The Concept of Self  [WLOs: 1, 2] [CLOs: 1, 5]

Prior to beginning work on this discussion, read Chapter 9 of the course textbook, and review sections 2.5, 3.1, and 3.2 from previous chapters. Also, read the articles

Children’s Sense of Self: Learning and Meaning in the Digital Age

and

Personal Self-Concept and Satisfaction With Life in Adolescence, Youth, and Adulthood

(Dodge, Barab, Stuckey, Warren, Heiselt, & Stein, 2008; Palacios, Echaniz, Fernández, & Barrón, 2015).

The concept of self is a core concept for the study of personality, and most of the theories we have studied in this course postulate some idea about what constitutes the self. This week’s materials examine the self-psychology model, which presents several theories regarding how we perceive ourselves and how that perception is expressed in personalities.

In your initial post:

• Identify two theories of self from those discussed in Chapter 9 that resonate the most with you.
• Provide a brief overview of each theory, being sure to identify the principal theorists associated with each of your two chosen theories.
• Explain why you relate to these theories.
• Describe the impact of the current digital age on the concept of self, including the impact of social media on the way we perceive ourselves.
• Explain whether or not our perceptions of self are evolving because of social media, including the idea of a digital self, and provide examples of how this might be happening or provide a rationale as to why you believe it is not happening.

Your initial post should be a minimum of 350 words and should include references to both of the assigned articles.

 

Personality

Disorders [WLO: 1] [CLOs: 4, 5]

Prior to beginning work on this discussion, read Chapter 10 of the course textbook. Pay close attention to the two case illustrations in Section 10.4 as these may inform the creation of the illustration in your initial post. Also, read the articles

An Integrated Approach to Treatment of Patients With Personality Disorders

and

Pathological Personality Traits Can Capture DSM–IV Personality Disorder Types

(Clarkin, Cain, & Livesley, 2015; Miller, Few, Lynam, & MacKillop, 2015).

For this discussion, select one of the personality disorders discussed in Chapter 10 that you find interesting, then conduct web research to find a person (i.e., living or not, historical, famous, and/or even fictional) who suffers from the disorder you chose to serve as a case study. Then choose a model of personality that will serve as a framework for devising a theoretical explanation and therapeutic intervention for the case you selected.

For your initial post,

• Describe the personality disorder for the case study you selected.
• Apply the theories in your selected model to explain how the disorder may have developed for your particular case and what may have been the underlying causes. The primary focus here should be on the theoretical explanation of how your chosen disorder may have developed and should not be a detailed description of the disorder.
• Discuss possible therapeutic interventions that might be applied in your case, based on your chosen model.

Your initial post should be a minimum of 350 words and should incorporate at least one peer-reviewed article.

 

Required Resources

Text

Lecci, L. B. (2015). Personality. Retrieved from https://content.ashford.edu

• Chapter 10: Personality and Psychopathology

 
Lecci, L. B. (2015). Personality. Retrieved from https://content.ashford.edu

• Chapter 7: Interpersonal Models of Personality
• Chapter 9: Self-Psychology: Humanistic/Existential Models of Personality

Articles

Clarkin, J. F., Cain, N., & Livesley, W. J. (2015).

An integrated approach to treatment of patients with personality disorders

. Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 25(1), 3-12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038766

• The full-text version of this article is available through the EBSCOhost database in the Ashford University Library. The authors of this article describe an integrated approach to treating patients with personality disorders. The article will help you with the Week 5 Personality Disorders discussion.

Kealy, D., Steinberg, P. I., & Ogrodniczuk, J. S. (2015).

“Difficult” patient? Or is it a personality disorder?

Clinician Reviews, 25(2), 40-46. Retrieved from https://www.mdedge.com/clinicianreviews

• The full-text version of this article is available through the EBSCOhost database in the Ashford University Library. The authors of this article discuss the identification and management of personality disorders. The article will help you with the Week 5 Personality Disorders discussion.

Miller, J. D., Few, L. R., Lynam, D. R., & MacKillop, J. (2015).

Pathological personality traits can capture DSM–IV personality disorder types

. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 6(1), 32-40. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1037/per0000064

• The full-text version of this article is available through the EBSCOhost database in the Ashford University Library. The authors of this article discuss and compare the interview method and the trait methods for diagnosing a personality disorder in the DSM-IV. The article will help you with Week 5 Personality Disorders discussion.

 

Dodge, T., Barab, S., Stuckey, B., Warren, S., Heiselt, C., & Stein, R. (2008).

Children’s sense of self: Learning and meaning in the digital age

. Journal of Interactive Learning Research, 19(2), 225-249. Retrieved from http://www.aace.org/pubs/jilr

• The full-text version of this article is available through the ProQuest database in the Ashford University Library. The authors discuss the influence of digital media on the development of a sense of self in children. The article will help you with the Week 4 The Concept of Self discussion.

Palacios, E. G., Echaniz, I. E., Fernández, A. R., & de Barrón, I. C. O. (2015).

Personal self-concept and satisfaction with life in adolescence, youth, and adulthood

. Psicothema, 27(1), 52-58. http://dx/doi.org/10.7334/psicothema2014.105

• The full-text version of this article is available through the EBSCOhost database in the Ashford University Library. The article discusses the relationship between life satisfaction and four dimensions of self-concept: self-fulfillment, autonomy, honesty, and emotions, and will help you with the Week 4 The Concept of Self discussion.

monkeybusinessimages/iStock/Thinkstock

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be

able to:

• Name and briefly describe the criteria used to
differentiate normal from abnormal manifes-
tations of behavior, thought, and affect.

• Identify the most common diagnostic system
used in the United States and some of the
prevalence rates for personality disorders.

• Name and define the DSM-5 personality dis-
orders found in clusters A, B, and C.

• Discuss the different prevalence rates for the
personality disorders, especially with respect
to sex differences.

• Identify some of the alternative models for
categorizing personality disorders, such as
those proposed by the International Classifi-
cation of Diseases, Millon, and the Five Factor
Model.

• Name and briefly describe some measures
of personality commonly used in clinical set-
tings, particularly the MMPI–2.

Personality and Psychopathology 10

Chapter Outline
Introduction

10.1 Defining Personality Disorders
• Criteria to Define Abnormal Functioning
• Criteria for Defining Problematic Functioning

in Terms of Personality
• Conceptualizing Personality Disorders

10.2 Types of Personality Disorders
• Cluster A Personality Disorders
• Cluster B Personality Disorders
• Cluster C Personality Disorders
• Other Specified Personality Disorder
• The Prevalence of Personality Disorders
• Alternative Organizational Models for the

Personality Disorders
• Questioning the Legitimacy of Mental Illness

• Explain why we need measures of response tendencies when assessing personality in clinical settings.

• Name some common validity scales used to assess over- and under-reporting tendencies.

• Read a case study and interpret some basic personality data in order to diagnose the patient, and provide a theo-
retical account of their etiology based on one or more of the theories presented in this text.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 283 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10

Introduction
Try to recall the last time you took an exam. How many pencils did you bring with
you? If you didn’t bring any, you might be considered unprepared. If you brought
one, you might still be considered to be acting carelessly, given that the point
might break. Perhaps you brought one extra, just in case. But what if you brought
three, four, or five backup pencils? Would this suggest that you were acting in
an obsessive manner, possibly demonstrating symptoms of obsessive-compulsive
personality disorder? These are subtle distinctions, and it’s hard to decide at what
point behavior—even a simple, mundane behavior, such as bringing pencils to a
test—goes from normal to abnormal, or nonpathological to problematic.

This example illustrates the complexity of differentiating subtle variations of
behavior, ranging from “normal” personality functioning to personality disorders.
Three extra pencils (or any particular number of pencils) doesn’t necessarily mean
anything diagnostically, but it might, especially if you spent too much of your
exam preparation time collecting and sharpening pencils or if you spent much
of the time taking the exam worrying about the durability of your pencils and
whether you brought enough.

So far we’ve explored how personality functions. In this chapter, we turn our
attention to the symptoms and development of personality dysfunction. The his-
tory of personality psychology developed hand in hand with clinical psychology.
Therefore, it is somewhat artificial to consider these two areas as distinct. Indeed,
throughout this text, there have been both implicit and explicit references to psy-
chopathology (e.g., depression, anxiety, personality disorders, etc.). In this chap-
ter, we will more directly deal with personality disorders, the criteria by which they
are defined and diagnosed, and assessment tools commonly used to assess per-
sonality disorders. We will conclude the chapter with two case studies that bring
these issues together with the explanatory accounts forwarded in earlier chapters.

As we explore the current thinking regarding personality disorders, it behooves us
to remember our discussion about defining “normal” from Chapter One. Much of
this chapter deals with abnormal personality as it is defined by the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) published by the American Psychi-
atric Association (APA), and while many of the behaviors discussed in this chapter
are clearly problematic, it is important to remember that “normal” is a relative,
culturally defined construct. And when it comes to defining what is normal or
abnormal in personality, our culture has collectively decided to let the American
Psychiatric Association decide.

10.3 Assessing Personality Disorders
• The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality

Inventory (MMPI–2)
• Personality Assessment Inventory

(PAI-)
• The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inven-

tory-III (MCMI-III/)
• Common Features of Each Assessment

10.4 Case Illustrations
• Case 1: Bob G.
• Case 2: Samantha K.

Summary

Introduction

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 284 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10

10.1 Defining Personality Disorders

Personality disorders share many of the same defining features with the concept of personal-ity; both, for example, have a stable pattern of behavior, affect, and cognition that charac-terize the individual. But to be considered a personality disorder there must also be a clear
indication that a person’s behavior, affect, or cognition is problematic in some way—maladaptive
or rigid, for example—and compromises the individual’s level of functioning. Personality disorders
can be differentiated from clinical disorders that do not involve personality (e.g., alcohol depen-
dence, schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, etc.), in that the former are typically more longstanding
and pervasive, and they typically manifest in more subtle ways.

One of the biggest challenges to identifying and diagnosing any disorder is establishing a set of
criteria that can help differentiate normal manifestations of behavior, affect, and cognition from
what might be labeled as abnormal or even pathological manifestations. Over the years, a number
of criteria have emerged by consensus, and some of those are briefly discussed in this section.
Note that these criteria are broadly applied to abnormal behavior, and there are separate factors
that will make them applicable to personality.

Criteria to Define Abnormal Functioning
Four basic criteria are considered relevant to differentiating abnormal from normal functioning:

1. statistical deviance,
2. dysfunction in daily living,
3. the experience of distress, and
4. danger to self or others.

Each criterion is important in defining
abnormal functioning, but none are nec-
essary or sufficient to determine that a
disorder is present. As an example, it is
true that behavior that is markedly differ-
ent (statistically deviant) from what most
people do is more likely to be defined as
abnormal, but some rare behaviors are
not disorders, and in fact can be quite
adaptive. For example, consider the life
and behavior of Mother Teresa, which
could be an extreme case of altruism,
or that of Bill Gates, which could be an
extreme case of financial and technologi-
cal success. Neither of these would be
considered maladaptive, but they are cer-
tainly deviant from a statistical standpoint.

It is also the case that, despite these criteria, debate has continued with respect to what specifically
should or should not be considered a disorder. Consider homosexuality, which prior to 1980 was
considered a psychiatric disorder by the World Health Organization (WHO) and was also included
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 2nd Edition (DSM-II; APA, 1968), but
since that time has not been considered a disorder. A wide range of factors influence what we
consider disordered, and the criteria—and interpretations of the criteria—will change over time.

Trevor Smith/iStockphoto/Thinkstock

What do we consider disordered behavior? When is
abnormal behavior pathological?

10.1 Defining Personality Disorders

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 285 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.1 Defining Personality Disorders

Statistical Deviance

Statistical deviance refers to the infrequency of a behavior or trait in the general population, with
the assumption that a lower frequency is typically associated with abnormal behavior. Statistical
deviance is determined by the context, including the temporal context and the social/cultural
context. Thus, what is considered typical today may have been labeled atypical in the past, and
vice versa.

Consider for example, the incidence of women engaging in roles traditionally considered mascu-
line, such as playing competitive sports, which was very rare a century ago, but today is not only
common, but is also considered healthy. Likewise, behavioral standards and normative experi-
ences vary tremendously around the world. For example, Windigo psychosis refers to a condition
sometimes observed in Native American (especially Algonquin) Indians where the afflicted indi-
vidual believes that he has been possessed by a spirit that results in a desire to consume human
flesh (cannibalism). This disorder is rarely observed in other cultures. Or consider a disorder like
anorexia nervosa and its incidence in Western civilization, with rates of occurrence of approxi-
mately 0.5% overall, but with higher rates among high school and college-aged females at almost
6% (Makino, Tsuboi, & Dennerstein, 2004). This disorder, however, is virtually non-existent in non-
Western cultures, with rates of approximately 0.0063%, even in females (Kuboki, Nomura, Ide,
Suematsu, & Araki, 1996). Of course, there is no specific value that defines statistical deviance,
and therefore this criterion is considered on a continuum.

Dysfunction in Daily Living

Simply being statistically unusual is not enough to consider a behavior disordered because rare
behaviors and traits can be adaptive—and common behaviors and traits, such as heavy alcohol
consumption among college students, are not necessarily adaptive. Thus, an important addi-
tional feature is the extent to which the behavior or trait leads to problematic functioning, or
dysfunction, in areas such as work, school, and relationships. For example, if someone is very
task-driven and highly competitive, and this results in their attaining considerable professional
success, establishing friendships, and attracting intimate partners who like that trait, then it would
be considered adaptive. However, if that same level of competitive drive results in the alienation
of intimate others, the inability to cooperate with colleagues, and, therefore, less career success,
then the behavior would be more likely labeled as abnormal and problematic.

The Experience of Distress

Behaviors and traits can also result in the individual or those around them reacting with distress,
and this criterion can help define abnormality. In fact, the individual’s own experience of distress
has been a major predictor (e.g., Cepeda-Benito & Short, 1998; Kimerling & Calhoun, 1994; Mond
et al., 2009; see also Vogel & Wei, 2005) of help-seeking behavior across a wide range of condi-
tions. From a practical standpoint, psychological distress increases the likelihood that a contact/
interaction will occur with a mental health professional and that a diagnosis will be made.

In addition to the individual’s own experience of it, distress can affect others, and this will simi-
larly increase the potential for the individual being encouraged (or even coerced) into treatment.
In this way, this criterion addresses the circumstance of people who behave abnormally but have
very little self-awareness. In this instance, the psychological distress is likely to be experienced by
those who interact with the individual. This criterion also interacts closely with the criterion of
dysfunction, as the experience of distress leads to dysfunction.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 286 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.1 Defining Personality Disorders

Danger to Self or Others

Some instances of behaviors and traits are a danger—risky or harmful—either to the individual
or to others. Consider suicidal behavior, which can be conceptualized as either an active (e.g.,
trying to take one’s own life) or passive (e.g., failure to engage in safer actions or avoid high-risk
circumstances) threat to the self. Self-injurious behavior, which is distinct from a suicide attempt,
would also be captured by this category of self-harm. Regardless of the specific example, this cri-
terion emphasizes what might be considered the ultimate dysfunction, as it threatens existence.
Moreover, such threats are also likely to involve distress by the individual and others. Thus, even
though the criteria can be theoretically distinguished, from a practical standpoint, they are highly
interrelated.

Criteria for Defining Problematic Functioning in Terms of Personality
In addition to defining a behavior or trait along a continuum from normal to abnormal, it is also
important to highlight the factors that help categorize it as a problem specific to the domain of
personality. Disorders of personality are somewhat unique in that they involve behaviors or traits
that are pervasive and longstanding. By pervasive we mean that the problematic behavior or trait
emerges in virtually all aspects of the individual’s life (this would be similar to Allport’s term, car-
dinal traits, as described in Chapter 8). By longstanding, we mean that the problematic behavior
or trait has been present for a significant portion of the individual’s life. As we shall see when
presenting the diagnostic criteria, personality disorders must be present since at least late ado-
lescence or early adulthood, and therefore personality disorders should generally not be assigned
until adulthood.

Despite the requirement that there be some durability to the personality disorder over the life-
time, some research suggests that personality disorders may not be stable in their presentation,
especially when there are overlying mood disorders, such as anxiety and depression (e.g., Ottos-
son, Grann, & Kullgren, 2000). Studies have also found somewhat modest temporal stability for
several measures of personality disorders (as indicated by the test-retest reliability coefficients;
e.g., Trull, 1993), and it is unclear if this means that it is the measures that are unstable or the
personality disorders themselves. Indeed, longitudinal studies have generally questioned whether
personality disorders are, in fact, stable over time (Cohen, Crawford, Johnson, & Kasen, 2005;
Skodol et al., 2005; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, Reich, & Silk, 2005), and this may have some
important consequences for the construct itself (i.e., how we define personality disorders).

Although this chapter will focus on the disorders of personality, it is important to acknowledge that
personality functioning is a critical aspect of understanding how other psychiatric disorders mani-
fest in the individual and how they can best be treated. For example, a diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) may present very differently for a highly extraverted, conscientious, and
neurotic individual relative to one scoring low on these traits (factors); both intervention strate-
gies and treatment outcomes may likewise be affected by these traits (e.g., Bock, Bukh, Vinberg,
Gether, & Kessing, 2010; Canuto et al., 2009; Ogrodniczuk, Piper, Joyce, McCallum, & Rosie, 2003).

Conceptualizing Personality Disorders
Beginning with the diagnostic system published in 1980 (DSM-III; APA), there has been an interest
in considering personality disorders as extreme versions of normal traits. In this approach, the dif-
ference between clinical and nonclinical manifestations of personality would be quantitative, not

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 287 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.1 Defining Personality Disorders

qualitative. That is, personality disorders and normal personality functioning would be defined
along the same continuum. In contrast, the more prevailing historical trend was to consider clini-
cal (disordered) presentations of personality and nonclinical (normal) presentations of personality
as qualitatively distinct, with medical terms used to define the former and traits to describe the
latter. Using this approach, the two manifestations of personality are considered categorically dis-
tinct. This highlights the division between at least two camps: those that believe that personality
disorders are quantitatively different from normal personality functioning (i.e., they are simply
extreme examples of the same traits) and those who believe that there are important qualitative
distinctions that require the use of different constructs in clinical and nonclinical settings (see
Clark, 2007; Strack & Lorr, 1994; Widiger & Samuel, 2005). The categorical model that emphasizes
the qualitative distinctions continues to be a central feature of the newest incarnation of the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; APA, 2013).

A third, hybrid approach assumes that the quantitative differences, when combined in certain
ways, can result in qualitative differences as well. There is some support for the latter position,
as researchers have found that the traits that co-occur in nonclinical populations differ from the
most common co-occurring traits in clinical settings (Livesley & Jang, 2005).

Yet another way to address this conceptual issue is to consider the distinction between abnormal
personality and disordered personality. Most researchers would agree that abnormal personality
is simply a variant of normal personality (i.e., a statistical oddity) that can be defined as an extreme
score (too little or too much) on the basic personality traits (see also Eysenck, 1987; Wiggins &
Pincus, 1989). In contrast, a personality disorder implies deficits in functioning and maladaptive
behavior (or in the very least, the absence of adaptive behavior). Thus, in referring to the criteria
noted earlier in this chapter, statistical deviance allows for a designation of abnormal, while some
of the remaining criteria, most notably the presence of dysfunction, results in a qualitatively dif-
ferent label (a disorder). Indeed, statistical deviance by itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to
meet criteria for a disorder.

Although the qualitative versus quantitative distinction may seem like nothing more than a the-
oretical debate, there are in fact some important implications. For example, if one adopts the
qualitative model, then it would be necessary to develop separate measures for use in clinical and
nonclinical settings (this is in fact the most common practice today). In contrast, the quantitative
model would not require separate measures to be developed, only separate norms (i.e., to quan-
tify the typical scores in clinical settings).

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 288 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10

10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

In 2013, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) was published by the American Psychiatric Association (2013). Previous versions of the DSM adopted a multi-axial system to categorize disorders. Axis I identified the clinical disorders and conditions
that might be the focus of clinical attention. Axis II included the personality disorders, learning dis-
orders, and mental retardation. Axes III through V covered medical disorders, psychosocial prob-
lems (e.g., homelessness, job loss, etc.), and a global (overall) rating of individuals’ functioning,
respectively. Traditionally, there has been considerable diagnostic overlap and interdependence
between the five axes, and in particular Axes I and II.

The DSM-5 adopts a very different approach by completely dropping the multi-axial system, and
combining what was formerly categorized as Axes I, II, and III into a single diagnostic system, owing
largely to the considerable overlap among the axes and the artificial nature of separating these dis-
orders. This now aligns the DSM more closely with the most widely used diagnostic system around
the world: the World Health Organization’s (WHO) International Classification of Diseases (ICD).
The disorders of the DSM-5 are now organized based on their relatedness to each other, focusing
on such factors as symptom overlap and similar underlying vulnerabilities. The DSM-5’s documen-
tation of diagnoses does retain separate notations for psychosocial and contextual factors, as well
as disability (formerly Axes IV and V, respectively), and none of the 10 personality disorders defined
in the previous DSM-IV have changed with respect to their specific criteria in DSM-5.

According to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013), personality disorders must also present in at least two of the
following four areas:

1. cognition (i.e., thinking; referring specifically to perceptions of the self, others, and
events)

2. affect (i.e., emotional experiences, referring specifically to impact on affective range,
lability, intensity, and appropriateness)

3. interpersonal functioning (i.e., relationships)
4. impulse control (i.e., the ability to, essentially, delay gratifying one’s needs and wants)

By requiring that at least two of the above-mentioned areas be affected, this assures that person-
ality disorders will be pervasive in their impact on the individual’s life, and this is in keeping with
the definition of personality.

Up to this point in the chapter, the more general requirements of personality disorders have been
reviewed. Now we turn our attention to the specific diagnostic criteria for each disorder. Each of
the personality disorders and their diagnostic criteria will be presented here, as forwarded in the
DSM-5. Importantly, the presence of the previously noted features (e.g., distress, dysfunction,
pervasiveness, etc.) is necessary for the diagnosis of a personality disorder in general, whereas the
following criteria are necessary for the diagnosis of a specific disorder.

The personality disorder criteria are presented in three groupings, referred to as clusters. There is
more symptom overlap within clusters rather than between the clusters.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 289 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

Cluster A Personality Disorders
The cluster A personality disorders all involve odd or eccentric behavior, resulting in decreased
socialization experiences and often increased isolation. Such behavior will most closely match the
presentation seen with other clinical disorders with psychotic symptoms, such as schizophrenia or
mood disorders with psychotic features. To qualify for the diagnosis of a personality disorder, the
symptoms cannot be better explained by one of the clinical disorders.

Paranoid Personality Disorder

The primary presenting features of paranoid personality disorder is a persistent and universal
distrust and suspiciousness of others. These individuals interpret the intentions of others as hos-
tile and demeaning in nature, and as a result they often take umbrage to these perceived slights
and respond with anger and provocation. Importantly, the suspiciousness is without justification
and may be very subtle (if present at all), even though the general themes may be common (e.g.,
fidelity of an intimate partner, loyalties of others, persecution from a government agency, etc.).
Thus, the symptomatic nature of the paranoid presentation is made most obvious by its recurrent
nature.

Because of these beliefs, close relationships will be difficult to maintain, both because of the per-
ception of attack and threat from others and because of the counterattacks that invariably occur.
As a result, they often engage in social isolation and self-sufficiency, they may present as emo-
tionally volatile, and they typically blame others for their shortcomings. According to the DSM-5,
stress may exacerbate paranoia, and this personality disorder may be a precursor to a more severe
psychotic presentation (i.e., schizophrenia). Prevalence rates have ranged from 2.3% to 4.3%, with
the disorder being more commonly diagnosed in males (DSM-5; APA, 2013).

Schizoid Personality Disorder

The primary presenting feature for schizoid personality disorder is flat affect and disengagement
from social interactions. Due at least in part to their lack of emotional experience, these individu-
als have few interests and goals in life, and they do not desire or derive pleasure from close rela-
tionships. As a result, these individuals present as indifferent and detached; they tend to choose
to engage in isolated activities. They are unlikely to have friendships or close connections (e.g.,
they rarely date or marry), and aside from first-degree relatives, they may have no one in whom
they might confide.

As was the case for paranoid personality disorder, the schizoid individual may experience height-
ened symptoms during times of stress, and this disorder may be a precursor to a delusional disor-
der or schizophrenia. Prevalence rates range from 3.1% to 4.9%, and this disorder is slightly more
common in males (DSM-5; APA, 2013).

Schizotypal Personality Disorder

The diagnostic category for schizotypal personality disorder includes a wide range of symptoms
that parallel what is often seen with schizophrenia, though symptoms tend to be less acute but
more pervasive. Symptoms include referential thinking (i.e., mistakenly believing that the actions
of others or events have special meaning or significance for the individual); magical thinking, which
includes superstitious beliefs as well as belief in telepathy or clairvoyance; odd or unusual percep-
tions; and unusual thinking or speech. Individuals with this diagnosis also have either restricted or

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 290 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

inappropriate affective responses, and their behavior can be characterized as peculiar. Schizotypal
personality disorder also tends to result in social isolation, with few if any close relationships, and
the presence of social anxiety that is unaffected by the familiarity of those with whom they inter-
act. Paranoia may be present, but it is not the primary or dominant symptom, as with paranoid
personality disorder. Likewise, restricted affect and social withdrawal are also present but are less
prominent relative to schizoid personality disorder.

As with the other cluster A personality disorders, schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders may
manifest later in life, though this occurs in a relatively small percentage of those affected. Between
30% and 50% of those with schizotypal personality disorder have a co-occurring major depressive
disorder. The prevalence rates for the cluster A personality disorders range from 3.9% to 4.6% in
the United States, but the rates are much lower in other parts of the world (e.g., less than 1% in
Norway). This disorder also appears to be slightly more common in males, and this is considered
one of the more stable personality disorders, in that symptoms tend to present in a consistent
manner throughout one’s life (APA, 2013).

Differentiating schizophrenia from the personality disorders of schizotypal, schizoid, and paranoid
is complex, and misdiagnoses can occur. Research suggests that one of the more effective ways
of differentiating schizophrenia from the personality disorders is that the former tends to have
more of what are referred to as the positive symptoms (e.g., active hallucinations and delusions),
whereas such symptoms are more subtle or even absent with the cluster A personality disorders.
Instead, it appears to be symptoms such as social and physical anhedonia that characterize the
personality disorders (e.g., Clementz, Grove, Katsanis, & lacono, 1991; Kendler, Thacker, & Walsh,
1996).

Cluster B Personality Disorders
The cluster B personality disorders
involve dramatic or emotional behavior,
and although relationships will be pres-
ent, there will be conflict, instability,
and exploitation. Moreover, unlike the
cluster A personality disorders, those in
this cluster typically present with con-
siderable affect and affective dysregula-
tion. This cluster most closely resembles
the mood disorders, although a cluster
B personality disorder diagnosis should
not be applied if the behavior is better
accounted for by a mood disorder.

Antisocial Personality Disorder

This diagnosis is explicitly not permit-
ted until the individual is aged 18 or
older, and a conduct disorder diagno-
sis is common prior to the age of 15.
Antisocial personality disorder also differs from other personality disorders in that it tends to
remit, or at least become less prominent, on its own, thereby suggesting that this is part of its
normal course (i.e., with more pronounced presentation earlier in life).

Click Images/iStock/Thinkstock

Antisocial personality disorder is much more common
in this context, with rates as high as 70 percent of
incarcerated men.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 291 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

The most prominent feature of this disorder is the universal and longstanding practice of complete
disregard for social norms, with the individual typically engaging in a long history of illegal behav-
ior. In fact, these individuals often come to clinical attention by way of the police (i.e., they rarely
present for voluntary assessment or treatment of antisocial traits). These individuals routinely vio-
late the rights of others, with little regard, remorse, concern, or empathy. They are callous, cynical,
aggressive (e.g., fights, assaults, etc.), irritable, impulsive, reckless, and irresponsible. They pres-
ent as opinionated and even arrogant, with a superficial charm and glib demeanor.

Because deceitfulness (lying) is a common feature of this personality disorder, there is often a
history of taking advantage of others for personal (typically material) gain. The prominence of
deceitfulness can be problematic from a diagnostic standpoint, as the clinician often relies on the
individual’s self-report to arrive at a diagnosis. Thus, it is often necessary to rely more on objective
information, such as arrest records and legal history, to arrive at an accurate diagnosis.

Antisocial personality disorder may be comorbid (co-occur) with mood disorders, substance abuse
disorders, and impulse control disorders. According to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013), prevalence rates
range from 0.2% to 3.3%, though rates can exceed 70% among males in legal and forensic set-
tings and substance abuse clinics. The disorder is significantly more common in males relative to
females (approximately three times greater in males; Eaton et al., 2012), though there are some
concerns that this difference is due to an overemphasis on the symptoms of aggression. Spe-
cifically, a recent study suggests rates of 1.9% for females and 5.5% in males (Eaton et al., 2012).
Socioeconomic status also appears to be a risk factor, with higher rates among those who are
economically depressed.

