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THOMAS S . FRENTZ ANO J A N I C E HOCKER R U S H I N G

But Jimmy Carter was more than a moralist. Carter was a wealthy agri-
businessman, having turned a financially precarious family business into a
five million dollar family fortune.® H e controlled a political machine that
rivaled that of the late J^ohn F . Kennedy for sopWstication and precision.
Carter revelled in hard work and was continuously shown in television ads
in a plaid shirt and comfortable old hiking boots walking through the fields of
his peanut plantation. Here was a man proud of his image, composed as much
from rags-to-riches ingredients as from spiritual constituents.

Thus, Jimmy Carter was a person in which materialism and moralism
had been integrated, and as such, he possessed the psychological prerequi-
sites to turn the 1976 Presidential election into a ritual of dialectical synthesis.
For example. Carter’s platform encompassed not only the concerns of his
Democratic partj^ but also many of the important proposals of tihe Republican
platform as well. Because of this amalgam of positions, many charged that
Carter was vague on issues. Moreover, Carter did not attempt to depict Ford
as the reincarnation of the Demon from San Clemetite. In fact, Ford’s own
credibility grew during the campaign and primarily the nagging reminder of
the pardon prevented an even greater spirit of respect between the candi-
datesJ Ford lost the election—just as Rocky lost the fight—but both Ford
and Rocky gained a great deal; for many. Ford’s courage and effort against
insurmountable odds elevated his stature as a person. Finally, because the
1976 election campaign manifested the pattem of dialectical synthesis, it
became a powerful vehicle of social change. For, as Edelman puts it, “They
[election campaigns] five people a chance to express discontents and enthu-
siasms, to enjoy a sense of involvement.”*

While the 1976 campaign reflected the pattern of dialectical synthesis, the
election itself did not, in that a winner was declared. As we have pointed out,
the campaign was a conflict between competing value systems—amoralism and
materialism. Such conflict is an essential constituent of this pattem of change.
The exigence of the campaign, recognized keenly by Carter, was the need to
restore the health of the American Dream. As he said: ” I t is a time for heal-
ing.”* Just as Carter sought to provide a remedy for the nation’s illness, so
does “Rocky,” but in a way that only film can realize.

« Newsweek, September 13,1976, p. 33.
* Following the Republican Convention, Feffd started the campaign farther behind

tittan any President in scientific polling history; a Gallup survey showed Carter ahead
50-33, and Harris gave Carter a 61-32 margin, according to Newsweek, August 30,
1976, p. 16. By late October, Gallup gave Carter only a 47-41 lead; Harris gave him a
45-42 lead; Assodated Press showsd Ford ahead for the first time, 49-45, Newsweek,
November 1,1976, p. 18, . ^ ^ , v,

8 Murray Edelraao The SymMk Uses of Pohtics (Urfaana: Umv. of Illinois Press,
1964), p. 3.

» CBS GMJTenticm Coverage, July 15,1976.

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WESTERN JODRKAL OF SPEECH COMMUNICATION F A I X 1978

” R O C K Y ” AS DIAUECTICAL SYNTHESIS

Five interrelated dimensions of “Rocky” become apparent when viewed
from the perspective of our model of social value.

Value Opposition
First, the film dramatizes value opposition. In the opening sc^ne, a dose-

up view of a particularly brutal, physical battle between Rocky and some
unknown opponent is shown. Subtly present in the b a d ^ o u n d is a painting
of a madonna hanging as a reminder of another set of values. At the very
outset, then, we experience the materialistic value of competition and winning
against the moralistic backdrop of religious love and compassion. This oppo-
sition recurs scenically throughout the film.

SymiioUc Conflict
The conflict between moralism and materialism in “Rodcy” is triggered

by the protagonist’s anger. Rocky is angry at his own initial inability to make
any form of significant human contact, at his inability to succeed in the fight
profession, at having to work for a loan shark in order to survive, and, most
directly, at those forces of materialism and wealth that keep Rocky and the
millions like him in the slums of south Philadelphia. In short. Rocky is angry
at himseU and his situation.

A i ^ e r often underlies human conflict—^whether thai conflict be physical
and destructive, as in the case of the Watts riots, or more detached and con-
trolled, as is the case with pwlitica! elections. Throughout the film, we see
resentment and hostility building both in Rocky and in his associates. When
Rocky is offered the chance to fight Creed, his anger takes specific focus and
becomes goal-directed.

Psychological Prerequisites
Ndther the awareness of value opposition nor the presence of the conflict

is responsible for the audience’s reaction to “Rocky.” An essential attribute
of the film is its evocation of s)TDpathy and support for Rodcy as he grows in
character. As one critic put it, “Rocky” is a study in self-actualization.^® The
progressive nature of that self-actualization process is what is important.
After all. Rocky is not a dualing dialectidan—the Eric Hoffer of the ring.
He is at the outset of the film—^most charitably put—a rather ordinary person
with a remarkable potential for growth and change.

As the film progresses, we witness a gradual, but certain process of value
Synthesis within Rocky. Rocky’s arduous training prc^^am reflects clearly
his endorsement of the puritan work ethic, his increaang need to “win” a
place for himself, and his unequivocal acceptance of direct, physical competi-

10Nancy L Street, “‘Rocky’; The Moral Imperative,” a ^ p c r presented at the
Western Speech CcHnmunicaticHi Association Convention, Photmx, Nov., 1977.

[234J

THOMAS S . FRENTZ AND JANICE HOOKER RUSHING

tion as the determiner of a person’s worth. Rocky exhibits extreme com-
passion : for Mickey, the fight manager of questionable motives; for Adrian,
the painfully shy lover-to-be; for an unidentified man, who cannot pay a debt
owed to the loan shark for whom Rocky works; and even for Adrian’s
brother, whose most redeeming feature seems to be his inability to exploit
Rocky. Moreover, Rocky searches with increasing clarity for his OMm dignity
and self-worth—^two deep-rooted facets of moralism. The very night before
his fight with the champion, Rocky tells Adrian, “If I can go the distance,
I’ll know for the first time in my life I’m not just another bum from the
neighborhood.” Rocky’s self-actualization is dramatic evidence of his inter-
nalization of materialistic and moralistic values.

To be aware of the importance of opposing value systems is one thing;
to integrate those systems within oneself is quite another. But that is pre-
cisely what occurs within Rocky as the film progresses. For example, in his
pre-fight training program. Rocky seems to understand tacitly both the ma-
terialistic and the moralistic senses of “purification.” Rocky endures the hard
work of training and at the same time he experiences the pain of self-sacrifice.
(Not only does he rise before dawn and gulp down five raw eggs prior to his
daily jogging ritual, but he also tells Adrian that “fooling around” will sap
his energy.) The effort of training is clearly materialistic, linked again to the
puritan work ethic. But the experiencing of pain through self-sacrifice is
moralistic, an experience commonly advocated by spiritual leaders.*^ In the
act of training, then. Rocky exhibits materialistic and moralistic values.

