answer question in attachment 

Running Head; INORGANIC COMPOUNDS 1

This week we talked about Thinking Strategically, the National Defense, National Military, National Security Strategies, and JOPES/APEX. How have these topics impacted you as a leader and how might you use this information in the future as a senior leader in the military?

250 words

one reference

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

National Security Decision Making Department

THE DYNAMICS OF DOCTRINE:

THE CHANGES IN GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

by

Timothy T. Lupfer

Reprinted from The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During
the First World War, Leavenworth Paper No. 4, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1981, pp vii-ix; 37-58. Public

domain material

Module 5.01

Introduction

Bullets quickly write new tactics.

-Wilhelm Balck 1

Although the immediate events of the summer of 1914 which led to the First World War
surprised Europe, the possibility of a general European conflict had been anticipated by

governments and the military. Despite this anticipation, confusion characterized the conduct of
the war, from beginning to end. No belligerent had prepared adequately for the actual conditions
and demands of this long war. The confusion was particularly apparent in the realm of tactics on

the western front. Prewar tactical doctrine had become inappropriate by December 1914. On all
sides expedient modifications soon competed with the prewar doctrine.

Military doctrine is guidance for conduct of battle approved by the highest military authority.

In the Imperial German Army on the western front, the Army High Command (die Oberste

Heeresleitung, hereafter called OHL) changed tactical doctrine significantly on two occasions.
In the winter of 1916-17 OHL adopted a new defensive doctrine which described an elastic

defense-in-depth in response to the Allied offensive tactics during 1916 (especially those the
British employed at the Somme) and in anticipation of the continuation of similar attacks in the
spring of 1917. This change is the subject of chapter 1. In the winter of 1917-18, OHL

developed a new offensive tactical doctrine in hopes of achieving a decisive victory on the
western front with their offensives planned for the spring of 1918. This change is the subject: of

chapter 2.

As the famous tactician, Wilhelm Balck,* noted, altering tactical procedures in the middle of

such a desperate struggle was a very serious undertaking, especially for the German Army. 2 To
alter the deeply ingrained habits in an army famous for its thorough peacetime training was

difficult, especially when the confusion of the war made the accuracy of any change uncertain.

*Wilhelm Balck had written extensively on tactics before the war. During the war he served as a division
commander. His son, Hermann Balck, was a company-grade officer in the First World War, and became
an outstanding field commander in the Second World War.

vii

The Germans did not win the First World War and their strategic conduct of the war was
often flawed. Yet, much value can be derived from their development of tactical doctrine, for the

Germans developed and applied new tactical doctrine impressively in 1917 and 1918. Their
tactical changes were systematic and thorough, for these changes in doctrine directly affected

subsequent battlefield success. The analysis of the doctrinal changes cannot be restricted to
examining changes to regulations because doctrine that influences nothing beyond the printing
press is stillborn.

German successes in World War I demonstrated a thorough process:

 Perception of a need for change

 Solicitation of ideas, especially from the battlefield units

 Definition of the change

 Dissemination of the change

 Enforcement throughout the army

 Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate the change

 Thorough training

 Evaluation of effectiveness

 Subsequent refinement

This outline describes the manner by which the German Army succeeded in changing and

implementing tactical doctrine during war. The process is not rigidly sequential; it is a dynamic
process that requires great intellectual ability and strong character from tacticians who desire to

make successful changes.

Many characteristics ascribed to the German military have too often sufficed for explanations

of German military success. Glib expressions such as “great organization” or “a knack for war”
do little justice to the men who brought success to German arms and, more importantly, offer

little guidance for anyone who desires to achieve similar success.

In the examination of the German process of tactical change, several important personalities

emerge. Their memoirs certainly must be used with caution, but I have quoted extensively from
participants in this paper, in part to convey the essential interest in tactics among the participants.

Their interest in tactics is instructive, for not all military leaders possess a continuing interest in
tactics.

viii

I do not intend to portray all German tactical efforts as inherently brilliant. The Germans
usually achieved a relative advantage over the Allies with respect to tactical change. Tentative

generalizations about the reasons for this German success and about the limitations of doctrine
itself in wartime are described in chapter 3. These conclusions can only be tentative, for the

uncertainties of war extend to its analysis. ”

Timothy T. Lupfer

Department of History
United States Military Academy

West Point, New York

The Offensive Tactics of 1918

In the second half of 1917, strategic conditions were developing that would offer the
Germans an opportunity to concentrate their military power on the western front in 1918. Russia,
suffering from internal convulsions as well as the extreme demands of the war, could not sustain

the war effort. As peace negotiations with Russia began, German units traveled from east to
west. The number of German divisions in the west went from 150 in October 1917 to 192 in

March 1918.1 The opportunity for force concentration in the west had to be seized quickly, for
the United States had declared war on Germany in April 1917. The Germans calculated that it
would require one year for the United States to exert any decisive influence on operations in the

west. Therefore, the changing strategic situation and deteriorating economic and political
conditions in Germany (due to the effects of the Allied blockade of Germany) only permitted the

Germans one final attempt at victory in the west.

On 11 November 1917 OHL decided that the great offensive would begin in the spring of

1918. Between this decision and the initiation of the offensive on 21 March 1918, the German
Army developed the appropriate doctrine and prepared as many units as possible for the attack.

In order to destroy the Allied forces, the Germans attempted to solve the tactical dilemma which
had frustrated the Allies for more than three years. The preferred German maneuver in prewar
doctrine, the envelopment, was impossible to achieve in the west. Therefore, a successful

penetration was required, to be followed up by force sufficient to achieve a strategic
breakthrough.

Although in two and one-half years the Germans had conducted only one major offensive on
the western front (Verdun), the German Army still had considerable experience from which to

draw. Units in the east had been participating in several major offensives throughout the war.
More recently, in October 1917, a German field army (Fourteenth Army under General Otto von
Below), having been formed with units from the western, eastern, and Rumanian fronts, was sent

by OHL to northern Italy to cooperate with the Austrians in an offensive against the Italians.
General von Below’s order to his forces before battle stated:

Every column on the heights must move forward without hesitation; by doing

so opportunities will be created for helping neighbors who cannot make progress,

by swinging round in the rear of the enemy opposing him.2

3

38

At the Battle of Caporetto the Germans and Austrians smashed through the Italian forces,
achieving a strategic penetration, and drove the Italians back to the Piave River. The other Allied

powers responded, sending French and British units to Italy to strengthen the front. Italy,
although badly shaken, remained in the war. The Germans and Austrians had not eliminated Italy
from the war, but the Central Powers success had been most impressive. Italy lost 305,000

soldiers, including 275,000 prisoners.3

The offensive successes in the east and in Italy had occurred within the unique conditions of
each theater. OHL, in considering the peculiar nature of the western front, did not blindly adopt
techniques derived outside the west and try to apply them immediately to the western front.

Instead, OHL examined each combat experience with respect to the particular conditions in
which it had occurred.

