur activite,

De l’avis de la Cour, peu importe que cette interpretation de l’ar-
ticle 96, paragraphe 1, soit ou non correcte; en l’espece, l’Assemblee ge-
nerale a competence en tout etat de cause pour saisir la Cour. En effet,
l’article 10 de la Charte a confere a l’Assemblee generale une competence
relative a «toutes questions ou affaires» entrant dans le cadre de la
Charte. L’article 11 lui a expressement attribue competence aux fins
d’e etudier les principes generaux pour le maintien de la paix et de la secu-
rite internationales, y compris les principes regissant le desarmement et la
reglementation des armements». Enfin, selon l’article 13, l’Assemblee
generale «provoque des etudes et fait des recommandations en vue …
[d’]encourager Ie developpement progressif du droit international et sa
codification».

12. La question posee a la Cour est pertinente au regard de maints
aspects des activites et preoccupations de l’Assemblee generale, notamment
en ce qui concerne la menace ou l’emploi de la force dans les relations
internationales, le processus de desarmement et le developpement progres-
sif du droit international. L’ Assemblee generale porte de longue date un
interet aces matieres et a leur relation avec les armes nucleaires. Cet interet
a trouve son expression dans les debats annue1s de la Premiere Commis-
sion et les resolutions de l’ Assemblee generale sur les armes nucleaires ;
dans la tenue par l’Assemblee generale de trois sessions extraordinaires sur
Ie desarmement (1978, 1982 et 1988) et, depuis 1978, de reunions annuelles
de la commission du desarmement; ainsi que dans la commande d’etudes
sur les effets de l’emploi d’armes nucleaires. Dans ce contexte, il importe
peu que des activites importantes relatives au desarmement nucleaire,
recentes ou en cours, aient ete ou soient menees dans d’autres enceintes.

L’article 96, paragraphe 1, de la Charte ne saurait enfin etre interprete
comme limitant la faculte qu’a l’ Assemblee generale de demander un avis
aux seules circonstances dans lesquelles elle peut prendre des decisions a
caractere executoire. Que les activites de l’ Assemblee dans les matieres
susmentionnees ne la conduisent a formuler que des recommandations
est des lors indifferent aux fins d’apprecier si elle avait competence pour
poser a la Cour la question dont elle l’a saisie.

13. La Cour doit par ailleurs s’assurer que l’avis consultatif demande
porte bien sur une «question juridique» au sens de son Statut et de la
Charte des Nations Unies.

La Cour a deja eu l’occasion d’indiquer que les questions

«libellees en termes juridiques et soul[evant] des problemes de droit
international … sont, par leur nature meme, susceptibles de recevoir

11

234 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

[and] appear … to be questions of a legal character” (Western
Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.Cl. Reports 1975, p. 18, para. 15).

The question put to the Court by the General Assembly is indeed a
legal one, since the Court is asked to rule on the compatibility of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons with the relevant principles and rules of
international law. To do this, the Court must identify the existing prin-
ciples and rules, interpret them and apply them to the threat or use of
nuclear weapons, thus offering a reply to the question posed based on
law.

The fact that this question also has political aspects, as, in the nature
of things, is the case with so many questions which arise in international
life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a “legal question” and
to “deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its
Statute” (Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports 1973,
p. 172, para. 14). Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse
to admit the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an
essentially judicial task, namely, an assessment of the legality of the pos-
sible conduct of States with regard to the obligations imposed upon them
by international law (cf. Conditions of Admission of a State to Member-
ship in the United Nations (Article 4 of Charter), Advisory Opinion,
1948, I.CJ. Reports 1947-1948, pp. 61-62; Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, I. CJ. Reports 1950, pp. 6-7; Certain Expenses of the United
Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion,
I. CJ. Reports 1962, p. 155).

Furthermore, as the Court said in the Opinion it gave in 1980 concern-
ing the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the
WHO and Egypt:

“Indeed, in situations in which political considerations are promi-
nent it may be particularly necessary for an international organiza-
tion to obtain an advisory opinion from the Court as to the legal
principles applicable with respect to the matter under debate …”
(I. Cl. Reports 1980, p. 87, para. 33.)

The Court moreover considers that the political nature of the motives
which may be said to have inspired the request and the political implica-
tions that the opinion given might have are of no relevance in the estab-
lishment of its jurisdiction to give such an opinion.

*
14. Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute provides: “The Court may

give an advisory opinion …” (Emphasis added.) This is more than an
enabling provision. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, the Statute

12

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 234

une reponse fondee en droit … [et] ont en principe un caractere juri-
dique» (Sahara occidental, avis consultatif, CI.J. Recueil 1975,
p. 18, par. 15).

La question que l’ Assemblee generale a posee ala Cour constitue effec-
tivement une question juridique, car la Cour est priee de se prononcer sur
le point de savoir si la menace ou l’emploi d’armes nucleaires est compa-
tible avec les principes et regles pertinents du droit international. Pour ce
faire, la Cour doit determiner les principes et regles existants, les inter-
preter et les appliquer a la menace ou a l’emploi d’armes nucleaires,
apportant ainsi a la question posee une reponse fondee en droit.

Que cette question revete par ailleurs des aspects politiques, comme
c’est, par la nature des choses, le cas de bon nombre de questions qui
viennent a se poser dans la vie internationale, ne suffit pas ala priver de
son caractere de «question juridique» et a «enlever a la Cour une com-
petence qui lui est expressement conferee par son Statut» (Demande de
reformation du jugement n° 158 du Tribunal administratif des Nations
Unies, avis consultatif, Cl.l. Recueil 1973, p. 172, par. 14). Quels que
soient les aspects politiques de la question posee, la Cour ne saurait refu-
ser un caractere juridique a une question qui l’invite a s’acquitter d’une
tache essentiellement judiciaire, a savoir l’appreciation de la liceite de la
conduite eventuelle d’Etats au regard des obligations que le droit inter-
national leur impose (voir Conditions de l’admission d’un Etat comme
Membre des Nations Unies (article 4 de la Charte ), avis consultatif, 1948,
Cl.l. Recueil1947-1948, p. 61-62; Competence de l’Assemblee generale
pour l’admission d’un Etat aux Nations Unies, avis consultatif, Cl.l.
Recueil 1950, p. 6-7; Certaines depenses des Nations Unies (article 17,
paragraphe 2, de la Charte ), avis consultatif, c.t.r. Recueil1962, p. 155).

Au demeurant, comme la Cour l’a dit dans l’avis qu’elle a donne en
1980 au sujet de Ylnterpretation de l’accord du 25 mars 1951 entre l’OMS
et l’Egypte:

«En fait, lorsque des considerations politiques jouent un role mar-
quant il peut etre particulierement necessaire a une organisation
internationale d’obtenir un avis consultatif de la Cour sur les prin-
cipes juridiques applicables a la matiere en discussion … » (CI.J.
Recueil 1980, p. 87, par. 33.)

La Cour considere en outre que la nature politique des mobiles qui
auraient inspire la requete et les implications politiques que pourrait
avoir l’avis donne sont sans pertinence au regard de l’etablissement de sa
competence pour donner un tel avis.

*
14. L’article 65, paragraphe 1, du Statut dispose: «La Cour peut donner

un avis consultatif…» (Les italiques sont de la Cour.) 11 ne s’agit pas la
seulement d’une disposition presentant le caractere d’une habilitation.

12

235 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

leaves a discretion as to whether or not it will give an advisory opinion
that has been requested of it, once it has established its competence to do
so. In this context, the Court has previously noted as follows:

“The Court’s Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ
which is entitled to request it; the reply of the Court, itself an ‘organ
of the United Nations’, represents its participation in the activities of
the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused.” (Inter-
pretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports 1950, p. 71; see also
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.CJ. Reports 1951,
p. 19; Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon
Complaints Made against Unesco, Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports
1956, p. 86; Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para-
graph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports 1962,
p. 155; and Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, I.CJ. Reports 1989, p. 189.)

The Court has constantly been mindful of its responsibilities as “the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations” (Charter, Art. 92). When
considering each request, it is mindful that it should not, in principle,
refuse to give an advisory opinion. In accordance with the consistent
jurisprudence of the Court, only “compelling reasons” could lead it to
such a refusal (Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO
upon Complaints Made against Unesco, Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports
1956, p. 86; Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para-
graph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports 1962, p. 155;
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Reso-
lution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports 1971, p. 27; Applica-
tionfor Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administra-
tive Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports 1973, p. 183; Western
Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports 1975, p. 21; and Applicability
of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu-
nities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I. CJ. Reports 1989,
p. 191). There has been no refusal, based on the discretionary power of
the Court, to act upon a request for advisory opinion in the history of the
present Court; in the case concerning the Legality of the Use by a State
of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the refusal to give the World
Health Organization the advisory opinion requested by it was justified by
the Court’s lack of jurisdiction in that case. The Permanent Court of
International Justice took the view on only one occasion that it could not
reply to a question put to it, having regard to the very particular circum-
stances of the case, among which were that the question directly con-
cerned an already existing dispute, one of the States parties to which was

13

MENACE au EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 235

Comme la Cour I’a souligne a maintes reprises, son Statut lui laisse aussi Ie
pouvoir discretionnaire de decider si elle doit ou non donner I’avis consul-
tatif qui lui a ete demande, une fois qu’elle a etabli sa competence pour ce
faire. Dans ce contexte, la Cour a deja eu I’occasion de noter ce qui suit:

«L’avis est donne par la Cour non aux Etats, mais a l’organe
habilite pour Ie lui demander; la reponse constitue une participation
de la Cour, elle-meme «organe des Nations Unies», a l’action de
l’Organisation et, en principe, elle ne devrait pas etre refusee.»
(Interpretation des traites de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hon-
grie et la Roumanie, premiere phase, avis consultatif, CI.J. Recueil
1950, p. 71; voir aussi Reserves a la convention pour la prevention et
la repression du crime de genocide, avis consultatif, CI.J. Recueil
1951, p. 19; Jugements du Tribunal administratif de l’OITsur re-
quetes contre l’Unesco, avis consultatif, CI.J. Recueil 1956, p. 86;
Certaines depenses des Nations Unies (article 17, paragraphe 2, de
la Charte) , avis consultatif, CI.J. Recueil1962, p. 155, et Applicabi-
lite de la section 22 de l’article VI de la convention sur les privileges
et immunites des Nations Unies, avis consultatif, CI.J. Recueil1989,
p. 189.)

La Cour a toujours ete consciente de ses responsabilites en tant qu’« or-
gane judiciaire principal des Nations Unies» (Charte, art. 92). Lors de
I’examen de chaque demande, elle garde a l’esprit qu’elle ne devrait pas,
en principe, refuser de donner un avis consultatif. Conformement a sa
jurisprudence constante, seules des «raisons decisives» pourraient I’y
inciter (Jugements du Tribunal administratif de l’OIT sur requetes contre
I’Unesco, avis consultatif, CI.J. Recueil 1956, p. 86; Certaines depenses
des Nations Unies (article 17, paragraphe 2, de la Charte) , avis consul-
tatif, CI.J. Recueil 1962, p. 155; Consequences juridiques pour les Etats
de la presence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest afri-
cain) nonobstant la resolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de securite, avis
consultatif, CI.J. Recueil 1971, p. 27; Demande de reformation du juge-
ment n° 158 du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, avis consultatif,
CI.J. Recueil 1973, p. 183; Sahara occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J.
Recueil 1975, p. 21; et Applicabilite de la section 22 de l’article VI de la
convention sur les privileges et immunites des Nations Unies, CI.J.
Recueil 1989, p. 191). Aucun refus, fonde sur Ie pouvoir discretionnaire
de la Cour, de donner suite a une demande d’avis consultatif n’a ete enre-
gistre dans I’histoire de la presente Cour; dans I’affaire de la Liceite de
l’utilisation des armes nucleaires par un Etat dans un conflit arme, Ie refus
de donner a l’Organisation mondiale de la Sante I’avis consultatif sollicite
par elle a ete justifie par Ie defaut de competence de la Cour en l’espece.
La Cour permanente de Justice internationale a une seule fois estime
qu’elle ne pouvait repondre a la question qui lui avait ete po see, eu egard
aux circonstances to utes particulieres de l’espece, a savoir, notamment,
que cette question concernait directement un differend deja ne auquel
etait partie un Etat qui n’avait pas adhere au Statut de la Cour perma-

13

236 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

neither a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a Member of
the League of Nations, objected to the proceedings, and refused to take
part in any way (Status of Eastern Carelia, P. C1.l., Series B, No.5).

15. Most of the reasons adduced in these proceedings in order to per-
suade the Court that in the exercise of its discretionary power it should
decline to render the opinion requested by General Assembly resolu-
tion 49/75 K were summarized in the following statement made by one
State in the written proceedings;

“The question presented is vague and abstract, addressing complex
issues which are the subject of consideration among interested States
and within other bodies of the United Nations which have an express
mandate to address these matters. An opinion by the Court in regard
to the question presented would provide no practical assistance to
the General Assembly in carrying out its functions under the Char-
ter. Such an opinion has the potential of undermining progress
already made or being made on this sensitive subject and, therefore,
is contrary to the interests of the United Nations Organization.”
(United States of America, Written Statement, pp. 1-2; cf. pp. 3-7, II.
See also United Kingdom, Written Statement, pp. 9-20, paras. 2.23-
2.45; France, Written Statement, pp. 13-20, paras. 5-9; Finland,
Written Statement, pp. 1-2; Netherlands, Written Statement, pp. 3-4,
paras. 6-13; Germany, Written Statement, pp. 3-6, para. 2 (b).)

In contending that the question put to the Court is vague and abstract,
some States appeared to mean by this that there exists no specific dispute
on the subject-matter of the question. In order to respond to this argu-
ment, it is necessary to distinguish between requirements governing con-
tentious procedure and those applicable to advisory opinions. The pur-
pose of the advisory function is not to settle – at least directly –
disputes between States, but to offer legal advice to the organs and insti-
tutions requesting the opinion (cf. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1. Cl.
Reports 1950, p. 71). The fact that the question put to the Court does not
relate to a specific dispute should consequently not lead the Court to
decline to give the opinion requested.

Moreover, it is the clear position of the Court that to contend that it
should not deal with a question couched in abstract terms is “a mere
affirmation devoid of any justification”, and that “the Court may give an
advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise” (Condi-
tions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations
(Article 4 of Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948, 1.Cl. Reports 1947-1948,
p. 61; see also Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1. Cl. Reports 1954,
p. 51; and Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1. Cl. Reports 1971,
p. 27, para. 40).

14

MENACE au EMPLOI O’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 236

nente, n’etait pas membre de la Societe des Nations, s’opposait a la pro-
cedure et refusait d’y prendre part de quelque maniere que ce soit (Statut
de la Carelie orientale, CP.J.1. serie B n° 5).

15. La plupart des motifs invoques en l’espece pour convaincre la
Cour qu’elle devrait, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discretionnaire, refu-
ser de donner l’avis demande par l’Assemblee generale dans sa resolu-
tion 49/75 K, ont ete resumes dans la declaration suivante faite par un Etat
dans la procedure ecrite:

«La question posee est floue et abstraite et souleve des problemes
complexes qui sont a l’examen entre les Etats interesses et au sein
d’autres organes ou institutions des Nations Unies ayant mandat
expres de les traiter. En donnant un avis sur la question posee, la
Cour n’apporterait aucune aide concrete a l’Assemblee generale
pour accomplir les fonctions qui lui ont ete conferees par la Charte.
Un tel avis serait susceptible de compromettre les progres deja rea-
lises ou en cours sur ce sujet delicat et serait en consequence contraire
aux interets de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.» (Etats-Unis
d’ Amerique, expose ecrit, p. 1-2; voir aussi p. 3-7, II. Voir egalement
Royaume-Uni, expose ecrit, p. 9-20, par. 2.23-2.45; France, expose
ecrit, p. 13-20, par. 5-9; Finlande, expose ecrit, p. 1-2; Pays-Bas,
expose ecrit, p. 3-4, par. 6-13; et Allemagne, expose ecrit, p. 3-6,
par. 2 b).)

En soutenant que la question posee a la Cour serait floue et abstraite,
certains Etats ont semble entendre qu’il n’existerait aucun differend
precis portant sur l’objet de la question. En vue de repondre a cet argu-
ment, il convient d’operer une distinction entre les conditions qui regis-
sent la procedure contentieuse et celles qui s’appliquent aux avis consul-
tatifs. La finalite de la fonction consultative n’est pas de regler – du
moins pas directement – des differends entre Etats, mais de donner des
conseils d’ordre juridique aux organes et institutions qui en font la
demande (voir Interpretation des traites de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie,
la Hongrie et la Roumanie, premiere phase, Cl.!. Recueil 1950, p. 71).
Le fait que la question posee a la Cour n’ait pas trait a un differend precis
ne saurait par suite amener la Cour a refuser de donner l’avis sollicite,

Par ailleurs, la Cour a clairement affirme que l’allegation selon laquelle
elle ne pourrait connaitre d’une question posee en termes abstraits n’est
qu’«une pure affirmation denuee de toute justification», et qu’elle «peut
donner un avis consultatif sur toute question juridique, abstraite ou non»
(Conditions de l’admission d’un Etat comme Membre des Nations Unies
(article 4 de la Charte), avis consultatif, 1948, Cl.!. Recueil1947-1948,
p. 61; voir aussi Effet de jugements du Tribunal administratif des Nations
Unies accordant indemnite, avis consultatif, CI.J. Recueil 1954, p. 51,
et Consequences juridiques pour les Etats de la presence continue de
l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la resolu-
tion 276 (1970) du Conseil de securite, avis consultatif, CI.J. Recueil1971,
p. 27, par. 40).

14

237 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

Certain States have however expressed the fear that the abstract nature
of the question might lead the Court to make hypothetical or speculative
declarations outside the scope of its judicial function. The Court does not
consider that, in giving an advisory opinion in the present case, it would
necessarily have to write “scenarios”, to study various types of nuclear
weapons and to evaluate highly complex and controversial technological,
strategic and scientific information. The Court will simply address the
issues arising in all their aspects by applying the legal rules relevant to the
situation.

16. Certain States have observed that the General Assembly has not
explained to the Court for what precise purposes it seeks the advisory
opinion. Nevertheless, it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide
whether or not an advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly for the per-
formance of its functions. The General Assembly has the right to decide
for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs.

Equally, once the Assembly has asked, by adopting a resolution, for an
advisory opinion on a legal question, the Court, in determining whether
there are any compelling reasons for it to refuse to give such an opinion,
will not have regard to the origins or to the political history of the
request, or to the distribution of votes in respect of the adopted resolution.

17. It has also been submitted that a reply from the Court in this case
might adversely affect disarmament negotiations and would, therefore,
be contrary to the interest of the United Nations. The Court is aware
that, no matter what might be its conclusions in any opinion it might
give, they would have relevance for the continuing debate on the matter
in the General Assembly and would present an additional element in the
negotiations on the matter. Beyond that, the effect of the opinion is a
matter of appreciation. The Court has heard contrary positions advanced
and there are no evident criteria by which it can prefer one assessment to
another. That being so, the Court cannot regard this factor as a compel-
ling reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.

18. Finally, it has been contended by some States that in answering the
question posed, the Court would be going beyond its judicial role and
would be taking upon itself a law-making capacity. It is clear that the
Court cannot legislate, and, in the circumstances of the present case, it is
not called upon to do so. Rather its task is to engage in its normal judi-
cial function of ascertaining the existence or otherwise of legal principles
and rules applicable to the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The conten-
tion that the giving of an answer to the question posed would require the
Court to legislate is based on a supposition that the present corpus juris is
devoid of relevant rules in this matter. The Court could not accede to this
argument; it states the existing law and does not legislate. This is so even
if, in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify its
scope and sometimes note its general trend.