Borderline Personality Disorder

The trajectory for borderline personality disorder appears to result in decreasing symptoms as the
individual ages, with greater stability beginning during the individual’s third and fourth decades
of life. The most noteworthy symptoms include instability of affect and relationships, with the
individual making dramatic attempts to avoid perceived abandonment by others. Those with bor-
derline personality disorder often vacillate between the idealization of others and the complete
devaluing of others, thereby leading to unstable relationships. Feelings of emptiness, anger, and
problems with intense anger control are common, along with instability of the individual’s self-
image. Impulsive and self-damaging behavior is common, sometimes marked by suicidal behavior
or threats. The suicidal behavior may be best described as suicidal gestures, as they can often be
described as high-visibility acts (i.e., making them known to others) with low lethality, thereby
suggesting that the primary purpose of such behavior is to manipulate others and avoid abandon-
ment. These individuals also have a pattern of disengaging from goal-directed behavior shortly
before accomplishing a goal, and, as a result, they tend to be underachievers.

At times of stress, psychotic symptoms can occur, and mood disorders are also comorbid with
borderline personality disorder. Histories of physical and sexual abuse, along with neglect, are
commonly observed in the families of origin. Prevalence rates range from 1.6% to 5.9%, with
the higher end of that range seen in primary care settings. Upwards of 10% prevalence rates are
observed in outpatient mental health settings and up to 20% of those in inpatient psychiatric
facilities. This disorder is largely diagnosed in females (approximately 75% of cases are female)
(DSM-5; APA, 2013).

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 292 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

Histrionic Personality Disorder

Prominent features of histrionic personality disorder include a dramatic and exaggerated emo-
tional presentation that is almost theatrical in nature. These individuals often inappropriately
sexualize situations, presenting as seductive and provocative, even when such behavior is clearly
inappropriate (i.e., either the situation is inappropriate or the target is inappropriate). These indi-
viduals strive to be the center of attention and often use their physical appearance to draw atten-
tion to themselves. Depression or intense emotional reactions can occur when they are not the
center of attention. Histrionic personality disorder involves rapidly shifting and shallow emotions
(e.g., uncontrollable sobbing and temper tantrums), and speech is often shallow and impression-
istic. They may depict themselves as victims in relationships with others.

Histrionic personality disorder is comorbid with somatization and mood disorders. Prevalence
rates are estimated to be approximately 1.8% in the general population, and females appear to be
more commonly diagnosed than males (DSM-5; APA, 2013).

Narcissistic Personality Disorder

The most prominent feature for narcissistic personality disorder is a grandiose self-presentation,
with an attendant need to be admired. These individuals will often exaggerate their achievements
(which are often quite ordinary) and thus expect to be recognized as superior to others. Narcis-
sistic personality disorder involves excessive self-absorption, with fantasies of power and success
and even intellectual prowess and beauty. They present as entitled, expecting favorable treatment
from others. This also leads to interpersonal exploitation and a lack of empathy (i.e., unwilling or
unable to recognize the viewpoint of others). Interestingly, despite presenting as superior, their
self-esteem tends to be very fragile (hence the need for excessive admiration), and they can react
quite strongly to perceived criticism.

This disorder co-occurs with mood disorders, anorexia nervosa, and substance abuse disorders
(especially cocaine). Depending on the stringency of the criteria use, prevalence rates for narcis-
sistic personality disorder can range from 0% to 62% in the general community, and males com-
prise 50–75% of the diagnosed cases. This indicates that this disorder has one of the largest ranges
in prevalence (DSM-5; APA, 2013).

Cluster C Personality Disorders
Cluster C personality disorders are marked by fear and anxiety. Interpersonal relationships occur,
but may be limited. Each of these disorders has a parallel clinical disorder that shares similar fea-
tures but is nevertheless distinct.

Avoidant Personality Disorder

Individuals with avoidant personality disorder are socially inhibited and are fearful of, and hyper-
sensitive to, negative evaluations from others. For these reasons, these individuals avoid interper-
sonal interactions, fearing that they will be criticized and rejected. Thus, they may only interact
with others if they are assured or certain of being liked and accepted (i.e., they require consider-
able nurturance and support). Those with avoidant personality disorder consider themselves as
inept, unappealing, inadequate, and inferior. They often exaggerate the potential for and conse-
quences of interpersonal failure, choosing instead to remain isolated and safe.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 293 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

This personality disorder has considerable overlap with social phobia, agoraphobia, and other
mood and anxiety disorders. This diagnosis can also co-occur with dependent personality disor-
der, because they identify a small number of close trusted friends to help them navigate daily life.
Prevalence rates are approximately 2.4% in the general population (DSM-5; APA, 2013).

Dependent Personality Disorder

Individuals with dependent personality disorder exhibit a pervasive need to be cared for by oth-
ers. They are overly reliant on close friends or family and constantly fear losing that support net-
work. They are extremely reluctant to make decisions for themselves, even minor decisions (e.g.,
what clothing to wear, what movie to see, what restaurant to select, etc.), and are reluctant to take
any personal responsibility for their actions. They constantly seek the advice and guidance of oth-
ers, and they require considerable reassurance. Because of their dependence on others, they are
reluctant to express any disagreement; they fear losing the support of others. Even acts that may
lead to greater independence are met with fears of losing social support, thereby undermining
the desire to be more independent. These individuals are also willing to engage in self-sacrifice to
maintain a relationship and may be willing to endure demeaning and humiliating circumstances.
This sometimes results in their tolerating emotional, verbal, physical, or sexual abuse at the hands
of those upon whom they depend.

This diagnosis is generally not recommended for use in children or adolescents. Mood disorders
most often co-occur with dependent personality disorder, and typically there is a higher rate of
occurrence in females. Prevalence rates are approximately 0.5% in the population (DSM-5; APA,
2013).

Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder

Individuals with obsessive-compulsive personality disorder are overly preoccupied with details
and trivial rules; they are stubborn; and they follow rigid moral standards, often forcing others to
do so as well. Although they consider themselves to be perfectionists, their perceived perfection-
ism actually interferes with the completion of tasks and the accomplishment of goals (or, in the
very least, the missing of deadlines) because of their meticulous preoccupation with details and
standards. They will refuse help even when they are behind schedule and are unwilling to delegate
responsibilities to others because of concerns that others will not complete the task in a manner
consistent with their own standards. If they do allow others to help, they will provide detailed
instructions and are unwilling to compromise on how things should be done (i.e., there is only one
way to accomplish any given task). Relationships are often compromised because they cannot see
the perspective of others, and they lack awareness of the frustration they cause in others with
their overly meticulous and rigid manner.

They are very poor allocators of time, sometimes spending more time planning an activity than
actually executing it. For example, a student with obsessive-compulsive personality disorder might
spend more time developing a study schedule and plan than actually studying for the test; he or
she might not even get to the point of studying.

These individuals often adopt extreme cautiousness in spending both for themselves and others,
and they may find it difficult to discard even worthless objects. Those with obsessive-compulsive
personality disorder often feel they are too busy to take any time off or engage in any pleasurable
activities like vacations. Excessive time is often spent on household chores, such as cleaning.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 294 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

Anxiety disorders often co-occur with obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, including
obsessive-compulsive disorder (the latter involves repeatedly having an obsessive thought and
then repeatedly engaging in ritualistic behavior to decrease the anxiety associated with that
thought). Obsessive-compulsive personality disorder tends to show little variability over one’s
lifetime. Prevalence rates in the general population range from 2.1 to 7.9%, and the disorder is
diagnosed in males about twice as often as females (DSM-5; APA, 2013).

Other Specified Personality Disorder
When individuals do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories, but they still have person-
ality patterns that result in deviance, dysfunction, distress, and/or danger, then they may qualify
for other specified personality disorder. In such instances, it is also possible to list the associated
features, some of which could correspond to the other diagnostic categories (e.g., antisocial fea-
tures) while others might not (e.g., passive-aggressive features). This diagnosis is also given when
mixed personality features are present.

The Prevalence of Personality Disorders
Personality disorders do not reflect acute problems or changes in functioning because, much like
personality itself, they are stable and almost lifelong in their presentation. Thus, researchers esti-
mate that those with personality disorders may be under-represented in clinical settings; thereby
leading to an underestimation of their occurrence in the general population.

One of the largest (N = 5,692) and most recent attempts at determining the prevalence of person-
ality disorders in the United States was published in 2007 and used DSM-IV criteria. The data are
still relevant because there have been few functional changes in the criteria for the personality
disorders between the DSM-5 and the previous version. Researchers concluded that the incidence
of personality disorders in the general population was approximately 1 in 11 (9.1%). Research also
finds that obsessive-compulsive personality disorder is one of the most common, with narcissistic
and borderline personality disorders being the next most common (Lenzenweger, Lane, Loranger,
& Kessler, 2007).

Relative to other countries, the United States appears to have a consistent and stable pattern of occur-
rence, whereas greater variability is seen elsewhere. Specifically, outside the United States, published
rates range from approximately 6% to 13%, but the average of these figures is commensurate with
U.S. rates (Sansone & Sansone, 2011). It also appears to be the case that personality disorders are at
least as common among those who identify as ethnic minorities (e.g., Blacks and Latinos) as among
those who identify as White in America (e.g., Crawford, Rushwaya, Bajaj, Tyrer, & Yang, 2012).

Not surprisingly, researchers examining psychiatric samples have found high rates of occurrence and
comorbidity (co-occurrence of different disorders). For example, in one such study, 23% of admitted
psychiatric patients were found to have a personality disorder (Mors & Sørensen, 1994). Moreover,
the researchers found that of those diagnosed with schizophrenia, 44% also had a personality disor-
der (PD), while 20% of those with mood disorders also had a PD (Mors & Sørensen, 1994). In general,
it appears that meeting criteria for one personality disorder makes it more likely that the individual
will meet criteria for a second personality disorder, and those with a personality disorder are more
likely to also have a diagnosed clinical (formerly Axis I) disorder.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 295 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

There are several possible explanations
for the high comorbidity with personal-
ity disorders, including the fact that the
diagnostic criteria overlap to a certain
degree, that having one diagnosis simply
increases the possibility that one will be
diagnosed for any other disorder, and
that problems of one kind increase the
probability that one will manifest other
types of problems. The issue of comor-
bidity is especially important when con-
sidering where the data are collected.
That is, when studying clinical samples
(those seeking treatment) it is reason-
able to assume that comorbidity will be
higher because multiple problems are
precisely why these individuals are seek-
ing treatment.

Personality Disorders as Primarily Adult Disorders

Although one might be tempted to assign a personality disorder (e.g., narcissistic personality
disorder) to an adolescent girl who appears egocentric in her thinking, or antisocial personality
disorder to a young, undisciplined boy, it is important to note that personality disorders are sup-
posed to have a history of at least one year and have begun to manifest since late adolescence
or early adulthood. In fact, the DSM-5 explicitly states that some PDs, like antisocial personality
disorder, should not be diagnosed prior to the age of 18. Instead, other diagnoses would be more
appropriate. As an example, a conduct disorder would be a more appropriate diagnosis for a per-
sistently disobedient child, whereas similar behavior as an adult would be more appropriately
labeled antisocial in nature. Similarly, an identity disorder might be a more appropriate diagnosis
for a teenager, whereas the same behaviors (identity disturbance) would be better characterized
as borderline personality disorder as an adult. Finally, it is noted that behaviors that manifest in
childhood and even adolescence may not continue to manifest into adulthood, even those that
are thought to reflect highly stable characteristics. Consider the research showing that a signifi-
cant portion of adolescents who are diagnosed with antisocial traits (e.g., psychopaths), do not
exhibit this behavior when they are later assessed as adults (e.g., Lynam, Caspi, Moffitt, Loeber, &
Stouthamer-Loeber, 2007; Salekin, Rosenbaum, Lee, & Lester, 2009).

Alternative Organizational Models for the Personality Disorders
The DSM nosological (referring to the science of diagnostic classification) structure is the domi-
nant model used in the United States to organize psychiatric disorders, including the personality
disorders (as noted in the previous section). Other organizational systems exist; some of the alter-
native models are here briefly reviewed.

Creatas/Thinkstock

Although a child may exhibit disobedient behavior, a
conduct disorder diagnosis is more appropriate than an
antisocial personality disorder diagnosis.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 296 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

The International Classification of Diseases, 11th Revision (ICD-11)

The World Health Organization (WHO) publishes the ICD and reports that the final version of the
International Classification of Diseases, 11th Revision (ICD-11) will be officially endorsed in 2015,
though a draft of the proposal was made available in 2012. The current version, the ICD-10, was
published in 1992 by WHO. Regardless of the specific version, this health classification system is
used around the world to facilitate diagnoses.

The ICD system assesses the severity of personality disorders using the following five levels:

1. normal personality
2. personality dysfunction
3. personality disorder
4. complex personality disorder
5. severe personality disorder

There are five personality disorder dimensions of the ICD system: asocial/schizoid, dissocial,
obsessional/anankastic, anxious-dependency, and emotionally unstable. According to the ICD-11
draft, the last dimension will be incorporated into the anxious-dependency dimensions, such that
anxious-dependency can be either anxious-dependency or emotional instability. Another signifi-
cant change proposed for the ICD-11 is that the clinician will determine whether the disorder is
present, rather than determining severity.

This system is quite different from the DSM-5, in that the ICD’s five categories are considerably
fewer than the DSM-5’s ten categories, and the ICD rates the severity of the disorder, whereas the
DSM only allows one to indicate whether it is present.

Millon’s Model for Classifying Personality Disorders

Millon devised a model to define both normal and clinical manifestations of different personality
traits (i.e., a continuum approach), he tied his diagnoses to a theoretical (evolutionary) model (the
DSM is atheoretical; that is, the categories are not based on any underlying theory), and he tied
the diagnostic categories to a specific measure (the DSM is not tied to any assessment tool). Mil-
lon’s model, which can be derived from the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI-III/; see
the next section of this chapter which examines the MCMI-III/ along with other assessments of
personality disorders), includes a total of 15 traits. Those defined under the clinical heading essen-
tially parallel the DSM-5 disorders; the first 10 match the DSM, whereas the last 5 are additional
categories (see Table 10.1).

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 297 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

Table 10.1: Millon’s personality disorder classifications and corresponding
normal traits

Normal Clinical

Retiring Schizoid

Eccentric Schizotypal

Suspicious Paranoid

Sociable Histrionic

Confident Narcissistic

Nonconforming Antisocial

Capricious Borderline

Conscientious Compulsive

Shy Avoidant

Cooperative Dependent

Exuberant Hypomanic*

Skeptical Negativistic*

Aggrieved Masochistic*

Pessimistic Melancholic*

Assertive Sadistic*

*Additional category that does not match the DSM
Source: Adapted from Millon, T. (2011). The disorders of personality: Introducing a DSM/ICD spectrum from normal to abnormal (3rd
ed.). Hoboken, NJ.: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Millon believed that most individuals would not present with a “pure” personality prototype,
but would instead present with a mixed picture of several of the personality variants. For exam-
ple, Millon suggested that the schizoid personality had four subtypes: (1) remote (i.e., avoidant,
schizotypal features), (2) languid (i.e., melancholic features), (3) affectless (i.e., compulsive fea-
tures), and (4) depersonalized (i.e., schizotypal features) (see Millon & Davis, 1996b).

The Five Factor Model for Classifying Personality Disorders

Researchers have also suggested that the Five Factor Model (FFM; introduced in Chapter 8) can
also serve to organize personality disorders. The advantage of using this model is that it allows
for continuity between clinical and nonclinical manifestations of personality disorders, and it is
based on a more empirically sound and tested model for organizing traits (Widiger, 2005). This is
in sharp contrast to the DSM structure, which has always struggled to establish construct validity
(e.g., Livesley, 2001).

In two independent reviews of the literature (Saulsman & Page, 2004; Widiger & Costa, 2002),
researchers have found that the disorders of personality fit very well into the Five Factor Model
of personality. Moreover, even lexical studies of the descriptive terms used for the personality
disorders (e.g., Coker, Samuel, & Widiger, 2002) suggest considerable overlap between the DSM
nomenclature and the Five Factor Model (see also Widiger, 2005; Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sander-
son, & Costa, 2002).

As an example, schizotypal PD is defined by high neuroticism, low extraversion, and high openness
to new experience (see Widiger et al., 2002, Table 6.1). The same researchers found that histrionic
PD is defined by high scores on neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, and openness to new

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 298 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.2 Types of Personality Disorders

experience. Obsessive-compulsive PD is defined by high scores on extraversion and conscientious-
ness, and low scores on agreeableness and openness to new experience.

Summary

Obviously, the models defining personality disorders that have been put forth vary considerably
in their structure and basic assumptions. Moreover, research comparing several of the models
defining personality disorders reviewed here suggests that Millon’s configuration tends to have
the least support, followed by the DSM which has moderate support. The strongest support has
emerged for the Five Factor Model, or similar, empirically derived variants (O’Connor & Dyce,
1998). Of course, the Five Factor Model has yet to be employed in clinical practice. Therefore,
although it is strong with respect to its basic scientific roots, research is needed to see how effec-
tively it can translate to applied clinical settings.

Questioning the Legitimacy of Mental Illness
The basic thesis of this chapter is that psychiatric illnesses such as personality disorders are legit-
imate—that they can be defined and organized into a coherent structure, assessed, and even
treated. However, there have been some theorists who have taken a very different position on the
matter. Although we have just presented the various criteria for the DSM personality disorders, we
will now consider an anti-establishment perspective.

Thomas Szasz was a psychiatrist who was one of the most vocal anti-psychiatry voices in the field.
Szasz argued that psychiatric illnesses (which would include personality disorders) are essentially
fabricated (e.g., Szasz, 1960, 2011a). Specifically, Szasz contrasted mental illness with medical con-
ditions like cancer and argued that the medical model should not be applied equally to mental
illness. Szasz argued that, unlike physical illnesses, there is no way to definitively determine if
mental illness is present in any given individual, as there is no test or objective method that allows
one to find a disease from the DSM or any other classification.

Instead, Szasz argues that mental ill-
ness defines unusual behavior but that
what we define as a mental illness is a
social construct, reflecting the prevail-
ing views of the professionals governing
the field. Szasz argues that the decision
about what to include in the DSM is
arbitrary; one version has homosexual-
ity as a disorder, while the next version
removes homosexuality but adds pre-
menstrual syndrome. Szasz argues that
true diseases do not move in and out of
favor; they should be more objectively
observable.

Szasz was also a strong proponent of giv-
ing people control over their lives rather
than imposing a diagnosis and, worst
of all, an involuntary treatment. Thus,
Szasz wouldn’t argue with someone who

.Getty Images/Dynamic Graphics/Creatas/Thinkstock

Previous versions of the DSM considered homosexuality
to be a disorder. Szasz argues that this and all other DSM
“disorders” simply reflect social and cultural standards,
not diseases.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 299 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10

10.3 Assessing Personality Disorders

wanted to change for self-improvement. His concern was with the imposition of treatment (i.e.,
involuntary commitments), especially given the arbitrary nature of mental illness.

In his 1988 book, Cruel Compassion, Szasz argued that we justify our attempts to control and
change others by considering the behavior as compassion, when in reality it is cruelty to impose
unwanted treatment on others. In fact, he argued, we are being selfish, because the true justi-
fication for our behavior is to either (1) change those who remain in society (i.e., those we have
to interact with) with medications, surgeries (e.g., lobotomies), or therapy, or (2) relegate those
who do not change to psychiatric hospitals so we do not have to interact with them. Because the
field of psychiatry essentially substituted the term disease (mental illness) for bad or undesirable
behavior, this now legitimizes treatment (Szasz, 1988; see also Szasz, 2011b).

Szasz was not alone in his criticism of the DSM. For example, despite the American Psychiatric
Association’s endorsement of the DSM-5, the current director of the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH), Dr. Thomas Insel, has expressed concerns over the lack of validity of the DSM-5
and its overreliance on symptoms to diagnose disorders.

Of course, Szasz’s perspective does not reflect the majority view, but there are some important
arguments that should be considered, including the fact that the determination of what consti-
tutes a disorder is essentially a process of consensus and is subject to change. Thus, we should be
cautious of attributing too much importance to any specific diagnostic criteria such as the DSM.
Moreover, if we accept that diagnostic categories are less than definitive, then we must be espe-
cially cautious about imposing treatments on the individual, as those treatments are based on the
assumption that the underlying problem to be changed is real.

Szasz’s critics countered that he
was an extremist in his position,
and like the very field he was
critiquing, he overstated reality.
For example, even though label-
ing behavior as a “mental illness”
may overstate reality, so too does
a complete denial that there is
any problem (see Phillips et al.,
2012, for a complete discussion
of these issues, especially as they
apply to the DSM-5).

10.3 Assessing Personality Disorders

Several measures have been developed and validated to broadly assess psychiatric disorders, including personality disorders. We will here review three of the more commonly studied, modern-day measures.
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI®-2)
As noted in Chapter 1, this instrument is often considered the gold standard in the assessment of
psychopathology because it is one of the most frequently used instruments, and it is arguably the
most widely researched measure (Graham, 2006).

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

In this 2001 paper, Thomas Szasz attempts to discredit the
legitimization of psychiatric disorders. Read it at http://
www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_05_4_szasz .

Reference: Szasz, T. (2001). The therapeutic state: The
tyranny of pharmacracy. The Independent Review, V(4),
485–521.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 300 5/21/15 12:40 PM

http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_05_4_szasz

http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_05_4_szasz

CHAPTER 10 10.3 Assessing Personality Disorders

The instrument was developed by comparing samples of those who had a particular psychiatric
diagnosis to control groups with no psychiatric diagnosis (the Minnesota normals) with respect to
their responses on a large number of items. The items that were consistently answered in a dif-
ferent way by the criterion group (those diagnosed) and the control groups formed the basis of
the initial scales. These scales were then cross-validated (replicated in other criterion and control
groups) and the items that survived comprised the original MMPI-. It was revised in 1989, result-
ing in a 567-item true/false inventory (the MMPI–2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, &
Kaemmer, 1989).

The MMPI–2 has validity measures to assess the respondent’s test-taking approach (i.e., under-
or over-reporting), basic scales to assess several clinical syndromes, and supplemental scales
that assess such areas as general adjustment, ego strength, how one handles the expression of
anger and hostility, and substance abuse measures, to name a few. The 10 basic scales from the
MMPI–2 are summarized in Table 10.2.

Table 10.2: Ten basic scales and descriptors from the MMPI–2

Scale Abbreviation—Name Description

1 Hs – Hypochondriasis somatic complaints, constricted by symptoms

2 D – Depression dysphoria, shy, irritable, guilt ridden

3 Hy – Hysteria sudden anxiety, naïve, self-centered, infantile

4 Pd – Psychopathic deviate poor judgment, antisocial, irresponsible, hostile

5 Mf – Masculinity–Femininity *traditional masculine or feminine traits

6 Pa – Paranoia ideas of reference, angry, resentful, suspicious

7 Pt – Psychasthenia ruminating, anxiety, fearful, apprehensive

8 Sc – Schizophrenia disordered thinking, delusional, bizarre, alienated

9 Ma – Hypomania expansive, grandiose, euphoric, overly extended

0 Si – Social Introversion withdrawn, aloof, insecure, low self-confidence

* This scale is scored separately by gender. High scores for each gender denote a gender stereotype
consistent presentation.
Source: Adapted from Butcher, J. N., Dahlstrom, W. G., Graham, J. R., Tellegen, A., & Kaemmer, B. (1989). Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2): Manual for administration and scoring. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

One of the unique features of the MMPI–2 is that it is not closely aligned with any theoretical
perspective, given that the selection of items was based almost exclusively on the statistical dif-
ferentiation of groups. In fact, this technique for scale development was sometimes referred to as
a “black box” or empirical approach to item selection because of the lack of clear theory-driven
decisions.

Three more recent updates to the MMPI–2 are noteworthy. The first was a significant psycho-
metric revision that resulted in the addition of the Restructured Clinical (RC) Scales (Tellegen et al.,
2003). These scales were designed to be more psychometrically sound than the original MMPI–2
clinical scales and they attempt to control for a response tendency (demoralization) that results in
considerable overlap among the scales.

The second change occurred in 2008 with the publication of the MMPI–2-RF (Restructure Form;
Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2008), which was based on the RC scale revision. This new measure, which
provided further psychometric improvements over the MMPI–2, is briefer than the previous

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 301 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.3 Assessing Personality Disorders

versions (338 true/false items), thereby simplifying the resources needed to administer and inter-
pret the measure.

Finally, it should be noted that new MMPI–2 scales, the Personality Psychopathology
Five (PSY-5)—Aggressiveness (AGGR), Psychoticism (PSYC), Disconstraint (DISC), Negative
Emotionality/Neuroticism (NEGE), and Introversion/ Low Positive Emotionality (INTR)—were
also introduced to parallel the dominant theoretical framework in personality psychology, the
Five Factor Model (discussed at length in Chapter 8). However, these new PSY-5 scales were
thought to have relevance in both clinical and nonclinical settings and are not intended as a
substitute or proxy for the big five (Harkness, McNulty, Ben-Porath, & Graham, 2002). The PSY-5
scales differ from the five factors identified in nonclinical populations, in that the former were
meant to determine the extent to which personality disorders might manifest and be recogniz-
able in clinical populations (see Harkness et al., 2002). They also differ from the other MMPI–2
scales by adding significantly to the prediction of personality disorders (Wygant, Sellbom,
Graham, & Schenk, 2006).

Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI®)
The PAI- is a 344-item measure that assesses 22 non-overlapping scales that were intended to
broadly assess psychiatric disorders, and like the MMPI- scales, it also includes validity indexes
(Morey, 2007). Its 11 clinical scales are grouped within the neurotic and psychotic spectrum,
and a third grouping is referred to as behavioral disorders or problems of impulse control. Other
scales assess such constructs as complications and motivation for treatment, harm potential, and
interpersonal relations, to name a few. Two specific clusters of personality disorder traits are also
assessed: borderline and antisocial.

The PAI- has normative data from patients, students, and the population at large, and reliability
and validity figures are adequate for both clinical and nonclinical settings.

Recent research also suggests that the PAI- is correlated with several life-event variables in mean-
ingful ways, providing further validation for this relatively new measure (Slavin-Mulford et al.,
2012). Moreover, recent studies have attempted to validate the PAI- for use in various settings,
including forensic populations (e.g., Newberry & Shuker, 2012) and neuropsychological settings
(Aikman & Souheaver, 2008).

The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI-III™)
The MCMI-III/ provides a standardized assessment of psychopathology matched to the Axis I
and II disorders of the DSM-IV. The current 175-item version was published in 1994 and was most
recently updated in 2009 (Millon, Millon, Davis, & Grossman). Although explicitly intended for use
in clinical populations, this measure has also been used in nonclinical settings to predict clinical
outcomes. The measure has validity indicators and 10 measures of clinical syndromes; seven of
those denote moderate conditions and three denote severe conditions.

The MCMI-III/ also includes 14 personality disorder scales that are subdivided into 11 basic scales
assessing schizoid, avoidant, depressive, dependent, histrionic, narcissistic, antisocial, sadistic,
compulsive, masochistic, and negativistic (with the latter also referred to as passive-aggressive)
and 3 severe personality pathologies assessing schizotypal, borderline, and paranoid features.

Despite the theoretical appeal and innovativeness of the MCMI/ tests, there have been some
concerns due to the modest, and in some cases poor, empirical support for some of the scales on

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 302 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.3 Assessing Personality Disorders

the inventory (e.g., Retzlaff, 1996; Saulsman, 2011). This has led some in the field to suggest that
the MCMI-II/ and MCMI-III/ have failed to meet the basic standards of admissibility for a test in
a court of law (known as the Daubert standard), especially when considering the valid assessment
of personality disorders (Rogers, Salekin, & Sewell, 1999). Moreover, researchers have suggested
that there are problems with the base rate data in the MCMI/ that is used to facilitate diagnoses,
and as a result some revisions have been suggested (Grove & Vrieze, 2009). It has also been noted
that although the original MCMI/ had reasonable validity, the MCMI-III/ has not received the
same empirical scrutiny; therefore, it is less clear whether the newest version is valid (see Craig &
Olson, 2005, Craig, 2008).

Common Features of Each Assessment
Although the measures presented here adopt distinct assumptions and have many unique scales,
there are nevertheless overlapping features. All are self-report inventories with symptom-specific
items that require the respondent to respond using some kind of a scale (either true/false or Lik-
ert). In all cases, scores are then compared to normative samples for interpretation, and the inter-
pretation takes into account the test-taking approach of the respondent (i.e., the validity scale
profile). Another common feature is that the measures essentially tap the same broad groupings
of psychopathology. For example, in a recent study, researchers factor analyzed (grouped) item
responses of psychiatric inpatients, those with substance abuse disorders, and even those drawn
from forensic settings. For both the MMPI–2-RF and the MCMI-III/, the measures captured
the extent to which the disorders are (1) internalizing, (2) externalizing, (3) reflective of paranoia/
thought disturbance, and (4) pathologically introverted (van der Heijden, Egger, Rossi, & Derk-
sen, 2012). Thus, irrespective of the measure, there appears to be some fundamental overlap
with respect to the constructs being assessed (i.e., the disorders themselves are a constant, and
the various measures essentially reflect that). This suggests that the more noteworthy difference
between the various measures may involve the validity scales, rather than the scales assessing
psychopathology.