Further evidence of Rocky’s internal synthesis of values can be found in
his ability to avoid most of the weaknesses inherent in each myth as it stands
alone.** Rocky is self-interested but not self-centered. The self-absorption of
materialism is avoided most clearly in the scene in which Rocky has finally
coaxed the timid Adrian into his apartment. As Rocky approaches the
woman, the camera emphasizes the difference in their sizes. We are led to
expect an ugly scene—perhaps even a rape attempt. But instead of removing
Adrian’s clothes, Rocky removes her glasses, saying, “I always knew you
were pretty.” Similarly, although Rocky doggedly goes after the black cham-
pion, Apollo Creed, he refuses to hate or even envy his opponent—another

IJ Martin Luther King, Jr., for instance, believed in the necessity of “self-purifica-
tion” of those engaging in nonviolent direct action against their oppressors; this involved
spiritual preparation for resistance through training sessions, discussions, and role-
playing. Suffering- and self-denial were considered to be dignified and redemptive. See
Letter From Birmingham City Jail (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee,
1963).

^ Fisher notes that each myth has weaknesses, and thus is susceptible to rhetorical
subversion. The weaknesses of the materialistic myth relevant to this study are that it is
suspect for those who are troubled by its real-iife manifestations of avarice, resentanent,
envy, and vindictiveness ; it is compassionless and self-centered; it encourages manipula-
tion and leads to exploitation. Relevant weaknesses of tbe moralistic myth are that its
advocates often appear self-righteous, “holier-than-thou,” scolding, and unrealistic, pp.
161-ffi.

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WESTERN JOURNAL OF SPEECH COMMUNICATION F A L L 1978

proclivity of the materialistic orientation. Though he pursues what he wants
persistently. Rocky avoids the pitfalls of manipulation, exploitation, and lack
of compassion so often associated with materialistic values.

Neither does Rocky resemble anything like a self-ri^teous, holier-than-
thou scold; the film is not a melodramatic morality play with Rocky as Virtue
and Apollo as Vice. Rather, Rocky is portrayed with all his faults—he does
legwork for a loan shark, he does get angry at Adrian’s brother Pauli, he
undermines Mickey’s self-respect before he restores it. H e learns through a
series of painful failures how to be a mem of dignity; that is, his character is
transformed in the film. “Rocky” is more like a parable than a sermon; as
the audience progressively identifies with a quite human hero, it experiences
vicariously a crucial blending of freedoms which are usually antithetical in
both conception and practice: the freedom to do and the freedom to be.^^ As
before, we are not claiming that Rocky was consciously aware of the integra-
tion process that was occurring. W e are claiming, however, that such a
process did occur and that there is ample evidence in the film to substantiate
the claim.

Resolution Through Diaiecticai Synthesis

Because Rocky had integrated an antithetical set of values, he had the
potential to define the impending fight as dialectical synthesis. But to under-
stand fully the rhetorical impact of the fight sequence, we need to examine
the pre-fight orientations of the champion, Apollo Creed, as well as Rocky.

We have already hinted at Rocky’s pre-fight choices. For Rocky, the fight
would be—if he had his way—an enactment of integration. As such, it would
not be a pre-arranged “circus” in which the outcome was already determined,
but an event in which he and champion Creed would “competitively cooper-
ate” to forge a synthesis of values. For many in the audience, the experiential
impact of the fight stemmed from the creative energy entailed in enacting
dialectical synthesis.

But the choice of form for the fight is not Rocky’s to make—at least not
without a struggle. An adversary (the antithesis to a thesis) always has a say
in the choice of patterns, and Creed is no exception. Blatantly modeled after
Mohammed Ali, Apollo Creed manifests, in caricature, the myth of material-
ism. When Creed (rhymes with greed) hits upon the idea of getting an un-
known Italian to fight him on the Bicentennial (“Who discovered America—
an Italian—right”), he exchanges these words with his promoter :

Promoter: “Apollo, I like it—^it’s yery American.”
Creed: “It’s very smart.”

1® Fisher notes: “Where the materialistic myth involves & concept of freedom that
emphasizes the freedom to do as one pleases [freedom from controls], the moralistic
myth tends toward the idea of freedom tiiat stresses the irveixmi to be as cme ccMceives
himself,” p. 162.

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THOMAS S . FEENTZ AND J A N I C E HOCKER R U S H I N G

As a symbol of materialism, Apollo Creed merely reflects the predomi-
nance of that myth. Because he desires no change at all, but rather a “show”
of power and superiority, he approaches the fight with a set of predetermined
rules—rules he naively thinks that Rocky shares. Of course, there is always
the possibility that an inversion could occur—^that Creed, the materialistic
champion, would lose to his chaUenger. But that probability is very unlikely,
particularly if Creed can choose his opponent.

Hence we can see in the pre-fight drama a difiEerence between Rocky and
Creed in regard to the patterns they each would enact in the impending con-
flict. A clear example of the pre-fight contrast occurs when Apollo’s manager
happens to watch Rocky on television pounding a side of beef in a meat locker:

Manager: “Hey, take a look at this guy you’re gonna fight. H e means
business!”

Creed: “Yeah, I mean business, too.”
The play on the word business is important. For the manager (who, by his
growing realization of what is happening, reflects Rocky’s consciousness),
business means seriousness, effort, uncertainty of outcome. For Apollo, busi-
ness is money from a show. For Creed, the fight would serve to increase his
celebrity status and his pocketbook. For Rocky, the fight would be a chance
not only to prove himself “not just another bum from the neighborhood,” but
also would serve as an arena in which an integrated set of values would be
created through their combat.

The synthesis is most dramatically determined, however, in the fight itself.
Rocky wins the choice of pattern near the end of the first round with a left
field punch that almost decapitates the champion. Apollo’s manager, who
seemed to sense all along that this fight would be different, will not let Creed
miss the choice that has just been made for him. After the first round, the
manager whispers urgently into the dazed champion’s ear: ” H e doesn’t know
it’s a damn show! H e thinks it’s a damn fight! Finish this bum and let’s go
home!”