15

MENACE au EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 237

Certains Etats ont cependant exprime la crainte que le caractere abs-
trait de la question ne puisse conduire la Cour a se prononcer sur des hypo-
theses ou a entrer dans des conjectures sortant du cadre de sa fonction
judiciaire. La Cour ne considere pas qu’en rend ant un avis consultatif
en l’espece elle serait necessairement amenee a ecrire des «scenarios»,
a etudier divers types d’armes nucleaires et a evaluer des informations
technologiques, strategiques et scientifiques extremement complexes et
controversees. La Cour examinera simplement les questions qui se posent,
sous tous leurs aspects, en appliquant les regles de droit appropriees
en la circonstance.

16. Certains Etats ont observe que l’Assemblee generale n’a pas
explique a la Cour a quelles fins precises elle sollicitait l’avis consultatif.
Toutefois, il n’appartient pas a la Cour de pretendre decider si l’Assem-
blee a ou non besoin d’un avis consultatif pour s’acquitter de ses fonc-
tions. L’ Assemblee generale est habilitee a decider elle-meme de l’utilite
d’un avis au regard de ses besoins propres.

De meme, des lors que l’ Assemblee a demande un avis consultatif sur une
question juridique par la voie d’une resolution qu’elle a adoptee, la Cour
ne prendra pas en consideration, pour determiner s’il existe des raisons
decisives de refuser de donner cet avis, les origines ou l’histoire politique de
la demande, ou la repartition des voix lors de l’adoption de la resolution.

17. Il a aussi ete soutenu qu’une reponse de la Cour en l’espece pour-
rait etre prejudiciable aux negociations sur le desarmement et serait, en
consequence, contraire a l’interet de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
La Cour sait que, quelles que soient les conclusions auxquelles elle pour-
rait parvenir dans l’avis qu’elle donnerait, ces conclusions seraient perti-
nentes au regard du debat qui se poursuit a l’ Assemblee generale, et
apporteraient dans les negociations sur la question un element supple-
mentaire. Mais, au-dela de cette constatation, l’effet qu’aurait cet avis est
une question d’appreciation. Des opinions contraires ont Me expo sees
devant la Cour et il n’est pas de critere evident qui permettrait a celle-ci
de donner la preference a une position plutot qu’a une autre. Dans ces
conditions, la Cour ne saurait considerer ce facteur cornme une raison
decisive de refuser d’exercer sa competence.

18. Enfin, certains Etats ont fait valoir qu’en repondant a la question
posee la Cour depasserait sa fonction judiciaire pour s’arroger une fonc-
tion legislative. La Cour ne saurait certes Iegiferer, et, dans les circons-
tances de l’espece, elle n’est nullement appelee a le faire. Illui appartient
seulement de s’acquitter de sa fonction judiciaire normale en s’assurant
de l’existence ou de la non-existence de principes et de regles juridiques
applicables a la menace ou a l’emploi d’armes nucleaires. L’argument
selon lequella Cour, pour repondre a la question posee, serait obligee de
Iegiferer, se fonde sur la supposition que Ie corpus juris existant ne com-
porterait pas de regie pertinente en la matiere. La Cour ne saurait sous-
crire a cet argument; elle dit Ie droit existant et ne legifere point. Cela est
vrai meme si la Cour, en disant et en appliquant le droit, doit necessai-
rement en preciser la portee et, parfois, en constater l’evolution.

15

2

38

THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

19. In view of what is stated above, the Court concludes that it has the
authority to deliver an opinion on the question posed by the General
Assembly, and that there exist no “compelling reasons” which would lead
the Court to exercise its discretion not to do so.

An entirely different question is whether the Court, under the con-
straints placed upon it as a judicial organ, will be able to give a complete
answer to the question asked of it. However, that is a different matter
from a refusal to answer at all.

** *
20. The Court must next address certain matters arising in relation to

the formulation of the question put to it by the General Assembly. The
English text asks: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circum-
stance permitted under international law?” The French text of the ques-
tion reads as follows: “Est-il permis en droit international de recourir ala
menace ou a l’emploi d’armes nucleaires en to ute circonstance?” It was
suggested that the Court was being asked by the General Assembly
whether it was permitted to have recourse to nuclear weapons in every
circumstance, and it was contended that such a question would inevitably
invite a simple negative answer.

The Court finds it unnecessary to pronounce on the possible diver-
gences between the English and French texts of the question posed. Its
real objective is clear: to determine the legality or illegality of the threat
or use of nuclear weapons.

21. The use of the word “permitted” in the question put by the Gen-
eral Assembly was criticized before the Court by certain States on the
ground that this implied that the threat or the use of nuclear weapons
would only be permissible if authorization could be found in a treaty pro-
vision or in customary international law. Such a starting point, those
States submitted, was incompatible with the very basis of international
law, which rests upon the principles of sovereignty and consent; accord-
ingly, and contrary to what was implied by use of the word “permitted”,
States are free to threaten or use nuclear weapons unless it can be shown
that they are bound not to do so by reference to a prohibition in either
treaty law or customary international law. Support for this contention
was found in dicta of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
“Lotus” case that “restrictions upon the independence of States cannot
… be presumed” and that international law leaves to States “a wide
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive
rules” (P. c.I.J., Series A, No. 10, pp. 18 and 19). Reliance was also
placed on the dictum of the present Court in the case concerning Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. United States of America) that:

“in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may
be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby

16

MENACE au EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 238

19. A 1a lumiere de ce qui precede, la Cour conclut qu’elle a compe-
tence pour donner un avis sur la question qui lui a ete posee par l’ Assem-
blee generale et qu’il n’existe aucune «raison decisive» pour qu’elle use de
son pouvoir discretionnaire de ne pas donner cet avis.

Un tout autre point est celui de savoir si la Cour, compte tenu des exi-
gences qui pesent sur elle en tant qu’ organe judiciaire, sera en mesure de
donner une reponse complete a 1a question qui lui a ete posee; ce qui, en
tout etat de cause, est different d’un refus de repondre.

** *
20. La Cour doit aborder a present certains problemes souleves par Ie

libelle de la question qui lui a ete posee par l’ Assemblee generale. En
anglais, ce libelle est le suivant: «Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons
in any circumstance permitted under international law?» Le texte francais
de la question po see se lit comme suit: «Est-il permis en droit internatio-
nal de recourir a la menace ou a l’emploi d’armes nucleaires en toute cir-
constance?» 11 a ete suggere que l’Assemblee generale demanderait ainsi
ala Cour si l’emploi d’armes nucleaires est permis en droit international
dans toutes les circonstances et il a ete expose qu’une telle question appel-
lerait inevitablement une simple reponse negative.

La Cour n’estime pas necessaire de se prononcer sur les divergences
possibles entre versions francaise et anglaise de la question posee. Celle-ci
1’a ete avec un objectif clair: determiner ce qu’il en est de la liceite ou de
I’illiceite de la menace ou de 1’emploi d’armes nucleaires,

21. L’utilisation du mot «permis» dans la question posee par I’Assem-
blee generale a fait 1’objet, devant la Cour, de critiques de certains Etats
au motif que cette utilisation supposait que la menace ou 1’emploi d’armes
nucleaires ne seraient permis que s’ils etaient autorises par une disposi-
tion conventionnelle ou par le droit international coutumier. Selon ces
Etats, une telle premisse serait incompatible avec les fondements memes
du droit international, qui repose sur les principes de souverainete et de
consentement des Etats; par voie de consequence, et contrairement a ce
que sous-en tend 1’emploi du mot «permis», les Etats seraient libres de
menacer d’employer ou d’employer effectivement des armes nucleaires a
moins qu’il ne soit demontre qu’ils doivent s’en abstenir en vertu d’une
interdiction contenue dans le droit international conventionnel ou coutu-
mier. A l’appui de cette these ont ete invoques des dicta de la Cour per-
manente de Justice internationale dans 1’affaire du Lotus, selon lesquels
d’une part «les limitations de l’independance des Etats ne se presument …
pas» et d’autrepart le droit international laisse aux Etats «une large
liberte, qui n’est lirnitee que dans quelques cas par des regles prohibi-
tives» (C.P.!.!. serie A n° 10, p. 18 et 19), ainsi qu’un dictum de la Cour
actuelle dans 1’affaire des Activites militaires et paramilitaires au Nicara-
gua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats- Unis d’Amerique ), selon lequel:

«il n’existe pas en droit international de regles, autres que celles que
l’Etat interesse peut accepter, par traite ou autrement, imposant la

16

2

39

THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited” (I. c.J.
Reports 1986, p. 135, para. 269).

For other States, the invocation of these dicta in the “Lotus” case was
inapposite; their status in contemporary international law and applica-
bility in the very different circumstances of the present case were chal-
lenged. It was also contended that the above-mentioned dictum of
the present Court was directed to the possession of armaments and was
irrelevant to the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, it was suggested that, were the Court to answer the question
put by the Assembly, the word “permitted” should be replaced by “pro-
hibited”.

22. The Court notes that the nuclear-weapon States appearing before
it either accepted, or did not dispute, that their independence to act was
indeed restricted by the principles and rules of international law, more
particularly humanitarian law (see below, paragraph 86), as did the other
States which took part in the proceedings.

Hence, the argument concerning the legal conclusions to be drawn
from the use of the word “permitted”, and the questions of burden of
proof to which it was said to give rise, are without particular significance
for the disposition of the issues before the Court.

* *
23. In seeking to answer the question put to it by the General

Assembly, the Court must decide, after consideration of the great
corpus of international law norms available to it, what might be the
relevant applicable law.

*
24. Some of the proponents of the illegality of the use of nuclear

weapons have argued that such use would violate the right to life as guar-
anteed in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, as well as in certain regional instruments for the protection of
human rights. Article 6, paragraph I, of the International Covenant pro-
vides as follows: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.”

In reply, others contended that the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights made no mention of war or weapons, and it had
never been envisaged that the legality of nuclear weapons was regulated
by that instrument. It was suggested that the Covenant was directed to
the protection of human rights in peacetime, but that questions relating
to unlawful loss of life in hostilities were governed by the law applicable
in armed conflict.

17

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 239

limitation du niveau d’armement d’un Etat souverain » (C.l.l.
Recueil 1986, p. 135, par. 269).

D’autres Etats ont juge hors de propos ce renvoi aux dicta tires de
l’affaire du Lotus et ont mis en cause leur portee dans Ie droit interna-
tional contempo rain ainsi que leur applicabilite aux circonstances, fort
differentes, de l’espece. II a en outreete soutenu que Ie dictum susmen-
tionne de la presente Cour se rapporte a la possession d’armements, et
n’est pas pertinent du point de vue de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes
nucleaires.

II a enfin ete avance que si la Cour devait repondre a la question posee
par l’Assemblee generale, il y aurait lieu de remplacer Ie mot «permis»
par «in terdi t ».

22. La Cour prend note du fait que les Etats dotes d’armes nucleaires
qui se sont presentes devant elIe soit ont reconnu soit n’ont pas nie que
leur liberte d’agir etait effectivement restreinte par les principes et regles
du droit international et plus particulierement du droit humanitaire (voir
paragraphe 86 ci-apres). II en a ete de meme des autres Etats presents
devant la Cour.

Des lors, ni l’argument visant les conclusions juridiques a tirer de
l’emploi du mot «permis» ni les questions de charge de la preuve qui en
decouleraient ne presentent d’importance particuliere aux fins de trancher
les problemes dont la Cour est saisie.

* *
23. Pour repondre a la question que lui a posee l’ Assemblee generale,

la Cour doit determiner, apres examen du large ensemble de normes de
droit international qui s’offre a elle, quel pourrait etre Ie droit pertinent
applicable.

*
24. Plusieurs tenants de l’illiceite de l’emploi d’armes nucleaires ont

allegue qu’un tel emploi violerait Ie droit a la vie tel que Ie garantissent
l’article 6 du pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques ainsi
que certains instruments de protection des droits de l’homme de caractere
regional. L’article 6, paragraphe 1, du pacte international relatif aux
droits civils et politiques dispose ce qui suit: «Le droit a la vie est inhe-
rent ala personne humaine. Ce droit doit etre protege par la loi. Nul ne
peut eire arbitrairement prive de la vie.»

A cela, d’autres Etats ont repondu que Ie pacte international relatif aux
droits civils et politiques ne mentionne ni la guerre ni les armes et que
l’on n’ajamais envisage que cet instrument regisse la question de la liceite
des armes nucleaires. Selon eux, Ie pacte vise la protection des droits de
l’homme en temps de paix, alors que les questions relatives a la privation
illicite de la vie au cours d’hostilites sont regies par le droit international
applicable dans les conflits arrnes.

17

240 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

25. The Court observes that the protection of the International Cov-
enant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except
by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions
may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the
right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not
arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test
of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be deter-
mined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.
Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain
weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life
contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to
the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of
the Covenant itself.

26. Some States also contended that the prohibition against genocide,
contained in the Convention of 9 December 1948 on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, is a relevant rule of customary
international law which the Court must apply. The Court recalls that in
Article II of the Convention genocide is defined as

“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
( a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the

group;
( c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated

to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

It was maintained before the Court that the number of deaths occasioned
by the use of nuclear weapons would be enormous; that the victims could,
in certain cases, include persons of a particular national, ethnic, racial or
religious group; and that the intention to destroy such groups could be
inferred from the fact that the user of the nuclear weapon would have
omitted to take account of the well-known effects of the use of such weapons.

The Court would point out in that regard that the prohibition of geno-
cide would be pertinent in this case if the recourse to nuclear weapons did
indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by
the provision quoted above. In the view of the Court, it would only be
possible to arrive at such a conclusion after having taken due account of
the circumstances specific to each case.

*
18

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 240

25. La Cour observe que la protection offerte par le pacte internatio-
nal relatif aux droits civils et politiques ne cesse pas en temps de guerre,
si ce n’est par l’effet de l’article 4 du pacte, qui prevoit qu’il peut etre
deroge, en cas de danger public, acertaines des obligations qu’impose cet
instrument. Le respect du droit a la vie ne constitue cependant pas une
prescription alaquelle il peut etre deroge. En principe, le droit de ne pas
etre arbitrairement prive de la vie vaut aussi pendant des hostilites, C’est
toutefois, en pareil cas, a la lex specialis applicable, a savoir le droit
applicable dans les conflits armes, concu pour regir la conduite des hos-
tilites, qu’il appartient de determiner ce qui constitue une privation arbi-
traire de la vie. Ainsi, c’est uniquement au regard du droit applicable
dans les conflits arrnes, et non au regard des dispositions du pacte lui-
meme, que l’on pourra dire si tel cas de deces provo que par l’emploi d’un
certain type d’armes au cours d’un conflit anne doit etre considere
comme une privation arbitraire de la vie contraire a l’article 6 du pacte.

26. Certains Etats ont aussi avance l’argument selon lequell’interdic-
tion du genocide, formulee dans la convention du 9 decembre 1948 pour
la prevention et la repression du crime de genocide, serait une regle per-
tinente du droit international coutumier que la Cour devrait appliquer en
l’espece. La Cour rappellera que le genocide est defini a l’article II de la
convention comme

«I’un que1conque des actes ci-apres, commis dans l’intention de
detruire, en tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial
ou religieux, comme tel:
a) meurtre de membres du groupe;
b) atteinte grave a l’integrite physique ou mentale de membres du

groupe;
c) soumission intentionnelle du groupe a des conditions d’existence

devant entrainer sa destruction physique totale ou partielle;
d) mesures visant a entraver les naissances au sein du groupe;
e) transfert force d’enfants du groupe a un autre groupe».

11 a ete soutenu devant la Cour que le nombre de morts que causerait
l’emploi d’armes nucleaires serait enorme ; que l’on pourrait, dans certains
cas, compter parmi les victimes des membres d’un groupe national, eth-
nique, racial ou religieux particulier; et que l’intention de detruire de tels
groupes pourrait etre inferee du fait que l’utilisateur de l’arme nucleaire
aurait omis de tenir compte des effets bien connus de l’emploi de ces armes.

La Cour relevera a cet egard que l’interdiction du genocide serait une
regle pertinente en l’occurrence s’il etait etabli que le recours aux armes
nucleaires comporte effectivement l’element d’intentionnalite, dirige
contre un groupe comme tel, que requiert la disposition sus-citee. Or, de
l’avis de la Cour, il ne serait possible de parvenir a une telle conclusion
qu’apres avoir pris dument en consideration les circonstances propres a
chaque cas d’espece.

*
18

241 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

27. In both their written and oral statements, some States furthermore
argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful by reference
to existing norms relating to the safeguarding and protection of the envi-
ronment, in view of their essential importance.

Specific references were made to various existing international treaties
and instruments. These included Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, Article 35, paragraph 3, of which prohibits
the employment of “methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment”; and the Convention of 18 May 1977 on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, which prohibits the use of weapons which have
“widespread, long-lasting or severe effects” on the environment (Art. 1).
Also cited were Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 which express the common
conviction of the States concerned that they have a duty

“to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction”.

These instruments and other provisions relating to the protection and
safeguarding of the environment were said to apply at all times, in war as
well as in peace, and it was contended that they would be violated by the
use of nuclear weapons whose consequences would be widespread and
would have transboundary effects.

28. Other States questioned the binding legal quality of these precepts
of environmental law; or, in the context of the Convention on the Pro-
hibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modi-
fication Techniques, denied that it was concerned at all with the use of
nuclear weapons in hostilities; or, in the case of Additional Protocol I,
denied that they were generally bound by its terms, or recalled that they
had reserved their position in respect of Article 35, paragraph 3, thereof.

It was also argued by some States that the principal purpose of envi-
ronmental treaties and norms was the protection of the environment in
time of peace. It was said that those treaties made no mention of nuclear
weapons. It was also pointed out that warfare in general, and nuclear
warfare in particular, were not mentioned in their texts and that it would
be destabilizing to the rule of law and to confidence in international
negotiations if those treaties were now interpreted in such a way as to
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.

29. The Court recognizes that the environment is under daily threat
and that the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for
the environment. The Court also recognizes that the environment is not
an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and
the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The

19

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 241

27. Dans leurs exposes ecrits et oraux, certains Etats ont en outre
soutenu que tout emploi d’armes nucleaires serait illicite au regard des
normes en vigueur en matiere de sauvegarde et de protection de l’environ-
nement, compte tenu de leur importance fondamentale.

Divers traites et instruments internationaux en vigueur ont ete expres-
sement cites, dont le protocole additionnel I de 1977 aux conventions de
Geneve de 1949 – qui, a son article 35, paragraphe 3, interdit l’emploi de
«methodes ou moyens de guerre qui soot concus pour causer, ou dont on
peut attendre qu’ils causeront, des dommages etendus, durables et graves
a l’environnement naturel» – et la convention du 18 mai 1977 sur l’inter-
diction d’utiliser des techniques de modification de l’environnement a des
fins militaires ou toutes autres fins hostiles – qui interdit l’emploi d’armes
«ayant des effets etendus, durables ou graves» sur l’environnement (ar-
ticle premier). Ont egalement ete citees la declaration de Stockholm de
1972 (principe 21) et la declaration de Rio de 1992 (principe 2) – qui
expriment la conviction commune des Etats concernes qu’ils ont le devoir

«de faire en sorte que les activites exercees dans les limites de leur
juridiction ou sous leur controle ne causent pas de dommages a
l’environnement dans d’autres Etats ou dans des regions [zones] ne
relevant d’aucune juridiction nationale».

Ces instruments, de meme que d’autres dispositions relatives a la protec-
tion et a la sauvegarde de l’environnement, s’appliqueraient a tout
moment, en temps de guerre comme en temps de paix, et seraient violes
par l’emploi d’armes nucleaires ayant des effets etendus et transfron-
taliers.