Also, the German forces on the western front were better prepared for offensive operations

than their record of recent experiences in major offensives indicated. Although Verdun had been

an offensive with a limited objective and the 1918 offensive plan sought a strategic
breakthrough, the Verdun battles had demonstrated several useful points: the value of sudden

concentrated artillery fire in depth before the assault, the need for centralized control of artillery,
the value of surprise, and the need for greater combined arms cooperation. The Germans had
tried several tactical techniques, such as attaching a horse-drawn artillery battery to an infantry

regiment in the attack, in order to provide the infantry better fire support.4

The German Army’s defensive experiences in 1917 provided another very important source
of offensive expertise. The aggressive tenor of the elastic defense-in-depth, especially the
counterattack, nurtured offensive excellence. To train the army for this defense, units acquired

the spirit of the counterattack, and OHL had codified storm trooper techniques to assist this
training. Having accumulated considerable counterattack experience in 1917, the German Army

in the west already had a deceptively solid base of doctrine and experience for offensive
operations.

The Germans had another source of experience on the conduct of the offense. They had
defended against the Allied attacks for three years, and recognized that the Allies had been

showing them what not to do.5 Reliance on massive firepower to destroy the enemy was clearly
not the solution. In any event, the Germans could not match the Allied expenditure of munitions,
so a different offensive technique was required. A French captain inadvertently provided one

important source of inspiration for developing such new techniques.

On 9 May 1915 Capt. Andre Laffargue led an attack on a German position. Afterwards,
Laffargue reflected upon the problems of the attack and expressed his ideas in a pamphlet, “The
Attack in Trench Warfare.” The French Army published the pamphlet, but distributed it for

information only; it did not

39

become French doctrine. The British did not translate it.6 Early in the summer of 1916 the
Germans captured a copy of the pamphlet, translated it at once, and issued it to units. Ludwig

Renn wrote that Laffargue’s ideas had immediate use as a tactical manual for German infantry. 7

Laffargue personified that resource of talent which exists at the small unit level and develops

in combat; he was a part of the “human canister” of combat who did not want to die, but to
succeed.8 Exclaiming, “Let us prepare our business down to the slightest detail in order to

conquer and live,” he set out to record his experiences and ideas.9

Laffargue advocated a sudden attack to achieve a deep penetration. His attack resembled a

gulp, not a nibble.* The momentum of the in-depth attack would disrupt the enemy, keep him off
balance, and prevent him from organizing an effective response. To capitalize on disruption, the

assault had to advance as far as possible. The first wave would identify, not reduce, defensive
strong points and subsequent attack waves would destroy them. An artillery bombardment
applied suddenly in depth throughout the enemy area would precede the infantry assault.

Disruption of enemy artillery batteries was particularly important to protect the infantry advance.

Laffargue stated that all troops were not assault troops; special training and care were
necessary to develop the aggressiveness and skill for the assault. Ironically, the German storm
units best epitomized this idea of elite assault units. In his pamphlet, Laffargue also expressed

the need for an automatic rifle for firepower in advance positions, a need later met in all armies
during the war by the light machine gun.11

Although they did not adopt all of Laffargue’s ideas (for example, he was very insistent on

some rather cumbersome formations), the Germans derived greater benefit from his ideas and put

more of his ideas into practice than the French did. German units became well acquainted with
his concepts and the operations section of OHL was impressed with the practical combination of

surprise, firepower, and maneuver to break the tactical stalemate.12

While the Allies had not pursued Laffargue’s concept of sudden attack as vigorously as their

enemies, they had pursued a technological solution to the tactical dilemma. During the Somme
battle in September 1916 the British introduced tanks. The initial use of tanks failed to cap italize

on the tactical and strategic potential of the weapon, to the chagrin of the early tank enthusiasts,
whose highly original tactical ideas had been rejected by British High Command. In their first
battle, tanks were dispersed as infantry supporting weapons and followed the characteristically

heavy and long artillery

*The metaphor likening attacks to consumption of food was popular in the First World War. Joffre described

his 1915 strategy of numerous attacks with limited objectives by stating, “I a m nibbling at them,” 10 The German

attack regulations of 1918 used the same metaphor and described “devouring” the enemy position.

40

preparation. The Germans quickly developed antitank tactics,13 but they did not attempt to
imitate the Allies in the use of the tank.

On 20 November 1917 at Cambrai the British conducted a surprise limited attack. The attack

caught the Germans off-guard, because it had none of the familiar signs that forewarned of

Allied attacks. Instead of the long relentless artillery preparation, there was a very brief but
concentrated artillery barrage, fired without previous registration in order to insure surprise.

Immediately thereafter a large concentration of tanks attacked, followed by infantry.

The results of this attack were as unexpected as the tactical procedures. The attack stunned

the Germans. The British penetrated the German defensive zones, suffering few Allied
casualties. Then, however, supply and reinforcement difficulties stalled further British progress.

Their impressive gains formed a large, inviting salient. The Germans moved reinforcements to
the area and ten days later eleven divisions of Crown Prince Rupprecht’s Army Group launched a
deliberate counterattack.

This large-scale counterattack was the first major German offensive action against the British

since 1915. The attack began with a bombardment that lasted only a few hours but gradually
intensified. German gunners fired large quantities of gas shells along with high explosive rounds.
The German infantry quickly advanced, following the rolling barrage. The British Official

History provided a description of this infantry assault, which clearly showed storm unit methods,
integration of different arms, and methods of bypassing resistance:

Proceeded by patrols, the Germans had advanced at 7 a.m. in small columns

bearing many light machineguns, and, in some cases, flamethrowers. From

overhead low flying airplanes, in greater numbers than had hitherto been seen,
bombed and machine-gunned the British defenders, causing further casualties

and, especially, distraction at the critical moment. Nevertheless few posts appear
to have been attacked from the front, the assault sweeping in between to envelop
them from flanks and rear.14

The Germans pushed deeply into the British positions, so quickly that the British general

commanding the 29th Division barely avoided capture, escaping in his pajamas. 15 In time,
confusion abated and British resistance intensified. The campaign ended with lines drawn almost
where they had been before the initial tank assault of 20 November.

Ludendorff had expected greater success, but he was still pleased with the results of the

counterattack because it had been achieved by troops who had not been specially trained for an
offensive.16 Analyzing the recent experiences almost immediately, Crown Prince Rupprecht’s
Army Group staff quickly circulated to its units a memorandum that stressed the importance of

surprise as demonstrated at Cambrai.17 This analysis of recent tactical experience was a
characteristic German Army method. British General Headquarters also circulated to its units a

pamphlet describing a successful action of three British

41

divisions in the defense against the German counterattack. The British Official History noted that
this effort by British GHQ was “unusual.”18

The Offensive Doctrine

On 1 January 1918 OHL published The Attack in Position Warfare (hereafter referred to as
Attack), which became the basic document for the German offensives of 1918. Just as Principles

had described a defense that incorporated the entire battlefield in depth instead of emphasizing
only the front line, Attack described an attack-in-depth, a devouring* of the entire enemy

position instead of nibbling away at the enemy front line. Once again that “mere captain,”
Hermann Geyer, was instrumental in writing the text.19

The objective of the major German offensive was to achieve a breakthrough after penetrating
the Allied line. In their efforts to penetrate the German defenses, the Allies had relied upon

massive artillery fire. The tank was another possible solution, but appropriate tank tactics did not
emerge until Cambrai. The Germans could not rely on a long destructive artillery bombardment
to give them their penetration, for they lacked the huge quantities of ammunition (their industrial

production did not match that of the Allies), and more importantly, they knew such tactics had
not worked. The Germans did not seek a solution through technological innovation. For example,

they did not attempt to develop the tank on a large scale, but chose to accomplish the attack-in-
depth with existing combat means in a carefully coordinated attack relying on surprise.