Begrudgingly, Creed accepts—as he must—the form of the fight that has
been imposed upon him. Rounds 2 through IS exemplify well conflict through
dialectical synthesis. The concept neatly explains that rare bond of respect
that grows between the fighters as the rounds pass. Though each man sys-
tematically reduces the other to a bloody pulp (after all, who ever said that
dialectical synthesis would be easy?), there is a poignant realization of their
joint effort in their closing exchange at the final bell:

Creed: “Ain’t gonna be no rematch! Ain’t gonna be no rematch!”
Rocky: “Don’t want none!”

Just as ancient dialecticians acknowledged the products of their loving intel-
lectual combat, so too do these combatsints salute each other in mutual respect
and acknowledgment of what they have created.

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WESTERN JOURNAL OF SPEECH COMMUNICATION F A L L 1978

As we migbt expect from a conflict of dialectical sjmthesis, no one loses.
Both win. Creed maintains his titte— îf by the narrowest of m a t i n s — a n d
by so doing, tbe integrity of tbe materialistic mytb is preserved. But Rocky
wins, too, and for some, bis victory is mucb more significant. H e wins bis
self-respect, bis wortb, and bis freedom. Most significantly, tbougb. Rocky
wins for us—albeit in ilt-defined form—a broadened perspective on social
values. For many Americans, Rocky, along witb Carter, provided a renewal
of bope.

Audience Role
As already noted, experiencing value cbange througb dialectical synthesis

creates strong identification between tbe audience and the change agents.
Sucb was tbe case witb “Rocky.” Few wbo saw tbe film did not become
engrossed in tbe figbt sequence between Creed and Rocky. Reactions varied
from states of anxiety and tension to acts of standing, screaming, and panto-
miming wbat Rocky sbould do in order to knock Creed out. Curiously enough,
tbe visceral reaction to tbe figbt was, for mjiny persons, a reality independent
of whether tbey “liked” tbe film or not.

What could be tbe cause of this degree of involvement by tbe film audi-
ence ? Several reasons seem insufficient. For one, tbe fact that tbe sequence
was a pbysicat prizefigbt seems inadequate to explain the intensity of its
effect. Tbere bave been numerous sucb scenes in, for example, films like
“Requiem for a Heavyweight,” “Somebody U p Tbere Likes Me,” “Tbe Joe
Louis Story,” and so on. Many of the fight sequences in tbese films contain
as mucb drama, uncertainty, and physical brutality as tbe sequence in
“Rocky.” Neitber could tbe technically superb cboreography account fully
for the effect of the sequence. For if it could, then the same persons wbo stood
and cbeered in “Rocky” would stand and cheer for film documentaries of
figbts—^wbere the techniques do not bave to be staged.

We argue that American audiences knew—tacitly, of course—tbat more
was at stake in that figbt sequence than the identity of tbe next Heavyweight
Boxing Cbampion. Audiences experienced in “Rocky” the creation of an
int^rated set of values that merged materialism and moralism, while re-
affirming the central worth of botb value orientations. And for many, it could
well bave been tbeir participation in tbe generative process of dialectical
syntbesis tbat gave the fight its magnetic appeal.

IMPLICATIONS

Like any beuristic concept, tlie model of social cbange presented bere is
not a cookie cutter; it cannot replace the creative insigbts of the intelligent
critic. We bope that future study in rhetorical criticism would explore at
least two avenues suggested by tbe model. First, the model needs to be con-
ceptually and metbodologically refined. Second, saice values—^tbeir forma-

[238]

THOMAS S . FRENTZ AND J A N I C E HOCKER R U S H I N G

tion, affirmation, and subversion—have always occupied a dominant place in
rhetOTkal messages, perhaps the model could be extended to other rhetorical
arenas than political acts and films. Insofar as the model alerts critics to how
values function rhetorically, we may gain insight into the overall process of
social change.

Our analysis of “Rocky” also implies that “underdogs” must come to
understand the total value structure of the sodety from which they are
alienated if they are to achieve dignity within it. (For how can one change
what one does not know?) Ideally, subordinates proceed through unfocused
alienation to increased psycholopcal awareness (i.e., through either dialecti-
cal transformation or synthesis) of the dominant value structures that exist
in tension. And if the “common people” seek cultural as well as personal
change, they must educate representatives of the power elite to the necessity
of change through some sort of symbolic confrontation. That is, because the
persons endorsing the dominant value system in a sodety very r a r d y re-
distribute power or re-orient their values voluntarily, the subordinates have
an obligation to make them aware of the maladies within the existing system.^*
As we have shown in “Rocky,” often this educational process can make the
power elite aware of the situation and, occasionally, can dictate the options of
individual and sodal action. Rocky, it will be recalled, defined for Apollo
Creed quite clearly and dramatically the pattern that their conflict was to take.

Nor should the humanistic potential of the dialectical synthesis pattern
be underestimated. For when this pattern can be enacted, when at least one
of the combatants has experienced this pattern internally, then symbolic con-
flict does not have to be competitive, such that when one wins, the other must
lose. It is equally true, as we have noted throughout, that dialectical synthesis
is the exception and not the rule. The rule is dialectical transformation, a
situation in which there must be a winner and loser (the loser usually being
the underdog). The implication of the film, of course, is that a viable, though
diflicult, alternative does exist.

Herbert W. Simons notes the prominence of the “system-as-organism”
metaphor—the idea that protestors are “pathological,” “unhealthy,” a “dis-
ease.” These aspects of the metaphor surely stress the dialectical transforma-
tion pattern where subordinates are conceived as losers—^losers that are
dangerous to the system. But he counters that even the organic metaphor
does not demand that the sole function of the system (enforced by those in
power) should be to maintain homeostasis:

u Martin Luther King, Jr., for instance, stressed that it B the job of the nonviolent
resister to educate the majority not cmly to the societal probleni, but also to the intenticais
of the mass movement to exercise “power under discipline,” in Stride Toward Freedom
(New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 211-19. J. Robert Cox notes that niany liberals
believed that it was their duty to educate !iie majority as to the evils of the Vietnam War,
in “Perspectives on Rhetorical Criticism of Movements: Antiwar Dissent, 1964-1970,”
WestemSpeech, 38 (1974), 254-68.

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WESTERN JOUHNAL OP SPEECH COMMUNICATION F A L L 1978

Besides maintaining basic life functions, the ‘healthy’ system or otgan-
ism changes, grows, adapts to problems. Single-minded preoccupation
with preserving life functions is indeed a sign of an aged and withered
ot^pjiism, one not contributing very much and not lSsely to survive for
very long.^*

Indeed, those in control may adjust to the challenger’s demands rather than
totally capitulate.”-^ Dialectical synthesis at once preserves the social order
(after all. Creed did retain his championship), while at the same time allows
the challengers to achieve their own measure of victory and success. “Rocky”
promotes the possibility of a social order one step beyond peaceful coexist-
ence—^that of mutual transcendence through cooperative action.”