28. D’autres Etats ont soit mis en question le caractere contraignant
de ces dispositions du droit de l’environnement, soit con teste que la
convention sur l’interdiction d’utiliser des techniques de modification de
l’environnement a des fins militaires ou toutes autres fins hostiles ait un
quelconque rapport avec l’emploi d’armes nucleaires dans un confiit
arme, soit encore nie etre lies de facon generale par les dispositions du
protocole additionnel I, ou bien rappele qu’ils avaient reserve leur posi-
tion sur l’article 35, paragraphe 3, de celui-ci,

Certains Etats ont egalement soutenu que l’objet principal des traites et
normes relatifs a l’environnement est de proteger l’environnement en
temps de paix; que ces traites ne mentionnent pas les armes nucleaires;
qu’ils ne se referent ni a la guerre en general ni a la guerre nucleaire en
particulier; et que ce serait fragiliser I’empire du droit et la confiance
necessaire aux negociations internationales que de faire dire aujourd’hui
aces traites qu’ils interdisent Ie recours aux armes nucleaires.

29. La Cour est consciente de ce que l’environnement est menace jour
apres jour et de ce que I’emploi d’armes nucleaires pourrait constituer une
catastrophe pour le milieu nature!. Elle a egalement conscience que l’envi-
ronnement n’est pas une abstraction, mais bien I’espace ou vivent les etres
humains et dont dependent la qualite de leur vie et leur sante, y compris

19

2

42

THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus
of international law relating to the environment.

30. However, the Court is of the view that the issue is not whether the
treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or are not appli-
cable during an armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations
stemming from these treaties were intended to be obligations of total
restraint during military conflict.

The Court does not consider that the treaties in question could have
intended to deprive a State of the exercise of its right of self-defence
under international law because of its obligations to protect the environ-
ment. Nonetheless, States must take environmental considerations into
account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pur-
suit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one
of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity
with the principles of necessity and proportionality.

This approach is supported, indeed, by the terms of Principle 24 of the
Rio Declaration, which provides that:

“Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development.
States shall therefore respect international law providing protection
for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its
further development, as necessary.”

31. The Court notes furthermore that Articles 35, paragraph 3, and 55
of Additional Protocol I provide additional protection for the environ-
ment. Taken together, these provisions embody a general obligation to
protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe
environmental damage; the prohibition of methods and means of war-
fare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause such damage; and
the prohibition of attacks against the natural environment by way of
reprisals.

These are powerful constraints for all the States having subscribed to
these provisions.

32. General Assembly resolution 47/37 of 25 November 1992 on the
“Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict” is also of
interest in this context. It affirms the general view according to which
environmental considerations constitute one of the elements to be taken
into account in the implementation of the principles of the law applicable
in armed conflict: it states that “destruction of the environment, not jus-
tified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary
to existing international law”. Addressing the reality that certain instru-
ments are not yet binding on all States, the General Assembly in this
resolution “[ajppeals to all States that have not yet done so to consider
becoming parties to the relevant international conventions”.

20

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 242

pour les generations it venir. L’obligation generale qu’ont les Etats de
veiller it ce que les activites exercees dans les limites de leur juridiction ou
sous leur controle respectent l’environnement dans d’autres Etats ou dans
des zones ne relevant d’aucune juridiction nationale fait maintenant partie
du corps de regles du droit international de l’environnement.

30. La Cour est toutefois d’avis que la question n’est pas de savoir si
les traites relatifs it la protection de l’environnement sont ou non appli-
cables en peri ode de conflit arme, mais bien de savoir si les obligations
nees de ces traites ont ete concues comme imposant une abstention totale
pendant un conflit anne.

La Cour n’estime pas que les traites en question aient entendu priver
un Etat de l’exercice de son droit de legitime defense en vertu du droit
international, au nom des obligations qui sont les siennes de proteger
I’environnement. Neanmoins, les Etats doivent aujourd’hui tenir compte
des considerations ecologiques lorsqu’ils decident de ce qui est necessaire
et proportionne dans la poursuite d’objectifs militaires legitimes. Le res-
pect de l’environnement est 1’un des elements qui permettent de juger si
une action est conforme aux principes de necessite et de proportionnalite.

Ce point de vue trouve d’ailleurs un appui dans le principe 24 de la
declaration de Rio, qui dispose:

«La guerre exerce une action intrinsequement destructrice sur le
developpement durable. Les Etats doivent done respecter Ie droit
international relatif it la protection de l’environnement en temps de
conflit arme et participer it son developpement, selon que de besoin.»

31. La Cour observera par ailleurs que 1’article 35, paragraphe 3, et
1’article 55 du protocole additionnel I offrent it l’environnement une pro-
tection supplementaire. Considerees ensemble, ces dispositions consa-
crent une obligation generale de proteger l’environnement naturel contre
des dommages etendus, durables et graves; une interdiction d’utiliser des
methodes et moyens de guerre concus pour causer, ou dont on peut
attendre qu’ils causeront, de tels dommages; et une interdiction de mener
des attaques contre I’environnement naturel it titre de represailles,

Ce sont lit de puissantes contraintes pour to us les Etats qui ont souscrit
it ces dispositions.

32. La resolution 47/37 de l’Assemblee generale du 25 novembre 1992,
intitulee «Protection de I’environnement en periode de conflit anne», pre-
sente egalement un interet it cet egard. Elle consacre 1’opinion generale
selon laquelle les considerations ecologiques constituent I’un des elements
it prendre en compte dans la mise en oeuvre des principes du droit appli-
cable dans les conflits annes. Elle precise en effet que «Ia destruction de
l’environnement non justifiee par des necessites militaires et ayant un
caractere gratuit est manifestement contraire au droit international en
vigueur». Tenant compte de ce que certains instruments ne sont pas encore
contraignants pour tous les Etats, I’Assemblee generale, dans ladite resolu-
tion, «[IIance un appel it tous les Etats qui ne l’ ont pas encore fait pour
qu’ils deviennent parties aux conventions internationales pertinentes»,

20

243 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

In its recent Order in the Request for an Examination of the Situation
in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 Decem-
ber 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, the Court
stated that its conclusion was “without prejudice to the obligations of
States to respect and protect the natural environment” (Order of 22 Sep-
tember 1995, 1. CJ. Reports 1995, p. 306, para. 64). Although that state-
ment was made in the context of nuclear testing, it naturally also applies
to the actual use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict.

33. The Court thus finds that while the existing international law
relating to the protection and safeguarding of the environment does not
specifically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it indicates important
environmental factors that are properly to be taken into account
in the context of the implementation of the principles and rules of the law
applicable in armed conflict.

*
34. In the light of the foregoing the Court concludes that the most

directly relevant applicable law governing the question of which it was
seised, is that relating to the use of force enshrined in the United Nations
Charter and the law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the con-
duct of hostilities, together with any specific treaties on nuclear weapons
that the Court might determine to be relevant.

* *
35. In applying this law to the present case, the Court cannot how-

ever fail to take into account certain unique characteristics of nuclear
weapons.

The Court has noted the definitions of nuclear weapons contained in
various treaties and accords. It also notes that nuclear weapons are
explosive devices whose energy results from the fusion or fission of the
atom. By its very nature, that process, in nuclear weapons as they exist
today, releases not only immense quantities of heat and energy, but also
powerful and prolonged radiation. According to the material before the
Court, the first two causes of damage are vastly more powerful than the
damage caused by other weapons, while the phenomenon of radiation is
said to be peculiar to nuclear weapons. These characteristics render the
nuclear weapon potentially catastrophic. The destructive power of
nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have
the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the
planet.

The radiation released by a nuclear explosion would affect health,
agriculture, natural resources and demography over a very wide area.

21

MENACE au EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 243

Dans l’ordonnance qu’elle a rendue recemment au sujet de la Demande
d’examen de la situation au titre du paragraphe 63 de l’arret rendu par la
Cour Ie 20 decembre 1974 dans l’affaire des Essais nucleaires (Nouvelle-
Zelande c. France), la Cour a declare que la conclusion a laquelle elle
etait parvenue etait «sans prejudice des obligations des Etats concernant
le respect et la protection de l’environnement naturel» (ordonnance du
22 septembre 1995, Cl.I Recueil1995, p. 306, par. 64). Cette declaration
s’inscrivait certes dans le contexte des essais nucleaires; mais elle s’ap-
plique al’evidence aussi al’emploi d’armes nucleaires dans un conflit arme.

33. La Cour constate ainsi que, si le droit international existant relatif
a la protection et a la sauvegarde de l’environnement n’interdit pas spe-
cifiquement l’emploi d’armes nucleaires, il met en avant d’importantes
considerations d’ordre ecologique qui doivent etre dument prises en
compte dans le cadre de la mise en ceuvre des principes et regles du droit
applicable dans les conflits armes.

*
34. Ala lumiere de ce qui precede, la Cour conclut que le droit appli-

cable ala question dont elle a ete saisie qui est Ie plus directement perti-
nent est le droit relatif a l’emploi de la force, tel que consacre par la
Charte des Nations Unies, et le droit applicable dans les conflits armes,
qui regit la conduite des hostilites, ainsi que tous traites concernant spe-
cifiquement l’arme nucleaire que la Cour pourrait considerer comme per-
tinents.

* *
35. En faisant application de ce droit en l’espece, la Cour ne saurait

cependant omettre de tenir compte de certaines caracteristiques propres
aux armes nucleaires,

La Cour a pris note des definitions qui ont ete donnees des armes
nucleaires dans divers traites et accords. Elle observe en outre que les
armes nucleaires sont des engins explosifs dont l’energie pro cede de la
fusion ou de la fission de l’atome. Par sa nature meme, ce processus, dans
le cas des armes nucleaires telles qu’elles existent aujourd’hui, Iibere non
seulement d’enormes quantites de chaleur et d’energie, mais aussi un
rayonnement puissant et prolonge. Selon les elements en possession de la
Cour, les deux premieres sources de dommages sont bien plus puissantes
qu’elles ne le sont dans le cas d’autres armes, cependant que le phenomene
du rayonnement est considere comme particulier aux armes nucleaires. De
par ces caracteristiques, l’arme nucleaire est potentiellement d’une nature
catastrophique. Le pouvoir destructeur des armes nucleaires ne peut etre
endigue ni dans l’espace ni dans le temps. Ces armes ont le pouvoir de
detruire toute civilisation, ainsi que l’ecosysteme tout entier de la planete.

Le rayonnement libere par une explosion nucleaire aurait des effets pre-
judiciables sur la sante, l’agriculture, les ressources naturelles et la demo-

21

244 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

Further, the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious danger to future
generations. Ionizing radiation has the potential to damage the future
environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects
and illness in future generations.

36. In consequence, in order correctly to apply to the present case the
Charter law on the use of force and the law applicable in armed conflict,
in particular humanitarian law, it is imperative for the Court to take
account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particu-
lar their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suf-
fering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come.

** *
37. The Court will now address the question of the legality or illegality

of recourse to nuclear weapons in the light of the provisions of the Char-
ter relating to the threat or use of force.

38. The Charter contains several provisions relating to the threat and
use of force. In Article 2, paragraph 4, the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of another State or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations is
prohibited. That paragraph provides:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.”

This prohibition of the use of force is to be considered in the light of
other relevant provisions of the Charter. In Article 51, the Charter
recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if
an armed attack occurs. A further lawful use of force is envisaged in
Article 42, whereby the Security Council may take military enforcement
measures in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter.

39. These provisions do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to
any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter
neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon,
including nuclear weapons. A weapon that is already unlawful per se,
whether by treaty or custom, does not become lawful by reason of its
being used for a legitimate purpose under the Charter.

40. The entitlement to resort to self-defence under Article 51 is subject
to certain constraints. Some of these constraints are inherent in the very
concept of self-defence. Other requirements are specified in Article 51.

22

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 244

graphie, et cela sur des espaces considerables. De plus, I’emploi d’armes
nucleaires ferait courir les dangers les plus graves aux generations futures.
Le rayonnement ionisant est susceptible de porter atteinte a l’environne-
ment, a la chaine alimentaire et a l’ecosysteme marin dans I’avenir, et de
provoquer des tares et des maladies chez les generations futures.

36. En consequence, pour appliquer correctement, en l’espece, Ie droit
de la Charte concernant I’emploi de la force, ainsi que Ie droit applicable
dans les conflits armes, et notamment Ie droit humanitaire, il est impe-
ratif que la Cour tienne compte des caracteristiques uniques de I’arme
nucleaire, et en particulier de sa puissance destructrice, de sa capacite
d’infliger des souffrances indicibles a I’homme, ainsi que de son pouvoir
de causer des dommages aux generations a venir.

** *
37. La Cour examinera main tenant la question de la liceite ou de l’illi-

ceite d’un recours aux armes nucleaires a la lumiere des dispositions de la
Charte qui ont trait a la menace ou a I’emploi de la force.

38. La Charte contient plusieurs dispositions relatives a la menace et a
l’emploi de la force. L’article 2, paragraphe 4, interdit la menace ou
I’emploi de la force contre l’integrite territoriale ou l’independance poli-
tique de tout Etat, ou de toute autre maniere incompatible avec les buts
des Nations Unies. Ce paragraphe est ainsi libelle:

«Les Membres de l’Organisation des Nations Unies s’abstiennent,
dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir a la menace ou a
I’emploi de la force, soit contre l’integrite territoriale ou l’indepen-
dance politique de tout Etat, soit de to ute autre rnaniere incompa-
tible avec les buts des Nations Unies.»

L’interdiction de I’emploi de la force est a examiner a la lumiere d’autres
dispositions pertinentes de la Charte. En son article 51, celle-ci reconnait
Ie droit naturel de legitime defense, individuelle ou collective, en cas
d’agression armee. Un autre recours licite a la force est envisage a l’ar-
ticle 42, selon lequel Ie Conseil de securite peut prendre des mesures
coercitives d’ordre militaire conformement au chapitre VII de la Charte.

39. Ces dispositions ne mentionnent pas d’armes particulieres. Elles
s’appliquent a n’importe quel emploi de la force, independamment des
armes employees. La Charte n’interdit ni ne permet expressement I’emploi
d’aucune arme particuliere, qu’il s’agisse ou non de I’arme nucleaire. Une
arme qui est deja par elle-meme illicite, que ce soit du fait d’un traite ou
de la coutume, ne devient pas licite du fait qu’elle est employee dans un
but legitime en vertu de la Charte.

40. Le droit de recourir a la legitime defense conformement a I’ar-
ticle 51 est soumis a des restrictions. Certaines de ces restrictions sont
inherentes a la notion meme de legitime defense. D’autres sont precisees
a I’article 51.

22

245 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

41. The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the
conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary inter-
national law. As the Court stated in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America) : there is a “specific rule whereby self-defence would
warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary inter-
national law” (I. c.l. Reports 1986, p. 94, para. 176). This dual condition
applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the means of force
employed.

42. The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use
of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all circumstances. But at the same
time, a use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence,
must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law appli-
cable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and
rules of humanitarian law.

43. Certain States have in their written and oral pleadings suggested
that in the case of nuclear weapons, the condition of proportionality
must be evaluated in the light of still further factors. They contend that
the very nature of nuclear weapons, and the high probability of an esca-
lation of nuclear exchanges, mean that there is an extremely strong risk
of devastation. The risk factor is said to negate the possibility of the con-
dition of proportionality being complied with. The Court does not find it
necessary to embark upon the quantification of such risks; nor does it
need to enquire into the question whether tactical nuclear weapons exist
which are sufficiently precise to limit those risks: it suffices for the Court
to note that the very nature of all nuclear weapons and the profound
risks associated therewith are further considerations to be borne in mind
by States believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defence in
accordance with the requirements of proportionality.

44. Beyond the conditions of necessity and proportionality, Article 51
specifically requires that measures taken by States in the exercise of the
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Coun-
cil; this article further provides that these measures shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security. These requirements
of Article 51 apply whatever the means of force used in self-defence.

45. The Court notes that the Security Council adopted on 11 April
1995, in the context of the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons, resolution 984 (1995) by the terms of which, on
the one hand, it

“[ tjakes note with appreciation of the statements made by each
of the nuclear-weapon States (S/1995/261, S119951262, S/1995/263,
S11995/264, SI1995/265), in which they give security assurances

23

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 245

41. La soumission de l’exercice du droit de legitime defense aux condi-
tions de necessite et de proportionnalite est une regle du droit internatio-
nal coutumier. Ainsi que la Cour l’a declare dans l’affaire des Activites
militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua
c. Etats- Unis d’Ameriquei, il existe une «regle specifique … bien etablie
en droit international coutumier » selon laquelle «Ia legitime defense ne
justifierait que des mesures proportionnees a l’agression armee subie, et
necessaires pour y riposter» (C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 94, par. 176). Cette
double condition s’applique egalement dans le cas de l’article 51 de la
Charte, quels que soient les moyens mis en ceuvre.

42. Le principe de proportionnalite ne peut pas, par lui-meme, exclure
Ie recours aux armes nucleaires en legitime defense en to utes circons-
tances. Mais, en meme temps, un emploi de la force qui serait propor-
tionne conformement au droit de la legitime defense doit, pour etre licite,
satisfaire aux exigences du droit applicable dans les conflits armes, dont
en particulier les principes et regles du droit humanitaire.

43. Certains Etats ont avance dans leurs exposes ecrits et oraux que,
dans le cas des armes nucleaires, la condition de proportionnalite doit
etre appreciee au regard d’autres facteurs encore. Ils soutiennent que la
nature meme de ces armes et la forte probabilite d’une escalade dans les
echanges nucleaires engendrent des risques de devastation extremement
eleves. Le facteur risque exclut selon eux toute possibilite de respecter la
condition de proportionnalite. La Cour n’a pas a se livrer a une etude
quantitative de tels risques; el1e n’a pas davantage a s’interroger sur le
point de savoir s’il existe des armes nucleaires tactiques suffisamment pre-
cises pour limiter ces risques: illui suffira de relever que la nature meme
de toute arme nucleaire et les risques graves qui lui sont associes sont des
considerations supplementaires que doivent garder a l’esprit les Etats qui
croient pouvoir exercer une riposte nucleaire en legitime defense en res-
pectant les exigences de la proportionnalite.

44. Hormis les conditions de necessite et de proportionnalite, l’ar-
ticle 51 exige specifiquement que les mesures prises par les Etats dans
l’exercice du droit de legitime defense soient immediatement portees ala
connaissance du Conseil de securite ; cet article dispose en outre que ces
mesures n’affectent en rien le pouvoir et le devoir qu’a le Conseil, en
vertu de la Charte, d’agir a tout moment de la maniere qu’il juge neces-
saire pour maintenir ou retablir la paix et la securite internationales. Ces
prescriptions de l’article 51 s’appliquent quels que soient les moyens uti-
lises en legitime defense.

45. La Cour relevera que le Conseil de securite, dans Ie contexte de la
prorogation du traite sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires, a
adopte le 11 avril 1995 la resolution 984 (1995), aux termes de laquelle,
d’une part, il

«[p[rend acte avec satisfaction des declarations faites par chacun des
Etats dotes de l’arme nucleaire (S/1995/261, S/1995/262, S/1995/263,
S/1995/264, S/1995/265), dans lesquelles ceux-ci ont donne aux Etats

23

246 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States
that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons”,

and, on the other hand, it

“[wjelcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will
provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the
Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of,
or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are
used”.