The doctrine in Attack was as applicable to the deliberate counterattacks of the defense as it
was to the main attack of an offense to achieve a breakthrough. The introduction to Attack
clearly stated this and it demonstrated the close tactical connection between the counterattack

and the offensive. Attack noted that the strategic breakthrough was the ultimate goal of the
penetration. In order to achieve that goal the attack had to strike deeply into the enemy position.

Acknowledging the impossibility of destroying all enemy forces in such a deep penetration, the
German tactical doctrine did not require complete destruction. Instead, disruption of enemy units
and communications was essential. Throughout the doctrine, keeping the enemy off balance,

pressing the attack continuously, and retaining the initiative received great emphasis.

The authors of Attack described all artillery missions (preparatory fire, creeping barrage,
isolating the objective) with the acknowledgment that total destruction of enemy forces could not
be achieved. For instance, artillery would neutralize, not necessarily destroy, enemy artillery

batteries; the Attack strongly recommended gas shells because of their disruptive characteristics.
The Attack clearly identified the need to move artillery and ammunition forward to

*The German text of this regulation, Der Angriff im Stellungsk rieg, used the word fressen, meaning to

devour or to consume.

42

maintain the attack. Also, the authors devoted 21 of the 113 paragraphs of Attack to air forces,
which received an increased role in strafing enemy positions.

Attack stressed infantry-artillery cooperation and recommended pyrotechnics to control
creeping barrages. Special horse-drawn artillery batteries provided mobile artillery to infantry
regiments, a technique used at Verdun and in some storm battalion organizations. The doctrine

encouraged any techniques that could assist the artillery in keeping up with the infantry, for in
the German attack the infantry, not the artillery, determined the speed of the attack:

The momentum of the infantry must not be dependent on the barrage, but vice
versa, otherwise the dash of the infantry will be checked in the rigid curtain of
fire.20

While the Attack urged German infantrymen to exploit the effects of artillery, it also

reminded them that success depended on their own skill. No amount of munitions could relieve
the infantryman from his responsibility to close with the enemy.21

To conduct the attack, the German infantry organized in depth. Speed and depth were the
means of securing their flanks and rear: speed to keep the enemy from reacting in time to the

attack, and depth to provide the follow-up units which would isolate the bypassed pockets of
resistance and prevent these remnants from interfering with the continuation of the attack. 22

There has been some confusion about the name of these new German offensive tactics.
After the German offensive of 1918, the French called the tactics “Hutier tactics,” attributing

them to General Oskar von Hutier. Mer serving on the eastern front, von Hutier was transferred
to the west for the 1918 offensives, during which his Eighteenth Army achieved the greatest
successes against the enemy. The French credited him with the invention of the offensive tactics,

and perhaps this erroneous conjecture provides another example of the personality-dominant
thinking of the Allies. The first Allied reaction to the new German tactics was to attempt to

identify an individual inventor. The Germans themselves never used the term “Hutier tactics,”
and recent research has established clearly that von Hutier did not invent these tactics.23 The
tactics were the product of an effective corporate effort.

A better term is “infiltration tactics.” While the German text does not use the equivalent

German word, “infiltration” is a satisfactory description of the infantry technique of bypassing
resistance and pushing forward as far as possible. However, “infiltration” connotes individual
movement, whereas the German movement was in small units, and the word is too exclusively

infantry oriented. The German effort emphasized the coordination (das Zusammenwirken) of all
arms, especially infantry and artillery: just as no one personality was the source of tactical

wisdom, there was no one weapon or technique that exclusively carried the German attacks. Like
the efforts of the officers in

43

developing doctrine, the efforts of the various arms blended in a complementary fashion.

The Attack Organization

In Attack as in Principles, the Germans considered the division the basic unit capable of
conducting independent battlefield operations. The offensive doctrine, however, established one
relationship that differed greatly from the elastic defense-in-depth. Whereas in the defense the

forward division commander had the authority to order counterattack units outside his own
division organization to deliver an immediate counterattack, in the offensive the higher

headquarters retained control of the follow-up units.24 The reinforcements were kept well
forward, but under the direction of higher headquarters they would reinforce success.25

To maintain the momentum of an attack, the belligerents had tried several different
methods for relieving the leading units in the attack during the war. The French had tried

successive waves (the first wave taking one objective, the second wave passing through to take
the next one) and the British had used a similar leapfrog technique in 1917. 26 But in Attack lead
units were instructed to continue without relief, for the doctrine considered it preferable to

maintain the attack and exhaust the lead unit, rather than attempt a succession which would lose
time and impetus.27 Unfortunately, this method resulted in severe losses for the lead units, which

would have an adverse effect on the 1918 German offensive.

Maintaining the initiative in the offense demanded the same high standard of small unit

leadership which the elastic defense-in-depth required. The fluid tactics required independent
action by the assault detachments and groups (Stosstrupps and Gruppen).28

The group (Gruppe) or section of the light machine gun and riflemen was the basic

infantry small unit, as it had been in executing the elastic defense-in-depth. This tactical

organization represented a significant change from the prewar technique of an advancing line of
similarly equipped infantrymen. Ludendorff remarked that the new role of the light machine gun

as the dominant weapon and the subordinate role of the riflemen (to protect the machine gun), as
shown during the defensive battles, was a difficult change for many German soldiers, previously
trained in infantry units where the rifleman had the dominant role, to understand. 29

An important aspect of the application of the new offensive doctrine was the role of the

storm battalions in teaching the new small unit techniques to the other German infantry units.
Each German field army had a storm battalion that acted as a teaching cadre during periods of
training. This instruction was so highly regarded that German units on the eastern front began

sending officers and noncommissioned officers to the western front to

44

attend storm unit training courses in late 1916. Field armies on the eastern front then imitated
their counterparts in the west by establishing their own storm battalions, based on Rohr’s unit. 30

The composition of storm units varied within these possibilities:

1 to 5 storm companies (infantry assault units)

1 to 2 machine gun companies (heavy machine guns)
1 flamethrower section

1 infantry gun battery (light mountain howitzers
or captured Russian guns)

1 Minenwerfer company (trench mortars)31

Besides the established storm battalions for each field army, ad hoc storm units were often

formed within infantry divisions and were usually led by a cadre trained by the field army’s
organized storm battalion.