Validity scales are typically embedded within the inventories and assess the extent to which the
respondent may have approached the test in a manner other than an honest and forthright one.
This is particularly important because these measures are often administered in settings where
the individual has much to gain or lose based on the outcome of the assessment. For example, in
psychiatric settings, the respondent may want to receive services and may, therefore, exaggerate
symptoms or problematic personality functioning to gain access to services. Or they may want to
avoid an involuntary hospitalization, thereby resulting in a minimization tendency. Thus, the use
of validity scales to gauge the respondent’s test-taking approach is critical to interpreting the test.

The MMPI–2 has the most comprehensive set of validity indicators, including multiple measures
of defensiveness (defensiveness and lie scales), a measure of superlative responding (answering
as you think a well-adjusted person might respond), multiple measures of exaggeration (items
infrequently endorsed either in the general population or in clinical settings), infrequent somatic
symptoms, measures of inconsistent responding, and a measure to assess for the tendency to
primarily give true or false responses. Of course, having the most validity measures does not nec-
essarily equate with having the best validity indicators, and this is the focus of the next research
feature.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 303 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10

10.4 Case Illustrations

10.4 Case Illustrations

In this section, we provide some case examples to illustrate the personality disorders, the mea-sures used to assess them, and how the theoretical models are applied to explain their occur-rence. In some instances, multiple theoretical perspectives will be applied to illustrate how
the same data can be explained from different perspectives—and, in some instances, with equal
plausibility.

Case 1: Bob G.
Bob G., a 32-year-old, single Caucasian male, presented for a psychiatric interview at the behest
of his supervisor, who had received numerous complaints from the residents of a building where
Bob is employed. The complaints essentially involve Bob being nonresponsive to requests and
attempts to interact (i.e., Bob goes out of his way to isolate himself from the residents, to the
point of undermining some of his duties). Bob had previously worked the night shift and had had
many fewer interactions with the residents, but because of a new rotating schedule, he was now
required to work the day shift sometimes.

Family background indicates that Bob has minimal interactions with his family of origin. His father
is now deceased, but had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. His mother is in out-of-state assisted
living. Bob also has a sister who provided collateral information, saying that Bob has always been a
social isolate and somewhat odd. He was also described by his sister as smart, and he did reason-
ably well in school.

Bob reported that his best friend was a former college roommate, whom he had not seen since
his freshman year, when they shared a dormitory room for one semester. He characterized their
relationship as mostly “focused on work,” and stated that they typically “gave each other space”
so that they could accomplish their schoolwork.

Bob is single and has not had any dates or expressed any interest in dating. He does describe him-
self as heterosexual, but when asked about his relationships with women, he simply noted that he
has some fellow security officers who work on other floors who are female. Bob also noted that he
perspires easily and heavily, and therefore he tends to keep to himself so as not to offend others
(especially women) with the smell. (Note: No odor was detected during the interview.) This is one
of the reasons he does not like to socialize with others. He also described himself as someone who
is “serious” and “all business.” Thus, he does not like to waste time with idle chatter. He reported
few socialization experiences outside the work setting. In fact, even in the work setting, he did not
appear to know many people; when he described having lunch with colleagues he described it as
“uncomfortable” and noted that he typically eats in the cafeteria with others, but does not speak
to them. Bob noted that he can usually tell what others are thinking, and so there is little need to
actually speak to them.

He denied the use of any alcohol or drugs and denied any legal history. He also denied any formal
psychiatric history. As noted, family psychiatric history only involves his father, who was diagnosed
with schizophrenia.

With respect to behavioral observations, Bob presented as somewhat awkward socially, he rarely
made eye contact, and his gaze often moved about the room. He sat with his hands clenched and
only spoke when asked a question, but he was cooperative. He was dressed in his security guard
uniform, which was kempt. Although Bob denied the experience of hallucinations, he did appear

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 304 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.4 Case Illustrations

to become overly engrossed in common stimuli in the interview room (e.g., staring at the walls
and the desk for prolonged periods of time). He occasionally engaged in some odd hand gestures,
where he seemed to be blocking out stimulation that was not apparent to the interviewer. Verbal-
izations were nonlinear (tangential and circumstantial) and difficult to follow at times. He would
begin to answer a question, but then become engrossed in another topic. For example, when
asked about his intense focus on the blue painted wall, he reported being lost in thought, contem-
plating the complexities of the depths of our oceans, and the undiscovered and even magical qual-
ities of that part of the world. Affective expression was generally flat throughout the interview.

One other odd verbalization is also worth highlighting. Bob stated that he became aware of the
current complaints from work because he “sensed” that others might be upset with him and
believed that it was not uncommon for others to be speaking about him behind his back. He also
expressed concern that the various executives who have offices where he works are likewise talk-
ing about him and may even be considering terminating his position because of Bob’s decision
not to attend church on Sundays. When asked directly if the executives would know about Bob’s
non-work-related behavior, he acknowledged that they would not likely know about this, but that
if they did, they would strongly disapprove. Despite these concerns, Bob was unsure as to why
he needed this evaluation, stating that he is doing fine and has not noticed any changes in his
behavior.

Data From Standardized Measures

Bob completed the MMPI–2. The validity profile indicated a mildly defensive response set, as
Bob either minimized his problems or demonstrated poor insight with respect to his difficul-
ties. Nevertheless, the basic scales are interpretable. Several of the clinical scales were elevated,
including scales 8, 6, and 0, indicating disordered thinking, eccentric behaviors, poor contact with
reality, withdrawal, alienation, suspiciousness, the tendency to displace blame on others, mis-
taken beliefs, introversion, social withdrawal, and aloofness. No other basic scales were elevated.

With respect to the PSY-5 scales, Bob was elevated on Psychoticism (PSYC), indicating discon-
nection from reality and odd beliefs and perceptions, and Introversion/Low Positive Emotionality
(INTR), indicating few positive emotions and social withdrawal.

Critical Thinking Questions:

• Referring to the DSM-5 criteria presented earlier in this chapter, which personality disorder (if
any) best fits Bob? What might be the pros and cons of administering the following measures
to assess Bob: (a) The MCMI-III/? (b) The Rorschach using the Exner scoring system?
Consider one of the theoretical perspectives presented in this text, and try to explain the
etiology for Bob’s behavior and presentation (i.e., how did he become the way he is now?).

Diagnosing Bob

Bob’s presentation in the clinical interview and MMPI–2 test scores suggest a personality disor-
der, most likely schizotypal PD. Importantly, there appear to be problems in functioning, as Bob
has been having problems at work and relationships are largely absent. His behavior is different
from that of most others, and he may cause those around him to experience distress, even though

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 305 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.4 Case Illustrations

he does not. Moreover, data from the clinical interview indicate that Bob’s behavior has been
constant through much of his life, and it appears to manifest in all areas of his life. Thus, if there is
a problem, it is likely to be one of personality.

Data to suggest schizotypal PD include the presence of odd beliefs, such as being able to “sense”
things (i.e., magical or delusional thinking), and also possible paranoid ideation, as indicated by
his concerns regarding the executives talking about him and planning to fire him for not attending
church (something his employers would not know about, let alone have an interest in). There may
have been some evidence of hallucinations, including smelling an odor that was not detectable
and seeing things in the walls that preoccupied his thoughts and engendered odd hand gestures.
Bob’s affect was flat, he presented as asocial, and he appeared aloof and alienated, with few,
if any, social contacts. Bob’s profile of scores on the MMPI–2 highlights many of these same
themes (i.e., disordered thinking, odd perceptions, alienation, and aloof presentation), thereby
providing further corroboration for the diagnosis.

Theoretical Approaches to Bob’s Case

A number of different theoretical accounts can be forwarded based on the theoretical models
reviewed in previous chapters. For example, from the neurobiological perspective, it is noted
that Bob’s father was diagnosed with schizophrenia, thereby suggesting that Bob would have an
increased genetic risk for a similar disorder, such as a cluster A personality disorder. Research also
suggests that the traits seen in the cluster A personality disorders can be the result of physiologi-
cal hard wiring, whereby one is less responsive to environmental stimuli and learning experiences
(e.g., Raine, 1988).

Bob also evidenced some mild but pervasive delusional ideation, with some evidence of paranoia.
Freud believed that paranoia resulted from a combination of two defense mechanisms that are
unconsciously engaged in order to address homosexual thoughts and feelings (note that Bob has
no dating history and no interest in any type of relationship with women). Freud might argue that
Bob deals with unacceptable homosexual ideation by first using reaction formation, such that the
thought “I, a man, love other men,” becomes the opposite, in the form of “I, a man, hate other
men.” Freud argued that this, too, was an unacceptable thought, so projection is used, thereby
changing “I, a man, hate other men” to “Other men hate me.”

The behavioral model might suggest that Bob was not properly reinforced for “normal” behavior
early in life, and therefore he engaged in increasingly bizarre behavior for reinforcement (possibly
attention). It might also be argued that many of Bob’s beliefs, such as his “decision” to avoid oth-
ers (especially women) because of his odor, is a preferred interpretation of reality, as the alter-
native is that others have little or no interest in him, and this is a far less favorable (reinforcing)
interpretation (cf. Roberts, 1991).

The cognitive perspective has also weighed in on odd or delusional thinking, as researchers have
demonstrated the presence of reasoning biases in those with delusional ideation. For example,
deluded schizophrenics were found to request less information relative to non-deluded psychi-
atric patients before reaching a decision, and despite having less information, they expressed
greater certainty in their decisions (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988; see also Garety, Hemsley, &
Wessely, 1991). Thus, it would be predicted that Bob would require less evidence to come to his
conclusion that the executives were conspiring to fire him for non-work–related behavior, and the
cognitive model would predict that he would have greater certainty in this delusional narrative
(see also McGuire, Junginger, Adams, Burright, & Donovick, 2001).

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 306 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.4 Case Illustrations

Case 2: Samantha K.
Samantha K. is a 26-year-old mother of one who was recently arrested by police for prostitution.
However, because police thought she was acting in an atypical manner, they brought her to the
regional psychiatric hospital for evaluation. Samantha was arrested in Atlanta, but she resides in
Baltimore. She reported having traveled to Atlanta to visit friends when her 5-year-old son, who
was staying with an ex-boyfriend in Baltimore, became ill with pneumonia and had to be hospital-
ized. Samantha stated that the reason she had turned to solicitation was so that she could earn
enough money to immediately travel back to Baltimore and pay for her son’s medical services.
She was quite convinced that her actions were fully justified, and she said she would do it again
if placed in the same position (“I don’t regret anything I’ve done, and you would have done the
same thing if you were in those circumstances”).

Although she denied any significant legal history, records indicate a series of arrests for petty
theft and marijuana possessions charges, dating back to when Samantha was 14. Despite the
large number of charges, few resulted in convictions. In those instances where she was convicted,
Samantha had lengthy explanations to justify her actions, and she typically put the blame on
either the circumstances or the actions of others.

Samantha has no psychiatric history. She completed high school, and although she scored reason-
ably high on aptitude tests, her grades were average and she did not continue education after high
school. Samantha has held a number of service-related jobs, such as hostessing at restaurants and
sales in clothing stores, but she has rarely held a job for more than a few months; she moves on
when she gets bored with the position. She has also been fired twice for suspicion of stealing on
the job, but no charges were pressed.

Samantha’s parents divorced when she was 4 years old, after many years of verbal and physi-
cal assaults. Samantha stayed with her mother and had little to no contact with her father. She
described her mother as having many different boyfriends, but no stable relationships. Because
her mother worked, she reported “essentially raising myself.” Samantha is somewhat estranged
from her family, who also reside in Baltimore. According to several members of her family, Saman-
tha will call a couple of times per year, but it is usually to request money or a favor. These requests
involve lengthy justifications and sometimes even business schemes that have never come to frui-
tion. Because she owes many people money, many acquaintances and family members have cut
off ties with Samantha.

Samantha is an attractive woman, who presents as somewhat charming at first. However, her
interpersonal style comes across as manipulative, and it’s not always clear if she is telling the
truth. She appears relatively calm and collected interpersonally, but will sometimes verbalize
aggression. The clinical interview was complicated by the fact that Samantha repeatedly changed
topics after several questions on any one topic. She also perseverated on her son’s health, but
despite saying she was concerned about her son, she did not appear concerned (at least her out-
ward appearance did not indicate it).

When asked about her son and the rationale for leaving him behind in Baltimore, Samantha
explained that she wanted to give her son some quality time with her ex-boyfriend; however, it
was unclear as to why her son would benefit from or even desire this contact, given that Samantha
dated her ex-boyfriend prior to her son’s birth (i.e., her son didn’t know Samantha’s ex-boyfriend
prior to this trip).

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 307 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.4 Case Illustrations
Data From Standardized Measures

Samantha completed the MMPI–2. The validity profile indicated that she was highly defensive;
she demonstrated a tendency to under-report and minimize problems. The observed defensiveness
can undermine the interpretation of the clinical scales, as low scores do not necessarily denote the
absence of psychopathology, but may instead be the result of excessive under-reporting. However,
any significant elevations that do emerge can be interpreted.

One clinical scale was elevated: scale 4. Elevations on this scale are often associated with poor
judgment, irresponsible behavior and attitudes, hostility, and the displacement of blame onto
others.

Two of the five personality subscales from the MMPI–2 were also elevated, most notably the
AGGR scale, which refers to the use of aggression, hostility, and intimidation to facilitate goal
attainment. The second elevation was on DISC, which suggests the presence of risk taking and
impulsivity and little regard for following rules. Finally, the MMPI–2 supplemental scale assessing
over-controlled hostility was also elevated, suggesting that although Samantha usually responds
appropriately to provocation, she is likely to sometimes evidence an exaggerated anger response,
even in the absence of provocation.

The NEO-PI was also completed, but this measure resulted in no significant elevations, aside from
Samantha’s endorsement of items indicating that she is very friendly (agreeableness) and dutiful
(conscientiousness). The scores on this face-valid measure appeared to reflect a more socially
desirable response set, but there are no formal validity measures on the NEO™-PI.

Critical Thinking Questions

• Referring to the DSM-5 criteria presented earlier in this chapter, which personality disorder
(if any) best fits Samantha? What might be the pros and cons of administering the following
measures to assess Samantha: (a) The MMPI–2? (b) The NEO/-PI? Consider one of the
theoretical perspectives presented in this text, and try to explain the etiology for Samantha’s
behavior and presentation (i.e., how did she become the way she is now?).

Diagnosing Samantha

Samantha’s test scores and her presentation in the clinical interview converge on a diagnosis of
antisocial personality disorder. A recurrent theme in the evaluation was her less-than-genuine
presentation. She under-reported her problems, was defensive on the standardized measures,
and even provided misleading information regarding her criminal history. Even the fact that she
has a lengthy criminal history is indicative of this diagnosis. Samantha also did not evidence any
remorse for her actions, opting instead to blame the circumstances on others; she even stated
that she would act in the same way if given the opportunity to do so again.

Samantha has superficial relationships and she tends to take advantage of others. She presents as
aggressive and even hostile at times, though she can be quite charming when trying to get what
she wants. Samantha’s actions also suggest that she is impulsive and has been an underachiever
for most of her life.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 308 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10 10.4 Case Illustrations

Given Samantha’s less-than-genuine presentation and defensiveness on the MMPI–2, it is not
surprising that she only endorsed more favorable characteristics on the face-valid NEO/-PI. The
MMPI–2 scores converge with many of the above descriptions, with elevations on scale 4, as
well as other scales assessing problems managing aggression and impulsivity. Importantly, even
though Samantha does not feel distress, she appears to be creating distress in those around her.
There is also clear evidence of dysfunction, with a poor work history, legal and drug problems, and
few stable relationships.

Theoretical Approaches to Samantha’s Case

The physician Philippe Pinel introduced the concept “manie sans délire” to refer to individuals
who appeared to think clearly, but who would nevertheless behave in a manner that would sug-
gest disturbance. Similarly, the physician James Prichard coined the term “moral insanity” to char-
acterize mental illness where emotional experiences are disturbed, but intellectual capacities are
intact. These terms arguably provide some of the earliest writings relating to the modern-day
concept of antisocial PD (see also Berrios, 1996).

More recently, antisocial tendencies have been referred to using the terms sociopath and psycho-
path, and this highlights two distinct etiologies for the associated behaviors, a behavioral (or social
learning) account and a physiological account.

The term sociopath implies problematic learning, which can include parental neglect (i.e., failure
to reinforce appropriate behavior and punish inappropriate behavior) and/or poor parenting (i.e.,
reinforcing inappropriate behavior and punishing appropriate behavior). Thus, from this account,
Samantha’s unstable home, and the report that she raised herself, would be consistent with prob-
lematic learning experiences early in life, resulting in the antisocial tendencies. Sociopathy also
involves problematic factors outside the family-of-origin, such as poverty and the presence of
delinquent peers. Samantha came from a single-parent home, and given her current shortcomings
with respect to finances, we can assume that she has and continues to struggle financially. The
case history also indicates involvement with the law and extensive experience with drugs begin-
ning at an early age, thus delinquent peers were also likely.

The above-described factors could also be accounted for by social learning theory, whereby
Samantha observed and subsequently modeled her mother’s numerous superficial relationships
and aggressive behavior toward her ex-husband. Similarly, her delinquent peers would have
served as targets to model, and their substance abuse and other criminal behavior would eventu-
ally lead to Samantha demonstrating these same behaviors.

The term psychopath has also been linked to antisocial personality disorder, but here the implica-
tion is the presumed physiological underpinnings of the disorder. That is, in contrast to the above
models, which emphasize environmental factors, the psychopathy model focuses on inherited
genetic factors.

Psychopaths are thought to have innate, temperamental features that predispose them to be
impulsive decision-makers, risk takers, and individuals who do not profit from learning experi-
ences (e.g., Cleckley, 1982; Hare, 1978; Lykken, 1957; Raine, 1987; see also Lykken, 1995, and
Raine, 1993, for reviews). For example, mild electric shocks (positive punishments) appear to
be less effective at eliminating behaviors for psychopaths, and this problematic learning may be
especially prominent when there are no delays in responding (i.e., impulsive responding). Some

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 309 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10Summary

research suggests that the cause of these and other related problems are the result of a dys-
function in the prefrontal cortex, which is the region of the brain governing decision-making,
responsiveness to rewards and punishments, and impulsivity (see Crews & Boettiger, 2009). This
extensive literature suggests that psychopaths are essentially wired differently than others, mak-
ing them less responsive to reinforcers and punishers, which then inhibits proper learning and the
internalization of moral standards. Researchers have also forwarded more complex physiological
accounts, though even these models are in keeping with the traditional literature, while also impli-
cating motivated behavior through classic approach-avoidance models presented earlier in this
text (see Arnett, 1997). From this perspective, it is somewhat irrelevant whether Samantha had
opportunities to learn or model appropriate behavior, as it would be assumed that she would not
profit from these experiences to develop proper, internalized moral standards. Thus, Samantha
would feel justified in her behavior even when it breaks the law or is contrary to moral standards.

Summary

Personality disorders have traditionally been studied separate from normal personality, and, as a result, researchers have developed distinct systems of categorization and unique mea-sures to assess them. The dominant model for identifying personality disorders in the United
States is represented by the DSM-5, which identifies 10 personality disorders (schizoid, schizo-
typal, paranoid, histrionic, narcissistic, antisocial, borderline, obsessive-compulsive, avoidant,
and dependent), along with the specific symptoms associated with each diagnosis. In addition to
the diagnosis-specific criteria, the identification of a personality disorder requires that there be a
number of other, more general, criteria, such as the presence of dysfunction, distress, danger, and
deviance from social/cultural standards. These criteria are neither necessary nor sufficient, but
the more criteria that are present, the more likely the observed traits will constitute a personality
disorder. The prevalence rates vary considerably for the personality disorders, and there are also
marked differences based on gender.

Although widely used, the DSM-5 and its predecessors are not the only classification system, and
many researchers argue that a more parsimonious and accurate approach would be one in which
the models used to characterize normal personality functioning (e.g., the Five Factor Model) are
applied to the personality disorders. This approach would then signal a quantitative rather than a
qualitative distinction between normal and disordered personality. Other critics of the DSM have
argued that it is not simply the diagnostic system that is a problem; rather, they question the very
existence of the psychiatric disorders themselves.

Some of the most commonly used measures of personality and other psychiatric disorders
include the MMPI–2, the PAI-, and the MCMI-III/. These measures are uniquely qualified to
assess disorders because they also have validity scales that assess the respondent’s test-taking
approach. This is important because in clinical settings there are often external contingencies that
can increase the incidence of over- or under-reporting biases, and these have to be understood
in order to interpret the data. Using information from these tests (and others), along with the
patient’s case history, allows the clinician to diagnose the individual. Moreover, the theories pre-
sented in earlier chapters can then be used to conceptualize the patient and how their pathology
developed.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 310 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10

Key Terms

Key Terms

abnormal personality A variant of normal
personality that can be defined as an extreme
of the basic personality traits.

antisocial personality disorder A personal-
ity disorder characterized by universal and
longstanding practice of complete disregard
for social norms and often a history of illegal
behavior.

avoidant personality disorder A personality
disorder characterized by social inhibition and
fear and hypersensitivity to negative evalua-
tions from others.

borderline personality disorder A personality
disorder characterized by instability of affect
and relationships, with the individual making
dramatic attempts to avoid perceived abandon-
ment by others.

cluster A personality disorders Personality dis-
orders that involve odd or eccentric behavior,
resulting in decreased socialization and often
increased isolation.

cluster B personality disorders Personality
disorders that involve dramatic or emotional
behavior and conflict, instability, and exploita-
tion in relationships.

cluster C personality disorders Personality
disorders that involve fear, anxiety, and limited
interpersonal relationships.

comorbidity The co-occurrence of different
disorders.

danger When certain behaviors or traits are
risky or harmful to either the individual or to
others.

Daubert standard The basic criteria of admis-
sibility for a test in a court of law.

dependent personality disorder A personality
disorder characterized by a pervasive need to
be cared for by others.

deviance The statistical infrequency of a
behavior in the general population; a lower
frequency is typically associated with abnormal
behavior.

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) The most
recent manual of the APA (2103), which has
eliminated the multi-axial system of categoriz-
ing diagnoses (used in previous DSM editions)
and aligned itself more closely with the World
Health Organization’s (WHO) International Clas-
sification of Diseases (ICD).

distress Negative feelings or reactions felt by
an individual or those around them as a result
of certain behaviors or traits.

dysfunction The extent to which a behavior or
trait leads to problematic functioning in daily
living.

histrionic personality disorder A personality
disorder characterized by dramatic and exag-
gerated emotional presentation that is almost
theatrical in nature.

International Classification of Diseases, 11th
Revision (ICD-11) The version of the World
Health Organization’s (WHO) International Clas-
sification of Diseases that will be released in
2015. The ICD is used worldwide for diagnoses.

longstanding When a problematic behavior or
trait has been present for a significant portion
of an individual’s life.

narcissistic personality disorder A personal-
ity disorder characterized by grandiose self-
presentation and a need to be admired.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 311 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 10Key Terms

obsessive-compulsive personality disorder A
personality disorder characterized by preoccu-
pation with details and trivial rules, stubborn-
ness, and rigid moral standards.

other specified personality disorder A diagno-
sis that can be given to individuals who do not
fit into the cluster personality categories but
still exhibit personality patterns that result in
deviance, dysfunction, distress, and/or danger.

paranoid personality disorder A personality
disorder characterized by persistent and univer-
sal distrust and suspiciousness of others.

personality disorder A deficit in functioning
and maladaptive behavior or, in the very least,
the absence of adaptive behavior; also known
as a disordered personality.

pervasive When a problematic behavior or
trait emerges in virtually all aspects of an indi-
vidual’s life.

psychopath A term for a person with anti-
social tendencies of a physiological etiology;
that is, the behaviors emerge because of inher-
ited genetic factors.

schizoid personality disorder A personality
disorder characterized by flat affect and disen-
gagement from social interactions.

schizotypal personality disorder A personal-
ity disorder characterized by a wide range of
symptoms that parallel those seen in schizo-
phrenia, though less acute and more pervasive.

sociopath A term for a person with antisocial
tendencies of a behavioral etiology; that is,
the behaviors emerge because of problematic
learning, which can include parental neglect
(i.e., failure to reinforce appropriate behavior
and punish inappropriate behavior); poor par-
enting (i.e., reinforcing inappropriate behavior
and punishing appropriate behavior); poverty;
and delinquent peers. Can also be indicative of
a social-learning etiology; that is, the behaviors
emerge as the individual models others’ anti-
social behaviors.

Lec81110_10_c10_283-312.indd 312 5/21/15 12:40 PM

Creatas/Thinkstock

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be
able to:

• Describe William James’ theory on multiple
selves.

• Characterize Carl Rogers’ humanistic
approach to understanding the self and the
constructs of unconditional positive regard
and conditions of worth.

• Identify Maslow’s needs hierarchy and its
relation to self-actualization.

• Characterize the views of the existential
theorists.

• Describe and critique the research examining
the emergence of the self, using self-directed
behavior in the mirror.

• Understand Markus and Nurius’ concept of
possible selves and how they can motivate
behavior.

Self-Psychology: Humanistic/
Existential Models of Personality 9

Chapter Outline

Introduction

9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology
• William James and Multiple Selves
• Carl Rogers and the Humanistic Movement
• Abraham Maslow
• Søren Kierkegaard, Rollo May, Viktor Frankl,

Irvin Yalom, Fritz Perls, and the Existentialist
Movement

9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self
• Testing Self-Recognition in Humans
• Testing Self-Recognition in Non-Human

Species
• A Critique of Research on Self-Directed

Behavior

• Describe Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory and the contrasts among the actual, ideal, and ought selves.

• Contrast the public and private self and how these constructs relate to individualism and collectivism.

• Describe terror management theory and how we experience existential threats to the self via mortality salience and
the buffering effects of self-esteem.

• Name and describe several measures of self-related constructs.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 253 5/22/15 3:23 PM

CHAPTER 9

Introduction
“There comes a time when you look into the mirror and you realize that
what you see is all that you will ever be. And then you accept it. Or you
kill yourself. Or you stop looking in mirrors.” Tennessee Williams

I am a ____________. If you were asked to complete this sentence, what would
you say? What word or phrase would best explain who you are? You might say
“boyfriend/girlfriend of _______,” or “son/daughter of ______,” or maybe you’d
use a trait like “funny” or “smart.” Or maybe the context of your environment
would dictate your response. If you were traveling abroad, for example, you might
claim your nationality, but at home you might claim your state or town as integral
to your identity. Or maybe your response would be dictated by your mood; you
then might be “thankful” on a holiday, “miserable” during finals, or “angry” after
you fail your personality theory test. So which response(s) defines the “real” you?
Of course, each of these responses (and the many more you could have written)
reveals some aspect of who you are and begins to address what will be termed
the self-concept.

The self-concept is, in essence, a theory one has about oneself. It provides mean-
ing for one’s life, it makes predictions about the future, and it guides motivated
behavior. When does the self-concept develop and does it develop for non-human
species? How do we know when someone develops a self-concept? What can the
mirror tell us about the self and can it induce greater self-focused attention? Is
self-awareness the same as self-recognition? How do we respond when the self is
threatened? How do other cultures view the self? These are some of the questions
to be considered in this chapter to help us better understand what is encompassed
by the self-concept. We will review the perspectives of humanism and existential-
ism, along with the more traditional views of the self.

Introduction

9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of
the Self and Research
• Possible Selves
• Self-Discrepancy Theory
• The Private and Public Self
• Threats to the Self: Terror

Management Theory

9.4 Assessment Strategies for the Self
and Related Constructs
• The Q-Sort Methodology
• The Assessment of Possible Selves
• Assessing Self-Discrepancies
• Measuring Self-Actualization
• Measuring Self-Focused Attention:

The Self-Focus Sentence Completion
Blank (SFSC)

• Measuring Self-Consciousness:
The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS)

• Measuring Personal Growth:
The Personal Growth Scale (PGIS)

Summary

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 254 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9

9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

Although virtually every prominent figure in psychology makes reference to the self, a lim-ited number of theorists made this the central theme of their theoretical contributions to understanding the person. The theorists who reclaimed the “self” as the focus of investigat-
ing human personality initiated a movement known as humanism-existentialism. In this chapter,
we will review the works of those who contributed to this movement and the emphasis on the
self, including William James, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Viktor Frankl, Rollo May, and others.

William James and Multiple Selves
William James was one of the earliest writers to expound on the concept of self. He defined the
self as the sum total of everything that can be referred to as ours, and he explicitly included our
“psychic powers” (i.e., internal mental experiences), as well as all of our material possessions,
family, ancestors, friends, and even our body (James, 1890). Because James adopts such a broad
view of the self, he considered it to encompass the constituent parts of “I,” which is a subjective
sense of self, and reflects active thought (the knower), and “me,” which is an objective sense of
self, with features that reflect the self-concept (the known). James further subdivided the self into
(1) its constituents, (2) the aroused feelings and emotions, and (3) the actions prompted by the
former two, which James specified as being either self-seeking or self-preserving in nature.

James’ (1890) theory further divides the constituents into three selves: the material, social, and
the spiritual, listed in ascending order of importance. The material self (me) includes all of our
material possessions, including our bodies. James suggested that as we become more invested in
our material possessions, they define us more. The social self is defined by all of our interpersonal
relationships, and James believed that there were many, often diverse, versions of this self. James
tied the manifestation of a specific version of the social self to the available social cues. Thus, he
believed that we present with the social self that is most consistent with (or drawn out by) the
given social environment. The most important self—the one that reveals our innermost self—is
the spiritual self. James believed that the spiritual self reflected our conscience, morality, and
inner will. James also believed that the spiritual self guides the other selves, dictating the range
of available social selves and the sought-after material selves. When considered in this way, it is
reasonable to assume that by examining a person’s possessions and interpersonal presentations,
it is possible to discern the inner (spiritual) self.