46. Certain States asserted that the use of nuclear weapons in the con-
duct of reprisals would be lawful. The Court does not have to examine, in
this context, the question of armed reprisals in time of peace, which are
considered to be unlawful. Nor does it have to pronounce on the ques-
tion of belligerent reprisals save to observe that in any case any right of
recourse to such reprisals would, like self-defence, be governed inter alia
by the principle of proportionality.

47. In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of unlawful attack, States
sometimes signal that they possess certain weapons to use in self-defence
against any State violating their territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence. Whether a signalled intention to use force if certain events
occur is or is not a “threat” within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter
depends upon various factors. If the envisaged use of force is itself un-
lawful, the stated readiness to use it would be a threat prohibited under
Article 2, paragraph 4. Thus it would be illegal for a State to threaten
force to secure territory from another State, or to cause it to follow or
not follow certain political or economic paths. The notions of “threat”
and “use” of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stand
together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal
– for whatever reason – the threat to use such force will likewise be
illegal. In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness of a State to
use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with the Charter.
For the rest, no State – whether or not it defended the policy of deter-
rence – suggested to the Court that it would be lawful to threaten to use
force if the use of force contemplated would be illegal.

48. Some States put forward the argument that possession of nuclear
weapons is itself an unlawful threat to use force. Possession of nuclear
weapons may indeed justify an inference of preparedness to use them. In
order to be effective, the policy of deterrence, by which those States pos-
sessing or under the umbrella of nuclear weapons seek to discourage mili-
tary aggression by demonstrating that it will serve no purpose, necessi-
tates that the intention to use nuclear weapons be credible. Whether this

24

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 246

non dotes d’armes nucleaires qui sont parties au traite sur la non-
proliferation des armes nucleaires des garanties de securite contre
l’emploi de telles armes»

et, d’autre part, il

«[s] e felicite que certains Etats aient exprime l’intention de venir
immediatement en aide ou de preter immediatement un appui,
conformement a la Charte, a tout Etat non dote d’armes nucleaires
partie au traite sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires qui
serait victime d’un acte d’agression avec l’emploi d’armes nucleaires
ou serait menace d’une telle agression».

46. Certains Etats ont soutenu que l’emploi d’armes nucleaires a titre
de represailles serait licite. La Cour n’a pas a se pencher, dans ce
contexte, sur la question des represailles armees en temps de paix, qui
sont considerees comme illicites. Elle n’a pas davantage a se prononcer
sur la question des represailles en temps de conflit arme, sinon pour
observer qu’en tout Mat de cause tout droit de recourir a de telles repre-
sailles serait, comme Ie droit de legitime defense, regi, notamment, par le
principe de proportionnalite.

47. En vue de diminuer ou d’eliminer les risques d’agression illicite, les
Etats font parfois savoir qu’ils detiennent certaines armes destinees a etre
employees en legitime defense contre tout Etat qui violerait leur integrite
territoriale ou leur independance politique. La question de savoir si une
intention affichee de recourir ala force, dans Ie cas OU certains evenements
se produiraient, constitue ou non une «menace» au sens de l’article 2, para-
graphe 4, de la Charte est tributaire de divers facteurs. Si l’emploi de la
force envisage est lui-meme illicite, se declarer pret a y recourir constitue
une menace interdite en vertu de l’article 2, paragraphe 4. Ainsi serait-il
illicite pour un Etat de menacer un autre Etat de recourir a la force pour
obtenir de lui un territoire ou pour l’obliger a suivre ou a ne pas suivre
certaines orientations politiques ou economiques. Les notions de «menace»
et d’«emploi» de la force au sens de l’article 2, paragraphe 4, de la Charte
vont de pair, en ce sens que si, dans un cas donne, l’emploi meme de la
force est illicite – pour quelque raison que ce soit -la menace d’y recou-
rir le sera egalement. En bref, un Etat ne peut, de maniere licite, se declarer
pret aemployer la force que si cet emploi est conforme aux dispositions de
la Charte. Du reste, aucun Etat – qu’il ait defendu ou non la politique de
dissuasion – n’a soutenu devant la Cour qu’il serait licite de menacer
d’employer la force au cas ou l’emploi de la force envisage serait illicite.

48. Certains Etats ont avance la these selon laquelle la possession
d’armes nucleaires est par elle-meme une menace illicite de recourir a la
force. 11 peut en effet etre justifie d’inferer de la possession d’armes
nucleaires qu’on est pret autiliser celles-ci. Pour etre efficace, la politique
de dissuasion, par laquelle les Etats qui detiennent des armes nucleaires
ou qui se trouvent sous leur protection cherchent a decourager l’agres-
sion militaire en demontrant que cette derniere ne servira aucun objectif,

24

247 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

is a “threat” contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, depends upon whether
the particular use of force envisaged would be directed against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of a State, or against the Pur-
poses of the United Nations or whether, in the event that it were
intended as a means of defence, it would necessarily violate the principles
of necessity and proportionality. In any of these circumstances the use of
force, and the threat to use it, would be unlawful under the law of the
Charter.

49. Moreover, the Security Council may take enforcement measures
under Chapter VII of the Charter. From the statements presented to it
the Court does not consider it necessary to address questions which
might, in a given case, arise from the application of Chapter VII.

50. The terms of the question put to the Court by the General Assem-
bly in resolution 49/75 K could in principle also cover a threat or use of
nuclear weapons by a State within its own boundaries. However, this
particular aspect has not been dealt with by any of the States which
addressed the Court orally or in writing in these proceedings. The Court
finds that it is not called upon to deal with an internal use of nuclear
weapons.

** *
51. Having dealt with the Charter provisions relating to the threat or

use of force, the Court will now turn to the law applicable in situations of
armed conflict. It will first address the question whether there are specific
rules in international law regulating the legality or illegality of recourse to
nuclear weapons per se; it will then examine the question put to it in the
light of the law applicable in armed conflict proper, i.e. the principles and
rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, and the law of
neutrality.

* *
52. The Court notes by way of introduction that international custom-

ary and treaty law does not contain any specific prescription authorizing
the threat or use of nuclear weapons or any other weapon in general or in
certain circumstances, in particular those of the exercise of legitimate self-
defence. Nor, however, is there any principle or rule of international law
which would make the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons or
of any other weapons dependent on a specific authorization. State prac-
tice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such does
not result from an absence of authorization but, on the contrary, is
formulated in terms of prohibition.

*
25

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 247

necessite que l’intention d’employer des armes nucleaires soit credible.
Qu’il y ait la une «menace» contraire a l’article 2, paragraphe 4, depend
du fait de savoir si l’emploi precis de la force envisage serait dirige contre
l’integrite territoriale ou l’independance politique d’un Etat ou irait a
l’encontre des buts des Nations Unies, ou encore si, dans l’hypothese OU
il serait concu comme un moyen de defense, il violerait necessairement les
principes de necessite et de proportionnalite. Dans l’un et l’autre cas, non
seulement l’emploi de la force, mais aussi la menace de l’employer,
seraient illicites selon le droit de la Charte.

49. Par ailleurs, le Conseil de securite peut prendre des mesures coer-
citives en vertu du chapitre VII de la Charte. Au vu des exposes qui lui
ont ete presentes, la Cour n’estime pas necessaire de traiter des questions
que pourrait soulever, dans un cas donne, l’application du chapitre VII.

50. Les termes de la question posee a la Cour par l’Assemblee generale
dans la resolution 49/75 K pourraient aussi, en principe, couvrir la menace
ou l’emploi d’armes nucleaires par un Etat a l’interieur de ses propres
frontieres. En l’espece, aucun Etat n’a cependant traite de cet aspect par-
ticulier de la question dans ses ecritures ou lors des audiences. La Cour
considere qu’elle n’est pas appelee a examiner la question d’un emploi
d’armes nucleaires au plan interne.

** *
51. La Cour, apres avoir examine les dispositions de la Charte rela-

tives ala menace ou al’emploi de la force, se penchera maintenant sur Ie
droit applicable dans les situations de conflit arme, Elle traitera d’abord
de la question de savoir s’il existe en droit international des regles speci-
fiques qui regissent la Iiceite ou l’illiceite du recours aux armes nucleaires
en tant que telles; elle passera ensuite a l’examen de la question qui lui a
ete posee a la lumiere du droit applicable dans les conflits armes propre-
ment dit, c’est-a-dire des principes et regles du droit humanitaire appli-
cable dans lesdits conflits ainsi que du droit de la neutralite.

* *
52. La Cour rappellera a titre liminaire qu’il n’existe aucune prescrip-

tion specifique de droit international coutumier ou conventionnel qui
autoriserait la menace ou l’emploi d’armes nucleaires ou de quelque autre
arme, en general ou dans certaines circonstances, en particulier lorsqu’il y
a exercice justifie de la legitime defense. 11 n’existe cependant pas davan-
tage de principe ou de regle de droit international qui ferait dependre
d’une autorisation particuliere la Iiceite de la menace ou de l’emploi
d’armes nucleaires ou de to ute autre arme. La pratique des Etats montre
que l’illiceite de l’emploi de certaines armes en tant que telles ne resulte
pas d’une absence d’autorisation, mais se trouve au contraire formulee en
termes de prohibition.

*
25

248 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

53. The Court must therefore now examine whether there is any pro-
hibition of recourse to nuclear weapons as such; it will first ascertain
whether there is a conventional prescription to this effect.

54. In this regard, the argument has been advanced that nuclear
weapons should be treated in the same way as poisoned weapons. In that
case, they would be prohibited under:

(a) the Second Hague Declaration of29 July 1899, which prohibits “the
use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating
or deleterious gases”;

(b) Article 23 (a) of the Regulations respecting the laws and customs of
war on land annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 18 October
1907, whereby “it is especially forbidden: … to employ poison or
poisoned weapons”; and

( c) the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 which prohibits “the use in war
of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices”.

55. The Court will observe that the Regulations annexed to the Hague
Convention IV do not define what is to be understood by “poison or
poisoned weapons” and that different interpretations exist on the issue.
Nor does the 1925 Protocol specify the meaning to be given to the term
“analogous materials or devices”. The terms have been understood, in
the practice of States, in their ordinary sense as covering weapons whose
prime, or even exclusive, effect is to poison or asphyxiate. This practice is
clear, and the parties to those instruments have not treated them as refer-
ring to nuclear weapons.

56. In view of this, it does not seem to the Court that the use of
nuclear weapons can be regarded as specifically prohibited on the basis of
the above-mentioned provisions of the Second Hague Declaration of
1899, the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 or
the 1925 Protocol (see paragraph 54 above).

57. The pattern until now has been for weapons of mass destruction to
be declared illegal by specific instruments. The most recent such instru-
ments are the Convention of 10 April 1972 on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction – which prohibits the
possession of bacteriological and toxic weapons and reinforces the pro-
hibition of their use – and the Convention of 13 January 1993 on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction – which prohibits all use
of chemical weapons and requires the destruction of existing stocks. Each
of these instruments has been negotiated and adopted in its own context
and for its own reasons. The Court does not find any specific prohibition
of recourse to nuclear weapons in treaties expressly prohibiting the use of
certain weapons of mass destruction.

58. In the last two decades, a great many negotiations have been con-
ducted regarding nuclear weapons; they have not resulted in a treaty of

26

MENACE au EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 248

53. La Cour doit done se pencher sur la question de savoir s’il existe
une interdiction de recourir aux armes nucleaires en tant que telles; elle
recherchera d’abord s’il existe une prescription conventionnelle a cet effet.

54. A cet egard, il a ete avance que les armes nucleaires devraient etre
traitees de la meme maniere que les armes empoisonnees, Auquel cas,
elles seraient prohibees:

a) par la deuxieme declaration de La Haye du 29 juillet 1899 qui interdit
«I’emploi de projectiles qui ont pour but unique de repandre des gaz
asphyxiants ou deleteres»;

b) par l’article 23 a) du reglement concernant les lois et coutumes de la
guerre sur terre, annexe a la convention IV de La Haye du 18 octobre
1907, selon lequel «il est notamment interdit: … d’employer du poi-
son ou des armes empoisonnees»;

c) par le protocole de Geneve du 17 juin 1925 qui interdit «I’emploi ala
guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires, ainsi que de tous
liquides, matieres ou precedes analogues».

55. La Cour fera observer que le reglement annexe a la convention IV
de La Haye ne definit pas ce qu’il faut entendre par «du poison ou des
armes empoisonnees» et que des interpretations divergentes existent sur
ce point. Le protocole de 1925 ne precise pas davantage Ie sens a donner
aux termes «rnatieres ou pro cedes analogues». Dans la pratique des
Etats, ces termes ont ete entendus dans leur sens ordinaire comme cou-
vrant des armes dont l’effet premier, ou meme exclusif, est d’empoisonner
ou d’asphyxier. Ladite pratique est claire et les parties a ces instruments
ne les ont pas consideres comme visant les armes nucleaires.

56. En consideration de ce qui precede, il n’apparait pas ala Cour que
l’emploi d’armes nucleaires puisse etre regarde comme specifiquement
interdit sur la base des dispositions susmentionnees de la deuxieme decla-
ration de 1899, du reglement annexe a la convention IV de 1907 ou du
protocole de 1925 (voir paragraphe 54 ci-dessus).

57. La ten dance a ete jusqu’a present, en ce qui concerne les armes de
destruction massive, de les declarer illicites grace a l’adoption d’instru-
ments specifiques. Les plus recents de ces instruments sont la convention
du 10 avril 1972 sur l’interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et
du stockage des armes bacteriologiques (biologiques) ou a toxines et sur
leur destruction – qui interdit la detention d’armes bacteriologiques ou a
toxines et renforce l’interdiction de leur utilisation – et la convention du
13 janvier 1993 sur l’interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication, du
stockage et de l’emploi des armes chimiques et sur leur destruction – qui
interdit tout recours aux armes chimiques et exige la destruction des
stocks existants. Chacun de ces instruments a ete negocie et adopte dans un
contexte propre et pour des motifs propres. La Cour ne trouve pas d’inter-
diction specifique du recours aux armes nucleaires dans les traites qui pro-
hibent expressement l’emploi de certaines armes de destruction massive.

58. Au cours des deux dernieres decennies, de nombreuses negocia-
tions ont ete menees au sujet des armes nucleaires; elles n’ont pas abo uti

26

249 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

general prohibition of the same kind as for bacteriological and chemical
weapons. However, a number of specific treaties have been concluded in
order to limit:

(a) the acquisition, manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons
(Peace Treaties of 10 February 1947; State Treaty for the Re-estab-
lishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria of 15 May
1955; Treaty of Tlatelolco of 14 February 1967 for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and its Additional Proto-
cols; Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons; Treaty of Rarotonga of 6 August 1985 on the Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone of the South Pacific, and its Protocols; Treaty of
12 September 1990 on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany);

(b) the deployment of nuclear weapons (Antarctic Treaty of 1 December
1959; Treaty of 27 January 1967 on Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; Treaty ofTlatelolco of 14 Feb-
ruary 1967 for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,
and its Additional Protocols; Treaty of 11 February 1971 on the
Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
and in the Subsoil Thereof; Treaty of Rarotonga of 6 August 1985
on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone of the South Pacific, and its Pro-
tocols); and

( c) the testing of nuclear weapons (Antarctic Treaty of 1 December
1959; Treaty of 5 August 1963 Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; Treaty of 27 Jan-
uary 1967 on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies; Treaty of Tlatelolco of 14 February 1967 for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and its Addi-
tional Protocols; Treaty of Rarotonga of 6 August 1985 on the
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone of the South Pacific, and its Protocols).

59. Recourse to nuclear weapons is directly addressed by two of these
Conventions and also in connection with the indefinite extension of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968:

(a) the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 14 February 1967 for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America prohibits, in Article 1, the use of
nuclear weapons by the Contracting Parties. It further includes an
Additional Protocol II open to nuclear-weapon States outside the
region, Article 3 of which provides:

“The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipo-
tentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.”

27

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 249

a un traite d’interdiction generale du meme type que pour les armes bac-
teriologiques et chimiques. Cependant, plusieurs traites specifiques ont
ete conclus en vue de limiter:

a) l’acquisition, la fabrication et la possession d’armes nucleaires (traites
de paix du 10 fevrier 1947; traite d’Etat du 15 mai 1955 portant reta-
blissement d’une Autriche independante et democratique; traite de
Tlatelolco du 14 fevrier 1967 visant l’interdiction des armes nucleaires
en Amerique latine, et ses protocoles additionnels; traite du 1er juillet
1968 sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires ; traite de Raro-
tonga du 6 aout 1985 sur la zone denuclearisee du Pacifique Sud, et
ses protocoles; traite du 12 septembre 1990 portant reglement definitif
concernant l’Allemagne);

b) Ie deploiernent d’armes nucleaires (traite du 1er decembre 1959 sur
l’ Antarctique; traite du 27 janvier 1967 sur les principes regissant les
activites des Etats en matiere d’exploration et d’utilisation de l’espace
extra-atmospherique, y compris la Lune et les autres corps celestes;
traite de Tlatelolco du 14 fevrier 1967 visant l’interdiction des armes
nucleaires en Amerique latine, et ses protocoles additionnels; traite
du 11 fevrier 1971 interdisant de placer des armes nucleaires et
d’autres armes de destruction massive sur Ie fond des mers et des
oceans ainsi que dans leur sous-sol; traite de Rarotonga du 6 aout
1985 sur 1a zone denuclearisee du Pacifique Sud, et ses protocoles);

c) les essais nucleaires (traite du 1er decembre 1959 sur l’ Antarctique;
traite du 5 aout 1963 interdisant les essais d’armes nucleaires dans
l’atmosphere, dans l’espace extra-atmospherique et sous l’eau; traite
du 27 janvier 1967 sur les principes regissant les activites des Etats en
matiere d’exploration et d’utilisation de l’espace extra-atmospherique,
y compris la Lune et les autres corps celestes; traite de Tlatelolco du
14 fevrier 1967 visant l’interdiction des armes nucleaires en Amerique
latine, et ses protocoles additionnels; traite de Rarotonga du 6 aout
1985 sur la zone denuclearisee du Pacifique Sud, et ses protocoles).

59. II a ete traite directement du recours aux armes nucleaires dans
deux de ces conventions, ainsi que dans Ie contexte de la prorogation illi-
mitee du traite de 1968 sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires:

a) Le traite de Tlatelolco du 14 fevrier 1967 visant l’interdiction des
armes nucleaires en Amerique latine prohibe, en son article premier,
l’emploi des armes nucleaires par les parties contractantes; il com-
porte en outre un protocole additionnel II ouvert aux Etats dotes
d’armes nucleaires exterieurs a la region, dont l’article 3 dispose:

«Les gouvernements representes par les plenipotentiaires sous-
signes s’engagent en outre a ne recourir ni a l’emploi d’armes
nucleaires ni a la menace de leur emploi contre les parties contrac-
tantes au traite visant l’interdiction des armes nucleaires en Ame-
rique latine.»

27

250 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

The Protocol was signed and ratified by the five nuclear-weapon
States. Its ratification was accompanied by a variety of declarations.
The United Kingdom Government, for example, stated that “in the
event of any act of aggression by a Contracting Party to the Treaty
in which that Party was supported by a nuclear-weapon State”, the
United Kingdom Government would “be free to reconsider the
extent to which they could be regarded as committed by the provi-
sions of Additional Protocol II”. The United States made a similar
statement. The French Government, for its part, stated that it “inter-
prets the undertaking made in article 3 of the Protocol as being with-
out prejudice to the full exercise of the right of self-defence con-
firmed by Article 51 of the Charter”. China reaffirmed its commit-
ment not to be the first to make use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet
Union reserved “the right to review” the obligations imposed upon it
by Additional Protocol II, particularly in the event of an attack by a
State party either “in support of a nuclear-weapon State or jointly
with that State”. None of these statements drew comment or objec-
tion from the parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

(b) the Treaty of Rarotonga of 6 August 1985 establishes a South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in which the Parties undertake not to
manufacture, acquire or possess any nuclear explosive device
(Art. 3). Unlike the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Rarotonga
does not expressly prohibit the use of such weapons. But such a pro-
hibition is for the States parties the necessary consequence of the
prohibitions stipulated by the Treaty. The Treaty has a number of
protocols. Protocol 2, open to the five nuclear-weapon States, speci-
fies in its Article 1 that:

“Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use any
nuclear explosive device against:

( a) Parties to the Treaty; or
(b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for

which a State that has become a Party to Protocol I is inter-
nationally responsible.”

