Compare & Contrast the references to ‘God’ and to the proofs of God’s existence as they arise in the third article of Summa Theologica, by Thomas Aquinas, and in the fifth of his six Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes.
How do they each define ‘God’?
Explain how Aquinas approaches his proof, under the influence of Aristotle, from an Empiricist point of view, and how Descartes approaches his proof from a Rationalist point of view?
Would you like to engage either of these thinkers/believers in a dispute? Is there a danger in attempting to prove God’s existence? What is it? Why is it dangerous? Or, why is it not dangerous?
Write a four-to-five page essay with a cogent response to these and other related questions that may arise in your research and reflection. (Type: Times New Roman #12; Double-Spaced.)

Client notes: , we are supposed to use the text he gave us and write a four to five page essay with a cogent response the questions at the bottom of the paper.

More information: Compare & Contrast the references to ‘God’ and to the proofs of God’s existence as they arise in the third article of Summa Theologica, by Thomas Aquinas, and in the fifth of his six Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes.
Below are two citations, the first from Aquinas:
“On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: “I am Who am.” (Ex. 3:14)
I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this
cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.”
Here’s Descartes:
“Here is a further possible objection to this line of thought: Admittedly, once I have supposed that all perfections belong to God, I must suppose that he exists, because existence is one of the perfections. But what entitles me to suppose God to have all perfections? Similarly, if I suppose that all quadrilaterals can be inscribed in a circle, I have to conclude that a rhombus can be inscribed in a circle; but that is plainly false, which shows that the original supposition was wrong. I agree that I don’t have to think about God at all; but whenever I do choose to think of him, bringing the idea of the first and supreme being out of my mind’s store, I must attribute all perfections to him, even if I don’t attend to them individually straight away. This necessity ·in my thought· guarantees that, when I later realize that existence is a perfection, I am right to conclude then that the first and supreme being exists.
Similarly, I don’t ever have to imagine a triangle; but whenever I do wish to consider a figure with straight sides and three angles, I must attribute to it properties from which it follows that its three angles equal no more than 180°, even if I don’t notice this at the time. When on the other hand I examine what figures can be inscribed in a circle, I am not compelled to think that this class includes all quadrilaterals. Indeed, I cannot—while thinking vividly and clearly—even pretend that all quadrilaterals can be inscribed in a circle. This kind of false pretense is vastly different from the true ideas that are innate in me, of which the first and chief is the idea of God. This idea isn’t a fiction, a creature of my thought, but rather an image of a true and unchanging nature; and I have several indications that this is so. •God is the only thing I can think of whose existence necessarily belongs to its essence. •I can’t make sense of there being two or more Gods of this kind; and after supposing that one God exists, I plainly see that it is necessary that he has existed from eternity and will stay in existence for eternity.
I perceive many other attributes of God, none of which I can remove or alter. Whatever method of proof I use, though, I am always brought back to the fact that nothing completely convinces me except what I vividly and clearly perceive. Some things that I vividly and clearly perceive are obvious to everyone; others can be learned only through more careful investigation, but once they are discovered they are judged to be just as certain as the obvious ones. (Compare these two truths about right-angled triangles: ‘The square on the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares on the other two sides’ and ‘The hypotenuse is opposite the largest angle’. The former is less obvious than the latter; but once one has seen it, one believes it just as strongly.)
Truths about God are not in the immediately obvious class, but they ought to be·. If I were not swamped by preconceived opinions, and if my thoughts were not hemmed in and pushed around by images of things perceived by the senses, I would acknowledge God sooner and more easily than anything else. The supreme being exists; God, the only being whose essence includes existence, exists; what is more self-evident than that?”
How do they each define ‘God’?
Explain how Aquinas approaches his proof, under the influence of Aristotle, from an Empiricist point of view, and how Descartes approaches his proof from a Rationalist point of view?
Would you like to engage either of these thinkers/believers in a dispute? Is there a danger in attempting to prove God’s existence? What is it? Why is it dangerous? Or, why is it not dangerous?
Write a four-to-five page essay with a cogent response to these and other related questions that may arise in your research and reflection. (Type: Times New Roman #12; Double-Spaced.)