Established storm battalions assaulted with additional infantry from an accompanying
division. The first wave was an infantry probe (from the accompanying division) whose purpose

was to identify enemy positions for the next wave, about 250 meters behind. The second wave
consisted of the elite storm companies and the flamethrower section, with additional infantry
support from the division. This second wave attempted to penetrate the enemy zones by pushing

through weak areas to envelop enemy positions. Supporting these efforts was the third wave,
about 150 meters behind, which contained the storm battalion’s heavy weapons and similar

additional support from the division. This third wave provided fire to support the forward
movement of the storm companies and to protect the flanks of the penetrations. Behind these
three waves followed the remainder of the accompanying division, which reduced pockets of

resistance bypassed by the storm units, provided reinforcements, and maintained the momentum
of the attack.32 In sectors where established storm units were not available, infantry divisions

used their own ad hoc storm units and imitated storm unit techniques.

The storm unit techniques and the new offensive doctrine emphasized a constant drive

forward. Speed and timing were essential for rapid advance, and small unit initiative was crucial
to seize the unpredictable and fleeting opportunities of the battlefield. There was no “secret

formula” in these techniques. Enemy positions were reduced in a practical fashion: the physical
and psychological effects of the advance reinforced each other.

Artillery support was carefully integrated into the assault plan. Although the infantry
missions necessitated decentralization of control, the artillery missions in support of the attack

required greater centralization of control over artillery. The Germans wanted to avoid any
prolonged artillery fire, for surprise would be lost and an artillery duel would develop in which
the Allies, with greater amounts of munitions would eventually prevail.33 Therefore. German fire

had to be fast and accurate, and its mission was neutralization rather than elusive and costly
destruction.

45

The techniques used to deliver fast and accurate neutralization fire in 1918 were greatly
influenced by one very remarkable man, Georg Bruchmuller, the most significant “import” from

the eastern front to the western front. He had been on the retired list at the outbreak of the war
because of a riding accident.34 Recalled to active duty during the war, he served on the eastern
front. Bruchmuller developed techniques to support attacks with a sudden concentration of

accurate fire instead of prolonged preparatory bombardments. In the spring of 1916 he convinced
the chief of staff of the Tenth Army to adopt this method of concentration for a major attack at

Tarnopol, and the effect in supporting the rapid advance of the infantry was impressive.

Bruchmuller’s technique emphasized fire in depth throughout the enemy positions. 35 His

support included an accurate creeping barrage, the Feuerwalze, for the advancing infantry.

Bruchmuller knew how to derive the greatest benefits from limited means. Attacks
received support based upon the estimated minimum number of batteries needed to achieve
success. Bruchmuller did not attempt to flatten every enemy position, for this was unnecessary:

In a fire action of a few hours only, the complete destruction of enemy

trenches, a complete harassing of rear areas, etc., could naturally not be achieved.
This was not at all contemplated. We desired only to break the morale of the
enemy, pin him to his position, and then overcome him with an overwhelming

assault.36

Bruchmuller developed several techniques to achieve this disruption, which required
strict control of all artillery assets. Each battery of each type of weapon received specific fire
missions with specific timetables. He organized the stages of delivery of fire in this way:

First Stage: Surprise concentration, hitting headquarters, phone links, command posts,

enemy batteries, and infantry positions. Fire is sudden, concentrated, and makes
extensive use of gas.

Second Stage: Most batteries reinforce those batteries already firing on enemy batteries.

Third Stage: Fire for effect on designated targets according to range. S ome batteries
continue to shell infantry positions, and heavy pieces engage long range targets. 37

Surprise was essential to achieve maximum disruptive effect on the enemy. Therefore,
the Germans had to conceal their attack preparations very carefully and their initial target data

had to be very accurate.

The relationship between infantry and artillery in all armies often became strained during

the war. In 1915, for example, French infantry in one sector wore conspicuous linen cloth on
their backs in a vain attempt to avoid being

46

shelled by their own artillery.38 To develop mutual confidence between infantry and artillery,
Bruchmuller began conducting lectures with the infantry unit before an operation. Bruchmuller

took great pride in gaining the confidence of the infantry: “The thanks of the infantry, in my
opinion, must be treasured more by every artilleryman than all orders and citations.”39 He
discussed his targets in detail, describing the timing of the preparation, the conduct of the rolling

barrage, and any other matter of mutual concern. At the end of his lectures he would entertain
questions, including those from the lowest ranking soldiers.40

Bruchmuller soon earned a great reputation as a superb artilleryman. He rose in position

in the east, commanding the artillery of von Hutier’s Eighth Army at Riga in September 1917.

When his unit was transferred to the west in late 1917, Bruchmuller arrived in time to participate
in the Cambrai counterattack. Ludendorff knew of Bruchmuller’s great skill, and by the

beginning of the offensive in March 1918, he had disseminated Bruchuller’s methods to the units
in the west. Ludendorff called Bruchmuller “one of the most prominent soldiers of this war .”41

The skills of Bruchmuller, Rohr, and others were brought together by OHL in the training
effort to prepare for the great offensive of 1918.

Preparation for the Offensive

Major Wetzell, OHL’s chief of operations for the western front, wrote a memorandum
about the coming offensive in which he listed three conditions necessary for success in the west

in 1918: surprising the enemy, hitting him at a weak point, and training the army “down to the
smallest details in accordance with military principles.”42

Again, the winter became a period of intense activity for the German Army on the
western front. Ludendorff knew that the training efforts of the previous winter had to be imitated,

only now in preparation for the offensive.43

German training programs throughout the war strongly emphasized individual training.44

Recruit training behind the front, which stressed this individual training, quickly incorporated the
new offensive doctrine. OHL revised the courses of instruction at the officer schools at Sedan

and Valenciennes. Each field army established a special instructional center behind the lines
where newly arrived units from the east trained in accordance with the new doctrine. 45

When possible, units withdrew from the front and went to the rear to conduct training
exercises. In accordance with OHL training outlines, companies, battalions, and regiments

conducted exercises emphasizing assault tactics and coordination of different weapons. The
scope of the exercises expanded; complete divisions were able to conduct practice assaults.
Pyrotechnic devices were

47

employed in training to develop methods of controlling creeping barrages. Despite a shortage of
munitions, the Germans used live ammunition in training to achieve realism. Ernst Junger’s unit

trained according to “Ludendorffs marvelously clear scheme of training,”46 and Junger recalled
the dangers of training with live ammunition:

Sometimes I made practice attacks with the company on complicated
trench systems, with live bombs [grenades], in order to turn to account the lessons

of the Cambrai battle [German counterattack of November 1917] … we had some
casualties. …A machine gunner of my company shot the commanding officer of
another unit off his horse while he was reviewing some troops. Fortunately the

wound was not fatal.47

The artillery units also trained very extensively. Because surprise was essential in the
German concept of the attack, the Germans sought methods to develop accurate artillery fire on a
first round basis, that is, accuracy without firing registration rounds on the potential target. This

was a technique the British had used with success at Cambrai. An artilleryman, Captain
Pulkowsky, developed the following method for the German artillery:

 Test fire each artillery piece to determine the peculiar characteristic of the individual gun,

called the “special influences.”