China and Russia are parties to that Protocol. In signing it, China
and the Soviet Union each made a declaration by which they reserved
the “right to reconsider” their obligations under the said Protocol;
the Soviet Union also referred to certain circumstances in which it
would consider itself released from those obligations. France, the
United Kingdom and the United States, for their part, signed Pro-
tocol2 on 25 March 1996, but have not yet ratified it. On that occa-
sion, France declared, on the one hand, that no provision in that
Protocol “shall impair the full exercise of the inherent right of self-
defence provided for in Article 51 of the … Charter” and, on the
other hand, that “the commitment set out in Article 1 of [that] Pro-
tocol amounts to the negative security assurances given by France to

28

MENACE OU EMPLOI O’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 250

Le protocole a ete signe et ratifie par les cinq Etats dotes d’armes nu-
cleaires. Sa ratification a Me accompagnee de declarations diverses.
Le Royaume-Vni, par exemple, a declare que, «dans Ie cas d’un acte
d’agression quelconque commis par une partie contractante au traite
avec l’appui d’un Etat dote d’armes nucleaires», Ie Gouvernement
britannique «serait libre de reconsiderer la me sure dans laquelle il
pourrait etre repute engage par les dispositions du protocole addi-
tionnel II ». Les Etats-Vnis ont fait une declaration similaire. Le
Gouvernement francais a pour sa part declare qu’il «interprete l’enga-
gement enonce a l’article 3 du protocole comme ne faisant pas obs-
tacle au plein exercice du droit de legitime defense confirme par l’ar-
ticle 51 de la Charte». La Chine a reaffirme son engagement de ne pas
etre la premiere a faire usage des armes nucleaires. L’Union sovie-
tique s’est reserve

b) Le traite de Rarotonga du 6 aout 1985 cree dans le Pacifique Sud une
zone denuclearisee dans laquelle les parties s’engagent a ne pas fabri-
quer, acquerir ou posseder quelque dispositif explosif nucleaire que ce
soit (art. 3). A la difference du traite de Tlatelolco, Ie traite de Raro-
tonga ne prohibe pas expressement l’emploi de ces armes. Mais une
telle prohibition est pour les Etats parties la consequence necessaire
des interdictions prononcees par Ie traite, Le traite comporte divers
protocoles. Le protocole 2, ouvert aux cinq Etats dotes d’armes
nucleaires, precise, en son article premier, que:

«Chaque partie s’engage a ne pas utiliser ou menacer d’utiliser
un dispositif explosif nucleaire quelconque contre:

a) des parties au traite; ou
b) tout territoire situe a l’interieur de la zone denuclearisee du

Pacifique Sud dont un Etat qui est devenu partie au protocole 1
est internationalement responsable.»

La Chine et la Russie sont parties a ce protocole. En le signant, la
Chine et l’Union sovietique ont chacune fait une declaration par
laquelle el1es se sont reserve le «droit de reexaminer» leurs obliga-
tions en vertu dudit protocole; l’Union sovietique s’est en outre
referee a certaines circonstances dans lesquelles elle se considererait
comme degagee de ces obligations. Les Etats-Unis, la France et le
Royaume-Uni ont, pour leur part, signe le protocole 2 le 25 mars
1996, mais ne l’ont pas encore ratifie, A cette occasion, la France a
declare, d’une part, qu’aucune disposition de ce protocole «ne saurait
porter atteinte au plein exercice du droit naturel de legitime defense
prevu a l’article 51 de la Charte», et, d’autre part, que «I’engagement
enonce a l’article premier [dudit] protocole equivaut aux garanties

28

251 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty on .
Non-Proliferation”, and that “these assurances shall not apply to
States which are not parties” to that Treaty. For its part, the United
Kingdom made a declaration setting out the precise circumstances in
which it “will not be bound by [its] undertaking under Article 1” of
the Protocol.

(c) as to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at
the time of its signing in 1968 the United States, the United King-
dom and the USSR gave various security assurances to the non-
nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty. In resolu-
tion 255 (1968) the Security Council took note with satisfaction of
the intention expressed by those three States to

“provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the
Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation … that is a victim of an act of, or an object
of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used”.

On the occasion of the extension of the Treaty in 1995, the five
nuclear-weapon States gave their non-nuclear-weapon partners, by
means of separate unilateral statements on 5 and 6 April 1995,
positive and negative security assurances against the use of such
weapons. All the five nuclear-weapon States first undertook not to
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that were
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons. However, these States, apart from China, made an exception
in the case of an invasion or any other attack against them, their
territories, armed forces or allies, or on a State towards which they
had a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a non-
nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in
association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. Each of the
nuclear-weapon States further undertook, as a permanent member
of the Security Council, in the event of an attack with the use of
nuclear weapons, or threat of such attack, against a non-nuclear-
weapon State, to refer the matter to the Security Council without
delay and to act within it in order that it might take immediate
measures with a view to supplying, pursuant to the Charter, the
necessary assistance to the victim State (the commitments assumed
comprising minor variations in wording). The Security Council, in
unanimously adopting resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, cited
above, took note of those statements with appreciation. It also
recognized

“that the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council will bring the matter immediately to the attention of
the Council and seek Council action to provide, in accordance
with the Charter, the necessary assistance to the State victim”;

29

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 251

negatives de securite accordees par la France aux Etats non dotes
d’armes nucleaires parties au traite sur la non-proliferation», et que
«ces garanties ne sauraient s’appliquer a des Etats non parties» a ce
traite. Quant au Royaume-Uni, il a fait une declaration par laquelle il
a precise les circonstances dans lesquelles il (me serait pas lie par ses
engagements au titre de l’article premier» du meme protocole.

c) En ce qui concerne le traite sur la non-proliferation des armes nu-
cleaires, les Etats-Unis, Ie Royaume-Uni et l’URSS avaient donne,
lors de la signature du traite en 1968, diverses garanties de securite aux
Etats non dotes d’armes nucleaires qui y etaient parties. Dans sa
resolution 255 (1968), Ie Conseil de securite avait accueilli avec satis-
faction l’intention exprimee par ces trois Etats

«de fournir ou d’appuyer une assistance immediate, conformement
ala Charte, a tout Etat non dote d’armes nucleaires partie au traite
sur la non-proliferation … qui serait victime d’un acte ou l’objet
d’une menace d’agression avec emploi d’armes nucleaires».

A l’occasion de la prorogation du traite en 1995, les cinq Etats
dotes d’armes nucleaires ont, par des declarations unilaterales dis-
tinctes des 5 et 6 avril 1995, donne a leurs partenaires non dotes
d’armes nucleaires des garanties de securite positives et negatives
contre l’emploi de telles armes. Les cinq Etats dotes d’armes nu-
cleaires se sont tous, en premier lieu, engages a ne pas utiliser d’armes
nucleaires contre des Etats non dotes de telles armes, parties au
traite sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires. Toutefois ces
Etats, hormis la Chine, ont formule une exception concernant Ie cas
d’une invasion ou de to ute autre attaque menee ou soutenue contre
eux, leur territoire, leurs forces armees ou leurs allies, ou contre un
Etat envers lequel ils auraient un engagement de securite, par un
Etat non dote d’armes nucleaires, partie au traite sur la non-proli-
feration, en alliance ou en association avec un Etat dote d’armes
nucleaires. En tant que membre permanent du Conseil de securite,
chacun des Etats dotes d’armes nucleaires s’est engage en deuxieme
lieu, en cas d’agression avec emploi d’armes nucleaires, ou de menace
d’une telle agression a l’encontre d’un Etat non dote d’armes nu-
cleaires, a saisir sans delai le Conseil de securite et a agir en son sein
pour que celui-ci prenne des mesures immediates en vue de fournir,
conformement a la Charte, l’assistance necessaire a l’Etat victime
(les formules employees variant legerement). Le Conseil de securite,
en adoptant a l’unanimite sa resolution 984 (1995) precitee du 11 avril
1995, a pris acte avec satisfaction de ces declarations. II a egalement
reconnu

«que les Etats dotes d’armes nucleaires qui sont membres perma-
nents du Conseil de securite porteront immediatement la question a
l’attention du Conseil et s’emploieront a obtenir que celui-ci four-
nisse, conformement a la Charte, l’assistance necessaire a l’Etat vic-
time»

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252 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

and welcomed the fact that

“the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or
support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to
any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or
an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are
used”.

60. Those States that believe that recourse to nuclear weapons is illegal
stress that the conventions that include various rules providing for the
limitation or elimination of nuclear weapons in certain areas (such as the
Antarctic Treaty of 1959 which prohibits the deployment of nuclear
weapons in the Antarctic, or the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 which cre-
ates a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America) or the conventions
that apply certain measures of control and limitation to the existence of
nuclear weapons (such as the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty or the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) all set limits to the use of
nuclear weapons. In their view, these treaties bear witness, in their own
way, to the emergence of a rule of complete legal prohibition of all uses
of nuclear weapons.

61. Those States who defend the position that recourse to nuclear
weapons is legal in certain circumstances see a logical contradiction in
reaching such a conclusion. According to them, those Treaties, such as
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as
Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) which take note
of the security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-
nuclear-weapon States in relation to any nuclear aggression against the
latter, cannot be understood as prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons,
and such a claim is contrary to the very text of those instruments. For
those who support the legality in certain circumstances of recourse to
nuclear weapons, there is no absolute prohibition against the use of such
weapons. The very logic and construction of the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons, they assert, confirm this. This Treaty,
whereby, they contend, the possession of nuclear weapons by the five
nuclear-weapon States has been accepted, cannot be seen as a treaty ban-
ning their use by those States; to accept the fact that those States possess
nuclear weapons is tantamount to recognizing that such weapons may be
used in certain circumstances. Nor, they contend, could the security
assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States in 1968, and more recently
in connection with the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995,
have been conceived without its being supposed that there were circum-
stances in which nuclear weapons could be used in a lawful manner. For
those who defend the legality of the use, in certain circumstances, of
nuclear weapons, the acceptance of those instruments by the different
non-nuclear-weapon States confirms and reinforces the evident logic
upon which those instruments are based.

30

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 252

et s’est felicite de ce

«que certains Etats aient exprime l’intention de venir immediate-
ment en aide ou de preter immediatement un appui, conformement
ala Charte, a tout Etat non dote d’armes nucleaires partie au traite
sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires qui serait victime d’un
acte d’agression avec emploi d’armes nucleaires ou serait menace
d’une tdle agression».

60. Les Etats qui estiment que le recours aux armes nucleaires est illi-
cite soulignent que les conventions qui comportent diverses regles de limi-
tation ou d’elimination de l’arme nucleaire dans des espaces determines
(comme le traite de 1959 sur l’Antarctique qui interdit Ie deploiement des
armes nucleaires dans l’Antarctique, ou le traite de Tlatelolco de 1967 qui
cree une zone exempte d’armes nucleaires en Amerique latine) et les
conventions qui appliquent des mesures de controle et de limitation a
l’existence des armes nucleaires (comme Ie traite de 1963 sur l’interdiction
partielle des essais nucleaires ou le traite sur la non-proliferation des armes
nucleaires) fixent toutes des limites a l’emploi d’armes nucleaires. Selon
eux, ces traites temoignent a leur maniere de l’emergence d’une norme de
prohibition juridique complete de toute utilisation d’armes nucleaires.

61. Les Etats qui soutiennent que le recours aux armes nucleaires est
licite dans certaines circonstances voient une contradiction logique dans
une tdle conclusion. Selon eux ces traites, tel Ie traite sur la non-prolifera-
tion des armes nucleaires, de meme que les resolutions 255 (1968) et 984
(1995) du Conseil de securite, qui prennent acte des garanties de securite
donnees par les Etats dotes d’armes nucleaires aux Etats qui n’en sont pas
dotes en cas d’agression nucleaire contre ces derniers, ne sauraient etre
compris comme prohibant l’emploi d’armes nucleaires ; et une te1le preten-
tion serait contraire a la lettre meme de ces instruments. Pour les partisans
de la liceite du recours aux armes nucleaires dans certaines circonstances, il
n’existe aucune interdiction absolue d’utiliser de telles armes. La logique et
la structure memes du traite sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires
le confirment. Ce traite, aux termes duque1, soutiennent-ils, la possession
d’armes nucleaires par les cinq Etats qui en sont dotes a ete acceptee, ne
saurait etre regarde comme un traite qui en proscrirait l’emploi par ces
memes Etats; admettre le fait que ces Etats possedent l’arme nucleaire
reviendrait a reconnaitre que cette arme peut etre employee dans certaines
circonstances. Quant aux garanties de securite donnees par les Etats dotes
d’armes nucleaires en 1968 et, plus recemment, dans le contexte de la
conference de 1995 des parties au traite sur la non-proliferation des armes
nucleaires chargee d’examiner le traite et la question de sa prorogation,
elles ne pourraient davantage etre concues sans presupposer qu’il existe des
circonstances dans lesquelles des armes nucleaires pourraient eire utilisees
de maniere licite. Pour les defenseurs de la liceite du recours aux armes
nucleaires dans certaines circonstances, l’acceptation des instruments sus-
vises par les differents Etats non dotes d’armesnucleaires confirmerait et
renforcerait la logique evidente sur laquelle se fondent ces instruments.

30

253 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

62. The Court notes that the treaties dealing exclusively with acquisi-
tion, manufacture, possession, deployment and testing of nuclear
weapons, without specifically addressing their threat or use, certainly
point to an increasing concern in the international community with these
weapons; the Court concludes from this that these treaties could there-
fore be seen as foreshadowing a future general prohibition of the use
of such weapons, but they do not constitute such a prohibition by them-
selves. As to the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga and their Protocols,
and also the declarations made in connection with the indefinite extension
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it emerges
from these instruments that:

(a) a number of States have undertaken not to use nuclear weapons in
specific zones (Latin America; the South Pacific) or against certain
other States (non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons);

(b) nevertheless, even within this framework, the nuclear-weapon States
have reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in certain circum-
stances; and

( c) these reservations met with no objection from the parties to the
Tlatelolco or Rarotonga Treaties or from the Security Council.

63. These two treaties, the security assurances given in 1995 by the
nuclear-weapon States and the fact that the Security Council took note of
them with satisfaction, testify to a growing awareness of the need to
liberate the community of States and the international public from the
dangers resulting from the existence of nuclear weapons. The Court more-
over notes the signing, even more recently, on 15 December 1995, at
Bangkok, of a Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,
and on 11 April 1996, at Cairo, of a treaty on the creation of a nuclear-
weapons-free zone in Africa. It does not, however, view these elements as
amounting to a comprehensive and universal conventional prohibition
on the use, or the threat of use, of those weapons as such.

*
64. The Court will now turn to an examination of customary interna-

tional law to determine whether a prohibition of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons as such flows from that source of law. As the Court has
stated, the substance of that law must be “looked for primarily in the
actual practice and opinio juris of States” (Continental Shelf (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1.c.i. Reports 1985, p. 29,
para. 27).

65. States which hold the view that the use of nuclear weapons is ille-
gal have endeavoured to demonstrate the existence of a customary rule
prohibiting this use. They refer to a consistent practice of non-utilization
of nuclear weapons by States since 1945 and they would see in that prac-

31

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 253

62. La Cour note que 1es traites qui portent exclusivement sur l’acquisi-
tion, 1a fabrication, 1a possession, 1e deploiement et 1a mise a l’essai
d’armes nucleaires, sans traiter specifiquement de 1a menace ou de l’emp1oi
de ces armes, temoignent manifestement des preoccupations que ces armes
inspirent de plus en plus a 1a communaute internationa1e; elle en conclut
que ces traites pourraient en consequence etre percus comme annoncant
une future interdiction generale de l’utilisation desdites armes, mais ne
comportent pas en eux-memes une te11e interdiction. Pour ce qui est des
traites de T1ate1olco et de Rarotonga et leurs protoco1es, ainsi que des
declarations faites dans Ie contexte de 1a prorogation illimitee du traite sur
1a non-proliferation des armes nucleaires, i1 ressort de ces instruments:

a) qu’un certain nombre d’Etats se sont engages a ne pas employer
d’armes nucleaires dans certaines zones (Amerique 1atine, Pacifique
Sud) ou contre certains autres Etats (Etats non dotes d’armes nucleaires
parties au traite sur 1a non-proliferation des armes nucleaires);

b) que toutefois, meme dans ce cadre, 1es Etats dotes d’armes nucleaires
se sont reserve 1e droit de recourir aces armes dans certaines circons-
tances;

c) que ces reserves n’ont suscite aucune objection de 1a part des parties
aux traites de T1ate1olco ou de Rarotonga, ou de 1a part du Consei1 de
securite.

63. Ces deux traites, 1es garanties de securite donnees en 1995 par 1es
Etats dotes d’armes nucleaires et 1e fait que 1e Consei1 de securite en ait
pris acte avec satisfaction montrent que l’on se rend de mieux en mieux
compte de 1a necessite d’affranchir la communaute des Etats et le grand
public international des dangers qui resultent de l’existence des armes
nucleaires. La Cour releve d’ailleurs que tout recemment encore ont ete
signes, le 15 decembre 1995, a Bangkok, un traite sur 1a denuclearisation
du Sud-Est asiatique, et 1e 11 avril 1996, au Caire, un traite sur une zone
exempte d’armes nucleaires en Afrique. Elle ne regarde cependant pas ces
elements comme constitutifs d’une interdiction conventionnelle complete et
universelle d’emploi ou de menace d’emploi de ces armes en tant que telles.

*
64. La Cour passera maintenant a l’examen du droit international

coutumier a l’effet d’etablir si on peut tirer de cette source de droit une
interdiction de 1a menace ou de l’emploi des armes nucleaires en tant que
telles. Ainsi que la Cour l’a declare, la substance du droit international
coutumier doit «etre recherchee en premier lieu dans la pratique effective
et Yopinio juris des Etats» (Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne/Malte) , arret, C.1.J. Recueil1985, p. 29, par. 27).

65. Les Etats qui soutiennent que l’utilisation d’armes nucleaires est
illicite se sont employes ademontrer l’existence d’une regle coutumiere
portant interdiction de cette utilisation. Ils se referent a une pratique
con stante de non-utilisation des armes nucleaires par 1es Etats depuis

31

254 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

tice the expression of an opinio juris on the part of those who possess
such weapons.

66. Some other States, which assert the legality of the threat and use of
nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, invoked the doctrine and prac-
tice of deterrence in support of their argument. They recall that they have
always, in concert with certain other States, reserved the right to use
those weapons in the exercise of the right to self-defence against an
armed attack threatening their vital security interests. In their view, if
nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945, it is not on account of an
existing or nascent custom but merely because circumstances that might
justify their use have fortunately not arisen.

67. The Court does not intend to pronounce here upon the practice
known as the “policy of deterrence”. It notes that it is a fact that a
number of States adhered to that practice during the greater part of the
Cold War and continue to adhere to it. Furthermore, the members of the
international community are profoundly divided on the matter of whether
non-recourse to nuclear weapons over the past 50 years constitutes the
expression of an opinio juris. Under these circumstances the Court does
not consider itself able to find that there is such an opinio juris.