Finally, James (1890) also wrote extensively about the ego, but he referred to it in a different way
from Freud, who was likewise articulating some of his earliest theories at this time. Specifically,

James defined the ego as one’s
total sense of identity, empha-
sizing the ego’s ability to con-
ceive of the totality of the self,
an integration of all of the com-
ponents. This ability is critical to
identifying incongruities, which
can prompt ego-driven change.
For example, if the material self
involves the amassing of numer-
ous material possessions, but
some of the core values of the

Beyond The Text: Classic Writings

In this early writing, William James (1892) writes about his
multiple conceptualizations the self. Read it at http://psych
classics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin10.htm.

Reference: James, W. (1892). The conscious self. In W.
James, The principles of psychology (Volume 1), Chapter 10.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 255 5/21/15 12:40 PM

http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin10.htm

http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin10.htm

CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

spiritual self emphasize self-sacrifice and philanthropy, then this inconsistency will presumably
lead to changes in the material self.

James believed that there is the potential for multiple selves, but that ultimately those selves must
compete for a limited resource—that being you. In the end, we must choose who we will be, if not
exclusively, then at least predominantly.

Carl Rogers and the Humanistic Movement
Carl Rogers was a psychologist who also had trained in pastoral ministries, and his theory reflects
many of the values that were no doubt instilled in his pastoral training. For example, Rogers
believed that humans were good at the core, but that circumstances could foster bad behavior.
This was in sharp contrast to the baser nature of Freud’s id.

Rogers based his ideas on the central tenet that a person is at the center of his or her own
phenomenal field, coming from a Greek word that means “how things show themselves.” The
phenomenal field is the totality of a person’s immediate experiences from his or her own per-
spective. This experience is not static; rather, it is a dynamic process. Therefore, the self is also
dynamic, changing as a function of one’s subjective experience. In this sense, Rogers was at least
partly responsible for putting the person back at the center of personality. Rogers emphasized
not just the experience that is readily available to the individual, but also what is potentially avail-
able (i.e., the phenomenal field includes things of which one might not have awareness at the
moment) (Rogers, 1959). Rogers emphasized the perception of reality, and although most people’s
perceptions capture aspects of the real world with which we all must deal, it is the case that an
individual’s perception could be quite unique and distinct from it (Rogers, 1951).

Although popularized by other theorists, it was Carl Rogers who first used the term self-
actualization to refer to the goal-directed behavior of the individual toward achieving his or her
potential. Rogers emphasized that actualization of the self is not automatic and can be extraordi-
narily difficult depending on the environmental circumstances (Rogers, 1951). Rogers stated that
the process of actualization is more likely to occur when people have full awareness of themselves
and the world around them. Emotions are thought to facilitate the process of actualization by driv-
ing goal-directed behavior. More recently, researchers have used the term “flourishing” to refer to
a process similar to Rogers’ self-actualization, and they include the concepts of self-acceptance,
autonomy, mastery, and personal growth (e.g., Ryff & Singer, 2000).

Rogers’ view of the self is an important aspect of the phenomenal field that with time becomes a
differentiated entity. Rogers defined this part of the phenomenal field using terms similar to those
employed by James, like “I” and “me,” and he includes not only one’s own views, but also those of
others (e.g., how others view what I call “me”). Rogers also believed that all of our experiences are
either accepted, which Rogers would refer to as symbolized (i.e., perceived by the individual and
cognitively organized), or they are not accepted, and either distorted into something else that is
more consistent with one’s self-concept (i.e., changing the reality of how something is perceived),
or denied, which preserves the self-concept from any experience that might threaten it. Distor-
tion and denial are Rogers’ equivalents of Freud’s defense mechanisms.

Important to Rogers’ theory is the belief in an ideal self, which is essentially the self that reflects
the attainment of goal-directed action. By using the term “ideal,” Rogers is implying that the ideal
self is not real—and in some ways, it is out of reach. The ideal self is thought to emerge when the
individual’s actual experiences and symbolized experiences are equivalent. In this scenario, the

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 256 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

In what ways have you experienced unconditional
positive regard versus conditions of worth?

actual self, which refers to the person’s perceived current self-state (the “I am”), and the ideal self
are the same. When there are significant discrepancies between the actual and ideal self, which
would occur when the person engages in denial or distortion of experiences, then, Rogers argued,
the individual experiences incongruence, and this can lead to maladjustment.

Thus, psychological adjustment comes from fully experiencing and accepting reality; the use of
defenses undermines this process. Notice how this differs from Freud, who believed that the
defenses were needed to achieve psychological adjustment. In fact, Rogers believed that we
would function best after becoming aware of impulses so that we could consciously control them.

Establishing Conditions of Worth

Rogers was an advocate of the position that in the absence of restriction on the self, indi-
viduals will strive for and achieve their ideal self. Rogers referred to this as the experience of

unconditional positive regard, which
means that you feel accepted no mat-
ter what you do (unconditionally). The
prototype for a relationship with uncon-
ditional positive regard is supposed
to be the parental relationship, but
not everyone receives this from their
parents. When Rogers developed his
therapeutic approach, one of the tech-
niques he employed was to be a source
of unconditional positive regard for his
patients. The reason for the success of
this approach, according to Rogers, was
that many individuals lack unconditional
positive regard from anyone in their life.
In contrast, Rogers saw people experi-
encing what he termed conditions of
worth, which is when people withhold
love and acceptance unless the individ-

ual behaves in a certain manner. “I’ll love you if you do me this favor,” would be an example of a
condition of worth, because it says that you’re valued and accepted only if and when you do the
favor. Rogers believed that maladjustment occurs as a result of too many conditions of worth,
because the individual either fails to meet the conditions and gain the positive regard from oth-
ers or because he or she does not act in a genuine manner in order to meet the conditions. This
theoretical position on the meaning of maladjustment provided a justification for Rogers’ form
of therapy (referred to as person-centered therapy), in which he provides unconditional positive
regard by being empathic, accepting, and genuine. In his theory, Rogers emphasized an almost
single-minded focus on positive development, rather than focusing on negative behavior and the
incidence of psychological disorders. In this respect, Rogers was at the forefront of what would
later be referred to as the positive psychology movement (e.g., Seligman & Csikszenmihalyi, 2000).
Rogers also believed that human beings are the primary agents of change and that his role in
affecting any change was simply to provide non-guided support in the form of unconditional posi-
tive regard. This was ultimately characterized as supportive psychotherapy.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 257 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

Abraham Maslow
Abraham Maslow was a convert from behaviorism who established a hierarchical model of human
motivation and the self. Like Rogers, he believed that humans are focused on growth, rather than
simply repairing problems. Maslow (1970) also used the term self-actualization to refer to the
individual’s capacity and willingness to reach his or her fullest potential. This includes striving for
happiness and self-satisfaction.

Maslow noted the difference between what he called motivation and meta-motivation. His moti-
vation referred to the satisfaction of deficits (which is very similar to the behavioral definition).
This deficit-reduction aspect of motivation focuses on the deficiency needs (or D-needs) that arise
from our basic requirements for life. They include, in ascending order of importance, according to
Maslow (1970):

1. Physiological needs, which are the most basic and strongest needs in life. For example, in
order to survive, we need food, water, and air.

2. Safety needs, which not only refers to threats to our existence, but also to anything that
can undermine predictability and a sense of security.

3. Belongingness needs, which refers to our basic human need for affection and interac-
tion. We need to feel as though we belong in a social context.

4. Esteem needs, which refers to both our own sense of competence and the sense that oth-
ers perceive our competence.

These needs have to be continually met, as their satisfaction is only temporary.

In contrast, meta-motivation is focused exclusively on growth. These being needs (B-needs) are
the essence of our need and desire to self-actualize—that is, they are the motivation to achieve
complete self-fulfillment. On a day-to-day basis, the individual must focus on D-needs in order
to survive. The B-needs allow one to
thrive, and become the focus of atten-
tion only after the D-needs are met.
Of course, because the satisfaction of
D-needs is always a temporary state,
this means that opportunities for self-
actualization are necessarily brief. For-
tunately, however, even a single experi-
ence of self-actualization can sustain us
for a lifetime. As an illustration, some
individuals achieve a moment of com-
plete spiritual fulfillment, or a brief time
of supreme relaxation or love (e.g., that
special beach you visited with someone
close to you), or, for some, it occurs in
something as simple as a hobby like golf
(e.g., a few holes when you seemed to
hit everything just right with very little
effort or thought). In that brief period
of time, you enjoy the moment, achieve
a higher level of awareness, and maybe
even experience the world outside of

Joggie Botma/iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Maslow suggested that self-actualization involves
“peak experiences” that allow for a sense of personal
growth and meaning. If this individual is having such an
experience, then he would be enjoying the moment with
a high level of self-awareness and would not be thinking
about any deficiency needs.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 258 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

yourself (i.e., no thoughts of your D-needs). We can then relive this experience and receive much
of the same positive emotional experiences well after the fact.

Unlike many others in the field of personality psychology, Maslow focused on some of the highest-
functioning individuals to better understand the basics of the self. As noted from his model,
Maslow believed that those who self-actualize represent our highest level of achievement and
the highest level with respect to mental health. Maslow believed that those who self-actualize
(as described above) have what he termed “peak experiences,” where the individual transcends
D-needs and can simply live (briefly) in the moment and reach their highest potential. Peak experi-
ences were defined as experiences of personal growth and meaningfulness in life. By living in the
moment, someone who regularly self-actualizes can have a peak experience even by engaging in
mundane activities that are part of the process of satisfying D-needs.

Although Maslow studied a wide range of people who he considered self-actualizers, his sample
was somewhat limited to those who had achieved political, scientific, or artistic prominence in
Western culture.

Søren Kierkegaard, Rollo May, Viktor Frankl, Irvin Yalom, Fritz Perls, and
the Existentialist Movement
These individuals collectively contributed to the existential movement, which thrived in the 19th
and 20th centuries, and proliferated most following World War II. Like the humanistic movement,
existentialism begins with the individual (the self) as he or she emerges (i.e., the emergence and
development of identity). A second basic assumption is that humans begin with a sense of disori-
entation or confusion caused by the lack of intrinsic meaning in our world.

Søren Kierkegaard

Søren Kierkegaard was a philosopher, but he is often credited as the first existentialist—even
though this label came after the fact, as Kierkegaard himself never used that term (Marino, 2004).
Kierkegaard believed that every individual was responsible for creating a sense of meaning in life
and then living it in a real (“authentic”) manner. Kierkegaard believed that individuals acquire free-
dom by expanding self-awareness and taking responsibility for their actions. This responsibility
is focused largely on establishing the meaning of life, rather than placing that burden on society.
However, Kierkegaard (1957) believed that gaining freedom and responsibility has a trade-off; it is
accompanied by anxiety and dread.

Rollo May

Rollo May’s work is considered within the existential movement because of his emphasis on the
experience of the self, the person as the active agent in life, and the role of anxiety as an existen-
tial threat (May, 1950). May believed that human behavior cannot be predicted from abstract laws
and principles because any laws that are relevant to the individual come from that person’s expe-
rience of life (May, 1953). The existential view also begins with a questioning of one’s personal
existence, with a meaningful life defined by authenticity to the self.

May was a clinical psychologist who, like Rogers, initially pursued a degree in religion (he actu-
ally completed his masters degree in divinity school). May believed that significant problems are
found in individuals’ failure to assume responsibility, perception that they are unable to act effec-
tively in the face of considerable problems in life (termed powerlessness), and unwillingness to
make difficult choices.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 259 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

May wrote extensively about anxiety, suggesting that anxiety manifests when we become aware
of our own sense of mortality. In keeping with his theory, May defined anxiety as a response that
occurs when something that is central to one’s existence is threatened (May, 1950). May believed
that such existential threat from anxiety is inevitable but that the particular source of anxiety
can change. He also differentiated normal anxiety, which naturally occurs, is proportionate to a
threat, can be managed, and can even lead to creative responses, from neurotic anxiety, which
is disproportionate to the threat, inhibits personal growth, and results in defensiveness. May
believed that a significant source of our neurosis comes from the loss or misplacement of values,
especially given Western society’s dominant values of materialism and success.

Central to May’s theory, and existentialism, is an awareness of the self (May, 1953). May sug-
gested that this process of awareness or consciousness occurs over several stages. The first is
innocence, in which as an infant we first become aware of the self. The second stage is rebellion,
in which the child begins to establish self-driven behavior as independent of the will of others.
This may manifest as defiance as the individual seeks to express free will. The third stage involves
ordinary awareness, whereby one is experiencing free will but is also taking responsibility for
those choices. The last stage is a creative awareness of the self and involves our ability to see the
self beyond its normal bounds. May defined the third and fourth stages as the healthy versions of
consciousness of the self, but he noted that few individuals achieve the fourth stage.

May also wrote about guilt, suggesting that it occurs when we fail to recognize our potential, fail
to recognize the needs of others, or fail to acknowledge our interdependence in the world (largely
referring to our interdependence with other people). May wrote about many other topics, such
as love and free will, but in all cases he emphasized our personal ability to make choices and take
responsibility for those choices. Importantly, May believed that apathy and emptiness were the
biggest existential threats and that psychopathology would result from problems connecting with
others and the inability to reach one’s destiny. In keeping with this philosophy, May did not “cure”
disorders. Instead, he believed that his therapy simply made people more human.

Viktor Frankl

Viktor Frankl was also a proponent of existential psychotherapy, as he emphasized human exis-
tence and human reality, and he focused on human crises. Drawing from his experiences in a
concentration camp during World War II, Frankl (1984) noted how individuals are able to derive
meaning from such horrific circumstances, and the ability to derive meaning is what can offset the
emptiness that can otherwise exist in and disrupt life. Interestingly, Frankl didn’t just experience
life in concentration camps (including Auschwitz), he actually engaged in therapy to help new-
comers experiencing shock adjust to the difficult environment. Frankl’s version of therapy, which
he called logotherapy, involved imbuing life with meaning, which meant intentionally seeking out
and creating meaningful encounters.

In his book, The Search for Meaning, Frankl (1984) wrote about such topics as anxiety and love,
and he believed that humans should always direct their actions and will toward others. Frankl
claimed that by focusing on others and forgetting oneself, one can achieve a greater sense of
humanity, with even a possibility of self-actualization for a select few. Indeed, by focusing on
others (or the broader human condition), he believed that the end product is a greater sense of
fulfillment, whereas by focusing on oneself, the end product is existential angst and a sense of
meaninglessness (see also Sartre, 1965, for a similar perspective).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 260 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

In addition to helping people deal
with the horrors of concentration
camps, Frankl also dealt with the
more mundane aspects of life that
could undermine one’s sense of
meaning. For example, he coined
the term “Sunday neurosis” to
characterize people who have
no sense of meaning in their life
outside the context of their work.
Thus, on a traditional day of rest,
Frankl suggested that these indi-
viduals were in an existential vac-
uum and unable to find meaning in their lives (see also Yalom, 1980). Frankl would argue that if you
feel bored, apathetic, and empty when you are not working, this label would apply to you as well (a
problem that is, no doubt, now minimized by 24-7 access to the Internet).

Irvin Yalom

Irvin Yalom is another prominent existentialist who has made significant contributions to the field.
He developed his own version of existential therapy that converged with many of the above-
mentioned theorists and practitioners. Yalom’s (1980) writings on existential therapy emphasized
four assumptions that apply to the human condition: (1) the experience of meaninglessness, (2)
isolation, (3) mortality, and (4) freedom. The key for Yalom is not whether these experiences occur
(he believes they do for everyone), but rather how people respond to them and whether that
response is adaptive or not. Yalom believes that the responses determine and reflect character
development, and determine whether forms of psychopathology will emerge.

More recently, Yalom has attempted to provide direction to the next generation of therapists by
providing them with guidelines for how to most effectively and humanely conduct therapy (Yalom,
2002). Yalom emphasizes the well-timed use of self-disclosures (i.e., giving the client information
about yourself) and how this can assist the process of therapy. He also cautions against the use of
diagnostic labels and short-term therapy and an overreliance on psychiatric medications.

Although many of the theorists discussed in this section were also practitioners and, there-
fore, applied their theory in the context of clinical work, none were actively involved in pri-
mary research. In the next section, we will review the research investigating many of the ideas
presented.

Fritz Perls

While Gestalt psychology actually began in the early 20th century with Max Wertheimer in what
was known as the Berlin School of Experimental Psychology, the name that has become synony-
mous with Gestalt is that of Fritz Perls. Perls was trained in Freudian psychoanalysis, but, with his
wife, Laura Perls, broke away from the analytic tradition when he immigrated to the United States
in 1946.

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

Read Sartre’s 1946 lecture, Existentialism Is a Humanism, in
which he explains and defends existentialism against its crit-
ics, at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre
/works/exist/sartre.htm.

Reference: Satre, J. (1989). Existentialism is a humanism. In
W. Kaufman (Ed.), Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sarte.
Amsterdam: Meridian Publishing Company.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 261 5/21/15 12:40 PM

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm

CHAPTER 9 9.1 Major Historical Figures in Self-Psychology

Gestalt psychology began its evolution in America in 1947 when Perls published Ego, Hunger,
and Aggression, but is generally accepted to have formally become a distinct psychological and
therapeutic model in 1951 with the publication of Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the
Human Personality, co-authored by Perls, Goodman, and Hefferline (Sale, 1995). Gestalt psychol-
ogy is concerned with experiencing and perceiving the whole rather than the parts, and was a
response to the reductionism of psychoanalysis.

Authenticity is probably at the core of Perls’ ideas. Gestalt psychology focuses on living authenti-
cally and with awareness. Unhappiness is thought to come from inauthenticity and resistance to
contact. Unhappy people are living in their heads while disowning their feelings. They are out of
touch with their bodies. They are living in the past or the future, but avoiding the present. They
talk about their experiences rather than experiencing them. And they are unaware of these con-
ditions. Learning to live in the “here and now” is core to the Gestalt perspective of well-being. In
fact, in therapy situations, clients are asked to deal with past issues in the now. So, rather than talk
about what happened in the past and how they felt about it, they are required to experience the
issue in the now and feel their feelings in the now. For example, a client who has lingering issues
with his deceased mother might be asked to mentally put his mother in the “hot seat” and talk to
her about his issues as if they were current. It moves from a third person perspective (putting the
disturbing circumstance out there and analyzing it) to a first person perspective (experiencing the
disturbing circumstance in the here and now).

Gestalt therapy focuses on the importance of paying attention to the body. Laura Perls (1992)
believed that anxiety is related to oxygen deprivation and therefore emphasized the importance
of breathing. Another basic tenet of Gestalt is that resistance to contact is often betrayed by the
body, and enhancing awareness of the body is a method of building awareness.

Perls also postulated that people cannot be understood outside of the context of their environ-
ments. Experiencing meaningful “contact” with ourselves and with the environment is also core.
Contact occurs at the boundary. The contact boundary is where we differentiate between what is
“me” and what is not “me.” It is about having authentic interactions with self and others. People
develop methods to resist contact that keeps them from being in the here and now and having
meaningful interactions with the environment. Perls also suggested that we use language to resist
authentic interactions by, for example, saying “I can’t” when in fact we mean “I won’t.”

Resistance to contact is a concept very similar to Freud’s defense mechanisms. There are five pri-
mary interruptions to contact:

1. Introjection: passively taking in the environment without discrimination
2. Projection: disowning parts of ourselves and projecting them onto others
3. Retroflection: doing to ourselves what we want to do to others
4. Deflection: changing the focus of a contact experience to avoid authentic interactions
5. Confluence: blurring the lines between self and environment (Polster & Polster, 1973)

The contact boundary must be permeable enough to allow interaction with the environment but
firm enough to maintain autonomy. Perls called this organismic self-regulation. Awareness allows
us to control that balance. “There is only one thing that should control: the situation. If you under-
stand the situation you are in and let the situation you are in control your actions, then you learn
to cope with life” (Perls, 1976, p. 33).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 262 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9

9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self

9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self

In this section, we examine how the concept of self has been studied and examined by its con-stituent parts. Researchers have typically begun at the most basic level, establishing what is thought to be the minimum requirement for the emergence of a self-concept: self-awareness.
This section will focus on the research establishing a methodology for self-awareness and an
understanding of how the self-concept first emerges.

Testing Self-Recognition in Humans
What do you see when you look in the mirror? Do you see the same person others see? Do you
have a grandiose view of yourself, or perhaps a devalued view?

The challenge for science is to develop methods for operationally defining and measuring con-
cepts. Of course, many psychological constructs are not directly accessible, and there can be
considerable subjectivity and variability in how they are assessed. Consider, for example, how
researchers can know if the self-concept is present. One approach has been to identify some

lower-level constructs that would have
to be present before the self-concept
could emerge. For example, researchers
have generally agreed that in order for a
self-concept to exist, there would have to
be self-awareness (i.e., in the absence of
self-awareness, a self-concept would be
highly unlikely). Thus, researchers have
identified some methods for defining
self-awareness. The most widely used of
these is to look for self-recognition when
infants and young children are exposed
to a mirror; this is sometimes referred to
as the mirror test.

To measure recognition, researchers
have typically used the emergence of
self-directed behavior, which is when
the person (or animal) directs behavior
toward (acts upon) oneself. For exam-
ple, when you look in the mirror and fix
your hair, this is an illustration of a self-

directed behavior. It requires that you recognize that the mirror image is you, that you use the
information from the mirror image, and that you direct behavior toward yourself. If, instead, you
attempted to fix the hair of the image in the mirror, expressed anger at the mirror image, or began
a conversation with the image, then we would conclude that there is no self-recognition, and one
would not expect to see any self-directed behavior.

.2006 Angela Georges/Flickr/Getty Images

The rouge test requires that the infant recognize the
image as him/herself, and then engage in self-directed
behavior to remove the red mark that would not be
visible without the mirror image.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 263 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self

Self-directed behavior has been studied by covertly putting marks (rouge) on the faces of children
of different ages to see how they react to those marks (also known as the rouge test). Researchers
following this method have found that children engage in self-directed behavior beginning around
18–24 months of age, and this behavior is thought to be a central precursor to later self-awareness
(e.g., Amsterdam, 1972; Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984; Bullock & Lutkenhaus, 1990; Butterworth,
1992; see also Vyt, 2001). Interestingly, using alternative methodologies (e.g., gazing times), some
researchers suggest that the most basic level of self-recognition may occur as early as 3 months
of age (Bahrick, Moss, & Fadil, 1996). Thus, overall there is sufficient research evidence to sug-
gest that physical self-recognition is the first of several developmental abilities to emerge in the
formation of the self, with later aspects of the self to include awareness of emotions, verbal self-
descriptions, and the developmental of self-evaluative emotions (Lewis, 1994; Stipek, Gralinski, &
Kopp, 1990; for a review see Courage & Howe, 2002).

The development of the self is thought to be facilitated by socialization experiences, whereby
children learn to develop knowledge and emotional experiences about the self as distinct from
knowledge and emotional experiences about others (e.g., Harter, 1983; see also Kärtner, Keller,
& Chaudhary, 2010). Although there is some evidence to suggest individual differences in the
emergence of self-directed behavior (e.g., the absence of such behavior in children with profound
cognitive impairments), such variability has not been well documented. The research that has
been conducted has yielded generally consistent effects. For example, whether children were mal-
treated does not appear to impact the timing of the development of self-recognition, nor does
their socioeconomic status (see Schneider-Rosen & Cicchetti, 1984; Schneider-Rosen & Cicchetti,
1991), and as noted, the research is very clear in demonstrating an age effect.

Testing Self-Recognition in Non-Human Species
A second line of research examines whether self-directed behaviors (and by extension, the self-
awareness and the self-concept) are a uniquely human phenomenon. This question is important
because it tells us something about the uniqueness of the self-concept and the level of cognitive
abilities needed to develop a self-concept. As recently as the mid-1970s, theorists and research-
ers hypothesized that self-awareness or self-recognition was one of the abilities that separated
humans from other advanced species and may have been one of the later attributes to evolve
(e.g., Buss, 1973; Kinget, 1975). However, research on a number of non-human species has since
suggested that self-recognition is not unique to humans.

Building largely from the work of Gordon Gallup, researchers have established a reliable para-
digm for evaluating self-recognition. Gallup began by examining chimpanzees in front of a mir-
ror. Initially they responded in a manner indicating no self-recognition (i.e., they responded with
threatening gestures in response to their mirror images). However, they did ultimately demon-
strate self-directed behavior, including grooming. Thus, there does appear to be a learning effect
for self-directed behavior; such that experience with the mirror does facilitate the emergence of
self-directed behavior (Gallup, 1970; see also Gallup, 1979, 1982, 1987; Gallup et al., 1995; Inoue-
Nakamura, 2001). In contrast, when studied in humans, past experience with the mirror (or any
reflecting surface) does not appear to impact the incidence or speed with which self-directed
behavior occurs (Priel & de Schonen, 1986). In addition, more recent research has shown that
chimpanzees can also engage in self-directed behavior even when exposed to their image via
video (Hirata, 2007). Finally, research suggests that just as humans show a developmental pattern
for the emergence of self-directed behavior, so too do chimpanzees (Inoue-Nakamura, 2001).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 264 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.2 Testing the Emergence of the Self

Gallup and others devised what is now commonly known as the mirror test, a method to gauge
the self-awareness of animals by determining whether they recognize their own reflection in a
mirror. Using a paradigm similar to that described for humans, researchers examined whether
great apes (including chimpanzees, orangutans, bonobos, and gorillas) who see their reflection
with, for example, a foreign marking on their face would take action to remove that object (Gal-
lup, 1977). The results indicate that all great apes demonstrate self-directed behavior under these
testing circumstances (e.g., Patterson & Gordon, 1993; Povinelli, de Veer, Gallup, Theall, & van
den Bos, 2003). Moreover, research also indicates that self-recognition and self-directed behav-
ior occur in a number of marine mammals, including bottlenose dolphins (Marten & Psarakos,
1995), killer whales, false killer whales, California sea lions (Delfour & Marten, 2001), and Asian
elephants (Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006). Moreover, researchers have also now documented
self-directed behavior in non-mammalian species, with the magpie being the only instance to date
(Prior, Schwarz, Güntürkün, & de Waal, 2008).

A Critique of Research on Self-Directed Behavior
There are, of course, some confounds with this type of research. First and foremost, self-recogni-
tion alone (as indicated by the presence of self-directed behavior) does not imply or demonstrate
the existence of a self-concept—or at least not a well-articulated self-concept. Moreover, despite
many similarities between human and non-human species, it is reasonable to question whether
self-recognition holds the same implications for humans as it does for non-human species, given
the presence of more advanced cognitive capabilities in humans. Another shortcoming of the mir-
ror test is that any animal that depends largely on the other senses for identification or has poorly
developed vision will not be able to validly take the mirror test.

With respect to the human research, it is also possible that the children are not motivated to clean
their face or remove the mark. Indeed, some researchers have suggested modified procedures
for increasing motivation for self-directed behavior (e.g., demonstrating the cleaning of a doll’s
face with a similar dot prior to the mirror test), and this results in an increased incidence of self-
recognition in the mirror test (Asendorpf, Warkentin, & Baudonniere, 1996).

Another issue is that self-awareness could occur at an earlier age when the child is not able to
evidence or able to conceive of some resolution to the foreign object observed on their person.
For example, it is possible that younger children recognize the rouge as being on their cheeks, but
they do not have the cognitive capacity to realize that they could remove it.

Moreover, in light of the recent finding of self-directed behavior in magpies (i.e., without any
behavioral conditioning, the magpies appeared to engage in self-directed behavior to remove a
foreign object on their feathers and only visible in the mirror), it raises the possibility that either
the self-concept is a much broader (cross-species) experience than was first thought, or there may
be some issues with the mirror methodology (e.g., it could simply be a form of learned behavior).

Finally, it should be noted that self-awareness, and therefore self-directed behavior, may be
affected by individual differences. That is, rather than considering self-awareness as a static point
that is “achieved” and something that is consistent across individuals, it may be the case that
individuals vary in the extent to which they have high self-awareness. For example, in a broad
review of the literature, it was shown that self-focused attention is consistently associated with
negative affect, and this was especially true when studying females and clinical populations (Mor
& Winquist, 2002).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 265 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9

9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

One interesting line of research looking at this issue has introduced the term
self-concept clarity (SCC). SCC refers to the structural components of the self and includes
the clarity and confidence with which the self-concept is known and conveyed by the indi-
vidual, and it is thought to be internally consistent and stable over time (Campbell et al., 1996).
Researchers have noted that low SCC is associated with high neuroticism, low conscientious-
ness, low agreeableness, and self-focused ruminative attention (Campbell et al., 1996).

While there are still questions surrounding mirror test methodology, the key issue may in fact be
whether there any self-related experiences that are uniquely human. Researchers investigating
what are referred to as possible selves and those examining existential threats to the self would
argue that there are at least some uniquely human experiences (even if self-directed behavior is
not unique to humans), and these examples will be the focus of the next sections.