Finally, there is a haunting worrisomeness about “Rocky.” It could be
rooted in a gnawing discomfort that some astute political observers find in
Jimmy Carter as well. For how permanent are the c(msequences of the dia-
lectical synthesis process or, for that matter, any primarily S3rmbolic ritual
of conflict? What becomes of the American voter two years after Carter
takes office? What becomes of Rocky and Adrian two years after their
“moment” ? One can rather easily imagine Rocky, still in the Philadelphia
slums, stumbling up to someone in a bar and slurring, “You shoulda seen
me in there with Creed—I was really somethin’!”

IS Herbert W. Simons, “Persnasion in Social Conflicts: A Critique of Prevailing
Conceptions and a Framework ior FvixiTe’R.tseaich,”Speech Monographs,29 (1972),238.

** For a description of various sti’ategies that control may employ, including adjust-
ment and capitulation, see: John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric of
Agitation and Control (Reading, Massachttsetts: Addiscw-Wesley, 1971), pp. 39-56,

*•” Ahhough we have focused on dialectical synthesis as a method of vsdue integra-
tion, ti>e method need not be restricted to conflicts in value. For example, one of the
more inaginative applications of the method occurs in “Close Encounters of the Third
Kind,” where mosic is the medium, dialectical synthesis is the method, and initijJ com-
municative contact between ontologically different beings is Ae goal.

[240]

The Rhetoric of “Rocky”:
A Social Value Model
of Criticism

JANICE HOCKER RUSHING AND THOMAS S . FEENTZ*

T.HE F I L M ” R O C K Y ” is a genuine enigma. It has all the sure-fire mgre-
dients of cinematic failure. The t h a n e of a local, mediocre club fighter’s acd-
dentai shot at the World Heavjrweight Boxing title is both implausible and
potentially maudlin. The cast of characters—^with the possible exception of
Burgess Meredith—^reads like a Who’s-Not-Who in Hollywood. The screen-
pky was written by someone wlu>se scripts had never been filmed and who
withheld the film rights until he could play the leading role. When that was
finally affirmed, the writer/actor all but converted the final product into a
home movie by using virtually his entire family in some capacity (even the
writer/actor’s dog, Butkus Stallone, has a supportii^ role). If we were to
document how to guarantee a film disaster, we could do worse than recomr
mend the ingredients that went into the making of “Rocky.”

But the film is not a failure. Incredibly, “Rocky” has charmed critic and
public alike. Seldom has a low-budget, personally-produced, no-star film so
captured the imagination of the American people.’^ Its universal appeal stems
in large part from the unusual way in which “Rocky” deals with American
values. Unlike other popular films which announce, predict, or reflect the
deterioration of American morality (e.g., “The Exorcist,” “One Flew Over
The Cuckoo’s Nest,” “All the President’s Men,” and “Network,” to name a
few), “Rocky” both celebrates the American Dream and implies an innova-
tive psycho-social process for identifying with its mythology. On the most
basic level, it is idealistic optimism tempered by experiential reality tbat sets
“Rocky” apart f rc«n other fihns making rhetorical statements about values.-

The importance of “Rocky,” however, is that the film need not be experi-
enced only on this baac level. When examined carefully, “Rocky” manifests
a particular pattern of value change. Moreover, that pattern—-while having
specific symbolic import in the film itself—reflects a more general social value

* Ms. Rushiog is a Lecturer in the D^iartment of Craamunication Studies at tbe
Umversity erf California, Los Angeles. Mr. Frexttz is an Associate Prcrfessor in the De-
partment of Commtmicaticn at the University of Colorado, Boidder.

^ C3iartctff-Win4der PnxiucticHis report d o i ^ s t k box office recdpts, as of November,
1977, at $ta}^00,000.

=’F a MBiilar view erf “Rodcy,” see: Newsweek, April 11,1977, p. 71.

[63]

WESTERK JOURNAL OF SPEECH COMMUNICATION SPRING 1978

modd (rf rtetoHcal critidan. To realize “Rwiy’s” i n ^ r t , we need to do
more than sinq)ly evaluate a film, we must develop an^q)rt^wiate modd ior its
investigation. Thus in Jhis initial es^y, wt will (1) discuss the reiationship
betweei societal values and film* and (2) outline a five-part sodjd value
modd oi rhetorical criddsm. In the second essay (to ^ i p ^ r in the Fall issue
of WJSC), we will onpSoy the modd to investigate tibe political context sur-
rounding “Rodcy,” demonstrate the unusual pattern of value change pre-
sented in tire film, and consider inqdications for future rhetorical critidsm of
such rh^orical statements.

FILM AND SOCIETY

Sodetal values and film are related in two fundamental ways. First, film
jmd sodety redprocally influence one amjther.* By projecting collective im-
ages trf a culture, by serving as symptoms of cultural needs, and by symboliz-
ing ti^ids, dramatic media both reflect and create sodetal events. Second,
sodo-political processes, like film, are structured and per«^ved as essentially
dramatic* Film is clearly a potent vehicle for symbolizing sodo-political

The redprodty betwerai fihn and sodety is manifested on three levels.
First, film projects the collective ima^s, feuitasies, and values of the culture
in whidi the film is created. Vievred historically, film reveals obvious corre-
lations between ideals in fashion, male and femate beauty, individual and
nationalistic heroian, and family life. Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Ldtes
put this p(»nt wdl:

The commcHi daydreams of a culture are in part the source, in part
Ute products of its popular myths, stories, ^\ays and films. Where
these produdions gain the s}mipath£tic response ol a wide audiraice, it
is Hkdy that thdr producers have tapped within themsdves the reser-
voir of common day-dreams.^

W . Rosenfield d e s e r t s the “model modi^ty” of riietorical criticism in
“The Anateny %rTatioiis and rhetorical norms. I l i e critic generate a (aradigm
wfaich is used as a basis

* See: D a w i M. Berg, “Rhetorfc, Reali^, and Mass Media,” Qmrteriy Jottrtud of
Speech, 58 (1972), 256, -who argues: T i r s t it is dear that soedia do more than merely
reflect events; they also create them. ‘Any medioo:,’ as antl^^iologist Edmtmd Carpeater
points out, ‘abstracts frraa the given and codifies in terms ^ t ^ t o^dimn’s grammar. It
cemrerts “given reality” into experioiced r e a l ^ . ”