68. According to certain States, the important series of General Assem-
bly resolutions, beginning with resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November
1961, that deal with nuclear weapons and that affirm, with consistent
regularity, the illegality of nuclear weapons, signify the existence of a
rule of international customary law which prohibits recourse to those
weapons. According to other States, however, the resolutions in question
have no binding character on their own account and are not declaratory
of any customary rule of prohibition of nuclear weapons; some of these
States have also pointed out that this series of resolutions not only did
not meet with the approval of all of the nuclear-weapon States but of
many other States as well.

69. States which consider that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal
indicated that those resolutions did not claim to create any new rules, but
were confined to a confirmation of customary law relating to the prohibi-
tion of means or methods of warfare which, by their use, overstepped the
bounds of what is permissible in the conduct of hostilities. In their view,
the resolutions in question did no more than apply to nuclear weapons
the existing rules of international law applicable in armed conflict; they
were no more than the “envelope” or instrumentum containing certain
pre-existing customary rules of international law. For those States it is
accordingly of little importance that the instrumentum should have occa-
sioned negative votes, which cannot have the effect of obliterating those
customary rules which have been confirmed by treaty law.

70. The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they
are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in cer-
tain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the exist-

32

MENACE au EMPLOI D’ ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 254

1945 et veulent voir dans cette pratique l’expression d’une opinio juris des
detenteurs de ces armes.

66. Certains autres Etats, qui affirment la liceite de la menace et de
l’emploi d’armes nucleaires dans certaines circonstances, ont invoque a
l’appui de leur these la doctrine et la pratique de la dissuasion. lIs rappel-
lent qu’ils se sont toujours reserve, de concert avec certains autres Etats,
Ie droit d’utiliser ces armes dans l’exercice du droit de legitime defense
contre une agression armee mettant en danger leurs interets vitaux en
matiere de securite. A leurs yeux, si les armes nucleaires n’ont pas ete uti-
lisees depuis 1945, ce n’est pas en raison d’une coutume existante ou en
voie de creation, mais simplement parce que les circonstances susceptibles
de justifier leur emploi ne se sont heureusement pas presentees.

67. La Cour n’entend pas se prononcer ici sur la pratique denommee
«politique de dissuasion». Elle constate qu’il est de fait qu’un certain
nombre d’Etats ont adhere a cette pratique pendant la plus grande partie
de la guerre fro ide et continuent d’y adherer. De surcroit, les membres de
la communaute internationale sont profondement divises sur Ie point de
savoir si Ie non-recours aux armes nucleaires pendant les cinquante der-
nieres annees constitue l’expression d’une opinio juris. Dans ces condi-
tions, la Cour n’estime pas pouvoir conclure a l’existence d’une telle opi-
nio juris.

68. Selon certains Etats, l’abondante serie de resolutions de l’Assem-
blee generale qui, depuis la resolution 1653 (XVI) du 24 novembre 1961,
ont trait aux armes nucleaires et affirment avec une con stante regularite
l’illiceite des armes nucleaires traduit l’existence d’une regle de droit
international coutumier qui prohibe Ie recours aces armes. Selon d’autres
Etats, cependant, ces resolutions n’ont aucun caractere obligatoire par
elles-memes et ne sont declaratoires d’aucune regle coutumiere d’interdic-
tion de l’arme nucleaire ; certains de ces Etats ont egalement fait observer
que cette serie de resolutions non seulement n’a pas ete approuvee par la
totalite des Etats dotes d’armes nucleaires, mais ne l’a pas davantage ete
par de nombreux autres Etats.

69. Les Etats qui considerent que l’emploi d’armes nucleaires est illi-
cite ont indique que ces resolutions ne pretendaient pas creer de nouvelles
regles, mais se bornaient a confirmer Ie droit coutumier relatif a la pro-
hibition des moyens ou methodes de guerre qui excedent, par leur utilisa-
tion, les limites de ce qui est autorise dans la conduite d’hostilites. lIs sont
d’avis que les resolutions considerees n’ont fait qu’appliquer aux armes
nucleaires les regles existantes du droit international applicable dans les
conflits armes; elles n’auraient constitue que l’«enveloppe» ou l’instru-
mentum contenant des regles coutumieres de droit international deja exis-
tantes. Pour ces Etats, il importerait done peu que l’instrumentum se soit
heurte a des votes negatifs, qui ne peuvent avoir pour effet d’annihiler ces
regles coutumieres, confirmees par Ie droit conventionnel.

70. La Cour rappellera que les resolutions de l’ Assemblee generale,
meme si elles n’ont pas force obligatoire, peuvent parfois avoir une valeur
normative. ElIes peuvent, dans certaines circonstances, fournir des ele-

32

255 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

ence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish whether
this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look
at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see
whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of
resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required
for the establishment of a new rule.

71. Examined in their totality, the General Assembly resolutions put
before the Court declare that the use of nuclear weapons would be “a
direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations”; and in certain for-
mulations that such use “should be prohibited”. The focus of these reso-
lutions has sometimes shifted to diverse related matters; however, several
of the resolutions under consideration in the present case have been
adopted with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions;
thus, although those resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern regard-
ing the problem of nuclear weapons, they still fall short of establish-
ing the existence of an opinio juris on the illegality of the use of such
weapons.

72. The Court further notes that the first of the resolutions of the Gen-
eral Assembly expressly proclaiming the illegality of the use of nuclear
weapons, resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 (mentioned in sub-
sequent resolutions), after referring to certain international declarations
and binding agreements, from the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868
to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, proceeded to qualify the legal nature of
nuclear weapons, determine their effects, and apply general rules of cus-
tomary international law to nuclear weapons in particular. That applica-
tion by the General Assembly of general rules of customary law to the
particular case of nuclear weapons indicates that, in its view, there was
no specific rule of customary law which prohibited the use of nuclear
weapons; if such a rule had existed, the General Assembly could simply
have referred to it and would not have needed to undertake such an exer-
cise of legal qualification.

73. Having said this, the Court points out that the adoption each year
by the General Assembly, by a large majority, of resolutions recalling the
content of resolution 1653 (XVI), and requesting the member States to
conclude a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in any cir-
cumstance, reveals the desire of a very large section of the international
community to take, by a specific and express prohibition of the use of
nuclear weapons, a significant step forward along the road to complete
nuclear disarmament. The emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule
specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such is hampered
by the continuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris on the one
hand, and the still strong adherence to the practice of deterrence on the
other.

* *
33

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 255

ments de preuve importants pour etablir l’existence d’une regle ou l’emer-
gence d’une opinio juris. Pour savoir si cela est vrai d’une resolution
donnee de l’ Assemblee generale, il faut en examiner le contenu ainsi que
les conditions d’adoption; il faut en outre verifier s’il existe une opinio
juris quant a son caractere normatif. Par ailleurs des resolutions succes-
sives peuvent illustrer l’evolution progressive de l’opinio juris necessaire a
l’etablissement d’une regle nouvelle.

71. Si on les considere dans leur ensemble, les resolutions de l’Assem-
blee generale invoquees devant la Cour declarent que l’emploi d’armes
nucleaires serait «une violation directe de la Charte» et, dans certaines
versions, que cet emploi «doit … etre interdit»; dans ces resolutions,
l’ Assemblee generale a parfois mis l’accent, plutot, sur diverses questions
connexes. Plusieurs resolutions dont il est question en l’espece ont cepen-
dant ete adoptees avec un nombre non negligeable de voix contre et
d’abstentions. Ainsi, bien que lesdites resolutions constituent la manifes-
tation claire d’une inquietude profonde a l’egard du probleme des armes
nucleaires, elles n’etablissent pas encore l’existence d’une opinio juris
quant a l’illiceite de l’emploi de ces armes.

72. La Cour note par ailleurs que la premiere des resolutions de
l’ Assemblee generale a avoir proclame expressement l’illiceite du recours
a l’arme nucleaire – la resolution 1653 (XVI) du 24 novembre 1961
(mentionnee dans des resolutions ulterieures) -, apres avoir fait refe-
rence a certaines declarations internationales et a certains accords obli-
gatoires allant de la declaration de Saint-Petersbourg de 1868 au proto-
cole de Geneve de 1925, a precede a une qualification de la nature
juridique de l’arme nucleaire, a une determination de ses effets et a
l’application de regles generales du droit international coutumier al’arme
nucleaire en particulier. Cette application par l’ Assemblee de regles gene-
rales du droit coutumier au cas particulier de l’arme nucleaire indique
qu’a ses yeux il n’existait pas de regle specifique de droit coutumier inter-
disant l’emploi de l’arme nucleaire ; si une telle regie avait existe, l’ Assem-
blee generale aurait, en effet, pu se contenter de s’y referer et n’aurait pas
eu a se livrer a un tel exercice de qualification juridique.

73. Cela etant, la Cour observera que l’adoption chaque annee par
l’Assemblee generale, a une large majorite, de resolutions rappel ant Ie
contenu de la resolution 1653 (XVI) et priant les Etats Membres de
conclure une convention interdisant l’emploi d’armes nucleaires en toute
circonstance est revelatrice du desir d’une tres grande partie de la com-
munaute internationale de franchir, par une interdiction specifique et
expresse de l’emploi de l’arme nucleaire, une etape significative sur le che-
min menant au desarmement nucleaire complet. L’apparition, en tant
que lex lata, d’une regle coutumiere prohibant specifiquement l’emploi
des armes nucleaires en tant que telles se heurte aux tensions qui subsis-
tent entre, d’une part, une opinio juris naissante et, d’autre part, une
adhesion encore forte a la pratique de la dissuasion.

* *
33

256 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

74. The Court not having found a conventional rule of general scope,
nor a customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear
weapons per se, it will now deal with the question whether recourse to
nuclear weapons must be considered as illegal in the light of the prin-
ciples and rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict and of the law of neutrality.

75. A large number of customary rules have been developed by the
practice of States and are an integral part of the international law rele-
vant to the question posed. The “laws and customs of war” – as they
were traditionally called – were the subject of efforts at codification
undertaken in The Hague (including the Conventions of 1899 and 1907),
and were based partly upon the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 as
well as the results of the Brussels Conference of 1874. This “Hague Law”
and, more particularly, the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, fixed the rights and duties of belligerents in their
conduct of operations and limited the choice of methods and means of
injuring the enemy in an international armed conflict. One should add to
this the “Geneva Law” (the Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949),
which protects the victims of war and aims to provide safeguards for
disabled armed forces personnel and persons not taking part in the hos-
tilities. These two branches of the law applicable in armed conflict have
become so closely interrelated that they are considered to have gradually
formed one single complex system, known today as international humani-
tarian law. The provisions of the Additional Protocols of 1977 give
expression and attest to the unity and complexity of that law.

76. Since the turn of the century, the appearance of new means of
combat has – without calling into question the longstanding principles
and rules of international law – rendered necessary some specific prohi-
bitions of the use of certain weapons, such as explosive projectiles under
400 grammes, dum-dum bullets and asphyxiating gases. Chemical and
bacteriological weapons were then prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Proto-
col. More recently, the use of weapons producing “non-detectable frag-
ments”, of other types of “mines, booby traps and other devices”, and
of “incendiary weapons”, was either prohibited or limited, depending on
the case, by the Convention of 10 October 1980 on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
The provisions of the Convention on “mines, booby traps and other
devices” have just been amended, on 3 May 1996, and now regulate in
greater detail, for example, the use of anti-personnel land mines.

77. All this shows that the conduct of military operations is governed
by a body of legal prescriptions. This is so because “the right of belli-
gerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited” as stated
in Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations relating to the laws and
customs of war on land. The St. Petersburg Declaration had already
condemned the use of weapons “which uselessly aggravate the suffering of

34

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 256

74. La Cour n’ayant’ pas trouve de regle conventionnelle de portee gene-
rale, ni de regle coutumiere interdisant specifiquement la menace ou l’emploi
des armes nucleaires en tant que telles, elle abordera main tenant la ques-
tion de savoir si le recours aux armes nucleaires doit etre considere comme
illicite au regard des principes et regles du droit international humanitaire
applicable dans les conflits annes, ainsi que du droit de la neutralite.

75. De nombreuses regles coutumieres se sont developpees, de par la
pratique des Etats, et font partie integrante du droit international perti-
nent en l’espece. Il s’agit des «lois et coutumes de la guerre» – selon
l’expression traditionnelle – qui furent l’objet des efforts de codification
entrepris a La Haye (conventions de 1899 et de 1907 notamment) et se
fondaient partiellement sur la declaration de Saint-Petersbourg de 1868
ainsi que sur les resultats de la conference de Bruxelles de 1874. Ce «droit
de La Haye», et notamment Ie reglement concernant les lois et coutumes
de la guerre sur terre, fixe les droits et les devoirs des belligerants dans la
conduite des operations et limite le choix des moyens de nuire a l’ennemi
dans les conflits annes internationaux. 11 convient d’y ajouter le «droit de
Geneve» (les conventions de 1864, de 1906, de 1929 et de 1949), qui pro-
tege les victimes de la guerre et vise a sauvegarder les membres des forces
armees mis hors de combat et les personnes qui ne participent pas aux hos-
tilites. Ces deux branches du droit applicable dans les conflits armes ont
developpe des rapports si etroits qu’elles sont regardees comme ayant
fonde graduellement un seul systeme complexe, qu’on appelle aujourd’hui
droit international humanitaire. Les dispositions des protocoles addition-
nels de 1977 expriment et attestent l’unite et la cornplexite de ce droit.

76. Des le debut du siecle, l’apparition de nouveaux moyens de com-
bat a – sans pour autant remettre en question les anciens principes et
regles du droit international – rendu necessaires des interdictions speci-
fiques concernant l’emploi de certaines armes telles que les projectiles
explosifs d’un poids inferieur a 400 grammes, les balles dum-dum et les
gaz asphyxiants. Puis Ie protocole de Geneve de 1925 a porte prohibition
des armes chimiques et bacteriologiques, Plus recemment, l’emploi
d’armes produisant des «eclats non localisables», de certains types de
«mines, pieges et autres dispositifs», ainsi que d’«armes incendiaires» a
ete, selon les cas, interdit ou limite par la convention du 10 octobre 1980
sur l’interdiction ou la limitation de l’emploi de certaines armes clas-
siques qui peuvent etre considerees comme produisant des effets trauma-
tiques excessifs ou comme frappant sans discrimination. Les disposi-
tions de la convention concernant les «mines, pieges et autres dispositifs»
viennent d’etre arnendees Ie 3 mai 1996 et reglementent desormais plus
en detail, notamment, l’emploi des mines terrestres antipersonnel.

77. Il ressort de ce qui precede que la conduite d’operations militaires
est soumise a un ensemble de prescriptions juridiques. 11 en est ainsi car

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257 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

disabled men or make their death inevitable”. The aforementioned Regu-
lations relating to the laws and customs of war on land, annexed to the
Hague Convention IV of 1907, prohibit the use of “arms, projectiles, or
material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering” (Art. 23).

78. The cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the
fabric of humanitarian law are the following. The first is aimed at the pro-
tection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never
make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use
weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and mili-
tary targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause
unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use
weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering.
In application of that second principle, States do not have unlimited free-
dom of choice of means in the weapons they use.

The Court would likewise refer, in relation to these principles, to the
Martens Clause, which was first included in the Hague Convention II
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899 and
which has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolu-
tion of military technology. A modern version of that clause is to be
found in Article 1, paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol I of 1977, which
reads as follows:

“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection
and authority of the principles of international law derived from
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience.”

In conformity with the aforementioned principles, humanitarian law, at a
very early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons either because of
their indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians or because of the
unnecessary suffering caused to combatants, that is to say, a harm
greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives. If
an envisaged use of weapons would not meet the requirements of humani-
tarian law, a threat to engage in such use would also be contrary to that
law.

79. It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the
human person and “elementary considerations of humanity” as the Court
put it in its Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the Corfu Channel case (I. Cl.
Reports 1949, p. 22), that the Hague and Geneva Conventions have
enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental rules are to be
observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions
that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of
international customary law.

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MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 257

aggraveraient inutilement les souffrances des hommes mis hors de com-
bat, ou rendraient leur mort inevitable». Le reglement concernant les lois
et coutumes de la guerre sur terre evoque ci-dessus, qui est annexe a la
convention IV de La Haye de 1907, interdit d’«employer des armes, des
projectiles ou des matieres propres acauser des maux superflus» (art. 23).

78. Les principes cardinaux contenus dans les textes formant le tissu
du droit humanitaire sont les suivants. Le premier principe est destine a
proteger la population civile et les biens de caractere civil, et etablit la
distinction entre combattants et non-combattants; les Etats ne doivent
jamais prendre pour cible des civils, ni en consequence utiliser des armes
qui sont dans l’incapacite de distinguer entre cibles civiles et cibles mili-
taires. Selon le second principe, il ne faut pas causer des maux superflus
aux combattants: il est done interdit d’utiliser des armes leur causant de
tels maux ou aggravant inutilement leurs souffrances; en application de
ce second principe, les Etats n’ont pas un choix illimite quant aux armes
qu’ils emploient.

La Cour citera egalement, en relation avec ces principes, la clause de
Martens, enoncee pour la premiere fois dans la convention II de La Haye
de 1899 concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre et qui s’est
revelee etre un moyen efficace pour faire face a l’evolution rapide des
techniques militaires. Une version contemporaine de ladite clause se
trouve a l’article premier, paragraphe 2, du protocole additionnel I de
1977, qui se lit comme suit:

«Dans les cas non prevus par le present protocole ou par d’autres
accords internationaux, les personnes civiles et les combattants res-
tent sous la sauvegarde et sous l’empire des principes du droit des
gens, tels qu’ils resultent des usages etablis, des principes de l’huma-
nite et des exigences de la conscience publique.»

Conformement aux principes susmentionnes, le droit humanitaire a tres
tot banni certaines armes, soit parce qu’elles frappaient de facon indis-
criminee les combattants et les populations civiles, soit parce qu’elles
causaient aux combattants des souffrances inutiles, c’est-a-dire des souf-
frances superieures aux maux inevitables que suppose la realisation d’ob-
jectifs militaires legitimes. Dans le cas ou l’emploi envisage d’une arme ne
satisferait pas aux exigences du droit humanitaire, la menace d’un tel em-
ploi contreviendrait elle aussi a ce droit.

79. C’est sans doute parce qu’un grand nombre de regles du droit
humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armes sont si fondamentales pour
le respect de la per sonne humaine et pour des «considerations elemen-
taires d’humanite», selon l’expression utilisee par la Cour dans son arret du
9 avril 1949 rendu en l’affaire du Detroit de Corfou (Cl.l. Recueil1949,
p. 22), que la convention IV de La Haye et les conventions de Geneve ont
beneficie d’une large adhesion des Etats. Ces regles fondamentales s’impo-
sent d’ailleurs a tous les Etats, qu’ils aient ou non ratifie les instruments
conventionnels qui les expriment, parce qu’elles constituent des principes
intransgressibles du droit international coutumier.

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258 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

80. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal had already found
in 1945 that the humanitarian rules included in the Regulations annexed
to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 “were recognized by all civilized
nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs
of war” (Trial of the Major War Criminals, 14 November 1945-1 October
1946, Nuremberg, 1947, Vol. 1, p. 254).

81. The Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Security Council resolution 808 (1993), with which he introduced the
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, and
which was unanimously approved by the Security Council (resolution
827 (1993», stated:

“In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the prin-
ciple nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal
should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are
beyond any doubt part of customary law …

The part of conventional international humanitarian law which
has beyond doubt become part of international customary law is the
law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims; the
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907;
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945.”