9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Most of the earliest contributions from the theoretical perspectives reviewed in this text (with the exception of trait theory) emerged from clinical applications. That is, the theory emerged from working in settings with individuals experiencing varying degrees of dys-
function in their lives. In contrast, self-theory is largely focused on the normal development of the
self and is grounded in research. Of course, much can be learned about the self when considering
situations such as the experience of stress and even threats to the self. We will here review some
of the more recent self-theories, the consequence of experiencing threats to the self, and the
research upon which these constructs are based.

Possible Selves
Researchers have developed the concept of
possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986), a term that
identifies the versions of the self that you could be,
but which are not necessarily occurring right now.
Possible selves are somewhat limitless, in the sense
that they can be anything that you imagine yourself to
be; possible selves can even be unrealistic. However,
past experiences play a critical role in defining possi-
ble selves, and as a result, they tend to be reasonably
grounded in reality.

Possible selves can be differentiated with respect to
their temporal focus (past, present, or future) and their
valence; positive possible selves denote what the indi-
vidual would like to become, and negative possible
selves denote what they would like to avoid (Markus
& Nurius, 1986). For example, one could refer to past
negative possible selves (one example of which might
be associated with regrets) or future positive possible
selves (one example being the ideal self). Although
there are many possible selves, researchers have largely
focused on the future possible selves, as this construct
serves to provide meaning to our lives and motivate
action toward future goals (see Erikson, 2007).

iStock/Thinkstock

Some experiences can activate a number
of possible selves. For example, receiving
a text from your boyfriend/girlfriend
that says “we need to talk” may activate
future possible selves of you as “single.”

Lec66661_09_c09_253-282.indd 266 5/26/15 4:08 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Markus and Nurius (1986) suggest that possible selves are influenced by both individual and con-
textual (i.e., situational, social, cultural, etc.) factors. Thus, possible selves can be triggered by
developmental factors and social norms (Conger & Peterson, 1984; Oyserman & Markus, 1990).
For example, adolescence is a time when family, peer groups, and school are the contexts in which
the self is defined. Normative tasks such as dating, gaining independence from family, and initial
experience with employment will also define possible selves at this stage in life. Similarly, college
students are focused on occupational, educational, and interpersonal (dating and marriage-
related) possible selves, whereas possible selves related to parenting and family are more typical
for young and middle-aged adults.

Information in our environment can also trigger possible selves that were previously unavailable. For
example, we may feel as though we are in a committed, long-term relationship. However, when a
boyfriend or girlfriend sends us a text saying “We have to talk,” or they change their Facebook status
to “single,” (or both!), this would likely activate a possible self that you may not have been consid-
ering prior to receiving that information; the negative future possible self as single (and lonely).
Similarly, if you made a comment in your psychology class and the professor said that it was quite
possibly one of the more brilliant statements ever made in that course, then this might activate a
future positive possible self as a graduate student. Some of the cues that trigger possible selves may
be fleeting and less personally directed (an image on a poster or in a commercial), or they may be
activated by inner thoughts and experiences (e.g., a moment of self-doubt or supreme confidence, a
reminiscence, etc.). This also means that some possible selves are considerably less likely as a result
of our circumstances and past experiences. For example, if you have had past academic failures, then
it will be more difficult and less likely that you will have future positive possible selves with respect
to academics. Indeed, research has shown that juvenile delinquents and those coming from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to identify possible selves in the academic and vocational
domains and identify strategies to facilitate the emergence of related possible selves (e.g., Oyser-

man, Bybee, & Terry, 2006; Oyser-
man & Markus, 1990; Oyserman
& Saltz, 1993). Similarly, research-
ers have shown that health pro-
motion behavior is less likely for
racial minorities who identify
with an ingroup self-concept that
involves unhealthy behaviors;
viewing health promotion behav-
iors as defining White, middle—
class possible selves (Oyserman,
Fryberg, & Yoder, 2007).

Possible Selves as Motivators of Action

Markus and Nurius (1986) suggest that individuals are motivated to reduce the discrepancy between
their present and future positive possible selves while increasing the discrepancy between their
present and future negative possible selves. Moreover, establishing future positive possible selves
increases the likelihood of individuals engaging in behavior and strategic planning that then increases
the probability of the possible selves coming to fruition (e.g., Oyserman & Saltz, 1993; Oyserman,
Terry, & Bybee, 2002). For example, high-risk students who developed school-based, positive pos-
sible selves demonstrated better in-class behavior (Oyserman, Brickman, & Rhodes, 2007), felt more
confident about their prospects for success and achieved better grades relative to their peers who
did not articulate positive possible selves in school (Oyserman, Bybee, Terry, & Hart-Johnson, 2004).

Beyond The Text: Classic Writings

In this 1986 paper, Hazel Markus and Paul Nurius introduce
the concept of possible selves and their implications. Read
it at http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1987-01154-001.

Reference: Markus, H. & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves.
American Psychologist 41(9), 954–969.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 267 5/21/15 12:40 PM

http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1987-01154-001

CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Similarly, negative future possible selves can also motivate behavior. Thus, a future possible self
as a “drop-out” can also lead to better school-related outcomes (Oyserman et al., 2006). Based
on these findings, it is reasonable to conclude that future negative possible selves in other life
domains could also motivate favorable behavior. Research suggests that a balance of negative and
positive possible selves may result in the best outcomes, especially in contexts where there may
be considerable obstacles undermining the achievement of one’s positive possible selves (e.g.,
Oyserman & Markus, 1990; Oyserman et al., 2006; Van Dellen & Hoyle, 2008).

In this respect, positive and negative possible selves (also referred to as hoped-for and feared pos-
sible selves, respectively) are similar in nature to approach-avoidance goals discussed in Chapter
8, such that there may be behavioral consequences for focusing on one type of possible self, and
the tendency to do so can reflect individual differences. Indeed, multiple negative possible selves
can be associated with more adverse outcomes. For example, a recent study showed that women
with anorexia were likely to have negative future possible selves and that negativity tended to be
stronger relative to a control group of women (Erikson, Hansson, & Lundblad, 2012). Moreover,
it appears that most individuals have more (or can more readily access) positive, relative to nega-
tive, possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003).

Self-Discrepancy Theory
What are your standards of comparison for your self-concept? How do you know when you are
doing well in life or not? These questions stand at the center of one interesting line of research
introduced by E. Tory Higgins.

Self-Constructs

Higgins (1987) introduced the concept of self-guides to refer to the internal standards that indi-
viduals use for comparison purposes. Some examples of self-guides are the self you ideally want
to achieve and the self you think others want you to be. Higgins suggested that these comparisons
occur all the time, and somewhat automatically, even without our awareness. Higgins emphasized
that any differences between the self-concept and the self-guides are referred to as self-discrepan-
cies, and individuals are highly motivated to minimize such discrepancies, as discrepancies result
in cognitive and affective discomfort (Higgins, 1987). Of course, self-discrepancy theory was not
the first to introduce the idea that discrepancies with the perceived self can result in discomfort
and that individuals are motivated to reduce such discomfort (see Festinger, 1957, for a related
discussion of cognitive dissonance, and James, 1890, who also discussed discrepancies and incon-
gruities in the self). However, Higgins’ theory advanced the field by articulating how certain types
of discrepancies result in specific emotional experiences and vulnerabilities. For example, negative
emotional states such as sadness would be predicted when the actual and ideal self-discrepancies
are especially large. In contrast, guilt might occur when the actual and ought selves are notably
different (see Erikson, 2007, for a discussion of how possible selves can be redefined).

Higgins identified three self-domains that can be internally compared. The first is the actual self,
which is one’s mental representation of the attributes, accomplishments, and abilities that one
perceives oneself to possess. In contrast, the ideal self is a mental depiction of the self one wants
to be but is not yet manifesting as the actual self. The ideal self serves to motivate goal-directed
behavior to achieve either the ideal self or approximations of it. The ought self is one’s mental
representation of the self that someone believes one should (or “ought to”) have. That someone
could be a family member, a friend, an intimate partner,—or it could be the individual him- or
herself. These can manifest in the form of perceived obligations or responsibilities.

Own

Actual Ideal Ought

Other

The Self Domains

How I see myself
as I truly am

How I think others
see me

How I think others see the
ideal me

How I see myself as I would
ideally be

How I think I should be

How I think others think
I should be

Standpoints

Figure 9.1: Higgins’ six self-state representations

This figure illustrates the six possible comparisons of the self-states from two different standpoints
(perspectives).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 268 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Higgins also posited that in making comparisons between the different self-domains, the individ-
ual could do so from two distinct vantage points. Higgins specified that one could adopt one’s own
standpoint or the standpoint of a significant other. By considering both the three self-domains and
the two standpoints, six self-state representations can be identified (i.e., actual-own, actual-other,
ideal-own, ideal-other, ought-own, and ought-other; see Figure 9.1). Higgins (1987) proposed that
the two actual self-states (actual-own and actual-other) are what most people consider as the
self-concept, while the other self-states provide the framework (self-guides) used for comparison
with the self-concept to motivate behavior, so as to maximize the match between the actual, the
ideal, and the ought self-states. Although self-theory fits well within the framework of personality
psychology, as an additional connection, Higgins proposed that there are individual differences in
the self-guides that one is most likely to use to motivate behavior. Thus, for some individuals, the
ideal self-guides are constantly considered and compared to the actual self, whereas for others, it
is the ought self-guides that drive their actions. For example, if you are someone who chronically
experiences guilt over what you should do relative to what you are doing in life, then it is more
likely that you are thinking extensively about the ought self-guides. If you are frequently fantasiz-
ing about a better life, then perhaps you are being largely guided by ideal self-guides.

Emotional Outcomes of Construct Comparisons

Because comparisons among the self-states are what ultimately motivate behavior, it is instructive
to both consider the different comparisons (e.g., actual-own vs. actual-other, ideal-own vs. ideal-
other, ought-own vs. ought-other, actual-own vs. ideal-own, actual-own vs. ought-own, ideal-own
vs. ought-own) and the distinct emotional experiences that might emerge as a result of those
comparisons. As an illustration, consider the long-term goal of obtaining your Ph.D. in psychology
(an end goal to motivate behavior). Using Higgins’ terminology, you might consider the ideal self
as the successful doctor in a thriving career, resulting in a good standard of living and prestige
from colleagues. The ought self might look a little different, perhaps as someone who uses their
doctoral degree to help others, and is very giving of one’s time in pro bono work. The actual self
might be a struggling graduate student who is perhaps questioning whether there is the stamina
to continue in graduate school for several more years and complete the dissertation. Perhaps,
then, the actual-own versus actual-other comparison involves the nearly burnt-out and uncertain
actual self from your perspective to the driven and nearly finished actual self from the perspective
of your parents. In this case, when the idea of dropping out crosses your mind, the disappoint-
ment you perceive from your parents’ perspective (the “other” in this case) may be one of the
motivating agents that keep you going.

Similarly, negative future possible selves can also motivate behavior. Thus, a future possible self
as a “drop-out” can also lead to better school-related outcomes (Oyserman et al., 2006). Based
on these findings, it is reasonable to conclude that future negative possible selves in other life
domains could also motivate favorable behavior. Research suggests that a balance of negative and
positive possible selves may result in the best outcomes, especially in contexts where there may
be considerable obstacles undermining the achievement of one’s positive possible selves (e.g.,
Oyserman & Markus, 1990; Oyserman et al., 2006; Van Dellen & Hoyle, 2008).
In this respect, positive and negative possible selves (also referred to as hoped-for and feared pos-
sible selves, respectively) are similar in nature to approach-avoidance goals discussed in Chapter
8, such that there may be behavioral consequences for focusing on one type of possible self, and
the tendency to do so can reflect individual differences. Indeed, multiple negative possible selves
can be associated with more adverse outcomes. For example, a recent study showed that women
with anorexia were likely to have negative future possible selves and that negativity tended to be
stronger relative to a control group of women (Erikson, Hansson, & Lundblad, 2012). Moreover,
it appears that most individuals have more (or can more readily access) positive, relative to nega-
tive, possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003).
Self-Discrepancy Theory
What are your standards of comparison for your self-concept? How do you know when you are
doing well in life or not? These questions stand at the center of one interesting line of research
introduced by E. Tory Higgins.
Self-Constructs
Higgins (1987) introduced the concept of self-guides to refer to the internal standards that indi-
viduals use for comparison purposes. Some examples of self-guides are the self you ideally want
to achieve and the self you think others want you to be. Higgins suggested that these comparisons
occur all the time, and somewhat automatically, even without our awareness. Higgins emphasized
that any differences between the self-concept and the self-guides are referred to as self-discrepan-
cies, and individuals are highly motivated to minimize such discrepancies, as discrepancies result
in cognitive and affective discomfort (Higgins, 1987). Of course, self-discrepancy theory was not
the first to introduce the idea that discrepancies with the perceived self can result in discomfort
and that individuals are motivated to reduce such discomfort (see Festinger, 1957, for a related
discussion of cognitive dissonance, and James, 1890, who also discussed discrepancies and incon-
gruities in the self). However, Higgins’ theory advanced the field by articulating how certain types
of discrepancies result in specific emotional experiences and vulnerabilities. For example, negative
emotional states such as sadness would be predicted when the actual and ideal self-discrepancies
are especially large. In contrast, guilt might occur when the actual and ought selves are notably
different (see Erikson, 2007, for a discussion of how possible selves can be redefined).
Higgins identified three self-domains that can be internally compared. The first is the actual self,
which is one’s mental representation of the attributes, accomplishments, and abilities that one
perceives oneself to possess. In contrast, the ideal self is a mental depiction of the self one wants
to be but is not yet manifesting as the actual self. The ideal self serves to motivate goal-directed
behavior to achieve either the ideal self or approximations of it. The ought self is one’s mental
representation of the self that someone believes one should (or “ought to”) have. That someone
could be a family member, a friend, an intimate partner,—or it could be the individual him- or
herself. These can manifest in the form of perceived obligations or responsibilities.
Own
Actual Ideal Ought
Other
The Self Domains
How I see myself
as I truly am
How I think others
see me
How I think others see the
ideal me
How I see myself as I would
ideally be
How I think I should be
How I think others think
I should be
Standpoints
Figure 9.1: Higgins’ six self-state representations
This figure illustrates the six possible comparisons of the self-states from two different standpoints
(perspectives).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 269 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Self-discrepancy theory predicts that the discrepancy involving the actual and ideal self from
one’s own perspective results in feelings of disappointment and dissatisfaction when the actual
self does not meet the standards of the ideal self. Discrepancies in this domain from the self-
perspective are also thought to be associated with depression and low self-esteem (e.g., Strau-
man, 1992; see also Strauman & Higgins, 1988). The magnitude of the discrepancy is one of the
factors that can also predict the behavioral response, as small discrepancies can foster adaptive
efforts to minimize the discrepancy, whereas as large discrepancies are more likely to result in the
individual giving up. In contrast, when the perspective is that of significant others, these same
actual-ideal self-discrepancies are more likely to induce feelings of shame and embarrassment
because the individual believes that he or she has fallen short of what is perceived as the expecta-
tions and hopes of others. Thus, we assume that others are disappointed in our achievements (or
lack thereof), which leads to shame.

Predicting Important Outcomes With Self-Discrepancy Theory

Possible selves have been predictive of a wide range of important life outcomes. For example,
smaller actual-ideal self-discrepancies for students is associated with academic success (Oyser-
man et al., 2006), and larger actual-ideal and actual-ought discrepancies have been linked to
depression (e.g., Oyserman et al., 2006; Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman, 1992) and anxiety (Scott
& O’Hara, 1993; Strauman, 1992). Self-discrepancy theory has also been used to predict coping
effectiveness and inter-role conflict for married professional mothers (Polasky & Holahan, 1998),
the incidence of disordered eating behavior (Landa & Bybee, 2007; Strauman, Vookles, Berenstein,
Chaiken, & Higgins, 1991), psychological adjustment to a diagnosis of cancer (Heidrich, Forsthoff,
& Ward, 1994), help seeking behavior for alcohol-related problems (Buscemi et al., 2010), physi-
cal activity (Lamarche & Gammage, 2012), and even immune functioning (i.e., cortisol levels and
natural killer cell activity; Strauman, Lemieux, & Coe, 1993).

The Private and Public Self
One of the more interesting studies of the self with important implications is a consideration of what
is known as the private and public self (also referred to as private and public self-consciousness). Pri-
vate self-consciousness is the direction of attention to our inner experiences (thoughts and feelings),
and our private self is therefore less likely to be shared with others. We may actively or automatically
keep this self hidden from others. Public self-consciousness is when we consider how we appear to
others, and as a result, our public self is the identity that we allow others to see.

Researchers (especially in the field of social psychology) have examined how we respond to
manipulations of private and public self-consciousness—for example, when an audience or cam-
era is used to activate public self-consciousness. Moreover, research has shown that public set-
tings minimize the distinction between the private and public self, while concealment (i.e., private
contexts or issues) can enhance distinctions between the two self-constructs (e.g., Sedlovskaya et
al., 2013).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 270 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

In contrast, personality researchers have investigated stable, individual differences in the direction
of self-consciousness. In fact, the descriptive term private self-dominant is used to refer to people
who tend to be more self-aware in general (i.e., self-conscious) and actively engage in self-focused
attention and self-focused goals. Self-disclosure is a common practice for these individuals. In con-
trast, those who are public self-dominant are less self-conscious, less focused on their own internal
experiences, and instead focused on social goals. Fenigstein and colleagues have assessed these
individual differences in self-consciousness and demonstrated that where attention is focused (pri-
vate vs. public self) determines which characteristics of the self (private vs. public) are emphasized
or valued most (for an overview, see Fenigstein, 2009). In connecting the current research back to
self-discrepancy theory, it has been shown that public self-consciousness is more likely to activate
thoughts related to the public view of the ought self, whereas private self-consciousness is more
likely to activate the ought self from the individual’s own perspective (Nasby, 1996).

Individualism Versus Collectivism: A Cultural Perspective

Culture refers to a set of attributes that can be ascribed to a group, including such things as com-
mon values, beliefs, habits, and customs, all of which influence the individual (e.g., Tseng, 2003).
Cultural factors are almost exclusively acquired, in that they do not reflect genetic influences
(though see McCrae, 2004, for an alternative view), and the acquisition of these cultural patterns
is referred to as enculturation. Importantly, each of us would likely have developed a different self
had we been raised (enculturated) in a different group.

Researchers have suggested that there
are differences between cultures with
respect to the manifestations of the
private and public self, and these dif-
ferences have broadly been referred
to as individualism and collectivism.
Collectivism essentially involves an
emphasis on the public self, where the
individual is concerned with how their
actions affect other members of their
ingroup, they tend to share resources
with their ingroup, and they subordinate
(or equate) individual goals to collective
goals (Hui & Triandis, 1986). Thus, a sig-
nificant part of their individual identity is
the identity of the group, and over time,
they become highly interdependent with
the ingroup (e.g., Triandis et al., 1986). In
contrast, individualism involves assign-
ing higher priority to personal goals over
those of the collective and striving for
independence from the ingroup. Thus,

the private self is generally more salient in this context (see also Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal,
Asai, & Lucca, 1988).

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Although some aspects of our identity are strongly
influenced and even derived from groups with which we
affiliate, we also develop an identity separate from the
group. In some cultures (collectivistic), the well-being we
derive from our identity may be more closely tied to the
group than others.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 271 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

Not surprisingly, various outcomes have been associated with individualism and collectivism. For
example, collectivism appears to be more important for the subjective well-being of those living
in China (Cheung & Leung, 2007) and is more commonly associated with a sense of social obli-
gation (Oyserman, Sakamoto, & Lauffer, 1998). When individualism and collectivism are studied
worldwide, researchers have suggested that southern Italian (Banfield, 1958), traditional Greek
(Triandis & Vassiliou, 1972), and rural Chinese cultures (Hsu, 1983) are more likely to be collectiv-
ist, whereas North American and both northern and western European cultures are more likely
to be individualistic (e.g., Inkeles, 1983; for an overview see Triandis, 1989; Triandis et al., 1988;
Triandis & Gelfand, 2012).

Despite the noted differences, researchers have also suggested that individualistic and collectivis-
tic cultures may not vary as much as was initially thought, as rates of conformity have been found
to be similar between Japan, a culture typically thought to be collectivistic, and the United States,
a culture typically thought to be individualistic (Takano & Sogon, 2008). Researchers have also
argued that there are problems with how individualism and collectivism are defined (e.g., using
national borders; see Fiske, 2002). Moreover, even within cultural groups, there remains vari-
ability in private and public self-consciousness. For example, it appears that neuroticism is associ-
ated with a heightening of both public and private self-consciousness (i.e., self-focused attention;
Scandell, 1998).

Threats to the Self: Terror Management Theory
Recall that existential theory suggests that individuals have the potential for great inner conflict
because we are aware of ourselves (our very existence), and we can experience existential fear
due to threats to our existence, as well as a sense of meaninglessness in our lives. The theoretical
perspective discussed in this section combines the idea of self-awareness with awareness of our
own mortality, two distinctly human experiences, to generate a wide-ranging theory on the self.

Ernest Becker (1973) argued that because we both value life and are aware of our own mortality,
we must constantly engage in activities to deny or avoid thinking about death and to infuse mean-
ing into our lives. Becker believed that this was the primary motivator in life and that all of the
trappings of civilization ultimately serve this function. This line of thinking draws heavily from the
existential theorists.

More recently, researchers have extended Becker’s view (and existentialism in general), by for-
warding what is known as Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon,
1986; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski,
1991b). TMT is rooted in the conflict that emerges from having a strong desire to live, but also
having an awareness of our inevitable mortality. Thus, the “terror” is fear of dying, and the man-
agement refers to the behaviors we engage in to “manage” the experience of our fear. This conflict
(and mortality awareness in general) is thought to be a uniquely human phenomenon, and it is
argued that the individual’s behavior, as well as societal practices, minimize this existential threat
by providing a sense of stability, order, and even meaning to our lives (Greenberg et al., 1986;
Pyszczynski et al., 2002; Solomon et al., 1991b). In essence, as we get more involved in our day-
to-day lives and attribute greater significance and meaning to these activities, we are less likely to
think about our mortality. However, our worldview is not maintained simply by the existence of
a culture; rather, one must feel as though one is actively engaged in and contributing to it. TMT
also suggests that our worldview can be easily threatened, largely because existential threats are
always readily available—in our own minds.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 272 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

An important assumption of TMT is that any threats to either our worldview or, more directly,
reminders of our mortality (referred to as mortality salience) will typically result in a reaction
to re-establish the threatened worldview and to respond harshly to the source of the threat or
reminder. The rationale is that the worldview threat is essentially an existential threat to our way
of life, and even our existence. In a series of studies, researchers demonstrated the hypothesized
effects from TMT. For example, in one study, researchers randomly assigned participants to either
experience a mortality threat (writing about their own deaths) or a control writing assignment and
then either experience via an outside target a threat to their political (ideological) views or not.
Participants were then given the opportunity to have something unpleasant occur to the target
(i.e., determine how much hot sauce the target would have to consume) (McGregor et al., 1998).
Consistent with TMT, the results indicated that participants gave the target significantly more hot
sauce to consume when their mortality was made salient and when the target expressed contrar-
ian political views to the participant’s own views (i.e., when the target threatened the partici-
pant’s worldview). The researchers also found that the effect was similar regardless as to whether
participants responded with aggressive behavior or derogatory statements against the target
(McGregor et al., 1998), as both serve to uphold one’s worldview. Other research suggests that
following exposure to mortality salience, participants were more lenient (less punitive) against
offenders when the victim was someone who posed a worldview threat to them (Lieberman,
Arndt, Personius, & Cook, 2001). These effects appear to be robust, as they have been reliably rep-
licated in the literature in over one hundred studies (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997),
and the emergent effects appear unique to the activation of one’s mortality rather than any other
aversive emotional states (Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2008).

Researchers and theorists have suggested that TMT can explain why conflicts are most likely to
occur when groups with disparate ideologies confront one another. In this context, the other
group’s beliefs and practices are a threat to our own existence, and assimilating or sometimes
annihilating the other group serves to strengthen our own worldview (see Berger & Luckman,
1976).

Self-Esteem Buffers Threats to One’s Mortality

In addition to acting harshly against threats to one’s worldview, it is also possible to strengthen our
worldview by enhancing our sense of self-esteem. Self-esteem means the value one attributes to
the self, and higher self-esteem is generally thought to be the more adaptive self-state (see James,
1890). The theoretical link in TMT is that because our culture should outlive (transcend) our exis-
tence, then living up to the standards of the cultural worldview and maintenance of the world-
view essentially eases the mortality threat (i.e., although we may die, what we have invested in—
our culture, our offspring, etc.—will continue to thrive). In this regard, self-esteem is a “buffer”
against the anxiety that comes from mortality threats (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, &
Schimel, 2004). One source of empirical support for this hypothesis is that self-esteem has been
found to consistently hold an inverse correlation with the incidence of anxiety (i.e., higher self-
esteem is associated with lower anxiety and higher anxiety is associated with lower self-esteem;
see Solomon et al., 1991b). Researchers have also shown that high self-esteem (whether exper-
imentally-induced or naturally occurring) results in one being less likely to defend against death
vulnerability (Greenberg et al., 1993; see also Hirschberger, Florian, Mikulincer, Goldenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 2002).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 273 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.3 Contemporary Theoretical Models of the Self and Research

To consider how this might apply to real life, assume you hear a news story about a terrorist
attack in your city. You would likely become quite harsh toward members of other (outside) eth-
nic groups or anyone who might have a different worldview (e.g., perhaps even those espousing
different political beliefs), and you may be more likely to subsequently engage in behavior that
elevates your self-esteem (e.g., engage in a sport you do well, turn to your work, etc.). The exten-
siveness of the reaction you experience would be affected by your baseline level of self-esteem
(i.e., there would be a stronger initial reaction for those with lower self-esteem).

Death Thought Accessibility and Awareness

More recent research has focused on measuring the construct of death thought accessibility—the
extent to which thoughts about death are available to the individual—rather than manipulating
thoughts of death (i.e., mortality salience) (Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010). This subtle
distinction has been important in elaborating the difference between defenses against conscious
(threat-focused) mortality threats and unconscious (or symbolic) ones (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, &
Solomon, 1999).

Because thoughts of death are so troubling to the individual, there will be active attempts to
suppress any such thoughts, either by distraction or by attempting to attribute less importance
to the issue, thereby resulting in their elimination from conscious awareness. However, thought
suppression of any kind actually leads to an increase in the incidence of the thought once active
suppression stops. The process by which these unwanted thoughts actually increase (i.e., become
hyper-accessible) after attempts to suppress them is known as ironic processes of mental control,
and this has been discussed extensively in the literature (Wegner, 1994, 2009). This ironic process
can therefore create what has been referred to as a “temporal signature” following exposure to
a threat. Specifically, when individuals are prompted with thoughts of death, this results in the
suppression of those death thoughts initially (through a worldview defense as discussed earlier),
but then those thoughts become even more accessible in the unconscious (Greenberg, Pyszczyn-
ski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994). In support of this hypothesis, researchers have found that
the most pronounced worldview defense occurred following subtle death thought exposure (e.g.,
completing a questionnaire near a cemetery), whereas worldview defense has been shown to be
absent in response to more blatant death thoughts (e.g., after having you write about your own
death) (Greenberg et al., 1994).

Finally, some research suggests that there are individual differences in the experience of these
effects. For example, death anxiety can be increased with mortality salience, but only for those
who do not perceive their lives as meaningful (Routledge & Juhl, 2010). Similarly, other research
has shown that the mortality salience effect and death thought accessibility vary as a function
of other individual differences, such as attachment styles, with anxious-ambivalent individuals
showing a more pronounced effect (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000), and right wing authoritarianism
(Weise, Arciszewski, Verlhiac, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2012).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 274 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9

9.4 Assessment Strategies for the Self and Related Constructs

9.4 Assessment Strategies for the Self and Related Constructs

Given the breadth with which the various self-concepts have been discussed in the litera-ture, it is not surprising that there have been numerous measures developed to assess the relevant constructs. A representative sampling of some of the more commonly employed
measures are reviewed here.

The Q-Sort Methodology
This represents one of the older methodologies for assessing the self (see Stephenson, 1953),
and the tests based on this approach have been standardized for use in both children and adults
and applied to a wide range of settings (Block, 1961, 2008). For example, the California Q-Sort
contains 100 cards, each with a statement that is descriptive of personality (e.g., “Makes friends
easily”). The Q-Sort method requires the individual to indicate the extent to which each statement
is self-descriptive on a scale ranging from most to least characteristic of me. The Q-Sort method
also typically requires the individual to come up with a specific distribution for the cards, such that
most of the cards are sorted in the middle of the continuum and the least are sorted at either end.
An analysis of how the cards are sorted then yields a picture of the individual’s self-concept, and
this is sometimes used to provide one perspective on their personality.

The Assessment of Possible Selves
Possible selves have been assessed using both open- and closed-ended strategies (Markus &
Nurius, 1986). The closed-ended approach is more directive and provides respondents with a list
of possible selves that they must endorse (e.g., checking those that are relevant) or rate in some
way, such as identifying those that are most attainable or important. Open-ended assessments of
possible selves begin with a brief definition of the construct and then require respondents to gen-
erate their own lists of possible selves, along with the strategies to achieve those possible selves
(see Oyserman & Fryberg, 2006, for an overview).