 Carefully record and tabulate this data for each gun.

 Record the ballistic effects of external factors (wind, atmospheric pressure, precipitation,

powder temperature and condition) in tables, under the heading “daily influences.”

 Plot initial target data using precise map locations.

 Apply the daily influences and special influences to obtain firing data sufficiently

accurate for firing without registration.

Pulkowsky’s method met considerable resistance. Von Kuhl, the chief of staff for Crown

Prince Rupprecht’s Army Group, recalled that several of the subordinate headquarters insisted
that no accurate firing could be done without registration. The new method was tested
extensively at the artillery school at Maubeuge and finally adopted.48

Ludendorff also noticed the objections, but supported the adoption of the method. Captain

Pulkowsky became the instructor of the technique and he “carried out his duties with great energy
and skill.”49 Pulkowsky instructed about six thousand officers and noncommissioned officers in
this technique before the March 1918 offensive.50 A company grade artillery officer’s diary I

provided evidence of the initial resistance to the new instruction. Upon receiving orders to be
trained for the offensive, he was disappointed, for he did not want to attend the school. 51

However, once he began the hard training, which included extensive use of live ammunition, his
initial skepticism gave way to

48

acclaim. He described the value of the Pulkowsky method during an attack on 27 May 1918:

Not a single battery had done any range firing, but our shooting was a
masterpiece of accuracy, all worked out and plotted according to the latest
principles of ballistics.52

In all the extensive preparation for the offensives, OHL did not ignore the continuing

refinement of defensive tactics. Of particular importance in light of the Cambrai experience was
defense against tanks. The appearance of tanks had often caused German soldiers to panic; OHL
reacted to stop this. The artillery units were trained to engage tanks with direct fire. For the

infantry, a 13-mm rifle was quickly manufactured whose bullets could penetrate the armor of
Allied tanks. Tank obstacles became part of defense preparation. The initial panic over tanks was

overcome.

53

This activity contrasted with the reluctance of OHL to begin a major effort in German use

of tanks. German units had recommended the German use of tanks from the beginning of Allied
employment of tanks, and, for example, a report of 2 October 1916 from the German First Army

on the Somme recommended that Germany produce its own tanks.54 Ludendorff, however, was
not enthusiastic. He thought that the limited resources of Germany were better directed to
manufacture more motor transport for greater strategic and operational mobility.55 Therefore for

the offensive of 1918, the Germans employed only a few German tanks and a limited number of
captured ones. This small effort had a negligible effect on the campaign, and Ludendorffs failure

to encourage German tank development has been severely criticized.

56

Although he probably underestimated the value of tanks, Ludendorli neglected no other

aspects of the preparation for the offensive. As early as July 1917 Ludendorff had outlined a
comprehensive program of patriotic training for the army. Germany was bearing the burden of

the effort for the Central Powers, and the length of the struggle and the economic stagnation
were seriously affecting German morale at home and in the army. Ludendorff began the patriotic
training to reverse this decline of morale in the army, for the effects of the blockade and the

frustration of the war threatened the ability of the German Army to perform according to the high
standards demanded by their tactics.57 Leadership was an important ingredient in improving

morale, and OHL published principles of leadership to guide the offensive training, to encourage
small unit initiative, and to remind all levels of command that leaders, including co mmanding
generals and their staffs, belonged on the battlefield.58

The German Army, however, could not train or equip every division for the offensive.

Lack of time, talent, and equipment created an unsatisfactory situation in which 56 divisions out
of 192 were designated attack divisions,* while the remaining divisions were called trench
divisions (Stellungsdivisionen).

*The Germans used the terms Angriffsdiuisionen, Stossdiuisionen, or Mobilmachungsdivi-
sionen to describe attack divisions.

49

This distinction was unfortunate but unavoidable for economic reasons. The attack divisions
received extra care, better rations, and more equipment, creating resentment among soldiers in

the trench divisions.59

Another example of a serious manpower shortage that forced the Germans to adopt a

grim expedient was their creating a leader reserve, usually in lead units. Heavy casualties had
occurred in the officer and noncommissioned officer ranks throughout the war, and in

anticipation of such heavy losses in the spring offensive, the German Army identified officers
who would be kept out of the fighting intentionally in order to be available to fill the anticipated
vacancies caused by casualties.60

Despite such difficult conditions, the German Army prepared well for the offensive.

Three field armies (Second, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth), designated to conduct the attack on 21
March 1918, contained attack divisions and were ready. Von Kuhl credited this success to
Ludendorff’s personal efforts,61 but Ludendorff’s greatest contribution was his ability to harness

the talents of so many to achieve such unity of effort.

The Offensive

The German offensive began on 21 March 1918. Although the Allies had been expecting
a German attack, the extremely rigorous security precautions of the Germans had confused the
Allies about the exact location of the main effort. Elaborate German deception measures had

convinced the French that the main attack would be delivered in their sector.

The major German attack was directed instead against the British positions east of

Amiens. (See map 4.) At 0440 on 21 March 1918 the artillery preparation began. Nearly six
thousand guns commenced firing in a seven-phase bombardment plan designed by Colonel

Bruchmuller. The elaborately planned bombardment lasted only five hours, and then the infantry
assaulted. The concentration of fire in those five hours was terrific. One German artillery
observer recalled that, whereas the French and British had pounded the Germans for days during

Allied offensives, the Germans had only five hours to return the favor. The fumes from the guns
were so intense that many German artillery crews donned their protective masks. 62

On the receiving side, a British soldier remembered his experience:

I was impressed by the way it came down with one big crash. We had

known of the coming attackbut not the exact day….I had always thought that the
bombardment would develop gradually but the full force was almost
instantaneous….One moment we were walking along as normal, the next there

were shells bursting all about us. We all ran like mad for cover.63

The Germans used gas shells extensively. In areas where an infantry assault was not

planned, they used mustard, a persistent agent. In the areas

50

where the German infantry would penetrate, the Germans delivered high explosive shells mixed
with shells of chlorine and phosgene gas. The Germans also fired shells containing lachrymatory

gas, a throat irritant. The Germans hoped that the irritant would penetrate the British masks,
forcing the British soldiers to remove their masks, and thereby exposing themselves to the more
lethal chlorine and phosgene. Despite its intricacy, this complex plan did not work. 64

The bombardment did achieve the overall desired effect, however. It disrupted British

communications and left British units in confusion. The British Official History described the
success of the German infantry assault:

Forward Zone as a whole was overrun at the first rush, the machineguns
still in action hardly firing a shot. Making good use of the valleys, where the fog

lay heaviest, the leading waves of German infantry swept onwards towards the
Battle Zone, leaving the posts and redoubts still holding out in the Forward Zone
to be dealt with by special parties.65

The advancing German infantry found many British areas in complete disarray. The German

artillery fire had been accurate, effective, and efficient.66

The British Fifth Army, which bore the brunt of the first day’s attack, lost considerable

ground. (See map 4.) Of the three German armies attacking on 21 March, the Eighteenth Army
(von Hutier) achieved the greatest success, although it had not been designated the principal

attacking force of the field armies in the attack. Although the British had adopted a defensive
system similar to the German one, the British had not understood the essential German concepts.
The British had neither efficiently organized their army nor sufficiently modified their training

program or their command structure to adapt the defensive concept.67

Compared with previous Allied offensive efforts, the German tactical success of 21
March 1918 was impressive. In the Somme battles of 1916 the British and French had labored
for 140 days at the cost of more than one-half million casualties to capture a total of ninety-eight

square miles of ground. In twenty-four hours in March 1918 the Germans secured about 140
square miles at a cost in casualties of less than one-tenth the Allied expenditure at the Somme.