82. The extensive codification of humanitarian law and the extent of
the accession to the resultant treaties, as well as the fact that the denun-
ciation clauses that existed in the codification instruments have never
been used, have provided the international community with a corpus of
treaty rules the great majority of which had already become customary
and which reflected the most universally recognized humanitarian prin-
ciples. These rules indicate the normal conduct and behaviour expected
of States.

83. It has been maintained in these proceedings that these principles
and rules of humanitarian law are part of jus cogens as defined in
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May
1969. The question whether a norm is part of the jus cogens relates to the
legal character of the norm. The request addressed to the Court by the
General Assembly raises the question of the applicability of the principles
and rules of humanitarian law in cases of recourse to nuclear weapons
and the consequences of that applicability for the legality of recourse to
these weapons. But it does not raise the question of the character of the
humanitarian law which would apply to the use of nuclear weapons.
There is, therefore, no need for the Court to pronounce on this matter.

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MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 258

80. Deja en 1945, Ie Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg
avait juge que les regles humanitaires contenues dans Ie reglement annexe
a la convention IV de La Haye de 1907 «etaient admises par tous les
Etats civilises et regardees par eux comme l’expression, codifiee, des lois
et coutumes de la guerre» (Prods des grands criminels de guerre devant
le Tribunal militaire international, Nuremberg, 14 novembre 1945-
I” octobre 1946, Nuremberg, 1947, vol. 1, p. 267).

81. Dans Ie rapport qu’il a etabli en application du paragraphe 2 de la
resolution 808 (1993) du Conseil de securite, par lequel il presentait Ie sta-
tut du tribunal international charge de poursuivre les personnes presumees
responsables de violations graves du droit international humanitaire com-
mises sur Ie territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie depuis 1991 – rapport unani-
mement approuve par Ie Conseil de securite (resolution 827 (1993)) -, Ie
Secretaire general declarait ce qui suit:

«De l’avis du Secretaire general, l’application du principe nullum
crimen sine lege exige que Ie Tribunal international applique des
regles du droit international humanitaire qui font partie sans aucun
doute possible du droit coutumier…

La partie du droit international humanitaire conventionnel qui est
sans aucun doute devenue partie du droit international coutumier
est Ie droit applicable aux conflits armes qui fait l’objet des instru-
ments suivants: les conventions de Geneve du 12 aout 1949 pour la
protection des victimes de la guerre; la convention de La Haye (IV)
concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre et les regles y
annexees du 18 octobre 1907; la convention pour la prevention et la
repression du crime de genocide du 9 decembre 1948 et Ie statut du
Tribunal militaire international du 8 aout 1945.»

82. La large codification du droit humanitaire et l’etendue de l’adhe-
sion aux traites qui en ont resulte, ainsi que Ie fait que les clauses de
denonciation contenues dans les instruments de codification n’ ont jamais
ete utilisees, ont permis a la communaute internationale de disposer d’un
corps de regles conventionnelles qui etaient deja devenues coutumieres
dans leur grande majorite et qui correspondaient aux principes humani-
taires les plus universellement reconnus. Ces regles indiquent ce que sont
les conduites et comportements normalement attendus des Etats.

83. II a ete soutenu au cours de la presente procedure que ces principes
et regles du droit humanitaire font partie du jus cogens tel que Ie definit
l’article 53 de la convention de Vienne sur Ie droit des traites du 23 mai
1969. La question de savoir si une regle fait partie dujus cogens a trait a
la nature juridique de cette regle, La demande que l’Assemblee generale a
adressee a la Cour souleve la question de l’applicabilite des principes et
regles du droit humanitaire en cas de recours aux armes nucleaires, et
celle des consequences que cette applicabilite aurait sur la liceite du
recours aces armes; mais elle ne souleve pas la question de savoir quelle
serait la nature du droit humanitaire qui s’appliquerait a l’emploi des
armes nucleaires. La Cour n’a donc pas a se prononcer sur ce point.

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259 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

84. Nor is there any need for the Court to elaborate on the question of
the applicability of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to nuclear weapons. It
need only observe that while, at the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977,
there was no substantive debate on the nuclear issue and no specific solu-
tion concerning this question was put forward, Additional Protocol I in
no way replaced the general customary rules applicable to all means and
methods of combat including nuclear weapons. In particular, the Court
recalls that all States are bound by those rules in Additional Protocol I
which, when adopted, were merely the expression of the pre-existing
customary law, such as the Martens Clause, reaffirmed in the first
article of Additional Protocol I. The fact that certain types of weapons
were not specifically dealt with by the 1974-1977 Conference does not
permit the drawing of any legal conclusions relating to the substantive
issues which the use of such weapons would raise.

85. Turning now to the applicability of the principles and rules of
humanitarian law to a possible threat or use of nuclear weapons, the
Court notes that doubts in this respect have sometimes been voiced on
the ground that these principles and rules had evolved prior to the inven-
tion of nuclear weapons and that the Conferences of Geneva of 1949 and
1974-1977 which respectively adopted the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the two Additional Protocols thereto did not deal with nuclear
weapons specifically. Such views, however, are only held by a small
minority. In the view of the vast majority of States as well as writers there
can be no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear
weapons.

86. The Court shares that view. Indeed, nuclear weapons were invented
after most of the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict had already come into existence; the Conferences of 1949
and 1974-1977 left these weapons aside, and there is a qualitative as well
as quantitative difference between nuclear weapons and all conventional
arms. However, it cannot be concluded from this that the established
principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict did
not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be incompatible
with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in
question which permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to
all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those
of the present and those of the future. In this respect it seems significant
that the thesis that the rules of humanitarian law do not apply to the new
weaponry, because of the newness of the latter, has not been advocated
in the present proceedings. On the contrary, the newness of nuclear
weapons has been expressly rejected as an argument against the applica-
tion to them of international humanitarian law:

“In general, international humanitarian law bears on the threat or
use of nuclear weapons as it does of other weapons.

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MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 259

84. La Cour n’a pas non plus a s’etendre sur la question de l’applica-
bilite aux armes nucleaires du protocole additionnel I de 1977. II lui suf-
fira d’observer que, si la conference diplomatique de 1974-1977 n’a
consacre aucun debat de fond a la question nucleaire et si aucune solu-
tion specifique concernant cette question n’y a ete avancee, Ie protocole
additionnel I n’a en aucune maniere remplace les regles generales coutu-
mieres qui s’appliquaient a to us les moyens et a toutes les methodes de
combat, y compris les armes nucleaires. La Cour rappellera en particulier
que tous les Etats sont lies par celles des regles du protocole addition-
nel I qui ne representaient, au moment de leur adoption, que l’expression du
droit coutumier preexistant, comme c’est Ie cas de la clause de Martens,
reaffirmee a l’article premier dudit protocole. Le fait que la conference de
1974-1977 n’ait pas traite specifiquement de certains types d’armes ne
permet de tirer aucune conclusion juridique quant aux problemes de fond
que Ie recours aces armes souleverait.

85. Passant ensuite a la question de l’applicabilite des principes et
regles du droit humanitaire a la menace ou a l’emploi eventuels d’armes
nucleaires, la Cour note que des do utes ont parfois ete exprimes sur ce
point, au motif que les principes et regles en question se sont developpes
avant l’invention des armes nucleaires et que les conferences de Geneve
de 1949 et de 1974-1977, qui ont adopte, respectivement, les quatre
conventions de Geneve de 1949 et les deux protocoles additionnels y rela-
tifs, n’ont pas specifiquement traite des armes nucleaires. Ce point de vue
est toutefois tres minoritaire. De l’avis de la grande majorite des Etats et
de la doctrine, il ne fait aucun doute que Ie droit humanitaire s’applique
aux armes nucleaires.

86. La Cour partage cet avis. Certes les armes nucleaires ont ete
inventees apres l’apparition de la plupart des principes et regles du droit
humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armes, les conferences de 1949 et
de 1974-1977 n’ont pas traite de ces armes et celles-ci sont differentes des
armes classiques tant sur Ie plan qualitatif que sur Ie plan quantitatif. On
ne peut cependant en conclure que les principes et regles etablis du droit
humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armes ne s’appliquent pas aux
armes nucleaires. Une telle conclusion meconnaitrait la nature intrinse-
quement humanitaire des principes juridiques en jeu, qui impregnent
tout Ie droit des conflits armes et s’appliquent a to utes les formes de
guerre et a toutes les armes, celles du passe, comme celles du present et
de l’avenir. II est significatif a cet egard que la these selon laquelle les
regles du droit humanitaire ne s’appliqueraient pas aux armes nouvelles,
en raison meme de leur nouveaute, n’ait pas ete invoquee en l’espece.
Tout au contraire, l’argument suivant lequel ces armes echapperaient
par leur nouveaute au droit international humanitaire a ete expresse-
ment rejete en ces termes:

«De maniere generale, Ie droit international humanitaire s’ap-
plique a la menace ou a l’emploi d’armes nucleaires comme il s’ap-
plique a d’autres armes.

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260 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

International humanitarian law has evolved to meet contempo-
rary circumstances, and is not limited in its application to weaponry
of an earlier time. The fundamental principles of this law endure:
to mitigate and circumscribe the cruelty of war for humanitarian
reasons.” (New Zealand, Written Statement, p. 15, paras. 63-64.)

None of the statements made before the Court in any way advocated a
freedom to use nuclear weapons without regard to humanitarian con-
straints. Quite the reverse; it has been explicitly stated,

“Restrictions set by the rules applicable to armed conflicts in
respect of means and methods of warfare definitely also extend to
nuclear weapons” (Russian Federation, CR 95/29, p. 52);

“So far as the customary law of war is concerned, the United
Kingdom has always accepted that the use of nuclear weapons is
subject to the general principles of the jus in bello” (United King-
dom, CR95/34, p. 45);

and

“The United States has long shared the view that the law of armed
conflict governs the use of nuclear weapons – just as it governs the
use of conventional weapons” (United States of America, CR 95/34,
p.85).

87. Finally, the Court points to the Martens Clause, whose continuing
existence and applicability is not to be doubted, as an affirmation that the
principles and rules of humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons.

*
88. The Court will now turn to the principle of neutrality which was

raised by several States. In the context of the advisory proceedings
brought before the Court by the WHO concerning the Legality of the
Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the position was
put as follows by one State:

“The principle of neutrality, in its classic sense, was aimed at pre-
venting the incursion of belligerent forces into neutral territory, or
attacks on the persons or ships of neutrals. Thus: ‘the territory of
neutral powers is inviolable’ (Article I of the Hague Convention (V)
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land, concluded on 18 October 1907); ‘belligerents
are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral powers . . .’
(Article I to the Hague Convention (XIII) Respecting the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, concluded on 18 October
1907), ‘neutral states have equal interest in having their rights
respected by belligerents .. .’ (Preamble to Convention on Maritime

38

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 260

Le droit international humanitaire a evolue pour tenir compte des
circonstances et son application ne se limite pas aux armements du
passe. Les principes fondamentaux de ce droit demeurent: attenuer
et limiter la cruaute de la guerre pour des raisons humanitaires.»
(Nouvelle-Zelande, expose ecrit, p. 15, par. 63-64.)

Aucun des exposes presentes a la Cour n’a preconise de quelque facon
que ce soit la liberte de recourir aux armes nucleaires en dehors de toute
contrainte humanitaire. Bien au contraire, il a ete soutenu expressement
ce qui suit:

«Les restrictions imposees par les regles applicables aux conflits
arrnes en ce qui concerne les moyens et methodes de guerre s’eten-
dent assurement aux armes nucleaires» (Federation de Russie,
CR95/29, p. 52);

«En ce qui concerne Ie droit coutumier de la guerre, Ie Royaume-
Uni a toujours admis que I’emploi d’armes nucleaires est assujetti
aux principes generaux du jus in bello» (Royaume-Uni, CR95/34,
p.45);

et:

«Cela fait longtemps que les Etats-Unis pensent que Ie droit des
conflits annes regit l’emploi d’armes nucleaires comme il regit
d’ailleurs celui d’armes classiques» (Etats-Unis d’Amerique,
CR 95/34, p. 85).

87. Enfin, la Cour voit dans la clause de Martens, qui continue indu-
bitablement d’exister et d’etre applicable, la confirmation que les prin-
cipes et regles du droit humanitaire s’appliquent aux armes nucleaires.

*
88. La Cour abordera maintenant I’examen du principe de neutralite,

qui a ete evoque par certains Etats. Dans Ie cadre de la procedure consul-
tative engagee devant la Cour par I’OMS au sujet de la Lichte de l’uti-
lisation des armes nucleaires par un Etat dans un canflit arme, la situation
a ete presentee comme suit par un Etat:

«Dans sa portee classique, Ie principe de neutralite etait destine a
prevenir I’incursion de forces belligerantes sur Ie terri to ire d’un Etat
neutre, ou bien les attaques dirigees contre les personnes ou les na-
vires d’Etats neutres. C’est ainsi que

38

261 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

Neutrality, concluded on 20 February 1928). It is clear, however,
that the principle of neutrality applies with equal force to trans-
border incursions of armed forces and to the transborder damage
caused to a neutral State by the use of a weapon in a belligerent
State.” (Nauru, Written Statement (I), p. 35, IV E.)

The principle so circumscribed is presented as an established part of the
customary international law.

89. The Court finds that as in the case of the principles of humanitar-
ian law applicable in armed conflict, international law leaves no doubt
that the principle of neutrality, whatever its content, which is of a fun-
damental character similar to that of the humanitarian principles and
rules, is applicable (subject to the relevant provisions of the United
Nations Charter), to all international armed conflict, whatever type of
weapons might be used.

*
90. Although the applicability of the principles and rules of humani-

tarian law and of the principle of neutrality to nuclear weapons is hardly
disputed, the conclusions to be drawn from this applicability are, on the
other hand, controversial.

91. According to one point of view, the fact that recourse to nuclear
weapons is subject to and regulated by the law of armed conflict does not
necessarily mean that such recourse is as such prohibited. As one State
put it to the Court:

“Assuming that a State’s use of nuclear weapons meets the require-
ments of self-defence, it must then be considered whether it con-
forms to the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict
regulating the conduct of hostilities” (United Kingdom, Written
Statement, p. 40, para. 3.44);

“the legality of the use of nuclear weapons must therefore be assessed
in the light of the applicable principles of international law regarding
the use of force and the conduct of hostilities, as is the case with
other methods and means of warfare” (ibid., p. 75, para. 4.2 (3));

and

“The reality … is that nuclear weapons might be used in a wide
variety of circumstances with very different results in terms of likely
civilian casualties. In some cases, such as the use of a low yield
nuclear weapon against warships on the High Seas or troops in
sparsely populated areas, it is possible to envisage a nuclear attack
which caused comparatively few civilian casualties. It is by no means
the case that every use of nuclear weapons against a military objec-
tive would inevitably cause very great collateral civilian casualties.”

39

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 261

Ie meme interet a ce que leurs droits soient respectes par les bellige-
rants … » (preambule a la convention concernant la neutralite mari-
time, conclue Ie 20 fevrier 1928). II est evident, cependant, que Ie
principe de neutralite s’applique avec une force egale aux incursions
transfrontieres de forces armees et aux dommages transfrontieres
causes aun Etat neutre par l’utilisation d’une arme dans un Etatbel-
ligerant.» (Nauru, expose ecrit (1), p. 35, IV E.)

Le principe ainsi circonscrit est presente comme un element etabli du
droit international coutumier.

89. La Cour estime que, comme dans Ie cas des principes du droit
humanitaire applicable dans les conflits annes, Ie droit international ne
laisse aucun doute quant au fait que Ie principe de neutralite – quel
qu’en soit Ie contenu -, qui a un caractere fondamental analogue a celui
des principes et regles humanitaires, s’applique (sous reserve des disposi-
tions pertinentes de la Charte des Nations Unies) atous les conflits arrnes
internationaux, quel que soit Ie type d’arme utilise.

*
90. Si l’applicabilite aux armes nucleaires des principes et regles du

droit humanitaire ainsi que du principe de neutralite n’est guere contes-
tee, les consequences qu’il y a lieu de tirer de cette applicabilite sont en
revanche controversees,

91. Selon un point de vue, Ie fait que Ie recours aux armes nucleaires
soit regi par Ie droit des conflits armes ne signifie pas necessairement qu’il
soit interdit en tant que tel. Comme un Etat l’a dit devant la Cour:

«A supposer que l’emploi d’armes nucleaires par un Etat reponde
aux exigences de la legitime defense, encore faut-il considerer s’il res-
peete les principes fondamentaux du droit des conflits armes regis-
sant la conduite des hostilites» (Royaume-Uni, expose ecrit, p. 40,
par. 3.44);

«Ia liceite de l’utilisation d’arrnes nucleaires doit done s’apprecier au
regard des principes applicables du droit international concernant l’em-
ploi de la force et la conduite des hostilites, comme c’est Ie cas pour
les autres methodes et moyens de guerre» (ibid., p. 75, par. 4.2, 3);

et

«en realite, les armes nucleaires peuvent etre utili sees dans une
large variete de circonstances, avec des resultats tres differents du
point de vue des pertes civiles probables. Dans certains cas, tel
l’emploi d’une arme nucleaire de faible puissance contre des navires
de guerre en haute mer ou sur des troupes dans une region a la
population tres clairsemee, il est possible d’envisager une attaque
nucleaire produisant relativement peu de pertes civiles. II n’est abso-
lument pas exact que toute utilisation d’armes nucleaires contre un

39

262 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

(Ibid., p. 53, para. 3.70; see also United States of America, CR95/
34, pp. 89-90.)

92. Another view holds that recourse to nuclear weapons could never
be compatible with the principles and rules of humanitarian law and is
therefore prohibited. In the event of their use, nuclear weapons would in
all circumstances be unable to draw any distinction between the civilian
population and combatants, or between civilian objects and military
objectives, and their effects, largely uncontrollable, could not be restricted,
either in time or in space, to lawful military targets. Such weapons would
kill and destroy in a necessarily indiscriminate manner, on account of the
blast, heat and radiation occasioned by the nuclear explosion and the
effects induced; and the number of casualties which would ensue would
be enormous. The use of nuclear weapons would therefore be prohibited
in any circumstance, notwithstanding the absence of any explicit conven-
tional prohibition. That view lay at the basis of the assertions by certain
States before the Court that nuclear weapons are by their nature illegal
under customary international law, by virtue of the fundamental prin-
ciple of humanity.

93. A similar view has been expressed with respect to the effects of the
principle of neutrality. Like the principles and rules of humanitarian law,
that principle has therefore been considered by some to rule out the use
of a weapon the effects of which simply cannot be contained within the
territories of the contending States.

94. The Court would observe that none of the States advocating the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances,
including the “clean” use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear weapons,
has indicated what, supposing such limited use were feasible, would be
the precise circumstances justifying such use; nor whether such limited
use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high yield nuclear
weapons. This being so, the Court does not consider that it has a suffi-
cient basis for a determination on the validity of this view.

95. Nor can the Court make a determination on the validity of the
view that the recourse to nuclear weapons would be illegal in any circum-
stance owing to their inherent and total incompatibility with the law
applicable in armed conflict. Certainly, as the Court has already indi-
cated, the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict – at
the heart of which is the overriding consideration of humanity – make
the conduct of armed hostilities subject to a number of strict require-
ments. Thus, methods and means of warfare, which would preclude any
distinction between civilian and military targets, or which would result in
unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited. In view of the
unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the Court has referred
above, the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with
respect for such requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considers that it

40

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 262

objectif militaire s’accompagnerait inevitablement de tres lourdes
pertes civiles.» (Royaume-Uni, expose ecrit, p. 53, par. 3.70; voir
egalement Etats-Unis d’Amerique, CR95/34, p. 89-90.)