The advantage of the closed-ended approach is that it provides greater standardization, though
this is at the cost of constraining the participant to endorse only the examples that are provided.
The open-ended assessment is more flexible and directly assesses the actual possible selves of the
individual. However, it requires researchers to content-code the elicited possible selves (Oyser-
man & Fryberg, 2006).

Assessing Self-Discrepancies
There are a number of different measures available for assessing self-discrepancies, though the
oldest and most frequently used of the measures is also the weakest from a psychometric stand-
point. Thus, several alternatives for assessing self-discrepancy will be reviewed.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 275 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.4 Assessment Strategies for the Self and Related Constructs

The Selves Questionnaire

One of the more frequently used methods for assessing self-discrepancies involves the Selves
Questionnaire (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985). The measure requires respondents to list as
many as 10 attributes/traits and associate each with the actual, ideal, and ought selves (with each
construct briefly defined). Researchers then compare the lists (actual-ideal and actual-ought) and
look for matches (exact or synonyms) and mismatches (antonyms) using Roget’s Thesaurus. The
process is typically done once for the actual self-concept and once for the ought self-concept.
Discrepancy scores are calculated by subtracting the number of actual-ideal matches from the
number of actual-ideal mismatches. This process is repeated for the actual-ought discrepancy
(Higgins et al., 1985).

However, due to significant shortcomings in the psychometric properties of the Selves Question-
naire (i.e., short-term, test-retest reliability coefficients below .70) and difficulties discriminating
between the real-ideal and real-ought discrepancies because they are highly inter-correlated (see
Watson, Bryan, & Thrash, 2010), there has been a push for alternative approaches, and three of
those are presented below.

The Idiographic Self-Concept Questionnaire-Personal Constructs (SCO-PC)

This approach is based on Kelly’s theory (1955) of personal constructs (the Repertory Grid reviewed
in Chapter 6) and similarly assumes that the individual has a unique perception of the self. The
SCO-PC identifies the respondent’s bipolar constructs as related to the actual, ideal, and ought
selves (requesting six constructs for each of the three selves). Discrepancy ratings are then com-
puted for the real-ideal and real-ought selves, with this instrument yielding good psychometric
features (Watson et al., 2010). Of the three alternatives to the selves questionnaires, this method
emerged as the most validated and psychometrically sound (Watson et al., 2010).

The Nonidiographic Self-Concept Questionnaire–Conventional Constructs (SCQ-CC)

The SCQ-CC uses a series of 28 personality characteristics originally drawn from the Adjective
Check List and requires respondents to rate the extent to which each characteristic is true/
accurate of each of the three self-states. Discrepancy scores are computed by comparing the rat-
ings for the real-self and ideal-self, and this is repeated for the real-self and ought-self perspec-
tives (Watson et al., 2010). This approach also yields adequate psychometric properties.

The Content-Free Abstract Measures (AM)

This online approach also measures real-ideal and real-ought discrepancies using nine pairs of
intersecting squares, though the degree to which they intersect varies from 0% to 100% in 12.5%
increments. The real self and ideal self are defined just as they were in the SCQ-PC and SCQ-CC.
Respondents are instructed that one square represents the real self and one the ideal self, and
they are to select the squares whose overlap corresponds to the perceived overlap of real and
ideal selves in general. Here discrepancy scores are calculated by comparing the overlapping areas
in the squares (Watson et al., 2010).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 276 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.4 Assessment Strategies for the Self and Related Constructs

Measuring Self-Actualization
Self-actualization measures are not only theoretically relevant to the phenomenological perspec-
tive, but also to several of the constructs involved in contemporary research. Four credible mea-
sures to assess self-actualization have been forwarded in the literature, and each will be briefly
reviewed.

The Personal Orientation Inventory (POI)

The POI is the oldest of the measures of self-actualization and is the most frequently used. Devel-
oped by Shostrom (1964), the POI draws heavily on the work of Maslow and attempts to assess
positive mental health (see also Burwick & Knapp, 1991). The POI has two factors: It assesses
inner-directedness and the effective use of time. The two factors of the POI are assessed via
12 subscales, which focus on the existential valuing of life experiences. Numerous studies have
emerged to demonstrate the validity of this instrument, though as noted, it is dated (e.g., McClain,
1970).

The Personal Orientation Dimensions (POD)

The POD is a 260-item measure that was based on, and uses a similar format as, the POI (Shostrom,
1975). The POD has 13 subscales with 20 items per subscale, and these subscales also overlap with
the POI. One downside of this measure is that the test-retest reliabilities are modest.

The Self-Report Measure of Actualization Potential (MAP)

This instrument was developed as an alternative to the POI, but it also focuses on capturing the
successful and functioning individuals. There are two primary factors reflecting self-reference and
openness to experience, though the 27-item inventory is represented by a five-factor solution
(Lefrancois, Leclerc, Dube, Hebert, & Gaulin, 1997). The strength of the MAP is that it yields stron-
ger psychometric values (i.e., higher reliability and validity figures) relative to its predecessors.

The Short Index of Self-Actualization

This brief, 15-item inventory assesses self-actualization and was developed as a short form of the
POI (Jones & Crandall, 1986). This short measure has a reasonably high correlation with the POI
(.67, p , .001), and was shown to correlate with other theoretically related constructs, such as
self-esteem and some personality measures. The measure was also able to discriminate between
those nominated as self-actualizers and non-self-actualizers, and it appears resistant to false pre-
sentations of self-actualization.

Measuring Self-Focused Attention: The Self-Focus Sentence Completion
Blank (SFSC)
The 30-item SFSC was initially developed to assess egocentricity but subsequently was validated to
assess self-focused attention (Exner, 1973). Individuals are instructed to complete an open-ended
sentence stem, and scoring is content-based, emphasizing the themes of self-focus, external-
world focus, ambivalence, or none of the above.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 277 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9 9.4 Assessment Strategies for the Self and Related Constructs

Several variants of this measure have been employed over the years, and one of the first ver-
sions was much broader, in that it did not necessarily emphasize the theme of self-focus (Kuhn &
McPartland, 1954). This version requires the respondent to complete the sentence “I am. . .” 20
times, and the responses are content analyzed. With respect to the research on the self, the test
has been used to focus on responses that correspond to the private, public, or collective self; how-
ever, most responses tend to fall in the category of the collectivistic and, particularly, the private
self. As an illustration, responses that refer to a social group (e.g., “I am a Democrat,” or “I am a
Dolphins fan,”) would be put in the collectivistic category. If a reference is made to others, but not
to a specific group, then the coding scheme would categorize it as representing the public self. Any
references to personal traits or experiences would reflect the private self. The scoring (categoriza-
tion) for this measure appears to achieve very high inter-rater reliability, and research shows that
the percentage in each category and the accessibility of the responses (e.g., those given first) are
generally theoretically consistent in terms of finding a higher proportion in the collectivistic cat-
egory in collectivistic cultures (Higgins & King, 1981).

Measuring Self-Consciousness: The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS)
Developed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975), the SCS is a 23-item measure that assesses
individual differences in the tendency to be self-conscious using two subscales. The private self-
consciousness subscale assesses awareness of the more personal and covert aspects of the self
(i.e., one’s own thoughts and feelings). In contrast, the public self-consciousness subscale assesses
the individual’s awareness of the self as a social object (i.e., how the person is perceived by oth-
ers). The individual differences in SCS appear to closely parallel the findings that emerge when
self-awareness is manipulated with a mirror (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1977). The measure was later
revised for use with the general population (Scheier & Carver, 1985), as the original measure was
largely validated for use with college students.

Measuring Personal Growth: The Personal Growth Scale (PGIS)
Central to all of the theoretical contributions to the self-construct is the assumption that the self
can develop or grow over time, and in fact, this was an intentional goal of some of the therapeutic
models mentioned in this chapter (e.g., Roger’s phenomenological approach).

The PGIS is a nine-item measure that assesses the extent to which the individual has experienced
personal growth along both cognitive and behavioral dimensions. Item responses range from
definitely disagree to definitely agree, and the scale demonstrates good psychometric properties
(Robitschek, 1998).

A revised version of the scale (PGIS-II) was developed to address some shortcomings in the origi-
nal instrument, which defined personal growth too narrowly (i.e., tied to a single context); also,
despite assessing two constructs (cognitive and behavioral), it was a unidimensional scale (Rob-
itschek et al., 2012). This revised scale includes four subscales (readiness for change, planfulness,
using resources, and intentional behavior). The four-factor structure appears to be robust, and
its psychometric properties are sound, as it demonstrates concurrent and discriminant validity
(Robitschek et al., 2012).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 278 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9Summary

Summary

Self-theory has a long and rich history within the field of personality psychology, with some of the earliest contributors, such as William James, foreshadowing a later emphasis on multiple selves. James also was among the first to note that individuals make comparisons between
different aspects of the self and derive meaning and satisfaction from the outcomes of these com-
parisons. Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow made significant contributions to our understanding
of the self by advancing humanistic psychology, which places the individual (self) as the central
focus (referring to the phenomenal field). While the humanistic movement emphasized a positive
approach to the individual, even elaborating on the concept of self-actualization, the existential-
ists focused more on aversive emotional experiences that occur as a result of our awareness of
our own mortality and freedom to make choices, which can result in a sense of meaninglessness.

Early research focused on developing experimental paradigms to establish the presence of the
self-concept, both developmentally in humans and in other species. The most broadly accepted
approach was to use the mirror in an attempt to elicit self-directed behavior. The assumption
being that if self-directed behavior occurs, there must be self-recognition, and self-recognition is
necessary for self-awareness. Self-directed behavior generally appears in humans near age 2, and
it has been documented in other species (including non-mammalian species).

Contemporary theories on the self emphasize the concept of possible selves, suggesting that
these are many and varied, and they motivate behavior (i.e., as we strive to reach various possible
selves). Self-discrepancy theory suggests that we continuously consider such self-representations
as the actual self, the ideal self, and the ought self (the self we think we should be), and any dis-
crepancies between these constructs impact well-being and other outcomes.

Research also suggests that when thoughts of our own mortality are activated (i.e., we experience
threats to the self), we experience existential angst and terror, and we attempt to manage this
terror by investing in cultural practices and attacking those who express different worldviews. We
also saw that there are interesting differences between the private and the public self, and there
is also a collectivistic self; the latter construct is more prevalent or more important in collectivis-
tic cultures (where the goals of the group or at least if not more important than the goals of the
individual).

Finally, each of the constructs introduced in this chapter has resulted in assessment tools to access
the various self-concepts, though these instruments vary considerably in their psychometric
soundness.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 279 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9

Key Terms

Key Terms

actual self According to Rogers (1951) and
Higgins (1987), an individual’s mental represen-
tation of the attributes, accomplishments, and
abilities that he or she perceives him- or herself
to possess.

collectivism A state in which the individual is
concerned with how their actions affect other
members of their ingroup, they tend to share
resources with their ingroup, and they subor-
dinate (or equate) individual goals to collective
goals.

conditions of worth Conditions that must
be met before an individual receives love and
acceptance from another.

creative awareness The stage in which an indi-
vidual is able to see the self beyond its normal
bounds, according to May’s (1953) theory.

death thought accessibility The extent to
which thoughts about death are available to an
individual.

denial In Rogers’ (1951) terms, when an expe-
rience is not accepted and is denied (in order to
preserve the self-concept, which is threatened
by the experience).

distortion In Rogers’ (1951) terms, when an
experience is not accepted and is altered into
something more consistent with an individual’s
self-concept.

enculturation The acquisition of cultural
patterns.

Gestalt A psychological theory and form of
therapy that was brought to America by Fritz
Perls. Refers to the whole being more than the
sum of its parts, and is focused on personal
growth through authentic living.

ideal self According to Rogers (1951) and
Higgins (1987), an individual’s mental depic-
tion of the self that he or she would like to
be; it is often different from the actual self,
but it can emerge when the individual’s actual
experiences and symbolized experiences are
equivalent.

incongruence According to Rogers (1951), this
is an individual’s experience of significant dis-
crepancies between the actual and ideal self.

individualism A focus on personal goals and
independence from the ingroup.

innocence The stage in which an infant first
becomes aware of the self, in May’s (1953)
theory.

material self James’ (1890) definition of the
self that includes all of an individual’s material
possessions and the body.

mortality salience An individual’s awareness of
his or her eventual death.

neurotic anxiety Anxiety that is disproportion-
ate to the threat, inhibits personal growth,
and results in defensiveness, according to May
(1950).

normal anxiety Anxiety that naturally occurs,
is proportionate to a threat, can be man-
aged, and can even lead to creative responses,
according to May (1950).

ordinary awareness The stage in which an
individual experiences free will while also
taking responsibility for choices, according to
May’s (1953) theory.

ought self An individual’s mental representa-
tion of the self that someone (often someone
else) believes the individual should be, accord-
ing to Higgins (1987).

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 280 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 9Key Terms

phenomenal field The totality of an individu-
al’s immediate experiences from his or her own
perspective.

possible selves The selves that an individual
identifies that he or she can be, but which are
not occurring at the present time.

powerlessness An individual’s perception that
he or she is unable to act effectively in the face
of life problems.

private self-dominant A term to describe indi-
viduals who are more self-aware and actively
engage in self-focused attention and self-
focused goals.

public self-dominant A term to describe indi-
viduals who are less self-conscious, less focused
on their own internal experiences, and instead
focused on social goals.

rebellion The stage in which a child begins to
establish self-driven behavior that is indepen-
dent of the will of others, according to May’s
(1953) theory.

self According to James (1890), the sum total
of everything referred to as ours, including
our internal mental experiences, our material
possessions, family, ancestors, friends, and the
body. It includes the subjective sense of self
(“I”), and also “me,” which is an objective sense
of self.

self-actualization According to Rogers (1951),
the goal-directed behavior of an individual
toward achieving his or her potential; according
to Maslow (1970), the individual’s capacity and
willingness to reach his or her fullest potential,
including happiness.

self-concept A theory an individual has about
himself or herself.

self-concept clarity (SCC) The structural
components of the self, including the precision
and confidence with which the self-concept is
known and conveyed by the individual.

self-directed behavior Actions that are done
to, or directed toward, oneself.

self-focused attention When the individual
directs awareness toward the self. This can be
experimentally manipulated with such things as
the presence of mirrors or cameras.

self-guides The internal standards that indi-
viduals use for comparison purposes.

social self James’ (1890) idea of the self as
defined by an individual’s interpersonal rela-
tionships; it includes many variations, often
quite different from one another, depending
upon the social situation.

spiritual self James’ (1890) concept of the self
that reflects an individual’s conscience, moral-
ity, and inner will; it guides the material selves
and social selves.

symbolized In Rogers’ (1951) terms, the
process of an individual accepting an experi-
ence by perceiving and cognitively organizing it
(instead of denying or distorting it).

Terror Management Theory (TMT) The theory
that states that humans engage in certain
behaviors to manage the experience of terror
associated with our awareness that we will all
eventually die.

unconditional positive regard When an indi-
vidual feels accepted by another, no matter
what he or she does.

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 281 5/21/15 12:40 PM

Lec81110_09_c09_253-282.indd 282 5/21/15 12:40 PM

Tina Fineberg/Associated Press

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be
able to:

• Compare and contrast the interpersonal
model with neurobiological, psychodynamic,
behavioral, and cognitive models.

• Summarize the contributions of Harry Stack
Sullivan to the development of the interper-
sonal model.

• Explain Sullivan’s use of the term self-system.

• Describe the research Henry Murray carried
out at Harvard.

• Discuss the origin and uses of the Thematic
Apperception Test.

• Describe the two continua that define Timothy
Leary’s interpersonal circumplex model.

• Describe some of the revisions to the inter-
personal circumplex and the central themes
assessed by the circumplex.

Interpersonal Models of Personality 7

Chapter Outline
Introduction

7.1 Major Historical Figures
• Sullivan’s Theory of Interpersonal Relations
• Murray’s Unified Theory of Personality
• Evolution of the Circumplex Model

7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models
• Benjamin’s Structural Analysis of Social

Behavior (SASB)
• Murray Bowen and His Contribution to the

Interpersonal System
• Klerman and Weissman’s Interpersonal

Model of Depression and Personality
• Kiesler’s Interpersonal Force Fiel

d

• Explain Lorna Smith Benjamin’s three copy processes: (1) identification, (2) recapitulation, and (3) introjection.

• Describe Bowen’s systemic therapy and the importance of the triangle.

• Describe how Klerman and Weissman’s interpersonal theory originated from their effort to develop an effective
treatment for depression.

• Describe Donald Kiesler’s concept of transactional escalation.

• Describe attachment theory, the work of Bowlby and Ainsworth, and the implications for adult intimate relationships.

• Identify some of the assessment tools used to evaluate interpersonal processes.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 195 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7Introduction

7.3 Interpersonal Relations and Their Link
to Attachment Styles
• Bowlby and Ainsworth’s Attachment

Theory

• L’Abate’s Relational Competence

Theory

7.4 Assessment Strategies and Tools for
the Interpersonal Context
• Thematic Apperception Test
• Assessing the Interpersonal Circumplex
• Assessing Attachment Styles
• Other Measures Tapping Aspects of

Interpersonal Functioning
• Cultural Influences

Summary

Introduction
Researchers who study personality from an interpersonal standpoint see inter-
actions with others as one of the best ways to examine personality functioning.
Much of who we are is determined by our social relationships, and social relation-
ships influence who we are. Family, friends, strangers, authority figures, subordi-
nates—each of them influences how we act, and so who we are as a person. Con-
sider how you behave with your mother or father, as opposed to your best friend
or your intimate partner. Each relationship brings to the fore different aspects of
your self, and this, in turn, influences the interpersonal interaction.

Let’s consider the following video from an Occupy Wall Street protest in Seattle:
http://ctgovernmentretaliations-rosey.blogspot.com/2011/11/amazing-video-of
-violence-at.html. As a backdrop to the video, recall that the Occupy Wall Street
movement began in September of 2011, in Zuccotti Park, which is located near the
financial district of New York City. The movement was focused on public percep-
tions that the financial sector, and the corporations it represents, has too strong
of an influence over government, contributing to financial and social inequalities
between the wealthiest individuals and the rest of the populace. Although the
movement eventually grew to include other cities, even outside the United States,
it was largely peaceful. The above video appears to illustrate an exception.

What may have provoked this behavior by police? How would you have reacted
had you been in the role of the police or the protestors? Importantly, notice that
not all protestors and not all police behaved in the same manner. Some individuals
appear more intent on provocation, defiance, and violent response, whereas oth-
ers evidence considerably more restraint and submissive/passive behavior.

The focus of this chapter is the role of interpersonal processes: how they reflect
our personality, how they are shaped by our personality, and how our responses to
others—whether they be close intimate partners, authority figures, or even peers
we briefly encounter—play a pivotal role in determining how we are (and allow
ourselves to be) treated.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 196 5/21/15 12:40 PM

http://ctgovernmentretaliations-rosey.blogspot.com/2011/11/amazing-video-of-violence-at.html

http://ctgovernmentretaliations-rosey.blogspot.com/2011/11/amazing-video-of-violence-at.html

CHAPTER 7

7.1 Major Historical Figures

7.1 Major Historical Figures

The interpersonal model of personality represented a major departure from previous mod-els, shifting the perspective from a psychology of the individual to a psychology of interac-tions between two individuals, otherwise known as dyadic interaction. Examples of dyads
that can and have been studied include child-parent, husband-wife, employer-employee, doctor-
patient, and teacher-student, to name a few. Importantly, dyads are not static; they change both
as a function of time and as a function of their interdependence. An important assumption of
this theory is that as a social interaction unfolds, the behavior of one individual typically results in
complementary behavior by the other individual in the dyad. Thus, the interpersonal perspective
assumes that personality is a fluid and evolving construct, varying as a function of these interac-
tions. Of course, these interactions are not random. We play a large role in determining with
whom we interact, how those interactions unfold, and even how people respond to us. Thus,
although the model has the potential for the fluidity of personality, the interactions generally tend
to reinforce our personalities.

When identifying theorists who emphasized the importance of interpersonal interactions, the
list is long and distinguished. For example, William James (1890) developed the concept of the
social me, Charles Horton Cooley (1902) introduced the term looking-glass self to highlight how
people think others perceive them, George Herbert Mead (1913, 1934) emphasized that the self is
shaped by expected and actual reactions of others, and Alfred Adler (1927) emphasized the social
motive (in German, gemeinschaftsgefuhl) as the fundamental force driving human action. Some
theoreticians went a step further and centered their thinking almost exclusively on interpersonal
behavior (broadly referred to as interpersonal models of personality), and it is those individuals
who will be emphasized here.

One of the originators of the interpersonal model of psychology was Harry Stack Sullivan, who was
the first to use the term interpersonal. Henry Murray was also an early influential figure who
emphasized the use of scientific methods in studying dyads. Murray Bowen was another signifi-
cant contributor to the interpersonal perspective, but he focused on the three-person relationship

system (referred to as the trian-
gle). A fourth influential figure
was Timothy Leary, a notable
counterculture figure in the
1960s, who was a psychologist
who taught at Harvard until he
was dismissed because of his
experimentation with psyche-
delic drugs. Each of these indi-
viduals and their ideas will be
explored in this chapter along
with a number of other interper-
sonal theories. Attachment the-
ory, and especially its implica-
tions for adult intimate
relationships, will also be
discussed.

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

Although not typically considered part of the interpersonal
tradition in psychology, George Herbert Mead penned
a classic paper in which he considered the social self as
central to any examination of self-identity. In this respect,
his ideas were very much in keeping with the major con-
tributors to the interpersonal movement. Read his paper,
“The Social Self,” (1913) at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca
/Mead/socialself.htm.

Reference: Mead, G. H. (1913). The Social Self. Journal
of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 10,
374–380.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 197 5/21/15 12:40 PM

http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Mead/socialself.htm

http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Mead/socialself.htm

CHAPTER 7 7.1 Major Historical Figures

Sullivan’s Theory of Interpersonal Relations
Harry Stack Sullivan, who was briefly discussed in Chapter 3, is considered the father of interper-
sonal theory. The importance of Sullivan’s work relates not so much to his theoretical contribu-
tions to personality, but rather to the fact that he shifted the perspective from what occurs in the
mind to what is observable in human relationships (Chrzanowski, 1977). Sullivan believed that
interpersonal patterns learned early in life are major determinants of adult personality. In his
theory, the interpersonal situation is the key concept, expressing his belief that to understand per-
sonality, the researcher should focus on the various ways in which two people can relate (Pincus
& Ansell, 2003). Moreover, Sullivan believed that important needs are essentially interpersonal
in nature and that satisfying those needs inevitably involves others. Obviously, intimacy needs

are explicitly interpersonal, but so too is the need for
autonomy, as this involves the negotiation of depen-
dency needs. In fact, our survival depends on coopera-
tion and complementary transactions (also referred
to as reciprocal transactions, where the needs of all
individuals in the interaction are met), as well as on
our own need satisfaction.

Sullivan applied his theory to his experiences as a psy-
chotherapist to help him understand the interpersonal
processes at play between himself and his patients.
Unlike Freud’s transference relationship, which is
projected onto the psychiatrist by the patient, the
patient-therapist dyad that Sullivan described involves
a two-way relationship. Sullivan explains that both
participants in this interpersonal relationship are
co-constructing and co-evolving their experience as
they relate to one another, and he coined the term
participant-observer to describe this bidirectional
process. The point of emphasis is the evolving rela-
tionship that develops between therapist and client.
In other words, the analyst cannot be a blank screen;
by the very nature of the relationship, the therapist is
a participant in the analytic process—a process that
Sullivan describes as meaning making. The patient is
of course also an active participant; patients manage
their own needs and try to obtain approval from those
whose approval they desire, which could include the

therapist (Hazell, 1994). However, Sullivan believed that the therapist’s participant-observer role
is deliberately non-authoritarian, because he believed that the individual has to play the primary
role in driving therapeutic change. The participant-observer role represents an important depar-
ture from Freud’s concept of the authoritarian therapist who presents with neutrality and Kohut’s
mirroring relationship (both discussed in Chapter 3).

Mike Cherim/iStockphoto/Thinkstock

This person is being offered a drug for
the first time. Assuming he prefers not
to use the drug, then this decision can be
seen as a trade-off between a sense of
individuation and a desire to merge his
identity with that of the group via group
acceptance.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 198 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.1 Major Historical Figures

The Role of Anxiety in Sullivan’s Interpersonal Theory

The central theme of Sullivan’s theory is that anxiety is the primary force responsible for building
the self-system (Bischof, 1970), and that anxiety emerges completely within the interpersonal
context. Specifically, he believed that anxiety increases when our relationships are not mutually
satisfying, resulting from a mismatch between the two individuals in the interaction, referred to
as a mismatch between two self-systems (see also Pincus & Ansell, 2003).

Sullivan (1953) first coined the term self-system to account for how interpersonal experiences
affect the manner in which personality is formed. He believed the self-system was organized
around gaining satisfaction and avoiding anxiety. Insecurity and unsatisfied organic needs gener-
ate tension or anxiety. Beginning from birth, humans attempt to reduce anxiety by striving for
interpersonal security. Sullivan used the term “security operations” to describe interpersonal tac-
tics to minimize anxiety by avoiding feeling abandoned or denigrated. He also argued that security
operations serve to protect our self-esteem.

The individual strives for an optimum level of anxiety: Too little, and there will be a lack of drive;
too much results in paralysis and inaction. Sullivan suggests that conformity can lead to approval
from others, which all individuals seek. But conformity can come at a cost to the true self, and that
also leads to anxiety. Among other things, anxiety interferes with intimacy and hinders creativity
(Chrzanowski, 1977). Sullivan believed that individuals need to learn to function in the presence of
anxiety without taking refuge in self-defeating actions like conformity. In a sense, what we all are
attempting to do is balance the tension between our individuality and our need for interpersonal
acceptance. For example, consider a situation where peers are pressuring you to engage in risky
behavior, such as trying a drug. You are likely to feel that trying the drug will lead to peer accep-
tance, but if this does not represent what you want to do, then trying the drug and merging with
the peer group would be at the cost of part of your individuality. Thus, the goal is to find a point
of balance where you can both express your individuality while still being accepted. Of course,
healthy relationships are less likely to make us feel as though we would be rejected for expressing
our individuality.

The Function of Anger

The way anger is managed is critical to our interpersonal adjustment. Too much anger and our
interpersonal style will annoy and repel others. But if there is not enough anger because we fear
alienating others, they may take advantage of us. Thus, how we manage and express our anger is
critical to interpersonal functioning. Sullivan suggested that the regulation of anger is also central
to intrapersonal functioning. In fact, personality problems are often evident in those who are
unable to experience anger as well as those who chronically react with irritation. Anger is a natural
response to an interpersonal injury. Fear of interpersonal aggression and loss of control can inhibit
our experience of anger, but fear of anger in others can induce anxiety (Chrzanowski, 1977). For
example, imagine that a colleague at work has intentionally taken credit for your work. This is a
situation in which some anger would be an appropriate and healthy response. In contrast, some
individuals would not display any anger for fear of losing control (i.e., exhibiting too much anger;
sometimes referred to as over-controlled hostility) or because they fear the anger will be recip-
rocated. Others might overreact or exhibit chronic anger. Thus, the ability to experience anger
appropriately is critical to interpersonal functioning as interpersonal injuries are inevitable in the
context of social interactions.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 199 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.1 Major Historical Figures

Styles of Thinking and Communicating

Sullivan divided cognitive experience into three developmentally based forms of thinking which
he labeled prototaxic, parataxic, and syntaxic. The term taxic refers to the order or arrangement
of things, and each of these three types of thinking reflect the lowest (or first) type of conscious
processes (prototaxic) to the last to develop and most mature (syntaxic).

Prototaxic refers to the first type of conscious processes in infancy and early childhood, in which
sensations and perceptions are fragmentary. In the absence of direct exposure to someone, there
is no cognition regarding that person (i.e., out of sight, out of mind). Prototaxic thinking in adult
interpersonal relationships reflects an infantile form of communicating or of relating to others.

The term para means previous or earlier. Thus, parataxic refers to responding to others based
on preconceived ideas about what they are like—that is, based on pre-established schemata.
Parataxic behavior is similar to Freud’s notion of transference. For example, those who tend to
respond to all authority figures as if they will be punitive because they had fathers who were puni-
tive are engaging in parataxic behavior. Similarly, if you were to avoid social interactions because
you assumed that others would insult or take advantage of you, that would be parataxic.

The term syn refers to a fusion or bringing together. Syntaxic refers to the ability to consider oth-
ers and use symbolic thinking. It is the most advanced developmental level, according to Sullivan,
and allows for the highest level of communication with others. Syntaxic behavior represents a
mature style of interpersonal communication. For example, being able to identify and express
needs to others appropriately illustrates syntaxic behavior.

The theorists and researchers who followed Sullivan, such as Murray, Leary, Benjamin, Bowen, and
Klerman and Wesserman (among others), built on this notion and developed a variety of empirical
methods to study interpersonal interactions. The works of these individuals will now be reviewed.

Murray’s Unified Theory of Personality
Murray was originally trained as a medical doctor and then obtained a Ph.D. in biochemistry. Later,
he developed a passion for the field of psychology, and especially personality theory. The goal of
Murray’s study of personality (which he termed personology), was to integrate all of the ideas of
the leading theorists to allow for scientific testing. He referred to this as the Unified Theory of
Personality. Murray amassed more personality data than any researcher had previously, based on
extensive testing and interviewing of 51 male students at Harvard. The results of this landmark
study were published in 1938. Although there were some mixed reviews when it was published,
most workers in the field believed that Murray had succeeded in strengthening the position of
psychoanalytic theory by bridging the gap between research and analytic constructions (Winter &
Barenbaum, 1999).