The approximate casualty figures for 21 March 1918 were:68

Killed Wounded Prisoner Total
German 10,851 28,778 300 39,329

British 7,512 10,000 21,000 38,512

The number of British prisoners reveals how disrupted the British defense was and also

suggests that total destruction by fire is not necessarily a prerequisite for a successful attack.

53

Despite the German tactical success in penetrating the British line, the Germans were
unable to achieve a strategic breakthrough. Transport difficulties still plagued German

operations. Despite techniques like using prefabricated, wooden travel-ways for artillery,69
displacing the artillery was still difficult, because of weight, lack of prime movers, and terrain.
Despite a severe shortage in horses in the Central Powers, Ludendorff had seemed to perform

miracles in obtaining horses for transport for the offensive, but the ability to move the supporting
units and the reserves to keep up with the attack still remained elusive. Some critics have also

argued that tanks might have assisted in sustaining the momentum of the initial success and that
the Germans should have pursued technological innovation more rigorously. 70 Georg Wetzell
attributed failure of the German March offensive, however, to unexpected movement of French

reinforcements by motor transport, German lack of discipline (soldiers stopped to loot the Allied
supply depots which contained ample stocks of items, especially certain food, which their own

army lacked because of the blockade), and the lack of drive (too many German units, especially
divisions, still waited for permission from higher headquarters to advance, instead of proceeding
on their own initiative).71

As the tactically impressive but strategically frustrating March offensive stalled,

Ludendorff conducted offensives in other sectors of the western front until July 1918,
desperately hoping to obtain the increasingly remote strategic breakthrough. Colonel Bruchmiller
directed the centralized artillery efforts for OHL in these attempts. However, the German Army

expended its forces while the Allies still had large reserves of manpower, specifically American
and British. The Allies also had overwhelming superiority in industrial production.

The German offensive in the French sector at Chemin-des-Dames in late. May 1918 also

had excellent initial results. General Duchesne, commander of the French Sixth Army, had

refused to position his forces in depth, although his superior, General Petain, had ordered him to
do so. Duchesne, a follower of Foch (who, as overall Allied commander, was Petain’s superior),

refused to yield any ground elastically, preferring to mass his infantry in the forward trenches.
Duchesne thought he was correctly applying the aggressive principles of Foch, that great
advocate of the offensive, by placing forces forward and refusing to yield any ground to a

German attack.

At 0100 on 27 May 1918 Bruchmuller’s 3,179 guns fired on the French positions and
about two and one-half hours later the German infantry advanced. French failure to destroy
bridges across the Aisne River greatly helped the Germans advance twelve miles in one day. 72

The unenlightened leadership of the French Sixth Army greatly assisted the German

efforts at Chemin-des-Dames, but when the Germans faced an enemy arrayed in depth, as other
French units were, the Germans could not achieve such dramatic tactical success. The Allies
continued to stall the German advances, and the Germans expended their irreplaceable attack

divisions in their vain efforts to get the strategic breakthrough.

54

By August 1918, despite impressive territorial gains-by First World War standards-the
German Army was exhausted. It had not broken the Allies and had not obtained the strategic

breakthrough, despite several impressive tactical victories. The Allies, with superior resources,
now took the initiative. Once again the Germans were on the defensive, now in a more desperate
condition from the losses caused by their offensive. They also occupied large salients and now

defended ground they had not had time to prepare. The Allies, especially forces of the British
Empire, now displayed greater tactical finesse in their attacks than they had shown in previous

years, using short artillery bombardments and integrating large numbers of tanks and aircraft in
well executed attacks.73 The German Army was no longer the effective force to stop these
offensives. When it appeared to OHL that political, economic, and social conditions in Germany

were going out of control, causing the German Army itself to be barely controllable, the German
military leaders (now the virtual rulers of Germany) agreed to a cessation of hostilities. The

Imperial German Army and Germany itself had been worn down by the Allies. That the army
itself had not been crushed on the battlefield would create the frustration and bitterness of the
“stab in the back” sentiment.

Tentative Generalizations

It is hazardous to give too much credit to any tactical doctrine; the conduct of battle is

often very decentralized. Yet, doctrine exists to give order to these efforts. Despite the German
defeat in the First World War, the German efforts in tactical doctrine deserve close attention. In

the development and application of new tactics for their army, the Germans generally displayed
superior ability. The German doctrine achieved the balance between the demands of precision for

unity of effort and the demands of flexibility for decentralized application. With clearly stated
principles, the doctrine provided thorough, consistent guidance for the training, equipping, and
organizing of the army. However, this consistency was not rigid, for in its battlefield application,

the doctrine provided sufficient flexibility to accommodate the demands of local conditions and
the judgment of several commanders. In examining this accomplishment some tentative

generalizations are apparent.

Methodology was a factor in German success. No tactical concept remained in the

isolation of pure theory. The better German tacticians judged ideas according to the actual
environment in which they would be applied. Their evaluation considered all influential factors:

the condition of German forces, the enemy situation, weapons, terrain, space, and time. No
tactical concept was a thing-in-itself with inherent strength: concepts crossed the gap from theory
to reality. For example, the counterattack was not valuable simply because it was a

“counterattack”; a counterattack would be valuable if it were delivered at the proper time by
well-trained units on known terrain against a confused enemy. The Germans did not neglect the

cause and effect relationships. They did not lull themselves into a sense of satisfaction by simply
coining a catchword or catchphrase. Their tactics were viable principles to adapt to the
battlefield, not impressive labels to hide ignorance. It is perhaps instructive to note that the

German offensive tactics of 1918 did not receive a catchy name until the Allies tried to give
them one (which was inaccurate, anyway).

The habit of considering the cause and effect relationships when developing tactical

concepts made the Germans cautious and prudent about change. They did not advocate change

for its own sake; they recommended change when conditions demanded improvement. The
Germans knew how thoroughly change had to be imposed before it would have the desired

effect. Therefore one can understand why Lieutenant Colonel Lucas of the French Army, in his

56

postwar study of tactical change, lamented that the French possessed many valuable prewar
regulations, but ignored them in the war. During the war, French tactical change was too often

exclusively a function of a single dominant personality, as shown, for example, in the variation
of French defense organization in the spring of 1918, depending upon the individual field army
commander’s adherence to the ideas of Foch or Petain. In the British Army, there were several

examples of innovative commanders. Unfortunately, an unimaginative and often unreflective
High Command did not seek better tactical solutions with sufficient determination and flexibility

of mind; tactical change for the entire BEF lacked the breadth, thoroughness, and speed which
OHL achieved under von Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The Somme has provided a clear
example: the British are still remembered as the great sufferers at the Somme, but it was the

Germans who were the better learners from the experience.