* See: Earnest G. Bormaim, “Fantasy and Rhetorical V&ion: The Rhetorical Criti-
d a n of Sodal RealiQr,” Qwaierty Journal of Speech, 58 ( 1 $ ^ ) , 396-407, who argues that
the irocess bs which fantasies goieratedin small groups b e ^ m s i n j ^ enactinei^ is also
draaiatic in nature. .-<

« Martha WolfeostdnaMNathan Lates, Momes: A ify^chological Study (Glencoe:
Free Press, 1950), p. 13. See also: Richard M. Merlma^ “Power and Community w
Televiswn,” ia Newocmib, who argues ttert telension’s weMems, crime saries, aad situ-

[64]

JANICE HOCKEK RUSHING AND THOMAS S . FKENI3

Second, fihn often dramatizes symjrttMns of particular societal nttds ĉ
an era. By portrayii^ external jM^lems facing the entire country, conflicts
amcBig aib-cukural groups, or internal needs shared by a major segmient of
the public, fitos give tan^ble structure to sodal phenranena. Like dreams,
films arouse an audiaice to recognize, with varying d^rees of comsdousness,
the most cHfical sodetel problons and in a form that is appealii^j.̂ It is often
easier to face saaal proMenra l^ identifying with attrjaaive, humorous, or
pattos-evddng diaracters engaged in some form of dramatic tension than by
listening to politidans, ministers, or other public persuaders preaching about
sodetal ills. As David M. Berg argues, mass media expands the awareness of
issues facing humankind, and thus “increases the ratio of exigence to reality.”*

This “symptomizing” relationship between film and sodety can be docu-
mented almost endlessly. Many 1940 war movies (e.g., “Guadalcanal Diary,”
“Iwo Jima”) r^ponded to a general public need to feel that the war was
morally justified. Similarly, select 1950 sdence fiction films (e.g., “The
Thing,” “Invasion of the Body Snatchers” ) can be seen as thinly veiled reflec-
tions of the Communist Threat. The popular “youth films” of the 19608 (e.g.,
“The Graduate,” “Easy Rider,” “Five Easy Pieces”) were symptomatic of
a duster of intracultural problems all relevant to the “generation gap.” Nos-
talgia movies of the early 197O’s (e.g., “Summer of ’42.” “American Grafiit-
ti”) could be analyzed as symptomatic of a desire to return to more tranquil
times following tlK turbulence of the Sixties.

Third, films often symbolize and reinforce sodetal trends.* Sometimes
films have modeled for sodety complete re-orientations in value structure.
For example, Thomas S. Frentz and Thcanas B. Farrell argue that “The Ex-
ordst” signaled an alteration from a positivistic to a more transcendent value
orientation.̂ ” Other times, films, or film genres merely reflect a trend already

ation oHnedies are “fertile sources of infonaatioa about the coilective proj^^ons of
Americans. . . . Unconscious as weli as ixmscious expectations of political b^avior, in-
dividual morality and social norms are acted out in television aitertaimnait series.” p. 87.
That films re^esent collectve sodetel projections implies the “intentional fallacy”—
that it is misleading to attribute meaning in any artistic creati

^ Horace Newcovnb makes a related point abcmrt tbe twc&m of televisicm in “Towai4
a Televisiffli Aesthetic,” in Newcondi, pp. 273-89. Televisicai dramatic programs, he Kiys,
often deal with taxttemporaiy histcn^cal ccHicems as s^ject matter, Init place t b ^ r char-
acters withm an older time frame. In this “mytiiical realm,” where values and issues are
nxire clearly defined and certain modes of befasvior, such as yidoice, are more permissible,
we TKOfstuze Ota own prdbjems. “Our history is all too familiar and perplexing, so to deal
with it we bnvt created the anrth

‘ B 2 Merg,p.2M.
* ITns asasnpticai cra-respcntds to Rosenfidd’s “M-E” or message-environment focus

w criticism, in wUdt focnses oji the ajvinaanort as the particular age and cirilizatkin m
waich the i s e s s a ^ was o-eated. Rosenfidd defined * e focus as follows: “This emphasis
“tm its rationale in ti» amustption that to &e extent t h ^ an aesthetic event can be am-
sidered tytncal c^ its age it will wovide valnaUe insight into the Intdlectu^ and social
trendsofthatage.”p.60.

[65]

ouiNAL OF SPWECU OJMMDNICATION SPHNG 1978

in progrras. Russdl L. Merritt, fw example, dscribes the “badiM
tyjMcaliy pkyed by Gary Cocper, J a m s Ste^rart, Henry Fonda, and Will
Roi^s—as the rhetM-ical duld of the Prc^essive eara tfiat enMrged around
tlM turn of the coitury, in wbJdi the prevailing phikis(q^y was ̂ aMtarian,
focusing upcm. the wisdom of the osiamon man.^

Although film and overall sodal protxs^s are iaextricably related, it is
with political processes that film is most symbioticidly l i n l ^ . For pc^tical
arts, like fikn, are essentially dranmtic and symbolic in form. Eddman rap-
tures tijis rdationshitp well:

The parade of ‘news’ about political acts r̂ HMted to us by the mass
media and drunk up by tbe jmUic as drama is the raw matoial of such
symbolizaticm. It has everjrthing: remoteness, the omnipotient state,
crises, and detentes. More tban tbat, it bas tlM blurring or absence of
any realistic detail tbat might question or weakai the symbolic mean-
ings we read into i t . . . If political arts are to promote sodal ad-
justment and are to mean wbat our inner problems require tbat tbey
mean, then tbese acts bave to be dramatic in outline and «npty of real-
istic detail.-‘̂

If both political processes and film are experiaiced as dramatic events,
tben botb are experienced as “spectator sports.” Daniel J. Boorstin comments
tbat Americans rardy confront political reality directly—that tbey instead
witness “pseudo-events” tbat apprar spontaneous and genuine, but are in fact
designed to obscure the ambiguous situation bebind tbe event.^’ And wben
tbis occurs, tbe experiendng of pioHtical change beccwnra analogous to tbe ex-
periencing of, say, a football game or—^more to tbe point bere—a prize fight;
tbe contart can be at once exbilerating wbile still somewhat detached.

SOCIAL VALtrE MODEL

We have argued that an interdqiendent relationship exists between film
and sodal phenomena in general, and political proce^es in particular. Sodetal
change, however, does not unfold capridously; it bas an underlying struc-

i« Thonaas S. Freatz and Thomas B. Farrell, “ConveraoB

” Russell L. Merritt, “The Bashftil Hero in American î tini,” Quarterly Journal of
h 61 a975)l&Speech, 61 a975),l&.