Although he was highly influenced by both Freud and Jung, Sullivan’s interpersonal perspective
also shaped him. As a result, the interpersonal influence is highly evident in his writings and formu-
lations. For example, Murray believed that the dyad should be thought of as a single system—one
that should be used to evaluate theory (Shneidman, 1981). Like Sullivan, Murray believed that the
dyad should be the main focus of personality research. In his view, understanding personality is
based on understanding the interpersonal processes that occur in significant human relationships.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 200 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.1 Major Historical Figures

Murray’s interest in the dyad led him to the idea that in interpersonal transaction, themes are
expressed, and he believed these themes to be common to all communication. Types of dyadic
themes include (1) reciprocation, (2) cooperation, (3) competition, and (4) opposition. Murray
believed that some of the important components of personality are better described by reference
to thematic dispositions, such as the tendency to cooperate or compete, rather than in terms of
general personality predispositions (Shneidman, 1981).

Murray also proposed that themes are expressed and received in a complementary way by two
participants. For example, an individual who needs to inform (relate facts and/or rumors) is the
transmitter; the transmitter will require a receptor who needs the information (state of curiosity
or personal interest). Murray was one of the first theorists to embrace general systems theory
(von Bertalanffy, 1951), which was an attempt to identify principles that can be applied to all disci-
plines, and apply it to the study of relationships (Shneidman, 1981). Indeed, this was the essence
of his Unified Theory of Personality. Murray’s contributions to the systems theory approach was
the identification of 30 separate needs that he believed subsumed the motivations for behavior.

Murray’s work was highly influential in stimulating research among his many collaborators and
students. For example, his ideas were responsible for the later development of what is known
as the interpersonal circle (IPC), which is a tool based on Murray’s list of 30 needs. The IPC was
developed largely by Timothy Leary and his associates (Freedman, Leary, Ossorio, & Coffey, 1951;
LaForge, Leary, Naboisek, Coffey, & Freedman, 1954; Leary, 1957). It is intended to provide a com-
plete system for analyzing interpersonal relationships and for diagnosing psychological problems.

Evolution of the Circumplex Model
Influenced by the earlier work of Murray and several other psychologists, along with Mead’s
(1934) sociological theory, Timothy Leary developed the interpersonal circle within the field of
psychology (1957). Leary’s conceptual leap also owed much to Sullivan’s notions about the impor-
tance of interpersonal behavior for diagnosing psychiatric conditions (Benjamin, 1993). This view
insists that interpersonal behavior, rather than character traits or symptom constellations, reflects
personality. Leary’s model of the interpersonal circle offered a new conceptual framework for
understanding personality and a useful system for diagnosing personality disorders. Leary (1957)
introduced the term interpersonal reflex to highlight the fact that individuals will spontaneously,
and in an automated and involuntary manner, react to the actions of others, and these reactions
can be classified by identifying a smaller number of underlying constructs that characterize (and
are common to) all reactions.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 201 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.1 Major Historical Figures

Figure 7.1: A depiction of Leary’s interpersonal circle

This represents one of the earlier versions of the interpersonal circumplex, and although the essence of
the model has remained intact, some of the descriptive terms have since been modified.

Source: Adapted from Kiesler, D. J. (1983). The 1982 interpersonal circle: A taxonomy for complementarity in human transactions. Psychological Review, 90(3), 195–
214. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.90.3.185. Copyright © 1983 by the American Psychological Association.

The basic dimensions of the IPC were used as the foundation, and there are two axes (also
referred to as dimensions). The horizontal axis is labeled “hostile,” or “cold,” or “distant” at the
left point and “love” or “friendly” at the opposing end. The vertical axis is labeled “submissive”
(“non-assertive”) at the bottom and “dominant” (“controlling”) at the top (see Figure 7.1). These
two dimensions result in four quadrants, which Leary acknowledged were similar to the tempera-
ments described by Galen (also known as the four humors; see Chapter 8 for a discussion).

Leary suggested that all dimensions of personality are represented in this circular model. For
example, those who are stubborn and rigid in their relationships would be placed in an octant
somewhere between dominance and love. And those who are passive-aggressive would be some-
where between submission and hate. And those who are perfectly adjusted, who have an optimal
blend of all characteristics, would find themselves in the middle of this circle.

Guttman (1966) subsequently renamed Leary’s (1957) interpersonal circle the circumplex model,
and this remains the more common term today. Like Leary’s theory, the circumplex model is a
two-dimensional representation of interpersonal space, referring to interpersonal needs, inter-
personal problems, interpersonal values, and the like. The variables are theoretically organized
and represented as a circle (see also Kiesler, 1996; Wiggins, 1979), and the two dimensions that
define this interpersonal space and anchor the model are typically referred to as agency and com-
munion. Agency refers to the process of becoming individuated or of differentiating the self. Com-
munion refers to the process of becoming connected with others. Thus, communion implicates
affiliation, friendliness, and love, whereas agency refers to achieving status, controlling others,
striving for power and dominance (see Wiggins & Trapnell, 1996).

In 1983, Hogan provided a more simplified and colloquial version of the circumplex, using the
terms get along and get ahead to define communion and agency, respectively.

Friendly

Hostile

Dominant
Competiti

ve

Mistrusting

Cold

Assur

ed

Aloof

Inhibited

Unassured

Exhibitionist

ic

Soci

able

Submissive

Deferent

Trusting

Warm

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 202 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.1 Major Historical Figures

Research emerging from other traditions has defined the circumplex factor space with the terms
affiliation and autonomy (see Benjamin, 1996), though the resulting descriptors are very similar
(see Figure 7.2).

Figure 7.2: Revised circumplex model

This version of the circumplex model emphasizes agency and communality as its two main factors, and
this is in keeping with the descriptive terms emphasized in most circumplex models.

Source: Locke, K. D. (2005). Interpersonal problems and interpersonal expectations in everyday life. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 24(7), 915–931.
Reprinted by permission of Guilford Publications.

Numerous researchers and theoreticians have adopted and slightly modified Leary’s basic con-
cept, but the general characteristics remain essentially the same. (Compare Figure 7.1 to 7.2.)

Sex Differences and the Circumplex Model

Research on the circumplex model suggests that it is a widely replicable means of organizing
human behavior (e.g., Wiggins, 1979, 1991) and it has also been used successfully in defining
personality disorders (Hennig & Walker, 2008; Lippa, 1995). Some differences have emerged, how-
ever, in terms of how the circumplex model maps onto gender. Critics contend that agency maps
onto masculinity and communion maps onto femininity (see also Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). For
example, Eagly (1995) notes that women demonstrate interpersonal behaviors such as sensitivity,
friendliness, and concern for others, whereas men engage in behaviors such as independence,
dominance, and control. A slightly different perspective was adopted by Paulhus (1987), suggest-
ing that trait masculinity and trait femininity are essentially mislabeled versions of (or proxies for)
the two circumplex dimensions.

In addition, researchers have also tried to identify the descriptors from the circumplex model
that result in the largest sex differences. One of the more robust sex differences with respect to
personality appears to be on the trait of aggression, with males being considerably more verbally

Self-sacrificing
Cold/
Distant

Domineering/

Controlling

Vindictive/
Self-centered

Socially
inhibited

Intrusive/
Needy

Nonassertive

Overly
accommodating

CommunalUncommunal

U
n
a
g
e
n
ti
c

A
g
e
n
ti
c

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 203 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7

7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

and physically aggressive than
females (Hyde, 2007). Similarly,
when considering the descrip-
tors of tender-mindedness and
warmth, females scored con-
siderably higher, whereas men
scored higher on assertiveness
(Feingold, 1994). One of the
reasons that researchers have
emphasized sex differences is
that the observed findings are
consistent with a number of
theoretical perspectives, includ-
ing gender schema theory (e.g.,
Bem, 1981) and sociobiological/
evolutionary theory (e.g., Schmitt & Buss, 2000). Despite theoretical support and the observed
gender differences in some areas, the vast majority of the descriptors appear to be more similar
than different on the interpersonal circumplex, and the differences that do emerge tend to be
small to moderate (Hyde, 2005). Thus, researchers typically use the same circumplex model to
characterize males and females alike, and this suggests that male and female personalities are
more similar than dissimilar.

7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

Unlike the behavioral and cognitive models of personality, the interpersonal models and the psychodynamic approaches emerged out of efforts to develop treatments for mental disor-ders. As we saw, the interpersonal movement was begun by Harry Stack Sullivan’s work and
later expanded by Henry Murray and Timothy Leary, who were primarily academics rather than
clinicians. In contrast, the theory and research presented in this section emphasizes academia
within the clinical tradition, emphasizing the works of Lorna Smith Benjamin, Murray Bowen, and
the combined efforts of Klerman and Weissman. Much of the work to be reviewed draws heavily
upon the ideas formulated by Sullivan, Murray, and Leary.

Because of the significant number of theorists who have developed or modified existing interper-
sonal models, and researchers who have validated many of these concepts, there is now a general
consensus that interpersonal views of the self are a critical component of any theory of personal-
ity. In fact, in a recent review of the extant literature, researchers concluded that the self is essen-
tially a socially defined construct, and that an integrative view of the self in relation to significant
others can consistently predict numerous outcomes in life (Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006). In
summarizing the literature, the authors conclude, among other things, that what they term the
relational self (the self in relation to important others) is an autonomous source of influence,
it provides meaning and orientation, it accounts for both the continuity and situation-specific
manifestations of personality, and it is broadly linked to both current and future psychological
well-being (Chen et al., 2006).

Beyond the Text: Clinical Applications

The interpersonal circumplex model for conceptualizing,
organizing, and assessing interpersonal behavior can be
applied to the individual, group, or even broad organiza-
tions (Wiggins, 2003). The link below allows you to explore
how the interpersonal circumplex applies to managerial
issues at all three levels. Personality psychology is quite
frequently applied to industrial and organizational settings
and this has led to a great deal of research. Explore here:
http://www.hsnz.co.nz/files/html5/circumplex/.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 204 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

Benjamin’s Structural Analysis of Social Behavior (SASB)
Lorna Benjamin’s work has resulted in one of the most widely accepted, empirically based models
of contemporary personality theory—a model concerned with the structural analysis of social
behavior (SASB; Benjamin, 1974, 1986, 1993, 1996, 2003). Benjamin believes that biology and
social behavior are inextricably linked and that they evolve together. Accordingly, she feels that
intrapsychic and social factors needed to be taken into account to understand personality, and
that they should not be neglected in favor of trait descriptions (1986).

In her early training, Benjamin worked with primates as a student of Harry Harlow (Blum, 2002).
This experience had a strong influence on her scientific interests in attachment and interpersonal
theory, as did her later training with Carl Rogers and her experience as a clinical psychologist.
These training experiences provided her with a unique combination of strong scientific, psycho-
therapeutic, and investigative skills.

The structural analysis of social behavior combines aspects of both Leary’s model, discussed ear-
lier in this chapter, and Earl Schaefer’s model of parental behavior (1965), which focused on the
tension that often develops as a result of the need to control children and the opposing need to
allow them the independence so that they can become responsible and autonomous adults (Mil-
lon, Davis, Millon, Escovar, & Meagher, 2000). Benjamin (1986) was interested in relating social
variables to psychiatric diagnostic categories. In an effort to provide empirical validation, she con-
ducted a study of 108 psychiatric inpatients using a variety of measures, including the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory.

The result of Benjamin’s research is the SASB model, which is a tri-circumplex model of personal-
ity. It was developed as an objective measure of interpersonal processes and can be used to code
both videotapes and audiotapes of social interactions—in psychotherapy sessions or in family or
group encounters. It captures verbal interactions and allows observers to code them for statistical
analysis. There are three classification dimensions: (1) love-hate, (2) enmeshment- differentiation,
and (3) interpersonal focus. Each dimension is assigned a value, and when these values are com-
bined, the SASB yields as many as 108 different classifications. These, in turn, can be reduced to
simpler descriptions (Benjamin, 1986).

Benjamin also identified three ways in which interpersonal patterns can be expressed or copied,
termed copy processes. They are: (1) identification, which refers to behaving in a fashion simi-
lar to another person—in a sense, adopting their values and characteristics; (2) recapitulation,
which is defined as acting as though someone from the past is still present and in charge; and (3)
introjection, which occurs when individuals treat themselves as they were previously treated. For
example, if you had a positive attachment figure who affirmed your goodness, you might introject
this positive notion of goodness and make it part of your internal model; if you had a more nega-
tive attachment, you might treat yourself poorly.

To illustrate these three copy processes, Benjamin (1993) describes the case of a paranoid hus-
band, who observed his father exert hostile control over his mother. As a result, the husband now
exhibits the same behavior with his wife. Benjamin described this as an example of identification
of imitation. If the wife of the paranoid husband also had a controlling and demeaning mother,
then a natural and adaptive response (at least adaptive in the short run) would be to complement
the mother’s behavior with submissiveness. Benjamin suggested that with prolonged exposure

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 205 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

to her mother, the woman’s self-concept would internalize the mother’s statements. Thus, as
an adult and when functioning within a marriage, her self-concept and compliance to hostile
demands results in her strong commitment to the paranoid and jealous husband. In essence, Ben-
jamin concluded that the husband’s hostility and control reinforces and complements the wife’s
response, illustrating the principle of recapitulation. Their interpersonal histories have therefore
determined (at least in the absence of any therapeutic intervention) a stable, but miserable, mar-
riage (Benjamin, 1993). The flexibility of Benjamin’s theory is demonstrated by the fact that she
utilizes behavioral concepts readily, and yet refers to internal experiences (in keeping with psycho-
dynamic and cognitive models) in expressing her ideas.

Research suggests that these copy patterns can be recovered using the SASB coding, and they
appear to be valid concepts (Critchfield & Benjamin, 2010). Moreover, the SASB model can be
used to both predict what might happen after an interpersonal event or what may have happened
beforehand.

Research examining some of the above-described interpersonal patterns has been limited, but
that which has been done generally supports the theory. Working within an interactionist perspec-
tive, Kausel and Slaughter (2011) tested the explanatory power of the complementary hypotheses
in predicting attraction in organizational hiring practices. Participants were 220 job seekers who
provided self-ratings on measures of personality, organizational traits, and their level of attraction
toward a potential future employer. They found that organizations that employed recruitment
strategies based on complementary personalities were more successful than those using the strat-
egy of similarity.

The SASB has been used widely to study such things as evaluations of initial dating interactions
(e.g., Eastwick, Saigal, & Finkel, 2010), predictions of therapeutic outcomes for interpersonally
complementary relationships early in therapy (Maxwell, Tasca, Gick, Ritchie, Balfour, & Bissada,
2012), and assessments of social perceptions (Erickson & Pincus, 2005). It even shows some appli-
cability in the interpretation of dream content (Frick & Halevy, 2002).

Murray Bowen and His Contribution to the Interpersonal System
Murray Bowen developed systemic therapy, which is a type of psychotherapy that addresses
people not on an individual level, as was common in earlier forms of therapy, but as people in
relationship. Systemic therapy is essentially interpersonal theory as applied to a clinical context.
It focuses on the interactions of groups, their interactional patterns, and dynamics. Systemic ther-
apy has its roots in family therapy, or more precisely family systems therapy, as it was later known.
Bowen developed his theory while working with families of schizophrenic children, eventually
applying over two decades of clinical work and research to the development of family systems
theory (Bowen, 1966). Bowen developed a number of concepts, each having clear interpersonal
implications. Some of these concepts are here described, though the constructs that relate more
directly (or exclusively) to his clinical work in family dynamics, especially between parents and
their children, will not be reviewed.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 206 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

Wavebreak Media/Thinkstock

In this triangle, there is one party who is clearly less
involved in the interaction. Bowen would argue that this
leads to feelings of rejection and also to attempts to re-
enter the interaction. Could the overt look of dejection be
a means of re-engaging the other members?

The Triangle

Bowen believed the triangle, referring
to a three-person relationship, was the
smallest unit in an interpersonal context.
The triangle was considered the basic
building block of larger interpersonal
systems because it is the smallest stable
system of relationships. Bowen believed
that the two-person system (dyad) was
too unstable because it was unable to
tolerate tension without having to draw
in a third party. In contrast, the triangle
can tolerate considerable more ten-
sion because conflict can be diverted by
the third member when the other two
members are interacting and experienc-
ing tension. In essence, the tension in
a triangle can shift among three poten-
tial relationships, thereby spreading
the load and minimizing a break in the
triangle. Bowen also believed that if ten-
sion was too high for the triangle, then it
could spill over into interrelated triangles, thereby stabilizing the system (though not necessarily
resolving the problem that caused the tension). Bowen also notes that despite the stability of the
triangle, it always leaves one person as less involved, connected, or interpersonally comfortable
relative to the other two individuals (the proverbial “outsider,” “third wheel,” or “odd man out”),
and this can lead to feelings such as anxiety and rejection, either from the anticipation of or from
actually being the third party. Bowen believed that individuals move from the inside to outside
positions in the triangle as each negotiates to become an insider (typically when the interactions
are calm and favorable) or when trying to become an outsider (typically when there is too much
tension in the triangle and watching the other two in conflict is now more desirable). Importantly,
although the interpersonal triangle grew out of the model of two parents and one child, Murray
and others eventually applied it to all three-person relationships.

Self-Differentiation

Another concept Bowen introduced that is central to systemic therapy is that of self-differentiation,
which refers to the individual’s ability to maintain a distinct sense of self, separate from the tri-
angle or group (Bowen, 1978). Bowen noted that we naturally develop some sense of self, but
the extent to which it develops and is differentiated from others is largely driven by the available
relationships in childhood and adolescence. Bowen believed that with insufficient differentiation,
individuals are too focused on receiving acceptance and approval from others, thereby empha-
sizing conformity over the true self. Similarly, Bowen suggested that those who do not conform
(i.e., rebels) are also poorly differentiated; the difference is that the “self” is now largely defined

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 207 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

in opposition to others. Obviously, the goal is to achieve differentiation, in which despite the rec-
ognition of the need for some interdependence, a separate self emerges that can tolerate some
degree of rejection, conflict, and criticism (Bowen, 1978). For example, the rebellious individual
can achieve a sense of autonomy by differentiating in some respects from others, but it would be
maladaptive to simply be oppositional in all respects, since the “self” would still be too tightly tied
to others. The latter strategy likely emerges from the individual’s lack of differentiated sense of
self. Because all families, groups and triangles will vary in the degree of self-differentiation of their
members, the interdependence, emotional intensity, and conflict within the groups will also vary.
With greater interdependence (less differentiation of the self), there will be more problems and
greater anxiety.

Bowen provided numerous examples of how this might manifest with respect to one’s family of
origin, and in this respect, interpersonal theory here has some parallels to theories that empha-
size family dynamics, such as psychodynamic theory. For example, Bowen believed that while
everyone has some degree of unresolved problems with their family of origin, those with less dif-
ferentiation of the self have more problems. Bowen suggested that when you return home to visit
family, if you feel like a child and find it difficult to make decisions for yourself, or if you experience
a considerable amount of guilt when in contact with your parents, then these are signs of poorer
self-differentiation.

Notice how this aspect of Bowen’s interpersonal theory overlaps with other theories discussed
earlier in the text. For example, Freud might refer to a less well-formed ego as the cause of prob-
lems associated with poor self-differentiation when an adult child returns to visit his or her family
of origin. Behaviorists might suggest that you are simply falling back into well-learned conditioned
responses when returning home. Cognitive theorists might suggest that the presence of your par-
ents in any context is likely to activate cognitive schemas that you employed most frequently
when you interacted with them. Presumably, if interactions have been minimal as an adult, it is
the childhood schemas that would be most accessible.

Emotional Cutoff

Bowen (1966) also introduced the term emotional cutoff to refer to the termination of any emo-
tional contact with another individual in order to manage unresolved issues. Importantly, the lim-
iting of contacting may decrease conflict and tension, but the problem is not resolved. Moreover,
the individual is then vulnerable in other relationships that may be sought out to compensate for
the one that has been cut off, thereby leading to decreased self-differentiation in those relation-
ships and too much interdependence.

Research also appears to support the idea that poor self-differentiation and the experience of
emotional cutoff leads to greater problems. For example, in one study, researchers demonstrated
that three distinct factors underlying self-differentiation (including the factors of emotional cut-
off and emotional reactivity) predicted the incidence of mental health symptoms (Jankowski &
Hooper, 2012) and this parallels other work showing how the differentiation of the self predicts
other aspects of psychological well-being (e.g., Hooper & DePuy, 2010). Thus, there does appear
to be some recent empirical support for some of Bowen’s primary theoretical positions.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 208 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

Societal Emotional Process

Although Bowen discussed the above concepts largely within the context of nuclear and extended
families and expanded on the theory within the bounds of family systems therapy (the context
within which he practiced), they can likewise be applied to other interpersonal interactions.
Bowen did, however, introduce one concept that was explicitly applied to groups outside the fam-
ily, which he referred to as societal emotional process. This concept characterizes how societal
behavior is governed by emotional systems (as opposed to simply focusing on cultural influences).
Thus, the societal emotional process involves how a society reacts to the emotional needs of the
individual. In Bowen’s work with juvenile delinquents, he hypothesized that the courts were play-
ing the role of parents for the juveniles by imposing punishments and expressing disappointment
in their behavior. Parallels can also be drawn to interactions that occur in schools and other gov-
ernment agencies, where the agency plays the role of parent. Bowen suggested that in the fami-
lies of origin, parents often failed to deal with the delinquent’s problems directly in order to avoid
anxiety and gain short-term peace, but that this was at a long-term cost for the child and the fam-
ily unit. He characterized this decision as a regressive pattern, and noted that institutions could
likewise fail to deal with problems and that this would result in a regressive pattern for society
(e.g., less principled decision-making by community and business leaders, bankruptcies, depletion
of resources, and the like). In this respect, Bowen believed that his interpersonal theory would
better account for both periods of regression and progression in society because it accounted for
the individual in context of society, rather than studying society alone.

Klerman and Weissman’s Interpersonal Model of Depression and Personality
In the 1970s, while researching the use of antidepressant medication, Klerman and Weissman
developed an interpersonal model of depression based heavily on Sullivan’s work; their work
later expanded to include other clinical syndromes and personality disorders (Klerman & Weiss-
man, 1986; Klerman, Weissman, Rounsaville, & Chevron, 1984; Weissman, Markowitz, & Klerman,
2000, 2007). Although their model is not considered a personality theory, it deals with important
concepts in personality from an interpersonal perspective.

Klerman and Weissman ground their model on Bowlby’s (1982) attachment theory (discussed in
Chapter 3). To review, attachment theory argues that humans have an innate tendency to seek
and maintain attachments. Attachments lead to the formation and expression of intense human
emotions, which strengthen and renew these bonds. Furthermore, these attachments establish
caretaker-infant bonds that are fundamentally important for human survival. Ainsworth’s work
with the experimental model known as the “strange situation” allows observers to classify dif-
ferent types of attachment (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978); attachment styles from
infancy demonstrate stability over the lifetime. Research with this model indicates that when
major attachments are disrupted, anxiety and sadness often result and, in extreme cases, can
later predispose the individual to depression (Mills, 2005).

Emphasizing Social Roles in Defining the Self and Psychopathology

The Klerman and Weissman model is especially interested in social roles within the family, work-
place, community, and among peers (Klerman et al., 1984). They note that these roles reflect
relationships that are often determined by the individual’s position within the social system. Like
Sullivan, they believe that disturbed interpersonal relationships are responsible for human dys-
function. Accordingly, the emphasis in this model is on understanding and treating depression and

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 209 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

other disorders, such as personality disorders, in an interpersonal context. The model looks for
relationships between personality traits and depression, paying close attention to three aspects
of personality and interpersonal relations:

1. Symptom function. Clinicians look at the development of symptoms of depression (such
as sleep and appetite disturbance, low energy, frequent mood variation, and increased
emotionality). These are presumed to have both biological and psychological causes.

2. Social and interpersonal relations. Especially important are interpersonal interactions,
whose patterns might be based on childhood experiences, current social reinforcement,
and perceptions related to personal mastery and competence.

3. Personality and character problems. Clinicians also look at enduring traits, such as inhib-
ited expression of anger or guilt, poor psychological communication with significant
others, and difficulty with self-esteem. These traits determine a person’s reactions to
interpersonal experience. Personality patterns form part of the person’s predisposition to
depression (Klerman et al., 1984).

One of the assumptions of the Klerman
and Weissman model is that humans
are social beings and that healthy func-
tioning requires interpersonal connec-
tions. All interpersonal connections are
thought to be rooted in our attachment
experiences during infancy, but the
focus of assessment and intervention
would be on the interpersonal experi-
ences that are manifesting currently in
one’s life. Consider depression, which
often involves deficits in interpersonal
relationship skills, with some studies
suggesting that these deficits not only
vary as a function of transient depres-
sion, but also appear as stable defi-
cits over time in those with histories of
depression (e.g., Petty, Sachs-Ericsson,
& Joiner, 2004). For example, some

individuals lack the skills required for appropriate social interaction, such as empathy (e.g.,
Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, & Berthoz, 2010) or self-assertion (e.g., Sanchez &
Lewinson, 1980). Others may have a limited number of relationships due to social with-
drawal both in childhood (e.g., Katz, Conway, Hammen, Brennan, & Najman, 2011) and adult-
hood (e.g., Choi & McDougall, 2007). Research also suggests that depression can occur when
relationships are present, but are either perceived to be absent (e.g., Cacioppo, Hawkley, &
Thisted, 2010) or perceived as shallow and unfulfilling (i.e., poor quality relationships; Leach,
Butterworth, Olesen, & Mackinnon, 2013).

iStock/Thinkstock

Do marital disputes lead to depression or does
depression result in more marital disputes?

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 210 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

The conclusion is that interpersonal intimacy and closeness seem to facilitate emotional respond-
ing and provide protection against stress and mental disorders. Not surprisingly, many studies
have linked marital discord to depression (Whisman & Bruce, 1999), with meta-analytic summa-
ries of the literature finding a consistent and strong effect for both men and women (Whisman,
2001). It seems clear that marital disputes may lead to symptoms of depression; it isn’t certain,
although it is considered likely, that depression might also lead to marital disputes. Even within
intimate relations, those who have a tendency to be highly dependent are more likely to become
depressed and experience marital dissatisfaction (Uebelacker, Courtnage, & Whisman, 2003). This
latter finding begins to bridge the connection between the experience of mood states and more
stable personality dispositions—in this case, traits related to dependency.

In a similar vein, disorders of personality are likewise hypothesized to relate to interpersonal func-
tioning. For example, avoidant personality characteristics appear to be related to interpersonal
competencies, such that conflict management skills appear to mediate the relation between stress
symptoms of avoidant personality disorder (Cummings et al., 2013). Borderline personality disor-
der is not only defined by interpersonal difficulties from a diagnostic standpoint (American Psychi-
atric Association (APA), 2013), but research also implicates the presence of interpersonal dysfunc-
tions (e.g., Minzenberg, Fisher-Irving, Poole, & Vinogradov, 2006). Research on those evidencing
schizotypal personality disorder also indicates that they are less likely to have “real life” friends in
favor of interpersonal interactions that are internet-based (Mittal, Tessner, & Walker, 2007). Even
schizoid personality disorder has been associated with interpersonal deficits (Mittal, Kalus, Bern-
stein, & Siever, 2007). Given these findings and the fact that interpersonal deficits are frequently
noted in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 1994) diagnostic criteria, it is not surprising that researchers have
recently proposed that the personality disorders defined in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) are similarly
related to deficits in interpersonal functioning (Skodol et al., 2011). Thus, Klerman and Weissman
have provided an important interpersonal model for the treatment of depression as well as a the-
oretical foundation for defining personality disorders. Their theory and treatment approach has
a firm foundation in attachment theory, emphasizing the importance of relationships for human
adaptation and functioning.

Kiesler’s Interpersonal Force Field
A final interpersonal model to be reviewed is Donald Kiesler’s interpersonal force field (Anchin &
Kiesler, 1982; Kiesler, 1983), which is a two-dimensional model based on the previously discussed
work of Leary (see Figure 7.3). Like its predecessor, the model describes interpersonal interac-
tions in terms of two dimensions, using the terms affiliation (love-hate, friendliness-hostility) and
control (dominance-submission, higher-lower status) (Kiesler, 1986). Kiesler believed that these
two dimensions dominate how individuals interact with each other. Kiesler explains that begin-
ning very early in life, people begin to adopt a distinct and identifiable interpersonal style. For
example, an individual might approach all new acquaintances in a friendly, but highly dominant
manner. This mode of interacting contains a very clear message concerning the degree of close-
ness and dominance that is expected of others. In future interactions, patterns that are set during

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 211 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

the first encounter are typically reinforced, with each person influencing how the other reacts.
Kiesler (1986) refers to this as exuding a “force field,” which largely determines the limited class of
responses that can be exhibited in response. In this sense, individuals strongly encourage “com-
plementary” responses that essentially validate (behaviorists would say “reinforce”) our inter-
personal style. Kiesler uses the expression interpersonal force field to describe the influences at
play in interpersonal interaction.