The Germans treated change with caution and respect. Once they decided that a tactical
change was necessary, they pursued it with the knowledge that several factors had to be changed
in order for the doctrinal change to have the desired effect. For example, this understanding of

the breadth of change accounts for their great respect for training: no tactical concept was
considered workable unless the army could apply the concept. The Germans always remained

very conscious of their army’s ability to perform. An army that adopts tactical doctrine that it
cannot apply will greatly multiply its misfortune. The Germans recognized the considerable
training effort that their tactical changes required. Only by a great devotion to training were they

able to develop high standards of execution which made their doctrine successful and which
earned a great reputation for their army.

In developing doctrine, the Germans always considered another critical factor, the enemy.

Unlike Nivelle, who unfortunately acted as if the success of his plans were utterly independent of

the existence of his enemy, the Germans respected their enemies. The German consideration of
the influential factors made the application of their doctrine an art, not a science.

The tactical principles were guides for the exercise of good judgment in unique

situations, not formulas to eliminate the need for good judgment. While the various drills in the

use of specific weapons and basic procedures were ingrained in the Imperial German Army
through thorough training and repetition, the application of these techniques in the unique

conditions of a battle was not done in a rigid fashion. The tactician was an artist who applied
force according to the particular conditions of the terrain, the enemy, his own force, and his
mission, using his own best judgment. Specific combat techniques or habits must be learned

through rigid training so they can be repeated in a consistent manner irrespective of conditions.
But tactics is the application of a variety of habits or techniques in combination in the unique

conditions of a specific battle. The difference between techniques and tactics is significant: to
instill techniques requires inflexibility and repetition; to develop a sense of tactics requires
flexibility, good judgment, and creativity.

57

The German consideration of all influential factors created tactical concepts that
encompassed the total battle. The positioning of forces for either offense or defense was based

upon depth. The tactical principles themselves, both offensive and defensive, emphasized the
physical depth of the battlefield and the engagement of the total enemy force. In their new
tactical doctrine, the Germans avoided excessive emphasis on the struggle at the forward edge,

where forces initially collided. The defensive principles discarded the rigid “belief” that the
defended space must remain inviolate. The enemy attack penetrated the defended space, but the

depth of the battlefield weakened the attacking force, preserved the defender, and enhanced the
defender’s success of retaliation through counterattack. In their offensive principles, the Germans
did not aspire to achieve total destruction at the thin area of initial contact; they used firepower

and maneuver in a complementary fashion to strike suddenly at the entire enemy organization.
The offensive and defensive principles did not regard the enemy as an impediment or irritant to

the methodical seizure or holding of terrain. The enemy force was the fundamental objective.

The process of developing principles to obtain this objective was a collective or corporate

effort. Individual talents and personalities were essential, but the doctrine emerged in an
atmosphere where ideas were discovered and shared, not invented and arbitrarily imposed. OHL

solicited ideas and experiences from subordinate units, and this genuine interest gave the final
product the wide ownership that eased the acceptance and application of the doctrine. There was
also a remarkable tolerance of dissent within the process, but this tolerance did not weaken the

determination to succeed. Certainly the German military leaders did not lack substantial egos,
but their process of developing tactical doctrine transcended individual egos. The German Army

respected and used talent, including that of the enemy. High rank was not a prerequisite for
talent. All large armies possess men of talent like Capt. Hermann Geyer; few armies use such
talent so efficiently.*

OHL directed the talent of Geyer and others to derive principles from combat

experiences. These principles were sufficiently general to apply to a variety of tactical
conditions, but sufficiently precise and specific to insure common understanding and unity of
effort. Their flexibility was their strength, for these carefully and accurately developed principles

could be modified without being discarded.2 Evidence from the battlefield was more respected
than the doctrine, both in development and execution. Therefore, the process of deriving the

doctrine was inductive, and the application was in the same inductive spirit. Too often on the
Allied side, tactics originally derived from experiences (either accurately or erroneously) became
deductive formulas indiscriminately

*Geyer’s remaining life and career had a bitter twist. Geyer was a General der lnfanterie (equivalent of

U.S. lieutenant general) in World War II, but he influenced the First World War much more as a captain. In World

War II, Geyer commanded the IX Corps and received the Knight’s Cross in June 1940. However, after Geyer’s

participation in the invasion of Russia in 1941, Hitler deprived him o f his command, along with other highly

respected officers, for little apparent reason. For the rest of the war his status was “awaiting orders.” He committed

suicide in 1946.1

58

deemed appropriate for any situation, despite contradictory evidence or changed conditions.
Nivelle’s offensive was a tragic example. Tactical methods used successfully in a specific

context, such as the Verdun counterattacks in late 1916, became universal formulas for success
in the spring of 1917. The result was disaster physically and emotionally, for the formulas had
been applied with such certainty. The Germans never attributed such certainty to their doctrine.

This degree of uncertainty fostered a healthy curiosity and mental flexibility. No evidence was
rejected or ignored simply because it did not “fit” the preconceived scheme. Therefore the

Germans were often more receptive to new evidence or ideas than their Allied counterparts.

In his memoirs, Crown Prince Rupprecht expresses this warning: “There is no panacea. A

formula is harmful. Everything must be applied according to the situation.”3

For the Germans all tactical solutions were tentative: the Germans developed tactical
doctrine inductively and applied and refined it in the same spirit. This process still demands
much talent and ability, and it still requires a deliberate search for evidence. Glib solutions do not

replace hard work.

Notes

Introduction

1Wilhelm Balck, Development of Tactics ─ World War, trans. by Harry Bell (Ft. Leavenworth,
1922), p.14. Wilhelb Balck’s son, General Hermann Balck of the Second Workd War, writes of his
memoirs, Ordnung im Chaos (Osnabrück, 1980), p.5.

2Hermann von Kuhl, Der Weltk rieg, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1930), 2:9.

Chapte r 2

lMartin Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle (London, 1978), p. 20.
2Von Below’s order, as recorded in Osterreich-Ungarne Letzter Krieg, vol. 6, p. 501, quoted in

Ronald Seth, Caporetto: The Scapegoat Battle (London, 1965), p. 146. Erwin Rommel fought as a
captain at Caporetto in a Wurtemberg mountain infantry unit, and won the Pour le merite for his”: actions
there. Rommel has described his First World War experiences in a book; Infanterie Greift An, published
in 1937. While the book is an excellent description of company tactics and small unit leadership, I do not
feel that it represented the epitome of assault tactics in the First World War (I feel the storm units do), nor
do I believe that Rommel’s book foreshadowed the concept of blitzkrieg, as some have suggested.