12 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbaaa: Univ. of Illinois Press,
1964), pp. S-9. See also: Murray Edelman, Politics as SymbsBe Action (Odcago: Mark-
ham. 1971).

“Daniel J. Boorstm, The Image (New York: Athegwan, 1962), » – 9-12. Dan
Nimmo, The Political Persuaders: The Techniques of U^em Election Ctrnpiagns
(Esgiewood QiflEs, N.J.: Prentke-Hall, 1 ^ 0 ) , atM three«*«cent trmds in puWtcizing
imlitical csmdidates tm tdevision: dK quest cA the news m e & for entertaining events to
report, tiie rteialistk television coverage oi sudi pviAic erett^ as ^uty oHtveatiotts ana
inai^uratkois, and tbe attempt o£ TV staticms to pmorma “griUic service” l^sta^ng

[66]

J A N I C E HOCKER R U S H I N G AND T H O M A S S . FKEHTZ

ture. This pattem has sddom been exjdored by sodal ami rh^wical taitics.
If kiM3vî <%e

Dialectical Opposition
The “collective consdousness” of a sodety is c(Hnpos«l primarily of broad

dusters of values that take the form of images, dreams, and myths that are
self-reflexive.-** The values basic to a culture’s thought and rituals exist fre-
quently in a fragile pattem of dialectical opposition—a state of tension, real
or potential conflict or change.

Several critics note the existence of such didiotomous value schemes. For
example, Alvin W . Gotddner argues that any culture’s outlook on its own fu-
ture is manifested in opposing values—those comprising a “tragic” vision and
those ccMnprising a “utopian” visicai. The tragic viewpoint incorporates the
belief that positive sodetal growth is not pnjssible and that the continuing en-
durance of stiflFering is the mcBt realistic stance. By contrast, the Utopian
framework is based on the assumption that the discrepancies between the real
and the ideal are surmountable; utopianism strives for perfection.^* E a d i vi-
sion co-exists in “profound tension” with the other.^* Since utopianism does
not focus on what already has been accomplished, Gouldner says, ” I t is contin-
uously poised on the brink of a new d « p a i r and pessimism, to whidi it is vul-
nerable, so that one tmintended outcome of the striving to enact the Utopian
vision is to regenerate the tragic vision. The pursuit of Utopia prepares for a
regression to the tragic view. “^”

A similar dialectical (^position among sodal values may be observed—in
slightly different form^—in American history. For example, Frentz and Far-
rell argue:

^* Marshall McLuhan argues Hxat the existetKe of w i ^ y shared mass media images
creates a situation in which the “globe is no more than a v i l l a ^ ” and everyone is neces-
sarily involved in t l » lives oi everyone else. Sex: Understanding Media: The Extensions
of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. S. By “myth,” we refer to a society’s crflec-
tiyity of persistQit Tains, handed

^Alvin W. Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins,
Grammar, and Puittre of Ideology (New YOTk: Seabmy, 1976), pp. 69-88. A variant of
me vteqiisn view is tiie ” i d e o l t ^ a l , ” whidi accepts mirersal iatperfectkm and merely
stnres fw better conditiais in iife.

“Goal

[67]

OUENAL OF SPCT^^H COMMUNICAnON S P M N G 1978

ThrotHgfaoot the history of Amoican Ibm^ht, t « o coiiirt^’vailiag im-
polses have akersativety donunated the nation’s ccmsdousness. There
IS . . . a positivist inclinatioa [tfiat] . . . r^iscrds any stetemoit to
be mesmingfcd cmlj in terms dt its Tm£table j ^ observable referents,
. . . distrusts the abstract, is contemptuous of tfisorder, and compen-
sates for its ^ q j d d s m w i ^ a fo-m ccnifideiKje timt ivdisctiaiiian, pre-
didion, and ccmtrol are valued inteUa:bial pastitara.^^

By contrast.

counteipart of Positivism in American tihonght, Transcendence,
. . . yeam(s) for that which is general and ideal, . . . finds meanii^
in that which is good; . . . harkens after the aidstorical; . . . com-
pensates for naive insecurity by piously anticipating a reemergence of
Utopian innocence.̂ *

The g«ieric names as well as the values underlying these dialectical oppo-
sitions vary; in this psiper, however, we are most cwicemed with the specific
form value opposition took in the socio-political context surrounding
“Rocky.” Walter R. Fisher aptly defines the dichotomy in the distincticoi be-
tween materialism and moralism. The materialistic myth

is groimded on the puritan worii ̂ hic and relates to the values of ^ o r t ,
persisteiK«, ‘playing the game,’ imtiative, self-reliance, adiieyement,
and succ^s. It undergirds ccHiq>etition as the way of determining per-
sonal worth, the free enterprise Systran, and the sotion of freedom, de-
fined as the freedom from a>ntrols, regulations, CH: constraints that
hinder the individual’s strivii^ for ascendency In the sodal-eccoicunic
hierarchy of s o d ^ . ^

In tension with the materialistic myth, the moralistic myth
. . . is well express^ in ba^c tenets of the Declaration of Independ-
ence : tfiat ‘all men are created equal,’ men ‘are endowed by their Cre-
ator with certain inali»iable rights,’ ‘among th^e are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness,’ . . . These tenets naturally involve tiie
values of tolerance, charity, compassitMi, and true r ^ a r d for the dignity
and w(Hlh of each and every i H i d l ^ ‘

As we shall demcmstrate, the tension between mora£sm and materialism is
particularly rdevant to understanding “Rocky.”

Symbolic Conflict
li the values of a society live in ddicate tension, we may ask what the con-

ditions for change are and if such change has an identifiable cx>nimunicative
form. Some sort of valtte c h a i ^ is inevitable whenever the diMninant form of

«Fretttzand Fan^l, i^. 40-41.
M Freatz and Farrell, p. 41.
3e Walter R. FISIKT, “Reaffinnatkn aad Sabv«-skm of due American Bream,”

terly Iimrwtd of Speech, 59 i\9m, 161.
aFish«-,p.l61.