92. Selon un autre point de vue, Ie recours aux armes nucleaires ne
pourrait en aucun cas etre compatible avec les principes et regles du droit
humanitaire, et est done interdit. Dans Ie cas OU elles seraient employees,
les armes nucleaires seraient en toute hypothese dans l’incapacite de faire
la distinction entre population civile et combattants ou entre biens de
caractere civil et objectifs militaires, et leurs effets, largement incontro-
lables, ne pourraient etre restreints, ni dans Ie temps ni dans l’espace, a des
cibles militaires Iegitimes, Ces armes tueraient et detruiraient d’une facon
necessairement indiscrirninee du fait du souffle, de la chaleur et du rayon-
nement provoques par l’explosion nucleaire et des effets induits de celle-
ci; et Ie nombre de victimes qui s’ensuivrait serait enorme. L’utilisation de
l’arme nucleaire serait done prohibee en toute circonstance, et cela meme
en l’absence d’une interdiction conventionnelle explicite. C’est precise-
ment en s’appuyant sur cette idee que certains Etats ont indique a la Cour
que les armes nucleaires sont par leur nature illicites au regard du droit
international coutumier, en vertu du principe fondamental d’humanite,

93. Une opinion analogue a ete exprimee pour ce qui est des effets du
principe de neutralite. II a ainsi ete soutenu par certains que ce principe,
comme les principes et regles du droit humanitaire, prohiberait l’emploi
d’une arme dont les effets ne pourraient etre limites en toute certitude
aux territoires des Etats en conflit.

94. La Cour relevera qu’aucun des Etats qui soutiennent qu’il serait
licite d’utiliser des armes nucleaires dans certaines circonstances, et notam-
ment d’utiliser «proprement » des armes nucleaires plus petites, de faible
puissance ou tactiques, n’a indique quelles seraient – a supposer que cet
emploi limite soit reellement possible – les circonstances precises justi-
fiant un tel emploi, ni demontre que cet emploi limite ne conduirait pas a
une escalade vers un recours generalise aux armes nucleaires de forte
puissance. En I’etat, la Cour n’estime pas disposer des bases necessaires
pour pouvoir se prononcer sur Ie bien-fonde de cette these.

95. La Cour ne peut davantage se prononcer sur Ie bien-fonde de la
these selon laquelle Ie recours aux armes nucleaires serait illicite en toute
circonstance du fait de l’incompatibilite inherente et totale de ces armes
avec Ie droit applicable dans les conflits annes. Certes, comme la Cour l’a
deja indique, les principes et regles du droit applicable dans les conflits
armes – qui reposent essentiellement sur Ie principe primordial d’huma-
nite – soumettent la conduite des hostilites armees a un certain nombre
d’exigences strictes. Ainsi, les methodes et moyens de guerre qui ne per-
mettraient pas de distinguer entre cibles civiles et cibles militaires, ou qui
auraient pour effet de causer des souffrances inutiles aux combattants,
sont interdits. Eu egard aux caracteristiques uniques des armes nucleaires
auxquelles la Cour s’est referee ci-dessus, l’utilisation de ces armes n’appa-
rait effectivement guere conciliable avec Ie respect de telles exigences. Nean-

40

263 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty
that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circum-
stance.

96. Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right
of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake.

Nor can it ignore the practice referred to as “policy of deterrence”, to
which an appreciable section of the international community adhered for
many years. The Court also notes the reservations which certain nuclear-
weapon States have appended to the undertakings they have given,
notably under the Protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga,
and also under the declarations made by them in connection with the
extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
not to resort to such weapons.

97. Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law
viewed as a whole, as examined above by the Court, and of the elements
of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a
definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which
its very survival would be at stake.

** *
98. Given the eminently difficult issues that arise in applying the law

on the use of force and above all the law applicable in armed conflict to
nuclear weapons, the Court considers that it now needs to examine one
further aspect of the question before it, seen in a broader context.

In the long run, international law, and with it the stability of the inter-
national order which it is intended to govern, are bound to suffer from
the continuing difference of views with regard to the legal status of
weapons as deadly as nuclear weapons. It is consequently important to
put an end to this state of affairs: the long-promised complete nuclear
disarmament appears to be the most appropriate means of achieving
that result.

99. In these circumstances, the Court appreciates the full importance
of the recognition by Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons of an obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear
disarmament. This provision is worded as follows:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotia-
tions in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.”

41

MENACE au EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 263

moins, la Cour considere qu’elle ne dispose pas des elements suffisants
pour pouvoir conclure avec certitude que l’emploi d’arrnes nucleaires
serait necessairement contraire aux principes et regles du droit applicable
dans les conflits annes en toute circonstance.

96. La Cour ne saurait au demeurant perdre de vue Ie droit fondamen-
tal qu’a tout Etat it la survie, et done Ie droit qu’il a de recourir it la legi-
time defense, conformement it I’article 51 de la Charte, lorsque cette
survie est en cause.

Elle ne peut davantage ignorer la pratique denommee «politique de
dissuasion» it laquelle une partie appreciable de la communaute interna-
tionale a adhere pendant des annees. La Cour note aussi les reserves que
certains Etats dotes d’armes nucleaires ont apportees aux engagements
qu’ils ont pris, en vertu, notamment, des protocoles aux traites de Tlate-
loleo et de Rarotonga, ainsi que des declarations faites par eux dans Ie
cadre de la prorogation du traite sur la non-proliferation des armes
nucleaires, de ne pas recourir it ces armes.

97. En consequence, au vu de l’etat actuel du droit international pris
dans son ensemble, tel qu’elle l’a examine ci-dessus, ainsi que des ele-
ments de fait it sa disposition, la Cour est amenee it constater qu’elle ne
saurait conclure de facon definitive it la liceite ou it l’illiceite de I’emploi
d’armes nucleaires par un Etat dans une circonstance extreme de legitime
defense dans laquelle sa survie meme serait en cause.

** *
98. Compte tenu des questions eminemment difficiles que souleve

I’application it I’arme nucleaire du droit relatif it I’emploi de la force, et
surtout du droit applicable dans les conflits annes, la Cour estime devoir
examiner main tenant un autre aspect de la question po see, dans un
contexte plus large.

A terme, Ie droit international et avec lui la stabilite de l’ordre inter-
national qu’il a pour vocation de regir ne peuvent que souffrir des diver-
gences de vues qui subsistent aujourd’hui quant au statut juridique d’une
arme aussi meurtriere que I’arme nucleaire. II s’avere par consequent
important de mettre fin it cet etat de choses: le desarmement nucleaire
complet promis de longue date se presente comme Ie moyen privilegie de
parvenir it ce resultat.

99. La Cour mesure dans ces circonstances toute l’importance de la
consecration par I’article VI du traite sur la non-proliferation des armes
nucleaires d’une obligation de negocier de bonne foi un desarmement
nucleaire. Cette disposition est ainsi libellee:

«Chacune des parties au traite s’engage it poursuivre de bonne foi
des negociations sur des mesures efficaces relatives it la cessation de
la course aux armements nucleaires it une date rapprochee et au
desarmement nucleaire et sur un traite de desarmement general et
complet sous un controle international strict et efficace.»

41

264 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation
of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a pre-
cise result – nuclear disarmament in all its aspects – by adopting a par-
ticular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the
matter in good faith.

100. This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations
formally concerns the 182 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other words, the vast majority
of the international community.

Virtually the whole of this community appears moreover to have been
involved when resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly con-
cerning nuclear disarmament have repeatedly been unanimously adopted.
Indeed, any realistic search for general and complete disarmament, espe-
cially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the co-operation of all States.

101. Even the very first General Assembly resolution, unanimously
adopted on 24 January 1946 at the London session, set up a commission
whose terms of reference included making specific proposals for, among
other things, “the elimination from national armaments of atomic
weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”.
In a large number of subsequent resolutions, the General Assembly has re-
affirmed the need for nuclear disarmament. Thus, in resolution 808 A (IX)
of 4 November 1954, which was likewise unanimously adopted, it con-
cluded

“that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on com-
prehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft
international disarmament convention providing for: . . . (b) The
total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons
and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the
conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful pur-
poses.”

The same conviction has been expressed outside the United Nations
context in various instruments.

102. The obligation expressed in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons includes its fulfilment in accordance
with the basic principle of good faith. This basic principle is set forth in
Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It was reflected in the Declaration
on Friendly Relations between States (resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 Octo-
ber 1970) and in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of 1 August
1975. It is also embodied in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, according to which “[e]very treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith”.

N or has the Court omitted to draw attention to it, as follows:

“One of the basic principles governing the creation and perform-

42

MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 264

La portee juridique de l’obligation consideree depasse celle d’une simple
obligation de comportement; l’obligation en cause ici est celle de parvenir
a un resultat precis ~ le desarmement nucleaire dans to us ses aspects ~
par l’adoption d’un comportement determine, a savoir la poursuite de
bonne foi de negociations en la matiere.

100. Cette double obligation de negocier et de conclure concerne for-
mellement les cent quatre-vingt-deux Etats parties au traite sur la non-
proliferation des armes nucleaires, c’est-a-dire la tres grande majorite de
la communaute internationale.

C’est d’ailleurs pratiquement l’ensemble de cette communaute qui a
paru concernee lorsqu’a diverses reprises des resolutions de l’Assemblee
generale des Nations Unies concernant Ie desarmement nucleaire ont ete
adoptees a I’unanimite. De fait, to ute recherche realiste d’un desarme-
ment general et complet, en particulier nucleaire, necessite la cooperation
de to us les Etats.

101. Deja, la toute premiere resolution de l’Assemblee generale,
adoptee a l’unanimite le 24 janvier 1946 a la session de Londres, portait
creation d’une commission dont l’un des mandats consistait a presenter
des propositions en vue notamment d’c eliminer, des armements natio-
naux, les armes atomiques et toutes autres armes importantes permettant
des destructions massives». Dans un grand nombre de resolutions ulte-
rieures, l’ Assemblee generale a reaffirme la necessite de ce desarmement
nucleaire, Ainsi, dans sa resolution 808 A (IX) du 4 novembre 1954,
adoptee egalement a l’unanimite, elle a estime

«qu’un nouvel effort [devait] etre fait en vue d’aboutir a un accord
sur des propositions completes et coordonnees qui seraient incorpo-
rees dans un projet de convention internationale sur le desarmement
prevoyant: … b) L’interdiction complete de l’utilisation et de la
fabrication des armes nucleaires et des armes de destruction massive
de toute sorte, ainsi que la transformation a des fins pacifiques des
stocks d’armes nucleaires existants.»

La meme conviction a ete exprimee en dehors du cadre des Nations
Unies dans divers instruments.

102. L’obligation exprimee a l’article VI du traite sur la non-prolifera-
tion des armes nucleaires inclut sa pro pre execution conformement au
principe de bonne foi. Ce principe de base est enonce a l’article 2, para-
graphe 2, de la Charte. 11 a ete reflete dans la declaration sur les relations
amicales entre Etats (resolution 2625 (XXV) du 24 octobre 1970) ainsi
que dans l’acte final de la conference d’Helsinki du ler aout 1975; il a
aussi ete incorpore a l’article 26 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit
des traites du 23 mai 1969, aux termes duquel «[tjout traite en vigueur lie
les parties et doit etre execute par elles de bonne foi ».

La Cour n’a pas non plus manque d’evoquer ledit principe en ces termes:

«L’un des principes de base qui president a la creation et a l’exe-

42

265 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

ance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good
faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation,
in particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becom-
ing increasingly essential.” (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),
Judgment, 1.c.i. Reports 1974, p. 268, para. 46.)

103. In its resolution 984 (1995) dated 11 April 1995, the Security
Council took care to reaffirm “the need for all States Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply fully
with all their obligations” and urged

“all States, as provided for in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effec-
tive international control which remains a universal goal”.

The importance of fulfilling the obligation expressed in Article VI of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was also
reaffirmed in the final document of the Review and Extension Conference
of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
held from 17 April to 12 May 1995.

In the view of the Court, it remains without any doubt an objective of
vital importance to the whole of the international community today.

* * *
104. At the end of the present Opinion, the Court emphasizes that its

reply to the question put to it by the General Assembly rests on the total-
ity of the legal grounds set forth by the Court above (paragraphs 20 to
103), each of which is to be read in the light of the others. Some of these
grounds are not such as to form the object of formal conclusions in the
final paragraph of the Opinion; they nevertheless retain, in the view of
the Court, all their importance.

* * *
105. For these reasons,

THE COURT,

(1) By thirteen votes to one,

Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion;
IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges

Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi,
Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins;

AGAINST: Judge Oda;

43

MENACE au EMPLOI O’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 265

cution d’obligations juridiques, quelle qu’en soit la source, est celui
de la bonne foi. La confiance reciproque est une condition inherente
de la cooperation internationale, surtout aune epoque OU, dans bien
des domaines, cette cooperation est de plus en plus indispensable.»
(Essais nucleaires (Australie c. France), arret, C.I.J. Recueil 1974,
p. 268, par. 46.)

103. Dans sa resolution 984 (1995) en date du 11 avril 1995, Ie Conseil
de securite a tenu a reaffirmer qu’il etait «necessaire que to us les Etats
parties au traite sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires s’acquittent
pleinement de to utes leurs obligations» et a exhorte

«tous les Etats a poursuivre de bonne foi, comme il est stipule a
l’article VI du traite sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires,
des negociations sur des mesures efficaces relatives au desarmement
nucleaire et sur un traite de desarmement general et complet sous un
controle international strict et efficace, qui demeure un objectif uni-
versel».

L’importance de l’execution de l’obligation exprimee a l’article VI du
traite sur la non-proliferation des armes nucleaires a aussi ete reaffirmee
dans le document final de la conference des parties au traite sur la non-
proliferation des armes nucleaires chargee d’examiner Ie traite et la ques-
tion de sa prorogation, qui s’est tenue du 17 avril au 12 mai 1995.

De l’avis de la Cour, il s’agit la indubitablement d’un objectif qui demeure
vital pour l’ensemble de la communaute internationale aujourd’hui.

* * *
104. Au terme du present avis, la Cour tient asouligner que sa reponse

a la question qui lui a ete posee par l’ Assemblee generale repose sur
l’ensemble des motifs qu’elle a exposes ci-dessus (paragraphes 20 a 103),
lesquels doivent etre Ius a la Iumiere les uns des autres. Certains de ces
motifs ne sont pas de nature afaire l’ objet de conclusions formelles dans
le paragraphe final de l’avis; ils n’en gardent pas moins, aux yeux de la
Cour, toute leur importance.

* * *
105. Par ces motifs,

LA COUR,

1) Par treize voix contre une,

Decide de donner suite a la demande d’avis consultatif;
POUR: M. Bedjaoui, President; M. Schwebel, Vice-President; MM. Guil-

laume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleisch-
hauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, M?” Higgins,juges;

CONTRE: M. Oda, juge;

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266 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

(2) Replies in the following manner to the question put by the General
Assembly:

A. Unanimously,

There is in neither customary nor conventional international law
any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons;

B. By eleven votes to three,

There is in neither customary nor conventional international law
any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use
of nuclear weapons as such;

IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda,
Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin,
Ferrari Bravo, Higgins;

AGAINST: Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma;

C. Unanimously,

A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that
is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations
Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is
unlawful;

D. Unanimously,

A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible
with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed
conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under
treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear
weapons;

E. By seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote,

It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules
of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law;

However, in view of the current state of international law, and of
the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in
which the very survival of a State would be at stake;

IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh,Shi, Fleisch-
hauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo;

AGAINST: Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Sha-
habuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgins;

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MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 266

2) Repond de la maniere suivante a la question posee par l’ Assemblee
generale:

A. A l’unanimite,

Ni Ie droit international coutumier ni le droit international
conventionnel n’autorisent specifiquement la menace ou l’emploi
d’armes nucleaires;

B. Par onze voix contre trois,

Ni Ie droit international coutumier ni le droit international
conventionnel ne comportent d’interdiction complete et universelle
de la menace ou de l’emploi des armes nucleaires en tant que telles;

POUR: M. Bedjaoui, President; M. Schwebel, Vice-President; MM. Oda,
Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Fer-
rari Bravo, Mille Higgins, juges;

CONTRE: MM. Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma,juges;

C. A l’unanimite,

Est illicite la menace ou l’emploi de la force au moyen d’armes
nucleaires qui serait contraire a l’article 2, paragraphe 4, de la
Charte des Nations Unies et qui ne satisferait pas a toutes les pres-
criptions de son article 51 ;

D. A l’unanimite,

La menace ou l’emploi d’armes nucleaires devrait aussi etre com-
patible avec les exigences du droit international applicable dans les
conflits arrnes, specialement celles des principes et regles du droit
international humanitaire, ainsi qu’avec les obligations particulieres
en vertu des traites et autres engagements qui ont expressement trait
aux armes nucleaires:

E. Par sept voix contre sept, par la voix preponderante du President,

11 ressort des exigences susmentionnees que la menace ou l’emploi
d’armes nucleaires serait generalement contraire aux regles du droit
international applicable dans les conflits annes, et specialement aux
principes et regles du droit humanitaire;

Au vu de l’etat actuel du droit international, ainsi que des ele-
ments de fait dont elle dispose, la Cour ne peut cependant conclure
de facon definitive que la menace ou l’emploi d’armes nucleaires
serait licite ou illicite dans une circonstance extreme de legitime
defense dans laquelle la survie meme d’un Etat serait en cause;

POUR: M. Bedjaoui, President; MM. Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleisch-
hauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, juges;

CONTRE: M. Schwebel, Vice-President; MM. Oda, Guillaume,Shahabud-
deen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Mille Higgins, juges;

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267 THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADVISORY OPINION)

F. Unanimously,

There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects under strict and effective international control.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of July, one thousand nine
hundred and ninety-six, in two copies, one of which will be placed in the
archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.

(Signed) Mohammed BEDJAOUI,

President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,

Registrar.

President BEDJAOUI, Judges HERCZEGH, SHI, VERESHCHETIN and FERRARI
BRAVO append declarations to the Advisory Opinion of the Court.

Judges GUILLAUME, RANJEVA AND FLEISCHHAUER append separate
opinions to the Advisory Opinion of the Court.

Vice-President SCHWEBEL, Judges ODA, SHAHABUDDEEN, WEERAMANTRY,
KOROMA and HIGGINS append dissenting opinions to the Advisory Opinion
of the Court.

(Initialled) M.B.

(Initialled) E.V.O.

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MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLEAIRES (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 267

F. A l’unanimite,

II existe une obligation de poursuivre de bonne foi et de mener a
terme des negociations conduisant au desarmement nucleaire dans
to us ses aspects, sous un controle international strict et efficace.

Fait en anglais et en francais, Ie texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix, a La Haye, le huit juillet mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-seize, en deux
exemplaires, dont l’un restera depose aux archives de la Cour et l’autre
sera transmis au Secretaire general de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.

Le President,

(Signe ) Mohammed BEDJAOUI.

Le Greffier,

(Signe ) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.

M. BEDJAOUI, President, et MM. HERCZEGH, SRI, VERESHCHETIN et
FERRARI BRAvo, juges, joignent des declarations a l’avis consultatif.

MM. GUILLAUME, RANJEVA et FLEISCHHAUER, juges, joignent a l’avis
consultatif les exposes de leur opinion individuelle.

M. SCHWEBEL, Vice-President, et MM. ODA, SHAHABUDDEEN, WEERA-
MANTRY, KOROMA et Mille HIGGINS, juges, joignent al’avis consultatif les
exposes de leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphe ) M.B.

(Paraphe ) E.V.O.

45