3S.L.A. Marshall, The History of World War I, (New York, 1964), p. 215.
4Crown Prince Wilhelm, pp. 169, 172; Balck, pp. 4, 79; Lucas, p. 72.
5Crown Prince Wilhelm, p. 292.
6Wynne, p. 57. Wynne’s claim is particularly damaging to the British, for the U.S. Infantry

Association translated Laffargue in 1916. Another influential captain, B. H. Liddell Hart, wrote in his
memoirs (1:26) that in 1916 he had written a pamphlet on his experiences as a company commander,
which the War Office had refused to publish for security reasons.

7Renn, p. 110.
8Andre Laffargue, The Attack in Trench Warfare, translated for the Infantry Journal (Washington,

1916), p. 6.
9Laffargue, p. 37.
10Richard M. Watt, Dare Call It Treason (New York, 1963), p. 91.
11 Ludendorff, 1:401, on introduction of light machine gun.
12Wynne, p. 58. I have not yet seen evidence which would connect Laffargue’s ideas with the

techniques of Nivelle, but the similarities make such a connection possible.
13For example, Sixth German Army, Use of Artillery in Combat Against Tanks, 25 March 1917,

trans. the American Expeditionary Forces from an earlier French translation (U.S. Army War College,
1918).

14British Official History, 1917, vol. 3, p. 177.
15C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War 1914-1918, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1936), p. 476.
16Ludendorff, 2:112.
17Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, Mein Kriegstagebuch, vol. 3, p. 193.
18British Official History, 1917, vol. 3, p. 221, see footnote.
19Donald J. Goodspeed, Ludendorff: Genius of World War I, (Boston, 1966), p. 244.
20German General Staff, Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg, 1 January 1918, trans. B.E.F. Intelli- gence

as The Attack in Position Warfare (G.H.Q., 1918), p. 12 (26 January 1918 Amendment). Hereafter cited
as Attack.

21Attack , p. 10 (26 January 1918 Amendment).
22Attack , p. 4.
23Laszlo M. Alfoldi, “The Hutier Legend,” Parameters 5, no. 2 (1976): 69―74.
24Balck, p. 266.

25Attack , p. 7.
26Balck, pp. 62, 81, 91; Lucas, pp. 43, 102.
27Attack , p. 5.
28Attack , p. 16.
29Ludendorff, 2:206.
30Gruss, pp. 65, 90, 121.
31Gruss, p. 73.
32Gruss, p. 101; Middlebrook, pp. 54-55
33Ludendorff, 2:205.

34Georg Bruchmuller, The German Artillery in the Breakthrough Battles of the World War, 2d
ed. (Berlin, 1922), trans. J. H. Wallace and H. D. Kehrn (U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Ft. Sill, n.d.),
p. 41.

35Bruchmuller, p. 65. His successful use of his techniques on a large scale in 1916 was at Tarnopol,
July 1916. See Wynne, p. 294.

36Bruchmuller, p. 72.
37Bruchmuller, p. 70.
38Balck, p. 244.
39Bruchmuller, p. 74.
40Bruchmuller, p. 43.
41Ludendorff, 2:238.
42Georg Wetzell’s memorandum as quoted in The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918 by R. H.

Lutz, trans. W. L. Campbell (Stanford. 1934), p. 16. According to Professor H. Deutsch of the U.S. Army
War College, who interviewed Wetzell in the interwar years, Wetzell favored defeating Italy first, but
Ludendorff favored attacking on the western front.

43Ludendorff, 2:200.
44Balck, p. 13; Crown Prince Wilhelm, p. 295; Ludendorff, 2:209.
45Crown Prince Wilhelm, p. 295; Gruss, p. 121.
46Junger, p. 240.
47Ibid.
48Von Kuhl, Genesis, Execution, and Collapse of the German Offensive in 1918, trans. U.S. Army

War College (Washington, 1933), pt. 2, p. 28. Hereafter cited as Genesis.
49Ludendorff, 2:206.
50Bruchmuller, p. 48.
51 Herbert Sulzbach, With the German Guns, trans. Richard Thonger (London, 1973), p. 141.
52Sulzbach, p. 179.
53Von Kuhl, Genesis, pt. 1, p. 70.
54Ibid., p. 72.
55Ludendorff, 2:203.
56Von Kuhl, Genesis, pt. 1, pp. 72-75; Balck, p. 277; Wynne, p. 321.
57Ludendorff, 2:68, 73; see also Erich Ludendorff, The General Staff and Its Problems, vol. 2, trans.

F. A. Holt (New York, 1934). This contains a copy of the document, “Outline of a Scheme of Patriotic
Education for the Troops,” issued by OHL, 29 July 1917.

58Extract from OHL principles of leadership as recorded in Lutz, ed., The Causes of the
German.Collapse in 1918, p. 16.

59Von Kuhl, The German General Staff, p. 345; Ludendorff, 2:345.
60Balck, p. 17; Ludendorff, 2:248. The British had kept a leader reserve for their attacks since 1915.

See Spears, p. 584.
61Von Kuhl, Genesis, pt. 2, p. 33.
62Martin Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle (London, 1978), p. 147.
63Middlebrook, p. 148.

64Middlebrook, p. 153.
65British Official History, 1918, vol. 1, p. 166. Despite’ the tactical success, the 1918 German

offensive had many strategic flaws. Ludendorff used two army groups (Rupprecht’s and Wilhelm’s),
instead of placing the attacking forces in one command. He also shifted the German efforts to five
different sectors from March to July, rather than pressing home in one sector.

66British Official History, 1918, vol. I, pp. 159, 162; Middlebrook, pp. 155,156.
67British Official History, 1918, vol. I, p. 39; Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers (New York, 1964),

pp. 297,298.
68Middlebrook, pp. 309, 322. Caution: These totals are not as “even” as they seem. Several wounded

Germans eventually returned to fight in 1918; the British prisoners did not.
69Horne, p. 64, footnote.
70Von Kuhl as quoted in Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918 , p. 71. As the failure of

the German offensive became apparent in July 1918, Ludendorff lost his confidence and his nerve and
began to turn on his staff. Von Lossberg (p. 344) described a painful scene in which Ludendorff bitterly
criticized Wetzell for having failed to judge correctly the fighting capacity of some German units that had
recently performed poorly. Ironically, Ludendorff was losing control over his ego.

71Wetzell as quoted in Lutz, p. 19. The looting, which also had occurred during the Cambrai
counterattack, was an indication that, despite the efforts of OHL, discipline in the German Army was
becoming fragile.

72Barrie Pitt, 1918: The Last Act (New York, 1963), p. 147.
73The Australian forces under General Sit John Monash were particularly effective tactically in 1918.

Chapte r 3

1Heinz Guderian mentions General Geyer in Panzer Leader, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (London,

1952), pp. 184, 185, 272. I am indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Boege, Bundeswehr Exchange Officer to
the United States Military Academy, for obtaining information on General Geyer from the register of
recipients of the Knight’s Cross.

2British Official History, 1917, vol. 1, is an example of an Allied view of the war which was
reluctant to recognize the flexibility of the Germans in tactics.

3Rupprecht, vol. 2, p. 270.