[ 6 8 ]

J A N I C E HOCKER R U S H I N G AND T H O M A S S . FKENTZ

the pferailing myth OT value duster is incapable of solving sodal p r t ^ e m s . ^
Altbou^ sodStal members may b^;in to questitMi the values of a m y l i indi-
viduaJly, the coUectkn preiaomtion of inadequacy must be a d o i o w l e d ^ be-
fore adual dianges can occur. Several forces operate simultaneously in the
emer^nce, coosenstial validation, and OMnmuniration (rf value diaxige to a
public Social and artistic critics, for instance, usually alert the public that its
general mood is due for a change by decrying the decline of values.**

Because values exist in a state of dialectical opposition, however, com-
municative conflict is the most common and powerful form for enacting
change. This conflictual form of value change is dearly reflected in political
acts as well as in film. In political change, Gouldner observes, “A good part
of the sense of men’s potoicy rests on conflictual validation, the asnduct of
successfid conflict, struggle, contest, and also w a r . ” ^ Cert^nly, “collective
non-movements,”** loosely structured groups of people conspicuously dem-
onstrating alternative ways of life, and rhetorical movements, groups at-
tempting to pressure the society at large for change, are political, conflictual
ways of bringing about value change.**

Film, with its dramatic affinity to political events, is also adept at depict-
it^ value changes through symbolic conflicts. As Marsha Kinder and Bev-
erle Houston note, film is particularly suited to representing myth for an
audience;

SinoB their b^innings movies have had the ^ w d a l qialities of a mythic
medium. Like the bdlad, the eircus, and odwr popular art forms, they
have drawn a mass audience. I n images Iar|fer than life, they both re-
flect and shape popular myths. One of their strongest powers lies in
t h a r ability to project dreams and fantasies under quiet, darkened con-
ditions, which enhance t h d r eff ectivaiess.*’

In both politics and film, the conflict is often expressed as a verbal or
physical battle brtween two opposing individual or groups of individuals.

22 Frentz and Farrell claim: “The eral of an era is usually marked by the increased
incapacity d cme dimension of consciousness to solve contemporary sodal problems,” p. 42.

2* Frentz and Farrell note that tte demise of Positivism in America was acccnapanied
by an mtensified concern with the Ammcan psyche on the part erf social critics, p. 43.

*̂ Goddner, p. 69.
25 According to RMI E . RcAerts and Robert Marsh Hoss, Social Movements: Be-

Uoetn the Balcony and the Barricade ( S t Loras: C. V. Mossby, 1974), p. 41, a “cd-
lechve non.’inovaBent refers to a sotuticNa to a proUem which does iMt attempt to in-
fluence Ae labor or prt^wrty relations of a given society.” That is, collective non-move-
“KBts, as exposed to movements, d̂ >etKi on psychological reorganizatioa rather ilian so-
^ change to solve ivc^laBS. Joseph Gusfield makes a similar distinction in Symbolic
Crusade: Status Pohtics and the Afoeriam Temperence Movement (Urtena: Univ. of
imnois Press, 1966). He identifies p^cbok^cally oriented movonents with statiu poli-
™^ |ra ecooomically oriented maraaaais with class politics.

°̂ Roberts smd Kloss ccxisider coQective nt»rnaoveiQents a&d movemeots to be evi-
aence of a “dklectical laiocess”; tiiat is, a social trend prodncra its own opposition by fos-
tenng witUn a e r o w of people Ihe psyiiiological need for negation oi the trend, p. 19.
, ”̂ Marsha Kimfcr and Beverle Houstc», Chse-Up: A Critical Perspective on Film
(New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovaaovich, 1972), p. 282.

169]

JotJSNAL OF Si^ECH COMMUNICAItON SVKOSSG 1978

Thus, Fisho- argues that ths 1972 Preadendal c a ^ a i g n w:^ a symbolic
struggle between Nixon as dK fls^ earner of the materiaHstic myth and Mc-
Govem as the symbd of the moralistic myth. Frentz and F a n ^ n^dntain
that the struggk bdiween Father Kanas and the Dantm in “The Exordst”
symbolizes a similar conflict, a battle bebween transeendoit Good and posi-
livistic EviL And, as we shall demonstrate, a compandde conflict is central to
die moning ol “Rocky.”

Patterns of Change
Symbolic conflict, then, is the necessary condition of value re-orientation

—both in politics and in film. There are, however, two different patterns that
such S3mAoUc conflict can take, each pattern having its own peculiarities and
necessary pre-conditions to enactment: dialectical transformation and dialec-
Heal synthesis. One pattern «itails an inversion frtmi one prevailing set of
values to the other—a dialectical transformation.^ In terms ol the concepts
discussed previously, this pattern would be exemplified in a transformation
from tragedy to Utopia, from positivism to transcendoice, or from moralism to
materialism (or, of course, vice-versa). Of the two patterns, dialectical trans-
formation is the simplest because it does not necessitate the creation of a new
value structure, but only the shift from one dominairt set of values to another
—^where both value sets are previously known and experienced. In addition,
dialectical transformation is a non-zero-sum game; as one set of values re-
places the other as the imderlying myth of social life, the value set ttat is re-
placed “loses” in a symbolic sense. This pattern is narked by competition.

The competitiveness of a dialectical transformation has not gone unnoticed
among political and film critics. Frentz and Farrell express concern over the
possible “debilitating effect of a total reliance on one dimension of consdous-
ness to the exdusion of the other.”^ Fisher, commaiting on the consequences
of the 1972 Presidential campaign, warns:

The gravest danger that the election may have fostered is an increased
loss oE faith in & American Dream, the whole dream. . . . America
needs heroes and rituals, presidents jtnd electioiK^ to sigiufy her whole
meaning—moralistic and materialistic; ^ae reqavK S3niibols tiiat her
dtizens can identify with and can gain sajoction from for what they are
as individuals and what they represent as i ^

The second pattern of value change is more omplex concqrtually and
difiicuit to enact ^rmbolicaliy. In a dialectictU synthesis tixs

^ There is some evideoce of this ^ t t e m . Of Positivism and TranscendeMX, Frentz
ami Farrell argot that “j^canse of tiieir antith^cal nature, these two dimensions oi
Americaa consckmaiess faaTe dbbed and flowed in aa irr^aiu- but recurrent cycie,” p. 41.
Goaldner daans that the modon coQscicntsness “is vr&sttiotaHy divided intermdly so that
one decade may be passitre and profonndly gloonrjr wUle the very iwxt is activistic ana
optkristic,” p. 75.

» Frentz and FarrdL p. 41.
«> Fisher, p. IS’.

[70]

J A N I C E HOCKER R U S H I N G AND T H O M A S S . FRENTZ

merely rqdaced with the new, but r ^ h e r an integration of the old with the
new is fornMd in sudi a way that the relationship among the participants is
reaffirmed. In other words, this pattern of change renews a sense of independ-
ence and oMnmunity among those involved. Moreover, there are no “losers”
in a dialectical syntheas process, because all parts are preserved, the s3Tnbolic
conflict is characterized by intense effort Hat is more cooperative than com-
petitive.