The principle of complementarity styles was hypothesized to occur in all relationships, but espe-
cially longer-term relationships (Carson, 1969; Kiesler, 1983; Orford, 1986; Wiggins, 1982). Spe-
cifically, people in dyadic interactions are thought to negotiate the definition of their relationship
through verbal and nonverbal cues, and the specific nature of this give-and-take can be predicted
by a model (see Figure 7.3). As an illustration, negotiation should occur along the following lines:
dominant-friendliness invites submissive-friendliness, and vice versa, whereas dominant-hostility
invites submissive-hostility (e.g., passive-aggressive actions), and vice versa.

A version of Kiesler’s (1986) interpersonal circle is depicted in Figure 7.3 (see also adaption by Mil-
lon et al., 2000). Kiesler’s emphasis on the way relationships and personalities interact and influ-
ence each other is clear in this model. It says, in effect, that if you behave a certain way, others will
respond accordingly (the position on the circle opposite to the one that describes your behavior).
As an example (as in Figure 7.3), if you behave in a cold-punitive manner, the response will be
warm and pardoning. Similarly, controlling behavior will lead to a docile response.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 212 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.2 Contemporary Theoretical Models

Figure 7.3: Depiction of Kiesler’s interpersonal circle

This version of the interpersonal circumplex illustrates both normal and pathological functioning.

Source: Adapted from Kiesler, D. J. (1983). The 1982 interpersonal circle: A taxonomy for complementarity in human transactions. Psychological Review, 90(3), 195–
214. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.90.3.185. Copyright © 1983 by the American Psychological Association.

Another concept introduced by Kiesler is what he calls transactional escalation (Van Denburg &
Kiesler, 1993). Transactional escalation describes how stress can make the individual’s patterns
of interpersonal behavior more extreme and rigid, thereby reducing even further the range of
behavioral responses that the person might produce. For example, an accountant who tends to be
compulsive (focused on details) and whose employer is facing financial difficulties may become
highly anxious. Stress caused by his fear of losing his job may lead him to become even more fix-
ated on minor details so that, in the end, his behavior becomes even more compulsive.

Arrogant–
Rigidly
autonomous

Confident–
Self-reliant

Spontaneous–
Demonstrative

Outgoing

Histrionic

Frenetically
gregarious

Controlling

Dictatorial

Critical–
Ambitious

Rivalrous–
Disdainful

Suspicious–
Resentful

Paranoid–
Vindictive

Icy–Cruel

Rancorous–
Sadistic Devoted–

Indulgent

All-Loving–
Absolving

Gullible–
Merciful

Ambitionless–
FlatteringSubservient

Abrasive–
Helpless

Unresponsive

Escapistic

Cooperative–
Helpful

Warm–
Pardoning

Trusting–
Forgiving

Respectful–
Content

Docile

Self-
doubting–
Dependent

Taciturn

Aloof

Antagonistic–
Harmful

Cold–
Punitive

Hostile

Deta
ched

Friendly
WarmTrusting

D
e
fe

re
n
tS

u
b
m

is
si

ve

U
na

ss
ur

ed

In
hi

bi
te

d

Cold
Soci

able

Ex
hi

bi
tio

ni
st

ic

A
ss

ur
edM

istrusting
C

om
petitive

D
o
m

in
a
n
t

Relatively more normal

Relatively more pathological (outer circle)

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 213 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7

7.3 Interpersonal Relations and Their Link to Attachment Styles

7.3 Interpersonal Relations and Their Link to Attachment Styles

Early contributors to attachment theory were reviewed in Chapter 3, but the more central aspects of this theory clearly apply to any interpersonal model of personality (see Fraley & Shaver, 2008). The basic premise of attachment theory is that early relationships with pri-
mary caregivers (typically referring to the infant-mother bond) establish a framework for adult
attachments. In this section, we will review the works of early contributors such as John Bowlby,
Mary Ainsworth, and Luciano L’Abate.

Bowlby and Ainsworth’s Attachment Theory
At the heart of attachment theory is the assumption that all mammals begin with a basic need for
attachment to adult figures that is not only necessary for survival (e.g., for food and protection)
but is also desired for higher-level needs, such as love (Bowlby, 1982). Thus, early attachments
form for all infants with the primary caregiver(s) who can provide those basic needs. The relational
aspect of this theory is immediately apparent because it is the caregiver’s response to the infant’s
basic needs that contributes to the somewhat stable pattern that emerges and then sustains itself
throughout the infant’s life. John Bowlby adopted an evolutionary perspective in studying attach-
ment, and he noted that this is an adaptive behavior that occurs in most social primates.

Initially, Bowlby studied the process of
attachment by focusing on deprivation
of attachment (e.g., maternal loss), but
beginning in the 1950s, Bowlby began to
collaborate with the developmental psy-
chologist Mary Ainsworth. The research-
ers noted that attachment behavior early
in life has clear survival advantages, as it
results in receiving protection and mate-
rial support from the group (family, com-
munity, etc.) and minimizes the potential
dangers of being isolated. Moreover, the
researchers noted that seeking the prox-
imity of others during times of threat is
especially adaptive.

Based on the collaborative efforts of
Bowlby and Ainsworth, attachment
theory suggests that the primary care-
giver’s response, in conjunction with the
attachment-seeking behavior from the infant (i.e., the infant’s needs), results in a series of expec-
tations formed by the infant, which in turn, manifest as stable behavioral patterns in relationships
(see Bretherton, 1992). This was studied in an experimental context by Ainsworth, in what she
termed the strange situation. This research paradigm involves briefly separating a child from his
or her mother in a novel setting and introducing a stranger. The goal of the research was to closely
study how the child responded to the absence and return of his or her mother, and how that might
compare to the responses to the stranger. Ainsworth and colleagues studied and classified the
children in terms of their behavioral responses in this situation (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978). Their initial work resulted in three classifications:

. Rayes/Lifesize/Thinkstock

This relationship and the bond that forms as a result is
thought to be central to the ability of the infant to form
healthy, secure relationships as an adult.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 214 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.3 Interpersonal Relations and Their Link to Attachment Styles

1. Avoidant was applied to infants who generally avoid opportunities to interact with their
primary caregivers, and as a rule are more isolative and least affected by the mother’s
departure in the strange situation. Ainsworth hypothesized that these infants were likely
rebuffed early on by their parents, and thus adopted this interpersonal strategy.

2. Anxious-ambivalent was used to characterize infants who are very clingy to their moth-
ers and become very upset when the primary caregiver leaves the room. They also
appear to rebuff the caregiver upon their return to the strange situation, despite the
apparent anxiety about her departure. These individuals are thought to be more exag-
gerated in their attempts to attach with others, which in turns drives many people away.

3. Secure infants easily explore the strange room while maintaining contact with the care-
giver, decreasing exploratory behavior when the caregiver leaves, and reattaching with
the caregiver upon her return. Thus, these infants are easily soothed, and are not marked
by the isolation tendencies of the avoidant infant or the overly clingy behavior of the
anxious-ambivalent.

Importantly, longitudinal research on a wide range of individuals indicates that there is consider-
able stability over the first 20–25 years of life with respect to these attachment styles (Waters,
Merrick, Treboux, Crowell, & Albersheim, 2000). Such findings are critical as they confirm the basic
assumption that early attachments are critical to later life attachments. Moreover, these early
patterns of attachment with one’s primary caregiver appear to have lifelong implications for adult
intimate relationships.

Specifically, researchers have developed an adult self-report measure of attachment styles (the
Adult Attachment Interview) that closely corresponds to the attachment styles emerging from
the research with children (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Moreover, the researchers concluded, using
self-report measures of adult romantic attachment, that the three basic attachment styles lead
to distinct ways of experiencing romantic love, and these distinctions are theoretically consistent
with the basic tenets of attachment theory (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). In this respect, researchers
have concluded that behavioral and emotional dynamics that are at play in the infant’s relation-
ship with the caregiver are also at play when in adult romantic relationships, and the stability of
these interpersonal patterns is consistent with the classic individual difference (i.e., personality)
model of psychology (Fraley & Shaver, 2000).

More recently, a four-category model of adult attachment styles was proposed, with each style
categorized by the person’s self-image (dependence) and image of others (avoidance), and each

of these can be defined as being
either positive or negative (Bar-
tholomew & Horowitz, 1991).
Thus, the individual with a posi-
tive self-view and a positive view
of others is labeled secure, with
these individuals being comfort-
able with both autonomy and
intimacy. In contrast, the indi-
vidual with a negative view of
self and negative view of oth-
ers is labeled fearful, and they
are characterized as fearful of
intimacy and avoidant of social
interactions. The individual who

Beyond the Text: Clinical Applications

Following years of work within developmental psychology,
researchers and clinicians began to apply attachment the-
ory to clinical work as well. In this paper, the author, Meifen
Wei, examines some of these implications of attachment
theory to counseling and psychotherapy. Read it at http://
www.divisionofpsychotherapy.org/wei-2008/.

Reference: Wei, M. (2008). The implications of attachment
theory in counseling and psychotherapy. Retrieved from
http://www.divisionofpsychotherapy.org/wei-2008/.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 215 5/21/15 12:40 PM

http://www.divisionofpsychotherapy.org/wei-2008/

http://www.divisionofpsychotherapy.org/wei-2008/

http://www.divisionofpsychotherapy.org/wei-2008/

CHAPTER 7 7.3 Interpersonal Relations and Their Link to Attachment Styles

has a negative self-view but a positive view of others is labeled preoccupied because they tend to
be preoccupied with relationships. Finally, the individual with a positive self-view but a negative
view of others is labeled dismissing, as they are generally dismissive of others and intimacy. One
theoretical advantage of this model is that it fits better within the framework of the circumplex
models discussed earlier in the chapter because each style has an opposing pole, which would cor-
respond to the opposite side of the circumplex (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). It also appears
to be the case that there are important points of convergence among the different models of
attachment styles (for a discussion, see Bartholomew & Shaver, 1998).

L’Abate’s Relational Competence Theory
Although considerably less well known than the other work reviewed in this section, L’Abate’s
Relational Competence Theory (RCT) has gained some attention and empirical support since its
introduction into the literature over 30 years ago (L’Abate, 1976, 2005). Essentially, RCT empha-
sizes how effectively we deal with other individuals, whether these are individuals with whom
we are intimate, or those we know less well. In fact, L’Abate notes that relationships can be cat-
egorized as intimate versus non-intimate, long lasting versus brief, close versus distant, commit-
ted versus uncommitted, and differing with respect to their dependence, interdependence, or
independence. L’Abate also emphasizes that all of these relationships are bidirectional, with the
individual being influenced by others as much as he/she is influencing others.

Similar to previously discussed theories, L’Abate (2009) suggests that RCT applies to all interper-
sonal experiences, and he refers to such themes as the extent to which the person’s identity is
differentiated, meaning, for example, whether priorities are self-focused (satisfying one’s own
needs) or other-focused (satisfying the needs of others) and what role they play in an interaction
(e.g., victim, persecutor, rescuer). RCT also involves the constructs of communality and agency,
which we discussed with regard to the circumplex model, the construct of “drama triangles,” and
many different types of communication (i.e., it is not limited to face-to-face interactions). There-
fore, according to L’Abate, RCT is expandable to account for the growing level of communication
that is Internet-based. Much like other interpersonal theories, RCT also has several clinical appli-
cations, in the form of self-help and psychotherapy for couples and families (e.g., L’Abate, 1992;
L’Abate & Weinstein, 1987) and defining personality disorders in terms of RCT (L’Abate, 2006).

Despite its more than 30 years of published history, RCT has been somewhat ignored in the
broader literature, and virtually all of the published work is by the author who originated the the-
ory. Moreover, only the most testable components of RCT have been empirically valuated, leaving
many central aspects of the theory untested. L’Abate (2006) recently compared RCT to attachment
theory, referring to the former as a relatively small player when compared to the extensive theory
and research on attachment styles.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 216 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.4 Assessment Strategies and Tools for the Interpersonal Context

7.4 Assessment Strategies and Tools for the
Interpersonal Context

Interpersonal theory has resulted in the development of a wide range of assessment tools. In discussing the assessment of any interpersonal context, whether it be a dyad, triangle, or larger group, it is important to note that these units are ever-changing as a function of time, situation,
and the individuals involved. They also vary as a function of the interactions themselves. That is,
following any given interaction, the interpersonal context can, and often does, change. Because
there are multiple contributors to this construct, there is the potential for even more change than
is often seen in an analysis of the individual in isolation. Thus, one of the greatest challenges for
assessment is to be able to measure the variability in the interpersonal context.

Presented here is a number of instruments that purport to assess interpersonal interactions, and
it should be noted that researchers have developed statistical models to help analyze the data
emerging from these assessments (e.g., Ferrer, Steele, & Hsieh, 2012). One of the bigger statistical
challenges for data coming from multiple interacting sources is that they are no longer statistically
independent. That is, the data points influence each other (this is a basic tenet of interpersonal
theory) and so they can’t be considered as independent observations, which is a basic assump-
tion of any statistical analysis (the statistical independence of each participant’s data). Therefore,
a statistical correction must be employed when assessing interpersonal data (e.g., Kenny, 1996;
Kenny & Garcia, 2012).

Thematic Apperception Test
The interpersonal model has produced an array of assessment strategies and tools. Probably the
best-known assessment tool in the interpersonal model is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT),
which was reviewed in detail in Chapter 2. However, it is worth noting here that because it pur-
ports to measure Murray’s interpersonal needs, it is considered an important measure for the
interpersonal perspective. The TAT assesses such interpersonal needs as dominance, deference,
affiliation, exhibition, recognition, rejection, nurturance, and succorance (having someone’s needs
met by another), to name a few (Murray, 1938).

The TAT is still very popular and used extensively in clinical practice, although to a lesser degree in
research (Weiner & Greene, 2008). Its use in research is limited because assessing the meaning of
respondents’ stories can be a highly subjective exercise that cannot easily be validated—although
various authors have developed manuals to serve as guidelines, in an attempt to standardize scor-
ing and increase the TAT’s validity (see, for example, Cramer, 1982, and Hibbard et al., 1994). Many
psychologists now consider it more appropriate to refer to the TAT as a “tool” or “technique”
rather than a test, thereby minimizing some of the criticisms with respect to less standardization
and some of the basic psychometric shortcomings (e.g., lower reliability coefficients). Neverthe-
less, there is little doubt that its introduction by Murray was a major innovation in personality
assessment and continues to be relevant in clinical practice and in interpersonal research, more
than six decades after it was published.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 217 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.4 Assessment Strategies and Tools for the Interpersonal Context

Assessing the Interpersonal Circumplex
A number of measures have been developed, largely for use in research, to assess the interper-
sonal circumplex. Because the circumplex model has been revised numerous times since Leary
first introduced it, the measures have likewise been revised to match the evolving theory and
terminology, and as noted, even some of the more recent work in the area of adult attachment
styles adopts a model that is consistent with the interpersonal circumplex.

Interpersonal Adjectives Scale (IAS)

Generally used as a self-report measure of trait descriptors, the 128-item Interpersonal Adjec-
tives Scale (Wiggins, 1979) requires the person to rate themselves on a series of adjectives. The
IAS maps on to the structural components of the circumplex model, which guides its develop-
ment. The reliability, validity, and factor structure of the IAS has been demonstrated using mul-
tiple methods and models (e.g., Gurtman & Pincus, 2000).

A revised version of the scale, the IAS-R, is now more commonly used. This version reduced the
scale to a 64-item short form, though it measures the same constructs and maintains or improves
on the psychometrics of the scale (Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988). The adjectives are rated
on an 8-point scale, with 1 denoting “extremely inaccurate” to 8 meaning “extremely accurate”
self-descriptors.

The Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-Circumplex (IIP-C)

This measure is also tied to the interpersonal circumplex, but it focuses on interpersonal problems,
rather than traits, which is the basis of the IAS (Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 1990; Horowitz, Alden,
Wiggins, & Pincus, 2000). In contrast to the IAS and IAS-R, which were developed to assess normal
variations in personality functioning from an interpersonal context, the IIP-C is instead focused on
interpersonal distress and interpersonal difficulties. The scale was created based on an analysis
of presenting complaints of clients seeking therapy based on problems that were interpersonal
in their origin. A 64-item test was developed from an initial list of 127 items (interpersonal com-
plaints), thereby yielding eight octant scales that not only map on to the circumplex, but also on to
Wiggins’ IAS/IAS-R scales. Respondents rate their agreement with a series of statements reflecting
interpersonal deficits.

The Circumplex Scales of Interpersonal Values (CSIV)

This self-report measure was designed to assess values that correspond to the circumplex model
and map on to the basic constructs of agency and communality (Locke, 2000). There are eight
8-item scales that have been shown to have good test-retest reliability, as well as good internal
consistency, and they relate to other measures of trait functioning that map onto the circumplex
model. The CSIV was also validated on the IIP-C and the TAT.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 218 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.4 Assessment Strategies and Tools for the Interpersonal Context

Assessing Attachment Styles
A wide range of measures have been developed to assess adult attachment styles, with most used
in research and, to a lesser extent, clinical settings. Although all are based on attachment theory,
there are some differences in how the measures are employed.

Assessing Romantic Love as a Function of Adult Attachment

Hazan and Shaver (1987) developed one of the first classifications of adult romantic styles using
three descriptors that map on to Ainsworth’s typologies of children. These descriptions were used
in their research to recruit participants from the community. The participants were asked to select
which of the three summaries best describes their feelings in adult romantic relationships. The
three categories are reproduced here (from Hazan & Shaver, 1987, Table 2):

1. Secure—I find it relatively easy to get close to others and am comfortable depending on
them and having them depend on me. I don’t often worry about being abandoned or
about someone getting too close to me.

2. Avoidant—I am somewhat uncomfortable being close to others; I find it difficult to
trust them completely, difficult to allow myself to depend on them. I am nervous when
anyone gets too close, and often, love partners want me to be more intimate than I feel
comfortable being.

3. Anxious/Ambivalent—I find that others are reluctant to get as close as I would like. I often
worry that my partner doesn’t really love me or won’t want to stay with me. I want to
merge completely with another person, and this desire sometimes scares people away.

The researchers demonstrated that the three categories were strongly related to the attachment
histories of the participants and their past experiences of romantic love; they even associated the
categories with state and trait loneliness (Hazen & Shaver, 1987).

The Adult Attachment Scale (AAS; original and revised)

In 1990, Collins and Read developed the AAS to assess adult attachment styles. This measure
was subsequently revised (Collins & Read, 1990), resulting in an 18-item scale assessing three
subscales. One subscale (closeness) assesses the degree to which the individual is comfortable
with intimacy. A second subscale (depend) assesses the degree to which one is comfortable being
dependent on others. The final subscale (anxiety) assesses the degree to which the individual is
preoccupied with being abandoned or rejected.

The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI)

The Adult Attachment Interview (George, Kaplan, & Main, 1984/1985/1996) tries to identify sta-
ble differences in how individuals experience attachment in adult romantic relationships. This self-
report inventory was developed largely as a research tool, and in addition to assessing romantic
relationships, it can also be employed to assess adult parental and peer relationships.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 219 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.4 Assessment Strategies and Tools for the Interpersonal Context

Four styles of adult attachment have been delineated: (1) secure, (2) anxious-preoccupied, (3)
dismissive-avoidant, and (4) fearful-avoidant, with there being considerable overlap with the
attachment styles emerging from Ainsworth’s strange situation for infants. The secure adults are
described as having a positive self-image, along with favorable views of their partners and relation-
ships. Secure adults tend to feel equally comfortable with independence and intimacy in relation-
ships. In contrast, the anxious-preoccupied individual is in need of a high degree of intimacy, even
after only a short period of initiating a relationship. These people seek constant responsiveness
and approval from their partners, they worry excessively about the relationship and its possible
demise, and they would be characterized as highly dependent. The dismissive-avoidant individual
is highly independent even within the relationship, presenting themselves as self-sufficient and
invulnerable. These people tend to be minimally expressive with respect to emotions, and in fact
are uncomfortable with too much emotional closeness. Finally, fearful-avoidant adults also seek
less intimacy and suppress emotions. They have an extreme fear of real relationships because of
the emotional pain that can result. However, at the same time, these individuals very much want
to approach others and make meaningful connections with them.

Adult Attachment Projective

More recently the AAI has been modified into a projective test that is based on responses to a
series of seven drawings, each evoking attachment-related themes (George & West, 2001). The
Adult Attachment Projective (AAP) uses the dimensions of disclosure, content, and defensive pro-
cessing to assign participants to one of four adult classifications (secure, dismissing, preoccupied,
and unresolved) that are similar in nature to the classifications noted with previous inventories.
The measure was validated in three separate samples, demonstrating good inter-rater reliability
and convergence with the AAI. Being a projective test, the AAP also provides a closer conceptual
connection to the earliest roots of attachment theory, which date back to psychoanalytic theory.

Other Measures Tapping Aspects of Interpersonal Functioning
Each year, new measures are developed, many of which have important implications for the inter-
personal aspects of personality functioning. Below is a small sampling of those instruments, pro-
viding some perspective on the breadth and diversity of these measures.

The Person’s Relating to Others Questionnaire (PROQ and PROQ2)

The PROQ (Birtchnell, Falkowski, & Steffert, 1992) is a self-administered, 96-item questionnaire
that assesses one’s relational tendencies with others. A total of 12 items (each rated on a 0–3
scale) contribute to each of the eight scales, and these scales correspond to the octants charac-
terized in the circumplex model. Each of the eight scales range from 0–30, with a total maximum
score of 240. The items emphasize negative relating over positive relating, with ten of the twelve
items focused on negative relating. This is in keeping with the bulk of the research conducted in
the field and reviewed in this chapter, which tends to emphasize the aversive consequences of
interpersonal interactions (see also Locke, 2006).

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 220 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7 7.4 Assessment Strategies and Tools for the Interpersonal Context

A revision of this instrument, the PROQ2, was subsequently developed, with the revision resulting
in an instrument with a better factor structure (i.e., scales that better map on to the underlying
constructs—the octanes—they are supposed to measure) (Birtchnell & Evans, 2003).

Test of Negative Social Exchange (TENSE)

Based on the premise that a significant portion of the literature has relied on single-item, unidi-
mensional assessments of adverse social interactions, Ruehlman and Karoly (1991) developed
the Test of Negative Social Exchange (TENSE). The TENSE assesses the four subscales (factors) of
hostility/impatience, interference, insensitivity, and ridicule. The scale was validated in two sepa-
rate samples, and the four factors (subscales) were established using exploratory factor analysis
and then replicated using confirmatory factor analysis. The TENSE demonstrated good test-retest
reliability, it can predict outcomes related to psychological well-being (depression, anxiety and life
satisfaction), and it appears to be distinct from social support (Ruehlman & Karoly, 1991).

Assessment Instruments Used in RCT

Several paper-and-pencil measures have been developed to evaluate aspects of Relational Com-
petence Theory, including the Self-Other Profile Chart to assess selfhood and the individual’s pri-
orities; the Sharing Hurts Scale (Stevens & L’Abate, 1989) to assess the extent to which one is able
and willing to share intimacy and also to assess identity differentiation; the Likeness Continuum
Task (Cusinato & L’Abate, 2008); and the Dyadic Relationships Test (Cusinato & L’Abate, 2005a,
2005b).

Cultural Influences
Cultural influences are not a specific focus of the interpersonal model; however, the theory rec-
ognizes that there is tremendous variation in the ways in which people express their values and
preferences. In addition, the interpersonal model has been applied to very diverse populations.
For example, Sullivan worked extensively with severely disturbed individuals and with those who
suffered from schizophrenia. He also worked with African American juveniles, but largely attrib-
uted any observed differences to cultural beliefs.

Although a thorough testing of a cross-cultural application of this model has not been demon-
strated, its recognition of individual diversity suggests that it would be useful for understanding
and counseling culturally diverse groups and minority groups (see also L’Abate, 2006). Of course,
areas such as attachment theory are also thought to transfer well across cultures, given that the
theory is built on basic human attachment that is neither culture- nor species-specific (e.g., van
IJzendoorn, 1990). Furthermore, it includes factors such as respect, acceptance, adopting the per-
spective of clients, and encouraging clients to explore their values. These factors, note Sue and
Sue (2007), are qualities that transcend culture.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 221 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7

Key Terms

Summary

The interpersonal model represents a remarkable departure from previous theoretical sys-tems. In a nutshell, it initiated a transition from its intrapsychic and behavioral predecessors to the field of interpersonal interaction. The father of the interpersonal model is Sullivan, a
clinician who was interested in severe emotional disturbances such as schizophrenia. He devel-
oped a theory that emphasized the survival and adaptation functions of interpersonal relations.
He coined the term participant-observer to account for the fact that, with its own dynamics and
processes, a dyad is greater than the two individuals in interaction. His main concern was with
transactions that occur in dyadic relationships. He also introduced the expression self-esteem sys-
tem to describe how attachments and related anxiety issues influence personality development.

Murray, another pioneer who was influenced by Sullivan, was particularly interested in the dyad.
Murray recognized the importance of the newly developed general systems theory, and thought it
would contribute much to a comprehensive system of personality. He and his associate developed
the Thematic Apperception Test, a widely used projective instrument both in clinical practice and
in research.

Leary, expanding on the work of Sullivan, made a major contribution with his model of the inter-
personal circle. He used this model to identify aspects of interpersonal relationships, which he
thought were a reflection of personality. Leary’s work led to many theoretical advances and much
research. Most notable is Benjamin’s structural analysis of social behavior, a widely cited, empiri-
cally derived application and integration of Sullivan’s and Leary’s work. This model is the most
influential of the current interpersonal lines. Other theorists have developed interpersonal mod-
els that have supported the theoretical emphasis of Benjamin’s.

Klerman and Weissman developed an interpersonal model designed to understand and treat
depression. They emphasized the importance of interpersonal roles and relations in the develop-
ment of depression and personality. Kiesler developed a two-dimensional model using Leary’s
interpersonal circle; he described how relationships shape our personalities and our actions, coin-
ing expressions such as transactional escalation to show how traits can be exaggerated in inter-
personal transactions.

Other major contributors to interpersonal theory were the theorists who contributed heavily to
attachment theory, which itself represents an interpersonal model to human personality func-
tioning. Individuals such as John Bowlby, who studied nonhuman species, and Mary Ainsworth,
the developmental psychologist, demonstrated that early patterns of attachment can be reliably
measured, differentiated, and used to predict relationship patterns as adults in a theoretically
consistent manner.

Key Terms

agency The process of becoming individuated.

anxious-ambivalent A term used to describe
infants who cling to their mothers and develop
anxiety at their mothers’ departures, and
rebuff them when they return.

anxious-preoccupied An individual in need of
a high degree of intimacy and constant respon-
siveness and approval from partners.

attachment theory The assumption that early
relationships with primary caregivers establish
a framework for adult attachments.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 222 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7Key Terms

avoidant A term used to describe infants who
generally avoid opportunities to interact with
their primary caregivers.

circumplex model A two-dimensional repre-
sentation of interpersonal space, such as inter-
personal needs, problems, and values.

communion The process of becoming con-
nected with others.

complementary transaction An interaction in
which the needs of all participating individuals
are met. Also called a reciprocal transaction.

copy processes Ways in which interpersonal
patterns can be repeated.

dismissive-avoidant A highly independent
and self-sufficient individual who minimally
expresses emotions.

dyadic interaction An interaction between two
individuals.

emotional cutoff The stopping of emotional
contact with another individual in order to
manage unresolved issues.

fearful-avoidant An individual who seeks less
intimacy and suppresses emotions.

identification The copy process of behaving in
a way similar to another person.

interpersonal circle (IPC) A model, based on
Murray’s list of 30 needs, intended to analyze
interpersonal relationships and to diagnose
psychological problems.

interpersonal force field The influences at play
in an interaction between people, influenced
by each person’s distinct style in dealing with
others.

interpersonal reflex An automatic and involun-
tary reaction to the action of others.

introjection The copy process of individuals
treating themselves as they were previously
treated.

parataxic The inclination to respond to
others based on preconceived ideas and
pre-established schemata.

participant-observer The bidirectional process
in which both participants in an interpersonal
relationship are co-constructing and co-
evolving their experience.

prototaxic The conscious processes in infancy
and early childhood, in which sensations and
perceptions are fragmentary.

recapitulation The copy process of acting as
though someone from the past is still present
and in charge.

relational self The self in relation to important
others.

secure adults A term to describe those who
have a positive self-image and favorable view of
their partners and relationships.

secure infants A term for those who easily
explore a strange room while maintaining con-
tact with their caregiver.

self-differentiation An individual’s ability to
maintain a distinct sense of self separate from
the triangle or group.

self-system Describes the personality as it
is organized around gaining satisfaction and
avoiding anxiety (or finding an optimal level of
anxiety) through interpersonal experiences.

societal emotional process A process focused
on how a society reacts an individual’s emo-
tional needs.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 223 5/21/15 12:40 PM

CHAPTER 7Key Terms

syntaxic The most advanced developmental
level of thinking, which allows for the con-
sideration of others and the use of symbolic
thinking.

systemic therapy A type of psychotherapy that
addresses patients in relationships.

transactional escalation When stress makes
an individual’s interpersonal behavior patterns
more extreme, thereby reducing the range of
possible behavioral responses.

triangle A three-person relationship; the small-
est unit in Bowen’s systemic therapy.

Lec81110_07_c07_195-224.indd 224 5/21/15 12:40 PM