Psychological Prerequisites
Change agents—be they politicians or characters in a film—are not totally

free to choose either pattern of value change; any change agent must manifest
internally a value eisemble consistent with the fattem to be followed. This
principle is based upon the assumption that agents of social change can only
be effective to the extent that they have experienced psychologically the new
values. For change agents to implement the dialectical transformation pattern
of symbolic conflict would r^juire that they have psychological knowledge of
one of the two competing sets of values. For individuals or groups dialectic-
ally to syntlKsize opposing values, however, they would have to have already
synthesized the values in question internally, to have “psychologically pre-
viewed” the synthesis process to be enacted in the sodo-political arena. It may
well be that the rarity with which the synthesis pattern is enacted stems from
the difficulty of achieving the psychological prerequisites.

Andience Role
The final component of our critical model involves the role of the audi-

ence, the spectators for which symbolic conflict is enacted. The audience’s role
in either dialectical pattern varies from intensified awareness to active parti-
cipation. This general intensified awareness is traceable to dissatisfaction with
a given value orientation that is no longer meeting societd needs—to a yearn-
ing for something different. The audience seems to be most actively involved,
however, when the pattern of change is synthetic; for dialectical sjmthesis is
an emergent pattern—a pattern in which the change agents creativdy forge a
new phoiomraion. Thus, when in^viduals witness such change, they indentif y
with an inventional process. Ideally, they are contributors to the generative
process; they both learn and vicariously help create that which did not exist
before the pattCTn was enacted.

The five-jdiase sodal value modd of rhetorical criticism we have out-
lined is schematized in Figure 1.

In this essay, we have argued that film and social change are inextricaHy
related and, as such, to understand d t h e r demands understanding that inter-
relationship. W e then created a five-part soda! value modd of rhetorical criti-
•̂ sm. In the seccoid essay, we shall tise the sodal value modd as a heuristic
vehicle for analyzing the political-rhetorical context in whidi “Rocky” oc-

[71]

WESTERN JOCEKAL OF SPEECH COMMONICATIOK SPKING 1978

F K U S E 1

Socki Value Model

1. Values c a s t in dialectical c^wsiticm.
2. Sycdxdiccraifiklk the necessary conditioQ for value re-(»ient^icm.
3. Ttoie are two patterns of symbolic conflict:

—d^ectlcal transformation’,
—dialectical synthesis.

4. P^diol(^cal prerequisite:
—dialectical transfonnation necessitates non-integrated change

t
—dialKtical synthesis requires integrated change agent

5. Audience role:
—participation in a g e n e r a t e process hogpens eiq)eriential

involvement in dialectical sjrnthesis.

corred and for evaluating Hie fihn as an expression of value chai^;e in Amer-
ican society.

172}

Review of Scholarly Work assignment requirements and information

Further explanation about the assignment

The purpose of your essay/outline/writing is not to argue whether you agree or disagree with the authors, but to show that you understand the arguments made by the authors to prove their thesis. Typically, we do not read the writings of others very closely. The purpose of this assignment is to show that you have read and thought about Rushing and Frentz’s arguments closely. By studying and understanding how other people construct their arguments, we learn how to better construct our own arguments.

In this essay, you will need to identify the authors’ thesis and purpose for this article because that is the foundation for their arguments. Then you explain the arguments the authors use to prove that thesis.

For some people, the best way to do this assignment is to outline the article. Others may find an essay format easier.  Whichever approach you choose, please remember that you are explaining this article to a reader, who needs to understand what you write. Assume the reader has not read the article. Therefore, phrases and incomplete sentences may be useful to you (the writer), but are likely to confuse a reader.

Don’t forget that when discussing what is said in the article, refer to the authors, not to the term “the article” or its title (“The Rhetoric of ‘Rocky’ “). The article is the tool by which people share their arguments. So you should introduce quotes or other references to the content  with “the authors said” or ” Rushing and Frentz state.”

Previous

Next

Synthesis
“The Future of
Work”

COMS 321

To do for Module 6 & 7 (March 1-15)

1. Prepare to write an essay on “The Future of Work”

◦ 1.1 Review the assignment requirements

◦ 1.2 Review the research provided in Module 6

◦ 1.3 Research and locate sources (scholarly and non-scholarly) explore the
future of work. Post summaries & correct MLA citation of 2 sources (1 must

be scholarly).

◦ 1.4 Consult, brainstorm, discuss, or hash out the future of work with your
writing partner

To do for Module 6 & 7 (March 1-15)

2. Write your essay on “The Future of Work”

◦ 2.1 Give yourself permission to be creative

◦ 2.2 Take a position—narrowly drawn vs. broad concepts

◦ 2.3 Write a draft

◦ 2.4 Rewrite, rewrite, rewrite, rewrite, rewrite, . . .

◦ 2.5 Exchange drafts with writing partner.

◦ 2.6 Revise and finalize paper.

Make an argument
about the future of work

Generate your idea by

1.Developed from considering
various articles/books/works
from current research

2.Have an idea that you explore
and refine through your
research

Limit your argument’s scope

Depth over breadth

Build your argument by
using sources

Synthesis of research,
of ideas

Synthesis

Essay

assignment requirements and information

Related Activities

1. Research and find two articles (one scholarly and the second either scholarly or non-scholarly) relevant to this assignment. Summarize and post the summaries along with MLA citations at 

DISCUSS: Scholarly research about the future of work

2. Exchange your draft of essay with your writing partner (and vice versa). In addition to generally reviewing and editing the essay, make sure to review your partner’s use of sources and in-text citations as well as the Works Cited page.

Further explanation about the assignment

The primary purpose of your essay is not to argue whether you agree or disagree with the authors, but to show that you understand the arguments made in the readings by developing your own argument about future of work based on a synthesis of the readings.

Additionally, you take on the role of a futurist ( “one who studies and predicts the future especially on the basis of current trends” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, online) by examining how work, employment, or careers in the future will be different than our current experience. 

I’d like you to develop a perspective/argument that is unique in the sense that your argument departs from what is usual or to be expected. The readings explain to you what has been said about this subject. Your goal is to identify and develop a thesis that brings the resources provided together (reconciles them) and that would would make people think, “I never thought of it that way.”

Of course, you are not developing a entire explanation about the future of work; my suggestion is that you focus on one aspect of that issue.

You want to present your perspective/argument (or thesis) in the opening paragraph of your essay. Since you have just two pages, you are explaining the structure of that argument and likely how you would go about proving your perspective/argument. The purpose of this essay is for you to briefly explain that perspective/argument in the nature of a topic proposal.

Don’t forget that when discussing articles or other resources,  refer to the author by name or designation as author, not to “the article” or to the title of the article.